DOCSLIB.ORG

Afgańskie Siły Zbrojne W Koncepcji Reform Sektora Bezpieczeństwa Po

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Afgańskie Siły Zbrojne W Koncepcji Reform Sektora Bezpieczeństwa Po UNIWERSYTET JAGIELLOŃSKI WYDZIAŁ STUDIÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH I POLITYCZNYCH INSTYTUT NAUK POLITYCZNYCH I STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH BEATA GÓRKA-WINTER DYSERTACJA DOKTORSKA AFGAŃSKIE SIŁY ZBROJNE W KONCEPCJI REFORM SEKTORA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA PO 2001 ROKU PROMOTOR: PROF. DR HAB. HUBERT KRÓLIKOWSKI KRAKÓW 2015 Składam serdeczne podziękowania Panu prof. dr hab. Hubertowi Królikowskiemu za okazaną pomoc i cenne uwagi przekazane mi w trakcie realizacji pracy. Mojemu Mężowi i Synom dziękuję za cierpliwość i nieustanne wsparcie. Spis Treści Wstęp ………………………………………………………………………………... 1 Rozdział I: Reforma sektora bezpieczeństwa – aspekty teoretyczne …………… 21 1. Problemy definicyjne ………………………………………………………….... 21 2. Podmioty reform sektora bezpieczeństwa ………………………………………. 25 3. Problem “dobrego rządzenia” w koncepcji reform sektora bezpieczeństwa …… 28 4. Cele i kierunki reformy sektora bezpieczeństwa ……………………………….. 35 4.1 Cele SSR w grupie państw rozwijających się ………………………………. 37 4.2 Cele SSR w grupie państw przechodzących transformację ustrojową ……... 40 4.3 Cele SSR w grupie państw postkonfliktowych ……………………………... 42 4.4 Cele SSR w grupie rozwiniętych demokracji zachodnich ………………….. 44 5. Czynniki warunkujące efektywność reform sektora bezpieczeństwa …………... 46 6. Podsumowanie ………………………………………………………………….. 49 Rozdział II: Reforma sektora bezpieczeństwa w grupie państw postkonfliktowych ……………………………………………………. 53 1. Cele i zadania reform sektora bezpieczeństwa w kontekście postkonfliktowym . 56 2. Podmioty reform sektora bezpieczeństwa w kontekście postkonfliktowym …… 60 2.1 Siły zbrojne jako podmiot SSR w kontekście postkonfliktowym …………... 61 2.2 Aktorzy pozapaństwowi …………………………………………………….. 62 2.3 Aktorzy zewnętrzni wobec SSR ……………………………………………. 67 3. Czynniki warunkujące efektywność SSR w środowisku postkonfliktowym …… 69 3.1 Postawa społeczności międzynarodowej …………………………………… 69 3.2 Postawa lokalnych elit politycznych i „local ownership” ………………….. 72 3.3 Określenie programu reform ……………………………………………….. 75 4. Wnioski …………………………………………………………………………. 77 Rozdział III: Armia afgańska w XIX i XX wieku – koncepcje funkcjonowania, struktura, główne problemy ……………………………………….. 79 1. Trudne początki - próby tworzenia afgańskich sił zbrojnych na przełomie XIX i XX wieku ……………………………………………………………………….. 81 2. Armia afgańska po zakończeniu drugiej wojny światowej ……………………... 83 3. Dezintegracja afgańskich sił zbrojnych w latach 1978 -1979 …………………... 86 4. Armia afgańska wobec rebelii mudżahedinów po inwazji Związku Radzieckiego (1979-1989) ……………………………………………………... 90 5. Kondycja armii afgańskiej po zakończeniu interwencji radzieckiej (1989-1996). 93 6. Próby odbudowy afgańskich sił zbrojnych w Islamskim Emiracie Afganistanu (1997-2001) ……………………………………………………………………... 97 7. Grupy zbrojne w Afganistanie u progu XXI wieku …………………………….. 99 8. Podsumowanie i wnioski ……………………………………………………….. 102 Rozdział IV: Uwarunkowania reform sektora bezpieczeństwa w Afganistanie .. 109 1. Uwarunkowania geograficzno-klimatyczne ……………………………………… 110 2. Potencjał ludnościowy i demograficzny ………………………………………….. 