DOCSLIB.ORG

Export Search Result (PDF)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Export Search Result (PDF) Peace Agreement Access Tool PA-X www.peaceagreements.org PA-X Peace Agreement Database 1915 agreements found. Resolution of Intra Afghan Peace Conference in Doha, Qatar (Doha Roadmap for Peace) 08/07/2019 Afghanistan Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Hizb-e-Islami 22/09/2016 Afghanistan Agreement between the two campaign teams regarding the structure of the national unity 21/09/2014 government Afghanistan Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to Transformation 08/07/2012 (Tokyo Conference) Afghanistan Conclusions of the Conference on Afghanistan and the International Community: From Transition to 05/12/2011 the Transformation Decade (Bonn Conference) Afghanistan Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan 02/11/2011 Afghanistan Renewed Commitment by the Afghan Government to the Afghan People and the International 22/07/2010 Community to Afghanistan (Kabul Conference Communique) Afghanistan The Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the National Consultative Peace Jirga 06/06/2010 Afghanistan Communiqué of the Conference on Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International 28/01/2010 Partnership (London Conference Communique) Afghanistan Statement of the International Conference on Afghanistan (Hague Conference) 31/03/2009 Afghanistan Declaration of the Special Conference on Afghanistan Convened under the Auspices of the Shanghai 27/03/2009 Cooperation Organization (Moscow Declaration) Afghanistan Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan (Paris Conference) 12/06/2008 Afghanistan Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law in Afghanistan 03/07/2007 Afghanistan Afghanistan Compact Building on Success (London Conference) 01/02/2006 Page 1 of 131 Afghanistan Berlin Declaration (Berlin Conference) 01/04/2004 Afghanistan Kabul Declaration of Good Neighbourly Relations 24/12/2002 Afghanistan Communiqué of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (Tokyo 22/01/2002 Conference) Afghanistan Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 05/12/2001 Government Institutions ('Bonn Agreement') Afghanistan Tashkent Declaration on Fundamental Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in 19/07/1999 Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghan Peace Accord (Islamabad Accord) 07/03/1993 Afghanistan Peshawar Accord 24/04/1992 Afghanistan Joint Declaration adopted by Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga 12/08/2007 Afghanistan/Pakistan Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not 29/02/2020 recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America Afghanistan/United States of America Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for 29/02/2020 Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Afghanistan/United States of America Project de charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale 14/08/2005 Algeria Texts for Implementing Acts relating to the Restoration of Civil Harmony 20/07/1999 Algeria Civil Harmony Act 13/07/1999 Algeria Plate-forme de l'entente nationale 17/09/1996 Algeria Page 2 of 131 Plate-forme pour une solution politique et pacifique de la crise algérienne (Plate-forme de Rome) 13/01/1995 Algeria Plate-forme portant consensus national sur la période transitoire 26/01/1994 Algeria Luena Memorandum of Understanding (Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of 04/04/2002 Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol) Angola Angolan Government's Peace Plan 13/03/2002 Angola Agreement signed by the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA Renovada on 18 February 18/02/1999 1999(Annex II to Agreement signed by the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA Renovada (Luanda Protocol)) Angola Agreement with UNITA-Renovada Updating the Lusaka Protocol Concerning the Appointment of UNITA 18/02/1999 Cadres to Government Positions (Annex III to Agreement signed by the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA Renovada (Luanda Protocol)) Angola Agreement with UNITA-Renovada Updating the Lusaka Protocol Concerning the Reinstatement of 18/02/1999 Government Administration over the National Territory (Luanda Protocol) Angola Final Timetable for the Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, Approved by the Joint Commission at 09/01/1998 Luanda, 9 January 1998 Angola Lusaka Protocol 15/11/1994 Angola Concepts for Resolving the Issues Still Pending between the Government of the People's Republic of 31/05/1993 Angola and UNITA (Bicesse Accords) Angola Peace Accords for Angola, Lisbon ('Bicesse Accords') 31/05/1991 Angola Ceasefire Agreement (Bicesse Accords) 31/05/1991 Angola The Protocol of Estoril (Bicesse Accords) 31/05/1991 Angola Fundamental principles for the establishment of Peace in Angola (Bicesse Accords) 31/05/1991 Angola Page 3 of 131 Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region 15/12/2006 Angola/Burundi/Central African Republic/Democratic Republic of Congo/Kenya/Republic of Congo/Rwanda/Sudan/Tanzania/Uganda/Zambia/(African Great Lakes) Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region 20/11/2004 Angola/Burundi/Central African Republic/Democratic Republic of Congo/Kenya/Republic of Congo/Rwanda/Sudan/Tanzania/Uganda/Zambia/(African Great Lakes) Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region 24/02/2013 Angola/Burundi/Central African Republic/Democratic Republic of Congo/Republic of Congo/Rwanda/South Africa/South Sudan/Tanzania/Uganda/Zambia/(African Great Lakes) Memorandum of Peace and Understanding in Cabinda Province 01/08/2006 Angola/Cabinda Protocol of Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region 30/11/2006 Angola/Central African Republic/Democratic Republic of Congo/Kenya/Republic of Congo/Rwanda/Sudan/Tanzania/Uganda/Zambia/(African Great Lakes) Joint Declaration on Cooperation over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic 27/09/1995 Argentina/United Kingdom Joint Statement of Confidence-Building Measures, including an Information and Consultation System 15/02/1990 and Safety Measures for Air and Maritime Navigation Argentina/United Kingdom Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and 10/11/2020 President of the Russian Federation Armenia/Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh) U.S.