The Vita Beata: Ambrose, De Officiis 2.1-21 And the Synthesis of Classical and Christian Thought in the Late Fourth Century

In his Sermo 150, Augustine argues that the desire to attain the vita beata has been the motivation for all types of philosophy, and that it is also the reason that people would give if asked why they became Christians; the quest is common to all human beings, whether good or evil. Appetitio…beatae vitae philosophis Christianisque communis est1. The truth of Augustine’s claims is illustrated in a variety of Christian works from the fourth century, which take up the traditional philosophical theme of hap- piness and the summum bonum. Lactantius relates the highest good to the immortality of the soul, and calls upon his readers to find their destiny by devoting themselves to the worship of the true God; the worship of God is the greatest virtue, and it wins the blessedness of eternal reward2. Augustine’s De beata vita, written at Cassiciacum in November, 386, and dedicated to the cultured neo-Platonist, Manlius Theodorus, presents a blend of Plotinian thought with Catholic orthodoxy: the blessed life con- sists in the knowledge of the triune God3. Ambrose’s De Iacob et vita beata, based upon sermons to which Augustine may well have listened earlier in 386, concentrates on the virtues of blessedness as illustrated in the narratives of the Maccabees and of the patriarch Jacob. Ambrose offers an amalgam of Stoic and neo-Platonist sentiments as he sketches the character of the per- son who proceeds towards eternal fellowship with God by ratio- nal control of his passions, detachment from his external circum- stances, and finally, like the faithful martyr, remaining steadfast

1. Augustine, Serm. 150.4. Augustine goes on to present Christ as the way to blessedness: haec est doctrina Christianorum, non plane conferenda, sed incom- parabiliter praeferenda, doctrinis philosophorum, immunditiae Epicureorum, superbiae Stoicorum (150.10). 2. Lactantius, Inst. 3.7ff.; 7. 3. See the edition of J. Doignon, Oeuvres de saint Augustin: Dialogues philosophiques: De beata vita — la vie heureuse (Bibliothèque augustinienne 4.1, Paris 1986). 200 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE as he faces death4. All these works have received justifiable atten- tion for their assimilation of major points from classical philoso- phy. However, one striking example of the way in which classi- cal perspectives and biblical teaching coexist in a fourth-century Christian mind has been relatively neglected by scholars: namely, the opening section of book 2 of Ambrose’s De Officiis (2.1-21). The passage repays careful study as an illustration of Christian humanism at work5. Ambrose models his De Officiis on Cicero’s work of the same name, which is in turn based upon the writing of the middle Stoic , with some further influence from and Heca- ton of Rhodes6. Ambrose follows the basic structure of Cicero’s three books, on the honourable, the expedient, and the relationship between the two. As Cicero wrote to his son Marcus, and beyond him to the ambitious young men who were witnessing the collapse of the Republic, so Ambrose addresses his spiritual ‘sons’, the younger clergy of Milan, setting out ideals of moral conduct which would foster the influence of the church in North Italian

4. On the composition of the work, see G. Nauroy, ‘La méthode de composi- tion d’Ambroise de Milan et la structure du De Iacob et vita beata,’ in Y.-M. Duval (ed.), Ambroise de Milan. XVIe centenaire de son élection épiscopale. Dix études (Paris 1974), pp. 115-153. On the neo-Platonism, see A. Solignac, ‘Nou- veaux parallèles entre saint Ambroise et Plotin: Le “De Iacob et vita beata“ et le Peri eudaimonias (Ennéade I,iv ),’ Archives de philosophie 19 (1956), pp. 148- 156. 5. I use the Budé text edited by M. Testard, Saint Ambroise, Les Devoirs 1-2 (Paris 1984, 1992). 2.1-21 has been studied by P.J. Couvée, Vita beata en vita aeterna. Een onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van het begrip “vita beata” naast en tegenover “vita aeterna” bij Lactantius, Ambrosius en Augustinus, onder invloed van de romeinsche Stoa (Baarn 1947), pp. 131-173, esp. pp. 155ff., along with Iac. Couvée’s treatment is, however, far from comprehensive, and fails to note the neo-Platonist influences which sit alongside the in Ambrose. Some details are also noted in J.E. Niederhuber, Die Lehre des hl. Ambrosius vom Reiche Gottes auf Erden. Eine patristische Studie (Mainz 1904), pp. 143- 159, and esp. pp. 191-204; F.H. Dudden, The Life and Times of St. Ambrose 2 (Oxford 1935), pp. 514-519 (again missing the neo-Platonism). See too: R. Holte, Béatitude et sagesse: saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne (Paris 1962), pp. 63-70, 165-176, 193-231; E. Dassmann, Die Frömmigkeit des Kirchenvaters Ambrosius von Mailand: Quellen und Entfaltung (Münster 1965), pp. 261-267. 6. On Cicero’s sources, see M. Testard, Cicéron, Les Devoirs 1 (Paris 1965), pp. 25-49; on the work generally, P. Mackendrick, The Philosophical Books of Cicero (London 1989), pp. 232-257. THE VITA BEATA 201 society, where challenges were being experienced from both pagan revivalism and Arian doctrinal deviancy (1.24). Ambrose’s work almost certainly consists of a number of addresses to these clerics on Ciceronian ethical topics, which have subsequently been slightly revised and collected for publication as a treatise on eccle- siastical conduct7. Ambrose’s introduction to book 2 does not parallel a similar section in Cicero. In Off. 2.1-8, Cicero introduces the theme of expediency, and defends the study of philosophy as he has been pursuing it in his recent writings; he also seeks to defend his posi- tion as one who sympathizes with Academic scepticism, pointing to the pragmatic epistemology proposed in his Academica, where it is argued that we can act on the basis of probability, once both sides of a question have been examined. Cicero has the phrase ad bene beateque vivendum in Off. 2.6, as he describes the practical quest of the philosophers, but he says no more about the vita beata in this section (he had already dealt with the subject at a popular level in Stoic Paradoxes 6-19, and in a thorough fashion in De Finibus and in Tusculan Disputations 5). Ambrose evokes Cicero at the beginning and end of his discussion, in 2.1 (superiore libro de officiis tractavimus, quae convenire honestati arbitraremur: cf. Cicero, Off. 2.1) and in 2.21 (sed iam ad proposita pergamus: cf. Cicero, Off. 2.8), and he mentions honestas or the honestum in 2.1,3-4,8, but otherwise there is no allusion to Ciceronian lan- guage, not even to the theme of expediency which is to occupy

