Headquarttrs Royal Air ?O May-December* Iq42
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MIDDLE EAST auto iSfclly SiiliOM) UUo.il L If 77/e R.A.F. Middlv East Review is Secret. It is intended for ttw information of all officers and flying crews, under conditions of security approve ' by the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that within these limits it has as wide a circulation as possible. No quotation may be made from it without the authority of S.A.S.O. H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. ; neither are any of its contents to be communicated to anyone outside the Services. All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruction of this document is aa offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920. Any unauthorised \ person obtaining posses^iqn of a copy should immejjiafely Jgeward it Ja a closed unstamped envelope to H.Q. RJ.Fjjfcg,,. HEADQUARTTRS ROYAL AIR ?O MAY-DECEMBER* IQ42 MIDDLE EAST REVIEW NOI HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EASUi * AiMnirn 1 fit Contents The Battle for Egypt Page 5 r 52 Air Attack on Coastal Traffic ' The War at Sea 54 Provisioning Malta in the Dark Days of 1942 67 R.A.F. Operations from Malta 74 The Eyes of the R.A.F % „ 84 Enemy Devices to makes Aerodromes Unserviceable ,, 88 Back from the Blue „ 90 The Entry of the U.S.A.A.F. into the Middle East 94 Takoradi to Cairo ,, 97 Stratospheric Reconnaissance -99' Foreword The purpose of the R.A.F. Middle East Review is to present the story of air force activities in the Middle East, and various aspects of those activities for their instructional as well as their informative value. The circulation is therefore Secret and limited to air force personnel. This first issue covers the period May to December, 194-2; the most momentous period in the Middle East of the present war, and one of the most eventful in the history of the modern world. Subsequent numbers of the Review .will appear quarterly. The R.A.F. Middle East Review is designed to be as comprehensive as possible, for behind the big events lie many smaller operations which, although taken as part of the day's work, are nevertheless important, and merit inclusion in any complete survey of R.A.F. activity.^ THE BATTLE AR MAY-JUNE C Y K E N A I C A EGYPT / * • OPS. (UCO&0J, H.q.,C-A F..M.E. The Battl The period 26th May, 1942, to the end of the year witnessed the grimmest fighting in the Middle East since the outbreak of war. The series of major engagements which at first appeared to foreshadow the enemy's seizure of the Delta and later ended in his utter rout have come to be known to the world as the "Battle for Egypt". This account treats of the air activity and indicates its effect on the course of the battle: for the purpose of clarity, it is divided into phases covering operations in Egypt and Cyrenaica. R.A.F. operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and Malta theatres, without which the story would be incomplete, are dealt with separately elsewhere in the Review. THE FIRST PHASE-BACK TO EGYPT OUE SECOND OFFENSIVE in Libya, known as enemy, seizing his chance with characteristic " Crusader," which began on 18th November, 1941, opportunism, forced us to retreat to Egypt. The achieved spectacular success, and within two part played by the R.A.F. before and during that months our land forces had driven the enemy retreat provides the theme for the first phase. from Halfaya to El Agheila. In doing this, how At the beginning of the campaign, it was esti ever, we had extended our lines of communica mated that in numbers we had a seven to five tion beyond our strength to hold them, and on superiority in tanks and eight to five in guns, 21st January, 1942, the enemy successfully but in respect of aircraft the Axis had the ad launched a counter offensive which obliged us to vantage. withdraw as far as Gasala, where, by the 16th Based in Cyrenaica, Crete and the Dodecanese, February, our position was established. the enemy had approximately 928 aircraft at For the next three months both the enemy and his disposal with serviceability estimated at 50% ourselves were reinforcing in preparation for the and, in addition, powerful forces were based in renewal of the battle. The enemy's air offensive Greece, Sicily and Southern Italy. The R.A.F. aginst Malta) in April had limited the R.A.F. strength in the Western Desert and Egypt (in attacks on his shipping, and consequently adequate cluding the Fleet Air Arm) on the 28th May, reinforcement of Axis men and material had two days after the commencement of the cam coached Cyrenaica ; off-loading continued at paign, totalled 849 operational aircraft, with an Benghazi in spite of the R.A.F. raids and Derna average serviceability of 60 per cent and there was