112 2.1 Zróżnicowanie etniczno-religijne ………………..…………………………... 114 2.2 Problem uchodźców afgańskich ………………………………..………….... 117 3. Uwarunkowania ekonomiczne …………………………………………………… 119 3.1 Problem upraw opium i szarej strefy …………………………………………. 124 3.2 Potencjał surowcowy …………………………………………………………. 129 4. Podsumowanie ……………………………………………………………………. 131 Rozdział V: Koncepcje budowy armii afgańskiej po 2001 roku ………………… 136 1. Afgańskie siły zbrojne w świetle porozumienia z Bonn (5 grudnia 2001 r.) …….. 138 2. Redefinicja koncepcji afgańskich sił zbrojnych w latach 2002-2004 ……………. 143 3. Modyfikacje koncepcji rozwoju Afgańskiej Armii Narodowej w latach 2005 – 2008 ………………………………………………………………………………. 151 4. Zmiany w koncepcji funkcjonowania afgańskich sił zbrojnych po roku 2009 ….. 154 5. Alternatywne koncepcje tworzenia afgańskich sił zbrojnych ……………………. 156 6. Podsumowanie ……………………………………………………………………. 158 Rozdział VI: Realizacja koncepcji budowy afgańskich sił zbrojnych po roku 2001 ………………………………………………………………….. 162 1. Nieudany eksperyment - próby stworzenia afgańskich sił zbrojnych na podstawie Porozumienia z Bonn z grudnia 2001 roku …...………………………………….. 163 2. Afgańska Armii Narodowa w świetle Dekretu z Petersberga z grudnia 2002 roku (Afghan National Army – ANA) …...…………………………………………….. 166 3. Umocowanie instytucjonalne i struktura Afgańskiej Armii Narodowej …...……. 168 3.1 Siły specjalne w Afgańskiej Armii Narodowej …...…………………………. 171 3.1.1 Afgańska Brygada Komandosów …...……..………………………… 171 3.1.2 Afgańskie Siły Specjalne ….........…………………………………… 173 3.2 Afgańskie siły powietrzne …...………………………………………………. 175 3.3 Zaangażowanie operacyjne Afgańskiej Armii Narodowej …...……………... 177 3.4 Szkolnictwo wojskowe …...…………………………………………………. 180 3.4.1 Afgańska Akademia Obrony Narodowej (National Military Academy of Afghanistan) ………………………..……………………………... 181 3.4.2 Afgański Uniwersytet Wojskowy (Afghan Defence University) ……. 181 4. Rola NATO w formowaniu Afgańskiej Armii Narodowej ………………………. 182 5. Najważniejsze problemy w formowaniu afgańskich sił zbrojnych ………………. 186 5.1 Problem istnienia sił paralelnych do afgańskiej Armii Narodowej …………. 186 5.1.1 Afgańskie Siły Bezpieczeństwa ……………………………………... 187 5.1.2 Fiasko procesu Demobilizacji, Rozbrojenia i Reintegracji …………. 188 5.1.3 Ograniczone efekty Programu Demobilizacji Nielegalnych Grup Zbrojnych ……………………………………………………………. 193 5.1.4 Ograniczone rezultaty Programu Pokoju i Reintegracji .…………….. 195 5.1.5 Milicje w prowincjach …….…………………………………………. 197 5.2 Problem finansowania Afgańskiej Armii Narodowej ……………………….. 200 5.3 Problem rekrutacji i dezercji ………………………………………………… 204 5.4 Problem równowagi etnicznej ……………………………………………….. 207 6. Podsumowanie ……………………………………………………………………. 210 Rozdział VII: Efektywność wysiłków podjętych na rzecz budowy Afgańskiej Armii Narodowej w latach 2001-2012 …………………………… 215 1. Problem sprzecznych celów zaangażowania Stanów Zjednoczonych w Afganistanie …………………………………………………………………. 216 1.1 Problemy wynikające z tzw. podejścia „light footprint” ……………….. 219 1.2 Problem wzmacniania pozycji komendantów wojskowych w prowincjach ……………………………………………………………… 221 2. Kwestia „local ownership” ………………………………………………….. 231 3. Kwestia wdrażania zasad „good governance” ………………………………. 236 3.1 Wdrażanie zasady przejrzystości ………………………………………... 237 3.2 Wdrażanie zasady odpowiedzialności i zasady rządów prawa ………….. 