7. So, int. al., M. Ihm, ‘Studia Ambrosiana,’ Jahrbücher für klassisches Philologie suppl. bd. 17 (1890), p. 27; R. Thamin, Saint Ambroise et la morale chrétienne au IVe siècle. Etude comparée des traités “Des Devoirs” de Cicéron et de saint Ambroise (Paris 1895), pp. 216-217; Th. Schmidt, Ambrosius, sein Werk de Officiis Libri III und die Stoa (Augsburg 1897), pp. 12-13; O. Barden- hewer, Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 3 (Freiburg 1912), p. 529; J.-R. Palanque, Saint Ambroise et l’Empire romain: contribution à l’histoire des rap- ports de l’Eglise et de l’Etat à la fin du quatrième siècle (Paris 1933), pp. 452- 455; Dudden 2, p. 694; A. Paredi, Saint Ambrose: His Life and Times (Notre Dame, Ind. 1964) p. 316. On the other hand, W. Steidle, ‘Beobachtungen zum Gedankengang im 2. Buch von Ambrosius, De officiis,’ Vigiliae Christianae 39 (1985), pp. 280-298, argues that book 2 is carefully constructed. On the compo- sition of the work more broadly, see M. Testard, ‘Etude sur la composition dans le “De officiis ministrorum” de saint Ambroise,’ in Y.-M. Duval, op. cit., pp. 155-197; id., ‘Recherches de quelques méthodes de travail de saint Ambroise dans le De officiis,’ Recherches Augustiniennes 24 (1989), pp. 65-122. 202 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE book 2. It is possible, though we cannot be sure, that 2.1-21 comes from an independent homily on the vita beata, which Ambrose has inserted into the published version of Off. by adding a little Ciceronian language. It is clear from even a cursory reading of 2.1-21 that Ambrose works with two distinct controlling concepts of the vita beata: (1) vita beata in a Christian sense, identified with eternal life; (2) vita beata in a non-Christian sense, associated with virtue, the bless- ings of a good conscience, and the moral benefits of suffering and privation. The coexistence of these two strands offers a fascinating glimpse into the way in which Ambrose combines biblical per- spectives with principles which he has inherited from classical philosophy. I shall consider his handling of each sense of vita beata in turn. (1) In 2.1, Ambrose sets the tone of his discussion by referring to his treatment of honestas in book 1: the honourable is the ideal in qua vitam beatam positam esse nulli dubitaverunt quam Scrip- tura appellat vitam aeternam. Scripture defines the blessed life as eternal life. Eternal life is called blessed ut non hominum opinion- ibus aestimandum relinqueretur sed divino iudicio committeretur (2.3). When it comes to defining this type of blessed life, Ambrose draws on the range of NT conceptions, depicting eternal life as a future reality with benefits in the present. A good deal of debate has, of course, taken place over the differences between the use of (eternal) life in the Synoptic Gospels and in the Fourth Gospel. Without entering into the complexities of the subject, I take it that the Synoptics do present a realized as well as a futuristic eschatol- ogy (so C.H. Dodd), and that the Johannine perspective is not just of eternal life as present reality but also of future resurrection into fulness of blessing (pace the theory that verses such as John 5.28- 29 and 6.54 are the work of a later ecclesiastical redactor who sought harmony with the Synoptics)8. Taking both sides together, it can be said that eternal life in the Gospels is both a present

8. C.H. Dodd, The Parables of the Kingdom (New York 1936); R. Bultmann, ‘zao ktl.’ in G.Kittel (ed.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 2 (Grand Rapids, MI 1964), pp. 832-875. THE VITA BEATA 203 experience and a future perfection of relationship with God, entered by faith in Jesus who has made such a relationship possi- ble, and evidenced by a faithful discipleship of good works. What- ever may be said about the diversity in Pauline eschatological expressions, and the tensions caused by development, the Pauline view of eternal life is of a life qualitatively different from life as it is presently known, a life which God bestows as part of the age to come, when immortality will become a full reality for believers9. Ambrose presents the blessedness of eternal life as something already entered in this world. There is present reward for discreet almsgiving and fasting, for we are assured of God’s approval (2.2- 3). Fundamentally, Scripture specifies that eternal life consists in cognitione…Divinitatis et fructu bonae operationis (2.5). Ambrose quotes the definition of John 17.3, and the promise of present reward as well as future life for good works in Matthew 19.29 (2.5). Eternal life rests on the good foundation of faith; good works are the proof in words and deeds that a man is iustus (2.7), or approved by God. Faith is a sure foundation on which to build an enduring edifice of good works, and a safe harbour in which the vessel of works may berth (2.7). The blessed life is not a matter of external circumstances, but of freedom from sin and being filled with the grace of God; the beatus vir, as the Psalms say, is he who shuns the company of the ungodly and walks according to the law of the Lord (2.8). The ability to rejoice when persecuted because of righteousness (2.9), to be courageous in the face of danger (2.10-11), and to count the attractions of physical pleasure and worldly gain as loss for the sake of Christ (2.12-14; cf. 2.17) characterizes the believer’s present blessedness. On the other hand, there is stress on blessedness as future reward. For those who seek glory in this world, the supposed real- ity of their present felicity is in fact an umbra futurorum, an obsta- cle to eternal life (2.2.); for those who are content to seek their reward from God, there is the genuine reality that they will have recompense from the auctor aeternitatis (2.3). The knowledge of

9. For an up-to-date overview of the issues, see L.J. Kreitzer, ‘Eschatology,’ in G.F. Hawthorne, R.P. Martin, & D.G. Reid (eds.), Dictionary of Paul and his Letters (Downers Grove, IL. & Leicester 1993), pp. 253-269. 204 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE

