10SvnenhSre,NW,Wsigo,DC 03 0.6.80www.aei.org 202.862.5800 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 very unpleasantrealityitwillbe. administration willhavetoconfront—anda choice. ThisisarealitythatthenextU.S. ply amatterofengineering,time,andTehran’s will benoinsurmountablehurdlesleft;itissim- that is,forseveralnuclearweapons.Soon,there enriching a“testamount”ofuranium—enough, Aghazadeh, announcedhiscountryhadbegun Atomic EnergyOrganization,Gholamreza progress. InlateSeptember, theheadofIran’s week, itseems,bringingfurtherevidenceofits toward acquiringnuclearweapons,withevery The IslamicRepublicinIrancontinuestospeed By ThomasDonnelly A StrategyforNuclearIran recently observed: gic Assessment and theauthorof fellow indefenseandsecurity policy studiesatAEI Thomas Donnelly([email protected]) isaresident ically, bysucceedinginthedemocratic transformationofAfghanistanandIraq. In theshortterm,atleast,UnitedStatesmustinsteadworktoisolateIrannotonlymilitarilybutideolog- preventing oneoftheworld’s mostdangerousregimesfromacquiringtheworld’s mostdangerousweapons. bargain” withTehran noraconventionalmilitarystrikeagainstitsnuclearfacilitiesoffersmuchhopeof certain tobeatthetopofnextadministration’s nationalsecurityagenda.Unfortunately, neithera“grand Regardless ofwhoiselectedtothepresidencyinNovember, thegrowingthreatposedbyanuclearIranis Anglo-Saxon civilization.” “a strategydrawnupforthedestructionof Guards, recentlyboastedthatIranhad a seniormemberoftheRevolutionary be itsterroristnetworks.HassanAbasi, cles fordeliveringanIraniannukewould North America,thoughthelikeliestvehi- range tostriketargetsinEuropeand [Iran] isalsoworkingonmissileswiththe (AEI Press,2004). Operation IraqiFreedom:AStrate- 2 1 As MaxBoot call it the “modest bargain”alternative—is call itthe“modest version oftheKerry“grand bargain” proposal— Iranian revolutionof1979. A moretempered ject ofmanyAmericandiplomats sincethe ment withIran;indeed,this hasbeenapetpro- to Iranthatemphasizesareasof“mutualinterest.” of advancinga“non-confrontational”approach Senators KerryandEdwardshavemadeapoint his currentarsenal.Undeterredbythatfailure, did nothingtopreventKimJongIlfromacquiring Korea, awidelycelebratedbitofarmscontrolthat the Clinton-era“AgreedFramework”withNorth bargain atall.Instead,itismerelyarecyclingof of agrandbargainisquicklyrevealedtobeno bombs. Uponcloserinspection,however, theidea to giveupthekindofnuclearfuelusedmake nuclear powerplantsinexchangeforapromise mullahs thatwouldallowthemtokeeptheir a pointofadvocating“grandbargain”withthe doves.” Department hawksandState be paralyzedbydisagreementsbetweenDefense so manyotherareas,theadministrationseemsto greater MiddleEast,allowsthat,“onIran,asin of theBushadministration’s strategyforthe moment inWashington. Boot,astrongsupporter armed Iraniscreatinga“DoSomething!” Kerry isnottheonlyoneeagerforengage- The anxietyraisedbytheprospectofnuclear- 3 The Democrats,bycontrast,havemade O ctober 2004

National Security Outlook - 2 - encapsulated in the recent report, Iran: Time for a New geopolitical facts obtain, and the United States has New Approach, by the Council on Foreign Relations started to formulate new strategies based upon them. And (CFR).4 As is so often the case, this “task force” of given that the “greater Middle East”—the immense swath mandarins calling for a new approach of the planet stretching from West Africa to Southeast is really just rehashing old ideas. Thus, the CFR Asia—is now the central strategic focus of American report finds: security policy, our approach to the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be written freely on a blank sheet of paper. [Tehran] could play a potentially significant role in promoting a stable, pluralistic government in Remember the ? Baghdad. It might be induced to be a construc- tive actor toward both and , but Whatever the outcome of this November’s election, it retains the capacity to create significant diffi- some version of the “Bush Doctrine”—whose main culties for these regimes if it is alienated from purpose is to preserve the generally liberal, stable, and the new post-conflict governments in those two peaceful international order that has resulted from the countries.5 collapse of the Soviet and that is predicated upon the United States’ role as global guarantor of Thus, inevitably, it is the council’s recommendation international security—is likely to continue. Just as the that the United States “engage selectively with Iran to Bush Doctrine represents, in some sense, a continua- promote regional stability.” This, in the task force’s tion of the de facto policies of the Clinton administra- eyes, constitutes a “revised strategic approach to Iran.” tion, a Kerry administration would likewise discover At least the CFR task force acknowledges that the that it is hard to retreat from the responsibilities of “grand bargain” notion “that would settle comprehen- unipolarity. As much as the Democratic Party might sively the outstanding conflicts between Iran and the