241 3.3 Wdrażanie zasady udziału oraz orientacji na konsensus ……………….... 246 3.4 Wdrażanie zasady efektywności, zdolności do reakcji oraz wydajności ... 248 4. Podsumowanie ………………………………………………………………. 254 Zakończenie ………………………………………………………………………… 260 Bibliografia …………………………………………………………………………. 276 Wstęp Upadek systemu dwubiegunowego oraz rozpowszechnienie modelu liberalnej demokracji jako swego rodzaju wzorca z Sèvres dla państw przechodzących transformację ustrojową prowokowało wielu myślicieli do formułowania tez, w myśl których zakończył się w dziejach historii etap, kiedy państwa i narody zmuszone były dochodzić swoich praw przy pomocy siły zbrojnej 1 . Zapobiegać temu miał wszechstronny system prawa międzynarodowego oraz system tzw. interlocking institutions, czyli współpracujących ze sobą organizacji i sojuszy międzynarodowych, stojących na straży światowego pokoju i bezpieczeństwa2. Ponadto, już „w 1982 roku na forum brytyjskiego parlamentu ówczesny prezydent USA, Ronald Reagan, zasugerował, że państwa, których systemy ustrojowe posiadają wbudowane mechanizmy ochrony praw i wolności jednostek, będą realizować powściągliwą politykę zagraniczną i akcentować pokojowe intencje w stosunkach z innymi państwami”3. Wbrew tym założeniom, zarówno wydarzenia z początku lat 90. ubiegłego wieku (konflikty na Bałkanach i w Afryce), jak i obecnie (postępująca destabilizacja Bliskiego Wschodu, wojna rosyjsko-gruzińska czy rosyjsko-ukraińska) pokazują, iż w XXI wieku użycie siły zbrojnej wciąż pozostaje jednym ze sposobów osiągania korzyści politycznych, uzyskania i utrzymania władzy nad terytorium danego państwa lub regionu, eliminacji politycznych oponentów, narzucania określonego ustroju czy zapewnienia dostępu do bogactw naturalnych 4 . Pomimo powszechnie obowiązujących regulacji prawa międzynarodowego, które wykluczają użycie metod siłowych w rozwiązywaniu sporów oraz czuwających nad egzekwowaniem tych zasad organizacji międzynarodowych (z Organizacją Narodów Zjednoczonych na czele5), konflikty zbrojne wciąż nie zostały wyeliminowane, a 1 Z najpopularniejszą wśród nich tezą o „końcu historii” sformułowaną przez amerykańskiego politologa Francisa Fukuyamę. Zob. F. Fukuyama, Koniec historii, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań, 1996. 2 Na temat koncepcji „interlocking institutions” (zazębiających się instytucji”) patrz artykuł Manfreda Wörnera, Sekretarza Generalnego NATO w latach 1988-1994 pt. A Vigorous Alliance, A Motor for Peaceful Change in Europe, w „NATO Review”, no. 6, vol. 40, December 1992, na http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1992/9206-1.htm . 3 Za: B. Wiśniewski, Teoria demokratycznego pokoju, [w:] R. Zięba, S. Bieleń, J. Zając (red.), Teorie i podejścia badawcze w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa 2015, s. 49. 4 O przyczynach wojen patrz m.in. J. Garrett, Przyczyny wojny i warunki pokoju, [w:] J. Baylis, J. Witrz, C.S. Gray, E. Cohen (red.), Strategia we współczesnym świecie, Wprowadzenie do studiów strategicznych, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków, 2009, s. 19-42. 5 Więcej na ten temat patrz: J. Morris, Prawo, polityka
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Arroyo Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker ARROYO CENTER The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No.
