Reason in Seneca Gould, Josiah, 1928

Reason in Seneca Gould, Josiah, 1928-

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 3, Number 1, April 1965, pp. 13-25 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v003/3.1gould.html

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JOSIAH B. GOULD

MAx POHLENZ, in his last great work on the Stoa, 1 maintained that Logos is the central concept of Stoic philosophy (I, 34). Neither Mette 2 nor Edelstein, 3 each of whom reviewed Pohlenz's study, notes the author's frequent reminders that Stoi- cism is "eine Logosphilosophie" and his contention, set forth early in Volume I, that the concept of Logos has in Stoic philosophy "pushed wholly to one side the Aristotelian J,o~s in doctrine as well as in terminology." One who is familiar with the fragments of the writings of the early Stoics hardly needs to be told that for Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, Logos is a fundamental notion. Help is needed when one tries to make clear to himself the content of this notion. An example is the moral philosophy of Chrysippus as we have reconstructed it from the fragments of his writings. For Chrysippus the basic expression in Stoic moral philosophy, "life in accordance with nature" (zb ~arh ~b~Lu ~'~u) becomes "life in accordance with reason" (r~ KaTh ~,bTou ~'~). I have, however, found it difficult to render an account of what, for Chrysippus, it would be to live in accordance with Logos or reason. On one hand, it would appear that to live in conformity with reason is to be guided by cumulative experience or generalizations from past experience about what would or would not be advantageous. It seems, that is, to be assent to reason when it passes from experience of this benefit following on that action to judgments such as "that kind of action issues in this kind of advantage." On the other hand, reason or Logos, in a fully developed state, we are informed, is the knowledge of genuinely good and genuinely bad things; and such knowledge is obviously not the kind of thing to be induced from particular experiences. In the first place a judgment that a particular consequence of a particular deed is of value presupposes the knowledge which Chrysippus describes as the "knowledge of things really good or really advantageous." For example, given that one has a relatively clear notion as to what health is, he with some experience, can judge whether or not this food and that activity contribute to health. But, on Chrysippus' view, it would seem that reason or Logos in order to come to conclusions about the value of health-inducing foods or activities has to possess a relatively clear notion about the value of something else in whose acquisition health is instrumental. The assertion that actions leading to health or wealth have value could not follow from some special insight by Logos into the intrinsic worth of health or wealth, for it is explicitly denied that they are unqualifiedly good. The question then arises whether Logos has an insight into 1Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. 2nd. ed. (GSttingen: Van- denhoeck & Rupreeht, 1959). H. J. Mette, Max Pohlenz: Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. 2 Bde. (G6t- tingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht). Review, Gnomon XXIII (1951), 27-39. Ludwig Edelstein, Max Pohlenz. Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung. (GSt- tingen: Yandenhoeck und Ruprecht, I [1948}, 490 pp.; II [1949], 230 pp.). Review, American Journal of Philology, LXXII (Oct., 1951), 426--432.

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something else which is genuinely good by reference to which judgments can be made about the value of health and wealth under certain conditions. The suspicion that this is so is heightened by the exalted status assigned to the wise man. The ideal of the wise man does not fit snugly with Chrysippus' conception of Logos as a generalizing instrument for determining what things and activities are useful. The wise man is too contemptuous of or, at least, too indifferent toward the "goods" of the world. It is unthinkable that he should attend to them with a view to determining which of them is useful. He knows already; his wisdom comes from other parts. He is sure of what is really good because an unobfuscated reason or Logns has declared this to him in an immediate way; he has not had to wait for the verdict of reason's generalizations on experience. It is difficult to ignore either of these aspects of Logos or reason in Chrysippus' philosophy, and yet they do not sit well together in it. Not being satisfied with my account of Chrysippus' moral philosophy, I decided to begin at the other end of the Stoic tradition where we are not limited to fragments alone. Chrysippus' books were studied in the first century A.D. Seneca ad- mired Chrysippus and rightly regarded him as one of the leading figures of the early Stoa. In the whole body of Seneca's works, there are fifteen allusions to Chry- sippus. If one reads through in turn the passages in which they occur, he cannot fail to discern that, in Seneca's mind, Chrysippus is one of the pillars of the Porch. Seneca usually mentions him in the same breath with other esteemed philosophers-- in large measure, Stoic philosophers--for example, Zeno; Zeno and Cleanthes; Zeno and Socrates; Cleanthes; Plato, Zeno, and Posidonius; Zeno, Cleanthes, Panaetius, and Posidonius. And in each of these passages it is obvious that Seneca is pointing out great men to his readers; representative is this sentence from On Benefits (vii. 8. 