God and good works will have a future, everlasting reward (2.6- 7,9); wealth, health, and happiness are actually an impediment to the kind of life which will be blessed as the last, whereas poverty, hunger, and sorrow will be rewarded (2.15-16; cf. 1.28-29,59). Eternal life spes futurorum est (2.18). As Ambrose puts it in 1.191, the vision of God which is promised to the pure in heart is synonymous with the solum bonum, the honourable. This Christian orientation of the vita beata is illustrated, typi- cally, with biblical exempla: Moses (2.10,13); Aaron (2.11); Daniel (2.11); Paul (2.12); Elijah (2.14); Naboth (2.17); Isaac (2.20); Jacob (2.20); Joseph (2.20); David (2.20); and Job (2.20)10. There is substantial deployment of scriptural language: in 2.6 and 2.8, Ambrose evokes the beatus vir of the Psalms, and in 2.9 and 2.15 he quotes from the Beatitudes. He is clearly seeking to establish the validity and to emphasize the importance of the vita beata theme by authenticating the language in the Scriptures. The blessedness of which secular philosophy speaks is something which can be found also — and, in the case of the OT tradition, earlier (cf. 2.6) — in the Bible11. The biblical legacy is set in antithesis to the prescriptions of blessedness given by pagan philosophers. Ambrose surveys the classical field thus: Itaque philosophi vitam beatam, alii in non dolendo posuerunt, ut Hieronymus, alii in rerum scientia, ut Herillus, qui audiens ab Aris- totele et Theophrasto mirabiliter laudatam esse rerum scientiam, solam eam quasi summum bonum posuit cum illi eam quasi bonum, non quasi solum bonum laudaverint. alii voluptatem dixerunt, ut Epi- curus, alii, ut Callipho et post eum Diodorus, ita interpretati sunt ut alter ad voluptatem, alter ad vacuitatem doloris consortium honesta- tis adiungerent, quod sine ea non possit esse beata vita. Zeno Stoicus solum et summum bonum quod honestum est; Aristoteles autem vel Theophrastus et ceteri Peripatetici in virtute quidem, hoc est hones- tate, vitam beatam esse, sed compleri eius beatitudinem etiam cor- poris atque externis bonis adseruerunt. (2.4) 10. On Ambrose’s exempla, see Thamin, pp. 244-249; G. Madec, Saint Ambroise et la philosophie (Paris 1974), pp. 179-186; R. Sauer, Studien zur Pflichtenlehre des Ambrosius von Mailand (Würzburg 1981), pp. 192-201. 11. Ambrose makes similar efforts to authenticate the basic Ciceronian philo- sophical language in the Bible: officium (1.25); officium medium and officium perfectum (1.36-37; cf. 3.10); honestas/honestum (1.221); utilitas/utile (2.23- 27); decorum/decet (1.30, 221, 223-224). THE VITA BEATA 205

Goulven Madec has pointed out that Ambrose here follows the doxography of Cicero, Fin. 5.7312: Saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus Herillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. multa sunt dicta ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despiciendis rebus humanis; hoc unum Aristo tenuit; praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendam aut expetendam. positum est a nostris in iis esse rebus quae secundum naturam essent non dolere; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit. at vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamasset, alter vacuitatem doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime. The details can be delineated quickly. Hieronymus of Rhodes was a Peripatetic philosopher and literary historian who lived at Athens c. 290-230 B.C. He held that the supreme good is the absence of pain: Cicero, Acad. 2.131; Fin. 2.8,16,19,32,35,41; 5.14,20,73; Tusc. 2.15; 5.84,87-88. Herillus (or Erillus) of Carthage, fl. c. 260 B.C., was a disciple of Zeno the Stoic and the founder of a separate, strict Stoic sect which does not appear to have survived beyond the end of the third century B.C. He taught that knowledge is the highest good, and that virtue is only a sub- ordinate end which differs according to circumstances: Cicero, Acad. 2.129; Fin. 2.43; 4.36,40; 5.23,73 (cf. also Tusc. 5.85; Off. 1.6). Theophrastus of Eresus in Lesbos, c. 370-288/7 B.C., was in turn Aristotle’s pupil, collaborator, and successor. He carried out extensive researches in science, especially botany, though little of his work survives; he was also an accomplished orator and prose stylist. In ethics, he followed his master (384-322 B.C.) in arguing that the highest good is a combination of virtuous activity of soul and external prosperity: Cicero, Acad. 1.33,35; 2.134; Fin. 5.12,77,85-86; Tusc. 5.24 (on Aristotle, cf. Cicero, Acad. 2.131; Fin. 2.19; 4.14 15)13. The association which Ambrose makes between Theophrastus and Aristotle is directly inspired by Cicero, Fin. 5.73.

12. Madec, pp. 171-172 (and p. 133 n. 240). 13. Aristotle and the Peripatetics distinguished three types of bona: those of the soul, of the body, and of fortune/the externals (NE 1098b12 ff., noted by Ambrose in Abr. 2.33, following Philo, Quaest. Gen. 3.16). 206 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE

Like other early Christian spokesmen, Ambrose inherits Cicero’s repugnance towards the voluptas ideal of Epicurus (c. 341-270 B.C.): it is seen as debased hedonism, not, as Epicurus actually intended, as a life of quietism, freedom from passion, the enjoy- ment of friendship, and the contemplation of the universe (cf. Cicero, Fin. 2; Tusc. 3.36-51). Ambrose calls Epicurus assertor voluptatis and defensor voluptatis (Ep. 63.13,19; cf. 63.17) and says that philosophers who are thought to be sobrii (doubtless he has Cicero especially in mind) laugh at Epicurus velut ebrium et voluptatis patronum (Off. 1.50)14. Callipho, whose floruit is probably in the early third century B.C., was a Cyrenaic or Epicurean disciple who believed that the end of man is a combination of pleasure and virtue. He stressed pleasure of the mind, whereas the hedonist Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaics, concentrated on bodily pleasure: Cicero, Acad. 2.131,139; Fin. 2.19,34-35; 4.50; 5.21; Tusc. 5.85. Callipho is sometimes linked with one Dinomachus. Cicero rejects the joining of voluptas to honestas as an impossible attempt to link opposites: Off. 3.119. Diodorus was successor to Critolaus as leader of the Peripatetic school, c. 110 B.C. He held that the summum bonum is virtue plus freedom from pain: Cicero, Acad. 2.131; Fin. 2.19,34- 35; 4.50; 5.14,21; Tusc. 5.85. (335-262 B.C.) was, of course, the founder of Stoicism, who taught in the Stoa Poikile at Athens from 313/2 B.C. He taught that the sole, supreme good is honestas, and that this is sufficient for the blessed life, which consists of living according to nature: Cicero, Acad. 1.35; 2.131; Fin. 3 (especially 50,58); 5 (especially 79ff.); Tusc. 5 (especially 33); Off. 3.3515. Stoic, Epicurean, and Peripatetic views are compared by Cicero in Fin. 5.74-7516.

