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Reason in Seneca Gould, Josiah, 1928 Reason in Seneca Gould, Josiah, 1928- Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 3, Number 1, April 1965, pp. 13-25 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v003/3.1gould.html Access Provided by Università degli Studi di Palermo at 04/20/12 11:37AM GMT Reason m Seneca JOSIAH B. GOULD MAx POHLENZ, in his last great work on the Stoa, 1 maintained that Logos is the central concept of Stoic philosophy (I, 34). Neither Mette 2 nor Edelstein, 3 each of whom reviewed Pohlenz's study, notes the author's frequent reminders that Stoi- cism is "eine Logosphilosophie" and his contention, set forth early in Volume I, that the concept of Logos has in Stoic philosophy "pushed wholly to one side the Aristotelian J,o~s in doctrine as well as in terminology." One who is familiar with the fragments of the writings of the early Stoics hardly needs to be told that for Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, Logos is a fundamental notion. Help is needed when one tries to make clear to himself the content of this notion. An example is the moral philosophy of Chrysippus as we have reconstructed it from the fragments of his writings. For Chrysippus the basic expression in Stoic moral philosophy, "life in accord- ance with nature" (zb ~arh ~b~Lu ~'~u) becomes "life in accordance with reason" (r~ KaTh ~,bTou ~'~). I have, however, found it difficult to render an account of what, for Chrysippus, it would be to live in accordance with Logos or reason. On one hand, it would appear that to live in conformity with reason is to be guided by cumulative experience or generalizations from past experience about what would or would not be advantageous. It seems, that is, to be assent to reason when it passes from experience of this benefit following on that action to judgments such as "that kind of action issues in this kind of advantage." On the other hand, reason or Logos, in a fully developed state, we are informed, is the knowledge of genuinely good and genuinely bad things; and such knowledge is obviously not the kind of thing to be induced from particular experiences. In the first place a judgment that a particular consequence of a particular deed is of value presupposes the knowledge which Chrysippus describes as the "knowledge of things really good or really ad- vantageous." For example, given that one has a relatively clear notion as to what health is, he with some experience, can judge whether or not this food and that activity contribute to health. But, on Chrysippus' view, it would seem that reason or Logos in order to come to conclusions about the value of health-inducing foods or activities has to possess a relatively clear notion about the value of something else in whose acquisition health is instrumental. The assertion that actions leading to health or wealth have value could not follow from some special insight by Logos into the intrinsic worth of health or wealth, for it is explicitly denied that they are unqualifiedly good. The question then arises whether Logos has an insight into 1Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. 2nd. ed. (GSttingen: Van- denhoeck & Rupreeht, 1959). H. J. Mette, Max Pohlenz: Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. 2 Bde. (G6t- tingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht). Review, Gnomon XXIII (1951), 27-39. Ludwig Edelstein, Max Pohlenz. Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. (GSt- tingen: Yandenhoeck und Ruprecht, I [1948}, 490 pp.; II [1949], 230 pp.). Review, American Journal of Philology, LXXII (Oct., 1951), 426--432. [13] 14 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY something else which is genuinely good by reference to which judgments can be made about the value of health and wealth under certain conditions. The suspicion that this is so is heightened by the exalted status assigned to the wise man. The ideal of the wise man does not fit snugly with Chrysippus' conception of Logos as a generalizing instrument for determining what things and activities are useful. The wise man is too contemptuous of or, at least, too indifferent toward the "goods" of the world. It is unthinkable that he should attend to them with a view to deter- mining which of them is useful. He knows already; his wisdom comes from other parts. He is sure of what is really good because an unobfuscated reason or Logns has declared this to him in an immediate way; he has not had to wait for the verdict of reason's generalizations on experience. It is difficult to ignore either of these aspects of Logos or reason in Chrysippus' philosophy, and yet they do not sit well together in it. Not being satisfied with my