wish to bury its head in the strategic sand, and despite United States is not a realistic goal, and pursuing such its deep-seated hatred of President Bush, there is no an outcome would be unlikely to produce near-term quiet life for the world’s sole superpower. progress on Washington’s central interests.”6 However, In particular, Kerry’s pretense of a return to the the depth of the differences between the United States status quo in the greater Middle East, of balancing one and Iran is no excuse for restricting “engagement,” in thuggish regime against another and making strategy the report’s view, and in particular the use of “incen- in partnership with Western European “powers” tives,” including expanded trade relations: “Given the such as France and Germany, is impossible to take increasingly important role of economic interests in seriously in a post-9/11 world. Even if the United shaping Iran’s policy options at home and abroad, the States could neatly withdraw from Iraq—itself an prospect of commercial relations with the United States almost oxymoronic formulation—the war on terrorism could be a powerful tool in Washington’s arsenal.”7 would not end and would still include many other Even more saliently, the task force believes that, while actors besides Osama bin Laden. the United States is right to advocate democracy, Thus there may be little alternative to the Bush America should abandon the “rhetoric of regime change, Doctrine’s “forward strategy of freedom”; a purely as it would be likely to rouse nationalist sentiments in defensive approach is impossible exactly because the defense of the regime even among those who currently pre-9/11 political order in the region was the primary oppose it.”8 While willing to forgo the grandeur, the source of the nihilism and violence that led to those Council of Foreign Relations hates to pass up a bargain. attacks. The Bush Doctrine’s fundamental set of Indeed, to the extent that the CFR report proves premises may prove remarkably stable: the rollback of anything, it is that the Cold War is not over: it lives both Islamic terror organizations and the governments on, and not just in time-warp regimes like Kim Jong that support them; containing China’s military ambi- Il’s North Korea or Saparmurat Niyazov’s Turkmenistan, tions; and, key to it all, preventing any true “axis of but among the strategic smart set in the United States, evil” that marks a conjunction of Islamic radicalism for whom détente never dies. with the rising great-power capabilities in Beijing. Alas for the Council on Foreign Relations, and This strategy is nothing if not ambitious. We are at last for the rest of us, the real world has moved on. attempting to resolve a massive civil war within the - 3 -

Islamic world while simultaneously preventing a dissatis- recent report on global terrorism puts it, “Iran fied China—even more dependent for its economic remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in growth on Middle Eastern oil than the United States 2003. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Min- is—from interfering with our efforts. The Bush adminis- istry of Intelligence and Security were involved in the tration’s occasional confessions about the magnitude of planning of and support for terrorist acts and continued the effort required—reflected in Defense Secretary to exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to pur- Rumsfeld’s forecast of a “long, hard slog” in Iraq and sue their goals.”11 National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s profession From Beirut to Buenos Aires, international terrorism of a “generational commitment” to the project of trans- has been central to Iran’s foreign policy since the 1979 forming the Middle East—only begin to hint at the task revolution. Tehran openly provides funding, training, before the United States. The only good news is that, and weapons to Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic while our enemies are many, they are individually weak Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of and not immediately disposed to unite against us. Palestine. Iran also has a long relationship with al Qaeda. As early as late 1991, Sudan’s Islamist leader, Sources of Iranian Conduct Hassan al-Turabi, sponsored meetings designed to encourage Shia and Sunni fundamentalists to put aside Iran stands directly athwart this project of regional their differences and work together against the United transformation. Indeed, the regime in Tehran came to States. “Not long afterward,” according to the 9/11 power by ousting Shah Reza Pahlavi in the tumultuous Commission report, “senior Al Qaeda operatives and year of 1979, when the old, autocratic order in the trainers traveled to Iran to receive training in explo- greater Middle East began to crumble. Ayatollah sives.”12 Ruhollah Khomeini established an unabashedly theo- Senior al Qaeda operatives captured by the cratic and revolutionary government, at the same time United States have revealed