-Armenia-Azerbaijan Joint Statement 25/10/2020 Armenia/Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh) Statement by the foreign ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the 10/10/2020 Republic of Armenia Armenia/Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh) Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Co-Chairs of the OSCE 16/10/2017 Minsk Group Armenia/Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh) Joint Statement by the Presidents of the Republic of Azerbaijan, The Republic of Armenia and the 05/03/2011 Russian Federation on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement Armenia/Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh) Joint Statement by the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries and the 01/12/2010 Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia Armenia/Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh) Agreement on strengthening the ceasefire 04/02/1995 Page 4 of 131 Armenia/Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh) Agreement on Confirmation of Commitment to Ceasefire 27/07/1994 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefire Agreement Signed in Bishkek 11/05/1994 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Bishkek Protocol 05/05/1994 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement on the Implementation of the 18 February 1994 Protocol 28/04/1994 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Joint Communique Regarding the Results of the Negotiations between the Representatives of the 13/09/1993 Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh Leaderships Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement to Extend the Ceasefire for a Period of 3 Days 10/09/1993 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement on the Resumption of the Ceasefire for a Period of 11 Days and a Meeting between the 30/08/1993 leaders of Azerbajan and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement on the Resumption of the Ceasefire for a Period of 5 Days and a Meeting Between the 17/08/1993 Leaders of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement to Extend the Ceasefire for a Period of 3 Days 05/08/1993 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement to Extend the Ceasefire for a Period of 7 Days 28/07/1993 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement to a Meeting between the Officials of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh on 28 July 1993 27/07/1993 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement on a Universal Ceasefire for a Period of 3 Days 25/07/1993 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement on a Universal Ceasefire for a Period of 3 Days 24/07/1993 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in the Area between Magadiz and Agdam 27/06/1993 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Agreement on the Cessation of Shelling of Stepanakert and Agdam 17/06/1993 Armenia/Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh Page 5 of 131 Joint Statement of the Heads of State in Tehran 07/05/1992 Armenia/Azerbaijan/(Nagorno-Karabakh) Joint Statement of the Presidents of the Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia on Karabakh Conflict 20/06/2016 Settlement Armenia/Azerbaijan/Russia/(Nagorno-Karabakh) Joint Statement of the Presidents of Azerbaijan,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) / European Union Force (EUFOR)
    United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) / European Union Force (EUFOR) Short Mission Brief I. Activity Summary: MINURCAT and EUFOR Overview The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), active from 2007 through 2010, was challenged from the start by the Chadian government’s minimal consent for a UN presence, which precluded the political processes essential to successful peacekeeping and eventually forced the abrupt closure of the mission. Though MINURCAT and the associated European Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR Chad/CAR) represent an interesting example of peacekeeping partnerships, their work was limited largely to protection of civilians and security sector training activities, without the ability to address underlying causes of conflict and instability. Regional dynamics and the Chadian government’s adept maneuvering hindered the intervention’s success in protecting vulnerable populations. Background Chad and its political fortunes have been deeply affected by regional actors since its days as a French colony. Since Chad’s independence in 1960, France, Sudan, and Libya have provided patronage, arms, support to rebel groups, and peacekeepers. Chad has hosted around 1,000 French troops in N’Djamena since the end of the colonial regime, maintaining one of three permanent French African military bases in Chad’s capital city. French and Chadian leaders place a premium on their personal relationships with one another to this day. Chad was the first country to host a peacekeeping operation from the African Union’s precursor, the Organization of African Unity, in response to a civil war between the government of President Goukouni Oueddei and the Northern Armed Forces of former Vice President Hissène Habré.