14. Cf. further Abr. 2.3; 2.85. For the position of Western Christian authors in general, see W. Schmid, ‘Epikur,’ Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum 5 (Stuttgart 1962), pp. 792ff. 15. On all of these philosophers, I draw on the details given by A.A. Long & D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (2 Vols., Cambridge 1987), where the other Greek and Latin sources besides Cicero can be found. 16. Interestingly, Lactantius, Inst. 3.7-8 also lists the definitions of the sum- mum bonum given by Hieronymus, Herillus, Callipho, Diodorus, Zeno, Epicurus, and Aristotle, among others: he very probably also follows this section of Cicero. THE VITA BEATA 207

Just as Ambrose critically surveys the physics of the secular philosophers in Exaëmeron 1.1-4, so he shows hostility to the ethics of pagan thinkers here17. He begins 2.4 with itaque, which implies a link between the views of the philosophers and the pop- ulares opiniones (2.2) or hominum opiniones (2.3) which he has just dismissed (the notions that present prosperity constitutes blessedness). No distinction is made here between those philoso- phers who emphasized bodily pleasure or temporal goods and those who rejected them: the philosophers en bloc are as much astray as the ordinary masses. 2.5 opens with an immediate antithesis to the philosophers’ tenets: Scriptura autem divina: as so often throughout De Officiis and throughout his œuvre gener- ally, Ambrose deliberately contrasts secular wisdom with the truth revealed in the Scriptures18. The scientia which really matters for blessedness of life is not the scientific expertise so esteemed by Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Herillus, but the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ (2.5). The polemic against pagan thought is continued in 2.6. Ambrose firmly believes in the conceit beloved of the Apologists, that pagan philosophers plagiarized their best thoughts from the Scriptures — the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy. Examples in De Officiis can be found in 1.31,79-80,92,126,132-135,141,180 (cf. also 2.43). In several places, he emphasizes the anteriority of biblical material without explicitly accusing the pagans of plagia- rism: cf. 1.31,43-44,94,118; 2.48; 3.2,80,92. The pivotal idea is that anteriority equals superiority: cf. 1.92 (sed ille sensus huius habet gratiam qui prior dixit) and especially 3.92: redeamus ad

17. So Madec, p. 84; see further J. Pépin, Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne (Ambroise, Exam. I.i.1-4) (Paris 1964). 18. On the antithesis of Scripture and philosophy, see Madec, passim. Madec’s work has been criticized for failing to distinguish between individual philosophical views, to which Ambrose is hostile, and the activity of philoso- phy, to which, arguably, he is not, and for not recognizing the subtle philo- sophical influences on Ambrose of intermediaries like Philo and Origen (see, e.g., H. Savon, ‘Saint Ambroise et la philosophie à propos d’une étude récente,’ Revue d’histoire de religions 191 (1977), pp. 173-196). Some of the criticisms are pertinent, but the basic tendency of Ambrose’s approach, as Off. plainly shows, is indeed to contrast the Christian and the secular thought- worlds. 208 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE nostrum Moysen, atque ad superiora revertamur, ut quanto praes- tantiora tanto antiquiora promamus. The same conviction is at work in 2.6. Ambrose cannot claim that the Hellenistic philoso- phers developed their ideas later than Christ (whose words are quoted in 2.5), but he goes back to the ‘prophet’ David, who spoke of blessedness long before the name of the philosophers was heard19. He recalls various statements from the Psalms which describe the condition of the beatus vir or the beati who know God and do good works (2.6 and 2.8). The starkest antithesis comes in 2.8: Et quoniam sola rerum scientia explosa est vel quasi inanis secun- dum philosophiae disputationes superfluas vel quasi semiperfecta sententia, consideremus quam enodem de eo Scriptura divina absol- vat sententiam, de quo tam multiplices et implicitas atque confusas videmus quaestiones esse philosophiae. The verb explosa est is used by Cicero in rejection of particular philosophical tenets in Fin. 5.23 and Off. 1.6. Ambrose contrasts the complicated debates of philosophy with the clear and authori- tative presentation of truth in the Bible. Perhaps he thinks of the review of philosophical opinions in treatises such as Cicero’s De Finibus and Tusculan Disputations, on which Lactantius bases his survey in Inst. 3.7ff. Christians could with some justification regard classical moral teleology as a labyrinthine subject: Augus- tine notes that Varro’s De Philosophia (now lost) enumerated 288 possible schools of thought de finibus bonorum et malorum (CD 19.1). (2) However, despite Ambrose’s assertion that his authority comes from Scripture (cf. 2.3,5,8 with 1.36,106,131,151; 2.65; also 2.113)20, there are several features in 2.1-21 which reveal a deep affinity with Stoic thought. The early Stoics thought that virtue does not require the addition of favourable external circum-

19. Ambrose follows Cicero, Tusc. 5.10 in repeating the commonplace theory that the word ‘philosophy’ was invented by Pythagoras (Abr. 2.37; cf. Virg. 3.19; also Augustine, CD 8.2; 18.37). Pythagoras came after David, of course (Off. 1.31), and borrowed ideas from the OT Scriptures (Off. 1.31; Expos. Ps. 118.2.5; Ep. 28.1). 20. See T.G. Ring, Auctoritas bei Tertullian, Cyprian und Ambrosius (Würzburg 1975), pp. 183-196. THE VITA BEATA 209 stances for a person to be blessed; conditions such as wealth or poverty and health or sickness are strictly adiaphora, or morally neutral (though one may clearly be preferable to another). Panaetius argued that such externals may be conducive to the practice of virtue and living according to nature, and so they can be regarded as lesser goods, which enable the individual to progress towards the summum bonum. However, Stoicism consis- tently maintained that the highest end is a life of virtue, whether this is attained by repudiation of every vice and detachment from externals (so the ancient Stoa), or by rational control of subra- tional passions and judicious handling of one’s personal nature and circumstances (so the middle and later Stoics); outward good fortune is not necessary to happiness. We find Ambrose striking the same note. Thus, in 2.1, the blessed life is said to be produced by tranquil- litas conscientiae et securitas innocentiae. In his study of the theme of conscience in De Officiis, Maurice Testard has argued that Ambrose takes over from Roman Stoicism (especially from Cicero) an esteem for the autonomous , and that his presenta- tion of conscience is predominantly patterned on the classical con- cept rather than on NT teaching21. I think that Testard has over- stated his case to some extent (the classical and the biblical pictures are surely not always mutually exclusive), but his com- ments on the presentation of conscience in 2.1-21 are basically sound: Ambrose oscillates between philosophical and Christian perspectives. The opinions of other people do not matter: the cri- terion of blessedness is internal, as perceived domesticis…sensi- bus, tamquam sui iudex (2.2; cf. 1.147; 3.24). Blessedness in the midst of dolores is possible when virtue is in control, which abounds with its own riches vel ad conscientiam vel ad gratiam (2.10)22. Virtue displays to itself the suavitas of a good conscience (2.12). The blessed life is not to be found in physical well-being

