The Bear Went Over the Mountain By John T. Correll Soviet forces in Afghanistan found them- selves bogged down in a fight they could not win. hen the Soviet armed 13th century. The Soviets would be forces entered Afghani- no exception. stan on Christmas Eve in They hoped in vain that their with- W1979, they did not intend drawal in 1989 would not be perceived to stay long. They had come to help as a defeat. To their dismay, Afghani- the floundering communist govern- stan would be known as “the Soviet ment in Kabul suppress an uprising Vietnam.” by tribal factions. They expected to restore order on the southern flank of Marxists Meet the Mujahedeen the Soviet Union and be gone in a few Beginning in the 19th century, czar- months at most. ist Russia and then the Soviet Union They had no intention of engaging contended with Britain for influence directly in general combat with the in Afghanistan, which lay strategically insurgents—the Soviets were there as between southern Russia and British backup for the armed forces of their India. When the British pulled out of client regime. They had no idea they India in 1947, they left the Soviets with would remain for nine years, suffer a free hand. Afghanistan fell solidly huge combat casualties, leave a record into the Soviet camp as the result of of failure and oppression, and depart a Marxist overthrow of the Afghan under fire from vengeful Afghans. government in 1978. A pro-Soviet junta Strictly speaking, it was not an inva- proclaimed the Democratic Republic sion. It was an intervention, requested of Afghanistan (DRA) and installed and welcomed by the Afghan leader, Mohammed Noor Taraki as President. who did not understand that he would The new regime introduced a Marxist traditional values prevailed and the not long survive the experience. By program of modernization and secular- recognized authorities were the tribal early 1980, the Soviet forces had taken ization. Among the changes were radi- chief and the village mullah, not the over the conflict from the local opera- cal redistribution of land, anti-religious distant national government. tors and made it their own. propaganda, education for women, Within a year, there was armed No outside power had conquered banning the burqa, and a new red flag resistance in 25 of the 28 provinces. the Afghans since Genghis Khan and in the Soviet style. The outrage was The rebels were called mujahedeen, the Mongols turned the trick in the strongest in rural Afghanistan, where “soldiers of God,” the name adapted 54 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2011 The Bear Went Over the Mountain Photo from the ZhirnovA. collection Here: Soviet troops navigate a ridge- line in Afghanistan. Below: Soviet tanks near Kandahar, where the USSR had taken over a military base. Right: A Soviet Hip helicopter passes one of two giant Buddha statues carved into the side of a cliff in the Bamiyan Val- ley. In 2001, Mullah Omar would order the deliberate destruction of the stat- ues, which dated to the 6th century. Photo viaTumblr.com ITAR-TASS photoITAR-TASS byKavashkin B. Zufarov andV. single-shot Martini-Henry rifles cap- a hostile Islamic state on its southern tured from the British in the 1880s. border. The Soviets did not trust Amin Their stronghold was the rugged Hindu and suspected him of seeking closer Kush, an extension of the Himalayas ties to the West. Their worst fear was that dominated the geography of eastern that he might strike a deal to allow US Afghanistan and from which they could bases in Afghanistan. mount raids and ambushes. The Soviets had used military force The armed forces of the DRA were before to whip wavering satellite states equipped with Soviet tanks, gunships, back into alignment. It worked well in and export models of older Soviet Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia airplanes, but even with increased in 1968. The “Brezhnev Doctrine”— aid, they could not stamp out the in- promulgated by Leonid Brezhnev, surgency. President Taraki asked the general secretary of the Communist from the jihad or holy war they declared Soviet Union to send military forces, Party of the Soviet Union—held that against the Kabul government in March but before Moscow could act, Taraki the USSR had the right to intervene in 1979. When the Soviets arrived, the was ousted and killed in a coup staged other communist states to ensure the jihad was extended to cover them, too. by his deputy, Prime Minister Hafizul- interests of world socialism. The mujahedeen clustered into some lah Amin. Amin renewed the request 30 local bands with no central organiza- for military support. The Soviets Go In tion. They were armed with whatever Foremost of the Soviet Union’s con- The decision in December 1979 to weapons they could get. Some carried cerns was the potential emergence of invade Afghanistan was not made by AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2011 55 What arguably had begun as an intervention took on the full trappings of an invasion. The United Nations, ITAR-TASS