5): "I shall not remind you of Socrates, of Chrysippus, of Zeno, and the others, truly great men--in fact too great, because envy set no bounds to our praise of the ancients. ''4 While it is not at all apparent that Chrysippus, in Seneca's estimation, is in any way a unique authority in the Stoic tradition, one who has cast a shadow on any of the other prominent figures in the school--he alludes to Cleanthes thirteen times and to Zeno twenty-one it is at the same time manifest that Chrysippus is viewed as one among the solidly preeminent spokesman for and exemplars of Stoic principles. The first step in the inquiry is that of determining how Seneca conceived ratio or reason. Judging from Seneca's use of the expression, what, I have asked, are the functions of reason in the cosmos and in the individual person? All of this might cast some light on at least the early Stoa's conception of reason and, at most, on some of the Chrysippean fragments. Whether or not this will be the case depends also on the delicate task of distinguishing in Seneea's thought original elements from influences coming not only from the ancient Stoa but also from those having their provenance in Posidonius and Panaetius. What I wish to present in this paper are some very provisional results of the first stage in this inquiry. Reason, as understood by Seneca, may be appropriately discussed in two major 4 All quotations from Seneca's works are from the translations in the Loeb Library editions of Seneca's moral essays and epistles. REASON IN SENECA 15 steps: (1) It may be considered as cosmic; (2) it may be approached as the ruling principle in man. Reason in the macrocosm or the universe as a whole is, in accordance with older Stoic views, identified by Seneca with God. Both God and reason on a cosmic level are, for him as for the Stoics generally, names for the active or motion-inducing principle in things. This active principle itself is one of the two fundamental in- gredients in the nature of things, the other being unqualified Matter. This second element, matter, during the period between conflagrations, becomes differentiated into a variegated universe by the action of God or Reason pulsating through it. God or Creative Reason (ratio faciens) is also called the general cause of the universe. And by general cause Seneca means the agent by which (a quo) it was produced. In an exposition of the notion of cause as found in Plato and Aristotle--- unusual in the generally homiletical Seneca--final and formal causes are rejected on the ground that they are merely accessory (Ep. lxv. 11). But it soon becomes evident that Seneca's efficient cause works purposefully. Reason as Creative Force in the cosmos operates, we are told, in the manner of an artist. The whole fabric of the universe is controlled by the hand of God or Reason (Ep. lxxi. 12). Having laid down that all things are made up of matter and of God, Seneca goes on to say "God controls matter, which encompasses him as its guide and leader." (Nempe universa ex materia et ex deo constant. Deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem secuntur et ducem. Ep. lxv. 23.) The universe itself is a scene of cyclical change. Everything that is, including the earth, has its appointed time to be born, to grow, to be destroyed. All things including the universe itself, having been put together will be resolved into their elements and, in Seneca's words, "The eternal craftsmanship of God, who controls all things, is working at this task." (In hoc opere aeternam artem cuncta temperantis dei verti. Ep. lxxi. 14.) Seneca's conviction that God or Reason presides over the universe provi- dentiaUy stems from the order and regularity with which in his view phenomena occur. The movements of celestial bodies and the productions on or near the surface of the earth take place with an artistry which, according to him, is far removed from chance (On Providence, i. 2). Furthermore even those happenings which appear to be irregular and undetermined--showers, clouds, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes--do not happen without a reason (sine ratio). They result from special causes (causas suas) which, Seneca implies, patient investigation will unveil (On Providence, i. 3). Here Seneca is evincing the Chrysippean view that there are no uncaused events. On the level of the macrocosm God or Reason, it ought to be noted, is identified with the presence of causes which sufficiently explain the oe- curence of phenomena. If cosmic Reason, penetrating primordial matter, gives the universe the character it has, we expect to find specifications of that reason in the particular objects of the universe. In fact, in the ancient Stoa, such specifications were regarded as taking different forms; for example, reason is the binding force in inanimate objects ac- counting for their cohesion; it is called nature in plants; it takes the form of soul in animals; and in men, it is described variously as soul or reason. Seneca alludes primarily to the latter manifestation of reason. It is man's reason which links him 16 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

to the reason of the Cosmos. Indeed, Seneca goes further; he holds that reason "is nothing else than a portion of the divine spirit set in a human body." 5 Reason appears in man at birth. It is initially imperfect but capable of being perfected (Ep. xlix. 12). Its perfection is the distinctive mark of man in the way that fruitfulness is that of the vine (Ep. xli. 7-8). Reason, that is, is the property in man which distinguishes him as such. It is the quality which cannot be taken from him in the way that his home or income might be. As Seneca puts his case,

Man is strong; so is the lion. Man is comely; so is the peacock. Man is swift; so is the horse. I do not say that man is surpassed in all these qualities. I am not seeking to find that which is greatest in him, but that which is peculiarly his own. Man has body; so also have the trees. Man has the power to act and to move at will; so have beasts and worms. Man has a voice; but how much louder is the voice of the dog, how much shriller that of the eagle, how much deeper that of the bull, how much sweeter and more melodious that of the nightingale! What then is peculiar in man? Reason (Ep. lxxvi. 9-10).

