MIDDLE EAST

auto­ iSfclly SiiliOM) UUo.il L If

77/e R.A.F. Middlv East Review is Secret. It is intended for ttw information of all officers and flying crews, under conditions of security approve ' by the Commanding Officer, who is to ensure that within these limits it has as wide a circulation as possible. No quotation may be made from it without the authority of S.A.S.O. H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. ; neither are any of its contents to be communicated to anyone outside the Services. All persons are hereby warned that the unauthorised retention or destruction of this document is aa offence against the Official Secrets Act, 1911-1920. Any unauthorised \ person obtaining posses^iqn of a copy should immejjiafely Jgeward it Ja a closed unstamped envelope to H.Q. RJ.Fjjfcg,,. HEADQUARTTRS ROYAL AIR ?O MAY-DECEMBER* IQ42

MIDDLE EAST REVIEW NOI

HEADQUARTERS ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EASUi * AiMnirn 1 fit Contents

The Battle for Egypt Page 5 r 52 Air Attack on Coastal Traffic ' The War at Sea 54 Provisioning Malta in the Dark Days of 1942 67 R.A.F. Operations from Malta 74 The Eyes of the R.A.F % „ 84 Enemy Devices to makes Aerodromes Unserviceable ,, 88 Back from the Blue „ 90 The Entry of the U.S.A.A.F. into the Middle East 94 Takoradi to Cairo ,, 97 Stratospheric Reconnaissance -99' Foreword

The purpose of the R.A.F. Middle East Review is to present the story of air force activities in the Middle East, and various aspects of those activities for their instructional as well as their informative value. The circulation is therefore Secret and limited to air force personnel. This first issue covers the period May to December, 194-2; the most momentous period in the Middle East of the present war, and one of the most eventful in the history of the modern world. Subsequent numbers of the Review .will appear quarterly. The R.A.F. Middle East Review is designed to be as comprehensive as possible, for behind the big events lie many smaller operations which, although taken as part of the day's work, are nevertheless important, and merit inclusion in any complete survey of R.A.F. activity.^ THE BATTLE AR MAY-JUNE

C Y K E N A I C A EGYPT /

* •

OPS. (UCO&0J, H.q.,C-A F..M.E. The Battl

The period 26th May, 1942, to the end of the year witnessed the grimmest fighting in the Middle East since the outbreak of war. The series of major engagements which at first appeared to foreshadow the enemy's seizure of the Delta and later ended in his utter rout have come to be known to the world as the "Battle for Egypt". This account treats of the air activity and indicates its effect on the course of the battle: for the purpose of clarity, it is divided into phases covering operations in Egypt and Cyrenaica. R.A.F. operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and Malta theatres, without which the story would be incomplete, are dealt with separately elsewhere in the Review.

THE FIRST PHASE-BACK TO EGYPT

OUE SECOND OFFENSIVE in Libya, known as enemy, seizing his chance with characteristic " Crusader," which began on 18th November, 1941, opportunism, forced us to retreat to Egypt. The achieved spectacular success, and within two part played by the R.A.F. before and during that months our land forces had driven the enemy retreat provides the theme for the first phase. from Halfaya to El Agheila. In doing this, how­ At the beginning of the campaign, it was esti­ ever, we had extended our lines of communica­ mated that in numbers we had a seven to five tion beyond our strength to hold them, and on superiority in tanks and eight to five in guns, 21st January, 1942, the enemy successfully but in respect of aircraft the Axis had the ad­ launched a counter offensive which obliged us to vantage. withdraw as far as Gasala, where, by the 16th Based in Cyrenaica, Crete and the Dodecanese, February, our position was established. the enemy had approximately 928 aircraft at For the next three months both the enemy and his disposal with serviceability estimated at 50% ourselves were reinforcing in preparation for the and, in addition, powerful forces were based in renewal of the battle. The enemy's air offensive Greece, Sicily and Southern Italy. The R.A.F. aginst Malta) in April had limited the R.A.F. strength in the Western Desert and Egypt (in­ attacks on his shipping, and consequently adequate cluding the Fleet Air Arm) on the 28th May, reinforcement of Axis men and material had two days after the commencement of the cam­ coached Cyrenaica ; off-loading continued at paign, totalled 849 operational aircraft, with an Benghazi in spite of the R.A.F. raids and Derna average serviceability of 60 per cent and there was developed as a base for transport aircraft was a specialised force in Malta which, included from Crete. On our side, the reinforcement and torpedo and medium bombers and four Spitfire equipping of the VHIth Army continued steadi­ squadrons. In particular, as regards Western ly and this was helped by the extension of the Desert operations, the R.A.F. single-engined desert railway to El Adem. fighter strength was particularly low compared By the middle of May both sides were ready to with that of the Axis. launch an attack, but it was our policy to let The R.A.F. possessed approximately the same the enemy make the attempt first, weaken him­ number of fighter aircraft as at the beginning of self against our superior strength, and then the "Crusader" campaign in November, 1941 — counter-attack with our full weight. After a but with important differences. There were now good beginning our plans went awry, and the two Kittyhawk-bomber squadrons in addition to the one Hurricane-boi role of the R.A.F. was to maintain early days of the batf T*iat tkis was achieved in spite IIDs made their first inferiority at the beginning, and Throughout the. er aircraft equal in performance shortage of Kitt'yhawks and Spitfires was a limit­ o tWaTOf^M ME. 109s and MC.202s throughout ing factor' and fthe. Hurricanes .were 'obliged !to the whole of the phase, was due to the fighting bear the bfiiiht df the normal-fighter activity..* • spirit of our pilots aided by the work of ground The R.A.F. formations concerned in the battle personnel, particularly maintenance crews and remained the same as during the "Crusader" Repair and Salvage Units. campaign, with the addition of No. 211 Group. The employment of the Air Force fluctuated A.H.Q., Western Desert, divided into Advanced according to the commitments imposed by the and Rear sections, controlled our desert striking changes in the land and sea situations, but the force and worked in close proximity to and in following tasks were performed throughout the co-operation with VHIth Army H.Q. Working entire battle :—• under A.H.Q., Western Desert was No. 211 Group which controlled three fighter wings, each or (a) The neutralisation of the Axis Air Force four to six squadrons. This decentralisation of by attacking landing-grounds and destroy­ command aimed at closer supervision of squad­ ing enemy aircraft whenever encountered. rons in order to secure the greatest operational (b) The denial to the enemy of the air over readiness possible. A.H.Q., Egypt was respons­ the battlefield. ible for the air defence of our lines of communic­ (c) The provision of close support to our land ation, the Delta and back areas and provided forces. protective cover for shipping in coastal waters in (d) The destruction of supplies and reinforce­ conjunction with No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) ments by attacking ports and bases, Group. The last-named formation co-operated dumps, shipping, and transport on all lines with the Royal Navy in providing protection for of communication. friendly shipping, reconnaissances for and strikes (e) The defence of our rear areas and lines of against enemy vessels and maintained anti-sub­ communication. marine patrols and general sea reconnaissance. No. 205 Group was responsible for all medium (f) The protection of our convoys and sea and heavy bomber squadrons and also controlled lanes and strikes on enemy shipping and the newly arrived U.S.A.A.C. detachment of heavy naval units at sea. bombers. The Campaign Opens The enemy's final line ran from Tmimi to Seg­ nali and, as became evident during the battle, The Axis offensive began on the evening of the had several advantageous features. From it he 26th May with a minor thrust by Italian units was able to redistribute his forces with ease and in a south-easterly direction from Segnali, keep his armour mobile; he could check our deep which was watched and reported by escorted patrolling to a certain extent, and the landing Tac./R aircraft of No. 40 Squadron. During the grounds at Martuba, Tmimi and Derna> were night, however, the enemy's 15th and 21st Arm­ well protected from ground attacks. Our land oured Divisions passed round Bir Hakim in forces held defended positions running South the south and the next morning moved forward from Gazalai to the fort at Bir Hakim, pro­ in two columns from the east of the fort to­ tected by minefields and strong points in con­ wards Acromca and El Adem respectively. Their siderable depth. Our fighter aircraft had bases advance was checked by our armour and, in at Maaten Bagush and Sidi Haneish but operat­ particular, the column advancing on Acroma ed principally from the landing grounds at was split into two parts, one of which moved Gambut; our light bombers were located in the south and the other north. In the meantime, Daba area, with advanced landing grounds at an attack on the fortress of Bir Hakim by Ita­ Baheira; and our medium bombers operated lian tanks and infantry was easily repulsed by from landing grounds in the Daba area. the Fighting French garrison. By the third week in May, the signs of an At this stage, the R.A.F's first concern was impending offensive were particularly marked: to achieve air superiority, and during the first enemy air attacks increased on our landing day of the battle proper over 160 sorties were grounds and the desert railheads at Capuzzo carried out on offensive and defensive patrols. and Misheifa, and every effort was made to Heavily escorted Stuka formations in the battle prevent our air reconnaisssance observing troop area were persistently attacked, and in the movements. As a counter-measure, the R.A.F. course of the day two JU.87s were destroyed, intensified the attacks on enemy aerodromes, and two were damaged, and the mixed bag of BR.20s, from the night 21/22nd to 25/26th May Welling- MC.202s and ME.109s included five destroyed, one tons, with Albacore illumination, made 94 effect­ prpbablyr&e&rotyed and six damaged at the cost ive sorties against the Martuba and' Tviimj-; 1 of:tfW-fljpfrter>s^lost by us. groups of landing grounds; in the meantime, our eA'ern'y^ aYr efft.rt was also hindered by light bombers concentrated on the Derna land­ ing grounds. day attacks on his landing grounds by Bostons and Baltimores and night attacks by Wellingtons. Valuable close support was given to our lane failure of the Axis plan, and in particular forces by light bombers and, to a greater extern, the failure to reduce Bir Hakim, obliged the by Kittyhawk-bombers which attacked supply enemy's armoured forces to make a general move columns in the rear of the enemy's armour and southwards in an attempt to shorten their lines put out of. action about 200 vehicles. of communication. Meanwhile, the Italian Trieste In view of the threat to Gambut from ad­ Division had succeeded in opening a small gap vanced enemy armoured units and the lack of an in our minefields near Rotunda Ualeb, but this adequate force for protection of the landing passage to the west could be used only intermit­ grounds, six fighter squadrons were withdrawn tently as it was under fire from our artillery. to base aerodromes but returned on the follow­ During the day, fighters and fighter-bombers ing day. harassed the enemy in 250 sorties against his The R.A.F's Close Support supply lines south and east of Bir Hakim. Attacks which began at first light continued The following day, 28th May, a renewed attack until sandstorms curtailed operations in the on El Adem from the south was repulsed, and afternoon; apart from the 120 vehicles whicn the main German armour, estimated to number were put out of action, general confusion was 200 tanks, which attempted another drive on caused. In response to a call from our land Acroma,, was dispersed by our armoured forces forces, also, an enemy column west of Acroma and air attacks. Attempts by one tank force to was bombed and machine-gunned by nine attack our Gazala positions in the rear were Bostons escorted by Tomahawks and Kitty- also frustrated. hawks, and our troops were able to make a suc­ It was evident that the enemy had under­ cessful attack immediately afterwards. estimated the strength of our land forces and In addition to the considerable close support the effect of the R.A.F's close support, which is afforded, offensive patrols were maintained mentioned in the next paragraph. Captured over the Acroma^Gazala area: two Stuka form­ documents show that he had planned on the ations were forced to jettison their bombs, two capture of Bir Hakim on the 28th May and JU.87s and two ME.109s were destroyed, and an immediate attack by his armour from the six other fighters were damaged. The effect east in the rear of our Gazala positions coin­ on enemy morale of these determined inter­ ciding with a frontal attack from the west by ceptions was apparent next day, when on several Italian units. Although, as has been indicated, occasions Stukas jettisoned their bombs on sight­ the attack from the east could not be made, the ing our fighters and fled; intercepted R/T mes­ Italians carried out their attack, but in a half­ sages from Stuka formations betrayed nervous­ hearted and ineffective manner. In the mean­ ness generally, pilots often stating that they had time, attacks were continued against Bvr Hakim, seen our fighters when in fact none was airborne. but these were all unsuccessful through combin­ ed land and air action, and accordingly enemy The Axis at Bay supplies were forced to travel by the long route On 30th May, the enemy's position was becom­ round to the south. ing desperate. He was held at every point he At the request of our land forces, the full attacked, unable to obtain supplies, with our force of the light bombers and fighters was minefields blocking his withdrawal westwards, directed against the enemy columns and and our air force continuously bombing and supply transport which, having been split up, straffing his troops and transport. In a final were endeavouring to contact each other. During attempt, therefore, to force an adequate passage the day, three well-escorted Boston attacks were through our minefields, the whole weight of the made on enemy columns in the Acroma and Axis armour was turned westward and after Bir Hakim areas, and low-flying fighter at­ heavy fighting a bridgehead was established tacks continued on suitable targets in the battle with a gap made by German sappers near 8idi area generally, causing havoc and confusion; Muftah protected by a strong screen of anti­ the Kittyhawk-bombers, which made over 50 tank guns in a semi circle from Taieb El Ess/em sorties, were particularly effective. to Got El Aslaga. The most significant feature of the air activity This gap and the smaller one at Rotunda that night was the successful interception by Ualeb now became the focal points of attack No. 73 Squadron Hurricanes of enemy aircraft for the R.A.F. as the enemy columns, armour raiding Gambut: two JU.88s were shot down, and transport, tried to withdraw to the west. one probably destroyed and five damaged. For The concentration of vehicles afforded better some nights after this, enemy bombers on night targets for the light 'bombers than formerly and raids dropped their bombs on the first run up three attacks were made by 27 Bostons (nine and made for home at top speed. to a formation) escorted by Kittyhawks and On 29th May, the fourth day of the campaign, Tomahawks. Two of the attacks were against the position of the Axis forces deteriorated still the Ualeb gap, in which 36 direct hits were scored on vehicles, causing complete chaos to further, and serious casualties were sustained the enemy's transport. Kittyhawk-bombers also through determined air attacks and successful repeatedly bombed and machine-gunned the two action by our land forces. gaps, oper^j0£pff)MEL *Hlfhg"or"B,ODD feet and ricanes) made 236 efective sorties between 26th dropping bombs from 1,000 feet. and 31st May. When Hurricane-bombers were The, enemy made strenuous efforts to protect first used in the desert during the "Crusader" his forces from these air attacks and, whereas campaign, they were equipped with 8 x 40 lb. in the previous two days columns had been bombs, but in practice these proved ineffective strung out with bad dispersal and little anti­ against armoured vehicles, and for the present aircraft defence, they were now concentrated and battle Hurricanes were fitted to drop 2 x 250 lb. well protected by guns. These two factors made and Kittyhawks 1 x 250 lb. bombs. The success our attacks expensive, but the damage and dis­ achieved led to the adaptation of further Kitty- organisation caused to the enemy on this critical hawks, some carrying 1 x 500 lb. bomb. day justified the heavy casualties which included The close support given by the fighter force four Kittyhawks destroyed and four seriously was naturally expensive and, during the first damaged. seven days of battle 38 fighters were destroyed, including 23 Kittyhawks, and 31 seriously Close Support Reduced damaged. On 31st May, the battle continued with con­ Throughout the week pressure was maintain­ siderable enemy armoured forces still east of ed by medium bombers at night against the our minefields and fighting was intense at enemy landing grounds at Martuba, Tmimi and Knightsbridge (the junction of the Trigh Capuz­ Derna, 161 effective sorties being made with zo and the track south to Bir Hakim) and along illumination by Albacores. In fact, the success the Sidi Muftiah ridge. Some of our troops suc­ of the latter led to the procedure becoming per­ ceeded in piercing the main gap in the region manent. Albacore pilots were carefully briefed Taveb El Essem - Rotunda Ualeb, which became with details of the area to be attacked and ar­ known as the "Cauldron," and the resulting mix rived over the target about fifteen minutes ahead up of forces here, combined with the fact that of the bombers. The slow speed, good visibility our land forces believed they had the situation and big flare-carrying capacity made it an ideal well in hand, led to a reduction in close support aircraft for the task, and the pilots, who at first by our aircraft. Fighters were ordered to revert were not keen on what they considered to be to their normal role, an essential measure in "sto6ge" work, later became enthusiastic when view of the risk now entailed in low-flying they learnt what good results were obtained as attacks against organised ground opposition and a result of their assistance. the need for conserving Kittyhawks, for which no replacements were available. The Enemy Recovers Enemy air activity had now increased and on By 2nd June, the enemy, by excellent organisa­ this particular day Axis aircraft had the best of tion and helped1 to some extent by two days of it, our losses being eleven aircraft with a number sand storms which restricted ground and more damaged against three enemy aircraft shot down especially air operations gainst him, had regroup­ and three probably destroyed. ed his forces in the "Cauldron" and with his for­ During the next day, 1st June, fighting ward base firmly established at Got El Uaieb was continued in the Knightsbridge and "Cauldron" being reinforced from El Cherima. areas, but unfortunately severe sandstorms ham­ pered our operations in the afternoon, and the He now realised that the reduction of Bir enemy was able to proceed unobserved with Hakim was essential to ensure the safety of clearing our mines and re-organising his supplies. his southern supply route and to remove a base In the morning, Spitfires made their first desert from which we could operate westwards. Ac­ sorties, but owing to their fewness in numbers cordingly, on 2nd June Italian troops, supported they were employed only as top cover with by tanks, initiated another attack. In spite of orders to avoid risk by using "tip and run" the unfavourable weather, Hurricane-bombers tactics. answered two calls for ground support and bomb­ ed enemy vehicles north of the fortress. The Enemy Initial Failure The next day, the assault on Bir Hakim was The Axis plan to by-pass Bir Hakim, capture resumed and, in particular, shelling and dive- Acroma and El Adem, cut our supply lines bombing intensified. The seriousness of the and reduce Tobruk, all in the course of three threat was appreciated by our land forces, but or four days, had failed, but the strength of the commitments in other regions of the battle bridgehead which enabled the enemy forces to ground, coupled with the assumption that in be regrouped and replenished from the west, attacking Bir Hakim, the enemy intended to coupled with the exhaustion of our land forces create a diversion and split our armour, consequent upon six days of severe fighting, prevented adequate assistance being sent, and prevented a decisive defeat being inflicted on accordingly the R.A.F. fighter and fighter-bomb­ them. In great part, the turning of the enemy er squadrons "adopted" the fortress for two from the offensive to the defensive was due 10 days—the 3rd and 4th June. More than 100 the air attacks on his extended lines of com­ fighter sorties on offensive patrols over the area munication and supply in which fighter-bombers were made on 3rd June, and Kittyhawk-bombers, (two squadrons of Kittyhawks and one of Hur­ on enemy eoncentra­ tions to the so ed bomber formations which attempted 60 vehicles out Bir Hakim. ed interception of a strongly escor.._ formation occurred at noon when Tomahawks emy Counter-Attacks of No. 5 Squadron g.A.A.F. completely broke up The enemy's reaction to our thrust was a firm the attack and destroyed seven Stukas. Five resistance which developed by 6th June into a Tomahawks were lost,­ but three pilots were successful major attack. The main German saved. armour threatened Knightsbridge with a pincer movement and tank reinforcements were sent " Merci Pour La R.A.F." south to Bir Hakim to help the attacks which During the morning, 4th June, Tomahawk and were now made with increasing spirit. Kittyhawk patrols were again successful in In view of the threat to our forces .A saving the garrison from dive-bombing attacks; in Knightsbridge, the air effort was principally an engagement with twelve JU.87s, escorted by diverted to that area. Throughout the day, ME.109s, six Stukas and one fighter were shot Kittyhawks, using cloud cover, repeatedly bomb­ down and two more bombers probably destroyed ed and machine-gunned enemy supply columns at the cost of four Tomahawks and one Kitty- moving up. On one occasion No. 112 Squadron, hawk. . after dropping their bombs, "jumped" a formation At midday, signals intercepted by our land of ME.109s, shooting down three and damaging forces intimated that an enemy ground attack another without loss to themselves. Light bomb­ supported by dive-bombers was due to begin at ers also hit the enemy hard in attacks on dis­ 13.00 hours. Accordingly, Kittyhawk-bombers persed tanks and vehicles in the neighbourhood were despatched and found suitable targets m of Sidi Muftah. the- form of enemy 'vehicles protected by few The most significant features of operations on anti-aircraft guns; as a result of 32 sorties, more 7th June were the speed with which calls for than 50 vehicles were destroyed or damaged. close support were answered, the increased ac­ The intended Stuka raid was also prevented and curacy of the fighter-bombers and their skill in our fighters, in addition to forcing the JU.87s identifying enemy troops. One call for support to jettison their bombs, shot down two CR.42s in the afternoon was answered within thirty-five and damaged another without loss to themselves. minutes, the result of the establishment of Air Many of the day's air combats were fought in Support Control close to Combined Headquarters. sight of the fort, which was surrounded by burn­ Kittyhawk-bombers attacked supply columns ing and damaged enemy material before our air­ and motorised infantry during the morning and craft left the scene. • afternoon in the "Cauldron"-Knightsbridge area The thanks of the Free French garrison for and Bostons successfully bombed vehicle concen­ the R.A.F. help was expressed in a signal sent trations some ten miles north of Bir Hakim. by the Officer Commanding to A.H.Q., Western On this day, also, Hurricane IIDs of No. 6 Desert, which ran:— " Bravo! Merci pour la Squadron, aircraft specially equipped with 40 mm. R.A.F. " cannon for " tank-busting," made their first operational sorties, but failed to locate suitable Attack on the " Cauldron " targets. Shortly before dawn on 5th June, a formation The next morning, 8th June, two particularly of Bostons attacked gun positions protecting the effective bombing attacks were carried out by "Cauldron" area and successfully prepared the escorted Bostons on transport vehicles and tanks way for an attack by our -land forces. Assaults south-west of Knightsbridge; one of several fires were launched from the east and the north which were started was visible for 30 miles, simultaneously and the latter succeeded in pene­ and our land forces confirmed the serious damage trating the "Cauldron" and certain units estab­ inflicted. The striking force of fighters and lished positions South of Bir Tamar. During the fighter-bombers, however, was held until word morning, enemy tanks and vehicles began to re­ was received from VIHth Army Headquarters as tire from the "Cauldron" and these were attack­ to whether the "Cauldron" or Bir Hwkim was ed at noon by Bostons, escorted by Tomahawks to receive particular attention. and Kittyhawks, in the area west of Sidi Muftah. Priority was given to the fortress, as it was Large fires were caused among the enemy's trans­ evident that a heavy attack was impending. At port, and photographs revealed that about once, Kittyhawks and Hurricanes carried out twenty direct hits and thirty near misses were continuous bombing and straffing sorties and, in scored on armour and vehicles. Our troops later particular, two combined attacks by Kittyhawk­ reported that several tanks had been knocked bombers and Hurricane IIDs were made. As a out. result of the two attacks, two tanks were des­ Both the "Cauldron" and the Bir Hakim troyed by the Hurricanes and at least one tank areas were patrolled by our fighters during the was destroyed by a direct hit from a Kittyhawk­ day. Hurricanes on morning patrols more than bomber. Intense anti-aircraft fire was encounter­ held their own with enemy fighters, and Toma­ ed and one Hurricane Hd and two Kittyhawk­ hawks and Kittyhawks again inflicted casualties bombers were destroyed. . ; . % TO fighter o#the morning of 11th June. Over 2,000 men sorties were made on offensive paTroIs; principal­ of the Fighting French garrison eventually got ly in the Bir Hakim area, and combats with to safety, but they had been compelled to leave enemy fighters were numerous. As a result of most of their guns behind. the fights we lost two fighters and the enemy lost The enemy now displayed astonishing speed in four and four others were damaged on either the orientation of his forces, and the original plan side. The enemy was now using JU.88s for of attacks on El Adem and Acroma, an assault bombing Bir Hakim with greatly increased on our Gazala positions from the rear, and then escorts and patrols which impeded interception. an advance eastwards, was put into effect during the following days. Supply-Dropping on Bir Hakim On 11th June, Bostons made thirty sorties on Bir Hakim had now been isolated for some attacks against concentrations menacing our days, and the situation was rapidly becoming Knightsbrige positions and our fighters suc­ critical due to the intensive dive-bombing and ceeded in intercepting a Stuka attack over even more intensive shelling. Supplies, especial­ the Acroma area. In the late afternoon, the ly medical, were urgently needed, and owing to rapid movement of enemy forces north-east from the risk and difficulty of penetrating the besieg­ Bir Hakim and east from the "Cauldron" focus­ ing forces, it was decided to employ aircraft for sing on El Adem was reported by our aircraft. supply-dropping. An Albacdre was despatched It was clear that a major attack was pending during the night of the 8/9th, but in spite of a and the R.A.F. prepared itself to give the great­ search lasting eighty minutes it failed to identify est possible support on the morrow. the fort and returned. The following morning, eight Hurricane-bombers and six fighters left on . Two Decisive Days the same mission. Six aircraft made a fighter- Throughout the day, 12th June, Bostons in bomber sweep to the south-east of the fort, while "boxes" of six, with small escort, and fighter- the six fighters patrolled to the south, and under bombers made continuous attacks on the enemy this cover the remaining two aircraft dropped columns advancing towards El Adem from the supply canisters which landed within a hundred south-west and tremendous damage was inflict­ yards of the fort. ed; in all, the fighter-bombers made over 100 Later on in the morning, the garrison launch­ sorties on bombing and straffing and the bomb­ ed a counter-attack in the northern sector with ers carried out 50 effective sorties. the object of reducing the heavy barrage. The The fighter force made 181 sorties on patrols attack was preceded by Hurricane and Kittyhawk over the area throughout^ the day, and it was ground-straffing, but in spite of this preliminary ensured that the enemy air forces did not use aid the garrison achieved only temporary suc­ El Adem aerodrome, which had been captured. cess, and throughout the rest of the day dive- The enemy made five bombing attacks against bombing and shelling increased. Our fighters our positions, but the largest one, north-west of continuously swept the area, and in the course of El Adem, was broken up by Hurricanes. This the day destroyed five ME.109s, probably destroy­ enemy formation included twenty JU.87s and ed four, and damaged seven other aircraft; we twenty JU.88s with a strong fighter escort; the lost one Tomahawk and one Kittyhawk. Hurricanes shot down six JU.87s, five ME.109s, That night, a^ Bombay of No. 216 Squadron one JU.88 and one MC.202 and damaged at least successfully dropped further supplies to the ten other aircraft. besieged garrison. On the following day, 10th June, heavy shell­ Our losses for the day were five Hurricanes ing and large scale bombing attacks were direct­ and five Kittyhawks, but strong support had been ed against the fortress. Spitfires and Hurri­ given to the land forces and the "box" at El canes succeeded in saving the garrison from one Adem remained intact. The enemy, however, of the raids and inflicted heavy losses on the by a skilful use of guns in close co-operation with Stukas, but two other attacks, including one by his tanks had inflicted great losses on our armour sixty heavily escorted bombers, attained their and from that time his armoured forces dictated objective. In the meantime, Kittyhawks bombed the trend of the battle. enemy concentrations around the fort and attack­ During the afternoon of 13th June, the enemy's ed gun positions. armoured units, leaving the El Adem escarp­ ment, continued the battle with our armour north Evacuation of Bir Hakim of Kmghtsbridge with such success that our The increased ground and air pressure, and land forces were obliged to abandon the area above all the enemy's accurate shelling, had ren­ and fall back northwards to Acroma. Once dered Bir Hakim untenable and the evacuation again, the enemy had induced our forces to of the fortress began during the night 10/llth employ our armour against his guns to the great June. detriment of our tank strength, which during The fall of Bir Hakim was a sad blow to the the week had suffered 200 casualties. R.A.F. which had done everything in its power Air activity during the day was restricted to mitigate the force of the enemy's attacks, and owing to sand storms, but offensive fighter R.A.P. fighters covered the garrison's withdrawal patrols were carried out when practicable. Only

