CHAPTER IV BOSNIAN CRISIS: POST-FORMATION PROBLEMS AND ISSUES CHAPTER IV

BOSNIAN CRISIS : POST-FORMATION, PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

Bosnia and ~erzegovina' located in the Balkans is surrounded by in the north and west and Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the east and south. A narrow strip of land gives Bosnia access to the Adriatic

Sea. Ethnically, it is 40 per cent Muslims, 33 per cent Serbs and 18 per cent Croats and 9 per cent others. 2

[see map 11

The strength of Serb population in Bosnia and

Herzegovina never reached majority since 1941, when there was a big massacre perpetrated by Croats. Since then, there has been an abrupt growth of muslim population and equally abrupt regression of the Serb and Croat population. In the 20 years period between 1961 ancl 1981 the number of Serbs in Bosnia was reduced by 05413. In

I-oughly the same period the Muslim population got doubled so that for the first time since 1941 massacr'e they becamr t,he 1a1yt.st ethnic group in Bosnia and l3t~rrec~ovina. iZcrtr1~1iny to 1981 (-enslls thc Scr-LIS in

Rosliia ill~tlHerz,t-1gC)virld dc~i.c~(lrlte~1 for 32.02 prr('.?nt, the'

Yl~sliin~;I 3q5 I (,(.tit dr~d the, Cr (ILIIs for IR.4 v~r

<.,.tit of t hr? pullI. Tn the ;t~tI t 11,.

t trt~;jl nurnbc~~of Se1.11:; i r~r?.~iisetl11111 1 heir t~(?rC'crllr~(j~. Source: Keesing' s Rewrd of Mrld Events, 199 3. decreased so that according to 1991 census they accounted for only 31.33 percent of the total population. 1

Disintegration Process of Bosnia The seeds of Bosnian conflict were deeply rooted in the history of Yugoslavia itself, the state set up in 1918 after the end of first world war. Yugoslavia was a pawn in the power game of mighty during second world war. During the war period when small Serb nationalities clamoured for recognition, Tito somehow maintained unity among the constituent nationalities of Yugoslavia. But with the thawing of cold war ancl the crisis in Soviet Union, discontent among the minorities again asserted to the embarrassment of the central government. However, the Yugoslav leadership could not check this upsurge and the country disintegrated in 1991; the first break away was Macedonia that declared its independence on 25 January 1991 fvllowed by and Croatia on 25 June 1991 and by on 5 April 1992. Yugoslavia's formal disintegrat ion occl~rred aftel. the EuroDean Community's recognition of Slovenia and Crclatiii url 15 January 199% and that of Bosnia and Herzeyovirra c!rr

f, .April 1992.' Irl severdl nlor~ths after thi-

f~lisintegratiorl of Y~lc~oslavinit was apu;ll en1 that a

ItI I the Yliyoslav re[111t11i(,r; wo111dt~e t111. 0111 1

~~,ayI (I 1)r c~s~:r\'i~~uquslavia. RIII t 110 Serh 111t i111.11 11111 t )lilt 200 all Serbs residing within the adjoining territories would live together within one state, alarmed the Bosnian Muslims. According to 1991 census Bosnia with a total population of 4.35 million, had two million Serbo- Croatian-speaking Slavs of Muslim nationality corresponding to 43.7 percent of the Republic's total population. While technically a minority in absolute terms, the Muslim Slavs outnumbered both the Bosnian orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats accounting for

31.3 percent and 17.3 percent respectively. 5 [see map 21

However, the Bosnian Muslims were alarmed to know that the Serbs wanted Bosnia to join their wider community which would render them much smaller minority in their own country. This prospect they visualised with great fear. On 15 October 1991, the Bosnians declared Bosnia and Herzegovina a sovereign independent state. Th? Bosnian declaration was adopted by Muslim and Croat legislators after the Serbian delegates walked out. of the Nat ional Assembly. ' Shortly thereafter, in October 1991. Bosnian Serbs establishecl a separate 'National Assernt~ly'. Now there were two legislatures and two

governments each responsible t.o it.s Assembly members.

In this cclntext it. may t~enot ~cl1 hat Cioat ];I rlf fe! ntl

to ~(IIIIIa Confedrrat ion with Bosnia. This ~Y'oLI~I!;~1 was Map shodng ethnic divisions in the former Yugoslavia, before the break-up in 1991.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Stdies ( IISS), ' A comprehensive peace for Bosnia and Herzegovina? ' Strategic Comnents, no. 10, (13 DeC. 1995). P. 4. 20 2 rejected by Bosnian leaders because it again would have reduced Bosnians to the status of a minority. Bosnians were dead determined to have a state in which Muslims would be in majority as against any proposal from the Serbs to join hands with them. So were the Serbs who claimed that more than half of Bosnia-Herzegovina was Serb majority region and as such it must go to them. It is strange that in this context both the parties forgot the terms of agreement signed by them in 1991 whereby they had agreed in principle to the division of Bosnia- Herzegovina the details of which were left out for further negotiations.

Serb Rejection of Power Sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina After the disintegration of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia (LCY) in January 1990, while major political parties were created in Bosnia and Herzegovina along national lines, the Muslim community organized itself into the Party for Democratic Action (PDA). The PDA which regarded itself as a 'centrist party influenced by Islam and highly sensitive to Muslim religious. political and cultural rights', received almost all of the Muslim votes. thus indicating the existence of a strong Muslim national consciousness in the republic. 1 The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina formed the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU-BH), a counterpart to CDII. The local Serbs formed Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia- Herzegovina (SPD). Although the SPDs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia did not have formal links they were infact both closely coordinated with the political parties in Serbia proper.

In November 1990, Bosnia and Herzegovina held free elections for the first time in its history. All the candidates were chosen either by their national identity or by their party affiliation. The Muslim dominated PDA won 86 seats: the SPD won 72 seats; and the CDU won 44 seats. In the two chambers of Bosnian Parliament Muslim Slavs numbered 99, Serbs 85, Bosnian 49 and Yugoslavs 7, a distribution closely reflecting the ethnic profile of the repub1ic.l Though the Serbs agreed to share power with other ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this arrangement could not last long. This was because of the Serb reactions to the events in Croatia in September 1990. The Serbpopulation living in Serb dominated areas like Knin had organized armed rebellion against the Croatian Government. On 1 October 1990 the Serb National Council in Croatia declared the autonomy of those areas inhabited primarily by Serbs, by proclaiming the "Republic of ~rajina". This was the first step towards rsreat.inya . Meanwhile. in March/April 1991 the SPD leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina were 20 4 actively promoting the secession of those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina which according to their calculation,belonged to Serb dominated area with a view to leading their merger with the Serbian autonomous region in Croatia. At the same time SPD in Bosnia began demanding the secession of large parts of northern and western Bosnia which would join up vith the Croatian "Krajina" to form a new republic. The three areas of Bosnia with predominantly Serb population also were declared "" by the Serbian Democratic Party of Croatia (SDS) on the lines on which the Serbs had used their tactics in Croatia. 9