account of Chrysippus' moral philosophy, I decided to begin at the other end of the Stoic tradition where we are not limited to frag- ments alone. Chrysippus' books were studied in the first century A.D. Seneca ad- mired Chrysippus and rightly regarded him as one of the leading figures of the early Stoa. In the whole body of Seneca's works, there are fifteen allusions to Chry- sippus. If one reads through in turn the passages in which they occur, he cannot fail to discern that, in Seneca's mind, Chrysippus is one of the pillars of the Porch. Seneca usually mentions him in the same breath with other esteemed philosophers-- in large measure, Stoic philosophers--for example, Zeno; Zeno and Cleanthes; Zeno and Socrates; Cleanthes; Plato, Zeno, and Posidonius; Zeno, Cleanthes, Panaetius, and Posidonius. And in each of these passages it is obvious that Seneca is pointing out great men to his readers; representative is this sentence from On Benefits (vii. 8. 5): "I shall not remind you of Socrates, of Chrysippus, of Zeno, and the others, truly great men--in fact too great, because envy set no bounds to our praise of the ancients. ''4 While it is not at all apparent that Chrysippus, in Seneca's estimation, is in any way a unique authority in the Stoic tradition, one who has cast a shadow on any of the other prominent figures in the school--he alludes to Cleanthes thirteen times and to Zeno twenty-one it is at the same time manifest that Chrysippus is viewed as one among the solidly preeminent spokesman for and exemplars of Stoic principles. The first step in the inquiry is that of determining how Seneca conceived ratio or reason. Judging from Seneca's use of the expression, what, I have asked, are the functions of reason in the cosmos and in the individual person? All of this might cast some light on at least the early Stoa's conception of reason and, at most, on some of the Chrysippean fragments. Whether or not this will be the case depends also on the delicate task of distinguishing in Seneea's thought original elements from influences coming not only from the ancient Stoa but also from those having their provenance in Posidonius and Panaetius. What I wish to present in this paper are some very provisional results of the first stage in this inquiry. Reason, as understood by Seneca, may be appropriately discussed in two major 4 All quotations from Seneca's works are from the translations in the Loeb Library editions of Seneca's moral essays and epistles. REASON IN SENECA 15 steps: (1) It may be considered as cosmic; (2) it may be approached as the ruling principle in man. Reason in the macrocosm or the universe as a whole is, in accordance with older Stoic views, identified by Seneca with God. Both God and reason on a cosmic level are, for him as for the Stoics generally, names for the active or motion-inducing principle in things. This active principle itself is one of the two fundamental in- gredients in the nature of things, the other being unqualified Matter. This second element, matter, during the period between conflagrations, becomes differentiated into a variegated universe by the action of God or Reason pulsating through it. God or Creative Reason (ratio faciens) is also called the general cause of the universe. And by general cause Seneca means the agent by which (a quo) it was produced. In an exposition of the notion of cause as found in Plato and Aristotle--- unusual in the generally homiletical Seneca--final and formal causes are rejected on the ground that they are merely accessory (Ep. lxv. 11). But it soon becomes evident that Seneca's efficient cause works purposefully. Reason as Creative Force in the cosmos operates, we are told, in the manner of an artist. The whole fabric of the universe is controlled by the hand of God or Reason (Ep. lxxi. 12). Having laid down that all things are made up of matter and of God, Seneca goes on to say "God controls matter, which encompasses him as its guide and leader." (Nempe universa ex materia et ex deo constant. Deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem secuntur et ducem. Ep. lxv. 23.) The universe itself is a scene of cyclical change. Everything that is, including the earth, has its appointed time to be born, to grow, to be destroyed. All things including the uni- verse itself, having been put together will be resolved into their elements and, in Seneca's words, "The eternal craftsmanship of God, who controls all things, is working at this task." (In hoc opere aeternam artem cuncta temperantis dei verti. Ep. lxxi. 14.) Seneca's conviction that God or Reason presides over the universe provi- dentiaUy stems from the order and regularity with which in his view phenomena occur.
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