The Role of the United Kingdom in Norway's History of European

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The Role of the United Kingdom in Norway's History of European The Role of the United Kingdom in Norway’s History of European Integration A Study of the 1972 Referendum Vilde Bye Dale Master Thesis in Modern International and Transnational History Department of Archaeology, Conservation and History, Spring 2020 UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Abstract Of the countries that have endeavoured to join the European Union (EU) since its inception in 1957, Norway and the United Kingdom are both anomalous due to their ambivalent approaches to the processes of European integration. Scholars have consistently emphasised the interrelat- edness between the two, and the extent of British influence on Norway on European integration in the post-war period. This study aims to determine how, or if, the British government influ- enced the Norwegian discourse on European integration. Building on primary source material and existing literature on the British-Norwegian relationship, it asks: Why did Norway and the UK follow different paths on the European question in 1972? The eBB and flow of London’s presence in the Norwegian debate is a continuous theme throughout this thesis. The results of the study establish that London’s influence on the Nor- wegian discourse diminished greatly in the 1960s. By the early 1970s, the British government’s influence on Oslo’s approach to European integration was more or less non-existent. Analysis of the parliamentary debate on 6-8 June 1972 demonstrates that London’s influence on the Norwegian discourse on Europe was not as significant as first assumed. Additionally, the study of the debate uncovers inherent disagreements among Norwegian parliamentarians in respect to what form the country’s association with the European Communities should take. Further analysis of secondary literature reveals that the Norwegian electorate’s decision to remain out- side of an enlarged ‘Europe’ in 1972 was not influenced by London in any substantial way. Rather, the Norwegian people’s rejection of EC membership was a result of wider develop- ments in Norway in the early 1970s, such as growing economic confidence and foreign policy assertion. ii Preface First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude towards my supervisor Kim Priemel, whose constructive suggestions and patient guidance has been invaluable. Thank you for your continued enthusiasm for this thesis. I feel lucky to have had a supervisor who cares so much about his students’ work. My undergraduate supervisor at the University of Essex, Dr Alix Green, was instru- mental in defining the path of my research. At a time in my life when I was uncertain about my future, she taught me not to underestimate the value of a historically-attuned mind. Thank you for inspiring me to pursue a degree in history. A special thanks to my fellow students in the MITRA programme, without whom I would not have made it through this master’s degree. Thank you for your steadfast encourage- ment and support over the last two years. Last but not least, I want to acknowledge my friends (Anniken, Siri, Henriette, and Hannah), who have contributed directly and indirectly to this thesis. Your moral support – and comic relief – gave me the strength to complete this research in due time, even when it seemed like an impossible task. Vilde Bye Dale – Oslo, 9 June 2020 iii Abbreviations CAP Common Agricultural Policy CFP Common Fisheries Policy EC European Communities ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEA European Economic Area EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association EU European Union NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nordek A Nordic economic union OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation iv Table of Contents Abstract ii Preface iii Abbreviations iv 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Historiography 2 1.2 Theoretical Considerations 5 1.3 Methodology 6 1.4 Outline 8 2. Norway, the United Kingdom and the Question of Europe 9 2.1 Norwegian Foreign Policy in the Post-War Period 11 2.2 Taken by Surprise: Norway’s First Application in the 1960s 14 2.3 The Second Application and the Primacy of Domestic Politics 20 2.4 Consolidation of the Anti-EC Movement 24 3. Third Time’s a Charm? Negotiating Membership 28 3.1 The Start of Negotiations 28 3.2 Fishermen’s Friend: Maritime Membership Obstacles 30 3.3 Farmer’s Market: Agriculture and EC Accession 34 3.4 A New Government in 1971 35 3.5 Almost There: The 1972 Accession Treaties 39 3.6 Full Stop: The Referendum and its Implications 41 4. Calling London? The Parliamentary Debate on European Integration in June 1972 44 4.1 Parliament and European Integration 44 4.2 How were Values, Beliefs and Assumptions Communicated in the Discourse? 