In September 1991, the Bosnian Serbs asked the Serb- dominated federal army to protect the 'Serb Autonomous Regions" which they had earlier declared. In response, YPA forces from Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Serbia) started moving through Bosnia and Herzegovina on 20 September 1991, to reinforce units in Croatia and asked the local Serbs to join them.lo During the march several villages inhabited primarily by Croats were destroyed. Bosnian croats concluded that the atrocities committed by the Serhian army was a warning to them to accept Serbian terms of allegiance or face a similar

fate. Thus began the implementation of what was called Plan Ram (Frame), which would establish the framework fol the new borders of a third Yugoslavia, in which 'all Serbs would live together in the same state'. 1I

Plan R~B

The announcement of Plan Ram (FRM), which was revealed by Yugoslav Prime Minister Markovic in September 1991 created more tension among all non-Eerbs. This was the framework of the new borders of a third Yugoslavia, in which a home land for all Serbs was promised. The announcement of Plan Ram was made much before the European Community's OX) recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in January 1993 and later its recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. International recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was essentially a pretext exploited by Serbia to justify its act of aggression against the Bosnian Government. This would mean that if Plan Ram was implemented the Serbs living in other republics would becomes citizens of new Serb republics.

Alarmed by the existence of Plan Ram and its possible implementation on 15 October 1991 the Bosnian Government declared Bosnia and Herzegovina a sovereign and independent state. This declaration was adopted by Muslim and Croat legislators after 73 Serbian delegates had walked o~~tof the National Assembly. l2 Shortly thereafter, in October 1991, Bosnian Serbs established a 'Serb National Assembly' to match exactly what had been done in Croatia earlier. Bosnian Serbs wanted to remain part of a Serb dominated Yugoslav federation: the Bosnian Croats and Muslims did not share their view point. This would also mean that Bosnia and Herzegovina was also to become a part of the Serb dominated state, whereas the fact was that in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a total population of 4.35 million there were only two million Muslims comprising 43.7 percent of the total population. Now they were in a fix as they were in no doubt of plurality but not a majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So they were not enthusiastic about leaving the Yugoslav federation as they felt they would be benefited more as part of a larger Yugoslavia than as a separate entity in which the Serbs would dominate them. But the secession of Slovenia and Croatia left no choice for Bosnian Muslims but to opt for secession. In order to secure popular support to the Bosnian Parliament's declaration of independence a referendum was held at the end of February 1992 in which 63 percent of people voted in favour of independence. The Serbs

boycotted the poll and immediately thereafter started a series of confli(!ts. To forestall the decision of

referendum for creating a new state the Serbs resorted to a sudden attack which enabled them to gain quick vivtory over a large part of Bosnia in the ~0rth.l' It should be noted that the primary cause of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina lay not in the relations between the various national groups, but Serbia's refusal to accept the sovereignty of the break away republic. The Military objective of the Serbian campaign was the defeat of the multinational Bosnian army, and the establishment of a land bridge between Serbia and Serbian-conquered territoris in Croatia. The EC and United States of America (USA) recognised Bosnia as an independent state on 7 April 1992 and on 22 May Bosnia became a member of the UN. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was mostly in reaction to the imminent recognition by the EC and USA of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. The Serbs didn't like this move and started adopting military means to prevent this event from happening. The Serbs were supported by the neighbouring Serb-majority region of Slovenia and Serbia.

It was quite anomalous that the resurgent nationalism of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs was supported by Serbian forces on the claim of Muslim Bosnians for their national state, but it was opposed by t.hose sections of Serbs whose case was viewed sympathetically by the Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Muslims' contention was.

that they would not like to live as a minority in a state they regarded to be hostile. This seemed to be the 'guilt' of Muslims to incur Serbian wrath.

In the Bosnian referendum, Muslims and Croats voted as a bloc to avoid inclusion in a smaller Serbian dominated Yugoslavia. In response to the attack in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992 by the YPA, Croats and Muslims fought together to defend the newly independent Bosnia state. The Muslim-Croat alliance within Bosnia and Herzegovina was initially supported by the Croatian Government that supplied arms to both communities and accepted Bosnian Muslim refugees. The rapid military gains by the Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina made it clear that the alliance concluded between Croats and Muslims at the time of war was for the Croats the marriage of convenience but for the Muslims it was a matter of life and death. The relations between Bosnian Muslims and Croats had never been happy. Bosnian Croats treated Muslims as junior partners, they also disliked Muslims because of their disinterest during the war in Croatia. Croats had been pursuing double strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were busy in exploring the possibility of a separate deal with Serbia at Bosnia and Herzegovina's expense. In their dealings the Croatian leaders preferred appeasing Milosevic at the expense of Bosnian Muslims thereby deflecting Serbian ambitions away from Croatia. Tudjman was chiefly responsible in causing collapse in Croat-Muslim alliance. Croats also began to say that Bosnia and Herzegovina was the artificial polity which prevented the integration of the Croatian community in Croatia itself. Such an inimical attitude of Croats for Muslims was bound to result in violent conflict.

Soon after wards. open hostilities broke out between Croats and Muslims at a number of plaes in central Bosnia. By the end of 1992, Croats and Serbs had in fact become military allies in the fighting against Muslim Slavs. The Spring of 1993 witnessed multinational negotiations in Geneva under the auspices of the UN intermediaries and : they offered a new proposal for the partitioning of their country, depending on the extent of Serbian military gains. Later, the US threat to use airstrikes against attempts to gain Bosnian territory had its impact on the Croatian leaders. Their immediate reaction was to accept a cantonal division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

However, this agreement was violated creating CI situation in which Muslim refugees left for safer places. The Croatian argument was that the Bosnidn Government wa:; encouraging Islamic fundamentalism as though s11c.h 210 phenomenon was in fact non-existent in that part of Europe. On 9 May 1993 military confrontation between Croats and Muslims increased, and the Croatian troops began 'ethnically cleansing' the territory of eastern Bosnia .

After nearly a year of fierce fighting between Croats and Muslim slavs in Central Bosnia, the Croatian policy stood discredited. Croatia was regarded as a much condemned state in international community which was likely to invoke UN embargo for its unsavoury role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croats lost some important cities in central Bosnia in the process creating about 50,000 refugees. One adverse effect on Croatia was that it failed to maintain effective coalitions to stop Serbian aggression, first with Slovenia and then with Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia on the other hand tried to negotiate with Serbian leaders identified by the US government as war criminals.

Bosnia and Herzegovina : Attempt at Splitting Serbian interest in dividing up Bosnia and Herzegovina stemmed from its overall political programme which called for the unification of all Serbs in one

state. Serbia considered that 60 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina's territory belonged to the mainly rural Serb 211 population and should be annexed to Serbia proper. [see map 31 While the leaders of the two countries had agreed in principle in 1991 on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were not able to agree on how much of Bosnia each country should receive. Serbia as a militarily stronger power wanted an effective control of a substantial portion of Bosnian territory, Croatian leaders wanted to combine parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Croatian Krajina.