Not only does reason differentiate man from the other animals; it is by virtue of reason that he surpasses them (Ep. lxxvi. 9). In Seneca's eyes the fact that man is essentially rational (rational enim animal est homo; Ep. xli. 8), and that reason may be perfected have an important bearing on man's happiness; but this will be more fittingly discussed in the following section where I hope with a view to opening up further Seneca's conception of reason to show how, according to him, reason operates in man's life. Reason, the ruling principle in men. Seneca maintains that reason is the ruling principle (regium; principale) in man (De Ira i. 3. 7). What are the functions of this principale, the Latin version of the ~e~ow~v of the ancient Stoa? To use a loose phrase, reason has a bearing on theoretical truths and on practical truths. What is that bearing? The ancient Stoa had defined wisdom as knowledge of things human and divine. Seneca is simply retailing this notion when he tells us that the wise man, in whom reason is perfected, "is never more active in affairs than when things divine as well as things human have come within his ken" (Ep. lxvfii. 2). But what do these grandiose expressions mean? Seneca uses the expression "divine things" to denote natural occurrences--the movements of the stars and planets, meteorological phenomena, occurrences on the surface of the earth such as the rise and fall of the waters of the Nile; and subterranean phenomena--earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. He devoted seven books to inquiries into these phenomena. They, however, consist in the main of the opinions of his predecessors on natural phenomena; he relies in particular on Posidonius. Whereas no one can deny that Seneca's enthusiasm for a knowledge of the universe is genuine, the eclecticism of his work in this field is hardly disguised. Seneca is eloquent in his affirmation of the beauty of disinterested scientific research: to the question, what advantage is to be derived from his labor, he replies: the greatest of all--to know Nature. Investigations such as these can render many 5 Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa (Ep. lxvi. 12). Spiritus is the Greek r~e~a which for some Stoics is the substance of God or reason. REASON IN SENECA 17 useful services; but what they give us of more value is that of retaining the attention of man by their splendor itself and that of being cultivated by reason of the marvels they unfold rather than for the profit that one might derive from their disclosure (N.Q. vi. 4. 2). Another of Seneca's characteristic views about knowledge of the nature of things is that there is in science an indefinite progress; in one of his letters he writes: I worship the discoveries of wisdom and their discoverers; to enter, as it were, into the inheritance of many predecessors is a delight .... But we should play the part of a careful house- holder; we should increase what we have inherited. This inheritance shall pass from me to my descendents larger than before. Much still remains to do, and he who shall be born a thousand years hence will not be barred from his opportunity of adding something further (Ep. lxiv. 7-8). Needless to say, this passage, which could have been written yesterday, does not sit well with the cyclical view of history espoused by Seneca. Accompanying the expressions of zeal for disinterested scientific investigation, and the avowal of an unlimited progress in scientific enquiry, there are in Seneca's writings a number of endorsements of the utility of inquiries into nature in respect of their edification of the soul. Happiness, we are told, cannot be achieved without a knowledge of things human and divine (Ep. lxxiv. 29). The mind in bondage to emotions experiences liberation when it turns to a contemplation of divine things-- that is, an investigation of the causes of natural phenomena. The second part of philosophy, as Seneca conceives it, we are told, teaches the things which men ought to do (N.Q.i. 1). When we turn to Seneca's views on what might be called the practical function of reason, his conception of the nature of that faculty emerges, I believe, more distinctly than is the case in his natural philosophy. A cardinal doctrine for Seneca is that reason in man is the source of truth and of virtue (Ep. lxxvi. 22). Unfortunately, he says little by way of helping us to understand how reason operates as an instrument for the acquisition of truth. Seneca's attitude toward dialecticians, even those of his own school who had studied words, their meanings, and proofs, was--in brief--that life is too short for this sort of thing (Ep. lxxxix. 5-6). He is less resentful and more loquacious when he turns to consider the way in which reason functions with respect to conduct, and it is here if anywhere that we shall discover more exactly what reason means for Seneca. His doctrine, put concisely though not unambiguously, is: When reason is "right and has reached perfection, man's felicity is complete" (Ep. lxxvi. 10). If we asked Seneca what this means, he would probably refer us to the 124 letters he wrote to Lucilius, his friend (and confessor, one is tempted to say). If we then strain this mass of homily and exhortation, we get an answer to our query which consists of three main topics: (1) reason and the fundamental moral precept; (2) reason and the emotions; (3) reason and death. There was a doctrine in the ancient Stoa that what is morally good (r~ KakS~) is the knowledge of what is genuinely advantageous and what is genuinely disadvantageous--a knowledge which enables its possessor to use things beneficially or injuriously--and that nothing else is good except that knowledge. The view is concisely expressed in this fragment (S.V.F. III, 165) of Stoic philosophy: 18 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