21. M. Testard, ‘Observations sur le thème de la conscientia dans le De officiis ministrorum de saint Ambroise,’ Revue des études latines 51 (1973), pp. 219-261. 22. In 2.10, vel ad conscientiam vel ad gratiam seems to link the Christian side (grace) to the classical concept (conscience) — so Testard, ‘Observations sur le thème de la conscientia’, pp. 237-238. 210 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE and pleasure but in altitudine sapientiae, suavitate conscientiae, virtutis sublimitate (2.19), though the harvest of a blessed con- science can be interrupted aliquo acerbo doloris (2.21)23. Although in 2.8-9 innocence is clearly related to freedom from sin, and although biblical citations are to be found in connection with the conscience theme in 2.2,10,12, it would appear that Ambrose can picture conscience without immediate reference to God (2.12,19,21), in a fashion which evokes the autarcheia of the Stoic sage, for whom rational control is possible because of the immanence of the . A similar impression is made in Ambrose’s evaluation of exter- nals. Again and again, he repudiates the (Peripatetic) view that external bona are necessary in addition to virtus (cf. 2.4), and preaches the Stoic supremacy of virtue alone, as is argued classi- cally by Cicero in Parad. 6-19 and especially in Tusc. 5, and by Seneca in such texts as Ep. 92 and De vita beata. The fulgor hon- estatis completely eclipses the lesser brightness of the supposed bona of outward things, as the sun excels the splendour of the moon and the stars (2.1)24. His appeal to Scripture contra philoso- phy in 2.8 is actually followed by the claim that Scripture teaches the (traditional Stoic) position that virtue alone is sufficient for blessedness, and the irrelevance of externals: virtue neque augea- tur bonis corporis vel externis, neque minuatur adversis. The Christian concept of freedom from sin is joined to this (2.8). Again, Scripture can show that the blessed life is marked by the rejection of voluptas and of doloris metus (2.9,12), just as the Sto- ics argue contra Epicurean ethics (on dolor, cf. Cicero, Tusc. 2, especially 31ff.). Or consider 2.18: certum est solum et summum bonum virtutem esse eamque abundare solam ad vitae fructum

23. I read acerbo not acervo , following the arguments of A.-V. Nazzaro, ‘Ambrosiana II. Note di critica testuale e d’esegesi,’ Vichiana 8 (1979), pp. 203- 210. 24. It is interesting that Cicero uses a similar image of the superiority of the radiance of the sun over that of the stars for the splendour of the virtues over bodily goods in Fin. 5.71 and 5.90, close to the passage (5.73) which Ambrose evokes in 2.4. The imagery of light and darkness is of course prominent in Ambrose, often under biblical inspiration (cf., e.g., 1.54-56; 2.64), and, also from Scripture, he uses the image of light very frequently as a Christological motif: see R. Morgan, Light in the Theology of Saint Ambrose (Rome 1963). THE VITA BEATA 211 beatae, nec externis aut corporis bonis sed virtute sola vitam praestari beatam…. Ambrose comes very close to avocating the of the Stoic sage. The blessed person is not deeply troubled by problems like poverty, hunger, pain, and danger (2.10-15), or blindness, exile, dishonour to or loss of children, and destruction of property (2.20). Certainly, there is some bitterness in these things, which virtus animi does not hide, but it is outweighed by the blessings of a good conscience (2.21). Again, we are reminded of the Stoic arguments in Cicero, Parad. 17-18; Tusc. 5 (e.g., on blindness: 5.110-115; on exile: 5.106-109; on simplicity of food: 5.97-102) or Fin. 5.84-86 (listing such afflictions as blindness, exile, need, childlessness, etc.). Ambrose gives standard examples of the worldly misfortunes to which the Stoic sage is indifferent. Bless- ing comes not from being in the midst of suffering for its own sake but in triumphing over suffering and not being broken tem- poralis motu doloris (2.19). The person who achieves such victory is similarly unconcerned about the absence of riches, which are of no benefit to the blessed life (2.14-17). Ambrose is again close to the Stoic paradox, that only the wise man is rich (Cicero, Parad. 42-52), the principle which he expounds to Simplicianus in Ep. 38 (cf. also Iac. 2.12). He is fond elsewhere of quoting Proverbs 17.6 (e.g., 1.118: sapienti et iusto totus mundus divitiarum est), adapt- ing the image of the Stoic sage who possesses all things to the Christian ideal of the man of faith who gives away his wealth in this world and inherits everlasting treasure in the next25. A related opinion is taken of freedom and slavery. Joseph was blessed in his servitude because he had resisted the libidines of Potiphar’s wife (2.20): on the superiority of inward freedom to the freedom of the flesh, one is reminded of the Stoic paradox that only the sage is free (Cicero, Parad. 33-41), which heavily marks the argument of Ambrose’s Ep. 37. Where he differs from all the Stoics (and especially, of course, from the perspective of Seneca) is in his argument that riches are in fact a hindrance to the vita beata, and that poverty is a blessed

25. See V.R. Vasey, ‘Proverbs 17:6b (LXX) and St. Ambrose’s Man of Faith,’ Augustinianum 14 (1974), pp. 259-276. 212 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE state (2.13-17; cf. 1.28-29,59-64,241-245). At this point, he is inspired once more by his reading of Scripture, and particularly with the Beatitude, ‘Blessed are the poor…’ (2.15; cf. 1.59): the godly poor are unencumbered by the dangers of wealth, and in the realization of their need they seek help from God, who will fur- nish them with eternal riches as a reward for their faithfulness, while the evil rich will be punished (2.16; 2.2.)26. Riches are to be despised: 1.23, 137, 182, 184-185, 192-193, 241-246; 2.66-67, 89, 108, 129-133; 3.57-5827. This Christian evaluation of wealth is typical of Ambrose’s stance on expediency generally in book 2 of De Officiis: utilitas is not a matter of temporal gain, but of behav- iour which contributes to the attainment of other-worldly benefit for others and for oneself (cf. 1.27-28; 2.23, 26-27; 3.9, 63). Related to this attitude to externals is the traditional Roman notion that to shun outward glory is to rise above it and to acquire true honour: itaque quo minus sequitur gloriam, eo magis super eam eminet (2.2), echoing Sallust, Cat. 54.6 and Pliny, Ep. 1.8.1428. Ambrose ties this to Jesus’s words about those who give alms or fast ostentatiously: habent mercedem suam (Matthew 6.2ff., quoted in 2.2). All the same, the argument is very classical. The most explicitly Stoic sentiment is found in 2.18, a para- graph which has received a good deal of attention from scholars who have examined Ambrose’s relationship to Stoicism: certum est solum et summum bonum virtutem esse eamque abundare solam ad vitae fructum beatae, nec externis aut corporis bonis sed vir- tute sola vitam praestari beatam per quam vita aeterna acquiritur. vita enim beata fructus praesentium, vita autem aeterna spes futurorum est.