In accordance with the Serbian-Croatian armistice agreed in January 1992 under UN auspices, two leaders, Milosevic (Serbia) andTudjman (Croatia) again negotiated on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This move was criticised by several European powers who felt that any attempt to divide the republic would be a major violation of the Helsinki principles and could easily lead to more bloodshed than had already occurred.14 When the second attempt to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina failed, the Croatian Government hastily concluded its alliance with the Bosnian Muslims.

On 6 May 1992, the two leaders met in Graz () to plan once again the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They reached a tentative agreement that Territories under Serbian Oontrol in Bosnia and Croatia. Source: Keesing' s Rewlds of World Events, 199 3 Bosnia and Herzegovina would be divided along the River the north of which would go to the Croat administration and the rest to Serbia. The object of this agreement was to create a new region 'Herzeg- Bosna'lS encompassing western Herzegovia and the Posavina region in north eastern Bosnia (as provided for by the Graz Agreement), both adjacent to Croatia. 'Herzeg- Bosna' was thus the Croatian equivalent of the 'Autonomous Serb Republic of Bosnia' established in April 1992, and in this way preparations for the eventual tripartite division of Bosnia and Herzegovina were completed. Now it remained for the international community, to legitimize the plan of partition of Bosnia- Herzegovina. It has to be noted that Bosnia-Herzegovina was created after it declined a Croatian offer to enter into a confederation with Croatia despite the warning that Croatian forces which were close to Sarajevo would not defend the Bosnian capital. The reason that compelled the Bosnian President not to accept the Croatian offer was the fear that such a confederation whould expose the Muslim Slavs numbering less than 2 million, as compared to 4.7 million catholic Croats, to strong pressures for assimilation with the Croatian majority. 16 Three Civil Wars In the wake of Serbian war of aggression against Bosnia in April 1992, a complex situation was created in which not one but three civil wars broke out in which Serbs fought against Serbs, Croats against Croats and

Muslims against Muslims. [see map 41 Armed conflicts among Croats themselves in ~osnia-~erzegovinaflared up briefly in the summer of 1992, when two Croatian militias, the Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane (HVO) and Hrvatske Odbrarabene 8naqe (HOS) clashed with each other. The HVO was in favour of partitioning the republic along ethnic lines, while the HOS wanted to maintain the territorial integrity of the state and fought together with Muslims towards that end. Since HVO was more well armed it could over power HOS and gradually absorbed the HVO units or got some of them disbanded.

Civil war among Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out in protest against the indiscriminate shelling of civilians in Sarajevo by Serb forces. Since the population was mixed, hundreds of Serbs were also the victims of their attacks. The Serbs complaint was that their aim was to defeat the concept of the pluralist, multi-ethnic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and those Serbs who supported this concept must also be defeated or made to realize that such a division had no prospects. Source: Msamament and Conflict Resolution Project, Managing Arms in Peqce Processes : Croatia and Bosnia - Herzegovina, UNIDIR, 1996 Moreover, a number of Serbs had joined the ranks of the Bosnian army, to defend the city and had thus come in direct conflict with the besieging Serb forces. According to some knowledgeable sources Serbs made up about 6 percent of the government's armed forces, mainly serving in the front-line units. 11

The worst outbursts of hostilities among Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were caused by a rich Muslim, Fikret Abdic. a former member of the Bosnian Presidency, who was involved in a number of dubious financial transactions. He with his militant followers proclaimed his region of Velika Kladusa in Western Bosnia to be an autonomous unit, independent of Sarajevo. At the outbreak of war in the spring of 1992. Abdic severed ties with the Bosnian Government and advocated a.policy of accommodation with Serbian and Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic rewarded him by allowing a substantial trade to take place between his region and Croatia. As a reaction to this de facto secession, and the resultant Muslim - Serbian alliance in the area, the Sarajevo authorities. launched a major military operation against Abdic. Despite the support he got of Serb forces, Abdic's forces

were defeated by the Bosnian Army in August 1994.'' The

trouble didn't. end there: again by early 1995, Abdic's forces supported by Serbs made some advances. But again 217 in August 1995, his forces were routed and the army disbanded following Croatian conquest of Krajina in the same month.

Towards Croat ~sllrReconciliation The policy followed by Tudjman towards Bosnia created a number of setbacks which caused international isolation of Croatian State. The first of the setbacks was that of UN sanctions against the presence of Croatian regulars fighting on the side of the local Croatians within Bosnia. In its wider repercussions the major international financial institutions, refusedto give any credit to Croatian Government to develop its economic projects and strengthen commercial dealings with other countries. Second, the Croatian Government had come under strong criticism for its policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina in those countries such as Austria, Germany and Hungary, that had in the past offered Croatia diplomatic support. Third, due to the prolonged war the military situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina had gone against the Croatian forces who were gradually losing territory in central Bosnia. The Croats in central Bosnia were in vulnerable position as they were surrounded by Muslim forces and attacked daily by the Muslim Bosnian army. 218 Moreover, the policy followed by the Tudjman created conflicts between those who supported the existence of a separate 'Herzeg-Bosna' and those who favoured alliance with the Muslims. This fluid situation weakened Tudjman's position in the Croatian policies. Finally, the decision of the US Government to become more actively involved in Bosnia significantly influenced Tudjman's policy. The US retained considerable credibility in Sarajevo and Zagreb and was perceived as an honest broker. Most of the eminent Croatian leaders believed that America alone could end Croatia's international isolation. The US proposedthe federation between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and a confederation between Bosnia and Croatia as the institutional framework to resolve the Croat-Muslim conflict, a proposal which was later accepted by all in March 1994.19

UN Participation The United Nations involvement in the former Yugoslavia began on 25 September 1991 when the Security Council called on all States to implement immediately a "general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia". Meanwhile the Secretary-General requested Cyrus Vance, former

United States Secretary of State, to go to Yugoslavia to study the ground realities. On 23 November 1991, Vance 219 convened in Geneva a meeting which was attended by the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia, the Secretary of State for National Defence of Yugoslavia and Lord Carrington, Chairman of the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia. The parties agreed on an immediate ceasefire and proposed speedy establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operations. However, while progress was made on other issues, the cease-fire broke down almost immediately.

The Security Council despatched a small group of military officers, civilian police and United Nations officials to go to the area to prepare for the implementation of the cease-fire plan. On 2 January 1992, at the initiative of the Personal Envoy, the representatives of the warring parties agreed on unconditional cease-fire. On 21 February 1992, on the recommendation of Secretary General the Security Council established United Nations Protection Force (UNPROPOR) for a period of 12 months as an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security in which the negotiations of overall crisis could be held.