10 a few fighter-bomber attacks werg fnade as the 'and ^also~ distracted TRe attention of the tank interlocking of the armoured forces limited the crews. A tank was not considered destroyed number of suitable targets. unless it went up in flames and consequently Withdrawal From Gazala claims were conservative as a tank hit at right angles in the manner described was almost On 14th June, the bulk of the enemy's armour certainly immobilised. Great damage was done closed in on Acroma. It was evident that our in the course of these attacks and, in particular, troops holding positions at Gazala were now ten tanks were immobilised. On this day and the in danger of being cut off and accordingly tht following two days, Bostons, at 6,000 to 7,000 withdrawal began of the 1st S.A. Division by feet, bombed the main enemy concentrations, the coast road to Sollum while the 50th Division where the flak was particularly heavy, and the fought its way round Bir Hakim and proceeded fighter-bombers and Hurricane IIDs skirmished to the frontier. on the outskirts. As a result of stubborn ground This withdrawal was covered by R. A. F. resistance and these effective air attacks, a tank fighters for three days and the air supremacy assault on the El Adem area was repulsed. which had been achieved is illustrated by thu -fact that the total losses our retiring troops Fighter Force Stays at Gambut suffered from air attacks were six men only. Although on the 15th June the enemy was held During this time the main road beyond Acroma wherever he attacked, he now had the initiative and through Tobruk eastwards was packed with and was testing for weaknesses in all sectors. vehicles affording perfect targets to aircraft, yet An ominous move was the by-passing of El the enemy did not dare to make determined Adem by enemy armoured units and the infiltra­ attacks. tion eastwards in the Belhamed - El Duda - Sidi Rezegh area. From this time, our landing R.A.F. Full Support grounds at Gambut were constantly threatened All commitments in the battle area continued by enemy forces only twenty miles away and to be met in spite of the diversion from Western no adequate land force could be allotted to Desert operations on 14th and 15th June of air­ ensure their security. Nevertheless, the courage­ craft, including a complete squadron of Kitty- ous decision was made to operate the fighter hawks, to provide protection for a convoy which squadrons from Gambut until the enemy were was en route westwards to Malta. The work practically on the threshold, so that air support of the R.A.F. in this connection is described else­ should not be denied our troops in the El Adem where in the account of air operations in the pro­ "box" and cover could be given to our forces visioning of Malta. retiring from Gazala. This cool risking of the On 14th June, as on the previous day, air fighter force indicated the confidence reposed activity was restricted by sand storms, but at in pilots and ground staffs alike. Indeed, these dusk, when conditions had become better, an considered the conditions ideal, as our air force effective raid was carried out by seven escorted was concentrated, control was close at hand Bostons on enemy forces attacking Acroma and and excellent targets were only a score of miles damage was inflicted on tanks and transport. distant. Morale was never higher and the only The next day, 15th June, the enemy increased fear, which proved unjustified, was that the re­ his pressure on Acroma and renewed his tank arming, refuelling and maintenance personnel and artillery attacks on El Adem. With the would be unable to bear the strain of the tre­ improvement in the weather conditions, the mendous effort now required of them. R.A.F. threw in the full weight of its available Meanwhile, landing grounds were prepared striking force. Bostons and Kittyhawk-bombers, right back to the frontier and a plan for the escorted by Tomahawks, made four bombing at­ steady withdrawal of squadrons, keeping about tacks on the main enemy concentrations threaten­ twenty miles in front of the enemy, had been ing our positions, and smaller concentrations of drawn up and could be implemented at an hour's tanks and armoured cars were also attacked by notice. Hurricane IIDs of No. 6 Squadron and the re­ mainder of the Kittyhawk force. The straffing The Enemy Moves Eastwards attacks of the Hurricane IIDs were timed to On 16th June, the enemy's main armour pushed take place immediately after the bombing by the on eastwards from El Adem and inflicted heavy fighter-bombers. Pilots lost height rapidly some tank losses on our forces at El Duda and Sidi distance from the target and positioned them­ Rezegh. selves so that they could fly straight at the side Our air striking force operated at full pressure of a selected tank at about twenty feet from throughout the day. Bostons and Kittyhawk­ the ground, at a speed of approximately 240 bombers, with fighter-escort, carried out seven miles per hour. Fire was jopened at 700 yards intensive bombing attacks on enemy concentra­ closing to 200 yards; these tactics were employed tions around El Adem and on columns advancing to ensure that a direct hit or penetration into the on Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. Due to success­ tank was made by the 40 mm. shell. The pre­ ful bombing at El Adem, an intended enemy liminary bombing was considered essential as the attack did not materialise, and the devastating dust thrown up by the bombs marked the targets effect of the attacks on enemy armoured units J^^p jf and sub­ cordingly put into force forthwith and the fighter sequently reported by our land forces stationed squadrons moved back to Sidi Azeiz. on high ground in that area. In addition to R.A.F. Achievement, 26th May to 17th June enemy concentrations, a tank repair shop and a suspected headquarters were bombed. Kitty- The 17th June marked a turning point in the hawks and Hurricane IIDs also made conti­ Battle for Egypt. The enemy's land forces nuous attacks on enemy columns and, apart now held full initiative; the VHIth Army was s from the havoc caused to vehicles, at least retreatin g eastwards to positions where a stand ten tanks received direct hits. In the course of could be made; the R.A.F., although having the the day, 59 Boston and over 200 low-flying fighter ascendency over the opposing air forces, was also sorties were carried out. Four Kittyhawks were obliged to withdraw, as the battle for aerodromes destroyed during the day, chiefly by intense anti­ had been lost. aircraft fire, and two Tomahawks engaged Jn The R.A.F. had maintained air superiority and bomber escort duties were shot down in combats. given the fullest close support to the land forces. Patrols were carried out by Spitfires, Hurri­ Twelve squadrons of fighters, each with an canes and Kittyhawks over our troops retiring average serviceability of ten to twelve aircraft, along the coast road towards Tobruk and over and two squadrons of light bombers, each with the El Adem and Sidi Rezegh battle areas. an average serviceability of fifteen aircraft, carri­ There were a number of engagements with ed out nearly 5,000 and 400 sorties respectively. the enemy in which our fighters had the upper The effective work of the fighter-bomber and hand: one JU.88 and two ME.109s were destroy­ Boston attacks has already been described in ed and three ME. 109s probably destroyed against some detail; it is estimated that the fighter- the loss of one Hurricane. bombers, taking full advantage of the lack of Wellingtons, in the continued absence of suit­ adequate protective air cover for the enemy's able night targets in the battle area, continued transport columns, destroyed over 1,000 vehicles the policy of attacking enemy aerodromes, con­ and the Bostons inflicted equal damage, although centrating that night on landing grounds at it is impossible in their case to give a reliable Tmimi where Stukas were known to be based. estimate. On 17th June, the enemy increased his pressure Apart from the damage caused, enemy morale on El Acfrsm and attacks multiplied against was adversely affected by our continuous air El Duda, Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. In spite attacks. The following statements by prisoners of the effective air support described in the of war indicate what was generally felt:— following paragraphs, our land forces were at "British aircraft seemed to do what they liked last obliged to withdraw from these areas and without interruption"; "Troops are at the end a general retreat eastwards began. of their tether owing to the worry of R.A.F. During the morning and afternoon, Bostons, straffing"; "Infantry complain that they, get no with fighter escort, repeatedly bombed the con­ support from their fighters when they are straffed centrations around El Adem and the columns by the R.A.F." Indeed, the VHIth Army Inter­ moving on Belhaimed and Sidi Rezegh, and in rogation Centre, summarising the results of the all 43 effective sorties were carried out, causing questioning of prisoners, began its report:— numerous fires and explosions. "Ground straffing and low level bombing has In the morning, the enemy kept standing apparently had very demoralising effect." patrols of 30 + ME.109s over El Adem and It is significant that not one escorted light Gazalai and this led to a number of engage­ bomber was lost in combat in the course of ments with our bomber escorts and offensive intensive operations, clearly illustrating the patrols. The enemy fighters, chiefly by "jump­ ascendancy achieved by the offensive spirit of ing" tactics, shot down ten of our fighters, in­ our fighters which rendered enemy attacks on cluding five Hurricanes, at the cost of two escorted formations most costly. The enemy's ME.109s and two MC.202s destroyed and another escorted bombers, on the other hand, were at­ ME.109 probably destroyed. A fighter reconnais­ tacked on every possible occasion, and in the sance was carried out to discover from which enemy attacks on Bir Hakim alone, seven raids forward aerodrome the enemy was operating his were intercepted and twenty-three Stukas were fighters. This was established as being at Gazala shot down. and an attack was immediately made on it by 27 Kittyhawk-bombers. Of the twenty ME. 109s Advent of the Heavy Bomber found on the landing ground, fifteen were hit and From June onwards heavy bombers began to two Fieseler-Storch aircraft were also damaged. play an increased part in the bombing of the Axis This raid effectively grounded the enemy's supply ports and enemy shipping in the Mediter­ fighter force for the remainder of the day. ranean. The first Fortress and Liberator sorties It was learnt during the afternoon that the El in the. Middle East had been made as early as Adem "box" had been evacuated by our land November, 1941, but in the course of the follow­ forces some hours previously and that German ing six months few sorties were carried out as tanks were in the immediate neighbourhood of reinforcements were negligible and maintenance Gambut. The R.A.F. it difficulties. In preparation for the ne |^fy^|^ Baltimores of No. 223 an effort was made to reinforce the R.A.F: quWdsron were presented from taking much part Liberators and a new American force, known as in operations owing to carburettor trouble and the " Halverson Detachment," had arrived in difficulties experienced with the rear guns, and Egypt. about twenty day sorties only were carried out After an initial failure, on the night of against enemy aerodromes in Cyrenaica. llth/12th June, when an attempt was made ro Blenheims of No. 14 Squadron could not be bomb the Rumanian oilfields, the American de­ used unescorted over the battle area and their tachment quickly gained operational experience slow speed rendered fighter-escort virtually im­ and gave increasingly valuable aid to the R.A.F. possible; during the second week in June, how­ bomber force. ever, they made nineteen night sorties against From the commencement of the campaign until landing grounds in Crete, as part of the bombing 17th June, the heavy bomber effort against the plan to limit the enemy air effort against ship­ enemy's ports was very limited, only six R.A.F. ping en route westwards to Malta. and nine American effective sorties being carried Hurricane IID Operations out. The effort gradually increased, however, and by the end of the next month appreciable Hurricane IIDs of No. 6 Squadron made about help was consistently given, particularly in the 30 sorties up to the withdrawal from the Gambut bombing of ports out of range of the Wellington landing grounds. 29 tanks were hit of which force. three only went up in flames and one exploded, and many of the other tanks immobilised were The Wellington Effort later recovered by the enemy. It was clear that these special Hurricanes were useful in knocking The close fighting on the battlefield precluded out tanks, but could be regarded only as a sub­ the use of the medium bomber force and their sidiary help in destroying the enemy's armour. night attacks were directed against the enemy's Experience showed that they required strong ports and landing grounds, over 400 sorties being fighter escort and were effective only where flak carried out in the first three weeks of the battle, was not intense; their best employment was mostly with Albacore illumination. against retiring forces as damaged tanks which Attacks were continued against Benghazi, the were repairable, even though hit more than once, principal Axis reinforcing port, and, as a re­ then fell into our hands and were not recoverable sult of 80 effective sorties, ponsiderable damage by the enemy. was done to shipping in the harb»ur and to the docks. Piraeus was^ the only other port at­ Aerial Reconnaissance tacked, and this only on one night, 11/12 June, Valuable aid to the land forces was rendered by when fourteen effective sorties were made in the two tactical reconnaissance squadrons, No. attacks on oil and chemical installations. 208 Squadron and No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. No. 208 Squadron, based at Sidi Azeiz, was al­ The majority of the Wellington sorties were located to 30th Corps and covered the whole of its made against the enemy's landing grounds and front, while one flight was put at the disposal of as a result of determined attacks, compared with 5th Indian Division and operated over the coastal which the Axis' raids seemed mere parodies, the area and the desert as far south as Maddalena enemy's air effort was consistently limited. and west to Bir El Gubi. The battle of Knights- Martuba, the enemy's principal aerodrome in bridge was regularly covered and on 1st June Cyrenaica, against which 99 effective sorties pilots brought back the first intimation that the were made, was most heavily attacked, but the enemy's "Cauldron" forces were being reinforc­ landing grounds at Derna and Tmimi received ed from El Cherima. Bir Hakim was also con­ almost equal attention with 75 and 67 effective tinuously watched and an accurate picture of sorties, respectively. During the second week of the enemy's encirclement of the fort was given June, also, the JU.88 bases in Crete were to 30th Corps through visual and photographic bombed with the object of neutralising the Ger­ reconnaissance. No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F., al­ man air striking force against the important located to 13th Corps, operated from El Adem Malta convoy, a total of 60 effective sorties be­ aerodrome until land operations there necessitat­ ing made against the principal landing grounds ed the withdrawal to Sidi Azeiz. In particular, on the island. enemy lines of communication and dispositions west of Gazala were covered, but assistance was Light Bomber Raids also given to No. 208 Squadron. After the fall In addition to their day bombing of targets in of Bir Hakim, the task of No. 40 Squadron S.A. the battle area, Bostons made successful night A.F. was practically a watching brief to ensure attacks against enemy aerodromes : 36 effective that the enemy's advance to the north-east was sorties were carried out against Derna landing carefully gauged in relation to Tobruk. grounds, fourteen against Tmimi and ten against Strategical reconnaissance was carried out by Martuba. These were the Bostons' first at­ No. 1437 Flight, re-equipped with Baltimores, and tempts at night bombing .west as Sirte was regular- satisfactory. ling of operations was great­ 1. Advent of ike Heavy Bomber.