    [Show full text]
  • What Are the Four Scenarios for the New Afghan Government Under Taliban? Publish Date: 01/09/2021
    Artical Name : Four Scenarios Artical Subject : What are the Four Scenarios for the New Afghan Government Under Taliban? Publish Date: 01/09/2021 Auther Name: Future for Advanced Research and Studies Subject : After the Taliban took over the Afghan capital of Kabul on August 15, 2021, and former president Ashraf Ghani fled the country, Hamid Karzai -who led the first Afghan government after the Taliban was ousted in 2001 and served as president until 2014- announced that he was forming a three-person ³coordination council´to secure a peaceful transition of power. The other two members of the council are Abdullah Abdullah, the former vice president and head of the government¶s peace delegation, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most notorious warlord who bombed Kabul during the Afghan civil war, which lasted from 1992 to 1996. Conceptual Outline of the Taliban¶s Rule Information derived from statements made by former officials affiliated with the Taliban is being circulated now about the form of the militant group¶s new government, the outline of which can be presented as follows: <!--[if !supportLists]-->1- Establishing an Islamic Emirate:The Taliban¶s reiteration that it is planning to establish an Islamic emirate is not new and is only natural, given that the group insisted on this demand during negotiations in Qatar with the former Afghan government. Despite this, today¶s Taliban seeks to emphasize that it is different from the Taliban that ruled Afghanistan two decades ago. It says it is now more open to, and seeks international recognition. That is why it is expected to present a model of a moderate Islamic emirate.
    [Show full text]
  • Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom's Sentinel April 1, 2021
    OFS REPORT TO CONGRESS FRONT MATTER OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS APRIL 1, 2021–JUNE 30, 2021 FRONT MATTER ABOUT THIS REPORT A 2013 amendment to the Inspector General Act established the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations and requires that the Lead IG submit quarterly reports to Congress on each active operation. The Chair of the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoD Inspector General (IG) as the Lead IG for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS). The DoS IG is the Associate IG for the operation. The USAID IG participates in oversight of the operation. The Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the DoD, the DoS, and USAID are referred to in this report as the Lead IG agencies. Other partner agencies also contribute to oversight of OFS. The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to: • Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation. • Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations. • Report quarterly to Congress and the public on the operation and activities of the Lead IG agencies. METHODOLOGY To produce this quarterly report, the Lead IG agencies submit requests for information to the DoD, the DoS, USAID, and other Federal agencies about OFS and related programs. The Lead IG agencies also gather data and information from other sources, including official documents, congressional testimony, policy research organizations, press conferences, think tanks, and media reports.
    [Show full text]
  • POLITICAL UPDATE Abdul Wardak and Bismillah Khan Mohammadi
    Mara Tchalakov POLITICAL UPDATE August 16, 2012 ABDUL WARDAK AND BISMILLAH KHAN MOHAMMADI: UNPACKING AFGHANISTAN’S MINISTERIAL SHAKE-UP n an unprecedented single session of Parliament on August 4th, the Lower House dismissed the Afghan Idefense and interior ministers, Abdul Rahim Wardak and Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, following successive no-confidence votes. After weeks of alleged rocket attacks by Pakistani security forces in the border provinces, Parliament summoned the two ministers to appear before the assembly and submit to questioning over rising insecurity in the country. The heated session that resulted in their impeachment spanned the members’ concerns over rocket attacks from across the Durand Line, allegations of corruption and nepotism within the Defense and Interior Ministries, and targeted assassinations of high-profile figures across the country. The Presidential Palace was quick to announce in the wake again be able to curry favor with key allies across all major of Parliament’s decision that the two ministers would be ethnic camps and thereby encourage their dependence on asked to remain in an acting capacity until their successor(s) him. Rumors of behind-the-scenes Palace lobbying for are named; former Defense Minister Wardak nonetheless the impeachments were making the rounds even before immediately resigned following his ouster. With transition the parliamentary session began.3 The characteristics that underway, the dismissal of two such vital Cabinet posts has made both ministers such valuable allies for the President— left the international community anxiously speculating the their clout, popularity with Western interlocutors, and, in move’s impact on stability and governance in the country.
