Save the Reef

A member group of Lock the Gate Alliance www.savethereef.net.au

Committee Secretary Senate Standing Committees on Environment and Communications PO Box 6100 Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600

Phone: +61 2 6277 3526 Fax: +61 2 6277 5818 [email protected]

Submission to the Senate Inquiry on The adequacy of the Australian and Queensland Governments’ efforts to stop the rapid decline of the Great Barrier Reef, including but not limited to: Points a–k.

Save the Reef would like to thank this committee for the opportunity to make a submission and would also like to speak further if there is an opportunity at any public hearings.

The Great Barrier Reef is Australia’s greatest natural asset. It is a tourism mecca, a 6 billion dollar economic boon as well as a scientific wonderland. It is a World Heritage Listed property and an acknowledged world wonder. The Great Barrier Reef is part of Australia’s very identity.

We are failing to protect the Great Barrier Reef. The efforts to stop the rapid decline of the Great Barrier Reef are grossly inadequate. It demonstrates that our current system for protecting the environment is broken. Environmental impact statements, conditions, offsets, regulations, enforcement and even the EPBC act, processes meant to protect the environment are being subverted and the impact is apparent. The holes in the “Swiss Cheese” are lining up and have allowed and are continuing to allow further destruction of the Great Barrier Reef when it needs our protection the most. The recent developments in Gladstone are a clear demonstration of the failure of our systems. A World Heritage Great Barrier Reef Island was turned into a site for three gas plants, (with a fourth gas plant also approved despite the expressed concern of the World Heritage Committee). There was an environmental collapse in Gladstone Harbour contributing to destruction of seagrass, and sickness in multiple species including humans. A fishing industry was destroyed and the World Heritage listed harbour was transformed from a blue sanctuary for endangered dugongs, turtles, dolphins, seagrass, into a muddy mess with a leaky bund wall. These failures were eventually acknowledged over two and a half years later in an independent review into the Gladstone Bund Wall. To date in this World Heritage Property no-one has been held accountable and apparently no laws have been broken.

Great Barrier Reef World Heritage listed Great Barrier Reef World Heritage listed Curtis Island and Gladstone Harbour before Curtis Island and Gladstone Harbour after

Even worse Gladstone Harbour has been touted as the model to follow for other port developments up and down the Great Barrier Reef, rather than the disaster to avoid. A cynic might suggest the lesson learnt from Gladstone Harbour is if you want to build oil and gas facilities on a World Heritage Island, or dredge a World Heritage harbour, take shortcuts, cut costs and hide documentation for a few years. Gladstone Ports, a government owned organisation delivered its part of the project not only on time but before its scheduled time. The resulting collapse of the environment and sickness in multiple species including humans, - effectively an example of “ecocide” in Gladstone harbour - was an “unfortunate” development. One might suggest that the social license to continue to dredge the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage area was severely damaged by these “unfortunate” events. The failure to protect Curtis Island and Gladstone harbour was apparent internationally and the risk of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area being listed as “In Danger” is in a large part due to the events in Gladstone.

Gladstone turbidity average 5.8 NTU (2004) Gladstone Turbidity averages ~20 NTU (2011)

Save the Reef has been concerned about government and statutory authorities’ mismanagement, particularly of the southern reef, for many years now. Two recent ‘independent’ inquiries commissioned by the federal government – one while Labor was in office, the second by the Coalition – have been immensely disappointing in their narrow focus and inadequate response to the ecological disaster that has been wreaked upon Gladstone Harbour. The most recent independent review acknowledged significant failings but exonerated all federal officers charged with enforcing federal environmental responsibilities.

A number of misleading statements by port officials, government appointed scientists and senior bureaucrats has led us to reflect on wider questions about the haste with which this development has been pursued by all levels of government beginning in 2008. Our concerns begin with the original decision to excise land from the World Heritage Area of Curtis Island for an industrial hub as well as the failure to enforce environmental regulation in Australia’s premier world heritage property.

A number of our concerns have already been outlined in submissions to the Independent Review of the Port of Gladstone, the Independent Review of the Bund Wall and letters to Minister for the Environment, Greg Hunt. They are appended to this submission. It has been disappointing to note the narrow approach of these reviews and the failure to address matters of substance that highlight inadequate management and responsibility for the World Heritage Area.

There has been contention around six major areas which we believe need to be fully investigated to restore public confidence:

 Excision of land within the World Heritage Area

 Energy Corporations relations with state and federal Governments since 2008

 The nature of agreements between Gladstone Ports Corporation [GPC], the LNG companies and the contractors for the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project

 Mismanagement by the federal environment department of the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project [WBDDP]

 Government failure to identify the cause and respond to toxic algal blooms in the inner harbour

 Impacts on marine life especially seagrass, and endangered species such as turtles, dugongs, whales and dolphins (including the snubfin).

Concerns regarding the Management of Gladstone Harbour

1. The excision of land within the GBR world heritage boundaries to create a state development area/industrial precinct: Why was the selection of a site outsourced to an engineering firm and why were World Heritage Values not included as part of any assessment criteria? Was the federal government consulted or informed about land use within the world heritage area? Was UNESCO advised of the plans to industrialise Curtis Is? Was the land sold to the LNG corporations? The ‘Properties’ section within the Queensland Department of State Development is now corporatized and presumably had responsibility for the land sales. Was the excised land sold at market rates? Were any staff paid fees for the land sales? Were public servants with responsibility for compulsorily acquiring and then making the land available to the energy corporations able to benefit financially from the transaction? What part did Mr Harvey, Director of Properties, play in the excision and sales of land? This was public land forcibly acquired from the World Heritage Area and the public have the right to know how this world heritage land was alienated and who precisely profited from it.

The Queensland Government made further changes to the Curtis Island precinct in 2010. Were the LNG proponents consulted over the creation of the environmental management precinct in 2010? Was UNESCO’s world heritage committee? Was land that is part of the Environmental Management Precinct provided to the LNG projects for their environmental offsets? Is the state government excising land which the public assumed was already protected as part of the world heritage area, in order to on-sell it to the LNG corporations as offsets? Are they required to purchase it and if so what rates are they charged?

2. Extent of influence of the main 4 energy corporations involved in CSG and LNG development with the state and federal governments. The New South Wales Independent Against Corruption is currently investigating the undue influence that coal mining companies, mining services companies and their lobbyists have had on government decision-making in that state. The diaries for Premiers Bligh and Newman indicate that they have had meetings with major gas corporations prior to government approvals and after public complaints about their improper influence. It is Save the Reef’s view that we need an equivalent investigation into meetings between state and federal government ministers with any individuals representing energy corporations in the lead up to the approvals for csg projects, for LNG projects, and for port infrastructure in Gladstone harbour. It is in the public interest to make the basis of those discussions publicly available including what support and assistance was promised to the energy corporations.

3. Agreements between the Gladstone Ports Corporation, LNG companies and WBDDP contractors. It is clear that Gladstone Ports Corporation placed project deadlines ahead of its environmental responsibilities. GPC whistleblowers, according to reports in the Australian newspaper in December 2013, claim GPC signed commercial contracts with the dredging contractors that gave them payment for any days the dredge was not in use. Consequently we would like to know who signed these commercial contracts which ignored GPC’s environmental responsibilities. In addition we need to know about any agreements Gladstone Ports Corporation has made with the LNG companies. Were LNG proponents promised state government infrastructure would be in place to support their first exports? Were they given a timeline for the availability of port facilities and shipping channels to be provided by the state government? Why were federal environment department officers so lax in enforcing regulations and attending Dredging Technical Reference Panel meetings when the scale of the harm to marine life, including species of National Environmental Significance, in September 2011 was so severe? (See pp. 67-69 Independent Inquiry into Bund Wall)

As with the commercial contract for dredging we have been concerned about the nature of the relationship between the Port Authority and the water quality contractor. Was the contract for monitoring water quality within the harbour for the Western

Basin Dredging and Disposal Project put to open tender? How much was Vision Environment paid? Were there any large additional payments made to them to conduct work? As the independent water quality monitor what was Leonie Anderson’s role in communicating or failing to report important data?

4. Management of the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project [WBDDP]. 4.1 The worst aspect of the latest “Independent Review” commissioned by Federal Environment Minister Greg Hunt is that it fails to name the perpetrators of the ecocide or to recommend appropriate disciplinary or punitive action.

It also failed to investigate a number of other disturbing aspects of the WBDDP environmental approvals.

4.2 On 9 November 2013, the Gladstone Observer reported that Gladstone Ports Corporation suppressed scientific knowledge about the presence of elevated levels of tributyltin in waters near the R.G. Tanna Coal Terminal in 2009.1

Gladstone Ports Corporation failed to divulge the scientific evidence regarding elevated tributyltin in its Environmental Impact Assessment for the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project in 2010, even though tributyltin was banned internationally in 2008.

The presence of tributyltin was thus not taken into account when it was given environmental approvals for its dredging program.

4.3 GPC also delayed public release of a water quality report from October 2011 for over two years. 2

This report found noxious algal blooms fatal to marine life were caused by the massive flow of sediment from the failed bund wall. We would like to know whether this scientific report was divulged to state and federal ministers who misled the public by claiming that flood waters were responsible for the massive fish kills in Gladstone Harbour. The independent review into the Bund Wall found

a number of community concerns about the monitoring, reporting and communication of data. It has been alleged that GPC was in possession of a September–October 2011 water quality management report from vision environment that identified the presence of algal blooms and elevated metals in Gladstone harbour and that this information was provided to the Queensland Government. It has also been alleged that both parties then withheld this information from stakeholders during 2011.

The panel considers that GPC was actively investigating water quality in Gladstone harbour through voluntary additional monitoring work during the time to which the allegations apply but that it was not in possession of a complete analysis of and report on findings until March 2012.

It is clear that algal blooms were notified in November 2011 by Vision Environment and it is unclear to what extent this information was passed on. The fish panel scientists were not told of the bloom nor were human health investigators and no harmful algal bloom plan was put in place. Save the Reef believes this put the public at risk from both consumption of fish that may have been contaminated with toxic algae, and through direct contact with the water. It is clear that a number of cases were directly related to contact with toxic algae. 2 people were taken to hospital by ambulance with severe respiratory symptoms after coming into contact with toxins from algae identified on their fishing nets. (Lyngbya). It is also clear that a number of infections and human health complaints were related to the turbid water. The lack of action with regard to harmful algal blooms was negligent, particularly in view of both human and fish disease at the time.

Matters of great public interest arise from the lack of transparency over the GPC relationship with its contractors, eg what information was provided to state and federal government environment departments when turbidity was elevated above water quality guidelines from May 2011 onwards? While commercial fishers and groups such as Save the Reef were communicating concern about the harbour with departmental officers, these officers actually weakened criteria for taking environmental action. We would like to know who the public servants and scientists were who recommended the change in dates for measuring the wet and dry seasons in the harbour rather than enforcing the original conditions.

Gladstone Ports Corporation was allowed to raise their permitted turbidity levels in May 2012 by re-calculating the mean background turbidity of the harbour using both the pre-dredging data but also incorporating post dredging data. Two sites were changed - QE4 - 28 (NTU) to 34 NTU (dry season); and 34 to 55 in the wet season. ST1 - 24 NTU was lifted to 35 NTU (dry season) and 38 to 65 (wet season). Who initiated and approved these changes? Were the public servants responsible informed of the bund wall leak?

Were all scientific members of government- and port- appointed advisory panels such as GPC’s Dredge Technical Reference Panel checked for any conflicts of interest?

Why didn't the independent dredge technical reference panel raise concerns regarding the high turbidity and the leaking bund wall.

The “Independent Review” praises the Abbot’s Government’s One-Stop Shop for approval of major projects (p. 75) and praises an increase in staffing levels in the federal environment department.

The problem is that the Abbot Government now has another 400 major approved projects to manage around the country – an increase in 50% from 800 in 2011 to more than 1200 in 2014. (pp.68-69)

5. Government failure to identify the cause and respond to toxic algal blooms in the inner harbour

The report of the Independent Inquiry into the Bund Wall is full of recommendations about informing the community about expected impacts, gathering more background data, publishing peer review reports, aligning water quality plans between federal and state governments, improving internal processes in the environment department and allowing for more resources for the environment department.

What is missing is any identification of the officers who failed to take action, including the author of the environmental approvals which were so poorly written that they were unenforceable. There were no fines recommended despite the tonnage of sediment allowed to pollute the inner harbour, no accountability, not even a lot of money required to implement the recommendations.

Save the Reef was immensely disappointed to note that the panel of the “Independent Review” did not interview Gladstone Ports Corporation whistleblower John Broomhead, the man who as environmental manager first alerted state and federal bureaucrats to major problems with the bund wall.

The report does not inform us when GPC informed the state and federal environment departments of the failure of the bund wall. It makes the claim that the discharge of sediment was possibly not ‘fully explained to the department’ (p.67) thereby attempting to exonerate both GPC and the failings of federal environmental regulators. Were the relevant ministers informed and when? Who and how senior were the public servants who were notified of the bund wall failure?