If to sail well is good and to sail badly is bad, then to sail is neither good nor bad. And if to live well is good and to live badly is bad, then to live is neither good nor bad. This knowledge of what is genuinely beneficial and what is genuinely harmful was held to be the excellence of reason; ignorance of these matters was thought to be reason's vice. Many things commonly thought to be good such as wealth and health, it was claimed, are not in fact good because there are circumstances in which they could conceivably be injurious, while it is the property of what is good always to benefit, never to injure (S.V.F. III, 117). I mention this ancient Stoic doctrine again for it appears that Seneca, too, adhered to it. Indeed one of the cash values of a perfected reason, according to him, is its conviction that this fundamental moral doctrine is true. The morally good in Latin becomes quod est honestum and is most frequently translated "that which is honorable." Seneca's view in these terms is that "that which is honorable is the only good; all other goods are alloyed and debased" (Ep. lxxi. 4). A perfected reason, or right reason as Seneca sometimes called it, is one which has grown to the point at which "all the actions of life, taken as a whole, are controlled by the consideration of what is honorable or base" (Ep. lxxvi. 18). Of course, reason does not grow toward this discernment in the way in which an acorn grows to be an oak. It requires the aid of a philosopher to point out the unpalatable consequences of adopting the opposite view. Here, then, is Seneca's argument, as I construe it, against the contradictory view, i.e., the view that there is something good other thau that which is morally good. To assume that other things are good is to place oneself in the hands of Fortune or under the control of another; one who is under the control of Fortune cannot achieve genuine happiness. Therefore, one who assumes that other things are good cannot achieve genuine happiness. To make a ease for his premises, Seneca introduces a number of examples: a man is saddened by his child's death; another is embittered because his child does something disgraceful; one man is tortured by passion for his neighbor's wife; another, by passion for his own. Most men are driven to despair by the expectation of death. Everyone is troubled when evils come suddenly upon his neighbor. Seneca implies that a child's death, a woman's desirableness, and one's own death are matters over which one has no control; they are circumstances controlled by Fortune, a catch-all term to designate things outside one's own power. To call any of these things good or bad is, consequently, to make trouble for oneself; it is simply to underwrite for oneself a life of anxiety and disquietude (Ep. lxxiv. 1-9). His second argument against the assumption that anything is good besides what is honorable is that to make it is to make an unfavorable judgment upon Providence. For whatever thing one may designate as good will be something which some good men do not possess (Ep. lxxiv. 10). Other considerations which work against the assumption that, in addition to the honorable, other things are good, are (1) this would be to assert that man is more fortunate than God, for God does not experience REASON IN SENECA 19 lust nor enjoy banquets and wealth; and (2) one would have to conclude that animals are more fortunate than men, for some of the things commonly regarded as good are ~iven to them in greater measure. For example, they eat their food with better appetite and are not weakened by sexual indulgence. A perfected reason is, it is implied, not merely one which has found the conclusion of these arguments convincing. It is also of such nature that it can take up a positive stance with respect to the things men ordinarily call good. In agreement with the ancient Stoa, Seneca calls these so-called goods advantages (commoda) or preferred things (produeta = vpo~v~w). They are things which we may possess but upon which we ought not to plume ourselves. They are things to be used, but not to be boasted about. They are things which one has upon loan, as it were, and are of the sort that may be withdrawn, and are such that if one has become too zealously attached to them a portion of himself is taken away when he loses them; but, even while clinging to them and before their possible loss, he is anxious about the time when he will be bereft of them. In brief, one must employ reason in the possession of things of this sort (Ep. lxxiv. 18). What ought to be noted here is that, in Seneca's view, perfected reason is asso- ciated with the fundamental moral principle in two ways; in the first place, reason is presumably the faculty which becomes convinced of the truth of that principle, and second, it is reason which allegedly administers this principle with the help of dicta and examples of the sort Seneca gives. Before we turn to the second practical use of reason, or rather because we are about to consider it, attention must be given to a subsidiary point in regard to the fundamental moral principle as conceived by Seneca. In a letter to Lucilius (Ep. xxiii), which is, in effect, an exhortation to soundness of mind (ut te exhorter ad bonam mentem), Seneca says that the main business of a man's life is to learn how to feel joy (disce guadere). And his lesson is that this joy derives from the cultivation of the best part of oneself, by which he can only mean reason (Ep. xxiii. 