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Afghanistan After the Drawdown 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW | Washington DC 20036 U.S A Report of the CSIS Hills Program on Governance AUTHOR Gerald F. Hyman Afghanistan after the Drawdown 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW | Washington DC 20036 U.S. Civilian Engagement t. (202) 887-0200 | f. (202) 775-3199 | www.csis.org in Afghanistan Post-2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706 t. (800) 462-6420 | f. (301) 429-5749 | www.rowman.com Photo Credit: PESHAWAR, PAKISTAN - DEC 30: Jamat-e-Islami (JI) Ameer Syed Munawar Hassan, addresses Jirga meeting at Nishtar Hall on December 30, 2010 in Peshawar. Asianet-Pakistan / Shutterstock.com. ISBN 978-1-4422-2831-3 Ë|xHSLEOCy228313z v*:+:!:+:! APRIL 2014 Blank Afghanistan after the Drawdown U.S. Civilian Engagement in Afghanistan Post-2014 AUTHOR Gerald F. Hyman A Report of the CSIS Hills Program on Governance April 2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofi t or ga ni za tion headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affi liated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to fi nding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive offi cer in 2000. CSIS does not take specifi c policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978- 1- 4422- 2831- 3 (pb); 978-1- 4422- 2832- 0 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefi eld 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202- 887- 0200 | www.csis.org 301- 459- 3366 | www .rowman .com Contents Executive Summary iv 1. Introduction 1 2. The Context and Prospects for the Post- drawdown Civilian Effort 8 3. Three Scenarios 37 4. The Afghan Perspective 50 5. U.S. Civilian Engagement 54 6. Conclusions 84 About the Author 91 | III Executive Summary In his 2013 State of the Union speech, President Barack Obama announced that by the end of 2014 “our war in Afghan i stan will be over” and, a month earlier, that “by the end of next year, 2014, the transition will be complete— Afghans will have full responsibility for their security, and this war will come to a responsible end.” The military transition, successful or not, is in full swing. Of course the war will not come to an end in 2014, responsible or otherwise. Even if the military drawdown goes as planned, “America’s commitment to a unifi ed and sovereign Af ghan i stan will endure, but the nature of our commitment will change,” the president said. On the military side, our enduring commitment will focus on training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and “some counterterrorism efforts that allow us to pursue remnants of al Qaeda and their affi liates,” presumably the Taliban. As the United States draws down, so too will the remaining coali- tion countries of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under North Atlantic Treaty Or ga ni za tion (NATO) command. But the United States and its ISAF allies also have massive civilian programs as do multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. At the July 2012 Tokyo international assistance conference, the government of the Islamic Republic of Af ghan istan (GIRoA) and the donors forged a new partnership, the Tokyo Declaration Partnership. The co ali tion partners and other donors pledged $16 billion over four years through 2016 (an amount each year equal to Afghan i stan’s entire gross domestic product) subject to several serious but not very specifi c perfor mance commitments by GIRoA, espe- cially better governance and the reduction of corruption. Neither side is likely to deliver on its commitments, although very sizeable civilian assistance programs are likely to survive. What should be the nature of those programs? What objectives should defi ne them, and what strategy should be pursued in achieving them? Presently, the donors have individu- ally and collectively included programs in dozens of areas, including infrastructure, health, education, democracy, governance, economic growth, food security, minority rights, environment, and many others, all supporting GIRoA’s Af ghani stan National Devel- opment Strategy (ANDS) and its 22 national priority programs. But with reduced funding, the full array will not be possible. Funding aside, conditions on the ground may not even make them workable. Choices will need to be made, objectives defi ned, and priorities estab- lished, preferably pursuant to some coherent strategy. The natural inclination of civilian agencies, at least those in the United States, will be to avoid strategic choices by doing somewhat less among all of the existing programs because “they are all necessary” to IV | complement one another and for the kind of Afghan i stan “we have all been working for and the people of Afghan istan have been promised and have come to expect.” That would be the wrong choice and it is the wrong objective. The real objectives need to be not just more modest but more strategic: plans need to derive from objectives, resources, and obstacles. Three areas are most critical for the survival of an in de pen dent, coherent, reasonably decent Af ghan i stan: security, gover- nance, and economic growth, in that order. Each is necessary for the next and although they are linked, that is the logical order. Other areas and objectives are desirable, no doubt, but these three are essential, and the essential should defi ne the assistance strategy with the desirable added if possible. Moreover, each of the three essential areas is itself uncer- tain. With heavy concentration on these three, the resulting country will still be subopti- mal, no doubt, but optimality is not in the cards in Afghan i stan notwithstanding (unrealistic) expectations. With a few minor exceptions (for example, perhaps some circumscribed work with the police and the courts), the security dimension (keeping the Taliban at bay or even defeat- ing them, establishing personal security for ordinary Afghans, establishing and retaining ANSF command and control while preventing internal factionalism, external warlordism, and sectarianism within the security forces) is the responsibility of the GIRoA, ANSF, and ISAF. It is beyond the core civilian writ. Although ANSF have been performing well beyond expectations (or fears), these are early days; Afghans remain still very much in doubt about their security. To date, the U.S. civilian programs have been adjunct to and supportive of the security and counterinsurgency effort. They have been revised in response to the changes in the counterinsurgency environment, strategy, and targets. A clear connection will and should remain but it will be a looser connection. The remaining two areas—governance and economic growth— should be the primary prongs of the civilian side. Their success will depend on the context of post-withdrawal Af ghan istan and on the per for mance, not the promises, of the government and people of Af ghan istan. A large number of contexts are possible, but it may be useful to think of three simple (perhaps simplistic) and obvious ones, together with the strategic implications of each for assistance, especially governance and economic growth. Optimistic Scenario According to plan, the ANSF will succeed in holding almost all current territory, institu- tionalize real command and control, win Afghan loyalties, and establish the conviction among Afghans that they can ultimately defeat the Taliban or at least confi ne them to a chronic but not existential problem, and certainly that they can prevent a Taliban victory. Assuming they perform as expected, it would temper, even reverse, the hedging strategies by which Afghans, uncertain about their futures, play all sides of the possibilities, includ- ing emigration, support for the Taliban, simultaneous support for the government, and enormous capital fl ight. AFGHANISTAN AFTER THE DRAWDOWN | V Within a relatively secure envelope, governance will depend on the policies and perfor- mance of the next government. President Hamid Karzai’s term will end with the 2014 elections. He cannot stand again. The race among a large number of registered candidates has narrowed. A successful presidential election is crucial for the legitimacy of the ensuing government. Equally important are successful parliamentary elections in 2015 and perhaps less so, depending on what happens, on various provincial and local elections. These are necessary, but insuffi cient conditions, for decent (note: decent, not necessarily good and certainly not excellent) governance. If the elections produce a credible albeit far from perfect result, if the ensuing government does provide decent governance with limited but very basic and reliable public services, if it reduces corruption, and if it establishes and implements reasonable policies, then continued economic growth is quite possible.
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