Was the Queensland Government’s Gladstone Fish Health Scientific Advisory Panel given full information about the bund wall failure?

Were the members of the Independent Review of the Port of Gladstone informed about the failure of the bund walls before they finalised their report in July 2013? What detail was provided to them?

Gladstone Ports and state and federal environment departments used the W2 clause in GPC’s environment approval licence [below] and stated high turbidity was due to tides.

Yet the engineers BMT who compiled the WBM reports stated clearly that tides alone did not cause the high turbidity. The models showed that a leak of 50 kg/ second or 180 tonnes/hr of dredge spoil on top of the tides was the best fit, and not tides alone.

Doesn't this suggest that it was affected by sediment from dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of the developing the Dredge Management plan? Did GPC breach its development approval when turbidity limits were exceeded but they officially claimed the tides - using the W2 clause (the natural variation clause)- were the cause? At the time it appeared that the state government allowed them to use this W2 clause instead of investigating the real source of the problem but they clearly knew it was being affected by sediment from the bund wall, to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the Dredge Management Plan. (ERA16 P 9 of 25)

Turbidity levels were changed in May 2012. Why was this done and were people who approved it fully aware of the bund wall failure?

Peter O'Sullivan, chief engineer for the WBDDP and Leo Zussino the former CEO of GPC are both on the public record blaming the tides for the high turbidity despite having full information about the problems with the bund wall. Have they breached their statutory responsibilities by deliberately misinforming the public? http://www.gpcl.com.au/Portals/0/2012%20media%20releases/6_June_2012_GPC_n ot_breaching_turbidity_levels_in_Gladstone_harbour.pdf http://www.gpcl.com.au/NewsPublications/MediaReleases/2012MediaReleasesArchi ve.aspx http://www.gpcl.com.au/Portals/0/2012%20media%20releases/4_Jan_2012_GPC_im plements_turbidity_management_plan_over_Xmas_period.pdf http://www.gpcl.com.au/Portals/0/2012%20media%20releases/4_May_2012_new_tur bidity_levels_approved.pdf

6. Turtle impacts Although Matters of National Environmental Significance are a responsibility of the federal environment ministry, the Independent Inquiry ignored the scientific reports which indicate seagrass, which sea turtles depend on, in the inner harbour is below 1 % of original levels. Gladstone Ports has been untruthful about the state of inner harbour seagrass and its negative impact on marine life. Additionally turtle research showing heavy metals including arsenic has been withheld and was overlooked by both Independent Inquiries.

Administrators at all levels misled the commercial and recreational fishers, the environment movement and the public about the real cause of the harbour's ill-health. Public confidence in the management of the reef world heritage area cannot be restored without significant investigation of the above concerns. The message for future port directors from state and federal government inaction so far is that they will look at Gladstone harbour, the cost savings, the finishing ahead of schedule and be impressed with the way the project delivered on budget and on time, ignoring their

environmental responsibilities and noting the failure of federal and state levels to enforce environmental compliance.

So you can have an engineering failure with ecocidal effects on marine life and still not be in breach of Federal Government approval to continue construction in a World Heritage Area.

Comments on Terms of Reference (c)

Save the Reef has appeared before state parliament over concerns regarding mine waste and the current use of rivers and streams in Central Queensland to be used as the drains for industry which feed into the Great Barrier Reef. It is of particular concern that known carcinogens such as heavy metals are being released into Central Queensland waterways. It is also of concern that Yabulu Nickel Refinery has not complied with environmental regulations and continues to risk further damage to the northern Great Barrier Reef. Management of non-agricultural activities within reef catchments impacting on the reef, including legacy mines, current mining activities and practices, and industrial operations including Yabulu appear to be under-regulated, a situation no doubt worsened by staffing cutbacks at the state level and inexperienced staff attempting to administer from Brisbane.

Regarding legacy mines, it is important to note that no meaningful rehabilitation of land is currently carried out in Queensland. The program for rehabilitation of mining land was put on hold by the Newman Government when it came to power.

The state government has continued to pump waters from the abandoned Mount Morgan mine but even there in heavy rainfall events, there is no means to prevent run-off from reaching the Fitzroy catchment.

The current fall in the price of coal has resulted in lay-off of mine workers and coal industry spokespersons decrying the fact that current production costs cannot be met given the current international price. So once again this boom and bust industry will close mines claiming that they have no resources to rehabilitate. The forty or so existing mines of the Fitzroy catchment will continue to release contaminated water which eventually reaches the mputh of the delta, Keppel Bay and the southern reef the foreseeable future.

Other comments

Cumulative impacts on water quality

Though management of the impacts of agricultural runoff remains a crucial step in protecting the reef and this includes pesticide usage and regulations of pesticides, it must be

10 acknowledged that water quality remains a critical issue. Any activity that adds to an already compromised water quality may worsen the effect on the reef. It is without doubt that dredging will add to the impact already from agricultural runoff.

Staff cutbacks

Recent budget cuts and staff cuts that ensued bring into question whether the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority has the independence, resourcing and capacity to act in the best interest of the long-term health of the reef. Board members with interests in the resource industry may be conflicted despite the issue being brushed aside by the Queensland Premier.

Independence of Scientific Work

Save the Reef is also concerned about the adequacy, timeliness and transparency of independent scientific work undertaken to support government decisions impacting the reef. Government scientists have been cautious in their statements with regards to Gladstone harbour and preferred to focus on a flooding event and critical issues such as the bund wall failure were not investigated or reported. A “corruption” of science was noted in the Gladstone Ports media releases where important information from engineering models and water quality reports were withheld from the public. There have been examples of “independent” reviewers and scientific panels not being given access to full information with regards to the leaking bund wall and algal blooms in Gladstone Harbour. Government “spin” may be contributing to public confusion. The website run by the Qld government named Reef Facts World Heritgate/UNESCO page http://www.reeffacts.qld.gov.au/ heritage/ does not in our view fully represent the concerns raised by UNESCO as an example.

Absence of precautionary principle

Government decision processes impacting the reef are not consistent with the precautionary principle, indeed despite significant coral damage to the inner reefs and understanding of the impact of poor water quality decisions to use both the World Heritage Area and even the Marine Park as dump sites for spoil continue to be made.

The strategic assessments currently underway may protect some of the reef from further decline, but equally many areas of the reef may not be protected. Significant issues such as climate change are not adequately managed through the strategic assessment. We have seen in Gladstone harbour a marked difference between what the laws and regulations should do to protect the area and what actually occurred. This is multifactorial but issues such as conditions, enforcement, staff cuts, budget cuts are all impacting on the ability for a policy document to produce real effects.

The identification and protection of off-limits areas on the reef coastline to help protect the health of the reef are essential and there are fears that there may be some review of protected areas and reversal of proactive legislation.

Conflicts of interest by both state and federal governments

Consistency of efforts with the World Heritage Committee's recommendations on what is required to protect the reef is inadequate. There is a significant conflict that exists within governments which are committed to economic growth and development and outside of government when it comes to the Great Barrier Reef.

Save the Reef is concerned as to the extent to which government decisions impacting the reef, including development of the strategic assessments and Reef 2050 Plan, involve genuine, open and transparent consultation with the Australian community, affected industries and relevant scientific experts, and genuine consideration of the broader community's views in final decisions. We have seen in Gladstone harbour how difficult it was to get the balance right, and we have not seen a significant change in management since the massive fish kills of September 2011 in Gladstone harbour.

Climate change

Save the Reef believes that there are a number of related matters such as climate change that are central to the Great Barrier Reef’s future. The responses seen recently with respect to climate change policy and the conflict that occurs in dealing with that issue within the government and outside of the government is in many ways similar to the issues facing the Great Barrier Reef. If the science of climate change is not enough to invoke the precautionary principle and bring rapid action to bear, we doubt it truly matters how clear the science is on reef degradation. There are some people who will be prepared to lose the Reef rather than accept the scientific facts.

Population density and development

Population density and development along the Reef remain critical issues. Save the Reef believes the most likely scenario is that the reef will die and that the projections by AIMS indicate there will be less than 10% of the reef left by 2040. It sees little hope that this broader decline will slow. It hopes by maintaining a few pockets of biodiversity (and this may require significant commitment in funds, research, etc) that at some stage in the future the reef will be able to recover. Save the Reef is aware that many scientists would suggest this is an optimistic outlook. Save the Reef believes in this context recent state and federal government action since at least 2008 with regard to our World Heritage Property have failed to protect this precious asset and has been reckless and irresponsible when it comes to management of the Great Barrier Reef world heritage area

Concluding comments

The Australian and Queensland Governments' efforts to stop the rapid decline of the Great Barrier Reef have been inadequate. We have demonstrated that the management to date of the impacts of industrialisation of Gladstone Harbour and Curtis Island, including dredging, dumping behind an inadequate and failing bund wall and offshore dumping has been woefully inadequate.

It is our concern that Abbott Point has been approved at a time before failures were acknowledged in Gladstone and that port authorities continue to use Gladstone as a model. We are concerned that GPC still have plans to develop the precious Fitzroy Delta and will apply the same principles used in the development of Gladstone Harbour. We remain concerned that as no laws were broken and no-one was held accountable that similar events may occur at Cape Melville, Bathurst Bay and other places in the Great Barrier Reef.

The Great Barrier Reef is acting as a canary in a coal mine for Australia and for the world community. Its declining water quality and the death of corals are warnings of our failure to manage multi-use environments sustainably. If a country as rich as Australia cannot effectively limit development to preserve a world heritage property then it is difficult to see how this can be achieved anywhere in the world. We need a change of direction by governments who for too long have been lured by promises of development but are in fact bringing degradation and an impoverished natural resource base for our children.

Dr Andrew Jeremijenko Dr Libby Connors Mr Chad Kirby

APPENDIX A

Please find below our submission to the Independent Review into the Leaking Bund Wall at the Port of Gladstone. In particular Dr Andrew Jeremijenko would like to discuss with the Senate Committee the human health issues associated with the dredging

Bund Wall Review Secretariat PO Box 787 CANBERRA ACT 2601 Email: [email protected]

28 February, 2014

Submission to the Independent Review into the Leaking Bund

Wall at the Port of Gladstone

Submission from Save the Reef

Save the Reef is an environment group that formed in response to state government and industry plans for massive expansion of coal and LNG port facilities in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, plans which were first made known to the public in 2010. Individual members had been following turbidity and water quality problems in Gladstone Harbour from 2010 and formed in 2011 to cooperate on information and to alert the public to the scale and consequent negative impacts already being experienced from inappropriate port developments.

One of our members, Dr Andrew Jeremijenko, is a specialist in Occupational and Environmental medicine who treated patients exposed to Gladstone harbour water and sick marine life. He has presented this information at international conferences.iii He was concerned that important health information was withheld from doctors and the public such as harmful algal blooms that put the public and fishermen at risk. The harbour was reopened to the public and they were told it was safe, when in fact toxic algal blooms were present. No harmful algal bloom plan was put in place. This was negligent behaviour and the people responsible should be held accountable. Given the short timeframe of only 10 business days for written submissions, Dr Jeremijenko would like to have the opportunity to

14 meet with the panel to discuss public health matters including bacterial infections and the presence of toxic algae and provide insights from his research to the panel.

The design and construction and functioning of the outer bund wall of the western basin reclamation area was critically flawed and resulted in considerable environmental damage, health risks and reputational harm. An extensive investigation into the bund wall failure is warranted.

There is a concern that two members in this independent review Anthea Tinney and Ian Creswell were part of the Gladstone independent review that stated with regard to the bund wall "the proponent had acted in accordance with their approved plans and as a result this incident was not found to be a contravention or breach of the conditions by the department." In effect Dr Andrew Johnson will need to examine the actions of his own team members and explain how they came to that conclusion in their original review. It is hoped that they will not make similar errors again. Their credibility has been seriously dented by their original findings and an explanation is required.

Save the Reef also believes explanations are required from the Gladstone Ports Corporation, the Western Basin Dredge and Disposal program, the Dredge Technical reference panel, the “independent” monitors Vision environment, and the regulators at both state and federal levels with regard to this bund wall failure. There may have been a number of individuals who may have colluded and deliberately misled and deceived others with regard to this matter. There are individuals who should be held accountable for one of the worst environmental disasters in the World Heritage waters of the Great Barrier Reef. Gladstone harbour, the bund wall failure and associated developments have contributed significantly to the threat of the Great Barrier Reef being listed as a World Heritage Area “In Danger.” It is hoped that this review may show UNESCO that Australians are prepared to protect the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area.

Our submission responds to the Terms of Reference, however we will respond to terms of reference 3 before terms of reference 2.

1. Examine and report on information relevant to the design and construction and functioning of the outer bund wall of the western basin reclamation area that has become available since the Independent Review reported on its findings;

On 16 September 2011, shortly after the dredging and dumping of dredge spoil behind the bund wall commenced in the Western Basin, Fisheries Queensland closed Gladstone Harbour and the surrounding area to fishing under section 46 of the Fisheries Act 1994, while the Queensland Government investigated a condition affecting some locally caught fish. The Gladstone Harbour and the surrounding areas were closed to all forms of commercial and recreational fishing from 16 September 2011 and 7 October 2011. The cause of the fish disease and the human disease was never really identified, though the harbour was reopened.