    [Show full text]
  • Taliban in Kabul...President Flees
    baseball Page 15 soccer THE FIRST ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY IN FREE KUWAIT Page 16 Established in 1977 / www.arabtimesonline.com MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 2021 / MUHARRAM 8, 1443 AH emergency number 112 NO. 17764 16 PAGES 150 FILS Government backs KD 1,000 for non-degreed 60s+ Work at ‘full’ KUWAIT CITY, Aug Taliban in Kabul ... President flees 15, (Agencies): The Council of Ministers strongly supports com- ing up with a humani- tarian solution for the 60-year-old and above expatriates who are non-graduates to help them renew their resi- dence permits, reports Al-Qabas daily quoting government sources. The daily quoting the same sources said KD 1,000 is ex- pected to be approved instead of the KD 2,000 provided the 1,000 dinars proposed by the government includes what the Council of Ministers called the ‘state fee’, which is expected not to exceed 500 dinars, and the same or less value for health insurance policy that will cover the cost of all treat- ments in private hospitals and medical centers. The health cover is to be provided by an insurance company in Kuwait. The sources said the solution supported by the Council of Min- isters is expected to see the light of day in the next few days. The solution was voted on by the 50 percent of the Public Authority for Manpower (PAM) Board of Directors. The sources indicated the pro- posal for 500 dinars cost of in- surance policy comes due to the high insurance policies for the age groups of sixty and above, A US Chinook helicopter flies over the city of Kabul, Afghanistan, Aug 15.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan After the Drawdown 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW | Washington DC 20036 U.S
    A Report of the CSIS Hills Program on Governance AUTHOR Gerald F. Hyman Afghanistan after the Drawdown 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW | Washington DC 20036 U.S. Civilian Engagement t. (202) 887-0200 | f. (202) 775-3199 | www.csis.org in Afghanistan Post-2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706 t. (800) 462-6420 | f. (301) 429-5749 | www.rowman.com Photo Credit: PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN - DEC 30: Jamat-e-Islami (JI) Ameer Syed Munawar Hassan, addresses Jirga meeting at Nishtar Hall on December 30, 2010 in Peshawar. Asianet-Pakistan / Shutterstock.com. ISBN 978-1-4422-2831-3 Ë|xHSLEOCy228313z v*:+:!:+:! APRIL 2014 Blank Afghanistan after the Drawdown U.S. Civilian Engagement in Afghanistan Post-2014 AUTHOR Gerald F. Hyman A Report of the CSIS Hills Program on Governance April 2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofi t or ga ni za tion headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affi liated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to fi nding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world.