6). Here cultivation of reason is identified not only with an adherence to the principle that only what is honorable is good, but to the constancy of purpose which derives from such adherence. One cannot be happy if he places his happiness in the control of externals (in aliena potestate; Ep. xxfii. 2). What Seneca wishes to commend is the "even and calm way of living which treads but one path," a way of life that is supposed to result when one, guided by reason, contemns the gifts of fortlme (ex contempto fortuitorum). I allude to this corollary of Seneea's fundamental moral principle both because it is relevant to his view of reason and also because his remark concerning joy ought to be born in mind when we consider his proscriptions with respect to the other passions. Reason and the emotions. The function of reason about which Seneca is most outspoken is that involved in controlling the emotions. The diagnosis and thera- peutic treatment of the emotions, regarded as diseases of the mind, occupied an important place in the moral theory of the ancient Stoa. Chrysippus, for example, regarded an emotion as an erroneous judgment about the goodness or badness of something which provoked a violent impulse. And his recommendations for relief from emotional maladies were in terms of effective ways and propitious times for 20 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY helping the victim understand the error in his judgment. Apparently influenced by Posidonius, Seneca rejected the intellectualistie psychology upon which this therapy is founded; he, in short, agrees with Plato and Aristotle that there are irrational elements in the soul (Ep. xcii. 1). He, nevertheless, opposing Posidonius and agreeing with Chrysippus, holds that the emotions are not merely to be moderated but to be eradicated. Moderate passion, in his view, "is nothing else than a moderate evil." Seneca nowhere engages in a systematic discussion of the passions; the ones he mentions most often in his letters and essays are anger, fear, lust, and greed. He did write an essay on anger, and I propose to use that passion as a paradigm case of the way in which for Seneca perfected reason functions with respect to the emotions. This is not to make an entirely gratuitous inference, for Seneca himself says that the tyranny under which an angry mind labors is "the tyranny under which that man must live who surrenders to the bondage of any passion" (de Ira i. 10.2). Seneca defines anger in much the same way as does Aristotle's dialectician in the de Anima (403a 30). It "has its being in an onrush of resentment, raging with a most inhuman lust for weapons, blood, and punishment, giving no thought to itself if only it can hurt another, hurling itself upon the very point of the dagger, and eager for revenge though it may drag down the avenger along with it" (de Ira i. 1). Having discussed several preliminary questions about anger--its uniqueness in man, its difference from irascibility, the different forms it takes, and its non- conformity with human nature Seneca turns to the query whether or not anger in moderation might not at times be beneficial. His answer is an unqualified no. In the first place, it is easier to exclude passions than to moderate them once they have been admitted. Second, Reason "to whom the reins of power have been en- trusted" is contaminated by the passions. Reason can and ought to be kept apart from the passions, for once "it plunges into anger, love, or the other passions, it has no power to check its impetus" (de Ira. i. 7.4). Seneca goes even further and, in an apparent lapse from the Platonic psychology avowed elsewhere, maintains that once passions are permitted a limited range, the mind is itself transformed into the passion, on the ground that reason and passion are not really distinct but "only the transformation of the mind toward the better or the worse" (sea affectus et ratio in melius peiusque mutatio animi est; de Ira i. 8.3). In brief the passions, Seneca holds, "are as bad subordinates as they are leaders" (de Ira i. 9.3). Seneca next (de Ira ii. 1.1) turns to the question whether anger arises spontane- ously from impulse or from choice, that is whether it arises of its own accord or with our knowledge, the point being of course that if it has arisen involuntarily, anger will not succumb to reason. Anger does not, Seneca holds, follow immediately upon the direct impression of an injury. Even following such direct impression, anger can only act with the approval of the mind (animo adprobante; ii. 1.4). Anger is a complex mental process involving the giving of assent, and is not to be assimi- lated to such reflex acts as shivering and blushing. Anger entails the direct impression of injury, the condemnation of the act, and the attempt to avenge it. The mind's condemnation of the act and its attempt to avenge it follow upon assent to the direct impression of injury and the becoming indignant; the first--the direct REASON IN SENECA 21 impression of iniury---Seneca suggests, can hardly fail