that Tehran attempted calling for a broader Muslim uprising and attacks upon to strengthen its ties to Osama bin Laden after the the United States, the “Great Satan.” And despite USS Cole attack in 2000, and that Iranian officials international isolation, devastating defeat in war, and have facilitated the travel of al Qaeda members widespread internal unrest, the regime retains its ideo- through their territory, failing to stamp their passports. logical character, as well as a firm grip on power. As It is also believed that eight to fourteen of the 9/11 the Council on Foreign Relations notes, the Islamic hijackers took advantage of this arrangement to transit Republic has achieved some “durability.”9 through Iran in 2000–2001.13 But if its political and strategic ends have been After the fall of the Taliban, several senior al Qaeda consistent, Tehran’s means have changed dramatically. operatives fled to Iran, where they have found a safe One of the best studies of the Iran-, done haven from which to plot further attacks—including by the United States Marine Corps, observed that the May 2003 terrorist bombing in Riyadh, in which the casualties of that conflict were so great that it thirty-four people were killed.14 Although Iran claims essentially bled the Iranian revolution to death.10 to hold several al Qaeda members in custody, it refuses Khomeini and his fellow mullahs were more than to disclose their identities publicly and has rebuffed willing to spread revolution by conventional military attempts to arrange for their transfer.15 means, but a generation of young Pasdaran zealots Yet for all the vehemence of its ideology and the broke itself in human wave attacks on Saddam Hus- violence of its anti-Americanism, the clerical regime sein’s army; what the U.S. military was able to do so in Tehran has found itself incapable of stemming the decisively in 1991 and again in 2003—slice through seeping U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and in the the Iraqi field force—the Iranian army could not man- broader region. While Iran essentially stood aside age even at the cost of perhaps a million casualties over when Operation Desert Storm drove the Iraqi army eight years. from Kuwait and contained Saddam Hussein’s regional If Iran could not export its revolution by conven- ambitions, the war ushered in the policy of “dual tional military means, then unconventional means containment,” targeted at Tehran as well as Baghdad; would have to suffice. Iran’s sponsorship of terrorists is indeed, the first Bush administration left Saddam in well-known. As the U.S. State Department’s most power primarily to serve as a bulwark against Iranian - 4 - expansionism. The “no-fly-zones” and other U.S. oper- throughout the region. This would be an ironic echo ations in the area throughout the 1990s attested to the of the extended deterrence thought to apply to U.S. fact that, even with no real regional partner—beyond allies during the Cold War. But in the greater Middle the on-again, off-again support offered by the Saudis— East of the twenty-first century, we are the truly revolu- the United States was more than capable of maintain- tionary force and “revolutionary” Iran is more the ing its military forces at Iran’s doorstep and had no status quo power. intention of withdrawing. The attitudes of the Council on Foreign Relations And while the mullahs may have celebrated the Iran task force reveal this dynamic with creepy perfec- attacks of September 11, 2001, they have come to rue tion. Aware that the fundamental strategic choice on many of the subsequent events. Although there was Iran is between policies of regime change and détente, little love lost between Tehran and the Taliban, the the consensus among the task force members is that expanded American military presence along Iran’s east- the problem is the weapons, not the government build- ern flank is far from welcome. The of Iraq, ing them. Indeed, the report makes it clear that the though it removed Tehran’s longtime nemesis in Bagh- task force was divided about the state of Iran’s dad, completed the near-encirclement of Iran by U.S. nuclear program: military forces. Iran’s attempts to influence the direc- tion of post-Saddam Iraq have yet to produce anything Although Task Force members voiced differing more substantive than its past efforts to undermine opinions on whether evidence is sufficient to Saddam; Tehran’s sponsorship of Moqtada al Sadr have determine that Iran has fully committed itself to helped the “Mahdi army” make headlines, but the developing nuclear weapons, the Task Force finality with which mainstream Iraqi cleric Ayatollah agreed that Iran is likely to continue its pattern Ali al Sistani evicted Sadr’s forces from the shrine of of tactical cooperation with the International Imam Ali in Najaf suggests that the majority of Iraq’s Atomic Energy Agency while attempting to con- Shia still have little interest in taking orders from Iran. ceal the scope of its nuclear program in