2. A convoy of JU.52s looking like flies on a window pane unloading at El Gubbi.

3. and 4. As a result of attacks on his landing grounds, the enemy's air effort -was consistently limited. ft I 20th June, no intimation of heavy enemy air at­ Photographic Unit, flying four tacks was received from Support Control co­ Spitfires, which was attached to A.H.Q., Western operating with the South African Division in Desert. T&bruk, and, as this special fighter force could be over the area for a few minutes only, it was Fall of Tobruk employed, shortly after noon, to escort nine Bos­ On 18th June, the position in the Western De­ tons on an attack on enemy concentrations on sert resembled that during the previous No­ the eastern side of the Tobruk defences, where vember. The Vlllth Army was now back on the penetration had taken place. Further attacks frontier line, having left a strong, amply pro­ were made at last light and during the night by visioned garrison at Tobruk, which had been twelve Bostons which, although effective, were reinforced by the troops withdrawn from El able only to cause temporary setbacks to the Adem and Acronva. It had previously been enemy's armoured forces. planned that Tobruk would not be held in the After the fall of Tobruk, it became the object event of an enemy advance, but by 15th June of our land forces to delay the enemy at the fron­ this decision had been changed, as the stocks ac­ tier as long as possible by harassing tactics and cumulated in the port were considerable, the to withdraw the main body of our troops to speedy evacuation of the garrison would be ha­ Mersa Matruh, where strong defences had been zardous, and there was no reason to suppose prepared. that the fortress, which had withstood one pro­ longed siege, could not withstand another, es­ The R.A.F. function in the battle area was to pecially as its resources were now greater. delay the enemy's *dvance, and to enable this ro be done effectively the land forces were to keep It became clear that the enemy had no inten­ the forward landing grounds west of Matruh tion of continuing his push eastwards until the secure to the last possible moment. Meanwhile; stronghold of Tobruk had been reduced, and the medium and heavy bombers continued to during the 18th and 19th June preparations wero make attacks on an ever-increasing scale on the made for launching an attack from the south­ enemy's ports and bases to prevent his reinforce­ east. Attempts were made by certain of our ment at this vital stage, and on his landing mobile units to harass the enemy's flank, but the grounds to hinder his air effort, which was now attrition of our armour during the previous week helped by the acquisition of forward landing rendered these forces too weak for the task. grounds. The enforced withdrawal of the R.A.F. squad­ rons from G-azala had put Tobruk out of range The Enemy's Drive Continues of our fighter aircraft and the garrison had to Once again, the enemy showed incredible speed rely solely on anti-aircraft fire to repel Stuka at­ in reorganising his forces and continuing his ad­ tacks. Efforts were made, however, to limit the vance, and on 21st June advanced units, supported scale of enemy raids by attacks on his landing by armour, approached our frontier defences. For grounds, Baltimores successfully attacking des­ the next two days our land forces fought a rear- persed aircraft at Gazala and Tmimi. The guard action but by 24th June the enemy was light bomber force was now operating from aero­ advancing in strength through the frontier wire. dromes west of Mersa Matruh, having left Ba­ During the morning of 21st June, concentrations heira at first light on 18th June. of tanks and transport were reported on the Sidi Meanwhile, the fighter force covered the with­ Azeiz landing ground and these were attacked drawal of our land forces from Sidi Rezegh at noon by Kittyhawk-bombers and at last light along the Trigh Capuzzo and the coastal road, by nine Bostons; considerable damage was inflict­ operating on 18th June from Sidi Azeiz and ed and several fires were caused. Later in the the following day from landing grounds in the evening another Boston force, operating from Sidi Barrani area, as no protection could be 4,000 to 5,000 feet, bombed motor transport on given to the Sidi Azeiz landing grounds from the Barditw - Tobruk road from Bu Amud to fast moving enemy columns reported near Ba­ Bvr El Bah&vra causing explosions and fires: heira. some of the explosions were of sufficient violence At dawn on 20th June, the enemy attacked to rock the aircraft and one fire was visible for Tobruk on a narrow front south of Sidi Baud thirty miles. Throughout the day, offensive and his armoured forces had almost instantaneous fighter patrols were maintained west of the fron­ success in piercing the main defences; how or why tier to cover the withdrawal of troops to the the garrison succumbed so quickly is not fully Matruh positions but no engagements with ene­ known but Tobruk was almost entirely in enemy my aircraft took place. * hands by last light on the same day the assault That night, nine Liberators of U.S.A.A.F. and was launched. three Wellingtons bombed harbour installations at Although Tobruk was out of range for norm­ Benghazi, causing damage to the Central and al fighter aircraft, the R.A.F. hac Cathedral Moles, and another force of seventeen hawk £A£ Wellingtons effectively attacked the enemy's land­ purpo ing ground in the Gazala area. Also, in order be us to hinder the enemy in his plan for putting the