UNPROFOR was first deployed in Croatia for which it was initially set up. Subsequently, its mandate was extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the former 220 Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It also had an operational mandate in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia () and a liaison presence in Slovenia. UNPROPOR established its headquarters in Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The headquarters were later moved to Zagreb in Croatia. ON 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to replace UNPROPOR by three separate but interlinked operations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council retained the mandate and name of UNPROFOR. In Croatia, it established the 'UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia', to be known as UNCRO. Within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Council decided that UNPROFOR would become the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). Their joint theatre headquarters, known as UN Peace Force headquarters (UNPF-HQ) were established in Zagreb, the Capital of Croatia. UNPF-HQ was also responsible for liaison with the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the other concerned governments and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Following the restructure of UNPROFOR in March 1995. the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Akashi as a Special Representative and Chief of United nations peace-keepinq forces in the former Yugoslavia. Likewise. two more senior UN officials. General Bernard Janvier and Kofi Annan were appointed as the Secretary-General's Special Envoys to the Former Yugoslavia in which the new republics were in the midst of crises.

UNPROFOR ceased to exist on 20 December 1995 when authority was transferred from UNPROFOR to the International Implementation Force as provided in the Peace Agreement. The Security Council set up a United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 21 December 1995 with a total of 1,721 police personnel, 254 international staff and 811 locally recruited staff .lo To coordinate United Nations activities, the Secretary-General appointed two more dignitaries Iqbal Raza of Pakistan and Peter Fitz Gerald of Ireland to help him in his work. The mandate of UNCRO was terminated on 15 January 1996, but the Council established for an initial period of 12 months a United Nations peace-keeping operation with both military and civilian components under the name of United Nations Transitional Administ-ration for Eastern Slovenia. Baranja and Western Sirrnium (UNTAES) with the initial deployment of 5,000 troops.

The Security Council also authorized United Nations military observers to continue monitoring the 222 demilitarization of Prevlaka peninsula. This mission was known as United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP). On 30 November 1995 the Security Council extended UNPREDEP's mandate for a period terminating on 30 May 1996. Subsequently on 1 February 1996 the Security Council on the recommendation of the Secretary General declared it as an independent missionll and increased the force's strength by 50 military personnel.

International Conference In July 1992. at the instance of the Security Council an International Confrence on Former Yugoslavia (ICPY) was convened in London on 26-28 August 1992. The Conference adopted a Statement of Principles for a negotiated settlement and established, a Steering Committee co-chaired by the Secretary-General's Personal

Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance , and Lord David Owen, representing European community.

The Co-Chairmen were to direct six working groups and prepare the basis for a general settlement and associated measures. They started the work at the United Nations office at Geneva. beginning in September 1992. Among the topics that were discussed was a move to negotiate a new cease-fire agreement on 29 March 1994 in Croatia: to prepare new blue prints for peace in Bosnia ,223 and Herzegovina: to prepare a framework for increasing humanitarian assistance and to defuse tensions involving ethnic and national communities and minorities; and to sponsor new plans for reconstruction and economic development.

As a result of the pressure brought about by the deliberations of the conference in early August 1994, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) severed economic and political relations with the Bosnian Serb leaders and closed its 300 mile border with areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces. In September, the Federal Republic (Serbia and Montenegro) agreed to implement the recommendations of the Conference to permit delivery of humanitarian assistance to the region which was its main need at the time. The ICFY also negotiated the economic agreement on 2 December 1994 between the Governments of Croatia and local Serb authorities. ICFY also contributed to defusing tensions in that country and helped the process of elections that took place in October 1994. After its recommendations had been adopted at the Peace

Implementation Conference on 8 and 9 December 1995 the ICFY ceased to exist. on 31 January 1996.22 224 Vance-Owen Peace Plan On 2 January 1993, Cyrus Vance in collaboration with Lord Oven presented a new proposal for Bosnia-Herzegovina problems. It contained the following points:

A the country was to be divided in 10 provinces according to the contiguity of segments;

* five major corridors would be created between the provinces that would allow safe passage of humanitarian aid and civilians;

R provisions of constitutional principles for the

republic with a large measure of autonomy to the provinces within a decentralized state: and

cease-fire and demilitarization arrangements which included demilitarization of Sarajevo, the monitoring of the borders and return of forces to their original positions.13

This was the first peace plan which divided provinces on ethnic basis which later became the basis of . The plan also stated in detail the disarmament and demilitarization measures which all the parties had to observe. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan was 225 received favourably by the Bosnian Croats as it met to a great extent all their important demands. The Bosnian Muslims objected to the demarcation of some of the borders which, if rectified to their satisfaction would pave the way for final agreement

Despite intense international pressure on the parties, negotiations collapsed at the end of January 1993.'' The Bosnian Serbs accepted the plan with some reservation, but they were not happy with the provision of getting only 50 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory instead of 70 per cent, they held at that time. However, Karadjic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan under strong pressure. j6 Subsequently on 15 and 16 May 1993, in a referendum, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan with a 96 per cent majority and voted in favour of the independence of the Serbian Republic.

For the implementation of Vance-Owen plan, about 50,000 to 60,000 peace keepers were needed which no group of small nations could provide. The US, on the other hand, was reluctant to send the ground troops to the Bosnian crisis region. So for want of support for the peace plan it could not be implemented. It was argued in some cliplomatic' rircles that had the leading powers been 2 26 more committed to the Vance-Owen plan, the Bosnian Serbs could have been persuaded to accept it.

However, the Vance-Oven plan was finally abandoned on 22 May 1993, when the US, Russia, Prance, UK and Spain established a "joint action plan" in Washington. This plan rejected military involvement and proposed creation of six security zones disigned to protect the Muslim civilian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though the creation of the security zones sought to solve some problems. particularly the protection of Muslin. community in the region, it failed to respond satisfactorily to what the Serbs had been asking for namely their claims to be treated as a majority community with honour.

The Vance-Owen plan was the last plan that would have kept Bosnia-Herzegovina together as a country in any true sense. The government, although decentralized. would have had stability and authority. If the plan had been implemented, it would have been very expensive, but in the words of Lord Owen, "had it been fully backed by the US we would have had peace in the summer of 1993."

Subsequently, some other proposals were also presented, namely a six point programme proposed by the US and the peace proposal from the Russian federation. But because of some of their inadequacies, these plans could not carry much weight with the parties for the consideration of which they were proposed. Thus, Vance- Oven plan, remained the only basis for negotiations for the political settlement of the conflict.