order to Under such apparently bleak circumstances, keep its options open as long as possible.16 Tehran’s traditional hankering for nuclear weapons has sharpened significantly. Iran’s conventional But if there were nuances about the state of Tehran’s options are now restricted to attempts to limit Ameri- nukes, there seems to be consensus about American can access to the region, such as by pointing missiles at policy: forget the regime-change idea and concentrate the Straits of Hormuz and bolstering ground-based air on the weapons. By focusing narrowly on the issues of defenses. Terrorism with a return address carries greater Iran’s weapons, any discussion of the larger conse- risks, too: it is interesting to speculate what the U.S. quences for American policy can be avoided. reaction would be now, in a post-9/11 world, to a Kho- What would the consequences be of a bargain with bar Towers–type bombing. What the Iranians could Iran—be it grand or small—for a strategy of political safely sponsor in 1996 might not be so safe now. transformation in the greater Middle East? Is it possible to The surest deterrent to American action is a function- pursue détente with Iran and regime change elsewhere? ing nuclear arsenal. Throughout the greater Middle East, any overt bar- gain with Iran will surely be read as a retreat on the What to Do? part of the United States. Three years after September 11, the question remains: do the Americans have the To be sure, the prospect of a nuclear Iran is a night- strength, stomach, and sincerity to carry through their mare. But it is less a nightmare because of the high project of democratization and regional transformation? likelihood that Tehran would employ its weapons or Observers in the Middle East can see that President pass them on to terrorist groups—although that is not Bush is committed, but there are doubts about the rest beyond the realm of possibility—and more because of his government. The world’s other industrial powers of the constraining effect it threatens to impose upon are either openly afraid and thus hostile, skeptical, or at U.S. strategy for the greater Middle East. The danger best noncommittal; but for a handful of allies, America is that Iran will “extend” its deterrence, either directly stands alone. If John Kerry becomes president, he will or de facto, to a variety of states and other actors backpedal—and the message in the region will be clear. - 5 -

Détente with Iran would compel the forces of free- puzzle that perplexes us. Earlier in September, the dom in the Middle East to further hedge their bets, and Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Tel Aviv was our sometime allies, like the Saudis, who through the planning on buying 500 bunker-busters, precisely the 1990s tried to reach an accommodation with Tehran, kind of munitions that might be able to destroy Iran’s would equally reckon that U.S. ambitions for change underground nuclear facilities.17 had overleaped themselves. Even Pakistan—congenitally In truth, however, a preemptive strike by Tel Aviv unstable and prone to play all ends against the middle would be exceedingly difficult. ’s long-range strike absent unceasing American attention—might toy with capacity is a fraction of the U.S. military’s and would, the idea of reversing its post-9/11 policies. as a matter of logistics, require at least American acqui- A bargain with Iran would also have global effects. escence (we own a good deal of the airspace between The most serious would not be in France or Germany, Tel Aviv and Tehran). And even if, miraculously, an whose governments have made it plain that they have Israeli strike achieved some tactical success, the Irani- no heart for transformation in the Middle East or for ans would surely hold us responsible and target U.S. a serious effort to oppose Iran, but in China. Beijing interests in retaliation. In sum, punitive strikes cannot and Tehran share a mutual dissatisfaction with the be designed to end the Iranian nuclear threat nor Pax Americana and have a long record of direct and ensure regime change, as our decade-long experience indirect cooperation on nuclear and missile programs. with Saddam Hussein should remind us. Hu Jintao and the new generation of leaders in China Nor, it seems, can traditional, “multilateral” diplo- have a much larger, global perspective than did Jiang macy. From Khartoum to Tehran, the “international Zemin and Deng Xiaoping before them, greater confi- community” is proving again that it is unwilling to dence flowing from China’s economic modernization, confront renegade regimes. Iran’s flouting of the IAEA and, almost certainly, an appetite to play the geopoliti- and the UN also takes a page from Saddam’s book. cal game more actively. Their horizons very clearly Despite growing evidence of Iran’s nuclear malfeasance, extend throughout the greater Middle East—China’s many countries are reluctant to sanction it for what energy interest in Sudan already poses the single great- they view as