16 newly won port my Crosses the'Frontier • mines were successfully laid in the harbour by By 24th June, the "VTIIth Army had taken up twelve Albacores of the F.A.A. and again on the positions at Mersa Matruih and mobile forces next night by eight more aircraft. covering the withdrawal of our troops, having The next day, 22nd June, our fighters continued delayed the enemy's progress for a few days their reconnaissances and patrols west of the only, were returning to join the main body. frontier, but once again there were no engage­ Early morning fighter reconnaissances on 24th ments with enemy aircraft. It was evident that June reported the advance %of enemy columns, the advance of the Axis land forces had overtaxed including tanks, across the frontier into Egypt the ability of their air force to keep up with from a point South of Sheferzen. At once them, and it is possible that our timely attack on continuous attacks were made on these vehicles the Gazala landing grounds on 17th June made until after dusk by Bostons, helped by Kitty­ them excessively cautious; at any rate, the enemy hawk-bombers. Bostons made 53 effective sorties air force was moving forward timidly and in and, as the enemy vehicles were massed to­ small numbers. gether at various points, considerable damage At dusk, six Bostons bombed dispersed fighter was inflicted. The most punishing raid was that aircraft on the Baheira landing ground 3 and carried out in the early evening by nine aircraft later on a further force of ten continued their of No. 24 Squadron S.A.A.F. which, operating nightly bombing and straffing of transport on the from 7,000 feet, dropped 18 x 250 1b. and Bardia - Tobruk road. Our principal air ac­ 18 x 500 lb. bombs on transport columns, scoring tivity that night, however, was directed against twenty direct hits and many near misses. Two Tmimi aerodrome, where many fires and explos­ attacks totalling twelve effective sorties were ions-were caused among dispersed aircraft as a also made by Baltimores during the afternoon result of attacks by 39 Wellingtons. and in the second of these five fires were started. Information regarding targets in the battle and Offensive patrols and escort for bombers were forward areas from ground sources was now neg­ provided by the fighter force but there were few ligible and fighter reconnaissance provided the encounters with enemy fighters: one ME.109 and sole basis for planning operations. On the morn­ one G.50 were shot down and another ME.109 ing of 23rd June, suitable targets in the form of was probably destroyed against one fighter lost transport concentrations were established for by us. Bostons and Kittyhawk-bombers west of the fron­ Two Beaufighter squadrons had now been at­ tier between Sidi Omar and Sheferzen and tached to the air striking force from No.201 these were attacked at noon and several other Group and these were emplo.yed for daylight at­ times during the day. Baltimores also made two tacks on enemy columns moving eastward from attacks on these targets, a raid shortly before back areas where fighter defence was unlikely dusk on concentrations at Sheferzen being par­ and later, also, in low-flying attacks against ticularly effective. advanced landing grounds, before adequate anti­ For the fifth day in succession, no enemy air­ aircraft defence had been provided. craft were encountered by fighter patrols oper­ Blenheims of No. 14 Squadron were again avail­ ating west of the frontier. able and these were now employed chiefly for In the evening, Bostons continued their bombing night attacks against the enemy's coastal road of transport on the Trigh Ca(puzzo and one of traffic, beginning on the night 24/25th June with the several fires caused was visible for thirty single attacks on small concentrations of trans­ miles. A few hours later, Wellingtons, having port near Gambut. dealt with Tmimi aerodrome on the previous Last Full-Scale Attack on Benghazi night, now turned their attention to the landing On the night 24/25th June, Wellingtons took "a grounds further east,' carrying out 42 effective final crack" at Benghazi before the relinquish­ sorties against Gazala and three against Gambut. ment of forward landing grounds led to the harbour going out of their range. 63 sorties by R.A.F. Withdraws Further East Wellingtons and 17 by Liberators of No. 159 The remarkable speed of the enemy's advance Squadron and the "Halverson Detachment" were necessitated another re-arrangement of units and made; fires and explosions were caused all round the moving of bomber and fighter squadrons the harbour and railway sidings in the vicinity towards or into the Delta area. A widespread were also attacked. reshuffle of units located there was made in the From 18th to 24th June, when the Axis advance shortest possible time. Some moved further south was most rapid, 105 Wellington and 31 Liberator and others were placed closer together. Advanc­ night sorties were made against the port to pre­ ed landing grounds were now located in the vent the off-loading of supplies intended to help Maati&n Baqush - Fuka area and base landing the enemy in his final break-through to the grounds were dispersed around Amxriya, Burg El Delta. Arab and Wadi Natrun. Medium and heavy bombers remained based in the Suez Canal zone, Advance on. M[atruh except for two Wellington squadrons operating The Matfyfi defences ^consisted basically of from Qotaifiya and Daba. T "b" ^ aii intensive %iS(iefleld ste'rly direction. It had his.way through the inadequately covered area been hoped to delay the enemy at the frontier in the Matruh -minefield. for a considerable time while the Matruh Bostons, acting* in close co-operation with defences could be strengthened, but the swift Kittyhawks, made a record number of 101 sorties advance of the Axis armoured units deprived and the fighter-bombers carried out 178 sorties. our land forces of the expected respite. The Low-flying attacks on tanks and vehicles away Matruh minefield had been laid previously with from the main concentrations were also made by a gap in the middle and this gap had been hur­ Hurricanes IIDs, and enemy transport in the rear riedly closed. It was through this -sparsely mined between Buq Buq and Sidi Barrani was straffed area, north of Hamza, that the enemy pushed by Beaufighters. through with his armoured forces on 26th June. Enemy air activity over the Matruh area Our main forces now gradually retired to the had now increased and our fighters made a Alamein line, while mobile units fought delaying number of interceptions. Hurricanes of No. 213 actions in their rear. Squadron shot down five ME. 109s over Char­ ing Cross, and patrols of Tomahawks, Kitty- R.A.F. Non-Stop Attacks hawks and Hurricanes each intercepted Stuka During the time that the enemy was penetrating attacks at dusk directed against the Matruh our Matruh defences, the R.A.F. struck with " box," shooting down five of the JU.87s and its full might against the advancing columns damaging eight others. Our losses during the and retained air supremacy over the battle area. day were heavy, totalling 12 fighters destroyed, ( including 8 Kittyhawks, and two fighters and Throughout the day, 25th June, escorted four light bombers seriously damaged. Bostons and fighter-bombers made continuous attacks on the enemy columns advancing from The night bombing of the enemy columns from Misheifa towards Matruh. Targets were now Sidi Barrani to Matruh was begun shortly after close at hand and a high-pressure "shuttle dusk by ten Bostons and was continued by service" was operated in an attempt to stem the 27 Wellingtons and seventeen Albacores until an advance of the armoured forces; 71 sorties were hour or so before dawn, some of the last-named carried out by Bostons and 118 by fighter-bomb­ aircraft dropping flares to assist the Wellingtons. ers. Unescorted Baltimores, operating at 17,000 R.A.F. close support the next day, 27th June, to 18,000 feet, bombed large enemy concentrations, was much the same as on the previous day, and Beaufighters ground-straffed the following except that the fighter-bombers were rested in columns which were more widely dispersed, scor­ an effort to build up serviceability. Escorted ing hits on transport vehicles and inflicting Bostons continued their attacks on the enemy casualties on enemy troops. Beaufighters and columns south-west of Matruh and Beaufigh­ Hurricanes also shot up aircraft on the landing- ters straffed road traffic between Matruh grounds at Sidi Barrani, which the enemy was and Bardia, putting out of action about 40 attempting to put into commission as advanced vehicles and causing much confusion and panic. landing grounds for his fighter aircraft. That night, the bombing of the enemy con­ As the enemy vehicles were now closely pack­ centrations now almost encircling Matruh was ed, our medium bombers could at last be put on carried on with greater vehemence than ever, the to battlefield targets and the non-stop bombing closely packed vehicles and tanks affording of the Axis columns continued throughout the splendid targets for Wellingtons, which made night. Wellingtons, helped by Albacore illu­ 63 effective sorties in the Matruh area, helped mination, made 36 effective sorties against tanks by Albacore illumination. In the enemy's rear, and transport, causing numerous fires and ex­ the Axis following columns stretching for miles plosions. In addition to the main effort of the westward were attacked by nine Liberators of medium bombers, eight Albacores dive-bombed No. 159 Squadron, and the group of landing forward columns, nine Bostons attacked the main grounds at Sidi Barrani were bombed by eleven concentrations, and nine Blenheims of No. 14 Wellingtons and twenty Bostons. Squadron continued their nightly bombing of the coastal road traffic. Matruh " Box " Surrounded By 28th June, the main forces of the Vinth In spite of this preoccupation in the battle Army had retired to the Alamein line, the with­ area, the need for constantly hindering the drawal being covered by mobile units, help­ enemy's accumulation of supplies was not lost ed by the non-stop R.A.F. bombing which im­ sight of. It was learnt that the enemy was al­ peded the enemy's advance, and protected from ready bringing Tobruk into use as a reinforcing air attacks by strong fighter patrols. The 10th port, and so that night, 25/26 June, seven Libe­ Corps units surrounded in the Matruh "box" rators were despatched to bomb the harbour were now ordered to fight their way out to the jetties, and continued their attacks for the next south-east which they proceeded to do with few nights. magnificent courage, assisted by the 7th Motor­ On 26th June, the R.A.F. attacks on enemy ised Brigade which turned back to help them. columns south-west of Matruh In order to protect this retreat on the 29th June, with e a fighter wing was retained at an aerodrome in the Daba area in spite ontinued by eighteen heavy and nine medium columns were east of Fukl bombers. from the landing ground, wJ idequate­ On the eve of the enemy attack, 30th June, ly protected. the light bomber force again went into action against the advancing enemy columns, concen­ Final Withdrawal of B.A.F. Squadrons trating particularly on tanks and vehicles in the From the time the enemy crossed the frontier area south of Daba. Bostons made 46 effective on 24th June, the R.A.F. withdrawal was speed­ sorties and Baltimores, whose "teething troubles" ed up as the advance of the Axis columns was were now practically over, made seventeen. Dust practically unchecked. By 30th June, the dis­ storms prevented the full observation of results, position of squadrons had been completed in but numerous fires were seen. Beaufighters readiness for the decisive battle.to be fought at attacked transport vehicles in the Fuka area Alamem. The squadrons concerned with opera­ but, in general, weather conditions were un­ tions in the battle area and in the enemy's rear favourable for low-flying ground attacks. were now located as follows: fighters were By this time, the enemy had brought forward based near Heliopolis<, H\elwam, and at a point a strong force of fighters and Stukas to Fuka, ten miles south-west of Cairo, with operational and an advanced landing ground for fighter air­ bases in the Amiriya area; light bombers had craft was established at Daba. On the 30th bases in the Sues; Canal zone with advanced June, however, and for part of the following two landing grounds south-west of Amiriya; medium days, sand storms which were more prevalent in bombers had withdrawn to aerodromes in Pales­ the above mentioned areas than at Amiriya tine, with operational bases in the Sues; Canal grounded the enemy's forward-based aircraft. zone; the heavy bombers were now located On the night 30th June/lst July, these forward entirely in Palestine. landing grounds, and enemy concentrations in The successive withdrawals culminating in the the vicinity, were bombed by Wellingtons, Blen­ locations as given above were carried out smooth­ heims and Albacores, a total of 38 medium and ly and accompanied by the systematic destruction 28 light bomber effective sorties being made. To of material where this could not be taken away. limit the long-range bomber effort, also, JU.88 Aircraft operated until the last minute, often bases in Crete were attacked by 24 medium attacking enemy units until they were within bombers. twelve miles of the landing ground. Due to the Attack on Alamein thorough work of the Repair and Salvage Units, all damaged aircraft were salvaged except five By 1st July, our land forces had taken up their which were burnt on the ground on the approach positions on the Alamein line. This defended of the enemy forces. line, beginning- at the village of El Alamein on Arabs Gulf, extended south-south-west across The full value of this work will be understood Ruweisat Ridge 35 miles to the north-eastern when it is remembered that the enemy in his tip of the impassable Qattara Depression. The retreat in the winter of 1941 had abandoned over defences included three strong points: El Ala­ 200 aircraft on his deserted aerodromes, many mein, a fortified central point, and a strongly of which were only slightly damaged. In spite defended southern section north-east of the of our repeated moves and often unfavourable Qattara Depression. In front of the positions, conditions, serviceability of aircraft was not only and harassing the enemy's right flank, were our maintained at a high level but the percentage motorised forces, but our main armour was with­ of serviceability in relation to strength actually drawn behind the line to act as a mobile reserve. rose; for example, this percentage for single­ The battle opened on the morning of 1st July engined fighters rose from 67 per cent, for the with an attack close to El Alamein by Ger­ first week of the campaign to 84.8 per cent, for man and Italian units supported by tanks, but the last week in June. this was repulsed. In the afternoon, German Prelude to Attack on Alamein armoured forces by-passed our central position and attacked it from the rear. This attack was R.A.F. activity on 28th and 29th June was on also repulsed and our armour engaged the enemy a reduced scale, due to the final withdrawal of and forced him to withdraw. squadrons to new locations, which was then tak­ Early information was vital for.the rapid em­ ing place, and also the need to build up service-' ployment of our air forces but little could be ability in readiness for the imminent Alamein learnt from our forward formations and opera­ battle. Small fighter patrols were maintained tions were planned solely on air reconnaissance. over the battle area, but bombing operations there were confined almost exclusively to night at­ The light bomber "shuttle service" again came tacks, Wellingtons on the night 29/30th June car­ into operation against the enemy columns, rying out 36 offective sorties on enemy columns particularly against those attacking the northern between Sidi Barrani and Fuka. In addition, end of the Alamein line during the morning. the Sidi Barramd landing grounds were heavily In spite of a four-hour hold-up in the afternoon attacked on the two nights by light and medium due to dust storms, over 100 bomber and an equal bombers and attacks on the port of Tobn ' number of low-flying fighter attacks were made. A i BATTLE AREA OCTOBER The high light of the day, h StftggTe>"Tor the Nile Valley " vastating attack by BeaufightdW^oTnhe^gfoup uf landing grounds at Sidi Barrani, in which The enemy made two major attacks on 3rd July four JU.87s, one ME.109 and one ME.110 were and both were held and subsequently repulsed. destroyed and ten more Stukas and three other An attack in the morning in the southern sector, aircraft were damaged. made chiefly by Italian forces supported by tanks and artillery, was routed by New Zealand troops Offensive fighter patrols, now helped by a who captured 200 prisoners, 28 guns and over second Spitfire squadron, were maintained over 100 vehicles. The thrust eastwards against our the forward battle areas when weather conditions position on a ridge ten miles south of Alamein made them possible, but the enemy's fighter force by German units, strongly supported by armour was grounded through dust storms for the great­ and guns, was checked by our 1st Armoured er part of the day and very few engagements Division and artillery and the enemy was forced occurred. to retire to the north-west. The entire Wellington force 'of seven squadrons, The outstanding R.A.F. effort on this day, aided by Albacore tiare-dropping, was that night made possible by ideal flying conditions, con­ put on to targets in the battle and forward tributed greatly to the enemy's failure by well- areas. The majority of the medium bombers at­ timed attacks on his tanks and vehicles and the tacked the enemy concentrations menacing the upsetting of his dive-bombing programme. nortnern and central sectors of the Alamein A record number of light bomber and fighter- front, inflicting widespread damage and again bomber attacks, totalling over 300 effective denying rest to the enemy's battle-weary troops; sorties, was made, principally against enemy the remaining Wellingtons bombed the enemy's forces in the northern and central sectors, and advanced landing grounds at b'uk,a and the rail­ some indication of the extensive destruction way at Daba. Anti-aircraft fire from the enemy's caused is given by the fact that over fifty fires concentrations was now intense and two Wel­ were started among vehicle concentrations and lingtons were shot down and three badly holed. gun positions. The next day, 2nd July, enemy armoured units The fighter effort was the greatest since the overran our cencral position but our armour ul­ opening of the campaign: 219 sorties were carri­ timately forced them to retire to the north-west; ed out on bomber and fighter-bomber escort an attack in the northern sector which developed duties, IV 3 on tighter-bomber and ground-straff­ in the afternoon was also repulsed by last lignt. ing attacks, and 159 on offensive patrols. Meanwhile, our land forces in the southern sector The enemy air forces now attempted to give began an outflanking movement towards the belated support to their tired troops and to north-west. hinder our bombing effort, but received a mauling from our fighters. Kittyhawks and Tomahawks Air support for our land forces in the escorting light bombers had four engagements northern and central positions was continuous with enemy fighters, shooting down an ME.109 throughout the day, except for an enforced break and an ME.110 at the expense of two aircraft in the afternoon due to low cloud. Combined damaged, and Kittyhawks engaged on low-flying sorties by light bombers and lignter-zbomoers ground attacks, on being engaged by German and again exceeded 200 and, in particular, two heavy Italian fighters, shot down two of them for the raids in the evening helped our tioops to repel cost of one aircraft damaged. Five Hurricane the enemy's attack in tne north. Beaufighters squadrons, aided by Spitfires and Kittyhawks, were again employed on shooting up dispersed patrolled the battle area the entire day and suc­ aircraft on the enemy's advanced landmg ceeded in intercepting three out of five Stuka grounds, but increased fighter opposition pre­ attacks. The most spectacular "Stuka party" vented a repetition of the previous day's success; was that of No. 1 Squadron S.A.A.F. This an early morning attack on the enemy's fighter squadron, with No. 274 as top cover, was on a landing ground at Daoa was prevented by an sweep over Alamein at 19.000 hours when the enemy fighter patrol, and an attack on the aero­ .formation suddenly encountered fifteen JU.87s, drome at x'uka, although moderately successful, escorted by about twenty M.E.109s. The Stukas proved expensive as two of our aircraft were jettisoned all bombs on sighting the Hurricanes shot down and a third was seriously damaged. and then dived down on to the " deck," where The enemy columns which had withdrawn they weaved and jinked in a desperate effort to elude the attackers. The squadron leader of No.1 westwards after the failure of their attacks, and Squadron, having shot down a Stuka in the first other concentrations in the rear stretching back few seconds, stayed above the combats and to Daba, were attacked throughout the night directed operations by R/T, while No. 274 Squad­ by the entire Wellington force. Numerous direct ron kept the enemy's top cover of ME. 109s hits were registered on vehicles, including tanks, engaged. Fourteen of the fifteen JU.87s were and many fires and explosions resulted; in the destroyed without loss to No. 1 Squadron, and Daba area, one of the explosions shook a Well­ one fighter was also shot down: our casualties ington flying at 6,000 feet ten miles away, and were one Hurricane of No. 274 Squadron damag­ smoke from the larger fires started rose to 7,000 ed. In other engagements, three JU.87s and four feet.