    [Show full text]
  • FINAL REPORT Quantitative Instrument to Measure Commune
    FINAL REPORT Quantitative Instrument to Measure Commune Effectiveness Prepared for United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mali Mission, Democracy and Governance (DG) Team Prepared by Dr. Lynette Wood, Team Leader Leslie Fox, Senior Democracy and Governance Specialist ARD, Inc. 159 Bank Street, Third Floor Burlington, VT 05401 USA Telephone: (802) 658-3890 FAX: (802) 658-4247 in cooperation with Bakary Doumbia, Survey and Data Management Specialist InfoStat, Bamako, Mali under the USAID Broadening Access and Strengthening Input Market Systems (BASIS) indefinite quantity contract November 2000 Table of Contents ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................... i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................... ii 1 INDICATORS OF AN EFFECTIVE COMMUNE............................................... 1 1.1 THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE..............................................1 1.2 THE EFFECTIVE COMMUNE: A DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS..........................................2 1.2.1 The Development Problem: The Sound of One Hand Clapping ............................ 3 1.3 THE STRATEGIC GOAL – THE COMMUNE AS AN EFFECTIVE ARENA OF DEMOCRATIC LOCAL GOVERNANCE ............................................................................4 1.3.1 The Logic Underlying the Strategic Goal........................................................... 4 1.3.2 Illustrative Indicators: Measuring Performance at the
    [Show full text]
  • PRISM Syrian Supplemental
    PRISM syria A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS About PRISM PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners Vol. 4, Syria Supplement on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; 2014 relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education to transform America’s security and development Editor Michael Miklaucic Communications Contributing Editors Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct Alexa Courtney communications to: David Kilcullen Nate Rosenblatt Editor, PRISM 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Copy Editors Fort Lesley J. McNair Dale Erikson Washington, DC 20319 Rebecca Harper Sara Thannhauser Lesley Warner Telephone: Nathan White (202) 685-3442 FAX: (202) 685-3581 Editorial Assistant Email: [email protected] Ava Cacciolfi Production Supervisor Carib Mendez Contributions PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers Advisory Board and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States Dr. Gordon Adams and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to prism@ Dr. Pauline H. Baker ndu.edu with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. Ambassador Rick Barton Professor Alain Bauer This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Ambassador James F. Dobbins without permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter Iv Bosnian Crisis: Post-Formation Problems and Issues Chapter Iv
    CHAPTER IV BOSNIAN CRISIS: POST-FORMATION PROBLEMS AND ISSUES CHAPTER IV BOSNIAN CRISIS : POST-FORMATION, PROBLEMS AND ISSUES Bosnia and ~erzegovina' located in the Balkans is surrounded by Croatia in the north and west and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the east and south. A narrow strip of land gives Bosnia access to the Adriatic Sea. Ethnically, it is 40 per cent Muslims, 33 per cent Serbs and 18 per cent Croats and 9 per cent others. 2 [see map 11 The strength of Serb population in Bosnia and Herzegovina never reached majority since 1941, when there was a big massacre perpetrated by Croats. Since then, there has been an abrupt growth of muslim population and equally abrupt regression of the Serb and Croat population. In the 20 years period between 1961 ancl 1981 the number of Serbs in Bosnia was reduced by 05413. In I-oughly the same period the Muslim population got doubled so that for the first time since 1941 massacr'e they becamr t,he 1a1yt.st ethnic group in Bosnia and l3t~rrec~ovina. iZcrtr1~1iny to 1981 (-enslls thc Scr-LIS in Rosliia ill~tlHerz,t-1gC)virld dc~i.c~(lrlte~1 for 32.02 prr('.?nt, the' Yl~sliin~;I 3q5 I (,(.tit dr~d the, Cr (ILIIs for IR.4 v~r <.,.tit of t hr? pullI. Tn the ;t~tI t 11,. t trt~;jl nurnbc~~of Se1.11:; i r~r?.~iisetl11111 1 heir t~(?rC'crllr~(j~. Source: Keesing' s Rewrd of Mrld Events, 199 3. decreased so that according to 1991 census they accounted for only 31.33 percent of the total population.