Over 2 years later reports were released that showed the design, construction and functioning of the outer bund wall may have contributed to the disease in the harbour. It is now known that in August 2011 GLADSTONE Ports Corporation was forced to seek urgent permission to breach its environmental approvals in a race to plug a leaking bund wall before it ran out of space to store potentially toxic acid sulphate soils from dredging associated with the $33 billion Curtis Island LNG export terminals.

An application for a transitional environment program lodged in June 2012 confirmed the environmental impact of the original bund wall failure and how an initial response had not fixed the problem. There was no fine or punishment and no-one has been held accountable for the change of the agreed design that caused the bund wall failure.

In August 2013 a presentation was given regarding the bund wall failure by Bill Service (Dredging Advisor for QGC) and Warren Hornsey (National Technical Manager for Geofabrics Australasia). iv Their presentation stated a tender process led to a suboptimal cheaper geotextile option being chosen then originally agreed to in the environmental approvals. That material was put on the wall rather than put in the wall as originally planned. This led to ballooning and tearing in the tides and the leak of dredge spoil including acid sulphate soils, heavy metals and other toxins into the harbour.

The engineers have shown the Gladstone Ports did not comply with the federal and state regulations to construct an appropriate bund wall that would hold the dredge spoil and minimize water quality impacts. It is likely the bund wall leak led to poor water quality contributed to the fish disease as well as human health impacts.

The engineers presentation was supported by other documents that have emerged over 2 years after the event, including an engineering model published September 2011;i a September and October 2011 WDDP water quality report, a January 2012 paper (additional bund wall sampling), ii September 2012 paper (field investigation of the bund wall) iii. All these papers were hidden from the public. A whistleblower, John Broomhead exposed further secrets about the events in Gladstone harbour including the redesign of the bund wall to save mangroves that may also have contributed to poorer water quality. These reports found the high turbidity levels, which the Gladstone Ports Corporation had previously blamed on tidal activity, were a result of a 180 tonne per hour leak in the project’s bund wall. They also record the presence of algal species known to cause disease in fish and humans .

Save the Reef has consulted with engineers with regard to the bund wall original design and the design that was implemented. The original concept design for the bund wall presented was a well proven way to construct a bund wall. That concept design was changed. The website of Abigroup provides some explanation. v

“Abigroup completes Port of Gladstone Western Basin expansion project, 9 January 2012” “The project started in October 2010 and before work began Abigroup, together with the design consultant SMEC, came up with a number of improved construction methodologies and design innovations which delivered overall savings for GPC while still meeting the client’s original design intent and functionality”

Save the Reef’s advice is that the improved construction methodologies and design innovations did not meet the client’s original design intent and functionality and did not meet the federal or state conditions, but that it would have delivered overall savings for GPC.

The Federal Government conditions, dated 22 Oct 2010 – GPC(EPBC2009/4904)8 included: • The design, construction materials, construction methodology and management for the outer bund wall of the Western basin land reclamation area must ensure appropriate design of the reclamation area to prevent water quality impacts from leaching material through the bund wall, decant waters and storm-water runoff.

Qld State Government conditions included: Condition 65 The proponent must ensure that the design, construction materials, construction methodology and management for the outer bund wall of reclamation area for the project: a) Is structurally sound b) Is designed for the purpose of preventing emissions from the containment area that may cause environmental harm c) Has been certified as fit for purpose by a registered professional engineer of Queensland d) Is maintained to the condition certified in (c) It was also required that the quarried material used for bund construction contain no material <12mm, to minimise potential dirty water impacts on marine flora and fauna during bund construction

The design for the Fishermans Landing bund wall that was implemented included a geofabric which was less than half the mass and over 3 times the flow rate of the original specification. This geofabric was placed on the face of the wall where it was exposed to wave and current action. This is one of the major factors that lead to the failure of the bund wall (photographs and analysis presented in Service and Hornsey (2013). vi The incorrect specification and placement of the geofabric were critical design flaws, especially knowing that the cross section was likely to be porous due to the specification for no core material <12 mm to be used to “ minimise potential dirty water impacts on flora and fauna ” (Service and Hornsey 2013).

The specification for no core material <12 mm to be used is not ideal for a bund wall designed to have limited permeability, but the geofabric (if supplied and located as specified) would have had a reasonable chance of providing adequate control of bunded sediment for the reasons explained by Service and Hornsey (2013).

The bund wall was built by Abigroup. Abigroup claims that they “delivered their contractual obligations in relation to the Gladstone Port Corporation Seawall Project ” vii. They are technically responsible for the finished product which failed. The more important questions is how the flawed design was approved for construction when it differed so greatly to the original concept design and was never going to meet federal and state regulations.

3. Consider the adequacy of monitoring requirements and operations

As a community group concerned about impacts on Gladstone Harbour, Save the Reef regularly checked the monitoring information that Gladstone Ports Corporation [GPC] made available for the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project [WBDDP]. Turbidity graphs from the WBDDP website were showing high turbidity. Levels were elevated particularly during spring tides. The baseline values for dry season turbidity in deep waters (>2 m LAT) in the dredging project area was 3.9 NTU (sect 5.6.1 in GHD 2009), yet the values recorded in August, September and October 2011 were well above 20 NTU exceeding Australian Water Quality Guideline (AWQG) trigger levels. High turbidity was associated with dredging processes that were underway at the time Save the Reef began asking questions privately of environment department officers at state and federal levels and publicly to the media. Two problems became evident in the responses we received and go to the heart of public accountability and the responsibility of state and federal officials to uphold environmental regulations on behalf of the public. (A more detailed examination of the high turbidity, algal blooms and the lack of regulation and response can be found in Appendix 1)

The first major problem was the modification of environmental criteria by state and federal environment officials when turbidity levels were being exceeded. Rather than enforce appropriate regulations designed to safeguard environmental standards in the harbour, the environment department agreed to change monitoring criteria to suit the WBDDP. In October 2011, GPC were allowed to change the dates for the wet and dry season. Moving these dates allowed higher average turbidity levels to be defined as “natural” and therefore not a matter for federal or state environment department intervention.

A further change in May 2012 allowed GPC to re-calculate “average” conditions by including turbidity recordings after dredging had begun as part of the background turbidity for the harbour. Neither of these decisions withstand scientific scrutiny. Later after the TEP in August 2012, the W2 clause was changed and turbidity clauses were replaced with light monitoring clauses. This allowed them to continue dredging despite high turbidity. As an example when the turbidity was over 300 NTU in January 2013 after the floods, the ports commenced dredging further adding to an already stressed environment.

These changes were approved not only by state and federal environment departments but also by the Dredge Technical Reference Panel which was required to convene when turbidity levels were continually exceeded. The appearance is that all of the changes to monitoring were not based on appropriate science but on allowing GPC to continue with its WBDDP despite the environmental disaster caused by the bund wall failure.

There was a lack of action by regulators to enforce the modified turbidity rules. The development approval contained the W2 clause. “W2 clause - Should turbidity levels exceed the above level(s) it is not a contravention of condition (W1) when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administering authority that elevated turbidity is the result of external factors, (for example, erroneous or invalid data, wave height, rainfall, tides, wind, etc) and not affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the Dredge Management Plan.“

It was clear from the WBM BMT engineering report that the tides alone (or natural variation) could not account for the high turbidity, In fact only with a leak of dredge spoil modelled at 180 tonne per hour could the high turbidity in September be explained. This report and others were hidden and thus no action was taken with regard to the W2 clause. viii

The Gladstone Ports Corporation stated “natural variation" such as the tides was the cause of high turbidity on their water quality monitoring website and in media releases. The regulators allowed them to use “external factors” such as tides instead of regulating them with regard to the W2 clause. It was clear from the hidden reports that the turbidity was “affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity.” (ERA16 P 9 of 25)

“Independent” monitoring done by Vision Environment revealed the high turbidity associated with the bund wall failure. Three papers in particular were not released that showed high turbidity associated with the bund wall and harmful algal blooms. ix x

The dredge technical reference panel may have known about the leaking bund wall and the harmful algal blooms. It is unsure how much information was hidden from the regulators but it appears that

18 many people including the scientific fish health panel and other independent reviewers were misled about the true extent of the cause and the size of the bund wall leak and its impact.

The Gladstone Ports and Vision Environment may be considered negligent for not reporting a harmful algal bloom and placing the public and fishermen’s health. A Queensland Health investigation in 2011 did not identify “any link between the diseases in Gladstone fish and human health issues” but they were unaware of much of this information above.

The deliberately misleading statements made to the media by port officials who were aware of the WBM BMT Report and the bund wall failure are an example of the deception by the Gladstone Ports. As an example in an ABC interview Leo Zussino, as the then CEO of GPC told the press that high turbidity was caused by “natural” tidal variations,xi that widespread death and disease in harbour marine life was caused by flooding earlier in the year. Peter O'Sullivan, chief engineer for the WBDDP, also made public statements blaming the tides for high turbidity.

The water quality monitoring that should have protected the waters of Gladstone harbour failed. The water quality monitoring was altered, moved or reduced in certain areas to hide the full impact of the bund wall leak. Leonie Andersen of Vision Environment, a consultancy which has the contract to undertake water quality monitoring of Gladstone Harbour, in early 2012 told the ABC’s Catalyst program that there was nothing abnormal about Gladstone Harbour waters.

All of these statements we now know to be false. Vision Environment’s water quality monitoring report for September-October 2011 was not released to the public until October 2013. In that report the consultants informed the Port Authority that excessive sediment loads flowing from the failed bund wall was causing high turbidity levels in the inner harbour and had also triggered a toxic algal bloom.

Water quality monitoring was originally made available to allow for transparency regarding the impacts of the WBDDP. When that monitoring showed problems port officials and their consultants then lied to the media and the public about the causes of that pollution. This misinformation was to allow the bundwall construction to continue causing environmental harm and for dredging for the project to continue apace despite excessive levels of turbidity.

Have Leo Zussino, Peter O’Sullivan and Leonie Andersen committed any offence by withholding the Vision Environment Report from Sept-October 2011 which acknowledged that there was high turbidity and that that turbidity was caused by the failure of the bundwall? They have certainly weakened the role of public reporting of environmental conditions and public trust in those reports.

In a series of articles in The Australian written by Graham Lloyd, GPC whistleblower John Broomhead said that both state and federal environment departments were informed about the tearing of the liner of the bund wall and related problems of high turbidity. It was noted that the GPC had signed a commercial contract which required them to pay the dredging contractor for days when the dredge could not be used, so there was a commercial disincentive to stopping the dredging.

Harmful Algal Blooms

Save the Reef believes that Gladstone Ports and Vision environment were negligent by not releasing the information about the harmful algal blooms they detected in the harbour. Toxic algae have been

19 associated with deaths and the cover up a harmful algal bloom was an irresponsible act. The harbour was reopened because it was believed to be safe. The levels of harmful algae at the time the harbour reopened were still very high. It is believed that the GPC may have misled the public health unit with regard to the extent of the harmful algal bloom.

Below is an outbreak curve from 48 fishermen that made statements regarding their illnesses which were analysed. All had a common exposure to marine water or sick fish.

Figure 5 an outbreak graph of reporting of fishermen illness.

Health Symptoms in Fishermen

20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

A number of fishermen reported reactions consistent with reactions to toxic algae such as Lyngbya. A report by Vision Environment documented harmful algal blooms “In total, 21 samples across all three zones were collected for algal enumeration and identification during the October 2011 sampling event. Samples were analysed for the presence of algae, in particular the presence of those associated with harmful algal blooms (HAB). Several algae were identified across all zones including Cyanobacteria (blue green algae), filamantous diatoms, dinoflagellates and material resembling a raphidophyte. In summary the following family/species were identified in quantifiable numbers, and in some cases bloom proportions: • Cyanobacteria ( to 90,000 cells/mL) o Trichodesmium erythraeum o Pseudanabaenaceae • Filamentous diatoms (<10 to 2,100 cells/mL) o Chaetoceros (up to 300 cells/mL) • Raphidophyte (<2 to < 20 organisms/mL) o Chattonella (only degrading cells resembling this genus were present) • Crytomonads (<10/mL)

This report of algal blooms coincides with the peak in health symptoms in August, September and October 2011. Blooms of harmful algae are found in water with elevated nutrient sources.”

“The identification of several algal species, including cyanobacteria (blue green algae), in numbers considered to be in bloom proportions, supported the finding that a large proportion of the suspended particles were likely to be algal cells. Elevated chlorophyll a, which is a measure of a photosynthetic pigment produced by many algae and a surrogate estimate for algal biomass, also supported these findings, in addition to erratic and variable dissolved oxygen concentrations which were recorded at several continuous data logger sites (refer Vision Environment QLD bimonthly data summaries) during this period. However concentrations of chlorophyll a in August 2011 in the Western Basin/Narrows zones were much higher than in October 2011 suggesting that bloom formation may have begun prior to the issues associated with the commencement of the CSD and placement of material into Bund Wall reclamation area. This suggests that algal cell numbers may have been much higher in August and September than that measured in October 2011 and that algal cell numbers quantified in October 2011 may have been an under estimation of actual bloom cell numbers.”