21 ^^Wfc three destroyed and four Kittyhawks and three Hur­ ere probably destroyed, and four ricanes badly damaged. JU.87s, five ME.109s and two MC.202s damaged. Our casualties for the day were eight Hurricanes The Enemy's Difficulties destroyed, three Hurricanes and two Kittyhawks The impetus of the enemy's advance had been badly damaged and a number of other aircraft checked: thereafter, land attacks were launch­ slightly damaged. ed by both sides from fortified positions t« probe Beaufighters also added to the destruction for weaknesses which might be exploited, but of the enemy's air force by the successful straff­ the much-advertised triumphant march to the ing of landing grounds at Si<$i Barmni, des­ Delta had taken its due place among historical troying four ME.109s, one S.79, and damaging might-have-beens. six other ME.109s. The enemy was now beset with the difficulties The VIHth Army daily signal to London attendant on supplying an army with land lines summed up the 3rd July as "a satisfactory day of communication stretching 600 miles to the much helped by the splendid work of the R.A.F." west and an army, moreover, which was in im­ The devastating bombing was continued mediate need of reinforcement in men and equip­ throughout the night by the entire medium bomb­ ment. Matruh and, above all, Tobruk were er force, supplemented by Albacores, Blenheims now brought into use as reinforcing posts, and and two Fortresses. Enemy concentrations and these became our objectives in ever-increasing communications from Alamein to Matruh were bombing raids. Meanwhile, air attacks on the heavily attacked, the most striking features of enemy's concentrations in the battle area and on the night's activity being the blowing up of an landing grounds continued, and our ascendancy ammunition train near Daba and an attack on in the air remained unquestioned. a tank repair depot east of Matruh, which caused Probing of Defences explosions and fires with smoke rising to 1,000 feet. After the failure on his major attack against the Alamedn line on 4th July, the main enemy The Axis Checked force moved southwards with the object of clos­ ing the right flank and establishing suitable The 4th July proved to be the turning point of positions for operations against our southern the battle. Fighting was resumed by the arm­ sector. The reaction of our land forces to this oured forces of either side in the northern sector move was an attack westwards on 9th July from and our armour, now reinforced, and helped by the Alamein area, which forced the enemy to the well-directed bombing attacks of the R.A.F., rush up forces to counter it. These enemy units forced the enemy to retire to the west. A sub­ then attempted to cut off our advanced troops sidiary cause of the enemy's withdrawal was the by a frontal attack on Alamein which began fear of being enveloped by the movement of our on 13th July : this, however, was soon checked forces moving west from the southern sector. by our land forces, backed up by effective air During the day, about twenty German tanks support. were knocked out by our armour and 600 Ger­ From 4th July onwards, it became increasing­ mans, suffering from exhaustion and lack of ly clear that the VHIth Army had recovered its sleep, surrendered with an alacrity which indi­ resilience and had the situation well in hand. cated that the enemy troops were nearing the All evidence pointed to the effectiveness of in­ end of their tether. tensive 24-hour bombing in reducing the enemy's On this critical day, the air effort was main­ resistance and will to fight and consequently the tained at its full intensity. The combined light R.A.F. bombers carried on at full pressure until bomber and fighter-bomber effective sorties the night of 6/7th July, after which, owing to totalled approximately 200, and their consistent the dispersal of the enemy's vehicles, suitable attacks on the enemy's armoured forces closing targets for a while became scarce, particularly in on the Alamein "box" contributed greatly for our night bombers. From the evening of to the enemy's decision to withdraw to the west. 4/5th July to the evening of 6/7th July, Bostons In the enemy's rear, fighter-bombers also at­ and Baltimores made approximately 190 day tacked his fighter landing ground at Daba, and sorties against enemy concentrations in the Beaufighters shot up lorries filled with troops, battle area and Wellingtons carried, out 176 putting out of action about 50 of these vehicles sorties, aided by 57 sorties made by Albacores and straffing the occupants. and Blenheims. Six Hurricane squadrons, stiffened by Spitfires Captured letters seldom failed to dilate on the and Kittyhawks, carried out over 180 sorties on hell dealt out by our bombing and ground-straff­ offensive patrols and intercepted three fighter ing and the commander of at least one Italian sweeps and two Stuka attacks, the day's. bag corps found it necessary to issue a special order consisting of three Stukas, three ME.109s and exhorting his troops to endure what he optimist­ one MC.202 destroyed, four Stukas and six fight­ ically described as "the enemy's momentary ers probably destroyed and six more aircraft superiority in aviation." damaged. Our total losses for the day were four With the wider dispersal of the enemy's Hurricanes, two Kittyhawks and one Beaufighter vehicles, the Boston and Baltimore effort return- SSINEO 22 ed to normal, but the consequent r le main reasons for inducing the concentrated anti-aircraft fire favourfgp'fTgmef^ enemy to abandon his attack. bomber activity, which continued at fun pressure. From 5th to 16th July, fighter-bombers carried Local Initiative Passes to Vinth Army out 1,321 effective sorties, iauing to exceed the By the 17th July, the German land forces were 100 mark on three days only, wnen weatner con­ seriously depleted and many units were reduced ditions were unfavourable. Dawn to dusK attacks to as little as 25% of their establishment. Re­ were made on transport columns and gun em­ inforcement of personnel was proceeding rapidly, placements by the Murricane-bomber squadron however, helped by the employment of transport and live Kittyhawk squadrons, which had now aircrart from Crete, and as many as 1.0U0 men been fitted wicn bomb racKs. were brought over in a single day. It may be Tne eitort was particularly intense on 9th and noted that these JU.52s did not always enjoy an 10th Juiy, wnen our land torces were making uninterrupted passage, a case in point being the their advance in tne nortnern sector and irom successful interception by Beautighcers on 11th 13th to ltsth July wnen tne fullest support was July. On that day, aircraft of Nos. 252 and 272 given to our troops countering the enemy's Squadrons, on orrensive reconnaissance off the irontal attacK directed against our Aiamein posi­ coast north of Tobruk, encountered about 25 tions. southbound JU.52s full of troops: three of the On 9th July, the fighter-bombers made 140 ef­ troop carriers were shot down, one was probably fective sorties in attacKs on enemy tanks and destroyed and at least ten damaged. supply coiumns in tne Atomem aiea, but the More serious than the depletion of his man­ enemy, tearing a repetition of tne destruction power, however, were the enemy's losses in tanks, caused by our attacks wnen his venicies were and it was estimated that he had 50 only, al­ concentrated, was keeping his transport wen though these were, in general, superior in per­ dispersed. Unly two reaiiy good targets were formance to the English types. To add to tnese located, consisting or a suppiy column oi 2,uuO troubles, the moraie of tne Italian troops was dispersed venicies and a group or ouu lomes ; now at its nadir and their surrendering was be­ tnese were enectiveiy bomoed and at least 5u coming a " tactical rule." On the asset side, venicies were destroyed. Tne next day, over 100 however, the Axis retained a superiority in artil­ rignter-bomoer sorties were carried out in the lery and anti-tank guns. same area and, in addition to tne destruction Un the nignt 2lsc/22nd July, our land forces, of transport, successrui attacks were made on intending to exploit the enemy's temporary weak­ enemy gun emplacements. ness, began a general attack on the whole front, From the 13tn to ltitn July, inclusive, the lignt which was preceded by heavy artillery and air bomber " shuttle service" again came into bombardment. During the night, Wellingtons operation and tignter-bombers made a supreme made 48 and Albacores 27 efrective sorties in enort as tne enemy attempted to pierce our attacks against enemy tanks and transport vehicles: tour direct hits were scored on a group northern derences. of tanks, an ammunition lorry was blown up, As the enemy concentrated his forces, targets numerous vehicles were put out of action, and were again pientirui tor tne Bostons and Baici­ among the many fires started, three appeared to mores and in tne tour days tney carried out 2b0 be petrol burning. Our land forces made con­ sorties. Six attacKs, comprising »Y sorties, made siderable progress, capturing Tel hli htisa in on 14th July were especially destructive, many the north, advancing along the Ruweisat RtriLge in enemy vehicles being immobilised and seven tires the Central sector, and reaching Ml Taqa plateau started. ttven greacer havoc, however, was in the south. wrougnt by the fignter-bomber force wnich aver­ The next day, 22nd July, escorted light bomb­ aged l«0 sorties on each of the four days in ers made five attacks on enemy columns in tne question, co-operating with Hurricane IiDs on northern and central sectors, Bostons carrying three of the days. The 15th July may be taken out 53, and Baltimores, which had now been re­ as indicative of the scope of the raids. Con­ inforced by a second squadron, making 24 effect­ centrated attacks were made on the enemy's ive sorties. Fighter - bombers also operated armour; in one attack, direct hits were scored at full intensity, carrying out over 120 effective on several tanks and one burst into flames, and sorties, principally in the same areas as the light in another attack a number of 500 lb. bombs bombers. One attack in the northern sector was were dropped among several groups each con­ made immediately before an attack by our land sisting of fifteen tanks. Other attacks were forces, and in the southern sector enemy artil­ directed against concentrations of transport lery which was holding up the advance of our vehicles and in one attack alone fourteen large troops was also successfully bombed. These at­ lorries were destroyed. In addition, an enemy tacks, which caused widespread destruction, were headquarters in the battle area was twice bomb­ made at the cost of three Kittyhaws destroyed ed and forced to move, at least one direct hit and one seriously damaged. being scoied on a group of three trailers. The intensive bombing of the enemy's trans­ The continuous bombing and straffing, helped port and supply dumps in the battle area was continued throughout the night_by 4j2 Welling­ by effective dive-bombing at night by Albacores, - cons, aided by 34 Albacpres. Tne attacks were, Daba, the need for retaining air supremacy be­ particularly successful; many direct hits were came increasingly vital and that this was achi­ scored on vehicles of all types, thiee petrol eved was freely admitted even by the enemy. bowsers were seen to go up in flames, and the During the period 5th to 28th July, R.A.F. last aircraft to leave the scene observed fifteen fighters carried out a total of 9,460 sorties, 87% fires burning, the smoke rising to 2,000 feet. of these being made over the battlefield and for­ The battle continued during the 23rd July, but ward areas. by the end of the day our forces, in general, had 2,174 sorties were made on low-flying attacks withdrawn to their original positions; in the and 1,470 on bomber and fighter-bomber escort northern and central sectors our armour was duties: the effect of the ground attacks in the checked by the enemy's anti-tank guns and in battle area has already been indicated, and the the south stony ground had prevented our troops success of our escorting fighters is shown by the digging in to consolidate the positions won. fact that one escorted light bomber only was Escorted light bombers made three 'morning shot down in combat during the entire campaign. attacks on about 500 vehicles, including tank The principal part of the fighter effort during carriers north of the central sector, immobilising the twenty-four days in question was directed to 25 vehicles and causing five fires, and in the offensive patrols, 4,298 sorties being carried out southern sector transport and gun emplacements on this activity. As a result of combats arising were effectively bombed. Fighter-bombers made from interceptions at least 44 bombers were shot 73 sorties in the course of the day, helping our down and an equal number probably destroyed withdrawing troops by attacks on enemy posi­ or damaged, and fighter losses were estimated ut tions, transport and gun emplacements. 53 destroyed, 32 probably destroyed and 80 dam­ For the next few days, the wide dispersal of aged. , Our fighter losses were 73 destroyed and vehicles in the battle area limited the scope of 45 seriously damaged. our day bombing, but a proportion of the Welling­ Offensive patrols and sweeps were particularly ton force, helped by Albacores, made nightly active on the 10th and 11th July, the 13th to 16th attacks on rear concentrations south-east of July inclusive, the 22nd to 24th July inclusive Daou, making 77 effective sorties in the four and on the 27th July. nights 24/25th to 27/28th July. On the 10th July, aircraft drawn from nine During the night 26/27th July, our land forces Hurricane squadrons, supplemented by Spit­ resumed their offensive, making some progress fire, Kittyhawk and Tomahawk squadrons, made in the north and in the' central sector. The a record total of 373 sorties covering our troops enemy's minefields and artillery, however, proved making their advance westwards in the northern to be more formidable than expected and on the sector. Six engagements occurred with enemy 27th July our troops were obliged to return vo aircraft, as a result of which two large form­ their original positions. ations of enemy bombers and dive-bombers, During the morning of the 27th July, escorted heavily escorted by fighters, were forced to jet­ Baltimores and Bostons made 30 sorties, bombing tison their bombs; three ME.109s, one MC.202 transport vehicles and enemy positions in the and two CR.42s were shot down, five ME.109s northern sector in support of our troops, and and one MC.202 probably destroyed, and twelve these objectives were also bombed by four other fighters damaged. We lost four Hur­ squadrons of Kittyhawks. Later in the day also, ricanes. On the next day, 11th July, our fighters enemy tanks and gun emplacements were attack­ continued their task of providing cover for our ed by further Kittyhawk-bombers, and the land forces, carrying out 302 sorties on offensive bombing was reported by our advanced troops patrols, but there were few engagements with to have been very effective. escorted formations of enemy bombers, and three escorting ME.109s only were shot down. Stalemate at Alamein In the course of the four days 13th to 16th By the 28th July, it was evident that neither July inclusive, 1,088 sorties were made by Hur­ side was sufficiently strong to deliver a knock­ ricanes, Kittyhawks and Spitfires on offensive out blow to the other and each required a sweeps planned to intercept enemy formations breathing spell in order to accumulate the men, which sporadically attempted to give close sup­ material and supplies necessary for the re­ port to the enemy land forces in their frontal sumption of full-scale operations. attack on our northern positions. The results The R.A.F., by its non-stop bombing in the achieved on the 16th July were especially good: battle area, had played a major part in the ar­ several bomber formations were intercepted and resting of the Axis advance and had afforded two JU.87s, one JU.88 , and two ME. 109s shot support to our land forces in their attempts to down, three ME.109s probably destroyed, and launch counter-attacks. seven JU.87s and one ME.109 damaged, for the loss of two Hurricanes. R.A.F. Fighter Effort, 5th to 28th July Although patrols were maintained over the There had been no slackening of the R.A.F. battle and forward areas on the days 22nd v.o fighter effort as the Alamein line became stabi­ 24th and on the 27th July, when our- land forces lised. In fact, with the enemy gradually con­ were launching counter-attacks, over 150 sorties centrating his air striking force at Fuka and being made on offensive sweeps on each of the