    [Show full text]
  • Toward Resolving Chad's Interlocking Conflicts
    Toward Resolving Chad’s Interlocking Conflicts AUTHORS Sarah Bessell, Kelly Campbell December 2008 UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036-3011 www.usip.org SYNOPSIS This USIPeace Briefing, based on a recent event, explores the internal, regional, and international components of the crisis in Chad. OVERVIEW The fragility of the Chadian government, as well as the fragmentation among Chadian civil society, political parties, and rebel movements, poses significant challenges that Chadian civil society, regional governments, African institutions and the international community must address with a coordinated strategy. Although the situation in the country is often examined through the lens of the Darfur crisis, several internal factors drive the instability in Chad and its regional actions. Thus far, efforts to address the political, security and humanitarian problems in Chad have seemed piecemeal and uncoordinated. A consensus is building that a comprehensive strategy encompassing the national, regional and international dimensions of the crisis is needed to move toward peace and stability both within Chad and between Chad and its neighbors. In October 2008, USIP and the International Peace Institute, in collaboration with Caring for Kaela, sponsored a multi-stakeholder consultation to address the political instability in Chad and its regional implications. The attendees included representatives from the Chadian diaspora, ambassadors from countries in the region, U.N. and EU representatives and experts from the non-governmental community and academia. This report summarizes the consultation’s main themes and recommendations. The first section addresses the security, political and humanitarian situation in Chad; examines the August 13 Political Agreement between the Chadian government and opposition parties and suggests ideas for the way forward.
    [Show full text]
  • Syrian War at the Crossroads
    \ POLICY BRIEF 4 \ 2020 Syrian war at the crossroads Curbing arms flow, imposing a no-fly zone and opening al-Yarubiyah border crossing Lena Schellhammer, Marius Bales \ BICC Policy recommendations to EU member states \ Impose a comprehensive arms embargo \ Establish a UN-mandated no-fly zone in to secondary conflict parties northern Syria Suspend the transfer of weapons, ammunition and To stop the cycle of mass displacement and attacks military equipment to secondary conflict parties, such against civilians, a UN-mandated no-fly zone must be as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to stop illegal re-transfers established in northern Syria. If a no-fly zone is not to the Syrian war zone. Existing national agreements successful in protecting civilians in northern Syria, a to suspend certain arms exports to Turkey (2019) by UN-mandated safe zone must also be considered and Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, France, the United ultimately implemented. Kingdom and Germany, as well as the export moratoria of limited duration for Saudi Arabia (2018), should be \ Extend humanitarian cross-border aid extended to a comprehensive, not time-limited EU (UNSCR 2165) and reopen the al-Yarubiyah arms embargo. border crossing EU member states must call on the UN Security Council \ Buy and destroy the still existing stocks to vote for continuing humanitarian cross-border aid of former Yugoslav weapons (UNSCR 2165) and to reopen the al-Yarubiyah border Many of the weapons that are re-exported to Syria are crossing with Iraq in north-eastern Syria to prevent old arms, produced in former Yugoslavian countries or the humanitarian situation from deteriorating further.