26. In 2.15, Ambrose quotes the Lukan version, beati pauperes (Lk. 6.20); in 1.59, he cites the Matthean version, beati pauperes spiritu (Mt. 5.3), though he treats it also as referring to material poverty: non dixit, beati divites, sed pau- peres. For similar exegesis elsewhere in Ambrose, see B. In-San Tschang, Octo Beatitudines: die Acht Seligspreisungen als Stufenleiter der Seele bei Ambrosius (Bonn 1976), pp. 7-33. 27. The imagery of looking down from a citadel of wisdom (1.192; cf. 1.137) is classical: cf. Statius, Silv. 2.2.131-132, and esp. Lucretius, 2.7ff. See further R.A. Gauthier, Magnanimité. Idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne (Paris 1951), pp. 223ff. 28. Cf. also Livy, 20.39.20: gloriam qui spreverit, veram habebit. On this idea as a principle of Roman politics, see D. Earl, The Moral and Political Tra- dition of Rome (London 1967), pp. 11-43. THE VITA BEATA 213

The difficulty lies in the ambiguity of Ambrose’s Latin: does per quam refer to vitam beatam or to virtute sola? Is eternal life obtained by the blessed life, or by virtue alone? A number of scholars have argued that per quam should be taken with vitam beatam. The argument runs thus: earlier in the sentence, Ambrose speaks of the fructus of the vita beata, which might then be said to be vita aeterna: the blessed life in this world, characterized by virtue, is the way to the future reward of eternal life. Supporters of this interpretation are uneasy with the alternative view, that Ambrose is making virtue the sole prerequisite for vita aeterna, without mentioning faith29. Nevertheless, I believe that this second reading is more persua- sive: the antecedent of per quam is virtute sola30. At the beginning

29. So Niederhuber, p. 192; id., Des heiligen KIrchenlehrers Ambrosius von Mailand, Pflichtenlehre und ausgewählte Kleinereschriften (Bibliothek der Kirchenväter 3.1.32, Kempten & Munich 1917), p. 5 n. 2 and translation ad loc.; M. Badura, Die leitenden Grundsätze des hl. Ambrosius (Prague 1921), p. 17; H. de Romestin’s translation in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church 10 (repr., Grand Rapids, MI 1980), ad loc.; Dudden 2, p. 516; Dassmann, p. 264 n. 314; Testard, ‘Etude sur la composition’, p. 175; id., ‘Observations sur le thème de la conscientia’, p. 238; id., translation in Budé text, ad loc.; R.E. Crouter, Ambrose’s ‘On the Duties of the Clergy’: A Study of its Setting, Content, and Significance in the Light of its Stoic and Ciceronian Sources (Th.D. diss., Union Theological Seminary, New York 1968), p. 253. See also the comments of H.H. Scullard, Early Christian Ethics in the West, from Clement to Ambrose (London 1907), pp. 183-187; L. Visconti, ‘Il primo trattato di filosofia morale cristiana (Il De Officiis di S. Ambrogio e di Cicerone)’, Atti della Reale Accademia d’Archeolgia, Lettere e Belle Arti di Napoli 25.2 (1908), pp. 54-57. 30. So D. Leitmeir, Apologie der christlichen Moral. Darstellung des Ver- hältnisses der heidnischen und christlichen Ethik, zunächst nach einer Vergle- ichung des ciceronianischen Buches “De officiis“ und dem gleichnamigen des heiligen Ambrosius (Augsburg 1866), p. 65; P. Ewald, Der Einfluss der stoisch- ciceronianisch Moral auf die Darstellung der Ethik bei Ambrosius (Leipzig 1881), p. 26 n. 1; Schmidt, pp. 18-19; Thamin, p. 220 n. 3; F. Wagner, Der Sit- tlichkeitsbegriff in der hl. Schrift und in der altchristlichen Ethik (Münster 1931), p. 220; J. Stelzenberger, Die Beziehungen der frühchristlichen Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa. Eine moralgeschichtliche Studie (Munich 1933), pp. 335-340; A. Cavasin, Sant’ Ambrogio, Dei Doveri degli Ecclesiastici, testo, introduzione, ver- sione e note (Turin 1938), translation ad loc.; J.T. Muckle, ‘The De Officiis Min- istrorum of Saint Ambrose: An Example of the Process of the Christianization of the Latin Language,’ Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939), pp. 68,73; Couvée, pp. 172- 173; A.F. Coyle, ‘Cicero’s De Officiis and the De Officiis Ministrorum of St. Ambrose,’ Franciscan Studies 15 (1955), p. 233; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa. 214 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE of the paragraph, Ambrose stresses that virtue is the solum et sum- mum bonum, which uniquely redounds towards the fructus of the blessed life. In the last sentence of the paragraph, he clearly dis- tinguishes the blessed life and eternal life: the blessed life is the fructus praesentium, while eternal life is the spes futurorum. There is no hint that the latter is gained by the former. Ambrose is obvi- ously differing from what he says in 2.1,3-5, where he makes vita beata and vita aeterna synonyms. He is here using vita beata to describe an earthly state which is obtained by virtue. Virtue secures one level of blessedness in this life, and another, the com- plete blessedness of vita aeterna, in the world to come. Such a concept of degrees of blessedness accords fully with what Ambrose says elsewhere in De Officiis: he speaks of progressing towards heavenly perfection in 1.233-240, and distinguishes the types of perfection which are possible in this world and the next in 3.11 (cf, also the virtutis profectus mentioned in 2.113). 2.18 is, then, it seems to me, a passage where Ambrose’s Stoic mind-set is remarkably transparent, as he highlights virtus as the solum et summum bonum and as the way to blessedness of one kind in the present and to eternal life in the future, without any mention of faith. It is of course clear from 2.5-7 and 2.9 that he thinks of virtus in terms of Christian good works, and in 2.9 he asserts that good works earn the blessedness of eternal life, again with- out referring to faith (which appears in 2.5-7). He thus fuses Stoic and Christian ideas: virtue is the ‘hope and cause of heaven’31,

Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung 1 (Göttingen 1948), p. 446; G. Banterle, Sant’ Ambrogio: opere morale I — I Doveri, introduzione, traduzione e note (Milan & Rome 1977), translation ad loc.; Sauer, pp. 39-41. 31. Muckle, pp. 72-73. Cf. also Fuga 37, where eternal life is said to be acquired virtute; and Off. 1.125, where the biblical reference to entering the reg- num caelorum at last comes after an allusion to Cicero, Off. 1.19 on thinking about how to live beate honesteque, an ideal which may be approached operibus. It is typical of Ambrose to focus on works in the context of eschatological salva- tion; he is preeminently a man of action, interested in encouraging correct prac- tical behaviour as much as in discussing mystical or spiritual knowledge. At the same time, a comprehensive reading of his works reveals the extent to which he asserts that meritorious good works are possible only as a result of grace and inner regeneration: so P.D. Löpfe, Die Tugendlehre des heiligen Ambrosius (Sar- nen 1951), esp. pp. 30-70, 96-99, 152-173 (though Löpfe greatly underestimates the Stoic influence). THE VITA BEATA 215 the prerequisite for earthly happiness and for eschatological bliss32. It is not surprising that Ambrose finds much of lasting value in Stoicism: similar points of contact are of course evident in Chris- tian writers from Paul onwards, and it would be natural for a Christian of Ambrose’s social and educational background to retain his affection for the sensible, gentlemanly pragmatism of the Roman Stoicism presented in Cicero’s De Officiis33. However, scholarly preoccupation with the Ciceronian input into the Christ- ian De Officiis has tended to produce a neglect of another vital element of Ambrose’s thought — neo-Platonism. Milan was, of course, a centre of sophisticated Christian Platonism, the circle of Manlius Theodorus, Zenobius, Hermogenianus, Simplicianus, and Marius Victorinus, who so inspired Augustine. Ambrose, an able reader of Greek, skilfully exploits material from Apuleius, Ploti- nus, and Porphyry in his sermons, and is an effective Christian missionary to the cultured high society of non-Christian Platon- ism34. He inherits from the Platonist tradition an extremely sharp