24 days in question, relatively few combats n WWrounds m tne place. This was due to the fact that the en s on the nights 24/25th air effort was now reduced, partly owing tv, and 25/26th July bombed aerodromes at Herak­ successful attacks on his aerodromes and partly lion, Crete, in order to limit the enemy long- to his need for building up serviceability. range bomber activity. As a result of these well-planned raids on his Attacks on Enemy Landing Grounds landing grounds (it was estimated that about 40 As the Alamein line became stabilised, the aircraft were destroyed and many more damaged) enemy air forces gradually caught up with their the enemy's power to support land operations with land forces, establishing operational bases in the air attacks was limited and his chance of disput­ forward area, particularly at Fuka and Daba. ing our air ascendancy was constantly reduced. These landing grounds became the objective of ever-increasing R.A.F. attacks. Bombing of Enemy Ports and Bases From 5th-14th July, before anti-aircraft pro­ As soon as the enemy had been halted at Ala­ tection was too formidable, constant attacks mein, the interruption of his supplies both at on the enemy's advanced landing grounds at sea and in port, which had never been neglected Daba were made by Kittyhawk-bombers. On 5th even when commitments in the battle area were July, fighter-bombers, using cloud cover, put out most exacting, became the main pre-occupation of of action six JU.88s, nine JU.87s and seven ME. the long-range bomber force. From 5th to 28th 109s on-the Daba landing • grounds. The next July, 187 heavy, 806 medium and 97 light bomber day, a force of Kittyhawk-bombers, co-operat­ effective sorties were carried out against enemy ing with eleven escorted Bostons, made another bases and harbours. attack destroying one ME.109 and one HE.Ill Benghazi was now out of range for Welling- and damaging four JU.88s, one HE.lll and over tons carrying an effective load, but in the 24 days ten ME.109s. Two days later, on 8th July, 32 under review, Liberators of No. 159 Squadron and Kittyhawk-bombers made a further successful U.S.A.A.F. made 56 effective sorties against the surprise attack at noon against two landing port and caused considerable damage to docks grounds in the same area. On one landing ground and shipping in the harbour. The smallness of a large fire was started among ten ME.109s, the Middle East heavy bomber force, how­ which were refuelling, a JU.87 was destroyed by a ever, precluded any possibility of actually closing direct hit and three JU.88s were damaged. On the port. 10th July, also, repeated Kittyhawk-bomber at­ Immediately after the capture of Tobruk on tacks were made on the Daba landing grounds 20th June, the port was put into use for the off- in order to limit the enemy air effort against loading of Axis supplies, and, owing to its ample our troops launching their counter-attacks, and harbour facilities and not too formidable distance the aircraft damaged on the ground included four from the front, it rapidly became the enemy's dive-bombers. principal reinforcing port and, in consequence, the During the second fortnight in July, light and predominant target of our long-range bombers. medium bomber activity against enemy landing From 5th to 28th July, heavy bombers made 112 grounds increased as the enemy's squadrons be­ and medium bombers 798 effective sorties in at­ came firmly established in the forward area. tacks against Tobruk, all of which except for 31 heavy bomber sorties were made at night. On Experience showed that night bombing, in­ the night of 17/18th July, the Wellington effort cluding the dropping of delayed-action bombs rose to 50 effective sorties and on four other oc­ and spikes, followed up by early morning at­ casions the medium bombers exceeded the 40 tacks on the next day, was the most effective mark. The raid on the night 20/21st July may be form of attack. During the night 23/24th July, taken as a typical example. Eight Halifaxes and for example, 30 Wellingtons aided by 12 Bostons twenty-nine Wellingtons co-operated in this at­ bombed the two main Daba landing grounds, tack on shipping and harbour installations; one scoring direct hits on aircraft and causing firea ship was set on fire by a direct hit and several and explosions, and this attack was succeeded by fires accompanied by violent explosions broke two more raids the next morning by 12 Balti­ out on a jetty and along the entire water front; mores and 18 Bostons, escorted by Kittyhawks in-addition, five of, the Wellingtons laid mines and Tomahawks, and 30 Kittyhawk-bombers. As a in the harbour. result of bombing, direct hits were scored on dis­ persed aircraft, fires were started among several Matruh harbour, which was being used as other groups, and two aircraft which attempted an advanced reinforcement port, was also at­ to take off during the raid crashed. When the tacked as the occasion demanded, and shipping, dust had cleared, the Kittyhawks machine-gunned jetties, dumps and tank repair shops in the vicin­ one landing ground from a low height, damaging ity became the objects of night attacks by light 21 more aircraft. In addition, the Kittyhawks, bombers. In all, 97 effective sorties were carried before releasing their bombs, shot down two JU. out against the port and other targets in the area. 88s and one ME.109 over the landing ground. The The R.A.F. attacks on the enemy's reinforce­ effect of the raid was apparent the next day when ment ports were continued on an even greater enemy activity was on a greatly reduced scale. scale during the succeeding month, and the date for the resMptUft aPfh^lfis*6ffensiVB WHs cons­ When the battle was mobile and protection was tantly postponed due to the failure to accumulate afforded to the enemy columns by dispersal and the necessary supplies. movement, air attacks, particularly by fighter- bombers, which proved more effective and eco­ Development of the Air Arm nomical than the enemy's dive-bombers, were de­ vastating but not decisive. When, however, the Any lingering idea that the R.A.F. was simply a enemy's forces were concentrated before our useful adjunct of the land forces, capable of ren­ Alamein positions, the R.A.F's non-stop bomb­ dering help at given times in restricted areas r>f ing proved a decisive factor in the stemming of the battlefield, was finally swept away. the enemy's advance. From 20th May, a week before the opening of In the enemy's rear, moreover, the air arm the land offensive until 28th July, when the Ala­ reached out to destroy supplies on the sea and mein line was stabilised, R.A.F. bombers carried at the ports and struck at the enemy's aircraft out nearly 7,000 and fighters nearly 20,000 ef­ at their bases. fective sorties against targets in the Western In spite of these tasks, sight was never lost of Desert and Cyrernaica. the need for maintaining air superiority.

THE SECOND PHASE • THE REINFORCEMENT RACE 29lh July -30th August

THE ENEMY REALISED that the longer the own, the R.A.F. had a full part to play. In co­ stalemate at Alamein continued, the better or­ operation with the Royal Navy, attacks were ganized and reinforced the Vlllth Army would made on enemy shipping and protection was become. Accordingly, the Axis land forces con­ given -to our own vessels: these operations in the centrated on strengthening their forward positions Eastern Mediterranean are considered separately in order to withstand any surprise counter-attack elsewhere in this Review. On the mainland, and, in the meantime, every effort was made lo the bombing of the Axis 3upply ports continued remedy deficiencies in men, material and supplies with increased vehemence and constant attacks in readiness for the resumption of their offensive. were carried out on the enemy's land lines of The greatest difficulty which the enemy had to communication. overcome was that of transportation which in­ In addition to the considerations indicated in volved the keeping open of his Mediterranean the preceding paragraph, the skilful handling of shipping routes and the maintenance of lines of the fighter force and well-planned attacks on communications stretching westwards to Ben­ enemy aerodromes were ever necessary to retain ghazi. Shipping was supplemented by the use air superiority, and close support to the land for­ of air transport from Europe via Crete to To­ ces was given whenever the opportunity arose. bruk, with a feeder-line running to Matruh and later as far as Fuka. To obviate the difficulties Increased Strength of the R.A.F. of transporting supplies from Benghazi, Tobruk On 29th July, the strength of R.A.F. operational was used on an ever-increasing scale and traffic aircraft in Egypt and the Western Desert (in­ with "F" boats was developed along the coast cluding the Fleet Air Arm) totalled over 900, westwards to Matruh. In addition, captured representing, in spite of the previous two months' motor transport had been pressed into service battle wastage, an increase of more than 50 air­ and the desert railway was brought into use craft since the commencement of the campaign. again early in August. The light bomber force had been greatly strength­ During this quiescent phase in the ground ened by the introduction of more Baltimores and fighting, our land forces maintained the initiative the withdrawal of the outmoded Blenheims; the in local activity but weakness in armour limited fighter force, however, was still depleted and, in the extent of their offensive operations. In the particular, was low in Kittyhawk strength while meantime, while reinforcing went on a pace, depth the Spitfires still constituted merely a token was given to the defences in the rear of the Ala­ force. mein front; in particular, the defence covering During the next month, aircraft reinforcing Alexandria was vested in an independent for­ continued at a steady rate. Between 29th July mation, the Delta Force; defensive positions were and 26th August, 181 bomber and 254 fighter air­ prepared at Wadi Natrun, and the Mena de­ craft arrived in the Middle East for disposal fences were undertaken by British Troops in as the need arose. The principal bomber rein­ Egypt. In short, until the building-up of the land forcements consisted of Bostons and Wellingtons, forces was completed the VTIIth Army was and among the fighter aircraft Hurricane Us prepared for a defensive battle. predominated. The number of new and recon­ To fulfil our fixed purpose of hindering the ditioned aircraft actually issued to squadrons enemy's reinforcement while continuing from the maintenance units totalled 149 bombers and 335 fighters: the principal bombe landing grounds were 60 Baltimores, 24 Wellingtons and theT itfesfT'beTw'een ~Cak-o and Wadi Natrun, tons, and the fighter aircraft included 145 Hur­ were also brought into use. ricane IIs, 85 Kittyhawks and 47 Spitfires. Tobruk, the chief Axis supply port, was with­ The strength of the bomber force gave few- in handy range and received nightly visits from grounds for worry. The small force of R.A.F. large formations of bombers. During the phase and U.S.A.A.F. Liberators was valuable for long- under review, 1,200 medium and 245 heavy range bombing and Halifaxes arrived in the Com­ bomber effective sorties were made against the mand on 8th July and began operations almost port. These attacks on Tobruk, coupled with the immediately; but it was realised that the im­ Royal Navy and R.A.F. attacks on shipping, mediate building-up of a large heavy bomber force hindered the enemy's accumulation of supplies in the Middle East was an impracticability. to such an extent that he was obliged to postpone The average total weekly strength of Welling- the resumption of his offensive, originally timed tons during the phase under review was 100 air­ for 25th August (the period of the full moon) craft and serviceability averaged 67 per cent. till the night of 30/31st August. These days of The light bombers regularly operating in the grace were a great help to our land forces. Western Desert comprised two squadrons of Bostons and two of Baltimores. The average to­ Apart from Tobruk, the advanced base of Ma­ iruh was most heavily attacked, 113 light and tal weekly strength of Bostons during the phase 50 medium bomber sorties being carried out under review was approximately 46 aircraft, with against the harbour installations, dumps and re­ an average serviceability of 69 per cent., and that pair shops. In addition, heavy bombers made a of the Baltimores was approximately 47 aircraft, few raids on Benghazi, Heraklion, Navarino and with 65 per cent, serviceability. Suda Bay, when aerial reconnaissance reported The strength of the fighter force, particularly particularly suitable targets, and light and me­ in respect of those types which bore any compar­ dium bombers occasionally bombed Bardia and ison with the performance of the latest Axis Sollum. fighters, continued to be a source of misgiving <-o the higher command. Owing to the static nature of the ground fight­ The Kittyhawk squadrons were especially short ing, far fewer targets were available in the battle of aircraft. At the beginning of the phase, the and forward areas than during the previous total Kittyhawk strength was 87, averaging 14-f month of close fighting, but adequate close sup­ aircraft per squadron. By conserving these air­ port was given to the* land forces: in all, medium craft as much as possible the average strength bombers carried out approximately 260 sorties and per week rose to 92 aircraft, with serviceability light bombers 240 against enemy camps, positions averaging 73 per cent. and lines of communication. From 29th July until 21st August, sorties were comparatively few, the Hurricane squadrons had been operating at full biggest attack being carried out by Bostons and intensity against superior aircraft and were Baltimores on transport concentrations on the 4th strained. On 29th July, the strength of Hurri­ and 5th August. From the night of 21/22nd canes actively engaged in Western Desert oper­ August until 31st August, however, when the ations was 214 aircraft, but the aircraft weekly enemy was preparing to resume his attack, 216 strength during the phase rose to 251 aircraft medium and 81 light bomber sorties were made by reason of reinforcements and few casualties. against targets in the battle area, particularly in Spitfires remained at low strength throughout the central sector. Throughout the phase, also, the phase. On 29th July, the total strength Bostons made successful night raids against the amounted to only 23 aircraft. By the middle of enemy's lines of communications immediately be­ August, however, a third squadron had begun hind the front, but Baltimores were found to be operations, and the average weekly strength unsuitable for night operations as distortion due during the last fortnight in August rose to 43, to curved windscreens affected night landings. with an average serviceability of 69 per cent. Ac­ cordingly, Spitfires could now take an appreciable Attacks on enemy aerodromes and landing part in operations, although fewness in numbers grounds were continuous throughout the entire still prevented this part being decisive. phase, over 220 sorties being carried out against these objectives, particularly against those in the B.A.F. Bomber Effort Fuka and Daba areas. From the night of The bomber effort during August was, for reas­ 25/26th to 30th August 45 medium and 46 light ons already considered, primarily directed against bomber effective sorties were made, and these the enemy's ports and bases, the attacks being seriously hampered the Axis air forces' prepar­ carried out chiefly by heavy and medium ations for their impending attack. The success of these raids is best illustrated by the fact that bombers. the Stukas were ultimately withdrawn from the Prior to the middle of the month, Halifax squad­ Daba area to a base at Sidi Haneish. rons were stationed in Palestine, but thereafter they operated from the Canal zone; conversely, Bombing Attacks in Detail Liberators first operated from the Canal zone and then removed to Palestine. Wellingtons were The following accounts illustrate the scope of now based in the Canal zone once again, and. by the raids during the phase under review. Tobruk : Night 29/30th July preparations for the renewal of his offensive, the This attack indicates the intensity of the Tob­ following raids being characteristic efforts. ruk raids, their combined nature, and the va­ From 22.30 to 02.15 hours on the night of riety of the targets attacked. From 00.40 to 03.05 23/24th August sorties were carried out by 41 hours, 57 Wellingtons, 3 Liberators and 7 Hali­ Wellingtons and ten Albacores, which also pro­ faxes took part in a series of attacks. The docks vided illumination, on enemy concentrations in th« received most attention and many fires were central sector. The Albacores dive-bombed M.T. started. In particular, bombs from the Liberators concentrations, while the Wellingtons scored hits started a yellowish blaze which could be seen for on tanks, transport and tents, and these objec­ twenty miles. The Halifaxes concentrated on fuel tives were also machine-gunned with good effect. installations, and Wellingtons which arrived on the Two nights later, the enemy's forward land­ scene later "stocked-up" the conflagrations caused. ing grounds at Daba were attacked by twenty- At least one direct hit was scored on a ship in the six Wellingtons, eleven Bostons, six Albacores harbour and a number of near misses on other and nine Mitchells (of U.S.A.A.F.). In all, 437 X vessels were reported. Other targets attacked 2501b. bombs and 36,000 spikes were dropped. included power houses, searchlight positions and Bursts were seen among dispersed aircraft and the El Ghilobi aerodrome. Six Wellingtons also many fires were started. After this raid, Stukas laid twelve mines in allotted areas of the harbour. were chary of operating from Daba and removed Although the anti-aircraft fire was fairly intense some sixty miles in the rear, and consequently and accurate, all of our aircraft returned safely. their activity against our" land forces was res­ tricted. Day Attacks on Landing Grounds The effectiveness of these raids is exemplified The U.S.A.A.F. Bomber Effort by the following attacks on landing grounds on Liberators of the U.S.A.A.F. concentrated main­ Daba and Fuka. ly on dusk attacks on enemy convoys, shipping Attacks were carried out on the Daba land­ in Sudu Bay and Navarino harbour and shipping ing grounds by six Baltimores of No. 223 Squad­ and docks at Tobruk, more than 115 effective ron and twelve Bostons of No. 12 Squadron, short­ sorties being carried out during the phase. ly after 07.00 hours on 9th August. The Mitchells, which ibegan operations in mid-August, Baltimores, operating from 9f000 feet, dropped had made over 50 sorties by the end of the 18 X 250 lb. and 12 X 500 lb. bombs. One near month: their principal objectives were Matruh miss on aircraft was claimed, and a fire, with and the landing grounds at Qotaifiya. The Ame­ smoke rising to a height of 1,000 feet, was report­ ricans had' settled down well, and as their air ed. The Bostons, attacking from 7,500 feet, drop­ force increased, more and more valuable help ped 24 X 500 lb. and 24 X 250 lb. bombs. Three was given to the Middle East striking force. near misses were claimed on a JU.52. R.A.F. Fighter Effort The conservative nature of the claims is shown by the fact that "the examination of photographs During the lull in the main battle, the fighter later proved that, in all, 27 dispersed aircraft strength was conserved, as far as possible, so that had been damaged or destroyed on L.G.104, which it could again put forward a maximum effort had "been attacked principally by the Baltimores. when the enemy attempted a renewal of his of­ It had taken two months to reach such a hig'u fensive. standard in accurate bombing, as the aircraft From 29th July to 30th August inclusive, 5,700 had no automatic distributors. The Baltimores sorties were made by fighter aircraft, excluding were by now considered to be even more effective shipping sweeps and protection, which are dealt than the Bostons for day bombing. with elsewhere. This total is somewhat over In the early morning of 14th August an ex­ half of the previous month's figure, when the tremely successful attack was carried out by fighters were operating at the highest intensity. twelve Baltimores of No. 55 Squadron and eleven In consequence of the static ground situation, Bostons of No. 24 Squadron against the enemy's there were comparatively few low-flying attacks main landing grounds at Fuka. In all, 45X500 and bomber and fighter-bomber escort duties also lb., and 35 X 250 lb. bombs, and eleven boxes c f required less fighters as the bombing in the battle 20 X 4 lb. incendiary bombs were dropped. Many area declined. Offensive patrols were maintained, direct hits and near misses were scored on dis­ but on a more limited scale than formerly, as persed aircraft and numerous fires were started. there was, in general, little enemy air activity The effectiveness of the raid can be judged by the over the forward areas. 1,955 sorties were car­ fact that it stopped the Italians from operating ried out on this activity, representing about 45% for four days. The only damage sustained by of the effort expended in the previous months. our aircraft was the slight holing of two Balti­ More fighter aircraft were now available for mores by anti-aircraft fire. local defence, however, and adequate protection was given to our advanced landing grounds Attacks prior to Enemy's Offensive around Amiriya and Burg El Arab and to the Heavy attacks were carried out during the last back areas, 1,272 sorties being made on these week in August in order to hinder the enemy's duties.

