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A Introduction University of Groningen The Soft Side of Dark Power Roslycky, L.L. IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below. Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2011 Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Roslycky, L. L. (2011). The Soft Side of Dark Power: A Study in Soft Power, National Security and the Political-Criminal Nexus with a special focus on the post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Separatism in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. University of Groningen. Copyright Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license. More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne- amendment. Take-down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum. Download date: 05-10-2021 The Soft Side of Dark Power © Lada L. Roslycky All rights are reserved. No parts of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means - electronic, mechanical, photocopy, recording or otherwise - without prior written permission of the author or the corresponding journal. Cover design by Lada L. Roslycky & M. Mellens, NetzoDruk Groningen. Printed by NetzoDruk, Groningen. This book is dedicated to our unsung heroes. So it goes. K. Vonneghut Table of Contents List of figures ii Acknowledgements iii Introduction - 1 - Part ONE: Soft Power Security - 12 - 1. Introduction - 12 - 1.1 The Perceived Power of the State - 14 - 1.2 Soft Power Security - 37 - 1.3 Conclusion Part One - 59 - Part TWO: Politically Organized Transnational Crime - 64 - 2. Introduction - 64 - 2.1 Transnational Organized Crime - 67 - 2.2 The State: A protection racket? - 79 - 2.3 Profiling the Post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus - 104 - 2. 4 Conclusion Part - 118 - Part Three: A Dark Side to Soft Power in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea? - 121 - 3. Introduction - 121 - 3.1 Ukraine: Its PCN, Crimea and the Russian Black Sea Fleet - 122 - 3.2 Trust Builders or the Post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus? - 161 - 3.3 Conclusion Part Three - 193 - Conclusion - 200 - Reference List - 210 - Appendix A - 1 - Appendix B - 1 - Appendix C - 1 - List of figures Figure 1 Tangible Power Equation ...................................................................... - 17 - Figure 2 Three Dimensional Chessboard of Power ......................................... - 31 - Figure 3 Hard and Soft Power Behaviours ....................................................... - 33 - Figure 4 Competition Spectrum ........................................................................... - 54 - Figure 5 Strategic Purpose and Political Security Interlinked ............................... - 56 - Figure 6 National Will and Societal Security Interlinked ....................................... - 58 - Figure 7 Soft Power Threats ................................................................................ - 61 - Figure 8 Soft Power Security ............................................................................... - 62 - Figure 9 Soft Power Aggression .......................................................................... - 63 - Figure 10 Political Criminal Dyad and Nexus ....................................................... - 88 - Figure 11 Dynamics of the PCN ........................................................................ - 102 - Figure 12 The PCN and Dynamic Relationship within the Dyad ........................ - 103 - Figure 13 Soft Power PCN Analyses ................................................................. - 196 - ii Acknowledgements The writing process certainly teaches much about preconceptions, conceptions and misconceptions, particularly one‘s own. I first express my gratitude to Prof. dr. P.M.E. Volten and Dr. J. Herman for their trust and remarks. The ideas for this book were sown while listening to the story of the Trojan War. It was my bedtime story. Coming from a family who experienced both Communist and National Socialist persecution, I was no stranger to tales of war. Yet hearing Homer‘s epic poem was the first time I felt awe imagining the deceiving war- makers and pondered the existence of those who protect humanity and serve justice. It was also the first time that my mother told me of the International Court of Justice and a little country called the Netherlands. She informed that certain rules had been put in place to protect human beings, their liberties and their states. Yet, for some reason those rules did not seem to work very well, and, I wanted to know why. It was during my legal studies at the University of Amsterdam that I recognized national security as a topic that provided a unique perspective on the interstices between international law and politics. Prof. dr. André Nolkaemper played a pivotal role in this process. I thank him for this and for encouraging me to pursue a doctorate. I am also thankful to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for promoting the development of its young professionals abroad. It was through one of its programs that I obtained a position within NATO‘s Information and Documentation Center (NIDC) in Kyiv. Already in the Kyiv-bound airplane, an advertisement promoting the export of Ukrainian women to the USA on a government issued in-flight immigration card signaled there is much to learn about the powers that be (Appendix A). The time in Ukraine was of enormous importance to my intellectual development and indeed to the eventual completion of this book. I next need to thank Michel Duray who, as Director of NIDC, entrusted me with responsibilities that enabled me to learn a lot. The Orange Revolution exposed me to numerous insights including the work of a forthright diplomat, the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris Tarasyuk. Thanks to him, and his colleagues at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Integration, I was able to gain a better understanding of post-Soviet politics, especially as they affect Ukraine. I am also much indebted to the late Serhiy Danilov. He taught me a lot about Soviet humor, the need to oppose oppression and coercion and, moreover, about the need to choose one‘s battles wisely. Sadly missed; you continue to inspire. iii My understanding of the political situation in The Autonomous Republic of Crimea, particularly as it pertains to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, has been greatly enhanced by Vice Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovainiy who was wonderfully generous with his time and never failed to give me helpful advice. Ambassador Victor Semenov, I need to thank for being candid. I also want to thank Gregoriy Perepelytsia, Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at Ukraine‘s Diplomatic Academy. Sergei Kulyk Director of NOMOS in Sevastopol allowed me to work in his office and brought me into contact with a number of people who were able to relate some of their travails. I also thank Oleg Yatsenko and Vadim ―Sheriff‖ who made an extraordinarily deep impression. This book would also not be what it is today were it not for the dedicated people at Harvard‘s National Security Program, particularly the astute Director of the Harvard Black Sea Security Program, Sergei Konoplyov, whom I thank for inviting me to the program as a visiting fellow. His work and manner of thinking promote international peace. They have left a deep, lasting mark on my own. The process of writing a PhD is long and filled with many laborious hours of reading. I was particularly inspired by the works of Roy Godson (Georgetown University) and Alfredo Schulte-Bockholt (St. Mary‘s University, Halifax), whose studies continue to be a model for me. Various people at the University of Groningen deserve mentioning. They made the writing process not only tolerable but actually enjoyable: Erica van Boven had an interesting PhD graduate program, became a confidant and friend; Andrej Zwitter shared his valuable opinions and ideas with me; Jarno Hoving was wonderful company; Vincent Boxelaar impressed me with his sundry skills and I am indebted; Laura Janssen and Margriet Drent motivated me with their dedication to individual and state security; Gorus van Oordt and Marijke Wubbolts for outstanding professionalism. No list of acknowledgements would be complete without an expression of my deepest gratitude to my friends and family who have supported me with encouragement, honesty and love: Pater Floor de Graauw; Eric Arnold; Yaromyr Oryshkevych; and the Voormalig Klein Poortje posse Aart, Vincent, Wouter, Peter and, particularly, Ron, Gea, and Jasper. Above all, my mother for believing in me and supporting me unconditionally, my father for teaching me fortitude, Oleh for being a
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