Meanwhile, the Bosnian Croats whose relations with the Bosnian muslims were strained started their own republic - "~erzeg-~osnia"." This led to the conflict between Muslim-led Bosnian Government forces and the forces of the Bosnian Croats. Efforts were made to hold discussions in Geneva and Brussels in December among all the parties concerned and it was agreed that the Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organized as the union of three republics: the Muslim-majority republic should have a minimum of 33.3 percent of territory and the Croat- majority republic should have 17.5 percent, leaving the Bosnian Serbs with 49.2 percent: a 'holiday truce' would cover the period between 23 December 1993 and 15 January 1994; and the three sides would return to Geneva on 15 January 1994, to continue the search for peace. In addition, working groups were established to look into those issues and to help reach an agreement on them by 15 January. Federation Agreement

In the wake of the UN-brokered cease-fire agreement of 23 February 1994 and the US-brokered Federation agreement signed in Washington on 1 March. hostilities between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims stopped. In February 1994, following the failure of the European negotiatiors' efforts, the US took active initiative to bring about peace in the region. After prolonged negotiations a peace agreement was signed between the military representatives of the Bosnian Muslim Government and the Bosnian Croats on 23 February 1994 at a meeting hosted by UNPROFOR in Zagreb (Croatia). The two parties agreed to the immediate and total cessation of hostilities from 25 February 1994, and UNPROFOR was authorized to monitor the demilitarized zone.

Parellel to the efforts that were being made by the EC and others to end hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the US also renewed negotiations between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This led to the signing of the two Washington agreements on 1 March 1994, which were officially known as the "Framework Agreement establishinu a Federation in the Areas of the Republic of Rosnia~~ Herzegovina with a Majority Bosniac and Croat. 48% Population", and the 'Outline of a Preliminary Agreement for a Confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the ~ederation?'~ These agreements constituted the basis for further negotiations with a view to creating the federation of Muslims and Croats in Bosnia- Herzegovina, combined with a confederation arrangements between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 18 March 1994, the Federation Agreement was signed by the representatives of the Bosnian Muslim Government and Bosnian Croats, while the Confederation Agreement was signed by Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic. The Federation's constitution was subsequently ratified by the parliaments of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian

Muslims. [see map 51

Contact Group Meanwhile on 25 April 1994, a Contact Group was established consisting of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union and the two Co-Chairmen of the ICFY Steering Committee. The Contact Group drew up a map for the allocation of territory between the Bosniac-Croat Federation dnd the Bosnian Serb entity (the so-called "Republike Srpska"). The map allocated 51 percent territory to the Bosnian Serbs. The Contact Group, supported by the Security MONTENEGRO

Source: Kcesing' s Records of Wrld ~vents, 1995. 231

Council and the council of leaders of the European Union, as well as by the other governments informed the parties that the proposed map would have to be accepted as presented, unless the parties could agree between themselves on changes. At the end of July 1994, the Bosniac-Croat Federation, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) accepted the map. The leaders of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia andMontenegro) urgedthe Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the map. The Bosnian Serbs however, rejected it.

However, the Contact Group peace plan continued to remain the basis for negotiations, but some adjustments were made to accommodate Bosnian Serb conditions. On 2 December 1994, the Contact Group agreed that special relations could exist between Bosnian Serbs and the FRY. But on the territorial distribution, however, positions remained unchanged.'' The Contact Group also insisted on the formal continuation of the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina as, in their view, this would create no further problem for other communities like Croats and Muslims. Somehow this position had long ceased to reflect political realities and Serb opposition continued

I o press a for a fresh reappraisal. 232 The opposition of Bosnian Serbs to the territorial division of the country suggested by the Contact Group was bound to have adverse reactions to the peace making efforts of the UN. The outbreak of fight is Bihac pocket in western Bosnia during the summer of 1994, caused much concern in the UN circles. When all diplomatic efforts failed to restore peace the Security Council decided to strengthen its forces in the region. In the meanwhile, the Secretary-General visited Sarajevo on 30th November 1994 and held long discussions with the leaders involved in negotiations. Immediately after the Secretary- General's visit, his Special Representative initiated further negotiations for a cease-fire. The visit of former United States President Jimmy Carter to Sarajevo in mid December 1994 greatly facilitated that process and led to the Bosnian Serbs announcing their willingness to agree to a cease fire.

A little after President Carter left, his representative succeeded in securing a cease-fire agreement between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian muslims on 23 December 1994 and another agreement on the cessation-of-hostil ities on 31 December 1994 .I! The latter agreement, which came into effect as 1 January 1995, i11r:luded ninp basic elements: 233 1. a four-month cessation of hostilities:

2. the establishment of a joint commission to oversee implementation of the agreement; 3. an exchange of liaison officers: 4. the separation of forces, withdrawal of heavy weapons and interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops along the line of confrontation: 5. freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UNHCR particularly for the purpose of delivering aid and monitoring human rights: 6. compliance with earlier agreements concerning Sarajevo and certain areas in eastern Bosnia: 7. restoration of utilities and joint economic activities: 8. release of prisoners and provision of information on missing persons; and 9. cooperation with UNPROFOR in the monitoring and withdrawal of foreign troops

On 2 January 1995, Bosnian Croat leaders joined these agreements. For a short time after the cease-fire there was much decline in the military activities in the region. Still much had to be achieved on the provision relating to the separation of forces and withdrawal of heavy weapons. Moreover, a continued lack of cooperation

on these issues by the r~artiesconcerned started causing hinderanc:e in the work of UNPROFOR. There was a fear 234 that renewed hostilities might break out before the expiry of the four month period of cessation of hostilities agreement. The UN efforts having resulted in tackling the Bosnian crisis that had defied all solutions so far were widely appreciated all over the world and there was general impression in diplomatic circles that UNPROFOR had done really a remarkable job of the mandate given to them. It was now realised in UN circles that the UNPROFOR required some essential changes to cope with the post treaty problems that arose to demand immediate UN attention.

Accordingly, on 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR replacing it with three separate but interlinked operations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with mandates extending until 30 November 1995. Known collectively as the United Nations Peace

Forces (UNPF) , with headquarters in Zagreb, (Croatia), the three operations were under the control of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to implement the mandate assigned to them.

The Council also established the United Nations f.:onfidence Restolation Operation in Croar ia, to hr known as TINCRO vhose mandate included (a) performing the 235 functions required under the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994: (b) facilitating implementation of the

Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994: (c) facilitating implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions: (d) monitoring the crossing of militry personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons, over the international borders between the Republic of Croatia and Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); (el facilitating the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of the Republic of Croatia; and (f) monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula. 32

The Council decided UNCRO to be an interim arrangement to create the conditions that would facilitate a negotiated settlement consistent with the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and which would guarantee the security and rights of all communities. The member states were requested to extend close air support to the territory of the Republic of Croatia in defence of UNCRO personnel in the performance

of YNCRO's mandate. 236 The Council also extended UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina till 30 November 1995. The Council also decided that UNPROFOR would perform its functions as proposed in the cease-fire agreement on 29 March 1994 and the economic agreement on 2 December 1994. By a Security Council resolution the UNPROFOR within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would be known as United Nations Preventive Development Force (UNPREDEP) with mandate and responsibilities identical to those given earlier.