28 The Hurricane squadrons had been operating at the limit of their range against superior aircraft In addition, a number of reconfiai5sa?feeg V1vere and were strained, so these aircraft were now made of enemy positions in the forward area, at almost entirely confined to an anti-Stuka role Tobruk and the Siwa Oasis. and as escort to tactical reconnaissance aircraft, The work of the P.R.U. Flight was outstanding. and their employment against enemy fighters The battle area, enemy landing grounds and ports was restricted. The Hurricanes proved success­ were regularly covered and the majority of ful in intercepting the enemy's dive-bombers, and the greatly increased photographic requirements the experience gained served them in good stead was successfully met. during the early days of September, when the enemy launched another attack against the Ala­ Air Defence of Egypt mein line. With the enemy's fighter force located at Daba, Combats and Interceptions ^Alexandria and the great part of the Delta were within range of the enemy long-range fight­ Owing to the limited enemy air activity over er force. As nearly all the R.A.F. fighter force, the forward areas, combats were comparatively apart from the night Beaufighters and No. 94 few and casualties on either side were not heavy. Squadron Hurricanes, was employed in the battle The following two short accounts, however, in­ area, a Hurricane night-fighter squadron (No.73) dicate how air superiority was maintained during was also allotted for defensive operations. Later, the entire phase. No. 211 Group held two squadrons and No. 252 On 19th August, twelve Spitfires of No. 92 Wing kept six aircraft in readiness for the day Squadron, which had begun operations in the fighter defence of iheAlexandria area. Middle East Command only six days previously, During the phase under consideration, the de­ were flying on a protective sweep, while No. 274. fensive fighters destroyed five HE.Ills, three Squadron Hurricane - bombers were bombing JU.88s, one JU.86 and three C.Z.1007s; another enemy transport concentrations, with No. 1 JU.86 was probably destroyed and five other air­ (S.A.A.F.) Squadron Hurricanes acting as top craft _were damaged. cover. A mixed formation of twenty ME.109s and MC.202s, flying at 12/14,000 feet, were sight­ Linked up with the general defence of Egypt ed and immediately attacked by the Spitfires. As was the safeguarding of our landing grounds. a result of the ensuing combats, four ME.109s During August, it became known that enemy were shot down, four probably destroyed and four parachute troops were in the battle area, and damaged. Nine of the twelve Spitfire pilots gliders had been observed at Tobruk. There claimed victims, and only one Spitfire was dam­ was, accordingly, a possibility that the enemy aged. might use these troops in attacks against our landing grounds, and the following precautions While on offensive patrol over the battle area were taken. Strong detachments, including tanks, on 29th August, eleven Kittyhawks of No. 2 S.A. were allocated to 12 A.A. Brigade, the formation A.F. Squadron'were jumped by five MC.202s and responsible for the anti-aircraft defence of our two ME.109s. A dog-fight followed from which aerodromes; R.A.F. units were warned to make only one enemy aircraft escaped unscathed. 'In full local preparations to encounter possible at­ all, one MC.202 was destroyed, another probably tacks; Hurricane squadrons were trained and destroyed, and two MC.202s and two ME.109s ready to provide a night-fighter force to help No. were damaged for the loss of one Kittyhawk. 73 Squadron if determined enemy night attacks were made. Reconnaissance Effort As the enemy's air strength increased in the Enemy Air Operations forward area, the opposition to No. 208 Squadron During August, the German Air Force was tactical reconnaissance aircraft increased. For­ located at Fuka and using the Daba landing merly, these aircraft operated singly or with a grounds as advanced bases. The Italians had their "weaver" and obtained guidance on the enemy forward aerodromes at Fuka, with the greater air activity from the fighter control by having the part of their air force in the rear, stretching back enemy plots over the battle area broadcast. In to Tripoli. Until the last few days of the month August, however, enemy air opposition forced es­ the enemy air forces were primarily employed corts to be provided, with a resultant reduction on the tasks of helping with the -conveying and in the number of sorties which could be carried protection of reinforcements and supplies to the out. Valuable information was obtained, how­ Axis' African supply ports, particularly Tob­ ever, about enemy transport movement and con­ ruk, and attempting to deny us the passage of centrations, gun positions and digging-in acti­ supplies to Malta. Above all, the enemy, like vities. ourselves, was building up serviceability in readi­ Strategical reconnaissance was continued by ness for the renewal of his attack. In con­ Baltimores of No. 1437 Flight and when possible sequence, operations against our Alamein po­ photographs were taken. The coastal area from sitions and Egypt were on a limited scale until Matruh to Tobruk was constantly covered. Re­ 28th August, when renewed air activity heralded ports were made of shipping in harbours, road the resumption of the Axis offensive. In general, throughout the phase, offensive ^Position at 30th August action was undertaken by the German Air Force, The vmth Army had utilised the lull in the while the Italians occupied themselves almost ex­ ground fighting in training newly-arrived units, clusively with defensive duties, particularly pro­ and the defences and dispositions were such that tection of shipping. the enemy attack was awaited with confidence. From 18th to 25th August, the enemy's The R.A.F. was also fully prepared to play its bomber activity was on an increased scale. With part in the coming battle, and the total strength the rising moon, German long-range bombers re­ of operational aircraft based in Egypt and the sumed their night attacks against targets in Western Desert well exceeded the 900 mark. Egypt. In particular, aerodromes in the Ami­ The maximum force was concentrated and con­ riya and Wadi Natirun areas were attacked trol was facilitated by excellent telephonic com­ on the four nights 21/22nd to 24/25th August by munications. All units which had been withdrawn forces of five to twelve aircraft, chiefly JU.88s, for the defence of the Delta were once more but on the whole little damage was done. Activity in the field, and pilots who knew the terrain, in­ in the forward areas was slight until the night timately were plentiful. Supplies for a maximum of 25/26th August, when the bombing of our po­ effort were ready on all landing, grounds. The sitions was carried out by Crete-based aircraft. word was awaited to throw in the full weight of Heavy raids were also made on our aerodromes, the air striking force. but as in the previous May, the attacks were The next few days would tell if the Axis had singularly ineffective. won the all-important reinforcement race.

THE THIRD PHASE-THE OFFENSIVE THAT FAILED Night 30th/31st August to 5th September

ON THE NIGHT of 30th August, the Axis forces and transport vehicles, destroying several by di­ resumed their offensive in a fresh endeavour io rect hits and damaging others by near misses, defeat the VTIIth Army and occupy the Delta. and at least five fires were caused. One Albacore The move was expected as clear signs of an forced-landed after completing its bombing and impending attack had been apparent for several one Wellington crash-landed as a result of an days. The enemy's dive-bomber and fighter activ­ attack by an enemy night-fighter. ity had been reduced in order to build up service­ The next morning, 31st August, the two main ability; long-range bombers had been switched enemy columns continued eastwards until noon, from Sicily to Crete; heavy night attacks when the northern column halted a few miles had been carried out on our main aerodromes; and south-west of Deir El Ragil and the southern determined attempts were made by strong stand­ column stopped a short distance south-west of ing fighter patrols to prevent our aerial recon­ Deir El Risw, apparently waiting for the 90th naissance of the southern sector. With regard to Light Division to join them. The pause was pro­ the enemy's night bombing effort, it is interesting bably used for replenishment and may have been to note that some of it was wasted against decoy extended, moreover, owing to poor visibility. landing grounds and decoy fires which had been The rear enemy columns were attacked twice skilfully improvised at suitable places in the by escorted light bombers during the morning: 15 Delta. Bostons and 17 Baltimores bombed tanks and The last tactical reconnaissance aircraft operat­ vehicles a few miles south of Munassib, scoring ing on the evening of 30th August reported three direct hits and starting three fairly large fires, fresh concentrations of enemy vehicles in the and three Mitchells (of the U.S.A.A.F.) attacked southern sector and a force of Wellingtons and transport between Munassib and Himeimat. Albacores was briefed to attack these targets. By The anti-aircraft fire protecting the enemy's con­ midnight, it was clear from the ground and air centrations was intense and three Bostons and reports that a full-scale enemy attack had begun. eight Baltimores were damaged. The enemy's armour in two main columns pe­ At about 15.30 hours, the German armoured netrated our minefields between Munassib and divisions continued without the 90th Light Divi­ Himeimat '• the northern column, comprising sion, moving off in two columns in a north­ the 15th Armoured Division, included 140 tanks easterly direction. By 18.00 hours, contact was and the southern column was made up of the 21st made with our land forces about three miles Armoured Division, with approximately 70 tanks. south-west of Alam El Bueib and in the ensuing The 90th Light Division also advanced on the left engagement the enemy suffered at least 25 tank flank but made little progress. casualties. The enemy's armour then withdrew The enemy concentrations were bombed during further south for the night. the night by twenty Wellingtons and eleven Al­ During the time that the Axis columns were bacores, the latter also illuminating the targets. halted dust storms prevented any air operations, Most of the bombs dropped burst among tanks but in the evening, in spite of adverse weather