photoITAR-TASS by vote of 104 to18, called for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Failed Strategies Fighting the mujahedeen was dif- ficult. The Soviets could not strike at their vital centers because there weren’t any. The rebels hid in caves in the mountains, retreated to their villages when not actively engaged, and came out only when conditions were in their favor. They rarely massed their forces, so direct attacks were of limited value. Their needs were mod- est, which reduced their vulnerability to interdiction of their supply routes. Two main leaders emerged, Ahmad A jihadist aims at an aerial target with a shoulder-fired Stinger missile. Shah Massoud, the “Lion of Panjshir” in the eastern mountains, and a radi- the entire Politburo but rather by a at fighting and desertions rose. Before cal Islamist, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, small circle consisting of Brezhnev, the losses had run their course, one in the south. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, entire regiment, complete with arms Young Muslims from abroad flocked Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, and and equipment, went over to the enemy. to join the cause. In 1982, Osama bin KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov. They Contrary to pre-intervention plans, Laden, the son of a Saudi billionaire, overrode the objections of Marshal Soviet troops became the DRA’s main set up a support infrastructure for the Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the General fighting force, and the Soviets adopted insurgents across the border in Paki- Staff, and senior military officials who an open-ended commitment. Their stan. His group became known as al warned that there was no military solu- first big engagement in March was an Qaeda, “the base.” tion in Afghanistan. attempt to flush insurgents out of the Following their standard doctrine, Brezhnev, 73 and ailing mentally and mountains in the east and block supply the Soviets first tried a ground strat- physically, was motivated in part by his routes from Pakistan. In September, egy. But neither large-scale sweeps dislike of Amin. The intervention plan the Soviets launched the first of nine nor small-unit actions were effective. was vague. Soviet forces were to prop numbered operations, none of them suc- “Clear and hold” operations produced up the Afghan regime and protect Soviet cessful, to gain control of the strategic only temporary results. Even when interests, but there were few details on Panjshir Valley. remote areas of the countryside were what they were supposed to do. The job was given to the 40th Army, hastily redesignated the “Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan.” On Christmas Eve, elite Soviet forces flew into Kabul, and Bagram military airport, 35 miles to the north. The next day, motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan from Soviet Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Amin was jubilant, From the personal collection of KuvakinE. which was a mistake. On Dec. 27, Soviet commandos dressed as Afghans attacked Amin’s palace, killed him, and replaced him with Babrak Karmal, one of his rivals who was presumably more compliant. Within a week, 50,000 Soviet troops were in Afghanistan and secured the major cities, airfields, and roads. By the end of the month, their numbers grew to 80,000. Soviet air forces deployed to bases at Bagram, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Shindand, and Herat. The Afghan Army, resentful of the Soviet invasion and of taking orders Soviet helicopter pilots and an Afghan in 1987 at Baraki Barak airfield in Afghani- from heavy-handed outsiders, balked stan. Two Hip helicopters are in the background. 56 AIR FORCE Magazine / November 2011 cleared, there were never enough troops to hold them. In 1983, the Soviets switched to an air strategy focused on shutting down supply routes and eliminating their local sources of support. The critical failing was that the Soviets would not ITAR-TASS photoITAR-TASS Yevstafyev by M. take the political risk of bombing the training and supply camps in Pakistan, giving the mujahedeen the advantage of a sanctuary. It was not possible to constantly patrol and interdict the 1,400-mile border and all of the individual trails. The insurgents moved mostly at night. By day, they were often able to avoid helicopters by the simple expedient of covering themselves with earth-colored cloaks. Sometimes the Soviets caught insur- gents or their replenishment caravans in the open, but the main effort was to establish a cordon in which the rebels could not live or move. Accordingly, Soviet airpower and artillery bombarded the area around the border to clear and depopulate it. Entire villages disap- peared and refugees fled to the cities and neighboring countries. In the valleys of the Hindu Kush and other parts of the country, the Soviet air force conducted standard opera- tions, both in support of ground forces and in independent attacks.