Vision environment admitted “it is possible that harmful algal blooms may have been a possible contributing factor in the fish disease syndrome.” Though they did not state it is possible the harmful algal blooms were a contributing factor in the human disease and they should have notified the authorities to ensure a harmful algal bloom response plan was implemented. It is postulated that the high turbidity and associated heavy metals may have contributed to the documented algal blooms and associated marine bacteria which has contributed to the illness in multiple species including fish and fishermen. The Ports dredging over the limit on Christmas, Easter, Australia day and Labor day when people recreate in the waters of Gladstone harbour may increase the risk of healthe effects from algal blooms and associated marine infections.

Neither DERM nor GPC provided Queensland Health with reports or evidence of “toxic blue green algae and dangerous diatoms”. The report about the findings was leaked to the Courier Mail in November 2011; the findings were confirmed by the then Environment Minister, Ms. Darling, in early December 2011. http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/possible-algae-link-to-fish-deaths/story-fn6ck51p- 1226207534864 http://www.couriermail.com.au/ipad/all-clear-on-algae-but-fish-still-sick/story- fn6ck51p-1226211701523

Queensland Health interviewed 27 people who were concerned they may have been unwell, in particular with infections and other skin conditions, as a result of contact with diseased fish from the Gladstone area. They reviewed the statements of 10 other people. The interviews were conducted in order to establish whether there was any clear pattern of illness among interviewees, and to identify possible links between diseased fish and risks to human health. A range of symptoms were described by interviewees, including 'flu-like' illnesses, infected injuries, boils, eye discharge and redness, swelling or rashes on the hands and feet. The majority of interviewees reported infected injuries and skin infections. 24 of these people reported infected injuries (e.g. barramundi spikes) or skin infections (e.g. boils). 10 swabs were taken and all grew Staph aureus of which half grew MRSA. The department reviewed the transmission of Staphylococcus finding it occurred via: – Direct person-to-person contact, especially in crowded situations – Sharing of personal items, e.g.towels, razors – Breaks in skin, e.g. cuts and scratches; and – Not related to handling of fish

As they were unaware of the bund wall leak and harmful algal blooms, it was concluded that there was “No clear pattern to reported conditions” and “No link identified between conditions found in fish and human health issues.”

At the same time as the health department were reporting their findings the Courier Mail xii in 2011 was reporting that toxic algae had been identified in Gladstone harbour. These leaked findings were confirmed in 2013. There were harmful algal blooms of blue-green algae and a second species known as a diatom. The report also detected Cattonella, which has been associated with fish deaths in other parts of the world. Another scientist Dr Matt Landos also identified Lyngbya and Tricodesmium in 25 plankton net samples taken in February 2012.xiii Lyngbya is well known to cause health effects in humans.

Many of the non-infectious symptoms in fishermen could be attributed to algal toxins such as Lyngbya. Osborne et al describe Lyngbya majuscula as “a benthic filamentous marine cyanobacterium, which in recent years appears to have been increasing in frequency and size of blooms in Moreton Bay, Queensland. It has a worldwide distribution throughout the inftropics and subtropics in water to 30m. It has been found to contain a variety of chemicals that exert a range of biological effects, including skin, eye and respiratory irritation.” xiv

The number of skin infections and other health symptoms reported in fishermen indicates that common environmental exposures may be contributing to the illnesses in the fishermen. The link to algal blooms, high nutrients, high turbidity and associated marine bacteria can be postulated but not proven. The disease in fish and the disease in fishermen that all occurred at the same time (temporal link) may not be proven, but that does not mean there was no link as suggested by the health department. The lack of a statistically significant result should not mean the null hypothesis is proven, just that it is not disproved. Many other factors are suggestive of a link. There was a harmful algal bloom at the peak of the illness.

Algal blooms refer to the overgrowth of algae (e.g. microalgae, macroalgae or cyanobacteria) in response to natural or human-induced changes to the environment. Algal blooms can have a major detrimental effect on estuarine and marine environments. Toxic algal blooms can degrade fisheries, affect natural ecosystems and potentially impact on the tourism industry. A harmful algal bloom is one where the alga species produces toxins that pose a threat to human and/or animal health or the environment, such as Lyngbya. Blooms occur when favourable conditions cause the rapid growth of one (or several) algae species allowing them to dominate the aquatic ecosystem. Environmental conditions influencing algae growth include high nutrients, high trace elements such as metals amongst other factors. xv Many factors in Gladstone harbour favour high frequency of algal blooms.

Harmful Algal Blooms (HABs) are common seasonal phenomena occurring throughout Queensland in fresh, estuarine and coastal marine waters. HABs may be potentially toxic thus posing a direct threat to human and animal health. Consequently, a HAB may have economic and social impacts There is a standard operational procedure to follow given the identification and/or receipt of a public enquiry regarding a potential HAB. The roles and responsibilities of the various response agencies with the capacity and expertise to deal with specific HAB incidences, ensure that the situation is handled by the appropriate agency within a consistent response framework.

The five steps include

1. Receiving the public inquiry

2. Provide general advice

3. Inspect the bloom

4. Analyse the bloom

5. Communicate the findings

6. Clear the bloom

Harmful algal blooms were notified in Gladstone harbour in August 2011, at a time of human illness yet the procedures to deal with it were not put in place. Fishermen were not notified or advised, the bloom appears not to be analysed, and the communication was leaked to the media and later confirmed. The health department put out no notices with regard to the bloom.

In contrast a harmful algal bloom in WA in August 2011 was handled very differently “Health officials have discovered a toxic microscopic algae at 'very high levels' in the Peel-Harvey Estuary, near Mandurah, WA, prompting a warning for people to avoid eating wild-caught shellfish.” “As a general rule people should not eat wild shellfish as their safety cannot be guaranteed.” xvi

This stark contrast between WA’s proactive warnings to the public in the media, compared to the leaked reports to media in Qld needs to be further investigated. Intoxication with blue-green algae can lead to convulsions, diarrhea and sudden death. The species Anabaena circinalis was the cause of the Darling River bloom in 1990-91. Paralytic poisons were found in the dead sheep and cattle along the river at that time. In the 1970s Cylindrospermosis, in a dam in Palm Island Queensland, was treated with copper sulphate. As the algae died, it released toxins into the water which were responsible for approximately 150 people being taken ill. Medical symptoms included

24 gastrointestinal, liver and kidney damage. (High levels of copper and acid sulphate soils in Gladstone harbour could lead to copper sulphate) Direct contact to cyanobacteria (e.g. Lyngbya) of exposed parts of the body including the ears, eyes, mouth and throat as well as ingestion of water containing cells by swallowing are cited as risks resulting from exposure at recreational water sites.

The algal blooms are related to nutrients and high turbidity which had been elevated in the Gladstone harbour and exceeded the 99th Percentile (“the licensed level”) for over 48 hours in at least one site, nearly every month from August, 2011 to April 2013. It is a statistically significant difference from previous years and the historical data and therefore should have been noted in all the reports.

As the Gladstone Ports Corporation did not receive an environmental protection order, they were not required to stop dredging during times of high turbidity between October, 2011 and January, 2012. The Gladstone Ports stated they have voluntarily taken action and reduced the hours of dredging during periods of high turbidity. The use of the natural variation clause and attributing the high turbidity primarily to spring tides was repeated continuously. The high turbidity was noted on the Christmas holidays, Australia Day, Easter holidays and Labour day. High turbidity (dirty water) on public holidays associated with algal blooms when people are using the harbour for recreation is an unnecessary risk. The cutter dredge continued to operate in periods of high turbidity. The Ports were “asked” to stop dredging in September 2011, by DERM around the time of the fishermen’s illness.

2. Provide advice as required to assist with the department's current review of the outer bund wall leak incidents in 2011 and 2012;

Thus there are a number of additional questions arising from the bund wall leak, the hidden documents and the information provided by the whistleblower which the people of Australia have a right to know:

Who within GPC made the commercial agreement with the dredging company that gave them payment for any days the dredge was not in use? Was the contract for monitoring water quality within the harbour for the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project put to open tender? How much was Vision Environment paid? Were there any large additional payments made to them to conduct work? As the independent water quality monitor what was Leonie Anderson’s role in communicating or failing to report important data?

What information was provided to state and federal government environment departments when turbidity was elevated above water quality guidelines from May 2011 onwards?

Since the leaking bund wall was a cause of excessive turbidity, the public have a right to know which officers in the state and federal environment departments were notified of the leaking bund wall and whether they followed appropriate procedures and the justification for not releasing documents. The Dredge Technical Reference Panel needs to disclose how much it knew and why it did not act to limit the damage from the leaking bund wall. Other questions of concern include:

What information was provided to state and federal government environment departments when turbidity was elevated above water quality guidelines from May 2011 onwards? What information was provided to the scientific fish panel, and the independent reviewers? Who were the public servants and scientists who recommended the change in dates for measuring the wet and dry seasons in the harbour ? Who were the public servants and scientists who recommended new methods for measuring turbidity in May 2012? Gladstone Ports Corporation was allowed to raise their permitted turbidity levels in May 2012 by re-calculating the mean background turbidity of the harbour using both the pre-dredging data but also incorporating post dredging data. Two sites were changed - QE4 - 28 (NTU) to 34 NTU (dry season); and 34 to 55 in the wet season. ST1 - 24 NTU was lifted to 35 NTU (dry season) and 38 to 65 (wet season). Who initiated and approved these changes? Were the public servants responsible informed of the bund wall leak? Why didn't the independent dredge technical reference panel raise concerns regarding the high turbidity and the leaking bund wall. How much did they know about the bund wall failure and the BMT WBM reports. Did they communicate their findings appropriately? Why were GPC’s Water Quality Monitoring reports from September and October 2011 not released to the public until October 2013 and who was responsible for this deferral?

Gladstone Harbour regulation appears to indicate that current approvals and compliance are ineffective. The recent record from whistleblowers indicates that compliance regimes have failed and are still failing in Gladstone harbour.

4. Seek submissions from relevant stakeholders on the design, construction and other matters relating to the subsequent leaking of the bund wall. It is anticipated that the review findings will be finalised by the end of March 2014. Save the Reef would like to request additional time for instance 7 days to edit and improve its submission and include other information such as photos. The time frame between notification and submission was short and has limited our opportunity to organise the submission and include all relevant information. Save the Reef would greatly appreciate the opportunity to

meet and discuss their findings with regard to Gladstone Harbour, the bund wall leak and associated illness. It is obvious the bund wall failed, what is more concerning is that important documents were hidden, and regulators and reviewers failed to ask the appropriate questions of relevant individuals to expose this leak.

Regards

Dr Andrew Jeremijenko Dr Libby Connors Mr Chad Kirby

APPENDIX 1

Turbidity levels as an environmental factor in Algal disease

Water quality reports relating to water quality tests were done in September and October 2011 but were not released. The water quality was poor at the time of the fishermen’s peak complaints in August and September 2011 and these reports confirmed high levels of toxic algae in bloom proportions. No harmful algal bloom response plan was initiated. The mean turbidity at that time was over three times the historical mean and exceeded the agreed 99th centile. ( It was noted that 25 days out of the 100 last days of 2012 were over the 99th Centile instead of the predicted 1 day e.g. September to December, 2011.) Over 20 cases reported health symptoms in August, September and October 2011 when the turbidity was high. Turbidity was noted to be associated with dredging activities and high total metals was associated with high turbidity. (Turbidity 90% correlated with total aluminium and 70% with total copper) No independent environmental samples or water quality measurements were taken by Queensland Health, and despite the fishermen linking their disease with dredging, there was no health department testing for toxic algae and associated bacteria done in the turbid water associated with dredging. The reports of toxic algae identified by DERM, Vision Environment and the Courier Mail reports appeared to have been ignored. There was no bacterial analysis by Qld health of the live trout boats, the water or the fish, though reports of Shewanella were noted by Biosecurity Qld with relation to catfish and mudcrabs.

Vision Environment stated in their May 2012 water quality report that “Clorophyll A concentrations in the Western Basin and Narrows area were highest in August 2011 algal blooms(when algal blooms were recorded) and remained high during the 2011/2012 wet seasons.” This was the time that multiple infections and irritations were most prevalent in the fishermen (see statements.) Algal blooms occur in association with high turbidity and high nutrient levels. They are often accompanied by high levels of marine bacteria.

Water quality was tested on the 26th September and results released in the Port Curtis - Current and Historical Water Quality in October 2011. The turbidity at site BG10 was found to be 136NTU and at site ST1 to be 75 NTU. These both exceeded the 99th percentile. The 99th percentile is listed for BG10 and ST1 as 46 and 24 NTU respectively for the dry season which runs from the 1st April to 19th November.