    [Show full text]
  • Disaster in Afghanistan Will Follow Us Home What on Earth
    Selected articles concerning Israel, published weekly by Suburban Orthodox Toras Chaim’s (Baltimore) Israel Action Committee Edited by Jerry Appelbaum ( [email protected] ) | Founding editor: Sheldon J. Berman Z”L Issue 900 Volume 2 1 , Number 3 2 Parshias Ki Seitzei August 21 , 2021 Disaster in Afghanistan Will Follow Us Home By Bret Stephens nyt.com August 15, 2021 What on earth was Joe Biden thinking — if, that is, he consequences. We should begin to anticipate t hem now. was thinking? The killing won’t stop. Watch — if you have the On July 8, the president defended his decision to stomach — videos of the aftermath of an attack in May on withdraw all remaining U.S. forces from Afghanista n. Afghan schoolgirls, which left 90 dead, or the massacre of After assuring Americans that “the drawdown is 22 Afghan commandos in June, gunned down as they were proceeding in a secure and orderly way” and that “U.S. surrendering, or Taliban figh ters taunting an Afghan police support for the people of Afghanistan will endure,” he officer, shortly before they kill him for the crime of took some questions. Here are excerpts from the White making comic videos. House transcript. One Taliban official declared that their jihad was Q: Is a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan now directed not against ordinary Afghans but only “against the inevitable? occupiers and those who defend the occ upiers.” Yet the The president: No, it is not. list of Afghans who fill that bill reaches into the thousands, Q: Why? if not higher. The president: Because you — the Afghan troops Women will become chattel.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Review, 14 August 2012
    CIVIL - MILITARY FUSION CENT RE Afghanistan Review Week 33 14 August 2012 Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises This document provides a weekly overview of developments in Afghanistan from 31 July – 13 August INSIDE THIS ISSUE 2012, with hyper-links to source material highlighted in blue and underlined in the text. For Economic Development more information on the topics below or other issues pertaining to events in Afghanistan, contact the members of the Afghanistan Team, or visit our website at www.cimicweb.org. Governance & Rule of Law Security & Force Protection Social & Strategic Infrastructure Economic Development Steven A. Zyck ► [email protected] akistan’s Peshawar High Court (PHC) decided on 02 August to extend a ban on exports DISCLAIMER of cattle and chicken to Afghanistan until at least 15 August, reports Dawn. The PHC The Civil-Military Fusion Centre P had first installed the ban on 23 July based on claims that Pakistani livestock was being (CFC) is an information and smuggled into Afghanistan, thus producing meat shortages and rising food prices in Pakistan. knowledge management organisa- Representatives of Pakistan’s livestock industry objected to the ruling, saying that authorised tion focused on improving civil- exporters using approved export routes should be exempted. A UN database shows that Af- military interaction, facilitating ghanistan imported approximately 56,000 chickens and nearly 5,000 head of cattle from Paki- information sharing and enhancing stan in 2009, the most recent year for which official records are available. situational awareness through the In other agricultural news, officials at Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and CimicWeb portal and our weekly Livestock (MAIL) tell Tolo News that this year’s corn harvest will be 40% larger than last and monthly publications.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethnicity in Afghanistan
    Afghanistan Ethnicity in Afghanistan Group selection The following groups are politically relevant in Afghanistan at some point in time since 1946: Hazara, Nuristani, Pashtun, Qizal- bash, Tajiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks. Except for the main ethnic groups of the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek, others have not been represented and considered as independent and distinct eth- nic groups involved in decision making. Although the Turkmen have been selected as a distinct ethnic group, they have often been counted as members of the Uzbek community. All ethnic groups are sub-divisions of the main four ethnic groups. For instance, the Hazara-Berberi, Hazara-Deh-i-Zainat and Taimanis are considered Hazara. Aimaqs, a collection of Persian-speaking semi-nomadic tribes, are considered Tajik in government census. Other ethnic minority groups in Afghanistan include the Aimaq, Baloch, Brahui, Pamir Tajiks and Pashai, but they are irrelevant at the national political level and thus, are not coded in EPR. Power relations 1946-1978 The Pashtuns dominated politics and the economy of the country during this period. Other ethnic minorities were mostly excluded from political decision making by successive governments. Zaher Shah (1933-73) introduced certain political reforms. He promulgated a liberal constitution (1964), providing for a two-chamber legislature to which the king appointed one-third of the deputies. The people elected another third, and the remainder was selected indirectly by provincial assemblies. Although Zahir Shah’s “experiment in democ- racy” produced few lasting reforms, it permitted the growth of unof- ficial political parties on both the left and right. These included the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) with close ideological ties to the Soviet Union.