32. See Sauer, pp. 35-47; cf. Niederhuber, pp. 191-204. 33. See J.T. Muckle, ‘The Influence of Cicero in the Formation of Christian Culture,’ Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 42.3 (1948), pp. 107-125; N.E. Nelson, ‘Cicero’s De Officiis in Christian Thought: 300-1300,’ in Essays and Studies in English and Comparative Literature 10 (Ann Arbor, MI 1933), pp. 59-160. The absorption of Stoicism into Christian thought generally is sur- veyed in many works, among them Pohlenz 1, pp. 400ff.; M. Spanneut, Le Stoï- cisme des Pères de l’Eglise, de Clément de Rome à Clément d’Alexandrie (Paris 1957); M.L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages 2: Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century (Leiden 1985). For a study of the blessedness theme in the matrix of the first century, see W.S. Vorster, ‘Stoics and Early Christians on Blessedness,’ in D.L. Balch, E. Ferguson & W. Meeks (eds.), Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abra- ham J.Malherbe (Minneapolis 1990), pp. 38-51. 34. One of the expedients tried by Ambrose in his attempt to escape ordina- tion was, according to his biographer Paulinus, philosophiam profiteri voluit (vita Ambr. 7). P. Courcelle, Recherches sur saint Ambroise. “Vies“ anciennes, cul- ture, iconographie (Paris 1973), pp. 9-16, suggests that this may have been a desire to withdraw to a life of neo-Platonist reflection (though cf. Madec, pp. 24- 25 n. 8). The Platonism in Ambrose’s works has been traced in a number of important articles: esp. P. Courcelle, ‘Plotin et saint Ambroise,’ Revue de Philo- gie 76 (1950), pp. 29-56; id., ‘Nouveaux aspects du Platonisme chez saint Ambroise,’ Revue des études latines 34 (1956), pp. 220-239; id., ‘De Platon à saint Ambroise par Apulée. Parallèles textuels entre le “De excessu fratris“ et le “De Platone et eius dogmate“,’ Revue de Philologie 87 (1961), pp. 15-28; id., 216 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE dualism of body and soul, and of the corrupt saeculum and the spiritual community, which is fundamental to his whole outlook35. It marks all of his moral and spiritual teaching. His sexual ethics are based upon the conviction that the rational powers of the soul must triumph over the evil instincts of the body and the dangerous allurements of the world; the believer finds strength by ‘putting on Christ’ in the regenerative water of baptism and thus by being taken up into a life of quasi-divine purity and self-control36. Chris- tian life is an ascent of the soul through earthly trials to the pure bliss of eschatological fellowship with God. Such Platonist perspectives emerge noticeably in 2.1-21. For example, 2.19 emphasizes the frailty of the human body, in which necesse est to suffer problems such as pain, grief, and sickness. The vita beata is experienced in altitudine sapientiae, suavitate conscientiae, virtutis sublimitate, not in corpore exsultatione (2.19). But not only is mental or spiritual prosperity superior to physical; Ambrose argues that physical troubles are spiritually beneficial: suffering is in fact conducive to the attainment of ulti- mate blessedness (2.10-21). He is here differing from traditional Stoicism, which views these conditions as morally neutral (though and Seneca can also see some value in suffering). For Ambrose, the vita beata appears eminently in these very troubles (2.9): dolores are of positive value to the redemptive progress of the believer, because when rightly handled (in humility, asceti- cism, and faith) they win the favour and reward of God eternally.

‘Anti-Christian Arguments and Christian Platonism: from Arnobius to Ambrose,’ in A. Momigliano (ed.), The Conflict between Paganism and Chris- tianity in the Fourth Century (Oxford 1963), pp. 151-192; L. Taormina, ‘Sant’ Ambrogio e Plotino,’ Miscellanea di studi di letteratura cristiana antica 4 (1953), pp. 41-85; Solignac, art. cit.; P. Hadot, ‘Platon et Plotin dans trois ser- mons de saint Ambroise,’ Revue des études latines 34 (1956), pp. 202-220; H. Dörrie, ‘Das fünffach gestufte Mysterium. Der Aufstieg der Seele bei Porphyrios und Ambrosius,’ in Mullus: Festschrift Theodor Klauser (Münster 1964), pp. 79- 92. On the difficulties in interpreting the use of Plotinus in Is., b. mort., and Iac., see also Madec, pp. 61-71. 35. See esp. W. Seibel, Fleisch und Geist beim heiligen Ambrosius (Munich 1958); A. Loiselle, “Nature“ de l’homme et histoire du salut. Etude sur l’anthropologie d’Ambroise de Milan (diss., Fac. Théol., Lyon 1970). 36. See P. Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunci- ation in Early Christianity (London 1989), pp. 341-365. THE VITA BEATA 217

There is thus a blessedness in suffering and privation, for these things constitute sanctifying trials, from which there will come final release into full beatitudo when the soul, the true human sub- stance, is liberated from the body (to be given a spiritual body in the last resurrection). God brings his people to glory through suf- fering. It was through such experiences that Job, for example, magis probatus est (2.20, echoing James 1.12)37. Ambrose embraces a Platonist understanding of the world as a place of purificatory trial, where the soul is increasingly sanctified in its progress towards heavenly perfection (cf. 1.233-240). He is able to synthesize such an idea with NT teaching on sanctification and NT encouragements that the faithful grow stronger and braver through weakness and suffering (cf. 2.20). The Platonist perspec- tive lies also at the heart of his conception of different levels of blessedness in 2.18. He espouses not only the immanent summum bonum of a life of Stoic virtue, and the transcendent summum bonum of Christian eschatology, but the neo-Platonist mean as well: this life is a training-ground of sanctifying tests and a realm whose beatitudo points us onwards in hope of the perfect bliss of the eternal life to come38. The combination of polemic against classical philosophy and assimilation of key points from Stoicism and neo-Platonism into a Christian argument is a reflection of the way in which a church- man of Ambrose’s stamp thinks. By social background, education, and legal and administrative experience, Ambrose is a product of the most influential class of Roman imperial society. He is steeped in the literature and the social mores of this world. 2.1-21 illus-