developed as a base for transport aircraft was a specialised force in Malta which, included from Crete. On our side, the reinforcement and torpedo and medium bombers and four Spitfire equipping of the VHIth Army continued steadi squadrons. In particular, as regards Western ly and this was helped by the extension of the Desert operations, the R.A.F. single-engined desert railway to El Adem. fighter strength was particularly low compared By the middle of May both sides were ready to with that of the Axis. launch an attack, but it was our policy to let The R.A.F. possessed approximately the same the enemy make the attempt first, weaken him number of fighter aircraft as at the beginning of self against our superior strength, and then the "Crusader" campaign in November, 1941 — counter-attack with our full weight. After a but with important differences. There were now good beginning our plans went awry, and the two Kittyhawk-bomber squadrons in addition to the one Hurricane-boi role of the R.A.F. was to maintain early days of the batf T*iat tkis was achieved in spite IIDs made their first inferiority at the beginning, and Throughout the. er aircraft equal in performance shortage of Kitt'yhawks and Spitfires was a limit o tWaTOf^M ME. 109s and MC.202s throughout ing factor' and fthe. Hurricanes .were 'obliged !to the whole of the phase, was due to the fighting bear the bfiiiht df the normal-fighter activity..* • spirit of our pilots aided by the work of ground The R.A.F. formations concerned in the battle personnel, particularly maintenance crews and remained the same as during the "Crusader" Repair and Salvage Units. campaign, with the addition of No. 211 Group. The employment of the Air Force fluctuated A.H.Q., Western Desert, divided into Advanced according to the commitments imposed by the and Rear sections, controlled our desert striking changes in the land and sea situations, but the force and worked in close proximity to and in following tasks were performed throughout the co-operation with VHIth Army H.Q. Working entire battle :—• under A.H.Q., Western Desert was No. 211 Group which controlled three fighter wings, each or (a) The neutralisation of the Axis Air Force four to six squadrons. This decentralisation of by attacking landing-grounds and destroy command aimed at closer supervision of squad ing enemy aircraft whenever encountered. rons in order to secure the greatest operational (b) The denial to the enemy of the air over readiness possible. A.H.Q., Egypt was respons the battlefield. ible for the air defence of our lines of communic (c) The provision of close support to our land ation, the Delta and back areas and provided forces. protective cover for shipping in coastal waters in (d) The destruction of supplies and reinforce conjunction with No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) ments by attacking ports and bases, Group. The last-named formation co-operated dumps, shipping, and transport on all lines with the Royal Navy in providing protection for of communication. friendly shipping, reconnaissances for and strikes (e) The defence of our rear areas and lines of against enemy vessels and maintained anti-sub communication. marine patrols and general sea reconnaissance. No. 205 Group was responsible for all medium (f) The protection of our convoys and sea and heavy bomber squadrons and also controlled lanes and strikes on enemy shipping and the newly arrived U.S.A.A.C. detachment of heavy naval units at sea. bombers. The Campaign Opens The enemy's final line ran from Tmimi to Seg nali and, as became evident during the battle, The Axis offensive began on the evening of the had several advantageous features. From it he 26th May with a minor thrust by Italian units was able to redistribute his forces with ease and in a south-easterly direction from Segnali, keep his armour mobile; he could check our deep which was watched and reported by escorted patrolling to a certain extent, and the landing Tac./R aircraft of No. 40 Squadron. During the grounds at Martuba, Tmimi and Derna> were night, however, the enemy's 15th and 21st Arm well protected from ground attacks. Our land oured Divisions passed round Bir Hakim in forces held defended positions running South the south and the next morning moved forward from Gazalai to the fort at Bir Hakim, pro in two columns from the east of the fort to tected by minefields and strong points in con wards Acromca and El Adem respectively. Their siderable depth. Our fighter aircraft had bases advance was checked by our armour and, in at Maaten Bagush and Sidi Haneish but operat particular, the column advancing on Acroma ed principally from the landing grounds at was split into two parts, one of which moved Gambut; our light bombers were located in the south and the other north.