45 5. Concluding Remarks 57 List of Cited Sources i v 1. Introduction On 25 September 1972, 53.5 percent of the Norwegian electorate rejected membership to the European Communities (EC). Years of deliberation and debate preceded the referendum, and the contentious question of Norwegian EC membership overturned political loyalties and caused the downfall of two governments. The political significance of the referendum, as well as the level of engagement it inspired, made the 1972 referendum an extraordinary episode in Norwegian history.1 Gro Harlem Brundtland would later argue that “the 1972 debate left us with a trauma which still has not been overcome”.2 Over a ten-year period, the British government prompted Norway to apply for EC mem- bership three times: in 1962, 1967 and 1970.3 Based on this, a scholarly narrative has devel- oped, suggesting that there was a clear tendency for Norway to look towards the United King- dom on the question of EC membership until the early 1970s.4 This thesis seeks to understand the connection between Norway and the UK in the period leading up to the 1972 referendum. Only ten years before the referendum, most Norwegian politicians maintained that it was ‘un- thinkable’ to remain outside the EC if the UK joined.5 Despite this, Norway and the UK went in different directions in 1972. This development suggests that the Norwegian government’s policy on European integration changed a great deal in the years leading up to the referendum. From implicitly following the British lead when applying in 1970, to deciding to put the ques- tion of membership to a popular referendum in 1972 – knowing that the no-side had a substan- tial lead in the polls. As a result of the government’s position on the European question, Nor- way was the only applicant out of four – Norway, the UK, Denmark, and Ireland – to not enter the EC in 1973. If Norway was as influenced by the UK on European integration as scholars suggest, why did they pursue a different path than the UK in 1972? Answering this question is the motive for this thesis, which will explore the British-Norwegian relationship on the issue of European integration, with a particular focus on the 1972 referendum in Norway. Whilst it may have been the UK that influenced the Norwegian government to apply for membership of the EC, it is doubtful whether the Norwegian electorate’s rejection of membership in 1972 was a result of British influence. This thesis will examine secondary literature on the subject as well 1 Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ottar Hellevik, Kampen om EF (Oslo: Pax, 1977), p. 9. 2 As cited by Martin Sæter, ‘Norway and the European Union: Domestic Debate Versus External Reality’, in The European Union and the Nordic Countries, ed. by Lee Miles, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 138. 3 Hilary Allen, Norway and Europe in the 1970s (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979), pp. 45-61. 4 Many scholars have indicated this, see e.g. Kristin M. Haugevik, ‘Ledestjernen som forsvant: Storbritannia i norsk utenrikspolitikk’, Nytt norsk tidsskrift, 32.4 (2015), p. 343. 5 Ibid. p. 346. 1 as parliamentary debates in order to determine how, or if, the British government influenced the Norwegian discourse on European integration. This thesis will argue that although the Nor- wegian government’s change in European policy was to some extent due to external factors, such as the British economic decline, internal considerations such as economic self-interests, the importance of favourable natural resource policies, and ideas of sovereignty and belonging had the greatest influence on Norway’s changed trajectory. 1.1 Historiography It was Tor Bjørklund’s book Mot Strømmen: Kampen mot EF that gave me the idea to explore the connection between Norway and the UK on the question of European integration. He argues that Norway and the UK have ‘intertwined chronologies’ when it comes to Europe: It is the British who have held the power on the will to act on EU issues by both handing in applications for membership and getting their applications rejected. This chronology – created by external events outside of Norwegian control – was one of the pillars in the exposition of campaigns against the EEC.6 I want to challenge the hypothesis Bjørklund puts forward, by arguing that the British only influenced the Norwegian government’s approach to European integration until the early 1970s. I propose that the 1972 rejection of membership signified a broader change in the Brit- ish-Norwegian relationship, with British influence on Norway declining more generally – not just on the question of European integration. In the following section I will outline the scholarly debate and demonstrate why I believe this thesis can make a valuable contribution. Norway’s history of European integration (or lack thereof) has attracted scholarly at- tention since the issue was put on the agenda in the 1950s and 1960s. It is well worth noting that the scholarly debate about Norway’s relationship with the EU is less extensive than that of the UK’s complicated relationship with the EU.
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