The Gladstone ports turbidity data also noted the high turbidity at site BG10 and ST1. “Turbidity has increased significantly and exceeded the 99th percentile during the spring tides with high tidal ranges. Mitigations actions are currently being undertaken. The Cutter Section Dredge was suspended on 29/09/11 to assist with settling the turbidity. Turbidity is expected to return below the trigger level naturally due to the lower tidal ranges. The exceedences have been reported to the Regulator.”

The DERM Director General Mr Reeves in a media statement commented on the high turbidity in September. He stated that “the September testing found turbidity levels were higher than the licensed levels. This confirms the decision taken soon after the samples were collected to temporarily cease dredging operations until turbidity returned to below the licensed levels." that dredging was ceased from 29th September to the 3rd October. September also experienced a high number of health symptoms in the fishermen.

In November 2011, DERM released a supplementary report, “Water Quality of Port Curtis and Tributaries, Supplementary Report Based on Data Collected in the week of 26th September 2011”. DERM Director-General Jim Reeves said this built on the previous report and reflected further analysis of the level of metals in the water column that could potentially impact on fish and other aquatic organisms. “This report describes levels of metals in waters around Port Curtis and Gladstone Harbour, particularly in terms of the levels of metals that might be taken up by fish and other organisms living in these waters.” The test samples, which were taken before dredging was temporarily halted by Gladstone Ports Corporation, confirm turbidity levels were higher at locations close to the dredging.

In the DERM report it was stated “It can be seen in Figure 10 (above) the turbidity measurements are generally highest closest to the dredging operations, both close to dredging activities and outside of the bund wall (which holds dredging spoils).” Sealing of the bund wall apparently resulted in reduced turbidity at BW2. The northeast corner of the Bund Wall had high turbidity as fast currents were scouring over the mudflats. Higher

30 turbidity was also noted at BW1, an unsealed section of the bund wall. As well as dredging, spring tides during the sampling period added to the turbidity in the water.

The Government Department of Resource Management (DERM) has stated they use turbidity as a proxy for the measurement of total suspended solids in a water column." DERM also noted in its October 2011 report that "turbidity in Gladstone harbour was found to be higher in the area most likely to be affected by dredging and associated activities." Turbidity triggers have been set in the EIS and is regulated by DERM. If turbidity exceeds the 99th perentile for 48 hours, at the principal contractor is responsible for acting on a turbidity trigger. The principal contractor has the obligation to report (weekly) non conformance, high/ low monitoring exceedances and actions taken and any complaints. DERM found that turbidity levels in dredge sites, dredge spoil sites and dredge plume sites were 20 to 60 times higher than in the control sites (Rodds Bay). The aluminium was also closely correlated to total suspended metals in the 2012 CSIRO report. xiv

In September, turbidity exceeded the turbidity limits, and DERM requested they suspend dredging. In October turbidity exceeded the 99th centile, but no environmental protection order was given to cease the cutter dredge. "The highest subsurface turbidity recorded from the October sampling was at site BG10 in the harbour with a value of 71 NTU. (above the 99th percentile) However, an examination of historical turbidity data collected by the GPC at site BG10 since October 2010 suggests that turbidity levels greater than 50 NTU are common at this site around spring tides." (Jim Reeves DERM) The high turbidity in site ST1 was noted again at Christmas time from the 23rd to the 27th (4 days over the 99th percentile) and the dredging was not ceased, though when confronted the GPC admitted they reduced it by 3 hours a day. The turbidity again exceeded the 99th centile on the 8th January and an environmental protection order was issued and dredging was stopped on the 10th of January. No environmental protection orders were issued during the period October 2011 to January 2012 as the primary cause of high turbidity was attributed to spring tides.

In January 2012 DERM released a second supplementary report “Second Update on the Water Quality of Port Curtis and Tributaries Including Data Collected in the Week of 24 October 2011.” In the report it was stated “Turbidity levels in parts of the harbour and river estuaries were higher in September and October 2011 than the preceding months but were consistent with those from summer and autumn (compare Figures 2, 3 with DERM, 2011a). The highest subsurface turbidity recorded from the October sampling was at site BG10 in the harbour (Figure 2; Zone 3–Table 1) with a value of 71 NTU. However, an examination of historical turbidity data collected by the GPC at site BG10 since October 2010 suggests that turbidity levels greater than 50 NTU are common at this site around spring tides.”

In media statements DERM continued to assert that there were no problems: “The sampling shows no clear pattern in the water quality results taken across the Port Curtis region to suggest that dredging was having any obvious impact on water quality,” Mr Reeves said. “What we are seeing is a natural month to month variation across all testing zones. “There was no evidence that turbidity, pH, oxygen levels, salinity or temperature had any negative impact on water quality in Port Curtis harbour or its estuaries, or fish health concerns,” (or human health concerns).

Gladstone Ports data for BG10 is found below over the period when DERM conducted testing. Turbidity was above the 99th percentile, however it is noted that Gladstone Ports was using the wet season turbidity level of 56 which was not meant to start until the 20th November.

In site ST1, it was raised for 9 days above the wet season levels. No environmental exceedance was reported. It was stated the primary cause for the high turbidity was spring tides. Examining historical data shows no period of nine days of high turbidity over the 99th centile. The use of the wet season turbidity triggers, which were not due to start until the 20th November is not explained.

It was also noted that earlier in the month from October 10th to October 14th the Al Mahaar Cutter Suction Dredge was suspended to assist in mitigating the natural turbidity cycles in the harbour.

Role of the Western Basin Dredging & Disposal Project and the Bund Wall

There was high turbidity in the Western Basin and a leaking bund wall at the time the human illnesses was reported in August and September. This bund wall was not repaired until June 2012. There were reports of algal blooms, high clorophyl-a and high nutrient, sediment and total suspended solids associated with the leaking bund wall.

A Transitional Environment Programme (TEP) was allowed to fix this "turbidity problem

“The Gladstone Ports Corporation has admitted that a bund, or dam which stores dredging sediment, has been leaking into the ocean and has increased water turbidity. A state MP in Central Queensland has accused the operators of the state's largest port of a cover-up and the Queensland Premier says their operations lack transparency.” http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-06-28/gladstone-ports-corp-accused-of-cover- up/4097246

The water quality reports released by DERM at the time of the TEP stated “Results of water quality investigations between September 2011 and May 2012, with the exception of a cluster of elevated metal concentrations around South Trees Inlet, have shown that none of the water quality properties measured was of significant environmental concern." This was despite the GPC admitting that the leaking bund wall and associated dredging has contributed to the high turbidity in the harbour having approved the TEP to fix the Bund wall leak, and approving dredging above the turbidity limits.

The multiple breaches over the 99th Centile for greater than 48 hours most likely due to the bund wall leak was contravening the conditions of their approvals. The Ports were not held accountable except for the one EPO on January 10th 2012. The ports continued to escape prosecution under the w2 clause – “the natural variation clause” - The Courier Mail wrote about this loophole that allowed the ports to dredge over the agreed limits. Previously the ports and government departments had been explaining the high turbidity away due to natural variation so that they were not punished for each exceedance (e,g, blaming tides or winds. ) The W2 clause states – “ Should turbidity levels exceed the above levels it is not a contravention of condition (W1) when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administering authority that elevated turbidity is the result of external factors (for example erroneous or invalid data, wave height, rainfall, tides, wind etc) and not affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the dredge management plan. “

As the leaking Bund wall contributed to the high turbidity which was admitted in the media and in the requests for the TEP, than some of that turbidity was not due to natural variation but due to the leaking bund wall. This therefore makes those exceedances breaches of their conditions.

34 http://www.gladstoneobserver.com.au/news/bund-wall-progress-gladstone-harbour/1453349/

The DEHP/DERM disguised these breaches explaining them away as natural variation when this was not the case. They continued to not enforce the rules despite monthly or fortnightly exceedances. This was the background to introducing the new light monitoring. Under that scheme high turbidity was not a breach as long as the light monitoring was within normal limits. As light monitoring has a 14 day rolling average, it would not pick up a breach until turbidity was well over the limits for over a week. In effect light monitoring has meant they are now allowed to dredge during periods of high turbidity. For example after the recent floods in January 2013 they started dredging when the turbidity was 300 NTU.

It was noted that in the end of October, 2011, where turbidity had exceeded the dry season limit for over 48 hours, that dredging was not ceased until 96 hours. This was raised with Arthur Dahl at DERM. It was noted that the Ports were on their website showing the turbidity 99th centile as wet season when in actual fact it was the dry season and their request to alter the dates had not been approved.

It is concerning that turbidity has continued to be high in 2012 and up to the wet season of 2013. A picture from the Space station of Gladstone Harbour, after the floods. After the floods turbidity went up to almost 300 at site ST1 and over 100 at site QE4. The GPC was allowed to dredge from the 27th January onwards despite the high turbidity because all light monitors were fine. The astronaut picture taken from the space station on 29th January, 2013 showed clearly the brown harbour and dredging at this time would have increased the sediment and contribute to seagrass death. Dredging continued throughout this period of brown turbidity because the rules are so relaxed that with light monitoring they can dredge 24 hours a day despite high turbidity.

Save the Reef has been disappointed with the monitoring of Gladstone harbour the lack of enforcement and the amendments. .

We are particularly disturbed by the lack of enforcement of turbidity limits in Gladstone Harbour. It is our understanding that the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority originally expressed concern to the Federal and State Governments about the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project (WBDDP) and specifically requested additional water quality monitoring for the duration of the project.

More importantly, since dredging began, the publicly available turbidity levels at a number of monitoring stations in the harbour have been above Gladstone Ports’ environmental licence conditions for more than 48 hours. Rarely has any action been taken by the State Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (formerly Department of Environment and Resource Management). One environment protection order was given on the 10th January 2012 but similar episodes which included Christmas 2011 and Australia day, Easter and Labour Day holidays in 2012, were not enforced despite high recreational use by the boating and fishing public at such times.

There is also a pattern of changing the turbidity limits rather than enforcing them. GPC first relaxed the turbidity limits by commencing the wet season on the 1st October instead of 20th November 2011. The historical data in the Water Quality Management Plan identifies the start of the Wet Season as the 20th November. The water quality graphs released on the Gladstone Ports website stated that the “wet season was from 20th November to 31st March and the rest of the year would be considered the dry season.” When Gladstone Ports Corporation was asked why the dates were altered this was the response:

The changes were requested by the Dredge Technical Reference Panel when they advised the Department (DERM) the trigger values had been developed around the wet/dry season cut off being 1 October (and 31 March) and therefore necessitating a change to development approval SPDE01611411. SPDE01611411 is our state government approved development application. The season dates on those graphs (on our website) unfortunately was our mistake.

However it is clear that the trigger values had been developed around the wet/dry season cut off of 20 November. The Water Quality Management Planxvii was quite specific about the wet season dates. It is noted in the EIS Appendix Kxviii with regards to turbidity that the wet season is December to April and October and November are considered as part of the dry season. Baseline turbidity in those months was historically low. The BOM data shows that rainfall is on average not high in October or November in comparison to the wet season months of December to March.xix Changing the start times for the Wet Season allowed a longer period of high turbidity in the harbour.

We are concerned that no scientific justification was given to include months that are not historically linked to high rainfall events. It is also noted that the rainfall in October 2011 and November 2011 had less than half the expected average over those 2 months, so heavy rainfall was not a cause of harbour turbidity in 2011. To alter these dates without scientific data, at a time when there is still confusion around diseased fish and human illnesses was in our view not prudent.

The Gladstone Ports Corporation [GPC] was then allowed to raise their permitted turbidity levels in May 2012 by re-calculating the mean background turbidity of the harbour using both the pre-dredging data but also incorporating post dredging data. Two sites were changed - QE4 - 28 (NTU) to 34 NTU (dry season); and 34 to 55 in the wet season. ST1 - 24 NTU to 35 NTU (dry season) and 38 to 65 (wet season). The Queensland state government approved these higher 99th percentile turbidity limits amending the development approval again.

It is notable that the federal government in their Water Quality Management Plan has stricter limits including an internal reporting trigger of the 80th percentile and external reporting trigger of the 95th percentile. These triggers appear not to have been enforced since the dredging program began in earnest in May 2011, despite many breaches.

We have also been disappointed by the composition of the Dredge Technical Reference Panel and the lack of publicly available data about its deliberations. The panel includes the contractors used by GPC for their monitoring program, representatives of the dredging contractors as well as government departments responsible for facilitating port development weighting the membership against those whose primary concern is environmental health.

From June to August 2012 Gladstone Ports Corporation was granted a Transitional Environment Programme(TEP) after GPC admitted that its leaking bund wall (part of land reclamation for the WBDDP) and associated dredging had contributed to high turbidity in the harbour. GPC introduced a light monitoring programme and were allowed to ignore the turbidity levels as long as the light monitoring levels were not exceeded under this TEP. During this time turbidity went to almost three times higher than the 99th percentile, yet the chosen light monitoring level remained within the normal range.