Working of UNCRO Specifically speaking the main mandate of United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) was to undertake functions stated in the cease- fire agreement of 29 March 1994. These were briefly as follows: (a) monitor the area between the forward troop deployment lines: (b) verify that all weapon systems were deployed in accordance with the provisions of the agreement; (c) occupy all checkpoints specified in the agreement; (d) chair the Joint Commissions at all levels:

and (e) conduct the liaison activities. " TO perfornr those functions fully, UNCRO was fully in exclusive control of the area between the forward troop deployment

lines. It would carry out patrols on the demilitarized

areas. UNCRO hat1 full freedom of movements ttr monltol 237 the deployment of troops and also supervise the local police, which was to assist the UNCRO.

In order to advance the process of reconciliation and the restoration of normal life, UNCRO would: (a) facilitate and support the opening of transportation networks, as well as of water and energy facilities: (b) support the negotiations and implementation of further economic and humanitarian measures. UNCRO was further expected to maintain conditions of peace and security and to restore confidence among the affected people for which it would: 34 a) provide assistance to needy individuals and communities in cooperation with international agencies; b) monitor the human rights situation of individuals so that there was no discrimination;

c) facilitate the voluntary return of refugees: and

d) support local confidence building measures.

The IlNCRO was busy with its peace efforts when on 24

April 1995 it suffered a major setback in Croatian Serb leadership vlosincj the hiqhwav in Sector West on the plea 238 that it was not of equal benefit to the Croatian Serbs. The situation was further deteriorated when on 1 May 1995, the launched a military offensive in the areas of sector West which was under Croatian Serb control. Despite Security Council appeal the fighting went on. The UN representative proposed a ceasefire on 1 May which was accepted by Croatian Serbs but not by Croatia. The hostilities resumed on 4 May when the Croatian army started taking important strategic points. The Croatian army imposed total restriction of movement on UNCRO in sectors which they had occupied. The situation continued to grow worse, threatening security of UN troops. A request had to be made on 4 August 1995 for NATO air presence over the sector. This was granted in order to deter hostile action against UN personnel.

Meanwhile, the UNCRO continued to carry out its functions in other sectors. But because of the high level of tension and lack of co-operation, its implementation remained seriously affected. The UN efforts continued and its special representative who met leaders of all parties could succeed in announcing on G August an agreement35 with the Croatian authorities to allow UN essential humanitarian services to operate in the region they had occupied. But. the UN representative was told that to be on the safe side all UN military 239 personnel were withdrawn from the area of conflict. Meanwhile the UN efforts enabled the parties to reach an agreement on the regions of Eastern Slovenia, Baranja, Western Slovenia and Western Sirmium. The Security Council was to consider the request to establish a transitional administration and authorize an appropriate international force which later came in the form of UNTAES. In order to allow the orderly establishment of such an operation the mandate of UNCRO was terminated after an interim period ending on 15 January 1996. UNTAES and UNMOP Though the mandate of UNCRO lapsed on 15 January 1996, the monitoring of the demilitarization of Prevlaka Peninsula was necessary. The Security Council decided in its resolution on 15 January to establish for an initial period of 12 months a UN peace keeping operation with both military and civil components under the name of UNTAES. Its jurisdiction would cover the East Slovenia. Baranja and Western Sirmium. The Council decided that demilitarization of the region would be completed within 30 days and UNTAES would be deployed to undertake its mission. Its civilian component would undertake tasks relating to the functioning of public services including law and order and would also undertake other artivities for the economic development of the reyior~to restore the normal situation. 240 The Security Council authorised UN militarl- observers to continue monitoringthe de-militarization of the province of Prevlaka for a period of 3 months. Twenty-eight United Nations Military observers in the Prevlaka were assigned the duties to report directly to United Nations Headquarters in New York. This mission would be known as United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) .

Peace Agreement The peace initiative undertaken by the United States with the support of the Contact Group resulted on 5 October 1995, in a country-wide cease-fire agreement, which came into effect on 12 October 1995. UNPROFOR, military and civilian personnel, undertook various measures to ensure the successful implementation of the agreement, including demining activities that were necessary to supply humanitarian aid to Sarajevo. As a result of this agreement all parties started restoring normal conditions in which the civil administration could function to provide basic amenities to the people.

The diplomatic initiative to end the Bosnian conflict culminated in talks held in Dayton (Ohio) in November 1955. On 21 November, the Peace Aqreement was

initialled and c~r~14 Decemtrer forrna:Lly signed at a 2-11 r:eremony in Paris. The princ:ipal terms of the acc.r~rd were as follows:

1. Bosnia and Herzegonia would remains juridically a single state.

2. Bosnia would at the same time be divided into two fully autonomous units, i.e., a Muslim-Croat federation controlling 51 percent of Bosnian territory and a Serb republic comprising 49 percent. [see map 61

3. All Bosnian, Croat and Serb armed forces were to be withdrawn to points within their respective administrative lines of demarcation.

4. These withdrawals were to be monitored and enforced by a multinational armed force, under NATO command. including Russian and other non-NATO forces.

5. During the implementation of the accord, the UN arms embargo against the warring parties would gradually be lifted.

In this context it should be noted that the territorial division of Bosnia essentially reflected the Source: Keesing' s Record of hbrld Events, 1995. 243 military outcome of the war which was quite obviously in favour of the Serbs. The Croat-Muslim federation remained more a matter of fiction than of reality as it was going to be a compromise between two communities each of which fought for its own entities. The United States which played an important role in the crises appeared determined to withdraw its more than 20,000 troops from Bosnia in a year's time. 16

Dayton Agreement : What it meant: Dayton Peace Accord, inter alia, contained a blueprint for the international intervention in the conflict in Bosnia - Herzegovina. The military aspects were to be handled by a US-led coalition of States utilizing the services of NATO, and the civil aspects would be handled by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In this context, the US responsibility in looking after military affairs should be noted by the fact that President Clinton had decided

to send 20,000 US troops to Bosnia as part. of a 60.000 - troop NATO deployment there.

So far as UN involvement was concerned, it consisted

in four ways, first. the Accord called for an

"authorization" by the Security Council of the del~loyment

of IFOR and its right to use military force against 244 violators of the ~ccord.'' Second, the Accord specified the procedure for withdrawal of UNPROFOR.'~ Third, it required cooperation of all parties with the International Tribunal for War Crimes in former Yugoslavia, which was a Security Council creation.40 Fourth, the Accord gave Security Council the authority to appoint a High Representative "to facilitate the Parties" and to mobilize and, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace-settlement.

