Afghanistan Ethnicity in Afghanistan Group selection The following groups are politically relevant in Afghanistan at some point in time since 1946: Hazara, Nuristani, Pashtun, Qizal- bash, Tajiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks. Except for the main ethnic groups of the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek, others have not been represented and considered as independent and distinct eth- nic groups involved in decision making. Although the Turkmen have been selected as a distinct ethnic group, they have often been counted as members of the Uzbek community. All ethnic groups are sub-divisions of the main four ethnic groups. For instance, the Hazara-Berberi, Hazara-Deh-i-Zainat and Taimanis are considered Hazara. Aimaqs, a collection of Persian-speaking semi-nomadic tribes, are considered Tajik in government census. Other ethnic minority groups in Afghanistan include the Aimaq, Baloch, Brahui, Pamir Tajiks and Pashai, but they are irrelevant at the national political level and thus, are not coded in EPR. Power relations 1946-1978 The Pashtuns dominated politics and the economy of the country during this period. Other ethnic minorities were mostly excluded from political decision making by successive governments. Zaher Shah (1933-73) introduced certain political reforms. He promulgated a liberal constitution (1964), providing for a two-chamber legislature to which the king appointed one-third of the deputies. The people elected another third, and the remainder was selected indirectly by provincial assemblies. Although Zahir Shah’s “experiment in democ- racy” produced few lasting reforms, it permitted the growth of unof- ficial political parties on both the left and right. These included the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) with close ideological ties to the Soviet Union. In 1967, the PDPA split into two major rival factions: the Khalq (Masses) faction headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and supported by elements within the military, and the Parcham (Banner) faction led by Babrak Karmal. However, both political factions were dominated by the Pashtun and the democratic facade of Zahir Shah’s reforms covered relentless legitimization of Pashtunizing the Afghan polity and society. The leaders of other ethnic groups were largely elimi- epr atlas 13 nated from politics often through imprisonment, execution or exile. Moreover, the Hazara particularly had to pay heavier taxes to the government, while the Pashtun nomads could annex their lands and received privileged treatment. Pashtuns began to finance the publication of fictitious histori- cal literature and documents to substantiate the superiority and historicity of the Pashtu language and culture. For instance, the publication of Puta Khazana (The Hidden Treasure) in 1960 by a pro-establishment scholar, Abdul Hay Habibi, is a reflection of this policy. Habibi claims that in 1763 King Hussain Shah Hotaki or- dered Muhammad Horak to compile a profile of Pashtun heroes and examples of their literary works. Puta Khazana chronicles the life story of Pashtun heroes and their literary works dated a hundred years after the death of Prophet Muhammad. During the reign of Daud Khan (1973-78), the Pashtunistan ques- tion regarding the political status of those Pashtun living on the British (Pakistani) side of the Durand Line developed after the inde- pendence of Pakistan in 1947 became the dominant issue. For relevant literature for the time between 1946-1978, see Dupree (1) and Schetter (2). 1 [Dupree, 2002] Overall, the Pashtun can be regarded as dominant holder of po- 2 [Schetter, 2003] litical power, while the other groups were politically excluded. How- ever, while the Hazara were clearly discriminated, the Tajiks were reportedly “closely linked to the regime overthrown with Soviet sup- port in 1978” (3) and generally influential in Afghan politics (ibid.). 3 [Minority Rights Group International, 2020] Given the dominance of the Pashtun, they are coded Powerless dur- ing this period. The Uzbeks and the Turkmen, on the other hand, were reportedly not dependent on the central government because of their relative prosperity and thus, “have not made a concerted ef- fort to garner political influence in the past” (ibid.). Therefore, they remain irrelevant in this period. 1979-1992 During this period the PDPA came to power. The Pashtun main- tained senior partner status over domestic politics in Afghanistan, the Tajik were considered a junior partner to the Pashtun as they were active in the political process and government institutions. Karmal, who became president in 1980, was a Tajik, as were many of his cabinet members. Only one cabinet minister was Hazara. To establish political stability and support for his government, Karmal enlisted the support of ethnic minorities, women and youth. These initiatives began to tip the ethnic balance of power. Karmal changed the make up of the government by bringing in more ethnic minorities into the armed forces and bureaucracy at the cabinet level. During this period the Kabul government