to occur; though such impressions may be weakened by practice and watchfulness. But the judgment is very much in man's power (ii. 4.2). And it is on this factor that Seneca concentrates in his recommendations for therapy of the passions generally and anger in particular. The medicine that it is to be applied to the emotions is the lore that is embodied in precepts. Accordingly anger is to be routed by means of precepts, we are told. In order that anger be avoided, certain rules (quaedam praecipientur) will be laid down which apply to the whole period of life. These rules fall under two heads: the period of education and the later periods of life (ii. 18.1). Seneca, I might say, takes into account the kinds of dispositions that are given to persons by nature herself when she makes some one of the four elements predominate in them; for example, he in whom fire dominates has a fiery constitution and is disposed to be wrathful; a predominance of cold makes for cowardice (ii. 19.2). Nothing can be done to change nature, but it is profitable to take note of how she has made us so that we may take conpensating measures; fiery constitutions, for example, ought to stay away from wine. Habit, however, is a more significant factor than nature and in this circumstance is grounded the summary recommendations Seneca makes concerning the education of children. What is important is that in quelling anger we do not blunt the native spirit of the child. I give only one sample of the precepts he enumerates; my topic is not Seneca's educational philosophy, but we ought to have a clear-cut case before us of what he means by precepts. Of the child's education Seneca says, "In struggles with his playmates we ought not to permit him either to be beaten or to get angry; we should take pains to see that he is friendly toward those with whom it is his practice to engage in order that in the struggle he may form the habit of wishing not to hurt his opponent but merely to win" (ii. 21.5). With regard to the precepts which are to be learned at the later periods of life, some center upon the impression which triggers the emotion; the gist of these precepts is that we ought not to be too prone to give credence to such impressions-- for example, the impression of injury in the case of anger. We ought always to allow some time to elapse. We ought not to give a ready ear to those who malign us; we ought to plead the cause of the absent person (ii. 22.2). We ought not to be exasperated by trifling and paltry incidents (ii. 25.1). To be iust judges we must remember that no one of us is free from fault (ii. 28.1). We ought always to search into the character and purpose of the offender (ii. 30.1). Others of the precepts are pertinent to the second condition of anger, the belief that we have been injured unjustly (ii. 31.1). We ought not to confuse what is unexpected with what is undeserved. We ought always to believe that there will come some blow to strike us. More generally, we ought to bear in mind how hideous the emotion of anger is and how injurious it is. In Seneca's view, attendance to such precepts as these breaks the circuit of the complex passion of anger so that judgment or reason remains in control. The content of these precepts is of interest, but what is pertinent to our subject is their source. As one may have anticipated, their source is reason. As I have indicated, Seneca holds that the man in whom reason is perfected knows divine and human things, and while I discussed the divine, I gave 22 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY scant notice to the human things mentioned. In his Natural Questions, Seneca says that the science of human things teaches "that which it is necessary to do on earth." It "dispels our errors and places at our disposal the light which enables us to see clearly into the perplexities of life" (N.Q.I. 1). Seneca, I believe, cannot but mean that reason is the source of those precepts which help us to eradicate the passions. "Source," I readily concede, is an ambiguous expression. Reason as a source might function either as an oracle or as an instrument for generalizing on experience. To this point I recur in the conclusion. Enough has been said to indicate the im- portance of reason in this, its second practical function, that of extruding the passions from the soul. I now turn to the last of reason's practical functions in Seneea's philosophy, and this is its relation to one's attitude toward death. The fear of death is an emotion and, like anger, it is based upon a judgment which is not incorrigible. Seneca is keenly sensitive to the forms this passion takes in the human mind. He says:

Death belongs among those things which are not indeed evils, but still have in them a sem- blance of evil; for there are implanted in us love of self, a desire for existence and self-preservation, and also an abhorrence of dissolution, because death seems to rob us of many goods and to withdraw us from the abundance to which we have become accustomed. And there is another element which estranges us from death: we are already familiar with the present, but are ignorant of the future into which we shall transfer ourselves, and we shrink from the unknown .... Therefore, although death is something indifferent, it is nevertheless not a thing which we can easily ignore. The soul must be hardened by long practice, so that it may learn to endure the sight and approach of death (Ep. lxxxii. 15-16).