37. See generally J.R. Baskin, ‘Job as Moral Exemplar in Ambrose,’ Vigiliae Christianae 35 (1981), pp. 222-231. 38. Cf. Dassmann, pp. 265-267, qualifying Couvée, pp. 169-170. The dual influences of Stoicism and neo-Platonism on Ambrose’s Weltanschauung are dis- cussed by P. Courcelle, ‘L’humanisme chrétien de saint Ambroise,’ Orpheus 9 (1962), pp. 21-34; see also id., ‘Deux grands courants de pensée dans la littéra- ture latine tardive: Stoïcisme et Néoplatonisme,’ Revue des études latines 42 (1964), pp. 122-140. Dassmann’s theory (as summarized on pp. 5-6, 302-304 of his book) of an evolution in Ambrose’s thought towards much more explicit neo- Platonism in the later works presupposes that the respective dates can be deter- mined quite precisely, which is not the case; it also overlooks the neo-Platonism (perhaps inspired by Ambrose’s tutor Simpicianus) which is identifiable in the texts which definitely are early. 218 RECHERCHES DE THÉOLOGIE ANCIENNE ET MÉDIÉVALE trates this. An obvious example of the pervasive influence of his classical education is the cluster of Vergilian echoes which we find in 2.2139. The lingering upper-class social attitudes, too, are visible in his traditional Roman esteem for the sanctity of family property in 2.1740. The very choice of Cicero’s De Officiis as the model for his teaching on duties is deeply suggestive of Ambrose’s intellectual make-up. His preaching and writing con- tinually present a synthesis of classical ideas and classical lan- guage with the biblical subject-matter and biblical exempla which his spiritual calling and re-education in the Scriptures have instilled in his mind. I do not believe, however, that Ambrose’s De Officiis as a whole is intended as an apologetic exercise, an attempt to bridge

39. caelum…obtexitur: cf. Vergil, Aen. 11.610-611; also Pliny, NH 2.38.104; ieiuna glarea: cf. Vergil, Georg. 2.212-213; laetas segetes: cf. Vergil, Georg. 1.1 (also Cicero, De Or. 3.155); sterilem avenam: cf. Vergil, Ecl. 5.36-37; Georg. 1.153-154; also Ovid, Fast. 1.692, and, significantly, Cicero, Fin. 5.91 (another remininscence of Cicero, Fin. 5 — cf. 2.1 and 2.4 — may suggest that Ambrose has recently looked at that text). vadosa litora may also evoke Valerius Maximus, 8.7.1. In 2.7, infida statio is somewhat reminiscent of Vergil, Aen. 2.23; Ambrose uses the same image in Iac. 2.28, where he also evokes Lucretius, 2.1-4 (cf., too, Iac. 1.24). On his knowledge of Vergil, see Ihm, pp. 80-94; M.D. Diederich, Vergil in the Works of St. Ambrose (Washington, D.C. 1931). A brief account of classical influences generally, esp. from the quadriga of Cicero, Vergil, Terence, and Sallust, can be found in G.L. Ellspermann, The Attitude of the Early Christian Latin Writers toward Pagan Literature and Learning (Wash- ington, D.C. 1949), pp. 113-125. 40. Ambrose sees Naboth as a sort of martyr for heredity; Naboth was quite right not to surrender his inheritance: cf. 3.63; Nab. 13; Expl. Ps. 36 .19; and see V.R. Vasey, The Social Ideas in the Works of St. Ambrose: A Study on the De Nabuthe (Rome 1982), esp. pp. 21-104, 150. Violations of property rights are adversus naturam (3.28); justice must defend these rights (2.49), and special kindness must be shown to those who have lost their patrimony through no fault of their own (2.69). However, in the notorious sentence in 1.132, natura igitur ius commune generavit, usurpatio ius fecit privatum (evoking Cicero, Off. 1.21), Ambrose is almost certainly assuming that private property is attributable to the Fall (cf. prima avaritia in 1.137), and he is closer to early Stoicism than to Cicero, who claims that long-standing possession makes property one’s own, according to legal recognition (cf. Cicero, Off. 1.21,51; 2.73,78). The origins of private property may be sinful; what matters now is the way in which posses- sions are used: wealth need not be entirely renounced, but ought to be employed for charitable purposes. See L.J. Swift, ‘Iustitia and ius privatum: Ambrose on Private Property,’ American Journal of Philology 100 (1979), pp. 176-187; M. Wacht, ‘Privateigentum bei Cicero und Ambrosius,’ Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum 25 (1982), pp. 28-64. THE VITA BEATA 219 the world of pagan philosophy and literature with the world of Christian faith and ecclesiastical life. Rather, Ambrose seeks to show how Christianity can commence with classical ideals, keep whatever is congenial and whatever does not (rightly or wrongly) appear to him to conflict with the Faith, and go on to demonstrate that Christians can attain to profounder levels of spiritual insight and moral achievement41. The same can be predicated of the microcosm of 2.1-21. The result of Ambrose’s approach is inevitably a mélange of classical and scriptural perspectives. Ambrose consistently protests against the errors of pagan philoso- phy, but his effort to show that the Scriptures present an altogether nobler conception of beatitudo reveals a mind that still operates with substantial parts of the traditional philosophical frameworks. The difference lies in the authority which the Christian Ambrose seeks for the old categories: the vita beata (like the Stoic divisions of officia, honestas and utilitas, and like ideals such as decorum and the cardinal virtues in general) can now be found in the far richer mine of biblical truth. The legacy of Stoicism and neo-Pla- tonism is overlaid with the language of the Psalms and the Beati- tudes, and the virtues of apatheia, autarcheia, and moral progress through suffering are illustrated not by the sage but by patriarchs, prophets, and apostles. The interweaving of the strands is entirely typical to Ambrose and his age. Some might judge the result to be a model of contex- tualized preaching, where the gospel is presented in the conceptual framework of the day; others will say it is an example of Chris- tianity stifled by its cultural setting. Such verdicts will perhaps depend on our own broader intellectual presuppositions. To me, it seems best simply to consider it as an illustration of the way in which the Christian theology of the late fourth century was unavoidably fed from two sources, and to leave the matter at that.

University of St. Andrews Dr. Ivor J. DAVIDSON School of Divinity, Scotland

41. See my article, ‘Ambrose’s De Officiis and the Intellectual Climate of the Late Fourth Century,’ Vigiliae Christianae 49 (1995), pp. 313-333.