Furthermore the light monitoring has been an ineffective substitute for accurate water quality monitoring since seagrass recovery across the region remained poor even at the start of its Spring 2012 growth season. See the assessment in Department of Agriculture, Fisheries & Forestry’s latest seagrass report: http://www.westernbasinportdevelopment.com.au/media/pdf/Gladstone%20Permanent%20Tr ansect%20Seagrass%20report%20August%202012.pdf

The 7th Water Quality report (EHP)xx released on the 22 June 2012, 3 days before the granting of the TEP states that “There was no clear pattern in the water quality results to suggest that dredging was having any major impact on water quality.” The 8th Water Quality report (EHP)xxi released on 31st July during the TEP stated in the executive summary “Results of water quality investigations between September 2011 and May 2012, with the exception of a cluster of elevated metal concentrations around South Trees Inlet, have shown that none of the water quality properties measured was of significant environmental concern.” Neither report mentioned the UNESCO findings which stated that ‘Reduced water quality from dredging [and] inadequate independent, scientific oversight in monitoring water quality suggested lack of government response when water quality targets are exceeded…”xxii

In September 2012, when monitoring stations recorded turbidity above the new higher 99th percentile for over 48 hours, GPC informed us that they were now exempted from the turbidity trigger levels because a dual light monitoring turbidity measurement was now being used. If light monitoring is normal they do not stop dredging due to high turbidity. On 1st October 2012, they commenced wet season levels early again.

The inadequacy of the light monitoring program became apparent in January 2013. Flood waters turned Gladstone’s inner harbour into a muddy mess that was visible from space and photos of the flood plume were published in local newspapers. Even the state Environment Minister, Andrew Powell, expressed concern about the mud’s destructive coating of seagrass yet GPC’s self-proclaimed “world-class” light monitoring program continued to indicate that there was no problem with turbidity in the harbour.

Without meaningful environmental measurement and state and federal regulators prepared to stand up to enforce environmental standards, it is difficult to see how either state or federal government levels will have the management capacity to regulate any further development in world heritage areas. Just one part of the environmental management required for this immensely important marine ecosystem, turbidity levels in Gladstone, have highlighted the failure of existing systems which have come to place industry needs ahead of natural values.

We wrote to Russel Reichelt about this matter and he wrote back to us stating that the federal government was going to amend its water quality plan. There were apparently 9 amendments to the plan.

Dear Russell Recheilt,

Thank you for your letter dated 9th November.

I would first like to raise my concern about the amended water quality plan that the Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (SEWPaC) is now considering. I believe that the recent seagrass reports indicate that light based monitoring in and of itself does not adequately protect the seagrass.

From the end of June to the current date, there have been periods of very high turbidity exceeding both the federal and state limits for long periods of time. This occurred during the TEP when light monitoring was first introduced and after the TEP in September 2012 and October 2012. Exemptions were granted that allowed continual dredging over the limits as long as light based monitoring was found to be within normal limits. The light monitoring stayed within the limits, but the latest seagrass report with data from October 2012 has shown very little regrowth of seagrass in the high impact zones of dredging.

I would argue this may be evidence that light monitoring on its own is not enough to protect the seagrass.

I have attached the relevant results of the high and low impact zones from the report as an appendix. I would like to point out that the seagrass regrowth in the inner harbour is in stark contrast to the seagrass in Moreton Bay that has had high rates of regrowth in the recent SE Queensland healthy waterways report.

It is noted that in Gladstone Harbour there has been some recovery in some of the low impact zones, but not in the high impact zones which suggests that dredging and water quality may be having an impact on seagrass recovery.

I also noted that Gladstone Ports Corporation in a report from the Gladstone Observer, misrepresented the facts.

The CEO of Gladstone Ports Corporation (GPC) stated that seagrass at Fishermans Landing a high impact zone had "spectacularly improved" This statement and "GPC has released the October results of seagrass monitoring which showed increases in seagrass cover around Fishermans Landing,

Pelican Banks North and Pelican Banks South" were incorrect as there has been no increase in seagrass cover around Fishermans landing.

The CEO also stated that "the report was proof that dredging was not to blame for the reduction in levels early this year." These statements do not reflect the report.

The rules that the state (EHP) currently enforce allow the Ports to dredge over the turbidity limits in the inner harbour and get an exemption if the light monitoring is within normal limits. This is despite less than 1% cover and very poor regrowth at most inner harbour sites.

I want to ensure that the Gladstone Ports does not misrepresent the facts of the report to GBRMPA as it has to the readers of the Gladstone Observer newspaper. Save the Reef believes the Gladstone Observer article should have reported. “Most of the seagrass in the inner harbour is dead. The Ports haven't fixed the turbidity problem after the TEP. They dredged over the limits in the TEP and continue to be allowed to dredge over the limits because the light monitors on top of the dead seagrass suggest the seagrass should be able to regrow even though this regrowth hasn’t occurred.”

I have had discussions with seagrass experts who have stated that in the Northern Territory a current dredging project dredges during the wet season but then gives the seagrass clean water (clarity) during known growth periods to allow the seagrass to regrow. Save the Reef would like to know if GBRMPA has considered this option.

It is possible clear water may assist in improving regrowth particularly after high sediments loads as in floods or dredging. It is possible that other factors associated with high turbidity may be affecting seagrass. This could include toxins such as heavy metals. It is noted that heavy metals found in the sediment by CSIRO including arsenic, aluminium and copper and that these total metals have been associated with high turbidity. Leonie Anderson has shown that seagrass in Gladstone harbour near dredging was found to have significantly higher levels of arsenic and aluminium. This is expanded after the letter as an appendix.

Save the Reef acknowledges there is a requirement to implement a move from turbidity based trigger levels to light based trigger levels. Save the Reef suggests it may be preferable to maintain the turbidity limits and introduce light monitoring and require both to be compliant initially, until evidence that light based monitoring can ensure better environmental outcomes than turbidity based readings. It does not have to be one or the other it can be both. The EHP exemptions that allowed dredging above the turbidity limits due to light monitoring may have led to harm. It is suggested that this is clarified by research. It may be that research demonstrates that both turbidity limits and light monitoring are required to protect the seagrass. We would suggest that GBRMPA may consider also allowing a period of clarity to allow the seagrass to recover.

Save the Reef would ask GBRMPA to urge SEWPaC not to amend the turbidity limits in line with the Qld government as Gladstone harbour water quality may be contributing to environmental harm. GBRMPA only allowed this project to go ahead after the Minister

Tony Burke put water quality controls in place. It is our opinion that these Water Quality controls have been changed and broken altered on a number of occasions by the state agencies, including changing the dates of the wet season, changing the turbidity limits and there is no clear evidence that has found these alterations led to better environmental outcomes. Indeed there is evidence of environmental harm in the Inner Harbour

With regard to the wet season limits, Save the Reef would like to see documented evidence regarding the Wet season for Commonwealth approved trigger levels, which in your letter you state has always been interpreted to be from 1 October to 31 March. It is clear in the picture below taken from the original approval dated 24/6/2011 that at the beginning of the project wet season dates were from 20 November to 31 March. (see picture below). We would like to see a similar table from the commonwealth government that when dredging began the wet season was from 1 October to 31 March inclusive, and the rationale behind the different wet season dates for state and federal departments.

It perplexes Save the Reef that the state government and federal government would have different wet season dates in the initial dredging approvals. Save the Reef would like to understand why the Commonwealth and GBRMPA initially

a) chose a date for the wet season that did not reflect the wet season,

b) did not reflect the historical background turbidity data from the EIS,

c) did not reflect the dates used in the Water Quality Management Plan in

(Click on water quality management plan)

Quotes taken from the Water Quality Management Plan

“Figure 9. Wet season turbidity at QE4 (20th November 2009 to 31st March 2010)” “Figure 17. Wet season turbidity at BG10 (20th November 2009 to 31st March 2010)” “Table 1. Water quality sampling dates from November 2009 to September 2010. Wet Season 20 Nov 2009 – 31 March 2010

The Water quality management plan states that if the 6 hourly EWMA is above the external reporting trigger level (95th percentile) for 1 week they are required to hold a DTRP meeting (step 4) and submit a report. (Step 5). As this did occur in October 2011 whether the wet season or dry season limit was applied, we would like to see the report that details the trigger level they used and how long they were over it for in October and the steps taken.

As you are aware the Ports requested that the state government amend that date and it was approved on the 30th October, 2011 to amend the wet season date to the 1st October. Save the Reef believes it was inappropriate for the state to change that date at the time when there was confusion around human and fish illness in the harbour and wonders if GBRMPA knew about this change and if so did it voice any objection to this change. We note that this amendment was not made public nor the approval posted on their website.

We note the GPC WBDDP website has posted the EHP amended development approval (or permit for dredging) from early September 2012. http://www.westernbasinportdevelopment.com.au/project_approvals_permits/section/docume ntation http://www.westernbasinportdevelopment.com.au/media/pdf/Ammendment%20Development %20Approval%20ERA%2016.pdf

One amendment that we noted is the W2 clause. The amendment changed the turbidity limits from the original

“Should turbidity levels exceed the above level(s) it is not a contravention of condition (W1) when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administering authority that elevated turbidity is the result of external factors, (for example, erroneous or invalid data, wave height, rainfall, tides, wind, etc) and not affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the Dredge Management Plan.” to

“Should turbidity levels exceed the above level(s) it is not a contravention of condition (W1) when it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the administering authority that a) elevated turbidity is the result of external factors, (for example, erroneous or invalid data, wave height, rainfall, tides, wind, etc) or b) clearly the result of other dredging activities (e.g. CSDorBHD dredging being undertaken within 500 m of a monitoring site); c) all benthic PAR monitoring sites (TC1, BS1, DC1, GC1, WI5-2 and PM1) are receiving the minimum light requirement.”

The Ports may be in contravention of their development approval because they have breached the turbidity limits but blamed in on tides and used the original W2 clause (the natural variation clause). Save the Reef has had advice that the turbidity breaches (before the amendment) were affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the Dredge Management Plan. The Ports admitted that the bund wall was contributing to high turbidity and were granted the TEP to fix this. The breaches after the amendment (e.g. September 2012) do not contravene their development approval as all benthic PAR monitoring sites are receiving the minimum light requirement.

If the Ports are asking for a similar amendment from the Federal government with regard to turbidity and light monitoring, Save the Reef again urges the federal government not to allow this amendment as it in effect nullifies the need to maintain turbidity within the limits.

Save the Reef suggests if high turbidity occurs it should be investigated and if the turbidity is affected by sediment from the dredging to a greater extent than the modelled turbidity increase used for the purpose of developing the Dredge Management Plan (ERA16 P 9 of 25) then appropriate action should be taken (e.g. repair the bund wall or reduce dredging)

Save the Reef believes biological monitoring of the harbour is important. :Leonie Anderson’s 2002 study on transplanted oysters and the uptake of heavy metals in particular aluminium by the oysters shows how effective this can be. I have attached a copy of a summary of it below.

Andersen, L.E., Melville, F., Fabbro, L.D., Storey, A.W. and Teasdale, P.R. (2006). RG Tanna Coal Terminal 4th Berth Dredge Management Plan, An Assessment of the Effects of Harbour Dredging, Centre for Environmental Management, Central Queensland University, Gladstone. Andersen, L.E., Melville, F., Steinberg, A.N. Teasdale, P.R. and Fabbro, L.D. (2008a). PCIMP Biomonitoring 2007, North Harbour Zones, Port Curtis Integrated Monitoring Program, Centre for Environmental Management, Central Queensland University, Gladstone. Andersen, L., Melville, F., Fabbro, L., Wilson, S. and Teasdale, P. (2008b). An assessment of the effect of dredging on Fisherman’s Landing: Stage 2, Draft. Centre for Environmental Management, Central Queensland University, Gladstone. Andersen, L.E., Storey, A.W. and Fox, S. (2002). Assessing the Effects of Harbour Dredging Using Transplanted Oysters as Biomonitors. Centre for Environmental Management, Central Queensland University, Gladstone.

In her research on crabs, she has stated that shell disease is not infectious and she believes it is environmental. She has shown high metals in crabs in biomonitoring (see 2009 paper) I believe she knows that it has something to do with metals but they have not had the statistical power to really find the answer in her studies. Crabs, prawns and other marine life requires further study. I have attached a paper regarding aluminium in Barramundi, that points out the need to do biomonitoring and assess the impacts of heavy metals on

fish. Other studies similar to the one below can be used to determine heavy metal exposures and should be considered.

See also Andersen, Boundy & Melzer, http://www.ozcoasts.gov.au/pdf/CRC/12- intertidal_fidler_crabs.pdf

The fiddler crab (Uca coarctata) was assessed for its biomonitoring suitability in Port Curtis. Fiddler crabs have a sedentary lifestyle and their feeding and burrowing activities expose them to water, dietary and sediment-derived contaminants. They are therefore potentially, a useful biomonitoring tool for assessing site-specific differences in contaminants, including metals. Fiddler crabs and sediments were collected from a number of sites in Port Curtis, representing increasing distance from the source of likely anthropogenic inputs. Crabs and sediments were also collected from reference sites outside the harbour and analysed for metal concentrations.