If we could ask Seneca what it is that the soul must become practiced at in order to liberate itself from the fear of death, his answer would concern reason in two respects. The first would bear upon the status itself of reason in the universe. The second would bear upon the use by man of his reason in lulling his fear to sleep (Ep. lvi. 6) with a Stoic lullaby, as it were. Let us have a look at these in order. It will be remembered that, in Seneca's view, reason in man is a fragmentary portion of the divine or cosmic reason. When a man perishes, his body is resolved into its elements and the fiery substance which constitutes his reason is reabsorbed into the cosmic ether. This was a view Seneca shared with his predecessors in the Stoa, though among them we fred slight variations. One holds that the souls of good men rejoin the cosmic soul immediately, and that the souls of bad men do not recombine with the divine soul until the next conflagration. Seneca, himself, does not have a fixed view. In one place (Ep. liv. 4), he says that death is non-existence. "We mortals," he says, "are lighted and extinguished; the period of suffering comes in between, but on either side there is a deep peace" (Ep. liv. 5). In another passage (Ep. lxxvi. 25), he argued that things conventionally called good are not good on the ground that, if this were so, souls once set free from the body would be worse off, whereas "if only it is true that our souls, when released from the body, still abide, a happier condition is in store for them than is theirs while they dwell in the body." In still a third place (Ep. lxxi. 16), Seneca is unsure whether the soul at death is sent forth into a better life, destined to dwell with deity and greater REASON IN SENECA 23 radiance and cairn or "without suffering any harm to itself, it will be mingled with nature again, and will return to the universe." Reabsorption being the fate of the soul when the body perishes, Seneca's view, I gather, is that reason's business is to liberate the mind from the fear of death by adhering to this doctrine as the likely tale about it. Indeed it is one's first duty to free himself from this fear (Ep. lxxx. 6). Seneca goes so far as to speak of the summons upward which the soul receives while still in its body (Ep. ~. 11-12). Reason, then, functions with respect to this passion by recounting alleged truths about its own destiny; the fear is presumably allayed once it is understood that its object is not a passage into the unknown, but a return of the soul to its authentic home. To summarize reason's practical functions, we may say that in Seneca's view a perfected reason is one which assents to the fundamental moral truth of Stoic philosophy: the only good thing in the world is what is morally good and the only bad thing in the world is what is morally base. And this assent is accompanied by what one may term reason's administering of this rule. It makes the soul tranquil and free by valuing in due measure those things which are advantageous and those which are disadvantageous in life which in Seneca's eyes makes for a detachment with respect to them which could not be achieved were they judged to be good or bad. Second, reason is instrumental in expelling passions from the soul inasmuch as it issues precepts designed to interrupt and thereby make inefficacious the complex act which constitutes the passion. In the ease of fear of death, a particu- larly vicious passion in view of the anxiety it generates, the precept which reason enjoins has a special status due to the circumstance that it has recourse to truths about the career of reason itself in the life of man. The precept, I gather, would be formulated somewhat as follows: one ought not to fear death, for this event is not a plunge into the unknown and it is not a termination of one's existence. It is rather a continuation of the life of the best part of oneself and under better conditions. In addition to this practical function of reason, we have seen that for Seneca reason has what one might call an ontological status and a theoretical function. On a cosmic level, reason is the divine creative substance which gives form to an otherwise unqualified matter. And in man it is the instrument by which he may achieve an ever-increasing knowledge of astronomical, atmospheric, and terrestrial phenomena. Its employment for this purpose, as we saw, is not only a source of truth but also a source of happiness. In point of fact Seneca alludes to three aspects of theoretical knowledge. The marvels that it unveils are of themselves wondrous to behold. Truths learned about the universe are useful for the betterment of man's material existence. Finally, reason exercised is a source of joy inasmuch as it is an engagement of that faculty in man which at once makes him most distinctively what he is and most akin to God. Such then is Seneca's account of reason. By way of conclusion, I should like to attempt to give more content to Seneca's view of reason in its practical function by attending to the notion of precept. Praecipio means "to give rules, to advise, ad- monish, warn, inform, teach; to enjoin, direct, bid, order." (Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary). A precept is "an authoritative command to do some particular act" (The Oxford Universal Dictionary). Now it will be remembered that when 24 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Seneca gives us examples of the kinds of precepts reason enjoins in order to expel anger, he formulates them in the periphrastic mood, that is, in imperative terms: we ought not to give a ready ear to traducers; we ought to plead the cause of the absent person against ourselves; we ought not to be exasperated by insignificant events; we ought to remember that no one is free from fault, and so forth--each of the recommendations employs either an ought or an ought not. If reason is the source of such injunctions, where one wishes to ask Seneca--does it find them or how does it become persuaded of their truth? Seneca in no place gives us a direct non-meta- phorical answer to this query, but I think we can make some inferences from his illustrations of the precepts he formulates. The upshot of these illustrations simply put is that one is harmed when he violates the injunction and is benefited when he obeys it. The tyrant Hippias, angered by his would-be-assassin