    [Show full text]
  • The Post-9/11 US-Led State-Building in Afghanistan
    Central European Journal of Politics Volume 6 (2020), Issue 1, pp. 1–25 ARTICLE The Post-9/11 US-Led State-Building in Afghanistan Ahmad Shah Azami1 Department of International Relations and European Studies Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno Abstract: Following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, the US shed much blood and spent enormous funds in the country as part of its “War on Terror” as well as for reconstruction and institution- building there. As the US intervention in Afghanistan mainly focused on dismantling Al-Qaeda and toppling the Taliban regime, it also aimed at establishing a functioning state. Along the way, US policy makers also made a number of mistakes which undermined the US-led international coalition’s own stated mission and goals. Thus, after spending around two decades in Afghanistan, the US failed to fully achieve its desired objectives. Based on a literature review, this paper discusses the reasons why the US-led state-building efforts in Afghanistan achieved limited success. It aims to reveal the US’ miscalculations and mistakes in Afghanistan from the perspective of three major components of state-building, i.e. Security and Peace; Democratization; and Reconstruction & Economic Development. Keywords: State-building, United States, Afghanistan, security, reconstruction, democratization How to cite: Azami, A. S. 2020. “The Post-9/11 US-Led State-Building in Afghanistan.” Central European Journal of Politics 6 (1): 1–25. 1. Introduction In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States (US) launched its military operation in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 called “Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)”.
    [Show full text]
  • Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Quality of Government: Understanding Development and Decay in Afghanistan and Beyond
    Brokers, Bureaucrats, and the Quality of Government: Understanding Development and Decay in Afghanistan and Beyond by Khalid Homayun Nadiri A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland January 2017 ⃝c 2017 – Khalid H. Nadiri All rights reserved Abstract Why do public institutions decay or break down? And why are they often so difficult to put back together? These questions have been the subject of a large body of academic literature in the social sciences, but we still do not have a good theoretical and empirical understanding of contemporary institutional development in countries with limited human capital, material resources, and the rule of law. External or internal conflicts often do not motivate governments to develop more robust institutional structures. Ethnic differences do not necessarily given rise to institutional dysfunction or conflict. And ideology frequently does not influence whether a government is able to design and implement policies that benefit the public at large, predictably enforce laws and property rights, or develop a monopoly of control over the national territory. In order to gain deeper insight into the processes by which contemporary institutions may develop or decay, this research closely examines a longitudinal case of initial institutional im- provement and subsequent failure that is not consistent with existing explanations: Afghanistan. In this puzzling case, I show that government institutions became progressively more institution- alized during the early and middle periods of the 20th century but ultimately failed to consolidate these gains, developing a recurrently unstable political system and an unproductive economy.
    [Show full text]
  • Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention a Review of Developments in Badakhshan and Kunduz Provinces
    Philipp Münch Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention A review of developments in Badakhshan and Kunduz provinces EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since the beginning of the 2001 intervention in The power structures of Kunduz and, to a lesser Afghanistan, the contributing nations to the extent, Badakhshan had already fragmented International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have before the intervention in 2001. In contrast to declared that their aim is to ‘assist the Islamic Badakhshan, the distribution of power among Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority’ Kunduz’ commanders of armed groups changed over the whole territory of Afghanistan. This report considerably because of the fall of the Taleban. attempts to answer whether and to what extent Affiliates of Jamiat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic ISAF forces have been successful in accomplishing Society of Afghanistan) became slightly superior to their task in the two northeastern provinces of those of other politico-military parties. Mainly Kunduz and Badakhshan. To answer the question, Pashtuns, but also members of other ethnicities this report maps the power distribution and the without affiliation to the groups in power, were constellations between the most-significant marginalised. In Badakhshan, Jamiat affiliates political actors of both provinces and relates them clearly dominated but were split between to actions of the central government and the supporters of former President Burhanuddin international actors working in Afghanistan. In Rabbani and the party’s Shura-ye Nazar-e Shomal unprecedented detail, this study takes the first (Supervisory Council of the North) faction. Since step toward assessing ISAF’s effects and uncovers the mid-2000s in Kunduz and since the late 2000s developments on the grassroots level that have to a much lower degree in Badakhshan, the been largely unnoticed.
    [Show full text]