Overall, results did not indicate that any one site was more contaminated than any other site. Copper and metal burdens and to a lesser extent aluminium and cadmium,were elevated in fiddler crabs from inner harbour sites compared to outer harbour sites. Correlations were established between metal concentrations in fiddler crabs and sediment for copper and strontium, but no other metals although the relationships were not strong. Fiddler crabs appear to be able to play a role in monitoring programs, although, due to their abilities to regulate metals, they may not be as suitable for biomonitoring as net accumulators such as oysters or m

Role of Aluminium and other Heavy Metals in Gladstone Harbour The Gladstone area is a major industrial centre. It is the location of one of Queensland’s major ports, and is the site of many industries including alumina refining and aluminium smelting, power generation and various other manufacturing facilities. There are two refineries and a smelter making Gladstone one of the most important aluminium centres in the world. Rio Tinto Alcan Yarwun (RTAY) is situated in the Yarwun area, 10km north-west of Gladstone in Central Queensland. QAL operates the Gladstone Alumina Refinery, on a site relatively close to the harbour. Rio Tinto and QAL have both had to significantly improve emissions control and environmental performance including reducing alumina dust. (A recent example is the replacement of the chute for loading of alumina recently at the wharf facility which reduced alumina dust emissions significantly.)xxiii Both refineries produce a white powder that is used to make aluminium metal. The process includes grinding the bauxite, dissolving aluminium hydroxide from the bauxite, then separating and precipitating the alumina and removal of water to produce alumina powder. This powder is stored for shipment to domestic and international customers. Pollution with Alumina dust is an ongoing issue.

The Boyne Smelters, one of the largest in the world, turns alumina into the metal aluminium. The Boyne smelters also have been required to improve their handling of alumina dust. The Boyne Smelter Development (BSD) which was to be completed by 2012 is expected to improve the plant's alumina handling equipment and alumina losses / alumina dust around the site. This should have positive effects on the environment with respect to alumina dust. xxiv

Figure 2: Escaping Alumina dust in Gladstone.

Alumina Dust It is unavoidable that with 2 refineries and a smelter that over the decades significant amounts of fine particulate alumina dust and other materials have polluted the Gladstone Environs. Though reduction attempts have occurred and are still underway, there has been and will continue to be a significant legacy of alumina dust. Much of this alumina dust will find its way into the harbour either directly through the wind or indirectly as run-off during heavy rains.

The Gladstone area community has raised concerns about the cumulative impact of air emissions from industry on the health and well-being of the community and the environment. A “clean and healthy air” testing program has been implemented. A higher prevalence of self-reported asthma in Gladstone was noted in the Gladstone Community Health Survey compared with estimates around Queensland. Queensland health has reviewed the data around asthma, miscarriages, and total cancers due to higher rates of asthma. This review showed no differences in rates between Gladstone and the rest of Queensland, except for chronic lymphoid leukaemia (CLL). Between 1996 and 2004, 19 cases of CLL were reported in Gladstone, whereas only 9 would have been expected. Dust in Gladstone has been reported as including silica, clays, pollens, coal dust, alumina, magnesite and other particulates e.g. diesel. (http://gilg.com.au/faq/index/1)

Figure 3. This is a box plot of how much aluminium fume or dust is released from Boyne Smelters in Gladstone in comparison to other smelters in US

The box plot compares international data to Boyne Smelters: • Minimum and maximum overseas – are small blue dots at the bottom and top of the range • 3rd quartile – the top of the enclosed rectangular box is the 3rd quartile limit • Median - the line within the box is the median, • 1st quartile – the bottom of the box is the 25%ile • Whisker – a whisker line extends both upward and downward represents the statistical limits beyond which values are considered anomalous • Mean – is the red cross (Boyne smelters mean dust levels are much higher than internationally)

Alumina and Red Mud Residue

The QAL refinery has used a seawater neutralization process for its red mud for over 40 years. Red mud is the fine-grained residue left after alumina has been extracted from bauxite at the QAL refinery. The red mud is washed several times with water to recover caustic soda. Sea water is then added to neutralise any remaining caustic soda, before being pumped to the Residual Disposal Area (RDA) on Boyne Island. The overflow from the dam discharges into South Trees Inlet. Magnesium depleted seawater that is contaminated with iron, copper and aluminium is returned to South Trees Inlet. During the heavy rainfall such as occurred in the floods, the seawater neutralization may have been suboptimal due to the freshwater influx. This may have led to higher levels of contaminants entering South Trees Inlet.

A better understanding of the process can be found at this link. http://www.outotec.com/imagevaultfiles/id_558/cf_2/case_study-_queensland_alumina_ltd.pdf

Red Wall Dam Boyne Island Gladstone

Testing by DEHP found five sites with aluminium levels above the trigger value - all five were in the South Trees Inlet area. http://media2.apnonline.com.au/img/media/pdf/port-curtis-11th-update- report.pdf The levels could be a threat to fish health and link the high metals to the red mud dam at the refinery. DEHP has asked QAL to conduct further toxicity and chemical tests on waters from its red mud dam and the waters of South Trees inlet and whetherthey are safe for aquatic species.

The red colour in the red wall dam is due to iron. It is probable that not only aluminium but other metals such as iron are being released to the environment from this process. Shewanella is well known to be found in areas with high iron content. Shewanella is able to metabolise iron. xxv

Aluminium and other heavy metals may be toxic to the marine environment especially if combined with acid sulphate soils. A study of the Port Curtis estuary region shows the estuary is poorly connected with the offshore region seaward of Facing Island and would be prone to the sedimentation of aluminium dust. xxvi The flushing time for the estuary is of the order of 19 days in January 1999. (This was evident in flushing, passive tracer and particle analyses. Tracers are transported efficiently throughout the estuary but inefficiently transported out of the estuary to offshore regions. This estimate is not expected to dramatically alter seasonally.) This flushing time is large in comparison with the time required for most particulates to settle from the water column, in particular aluminium hence the estuary may accumulate aluminium and other contaminants in the sediment over time.

Median tracer distribution resulting from a release site at Gladstone.

In contrast to Port Curtis estuary, Rodds Bay is well flushed and well connected to offshore regions, with an e-folding flushing time of 5 days in January 1999. Rodds Bay was used as a control site in the DERM study when studying metals and metalloids.

Heavy metals and other nutrients were high at the time of infections in the fishermen. It is possible that metals and metalloids contributed to poor water quality and health effects in the fishermen. The Aluminium results and quotes from the supplementary report in October 2011 are given below. “The total aluminium concentrations measured at the sampling sites in the September 2011 survey were mostly aluminium associated with the particles in the water column and a very small amount was in the dissolved form in the water (Figure 6). Aluminium is often closely associated with the amount of sediment in the water. There is a strong relationship between total aluminium and turbidity at the sites (R2 = 0.90) (Figure 7).

As turbidity is used as a proxy for the measurement of total suspended solids in a water column, this means that approximately 90% of the variation in total aluminium concentrations is explained by the total suspended solids concentration of the waters in and around Port Curtis. This was also found by the CSIRO metal report in 2012 which found that 70% of the variation could be explained by the total suspended solids concentration.

The CSIRO investigation assessed “whether there was a decline in water quality in and around Port Curtis ... previously collected total metal concentration data were compared with the totals metal concentration data collected during the September 2011 survey. Five sites that were surveyed in September 2011 had been previously surveyed by the Gladstone Port Monitoring Program. These were two sites north of the dredging area (QE3 and QE4), one site south of the dredging area (BG10) and two reference sites in Rodds Bay (RB1 and RB3).” It is noted that the Aluminium was over 10 to 60 times higher than the control sites.

“There was an increase in the total aluminium concentrations at three of the five sites (QE3, QE4 and BG10) in September 2011 compared to previous months. This pattern is very similar to that for the measured turbidity at the sites (Figure 8), indicating that the apparent increase associated with total (but not dissolved) aluminium concentrations was related to the increased suspended sediment in the water column at these sites. Total aluminium is particularly high at BG10 in the area of potential impact from dredging plume (as is the turbidity reading) “

For 14 of the 20 sites surveyed for aluminium, including the sites in Zone 1, it could not be determined whether the TV had been exceeded or not. This occurred because the concentrations at these sites were reported as being below the level of reporting (LOR) which is the lowest concentration the laboratory will confidently state as being measured (Figure 2). Of the six that exceeded the aluminium TV, three of the sites (QE3, QE4, and ST1) were from Zone 2 and three sites (MM1, BG10 and C6.4) were from Zone 3. The two highest concentrations measured were at QE3 (70 μg/L in Zone 2) and C6. 4 (80 μg/L in Zone 3).

There is a good review of water and sediment quality in Port Curtis xxvii that includes multiple papers of interest which demonstrate the impact of dredging such as heavy metal uptake in transplanted oysters close to dredging and indicates the baseline water quality of Port Curtis.

Total aluminium was not reported in the second supplementary report. Dissolved aluminium was reported. It was found “For 18 of the 19 sites surveyed for aluminium in October 2011 no aluminium could be quantified (i.e., measured aluminium was below the limit of reporting) In September 2011, quantifiable concentrations of dissolved aluminium were detected at six sites, with

51 four sites (QE4, ST1, BG10, and MM1) having concentrations of 20 μg/L and two sites (QE3 and C6.4) having concentrations of 70 and 80 μg/L, respectively. For the 18 sites with concentrations less than the LOR it could not be determined whether the aluminium TV had been exceeded or not as the LOR was greater than the TV. The only site that exceeded the aluminium LOR in October was MM2 in Zone 3 (within the Gladstone Marina at 20 μg/L).”

Figure 12: Measured concentrations (based on one sample per site) of dissolved aluminium (Al) in water samples collected in September and October 2011 from Port Curtis compared to Australian and New Zealand Water Quality Guideline trigger values (TVs) and the limit of reporting (LOR). Samples that are shown as equal to the LOR may have metal concentrations less than or equal to the LOR. In this case, LOR is above the TV. D/S D1 was not sampled in the October 2011 sampling round. Yellow shading indicates Zone 1 sites, pink, Zone 2 sites and blue, Zone 3 sites.

There was high aluminium in Water Samples Collected by WBM Oceanics (2002) and URS (2007). xxviii In a study assessing the effects of Harbour dredging using transplanted oysters as biomonitors, dredging showed significant effects on Aluminium concentration which increased over time. The concentrations were higher in the east and north than in the south and higher near the dredging activity than in the control locations. xxix The importance of this study is that it shows aluminium uptake is occurring by oysters and it is higher near dredging. This confirms that aluminium is made bioavailable after dredging. An Assessment of the Effects of Dredging at Fisherman’s Landing by Andersen et al xxx also found high aluminium associated with dredging. Aluminium is often closely associated with the amount of sediment in the water and turbidity at the site. The CSIRO conducted a study in 2012 xxxi Aluminium was extremely high in the sediment, but there are no set guidelines. The values in the CSIRO report ranged from 14600 to 19500 ug/g dry weight. In comparison arsenic was above the guidelines and its value was 1.11 ug/g to 1.3 ug/g dry weight. Iron and copper were also high, but again no guidelines for sediment values exist, so the CSIRO report did not point out these high values. (Iron 29400 to 31,200 ug/g dry weight Copper 289 to

297 ug/g dry weight) Shewanella is well known to metabolise these heavy metals in particular iron in anaerobic conditions. A test of sediment to assess Shewanella growth was not done.

Aluminium has been demonstrated to be high with high turbidity. Other metals such as copper have also been linked to high turbidity. Statistical analysis of turbidity shows that there was a significantly higher level of turbidity in the last 100 days of 2011 (September 26 to December 31) 2011 when compared to all previous years. (Further data to be provided) Over 25 days out of last 100 days of 2011 were above the 99th centile when the expected rate was 1 day per 100 above this level. If the wet season dates had not been adjusted the results were even higher. This high level of turbidity and associated heavy metals and other nutrients may have contributed to the algal blooms and marine bacteria such as shewenella.

Driven over a leaky wall

 by: GRAHAM LLOYD, ENVIRONMENT EDITOR  From: The Australian  January 13, 2014 12:00AM

IT was in August 2011 that Gladstone Harbour environmental manager John Broomhead first realised something had gone horribly wrong.