    [Show full text]
  • Rapport Mission D'évaluation Rapide Des Besoins Suite À L'attaque D
    Rapport Mission d’évaluation rapide des besoins suite à l’attaque d’Ogossagou. Mopti le 24 Mars 2019 Photo pendant la Mission Mopti, le 26 mars 19 Présentation du cercle de Bankass Le cercle de Bankass compte 12 communes rurales : Bankass, Baye, Diallassagou, Dimbal-Habbé, Kani - Bonzon, Koulogon-Habbé, Lessagou-habbé, Ouenkoro, Segué, Sokoura, Soubala et Tori. Le conseil communal de Bankass qui est l’organe de décision est composé de 23 conseillers dont 2 femmes. Le bureau communal organe exécutif est constitué du Maire et de ces 3 adjoints. L’état est représenté par le sous-préfet qui réside au niveau du chef-lieu même de la commune qui est Bankass. La commune couvre une superficie de 1 200 km² et comprend 26 villages inclus Ogossagou et 23 Hameaux pour une population estimée à 31 996 habitants (RGPH 2009) dont 52 % sont des femmes. Les Dogon, Dafing, Peulh, Samogo, Mossi sont les principales ethnies qu’on y rencontre dans la commune. Contexte Le cercle de Bankass est aujourd’hui le point culminant du conflit intercommunautaire dans la région de Mopti. Depuis le début de l’année 2019, le cercle de Bankass a enregistré plusieurs cas d’attaques impliquant les groupes armés. Le 1er janvier 2019 le village de Koulogo a enregistré plus de 30 morts, plusieurs blessés et déplacés. Les acteurs humanitaires et le gouvernement ont apporté des aides alimentaires, non alimentaires et financiers. Plusieurs attaques isolées ont suivi celle de Koulogo tel que : - Le 19 Janvier 2019 à 18h, le hameau Youssouf gorè dans la Commune de Sègue, a été la cible d’une attaque des hommes armés non identifiés.
    [Show full text]
  • Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa
    Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa Proceedings from an ACCORD Workshop 14 & 15 September 2009 Durban ACCORD The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) is a non-governmental institute working throughout Africa to bring creative solutions to the challenges posed by conflict on the continent. ACCORD’s primary aim is to influence political developments by bringing conflict resolution, dialogue and institutional development to the forefront as an alternative to armed violence and protracted conflict. Acknowledgements The 14 and 15 September 2009 workshop, ‘Peace Agreements and Durable Peace in Africa’ was organized with the generous support of the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida). The Rapporteur Dr Segun Ige was the rapporteur for the 2009 workshop. Dr Ige is a rhetoric specialist and currently an Independent researcher. Contributors Tamara Kirkwood contributed to the research for the country conflict profiles within the report. Ms Kirkwood is a Coordinator in the Operations Division at ACCORD, during the writing of this report she contributed in her capacity as the Special Projects Officer in the Knowledge Production Department. Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, co-editor of the report, is a Senior Research Fellow of ACCORD and a doctoral candidate at the University of Uppsala’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research. Dr Shauna Mottiar, co-editor of the report, is a Senior Research Fellow of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Disclaimer Views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of ACCORD or the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA). While every attempt was made to ensure that the information published here is accurate, no responsibility is accepted for any loss or damage that may arise out of the reliance of any person upon any of the information this report contains.
    [Show full text]
  • Compte Rendu De La Reunion Mensuelle Du Cluster Protection
    COMPTE RENDU DE LA REUNION MENSUELLE DU CLUSTER PROTECTION Lieu et date : Mopti, 28/01/2020 Nombre de participants : 20 Organisations membres/observateurs présents : COOPI, AMSS, IEDA-RELIEF, GRAT, PAM, CIAUD CANADA, NRC, MERCY CORPS, UNHCR, IOM, UNFPA, WORLD VISION, DRDSES / CICR, MINUSMA Présidence : UNHCR Délai de Responsables de mise Points à l’ordre du jour Résumé des discussions Actions à prendre mise en en œuvre et/ou de suivi œuvre L’agenda de la réunion mensuelle du Cluster Protection se présentait comme suit : • Analyse de la situation de protection • Actions de réponse de protection prises à la suite des rapports d’évaluation rapide de protection produits pendant les mois de novembre, décembre 2019 et janvier 2020 • Présentation des rapports d’évaluation rapide de protection de Doucombo et Socoura (réponses apportées et/ou positionnement) ; • Principales activités réalisées au cours du I. Introduction mois/Contraintes/Réponses/Perspectives (Sous-Cluster/Groupes de Travail) • Divers L’agenda proposé a été validé comme tel par tous les participants. Revue des recommandations de la réunion du mois précédent Lors de la réunion mensuelle du mois de décembre 2019, CIAUD CANADA avait été invité à documenter la situation des ressortissants burkinabés (potentiels réfugiés) et la porter à l’attention de l’UNHCR qui détient le mandat nécessaire pour apporter assistance et protection aux réfugiés. Des actions ont effectivement été prises par CIAUD CANADA afin de ne plus présenter la situation des réfugiés burkinabés lors des réunions mensuelles du Cluster Protection. Durant le mois de janvier 2020, soixante-huit (68) Comme recommandations, rapports flashs ont été produits concernant la région de il a été retenu : Mopti contre cinquante-quatre (54) durant le mois précédent.