increasingly turned to and de- pended on non-Pashtun minorities - as did the foreign supporters of the Mujahidin. For example, increasing numbers of Hazara and Uzbeks were included in the army. The government even established epr atlas 14 ethnic-based institution and military divisions, such as the Shurai Mili Hazara (Hazara national council) and Division 53, a strong Uzbek army unit led by General Dostom who later grew into a pow- erful Uzbek leader. Division 80, dominated by the Hazara was led by Siad Mansour Nadri who secured the main road to Kabul from the North. These leaders became central players in the war (Jihad) against the Soviets and some of them continued to occupy key posi- tions in the Karzai government (2001-2014). During this period the distribution of elite positions in the gov- ernment changed in favour of non-Pashtun ethnic minorities and new players emerged in Afghan politics, heralding significant shifts in the ethnic balance of power. Even small minorities like the Char Aimaq played a role in the Jihad against the Soviets. Soviet and popular displeasure with the Karmal regime led to its demise in May 1986. Karmal was replaced by Muhammad Najibullah, a Pashtun who had established a reputation for brutal efficiency during his tenure as the former chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD). As President, Najibullah was largely ineffective and highly dependent on Soviet support. Undercut by deep-seated divisions within the PDPA, his efforts to broaden the support base of the government proved futile. For relevant literature for the time between 1979-1992, see works by Roy (4; 5). 4 [Roy, 1995] 5 [Roy, 1990] 1993-1996 The Pashtun domination of the Afghan polity eventually came to an end in April 1992 when a coalition of Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek overthrew Najibullah’s regime. From 1992 to 1996 the Tajik Burhan- nudin Rabbani led the central government. However, ethnic and power rivalries fragmented the ruling alliance, marking Afghanistan’s descent into warlordism and ethnic conflict. Therefore, this period is coded as State Collapse in EPR. In terms of military and political power, Afghanistan was divided into separate local power bases, while the various ethno-political fac- tions led by Ahmad Shah Massud, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Rashid Dostom and Abdul Ali Mazari all contributed to the destruction of Kabul. The Uzbek Dostom controlled most of the Northern part of the country, such as the crucial cities of Mazar, Faryab, Jozjan, Samangan, and partially Baghlan and Kunduz. The forces loyal to the Tajik Ahmad Shah Massud, controlled Parwan, Takhar, Kapisa, Badakhshan and parts of Kunduz. The Hazara-affiliated Hezb-e Wahdat controlled the central provinces of Bamiyan, Uruzgan, parts of Ghor, most of Ghazni and Wardak. It also had substantial mil- itary presence in the North. In the West, the Tajik commander, Ismail Khan controlled Herat, Farah and parts of Ghor while Pash- tun parties, mainly the Hizb-e Islami of Gulbudin Heykmatyar, controlled Southern provinces and some of the surrounding areas. After the government of Najibullah collapsed in 1992, there was not one dominant power in Afghanistan. General Dostom, who epr atlas 15 controlled most of the Northern provinces, was independent of the Kabul government and for all practical purposes the North enjoyed de facto autonomy. In the west, Ismail Khan was an ally of Rab- bani’s, but was not subordinate to Kabul either. The Hazarajat had de facto autonomy since mid 1980s. Nor did Kabul have authority over the Pashtun populated provinces in the South and East. An authoritative account of the time of the civil war is Rubin (6). 6 [Rubin, 2002] 1997-2001 The predominantly Pashtun militants of the Taliban seized Kabul in September 1996; installing a radical Islamist regime recognized in 1997 only by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Fazel Aimaq lost his position as the Mayor of Kabul and the non-Pashtun opposition coalition retaining strongholds in Northeastern Afghanistan estab- lished the United Front, later known as the Northern Alliance, under the command of the Tajik Ahmad Shah Massud. Resistance to the Taliban came particularly from non-Pashtun ethnic groups in the north, west, and central parts of the country, who saw the power of the Taliban as a continuation of the traditional Pashtun hegemony of the country. The leader of Hezb-e Wahdat, Abdul Ali Mazari was brutally executed. When Taliban captured the city of Mazar-e Sharif for the second time they carried out a systematic summary execu- tion of mostly Hazara and some Uzbeks. These ethnic atrocities are widely reported by human right organizations worldwide. The Tajik resistance was restricted to the Panjshir Valley and some pockets of the Hazarajat highlands. Former President Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmed Shah Masud, both Tajiks, maintained control of some largely ethnic Tajik territory in the country’s northeast (7), 7 [US Department of State, 1999] warranting the Tajik’s regional autonomy status.