The history of negotiations of the Dayton Accord suggested the advisability of international reaction to a major conflict requiring substantial involvement of military forces and the liklihood of active conduct of military operations by those forces. It was based on the following principles: (1) active involvement in negotiations of the settlement by the interested Big Powers and regional powers with the UN playing but a

guiding role; (2) settlement based on consent by all

parties involved: (3) the use of military force outside the UN political and military command and control

mechanism; (4) t.he use of the UN Security Council to

legitimize the military effort: (5) the use of international relations in coordinal ing the humanitarian,

social, and economic aspect.^ of the settlement. Pt3 24!3

Dayton Agreement : Significance In reaching the Dayton agreement what succeeded was diplomacy backed up with force - A key lesson of the conflict. Dayton Accord was to turn Bosnia from a big problem into a "big experiment". By Dayton a new Bosnia was created - writing a fresh constitution, establishing mechanisms for enforcing human rights standards, organizing elections, returning refugees to their homes, and reforming civil administration." [see map 71

In the light of the Dayton agreement, the Republics - the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the requested the Security Council to withdraw UNPROFOR and authorize to establish a Multinational Military Implementation Force (IFOR) to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement. The parties also requested Security Council to establish a United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF). The IPTF tasks would incl~de:'~ a) monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organizations, structures and proceedings: (Bosnian Serb Republic Muslim-Croat Federation

-

Source: The World Today, January 1996. b) advising law enforcement personnel and forces: c) training law enforcement personnel:

d) facilitating, within the IPTF mission of assistance, the parties' law enf orcement activities:

e) assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats:

f) advising government authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the organisation of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and

g) assisting by accompanying the parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibility. On 15 December 1995, the Security Council, authorized member states to establish IFOR under unified control and command of NATO and non-NATO nations, to effect implementation of peace agreement and ensure compliance with its provisions. It was earlier decided that the authority of UNPROFOR be transferred to IFOR. In a

separate resolut ion" adopted on 21 December, the

Security Cc~uncil decided to establish IPTF and a IIN 248 civilian office for a period of one year from the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR. Subsequently, this operation became known as the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). In accordance with the Security Council decision UNPROFOR began withdrawing from Bosnia and Herzegovina those forcecs which were not incorporated into IFOR. On 20 December 1995''. the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR took place. During the transition period only essential UNPROFOR forces would be retained and gradually they would be replaced by the NATO forces.[see map 81

UN Preventive Deployment Force The Security Council established on 31 March 1995. UNPREDEP as a distinct operating entity in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to monitor developments on the borders of Macedonia and Yugoslavia and to help civil authorities to maintain law and order. To enhance its effectiveness and fulfil its mandate the UNPREDEP cooperated with various regional organizations including the OSCE mission established in 1992. Also since its establishment, UNPREDEP worked closely with ICFY. This cooperation mainly involved two areas: humanitarian issues and the promotion of dialogue on human rights issues involving ethnic communities dnd national minorities. In brief it provided a valuable framework ml~~-lf- BOSNIA: NEGOTIA~ION AND RETREAT

BOSNIA 0 EDERAL REPUB HERZEGOVINA

February 1996. By then UNPROFOR had been withdrawn and replaced by NATO in Bosnia.

Source: Benton, Bzrbara (ed.), Solders for Peace : Fifty Years of W Peacekeeping (New York : Facts on File, Inc1, 1996. 250 for peace making, peace-building and humanitarian activities. The Secretary General in his report to the Security Council referred to UNPREDEP's deployment role which had contributed greatly to the peace stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in the Southern Balkans. This mandate was extended upto 30 May 1996.

In view of the pioneer role played by UNPROFOR in the extremely complicated situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would be quite relevant to have a brief critical appraisal of the contribution made by this UN agency in bringing about peace and normalcy in the region. One of its problems was that eversince the start .of the formation of UNPROFOR, its mandate did not seem to have been clear to the member states. In May 1995, the Secretary General stated its correct nature when he said that UNPROFOR was not deployed to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That could not be the role it was called upon to play in the troubled areas. UNPROFOR consistecl of the semi-armed volunteer troops contributed by the member-states to help the warring parties to limit their war activities and find ways to corne to an dmicable settlement. In that sense, it could rightly be te~-rnedas

a f<~rceof peace-makers. Its essenti~il role was to sc? 251 that the innocent people in the conflict region suffered least from the consequences of war.

Most of the conflicts in which UNPROFOR personnel were deployed were essentially intra-state and in such cases peoples' hardships could be minimised only if an international body with clean bonafides came to their help. The UNPROFOR sought to achieve that end. It succeeded to a great extent in persuading belligerents to agree to establish 'no fly zones' 'safe areas' and 'exclusive zones' which by mutual consent would remain immune from both armed as well as air attacks. This was to further UN mission to continue to do their humanitarian activities such as supplying good grains and medical aid to the people in distress in areas which were affected by war activities. Above all, their aim was to negotiate local cease-fires and try through negotiations to reach an over all political settlement. In most of these missions UNPROFOR achieved considerable success, though for various obvious reasons they could not achieve the target which their mandate had specified for them.

To pinpoint the true nature of UNPROFOR it should be restated in brief that the Force, was not to be treated as an end in itself, but as a means to create renditions in which peaceful negotiations could take place leading Lo permanpnt r;c~lution of the problem. 252 UNPROFOR's original peace-keeping mandate, which could not be implemented without the cooperation of the parties, was gradually, enlarged to include elements of enforcement. This was interpreted to mean that UNPROFOR itself had become a party to the conflict. For example, the 'safe areas' mandate, required it to cooperate and negotiate with a party which was going to be subjected to airstrikes in certain circumstances. Similarly, the UN after having imposed sanctions on one party had to set up a force that would work with the consent and cooperation of that party to implement the original decision of the Organisation. The result was that Bosnian-Serb leaders withdrew their cooperation from UNPROFOR declaring that they were applying their own sanction to the UN. This sort of policy caused much confused situation in which the UN found itself a target of criticism.

In reply to the criticism that the United Nations involvement in the former Yugoslavia was not a success" the United Nations Secretary-General explained that the original and primary purpose in deploying United Nations peace-keeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to protect humanitarian activities. The UNPROFOR deserved all credit for the activity it had to carry out in the midst of a1 l ot~structic~n:;and difficulties. It also cI~.served credit for its successes in neqotiat ing and hrl~~ittgto 253 implement ceasefires and other military arrangements, without which many more people would have died and material destruction would have been even greater.

The price that the UN personnel had to pay in the operations was very high in terms of death of the personnel and injuries to all participants. At the time of peace deployment in August 1995, the former Yugoslavia accounted for nearly 70 per cent of peace-keepers world wide and over two-thirds of peace-keeping costs. The Secretary-General welcomed the fact that the vast task of helping to implement the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be entrusted to the United Nations alone. Only a cooperative effort between many international organizations and member states could generate the skills and resources and, above all, the political will required to end the fighting and start building the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 16

UN Missions : their limitations The propriety of intervention strategy which was adopted by the Unitecl Nations and other International Organizations during the crisis was often questioned in several diplomatic circles. But it was defrndecl on the ground that it was formulated to protect the Muslims in

'safe ar.etgs' and to keep Sarajevo from fallirlg Lly the 254 Serb bombardments. It was quite consistent with the conviction that they had no desire to commit themselves to a land war in the Balkans against the Serbs. But it would enable the victims to resist the aggression with the help of outsiders, who with the armed strength would prevent the victims from being wiped out.

