Topical Essays Supplying the Manpower That America’s National Security Strategy Demands Blaise Misztal and Jack Rametta1 Introduction time to introduce new and beneficial regula- The first mention of the military in our na- tions, and to expunge all customs, which from tion’s founding document refers, perhaps not experience have been found unproductive of surprisingly, to the authority, vested in Con- general good.”3 The questions that Washington gress, to create an armed force in the first place. raises go beyond concerns about an incipient Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution imbues armed force and are critical to the strength of the legislative branch with the power to “raise any military, but particularly one that depends, and support Armies.” However, the Constitu- as the U.S. military does, on voluntary service. tion provides little guidance as to what else Indeed, one could argue that the unrivaled Congress should take into account in raising superiority of the American armed forces over an Army. the past 70 years can be attributed in large part Fortunately, George Washington, soon to to the willingness of lawmakers and defense be our first commander in chief, laid out his leaders to revisit and revise how servicemem- vision for the U.S. military. Washington’s “Sen- bers are recruited, managed, promoted, paid, timents on a Peace Establishment,” written in and retained. The set of laws and policies that 1783 three years before he assumed the presi- manage these functions, known collective- dency, might be the first treatise on American ly as the defense personnel system, provides strategy.2 In it, he of course touches on tradi- the manpower supply—not just in terms of tional questions of strategy—what threats the numbers, but also in terms of rank, skills, and Army must defend against, where it should specialties—that America’s military needs to be positioned, or how large it should be—but execute its mission and America’s National Washington delves most deeply into questions Security Strategy demands.4 related to the who, not the what or how, of mili- Although there is a surprising degree of tary force: how to recruit troops, how long they continuity between the military envisioned should serve, the ideal composition of the mil- by Washington and the one that exists today, itary and officer corps, criteria for promoting the personnel system has evolved significant- troops, how to determine pay, and even the ly over the past two-and-a-quarter centu- appropriateness of providing rum in soldiers’ ries, shifting from volunteer militias to con- rations (vinegar, it turns out, is better). scription and then finally to an all-volunteer As this document was meant for the “Com- standing force, accompanied by the growth of mencement of our Military system,” Washing- compensation and benefits and the inclusion ton argued that this focus on military person- of women. Many of these changes have been nel was necessary because it was “the proper instituted in the past seven decades and reflect The Heritage Foundation | heritage.org/Military 19 the need to ensure that the force is able to pro- example, while conscription has been in use in a tect American interests as effectively as possi- variety of different forms since the Revolution- ble in a changing security environment. The ary War,6 the modern draft originated in World personnel system utilized by today’s military, War I (when the phrase “selective service” was for example, was enshrined in statute shortly first coined).7 And while basic units of the Army after World War II and was updated to address (and later the Navy, Air Force, and Marines), the evolving strategic context of the Cold War. such as officers and enlisted personnel, date Given the currently shifting and ambig- from well before the colonial era, the function of uous strategic landscape in which threats those components morphed with the evolution range from the high end (Russia and China) of modern military technology and strategies. to the low (non-state actors), and with the Before World War II began, the Army was military’s missions varying from the techno- ill-prepared (from a personnel perspective) logical (defending cyberspace) to the personal for a large-scale conflict: The total number of (security assistance), it might be worth evalu- officers before the war was only 15,000; older ating whether the current personnel system senior officers populated the ranks; and there is in need of another update. This sentiment were limited opportunities for new junior of- is reflected in the FY 2019 National Defense ficers to proceed up the ladder.8 The enlisted Authorization Act, which made several statu- force swelled as the United States entered the tory changes in the officer promotion system war, rising from 269,023 in 1940 to 1,462,315 in to allow for more flexible military career paths. 1941 to 8,266,373 at its height in 1945.9 Howev- The questions that should drive such an analy- er, there were not enough experienced officers sis, U.S. Naval War College Professor Jacquelyn to lead these new troops effectively. At the time, Schneider suggests, include: the Army’s promotion system was based on se- niority, and Congress retained strict control l “What does the warrior of the future of the number of officers allowed at each rank. look like?” This created a significant logjam for promo- tions between the two world wars. Then Army l “What are the roles and missions the Chief of Staff and later Secretary of Defense United States will need to prepare its George Marshall gained President Roosevelt’s people for?” approval to address the issue by culling the Ar- my’s senior ranks in 1940.10 The following year, l “What are the technologies those warriors Congress passed the Army Vitalization Act of must master in order to succeed at their 1941,11 giving Army command further discre- mission?”5 tion to open senior slots to junior officers for promotion and thereby allowing new officers The greater the variance between the an- to be commissioned. swers to those questions and the servicemem- Problems with the seniority system persist- bers produced by the current system, the more ed throughout the war because it was nearly reform the system might require. impossible to remove officers from the ser- vice. Congressional approval was repeatedly The Evolution of “Up-or-Out”: required to fix the bloated, aging officer corps. From World War II to DOPMA By the end of the war, the Army had more than World War II: The Origins of “Up-or- 385,000 officers,12 about 19 times more than Out.” While the origins of the modern U.S. mili- before the war began. After the war, testify- tary and some of the institutional structures can ing during hearings on the proposed Officer be traced back to the early years of the Repub- Personnel Act of 1947, General Dwight D. Ei- lic, most of today’s personnel policy emerged senhower, then Army Chief of Staff, told the from the World Wars and their aftermath. For Senate Armed Services Committee that: 20 2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength I think that no great argument would servicemembers to steadily climb the have to be presented to show that our ranks, while a system based on seniority promotion system [seniority] has been merely rewards time in rank. unsatisfactory. Until we got to the grade of general officer, it was absolutely a lock- Given its real and perceived advantages, up- step promotion; and short of almost crime or-out was applied uniformly across the ser- being committed by an officer, there were vices for permanent promotions after World ineffectual ways of eliminating a man.13 War II with the passage of the Officer Person- nel Act (OPA) of 1947. The services still had General Eisenhower further explained that: flexibility for temporary assignments.16 The OPA also made a series of other policy changes If you look at General Marshall’s difficul- with the goals of providing uniformity between ties in 1940 and 1941 I believe you will find the Army and the Navy, emphasizing “youth that of the people he could make division and vigor,” and creating a force that could re- commanders, and corps commanders, mobilize quickly if necessary.17 and certainly there were not over five of The 1954 Officer Grade Limitation Act them who went through this war. All the (OGLA) further solidified up-or-out by im- rest of them had to be replaced and got- posing statutory limitations on the number of ten out of the way and younger men had regular and reserve officers that could serve at to come along and take over the job. each rank for all grades above major and elim- inating the loophole in OPA which did not im- We must keep this corps vital and pose limitations on temporary promotions.18 youthful.14 The last major change in personnel policy to occur before the end of the draft era in 1973 Congress heeded Eisenhower’s call and was the codification of the majority of U.S. mil- allowed for the drastic expansion of the offi- itary policy into Title X of the U.S. Code after cer corps. the Korean War. Title X unified most existing While congressional action was required permanent statutory military policies, includ- to clear the Army’s logjams, the Navy oper- ing the OPA and OGLA, under one heading. ated quite differently. Instead of employing a At the time, there was widespread agree- seniority system for promotions, the Navy re- ment among military and civilian experts that lied on an up-or-out promotion system, which up-or-out was a significant improvement.