its legitimate right to develop a complete est roadblock to stopping the genocide in Darfur, for nuclear fuel cycle. example—and they are deeply conscious of the poten- Alas, the primary burden of isolating and containing tial U.S. stranglehold on China’s future growth. Torn a nearly nuclear Iran rests with the United States. Like between their interests in U.S. security guarantees and so much of our future work in the greater Middle East, a desire for greater autonomy, Beijing will keenly note, this must be a long-term effort requiring patience and and perhaps be happy to broker, any bargain for Iran. resolve. The first order of business is to keep Iran from establishing a deeper relationship with great-power Regime Change by Other Means sponsors. Breaking Tehran’s ties to China will be diffi- , given the fact that no American administration, If détente with a nuclear Islamic Republic jeopardizes Republican or Democrat, has yet been willing to force the project of Middle East transformation, then direct Beijing to choose between the constraints and the ben- military confrontation is an equally unappetizing efits of the Pax Americana—witness Taiwan, North method of regime change. In the heat of the “Do Korea, and now Sudan. Better hopes lie with India, Something!” moment, the difficulties of even limited which, if pressured to scale back its links to Iran as the military strikes are too little appreciated. While a full price of a real strategic partnership with the United discussion of the operational realities is beyond the States, might become a serious future ally. scope of this essay, some hard truths are worth men- The second order of business is for the United tioning. Iran is large, populous, rugged, and its nuclear States to retain the initiative in its new project of facilities are spread throughout the country. Its nuclear reform and transformation in the greater Middle East. program probably cannot be crippled in a single, surgi- The real isolation of revolutionary Iran will come cal strike, as was Iraq’s in Israel’s famous Osirak raid. when it is drowned in a larger sea of liberal, account- And, speaking of the Israelis, it is not uncommon able governments in the region. If democracy takes to hear the hope expressed among U.S. policymakers, hold in Afghanistan—where ten million have regis- albeit sotto voce, that they will somehow solve the tered to vote in October’s presidential election, far - 6 - more than expected—and Iraq—where, despite a con- Foreign Relations, 2004). Accessed at http://www.cfr.org/pdf/ tinuing counterinsurgency campaign, the transitional Iran_TF.pdf. government of Iyad Allawi has pledged to hold a vote 5. Ibid., 2. this January—Iran’s dictatorship will come under 6. Ibid., 3. increasing pressure. 7. Ibid., 3–4. In a curious way, Iran suffers from both the Middle 8. Ibid., 4. East’s great maladies—it is both a sclerotic autocracy and 9. Ibid., 1. a backward-looking theocracy. The success of democracy 10. Douglas V. Johnson and Stephen C. Pelletiere, in Afghanistan and Iraq not only will surround Iran strate- Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War, Volume I, Fleet Marine gically, but ideologically as well. In the final analysis, sup- Force Reference Publication 3-203, 1990. porting and expanding the forces of freedom in the region 11. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Washington, DC: offers, for now, our best hope for containing Iran and U.S. Department of State, April 2004). Available at diluting the value of its nuclear deterrent. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/. 12. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the Notes United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (July 2004), 61. Available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/ 1. The author is indebted to Henry Sokolski, director of the 911Report_FM.pdf. Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, for making available 13. Ibid., 240–241. the draft report, Restraining a Nuclear-Ready Iran: Seven Levers, 14. Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Suggests a A Report of NPEC’s Competitive Strategies Working Group, Sep- Qaeda Cell in Iran Directed Saudi Bombings,” tember 13, 2004. Though the conclusions about Iran’s nuclear Times, May 21, 2003. program are the author’s, they rest heavily on the innovative 15. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (Washington, DC: and original research that NPEC has conducted. U.S. Department of State, April 2004). Available at 2. Max Boot, “Bush Can’t Afford Inaction on Iran,” Los http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/. Angeles Times, September 9, 2004. 16. Brzezinski and Gates, Iran: Time for a New 3. Ibid. Approach, 2. 4. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, cochairs, 17. Craig S. Smith, “Iran Moves Toward Enriching Iran: Time for a New Approach (New York: Council on Uranium,” New York Times, September 22, 2004.

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