    [Show full text]
  • The Precariousness of the De-Escalation Zones in Syria
    The Precariousness of the De-Escalation Zones in Syria Mustafa Gurbuz May 10, 2017 Although the Russia-Turkey-Iran agreement on Given the fact that neither the Assad regime nor de-escalation zones in Syria was announced the Syrian opposition has signed the recent with boastful statements, ongoing clashes on agreement, maintaining the de-escalation zones the designated zones point to serious could be an arduous task. Three major problems impediments in implementing the ceasefire on arise (1) the Assad regime’s militaristic the ground. “We as guarantors…will do interpretation of the agreement and reluctance everything for this to work,” declared Russian to provide “rapid, safe and unhindered President Vladimir Putin in his meeting with humanitarian access” and “measures to restore Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who basic infrastructure facilities,” which are stated in turn said that the agreement will solve “50 as essential elements in the agreement, (2) the percent of the Syrian issue.” The Syrian opposition’s deep skepticism and internal opposition groups, however, criticized the divisions, and (3) the potential provocations by overall Astana process, noting that the de- Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other al-Qaida escalation zones could result in partitioning affiliates to disrupt the process. These are “the country through vague meanings.” nestled among the rebels in all proposed de- escalation zones and are most powerful in the According to a statement from the Russian Idlib region and its surroundings—a critical Foreign Ministry, the agreement suggests that zone that could determine the fate of the the guarantor states—Russia-Turkey-Iran— agreement.
    [Show full text]
  • EUI RSCAS Working Paper 2021/08 How Global Jihad Relocalises And
    RSC 2021/08 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Middle East Directions Programme How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni European University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Middle East Directions Programm How Global Jihad Relocalises and Where it Leads. The Case of HTS, the Former AQ Franchise in Syria Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni EUI Working Paper RSC 2021/08 Terms of access and reuse for this work are governed by the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC- BY 4.0) International license. If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper series and number, the year and the publisher. ISSN 1028-3625 © Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni, 2021 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY 4.0) International license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Published in January 2021 by the European University Institute. Badia Fiesolana, via dei Roccettini 9 I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual author(s) and not those of the European University Institute. This publication is available in Open Access in Cadmus, the EUI Research Repository: https://cadmus.eui.eu Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics.
    [Show full text]
  • The Political in Bosnia and Herzegovina
    Hunger & Fury: The Political in Bosnia and Herzegovina Jasmin Mujanović A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Re- quirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Political Science York University Toronto, ON May 2016 © Jasmin Mujanović, 2016 Abstract This text is an attempt to (re)approach the process of political and social transfor- mation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) over the past century and a half through the prism of popular agency. The primary research question of this dissertation asks why given nearly uni- formly catastrophic social indicators across virtually all socio-economic categories there are so few instances of overt popular dissatisfaction (e.g. protests and/or energetic voter turnout) with the prevailing political order in BiH? In addressing this question through an analysis that straddles political theory, international relations, and political economy literatures I focus on the role played by the specific local variant(s) of the nation-state form in essentially depoliti- cizing the majority of the population in this polity. My central argument is that rather than creating the conditions for rational-legal public administration and multi-party competition, the state in BiH has historically served to deny political agency to would-be citizens. The state in BiH has actively sought to eliminate civil society, in other words, and that therefore the de- fining political and social crises in contemporary BiH must be understood in the context of nearly two centuries of this particular and peculiar state (and nation) formation process. I ar- gue that the historic evolution of the BiH polity has been characterized by a form of elastic authoritarianism; the process of seemingly persistent ideological mutation contrasted by static political and economic patterns.
    [Show full text]