Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data∗ Maxim Mironov and Ekaterina Zhuravskayay This draft: January 2014 Abstract This paper develops a novel approach to measuring illicit payments of firms to politicians based on objective financial data from Russia. Firms with public procurement revenue substantially increase tunneling around regional elections, whereas neither the tunneling activity of firms without procurement revenue, nor the legitimate financial activity of firms exhibits a pronounced political cycle. We show that the correlation between tunneling around elections and procurement contacts across firms is an indicator of corruption. We use the variation in the strength of this correlation to build a locality-level measure of corruption. Using this measure, we test and reject the “efficient grease" hypothesis by showing that in more corrupt localities procurement contracts are allocated to less productive firms. ∗We thank Ray Ball, Francesco Caselli, Matthew Gentzkow, Sergei Guriev, Irena Gros- feld, Peter Lorentzen, Christian Leuz, Garen Markarian, Elena Paltseva, Paolo Porchia, Paola Sapienza, Andrei Shleifer, Jeremy Stein, Marco Trombetta and the participants of the NES/SITE/KEI/BEROC/BICEPS retreat in Ventspils, the ISNIE Annual Conference, NBER Political Economics meetings, 2014 ASSA/AEA in Philadelphia, and the seminar participants at UTDT, IE Business School, EDRD, Paris School of Economics, New Economic School, Sciences Po, and Toulouse School of Economics for helpful comments. The paper was previously circulated under a title: \Corruption in Procurement and Shadow Campaign Financing." yMironov is from IE Business School, Madrid; Zhuravskaya is from the Paris School of Eco- nomics (EHESS) and New Economic School. Please send correspondence to: Ekaterina Zhu- ravskaya, Paris School of Economics, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France, Email: Zhu-
[email protected].