Another instance of UN weakness was observed during the Bosnian crisis when the United Nations allowed itself to become the administrator of Sarajevo at a crucial time. It was a wise step on the part of the UN to take the responsibility of defending the functional utility of this international airport when it was under Serbian siege. The United Nations prevented the city from starving to death and yet, by its indecisive policy it helped to prolong the city's sufferings.

In brief, the outside intervention helped to retard Serbian achievement of its goals of a Greater Serbia. For instance, had Croatia not heen recognised in late December 1991 by EC and others, it is quite possible that it would have been conquered entirely by Serbia.

Likewise the timely UN intervention saved the airport of Sarajevo from falling into hands the of Serbians. If it had fallen, all of Bosnia would have been in the hand!; of the Bosnian Serbs. I the outside interventic~n had 255 fulfilled UN's limited mandate. In effect, it prevented the full realisation of Serbian war aims which were either to revive the old centralized federal system of Yugoslavia or if that was not possible to create a bigger Serbia by incorporating the Serbian minorities in adjoining states of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovinathe UNPROFOR's performance was a mixture of achievements and setbacks. More than ever before, the country faced the possibility of renewed hostilities. UNPROFOR's stabilization of the situation on the ground had not been matched by political progress on a negotiated settlement. The impasse on the Contact Group's proposal created a vacuum in which UNPROFOR had little or no political relevance for the pursuit of local initiatives. While UNPROFOR continued to perform humanitarian and confidence-building tasks, the lack of progress on the fundamental political questions had created a situation in which it could do little. In concrete terms it could delay rather than prevent a renewed outbreak of hostilities. That could also have negative consequences for the future of t.he Federation which could not remain immune from the processes in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina or tht. peace mission area as a whale. Reference

The Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina will be referred to as 'Bosnia'. J. ~ou,'Deconstructinq Yuqoslavia', Survival, (19911, p. 293. The United Nations and the situation in The Former Yuqoslavia, United Nations, Reference Paper: 1994, pp. 1-5. James Gow, 'pne Year of War in Bosnia - Herzesovina' in REF/RL REsearch Report 2 (June 1993). pp. 1-13. Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War, (London: Heinenann, 1994), pp. 263-265. Silber, L., '] Croatia set peace talks', Washington Post, 16 October 1991, p. A29. Moore, P., 'The Islamic communitv's new sense of identitv' . REF/RL, Report on Eastern Europe, vol. 1, no. 44 (1 November 1981). p. 20. 'Final results in Bosnia announced'. Tanjug (Belgrade), 12 December 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU), FBIS-EEU-90-240, 13 December 1990, pp. 47-48. Malcolm, N., Bosnia: A Short Historv New York, N.Y: New YOrk University Press, 1994, p. 224. 'Islamic cornmunitv warns Bosnia of war threat'. Tanjug (Belgrade), 25 September 1991, in FBIS-EEU- 91-187, 26 September 1991, p. 57: and Cowell, A.. 'Yuqoslavia Clashes mav be widenins', New York Times, 21 September 1991, p. A3. Vreme (Belgrade), 30 September 1991, pp. 4-5. Silber, L., 'Bosnia declares sovereiqntv: Serbia, Croatia set Deace talks', Washington Post, 16 October 1991. p. A29. 13 Sudetic, C., 'Serbs attack Muslim Slavs and Croats -in Bosnia', New York Times, 4 April 1992, p. A3. Only 63.4 percent of all eligible voters participated in the referendum. 99.7 percent voted for independence. As in Croatia, almost the entire resident Serb population boycotted the referendum. US House of Representatives, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia - Herzegovina (Washington, D.C: US Government Printing Off ice. 12 March 1992) . Which took over from the "Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna", proclaimed on 3 July 1992. Burns, J . , 'Croats claim their own slice of Bosnia', New York Times, 6 July 1992, p. A3. Sudetic, C., 'Serbs of Saraievo stav loval to Bosnia', New York Times, 26 August 1994, p. A5. See, Le Monde, 12 July 1994, p. 7. and New York Times, 26 August 1994, p. A5. For a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for Croat-Muslim cooperation within the new federation, based on more than a year of EU administration of Mostor, capital of the western Bosnia region of Herzegovina, see Dobbs. M., 'Defeat of the bridge- divers: hopes for unifying Bosnia crumble in Mostor'. Washington Post, 17 September 1995, p. cl. A failure of the Croat-Muslim federation would signal the end of hopes for the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a meaningful political entity (which would have to be based on the integration of the Serb parts of the country as well) . UN Doc. S/1996/119. UN Doc. S/1996/76. UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeepinq, United Nations, 3rd edn. 1996, pp. 488-492. Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Managing Arms in Peace Processes : Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (New York/Geneva: United Nations) 1996.

See UN Document S/25479 of 26 March 1993, p. 8. The Bosnian Serb assembly in Pale had finally accepted the outlines of the plan on 19-20 January 1993. Western European Union,' The Yugoslav Conflict- Chronology of events from 30 May 1991 - 8th November 1993, ref. A/WEU/DEF (93) 14. Speech by Lord Owen to the Foreign Press Association, 27 March 1995. Andric, The Development of S~iritualLife in Bosnia under the Influence of Turkish Rule (Durban, N.C: Duke University Press, 1990). p. 18.

UN Document S/1994/255 of 4 March 1994. 51 per cent for the Croat-Muslim Federation, 49 per cent for the Bosnian Serbs. UN Doc. S/1995/8.

UN, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, United Nations, 3rd edn. 1996, p. 545. UN DOC. S/1995/320. UN Doc. S/1995/320. UN Doc. S/1995/666, annex 111. See Hand, B., 'Consress and the country consider post-conflict Bosnia, CSCE Digest, vol. 18. no. 1 (December 19951, pp. 1 and 5-6. Cf. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: IFOR taks regulated mostly in Annex 1-A concerning the military aspects of the peace settlement and OSCE tasks in Annex 1-B on aspects of regional stabilization, Annex 3 on elections and Annex 10 pertaining to the civilian implementation. Ibidem, Annex 1-A, Art. I(1) (a)&(b), Art. VI(1). Ibidem, Annex 1-A, Art. VII. Ibidem, Art IX, Annex 1-A, Art. X. 1 US Foreign PoJicy Agenda: Peacekeeping and Regional Stability, Electronic Journal, US Information Service, 1998, p. 17. 42 UN Doc. S/1995/987. 43 S/RES/1035 (1995).

44 S/2995/1050. 45 S/1995/1031

46 United Nations Peacekee~inqOperations (New York : United Nations, Department of Public Information, December 1995).