The bund wall to retain the millions of cubic metres of dredge spoils from work on the $35 billion Curtis Island LNG developments was about to be completed and a team of workers was clearing the vast ponds of turtles, dolphins and other sea life so they did not become trapped. "I could see that when the tide started to recede there was a massive flow of water running out along the mangrove trees at the back of the pond ... The bund wall was leaking and it was only going to get worse." History may well show this was the lost opportunity to head off an ecological disaster in a World Heritage-listed area that has made headlines around the world. Within weeks of Broomhead's alarm, which he says was made known to the most senior officials at Gladstone Ports Corp, Queensland's premier industrial port had been closed to fishing. Hundreds of turtles were stranding and dying, dolphin populations that had been monitored for years were disappearing, dugongs were washing up dead and fish were being hauled from the harbour floor red raw and oozing puss. The reason for the collapse of Gladstone's aquatic system has been the subject of a hard-fought examination that has cost millions and involved some of the nation's biggest universities and respected marine science minds. The examination has been conducted under the threat of legal action from fishermen who lost their livelihoods. And it has taken place under the astonished gaze of UNESCO, which simply cannot believe the planet's greatest coral treasure, the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage area, could be treated in such a cavalier way. At stake has been not only the health of Gladstone Harbour and potentially the Great Barrier Reef, but also the corporate egos and the environmental reputations of some of the world's biggest energy companies, which are investing tens of billions to make Gladstone Australia's liquefied

53 natural gas export gateway to Asia. Four separate joint ventures - involving British Gas, Santos, Petronas, Total, Kogas, ConocoPhillips, Origin Energy and Sinopec - agreed to demands by Gladstone Ports that the LNG processing infrastructure be sited on Curtis Island, dramatically increasing costs of construction. And the companies have largely been passengers as the state-owned port authority has dredged the waterway to accommodate giant LNG tankers due to begin ferrying the first of what will be an ocean of controversial coal-seam gas from the Darling Downs and western Queensland to Asia from later this year. The engineering triumph of the Curtis Island projects will always be sullied by lingering questions about what went wrong. The problems at Gladstone have made headlines around the world. When legendary US television anchorman Dan Rather sent a team to Gladstone Harbour last year to report on how the US government was lending billions to a controversial project in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage- listed area, US viewers had a first-hand taste of transparency, Gladstone Ports-style. Rather's team filmed Gladstone Ports' former media manager Kieran Moran berating a French TV crew for interviewing a resident concerned about the impact of the project on marine life. Armed with the results of water-quality testing it had spent millions securing, Gladstone Ports Corp has always insisted that problems had either been minor or due to natural forces beyond its control. But from the evidence of former employees and documents only recently released it is possible to piece together an explanation that is more complex yet easy to understand. It seems clear that Gladstone Harbour had its perfect storm in 2011, starting with flooding rains, but ultimately the environment was a victim to human failings. The decision to build across the water on Curtis Island, using an armada of barges to ferry people and materials to the site, added stress to a system that was already weakened by natural events. The leaking bund wall was simply the final straw. Gladstone Ports was, at best, too slow to admit the full extent of what was happening, and state and federal regulators were either asleep at the wheel or too conflicted to act when the danger signs were there. With the benefits of hindsight, something should have been done sooner to ease the development pressure. According to Broomhead, the telltale signs that Gladstone's aquatic system was on the brink of collapse were there in mid-2011. It would be wrong to accuse Gladstone Ports of hiding the bund wall failure completely. The corporation says it will now only discuss the bund wall with the federal Environment Department, which is holding an inquiry. But, in response to earlier questions, a spokesperson for Gladstone Ports said that, "in September 2011, GPC notified relevant regulatory authorities and the community of a leak in the bund wall, and its contribution to turbidity (cloudiness caused by sediment) in the harbour". A press release dated September 29, 2011, said dredging would be temporarily stopped because "extreme tidal movements along with the high wind conditions have significantly increased the turbidity levels in the harbour". The press release said "a further contributing factor has been the porosity of the newly created bund wall at Fisherman's Landing". Gladstone Ports said the liner within the bund wall was designed so that dredge spoil placed against the wall would seal the bund. "Until that process is complete, some fine material will seep through the wall and into the Western Basin during extreme tides," it said. In retrospect, this appears to have been an understatement. In November 2011, Gladstone Ports

54 received a report it had commissioned showing the bund wall failure provided the best explanation for a plunge in water quality at a time when the fish disease outbreak was at its peak. The report, by engineering consultants BMT WBM, said: "These results indicate that the porosity of the bund may be the key cause of widespread elevated total suspended sediment levels." Other scientific reports that were withheld from public examination by Gladstone Ports for more than two years said the bund wall failure could be linked to an algal bloom that included toxic levels many times higher than the amount needed to cause fish deaths. The just-released 2011 document by BMT WBM, reported in The Australian in November, said it was "possible that harmful algal blooms may have been a possible contributing factor in the fish disease syndrome". The water-quality report, which had been commissioned by Gladstone Ports in October 2011, said "highly turbid waters were most likely created in September-October 2011 due to the addition of fine sediments derived from the overly porous bund wall and dredge-related operations". Just over six months later, in mid-2012, the scope of the problem became clear when Gladstone Ports was forced to seek urgent permission to breach its environmental approvals. The corporation said it was a race against time to fix the leaking bund wall before it ran out of space to store potentially toxic acid sulphate soils from dredging. Gladstone Ports Corporation has yet to fully explain what went wrong, but evidence from former employees in recent weeks has started to paint a picture of cost cutting and human error. In a technical briefing on the Gladstone bund wall failure, former dredging adviser to the Queensland Gas Corp, Bill Service, and national technical manager for Geofabrics Australasia, Warren Hornsey, said the bund wall had failed due to the use of inferior geotech fabric that was inappropriately placed on the side of the bund wall rather than being buried inside it. In a presentation to Engineers Australia on the Gold Coast, Service and Hornsey said that when tenders were invited for the bund wall the design included the use of heavy-weight geotextile fabric embedded in the core of the bund wall. However, the "design and construct tender that was accepted provided for a design that differed from the concept with respect to two important features", the presentation said. These were the use of lighter-weight geotextile, which was laid on the inner face of the bund wall rather than buried within it. The presentation said that the geotextile arranged in this way had failed to capture much of the sediment due to ballooning away from the core, splitting and lifting. When tidal flows reversed, the geotextile material did not return to its original position but was left crumpled, ripped, torn and with holes due to water movements. There is no dispute the design changes that were eventually accepted by Gladstone Ports were a significant departure from the original. A spokesperson for Gladstone Ports declined to comment on the accuracy of the presentation, which the corporation said provided "a comparative outlook of a concept plan and an engineering design". For Broomhead, the cause of the bund wall failure was more significant than the design changes outlined by Service and Hornsey. The bigger issue, as The Australian reports today, was that new modelling had not been undertaken after the shape of the reclamation area was changed in an effort to protect some mangrove trees on the shoreline. Broomhead said changing the shape of the pond had changed the dynamics of the system, with

55 serious consequences. Whether the leaking bund wall fully explains the fish health issues is a moot point. Broomhead says he believes fish disease was on the way due to flooding before the bund wall started to leak. And the situation was made worse by increased harbour traffic from construction. Ian Poiner, who led the state government inquiry into fish health and now chairs the Healthy Harbour partnership for Gladstone, says that increased turbidity did not necessarily explain the fish health issues, which have been blamed on heavy flooding early in 2011. "To me the issue was having a proper, fit-for-purpose monitoring program," Poiner says. "Until you get that it is difficult to tease out what is causality. "The suggestion was it was something to do with the extreme flood events, but it is difficult to tease out causality from the past." Despite the amount of time spent on environmental paperwork and business complaints about the restrictions of green tape, there is a lingering question in the wake of Gladstone Harbour. Why did no one have the will or the power to call a stop when a World Heritage-listed area was on the point of ecological collapse?

http://www.sunshinecoastdaily.com.au/news/just-317500-fees-dump-spoil-reef/1731262/

Just $317,500 in fees to dump spoil on the reef

25th Jan 2013 9:51 AM

THREE Queensland port corporations paid the Federal Government just $317,500 in fees to allow them to dump more than 27 million cubic metres of dredge spoil in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area in the past 12 years. The ports at Gladstone, Mackay, Townsville and Hay Point applied for a total of 22 permits to dump dredge spoil within the limits of the WHA between 2000 and September last year. Of the total 22 permits applied for, 21 were approved by the Federal Government, allowing more than 27 million cubic metres of dredged sea bed to be dumped in the world heritage-listed site. The latest application, for a permit to dump a further 3.4 million cubic metres near Townsville, has not yet been approved by the nation's environmental regulator. Under the Sea Dumping Act, the government charges ports to dump the dredged spoil, with applications to dump more than 100,000m3 costing $23,500 each, and those less than 100,000 cubic metres, charged $16,500. The act has been updated several times since it was first created in the early 1980s, with most changes to marginally increase the cost of permit fees for port authorities. But in the latest changes, which came in 2009 under Federal Labor, the government also removed strict provisions that previously governing sea dumping in Australian waters. Those amendments included removing the distinction between contaminated and non- contaminated materials and removing the distinction between environmentally sensitive and non- environmentally sensitive areas. The 2009 changes to the Act also removed the fee category payable for permits allowing more than 500,000 cubic metres of dredged material to be dumped - a move which removed higher fees for the larger amount of dumped sediment.

Since those changes were made, 10 of the 19 applications approved have been for sea dumping permits more than 500,000 cubic metres - ranging between 548,000 cubic metres and 11 million cubic metres of spoil. The figures of approved sea dumping permits were released after Federal Environment Minister Tony Burke answered questions Queensland Greens Senator Larissa Waters posed last year during Senate Estimates. In addition to the 21 permits already approved by the regulator, 12 other applications within the marine park boundaries were also approved under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act. Those applications totalled more than 25 million cubic metres of dredge spoil, largely for maintenance projects at ports at Hay Point, Cairns, Abbot Point and fishing marina Rosslyn Bay.

Barge dumped dredge spoil 'to safeguard crew and vessel'

5th Dec 2012 5:40 PM

A BARGE working on the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal project dumped dredge spoil in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, breaching Commonwealth environmental approval conditions, in January this year. The dumping of 730 cubic metres of dredge spoil within the World Heritage Area led to a $6600 fine for the Gladstone Ports Corporation. As part of federal environmental conditions on the massive dredging project, spoil could only be dumped in approved areas, including the East Banks Sea Disposal Site. But a spokeswoman for the Federal Environment department said the dumping of the spoil outside of the disposal site had contravened environmental approval conditions. She also confirmed the spoil was dumped within the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, although the department did not believe it resulted in any adverse impacts on the reef. Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project Manager Peter O'Sullivan confirmed the breach occurred on January 28 at 5.10am, after a split hopper barge was loaded with dredge spoil by backhoe dredge Razende Bol. Mr O'Sullivan said after the loading of the spoil, the barge set sail for the disposal site, but "when confronted with rapidly deteriorating weather conditions", the captain decided an emergency dump was needed to safeguard the crew and vessel. "This decision was based on the hydraulic pressure in the system controlling the opening of the split hopper being approximately 50bar above the nominal level of 250bar, indicating that an excessive amount of water had entered the hopper and increased the downward pressure on the hopper," he said. Mr O'Sullivan said the barge was about 1.25 nautical miles from the approved disposal site when it was forced to dump the spoil. He said there was 730 cubic metres of dredge spoil dumped, and the spoil was not potential acid sulphate soil. The dredge contractor, Van Oord Dredging International, had since made changes to more accurately predict weather forecasts, including wave heights and strong winds.

"The dumping procedures and the use of the alternative sailing channel were reviewed to limit the risk of any reoccurrence," he said. "At this time there are no backhoe dredge tug and barge combination barges working on the Western Basin Dredging and Disposal Project." Mr O'Sullivan said the dump position was recorded and both state and federal environmental regulators were notified, before video cameras were towed through the area to show the dump had no impacts on marine plants or corals. "A repeat survey was done to ensure material had not migrated out of the area. All these reports were provided to the regulators," he said. The departmental spokeswoman said the payment of such fines "should not be taken as an admission of liability for contraventions of national environmental law". The $6600 fine was the maximum amount the federal environment department can charge a company for breaches of approval conditions under the Environmental Protection, Biodiversity and Conservation Act. http://www.sunshinecoastdaily.com.au/news/companies-dump-dredge-great-barrier- reef/1729527/

Companies dump dredge in the Great Barrier Reef

24th Jan 2013 10:00 AM

TWO Queensland port corporations paid less than $100,000 to dump nearly 2.5 million cubic metres of dredge spoil in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area last year. Under the Federal Government's Sea Dumping Act, companies can apply for permits to dump dredge spoil and other things such as marine vessels at sea. In the last financial year, the Environment Department handed out 14 approvals for sea dumping, 10 of which were for dredge spoil to be dumped around the country. Of those approved, three applications came from the North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation and the Port of Townsville, to dump a total of 2.44 million cubic metres of dredged sediment in the World Heritage Area. The approvals were for new dumps at the Townsville and Mackay ports under the Sea Dumping Act and one at Hay Point port under the approval of the Great Barrier Marine Park Authority. In total, the 10 sea dumping application approved would see more than 100,000,000 cubic metres of dredge spoil dumped at sea in Australian waters. The majority of that dumping would be conducted on the Western Australian coast, as part of massive off-shore gas projects near Onslow and Port Hedland. Under the Sea Dumping Act, any dredge spoil dumping application involving more than 100,000 cubic metres can only be approved if the company pays a fee costing $23,500. Sea Dumping approvals for dredged material under 100,000 cubic metres costs a company only $10,000. For the four approvals in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, each company paid the fee, totalling $80,500, as the Hay Point proposal was for only 17,000 cubic metres. The Federal Environment Department did not turn down any applications for sea dumping permits in 2011-12.