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Download/Csipubs/Modernwarfare.Pdf DOING WHAT YOU KNOW THE UNITED STATES AND 250 YEARS OF IRREGULAR WAR DAVID E. JOHNSON DOING WHAT YOU KNOW THE UNITED STATES AND 250 YEARS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE DAVID E. JOHNSON 2017 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2017 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHOR David E. Johnson is a Senior Fellow at CSBA. He joined CSBA after eighteen years with the RAND Corporation, where he was a Principal Researcher. His work focuses on military innovation, land warfare, joint operations, and strategy. Dr. Johnson is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University where he teaches a course on strategy and military operations and an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point. From June 2012 until July 2014, he was on a two-year loan to the United States Army to establish and serve as the first director of the Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group. Before joining RAND, he served as a vice president at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) following a 24-year career in the U.S. Army, where he served in command and staff positions in the Infantry, Quartermaster Corps, and Field Artillery branches in the continental United States, Korea, Germany, Hawaii, and Belgium. He retired as a Colonel in 1997. His military awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit, Parachutist’s Badge, Ranger Tab, Expert Infantryman’s Badge, Army Staff Identification Badge, the Ancient Order of Saint Barbara, and the Noble Patron of Armor. His work has been featured on the profes- sional reading lists of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force Chiefs of Staff, The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Commander, the Chief of Staff Royal Air Force (United Kingdom), the Chief of Staff of the British Army, the Royal Australian Air Force Chief of Staff, and the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence. He has served as a member of the Maneuver and the Fires Centers of Excellence Advisory Boards, and as a consultant to the U.S. Defense Science Board and the U.S. Army Science Board. He has MA and Ph.D. degrees in history from Duke University. He also has an MMAS from the U.S. Command and General Staff College, an MS from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and a BA from Trinity University. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This monograph is an expanded version of David E. Johnson, “You Go to COIN with the Military You Have: The United States and 250 Years of Irregular Warfare,” in Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir, eds., Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016). The author is grateful to his colleagues Hal Brands, Thomas Mahnken, Whitney Morgan McNamara, Rick Russo, and Timothy Walton; to his friend Mark Perry for commenting on this work; and to Kamilla Gunzinger and Erica Brown for their skillful editing. Thanks are also due to Adam Lemon for proofreading and Marlyn Brown for her work on the report layout. The opinions and analysis in this study are those of the author; any shortcomings are solely his responsibility. CSBA receives funding from a broad and diverse group of funders, including private foundations, government agencies, and corporations. A complete list of these organizations can be found on our website at www.csbaonline.org/about/contributors. Cover Photo: Long Khanh Province, Republic of Vietnam. SP4 R. Richter, 4th Battalion, 503rd Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade and Sergeant Daniel E. Spencer with a fallen comrade Courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration. Contents INTRODUCTION ...............................................................1 A Word of Caution ..........................................................2 TWO CENTURIES OF IRREGULAR WARFARE AND COIN AT HOME AND ABROAD . 5 Regular Even in Revolution—The Origins of American Conventionality in War ...............5 Adapting the Regular Army for the Irregular—the Indian Wars of 1790–1891 ...............8 Expeditionary COIN After the Spanish–American War. 17 Back to Conventionality: the U.S. Military After World War I ...........................28 America in Vietnam (1945–1975) .............................................30 No More Vietnams (1975–2006) ..............................................50 21ST CENTURY U .S . COIN .......................................................55 Relearning COIN After “Winning” in Afghanistan and Iraq ............................55 21st Century U.S. COIN Methods .............................................65 Measuring Success .......................................................69 Constraints on U.S. and Western Irregular Warfare and COIN Approaches ................71 U.S. Strategic Culture Is Part of the Problem .....................................73 The United States is No Longer Doing COIN, So Why Does It Matter? ...................76 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED AND WHAT DO WE DO GOING FORWARD? .......................79 INDEX ................................................................. 88 LIST OF ACRONYMS .......................................................... 91 FIGURES FIGURE 1 ............................................................... 7 FIGURE 2 .............................................................. 13 FIGURE 3 .............................................................. 16 FIGURE 4 .............................................................. 20 FIGURE 5 .............................................................. 24 FIGURE 6 .............................................................. 27 FIGURE 7 .............................................................. 33 FIGURE 8 .............................................................. 38 FIGURE 9 .............................................................. 41 FIGURE 10 .............................................................. 43 FIGURE 11 .............................................................. 46 FIGURE 12 .............................................................. 50 FIGURE 13 .............................................................. 52 FIGURE 14 .............................................................. 58 FIGURE 15 .............................................................. 64 FIGURE 16 .............................................................. 67 www.csbaonline.org 1 Introduction The United States has been continuously engaged in irregular combat since initiating operations in Afghanistan the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. homeland. Its military forces, particularly the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces, have made significant adaptations after the onset of the insurgency in Iraq following the initial success of conventional operations there in 2003. Yet, victory—achieving the desired political objectives—in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to elude the United States more than fifteen years into the Global War on Terrorism despite significant investments in blood and treasure.1 This study endeavors to answer the question: Why is that? The United States has a long history of engaging in irregular wars and countering insurgencies, one that predates its independence. Many of these efforts, as will be recounted, were successful. Others were not. To understand what worked, what did not, and why, this study assesses the measures, both coercive and benign, that the United States has used in a limited number of pivotal cases to determine if U.S. irregular warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches have changed significantly over the past two centuries. It also makes recommendations for the future. 1 There is a broad literature on U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. As Martin van Creveld noted on the back cover of Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir, eds., Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), “Over the last decades, so large has the literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency become that, had it been loaded on the Titanic, that ship would have sunk without any help from the iceberg.” That said, there are several useful assessments, particularly on the political and strategic dimensions of Iraq and Afghanistan that I found particularly useful. See Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collings, eds., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015); Frank G. Hoffman, “Small Wars Revisited: The United States and Nontraditional War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 6, December 2005; and Paul Cornish, “The United States and Counterinsurgency: ‘Political First, Political Last, Political Always’,” International Affairs 85, no. 1, 2009. 2 CSBA | DOING WHAT YOU KNOW A Word of Caution In the 1989 revised edition of his collection of essays on the American Revolution, historian John Shy reflected on his perspective when he wrote the original volume, published in 1976 shortly after the fall of South Vietnam: Several of [the essays] play deliberately in that dangerously subjective zone where past meets present, and all of them
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