apprehended before the act came off, tortures him and makes him reveal his accomplices, who are killed one by one as they are named. When Hippias asked if there were any more, the shrewd prisoner who had named the friends of the tyrant replied, "No, you alone remain; for I have left no one elsewho cares anything about you" (de Ira, ii. 23.1). The tyrant's hasty judgment had led him to slay his own friends. How does this story bear on the truth of the precept that we ought not to be led to anger quickly even by open and evident acts? I suggest that it is intended to do so by making one see the consequences that anger might entail in his own life. The assumption is, of course, that one wishes not only to preserve his own life, but to live well. And more pertinently for our topic, it is assumed that reason will generalize from instances of this sort to principles. In other words, one will infer from the facts that Hippias and Alexander were harmed by wrath, that he, too, will be placed at a disadvantage by it. In the fourth century, the philosophers Aristippus, Eudoxos, and Aristoxenus had argued that pleasure is the highest good on the ground that every animal, both the rational and the irrational, aims at it; it is the final goal of life built into the struc- ture of things by nature itself. It is no novelty then, if the hellenistic philosophers continue to take this empirical tack in their discussion of the final good. To prove that pleasure is the final end of life, Epicurus "uses the fact that living things, as soon as they are born, are well-pleased with it, but inimical towards pain, and this naturally and apart from reason." Polemo appealed to the same fact of experience but he gives it a different interpretation. That which every natural organism strives after, in his view, is its own safety and preservation. This appears also to have been Zeno's way of regarding this matter (S.V.F. I, 198). Chrysippus sets forth the doctrine explicitly (S.V.F. III, 178) in his book Concerning Ends, taking up the cudgels against the Epicurean school. He maintains that that which is first conform- able to the nature of every animal is not pleasure, but rather its own constitution and its consciousness of this. By making the living being dear to itself, nature makes him in such a way that he draws near to those things which are suitable to his constitution and is repulsed by those things which might harm him. Pleasure is an incidental factor consequent to nature's having found what is suitable to the animal constitution. Some animals continue throughout their lives to be guided by impulse or instinct; in one species, namely man, reason supervenes on impulse. And just as it is natural for the other animals and the young of the human species to live in ac- REASON IN SENECA 25 cordance with instinct, it is natural for man after childhood, to live in accordance with reason (S.V.F. III. 178). This ancient Stoic doctrine is essentially that affirmed by Seneca in his essay, On the Happy Life, and it helps us to understand more clearly, I believe, the practical function of reason. Seneca's theory of precepts, as I have attempted to construe it, is as follows: Every man desires by nature to preserve his life and to live well; if one would live well, he must obey certain precepts which emerge from generalizations made on examples and experience 9But while this explains the origin of precepts-which, it might be noted, have turned out to be hypothetical imperatives-- and reason's role in obtaining them, it would seem at the same time to make a hedonist of our Stoic philosopher. Seneca certainly would not deny that the use of reason in the way we have described involves pleasure for its possessor (de Vita Beak, IX. 1), but he would maintain that this was not the agent's aim. His goal rather is just excellence of reason or soundness of mind. It is choice itself of the rational solution which constitutes the highest good (de Vita Beata, IX. 3). As Seneca himself says,

9 . . even though virtue is sure to bestow pleasure, it is not for this reason that virtue is sought; for it is not this, but something more than this that she bestows, nor does she labor for this, but her labor while directed toward something else, achieves this also. As in a ploughed field, which has been broken up for corn, some flowers will spring up here and there, yet it was not for these poor little plants, although they may please the eye, that so much toil was expended-- the sower had a different purpose, these were superadded--just so pleasure is neither the cause nor the reward of virtue, but its by-product, and we do not accept virtue because she delights us, but if we accept her, she also delights us. The highest good lies in the very choice of it, and the very attitude of a mind made perfect, and when the mind has completed its course and fortified itself within its own bounds, the highest good has now been perfected, and nothing further is desired; for there can no more be anything outside of the whole than there can be some point beyond the end" (de Vita Beata, IX. 1-4).

Pleasure is a by-product of virtue or soundness of mind. It is the actual decision to follow the edicts of reason rather than any advantages which result therefrom which constitutes man's highest good. This, I also believe, clarifies somewhat the relation of reason to the fundamental moral principle of Stoicism, for to say that the knowledge of which things are genuinely beneficial and which genuinely harmful is the only good thing in the world, is a high-powered endorsement by reason of its own activity in man's life. Seneca would hold, then, that there is nothing greater to which the blessing of a sound mind may be ascribed and all other blessings flow from it. I should like to add a fmal note 9Seneea's notion of reason is obviously steeped in far-reaching doctrines about the nature of the all--if I may employ a Greek conception-and about the nature of man. But that his attachment to the life of reason is something of the order of a dedication is not always concealed. In a defiant address to Fortune he says, "Do what you will, you are too puny to disturb my serenity. Reason, to whom I have committed the guidance of my life, forbids it" (de Ira ~fi. 25.4). One wishes that Seneca had explored further the nature of such a commitment.

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