30 conditions, attacks were resumed on transport following up the main enemy columns in the area TaliSIP Pftolfef .ftf%^i^f§-§r UTni between Mtmassib and Himeimat by eighteen venced to Deir El MuhaffT Bostons and two Mitchells, escorted by Kitty- our forces they achieved little success. hawks. Three direct hits were scored and five In the course of the day, in spite of intermit­ fires were started, but poor visibility prevented tent dust storms, eight attacks were made by the observation of full results. our light bombers, comprising 65 Boston, 54 Bal­ Offensive patrols were maintained over the bat­ timore and six Mitchell sorties, the formations tle area by Hurricanes and Spitfires, except dur­ being escorted by Kittyhawks and Tomahawks, ing the afternoon when dust storms were preval­ which carried out 155 sorties on these duties. ent. Special mention may be made of an inter­ Great damage was done to tanks and transport, ception by twelve Hurricanes of No. 213 Squadron chiefly in the Deir El Turf a area, and concentra­ of 40 JU.87s escorted by fifteen plus ME.109s and tions to the north-west of Munassib were also MC.2.02s. The JU.87s were forced to jettison bombed. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was again in­ their bombs in their own territory and.three of tense and one Baltimore, one Boston and one them were shot down. On our side, one Hur­ Mitchell were shot down and several other air­ ricane was destroyed and one damaged. As a craft damaged. result of other engagements during the day, one Enemy fighters attacked five of.the bomber ME.109 and one MC.202 were destroyed, and two formations and in the ensuing combats Kitty- ME.109s and two JU.87s damaged, at the cost cf hawks destroyed one ME.109, damaged another, one Spitfire and three Hurricanes destroyed. and probably destroyed one MC.202. Our losses In addition to the casualties inflicted by R.A.F. were three Kittyhawks and two Tomahawks fighters, our anti-aircraft fire shot down three destroyed. JU.87s, three ME.109s, one CR.42 and one un­ Continuous patrols were carried out by Hurri­ identified aircraft. canes, Kittyhawks and Spitfires throughout the day. Two formations of JU.87s and one formation Heavy Night Bombing of JU.88s were intercepted, and one formation of The bombing of the Axis concentrations, par­ each type was forced to jettison its bombs. Four ticularly between Deir El Agram and Deir Stukas, two JU.88s, three ME.109s were shot El Ragil, was continued during the night by down, three ME.109s probably destroyed, and one 46 Wellingtons and 27 Albacores,, most of the JU.87, one JU.88 and ten ME.109s damaged, for Wellingtons carrying out two sorties each and the loss of one Spitfire and five Hurricanes. In some of the Albacores three. The raids were very other engagements, at least two ME.109s were successful as the closely-packed concentrations destroyed and several others were damaged, our of enemy tanks and vehicles in a confined area losses being one Spitfire and one Hurricane. presented excellent targets. Over thirty fires were started and, apart from the havoc wrought Night Bombing Intensified among vehicles generally, several ammunition That night, lst/2nd September, the bombing of lorries were blown up. enemy tanks and transport concentrated in the central and southern sectors was intensified, at The German •Armour Cheeked tacks being carried out by 66 Wellingtons and The next morning, 1st September, the main 16 Albacores. The greatest destruction inflicted battle was resumed in the area between Point was at Mirbat Aza, Deir El Tan-fa and Deir El 102 (about three miles south-west of Alam El Ragil. Very many vehicles were destroyed and Bueib) and Alam El Haifa. The German ar­ damaged, and a large number of fires and ex­ moured divisions made two attacks against our plosions were caused. In the main, 250 lb. bombs positions- expecting to entice our armour into the were used, but, in addition, three 4,000 lb. bombs open. We had learnt our lesson in this respect, (one of which failed to explode) were dropped however, and the attacks were repulsed by our among dispersed vehicles, causing large fires. artillery dug in on high ground and by tanks fir­ Light bombers operating over this area on the ing from hull down positions; no mobile tank following morning confirmed the great damage engagements took place. caused by these attacks. The good work of the artillery was aided by the " The Boston Tea Party " light bomber attacks delivered in the enemy's rear. The effect of this bombing is indicated by The next day, 2nd September, the German the damage caused by eighteen escorted Balti­ armour in front of our Alam El Haifa posi­ mores in the early morning on badly dispersed tions, after their unhappy experience of the pre­ transport in the Deir El Ragil area. In addition vious day, made no attempt to attack and, in to a large fire which was started, photographs fact, withdrew some distance to the south. The revealed that five direct hits and 32 very near German force then included approximately 150 misses had been scored. tanks, .which were protected by a screen of 8.8 During the afternoon, the German armour again cm. guns. The 90th Light Division on the left formed up to launch an assault, but no attack flank was relieved by the Trieste Division, but materialised. In the meantime, 90th Light Di­ before the change was effected the Italians suf­ vision had made a little more progress than on fered casualties at the hands of our land forces

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1. 77(1- Wellingtons played a memorable part in the Battle for Egypt.

2. Bostons take off in for­ mation designed to mini­ mise dust interference with the I'ision of pilots.

3. and 4. Good bombing h\< light homhers during "The Boston Tea - Tarty"

5. — and a typical result. etween Himeimat and Deir El Ragil. screen in the neighbourhood of Deir El Tarfa. On being relieved, elements of the 90th Light Harassed by our light forces from the south and Division fell back to the area east of Khadim. by continuous R.A.F. bombing attacks, the ene­ Throughout the day, our artillery fire, combin­ my continued his withdrawal to the area between ed with continuous R.A.F. bombing attacks, kept Munassib and Himeimat Abandoned German enemy vehicles on the move and inflicted heavy tanks numbered at least 80; of these, 39 were casualties. Our light bombers made 176 effective demolished and most of the others required no sorties, comprising 110 Boston, 57 Baltimore and further demolition. nine Mitchell sorties; in all, ten attacks were The light bomber "shuttle, service" was in ope­ made, escorted by Kittyhawks, Tomahawks and ration from dawn to dusk. A record number of P.40s (of the U.S.A.A.F.). Enemy concentrations 200 effective sorties were made, comprising 52 in the areas of Deir El Agram, Deir El Tarfa, by Baltimores, 90 by Bostons and 18 by Mit­ Deir El Ragil and, to a lesser extent, Samaket chells. Eleven attacks were carried out on the Gaballa were attacked. Great damage was in­ withdrawing enemy columns, wherever suitable flicted and many fires caused; some of the con­ concentrations were found, from the area south flagrations started by formations operating in of Deir El Agram southwards to the area be­ the morning were observed to be still burning by tween Munassib and Himeimat. Most of the our aircraft continuing the bombing in the even­ 250 lb. and 500 lb. bombs dropped burst among ing, and the havoc caused by the raids in general enemy vehicles and widespread destruction and was confirmed by our land forces. As a result confusion was caused. Our land forces reported of the intense anti-aircraft fire which protected that the accuracy of the bombing compelled the the enemy's concentrations, six Baltimores and enemy to attempt the rapid dispersal of his ve­ two Bostons were slightly damaged. hicles every time our bombers approached. Escorting fighters shot down two ME.109s The light bombers were escorted by Kitty- which attempted interceptions, but in the engage­ hawks, Tomahawks and P.40s which made 156, 21 ments we lost two Tomahawks and one Kitty- and 60 sorties respectively. Six of the bomber hawk. formations were attacked by ME.109s and the Offensive patrols over the battle area com­ escorting fighters shot down two, probably des­ prised 78 Spitfire and 178 Hurricane sorties. The troyed five and damaged several others for the most successful bomber interceptions were made loss of three Kittyhawks and one Tomahawk. by ten Hurricanes of No. 274 Squadron and twelve Hurricanes of No. 127 Squadron. These Six Hurricane IIDs, escorted by twenty Hurri­ aircraft encountered formations of Stukas escort­ canes, had a particularly successful day, des­ ed by M.E.109s and forced one formation to jet­ troying three tanks Mark III, two unidentified tison their bombs. Six dive-bombers were shot tanks, one armoured car and a large lorry. down, four probably destroyed and seven dam­ 156 Hurricane and 60 Spitfire sorties were car­ aged and four enemy fighters were also damaged. ried out on offensive patrols. Six Spitfires of In other engagements, three M.E.109s and one No. 145 Squadron encountered thirteen ME. 109s MC.202 were shot down, one ME. 109 probably and succeeded in destroying one enemy fighter, destroyed and several others damaged. Our losses probably destroying two and damaging another were three Spitfires and one Hurricane. During for the loss of one Spitfire. In other engage­ the day, also, our anti-aircraft fire shot down ments, one ME.109 was destroyed, two probably three JU.88s and one ME.109 attacking our posi­ destroyed and two others damaged, but our losses tions in the central sector. were higher, including the destruction of one Spitfire and three Hurricanes. Intensive Night Bombing Continued Air Activity Night 3rd/4th September When the light bombers had completed their day's work, the medium bombers took over, car­ "Double sorties" were again made by Welling- rying out during the night 71 effective sorties, tons and Albacores against enemy concentrations aided by eight flare-dropping Albacores. Most now located in the southern sector, the medium of the aircraft again made "double sorties." Ene­ bombers making 71 and the Albacores ten effec­ my armour and transport concentrations in the tive sorties. Bombs were dropped on tanks and central sector were bombed unceasingly and, vehicles and many direct hits and near misses apart from the great damage done, enemy troops were scored and numerous fires were started. were again denied the rest which was becoming The enemy air force was also active. From increasingly necessary. The actual results ob­ 22.00 hours to first light, enemy bombers, be­ served included many vehicles destroyed by lieved to be chiefly JU.88s, bombed and straffed direct hits, the blowing up of two ammunition our forward positions, particularly in the south­ lorries and over thirty fires, some of which were ern area. Searchlights and Verey lights were fuel burning. employed to guide the attacking aircraft and, in all, approximately 60 sorties were made. The Record R.A.F. Sorties effect of the bombing was not comparable with In the early morning, 3rd September, the main that of our medium bombers on the same night, enemy force withdrew from Deir El Alam to partly owing to the relative scarcity of suitable Deir El Ragil, leaving a tank__a.ild» anti-tank targets in the form of concentrations of vehicles BP 34 and partly due to the absence of flare-di-opping escorted formation of JU.88s, on sighting Spit­ aircraft corresponding to the Albacores. fires and Hurricanes, played the same cautious The Enemy's Withdrawal Continues game and fled. On the 4th September the enemy reacted to an Scale of the R.A.F. Battle Effort attack by our land forces southwards on to the From the night 30th/31st August to 5th Sep­ area west of Deir El Mwhafid by counter­ tember, practically the entire R.A.F. bomber attacking twice in the morning and twice, on a force, except the heavy bombers, was exclusively larger scale, in the afternoon. Our heavy artil­ employed on bombing the enemy's columns in the lery fire and bombing attacks, however, drove battle area. During the period of the battle, our the enemy back. Meanwhile, the main German bombers dropped approximately 6,600 bombs, armour continued its withdrawal to the west con­ having a total weight of 1,736,000 lbs. This re­ stantly harassed by our armoured forces operat­ presents roughly one bomb dropped evei-y 71 sec­ ing from the east and south and disorganised by onds. The average concentration of our bombing R.A.F. bombing attacks. was estimated at 25,000 lbs. per square mile per Air operations were more restricted than on hour. the preceding two days due to dust storms which In the course of the continuous night bombing, prevented operations in the afternoon, but four Wellingtons carried out 288 effective sorties and escorted light bomber attacks were made on ene­ Albacores assisted with 77 effective sorties: 3,172 my tanks and transport withdrawing in the area bombs, weighing 816,300 lbs., were dropped. between Munassib and Himeimat. The raids were extremely successful and caused many Light bomber sorties totalled 652, including 48 fires and explosions. Two attacks were also made by Mitchells of the U.S.A.A.F., and bombs with a total weight of 915,000 lbs. were dropped. In to assist our troops to repel the enemy's-counter­ particular, on the "peak day," 3rd September, attacks mentioned in the previous paragraph. In 200 effective sorties were made and 1,036 bombs, all, 42 Boston, 18 Baltimore and 12 Mitchell sor­ totalling 269,750 lbs. in weight, were dropped. ties were carried out. Escorted Hurricane-bombers of No. 7 Squadron R.A.F. fighters carried out 2,500 sorties, ex­ were also busy during the day: 110 Jeffrey 9 lb. cluding those over the Eastern Mediterranean. bombs were dropped on a group of tanks and 1,165 sorties were made on offensive sweeps and armoured cars a short distance south-east of 912 on bomber escort duties. P.40s of the Himeimat and two tanks and one armoured car U.S.A.A.F. also helped with the latter activity, were hit and left smoking, and troops in the vi­ carrying out over 150 sorties during the last cinity were machine-gunned. four days of the battle. Spitfires and Hurricanes carried out offensive Features of the Air Activity patrols, making 47 and 72 sorties respectively. There were, however, only three engagements The most striking feature of the R.A.F. effort with the enemy, in which one ME.109 was shot was the continuous bombing of the Axis columns. down, one probably destroyed and several dam­ In particular, an efficient "shuttle service" of aged. Bostons and Baltimores was operated during the The medium bomber effort during the night daytime, the strength of each bomber formation was reduced as it was evident that the enemy being normally limited to eighteen aircraft in was in the process of abandoning his offensive. order to conserve our fighter strength. His withdrawal had been going on for two days Owing to the low strength of the Kittyhawk and fewer suitable targets were now available, squadrons, these aircraft were principally allot­ due to the more thorough dispersal of vehicles. ted the task of providing escort for the light bombers to the exclusion of fighter-bomber at­ The Enemy Offensive Called Off tacks. In spite of the repeated attempts of ene­ By 08.30 hours on 5th September, H.Q. 15th my fighters to interfere with our bombers, not Armoured Division had withdrawn to Khadim one of these was shot down in combat during the and no doubt now existed that the enemy's offen­ entire battle period. sive had proved abortive. The enemy's with­ The Hurricanes were retained chiefly in their drawal did not proceed unmolested: our troops bomber interception role, and due to the deter­ harassed him from the east and north and the mination with which they pressed home their R.A.F. made a number of bombing attacks on attacks were extremely successful. the retreating transport columns, although bad The failure of the JU.87s was most noticeable. weather restricted air operations. The Stukas almost invariably jettisoned their There were a few engagements with enemy bombs on sighting Spitfires or Hurricanes and fighters as a result of which one ME.109 was des­ made for home. By the end of the battle, more­ troyed, one probably destroyed and three dam­ over, the Stukas had abandoned dive-bombing and aged; our losses, however, were higher, three were hurriedly dropping their bombs on the level. Spitfires being shot down and two damaged and The bogy of the dive-bomber had been finally one Kittyhawk destroyed and another damaged. exposed, when opposed by a determined fighter The jettisoning of bombs by Stukas was now force it proved to be a crow masquerading in an more or less expected, but during the day a well- eagle's feathers. lere was only one effective enemy night raid Liberators (all of the U.S.A.A.F.) on 1st and in the battle area and it wasvevident that the 2nd September, respectively. enemy felt the lack of a suitable flare-dropping Two heavy night attacks were made on enemy aircraft corresponding to the Albacore. landing grounds. On the night of 31st August Once again, Beaufighters* showed their great /lst September, attacks were made by 25 Wel­ value by most successful attacks on enemy road lingtons and 16 Liberators (of U.S.A.A.F.) on traffic striking as far back as Sollum; apart landing grounds from Daba to Sidi Haneish. from attacks on lorries filled with troops, petrol- In addition to the usual loads of 2501b. and 5001b. laden vehicles urgently needed at the front were bombs, two 4,000 lb. bombs and over 20,000 spikes destroyed. were dropped. On the next night, 2nd/3rd Sep­ The aid given by the U.S.A.A.F. was indicative tember, landing grounds at Daba and Qotaifiya of what was to come when American squadrons were attacked by sixteen U.S.A.A.F. Liberators arrived in strength in the Middle East. Mit­ which dropped a total of 96,000 lbs. of bomb.?, chells co-operated with our light bombers, car­ causing numerous fires.­ rying out 48 effective sorties and P.40s made their first appearance in the desert assisting with Comparison of Casualties bomber escort duties. During the six days of battle, the enemy suf­ Air Defence of Egypt fered many more bomber casualties than the In an attempt to incapacitate our light bomber R.A.F., in spite of a more limited activity. and fighter forces, four enemy night raids and Twenty-six enemy bombers were destroyed, in­ one day attack were made on groups of landing cluding thirteen Stukas, five probably destroyed grounds in the Burg El Arab, Amirya and and seven damaged. Our losses were seven Wadi Natrun areas, but these were all com­ bombers destroyed, including four Baltimores, paratively ineffective. In addition, attempts were and thirteen seriously damaged. made at aerial reconnaissance. Our fighter casualties, however, were higher Hurricanes controlled by No. 211 Group shot than those of the Axis air forces; 43 aircraft down 'two JU.88s near Burg El Arab on the were shot down and 27 seriously damaged. night 30th/31st August, and Beaufighters dam­ Hurricanes, which bore the brunt of the offensive aged a HE.Ill near Alexandria on the night operations, were outclassed in performance by 31st August/lst September and destroyed two the ME.109s and MC.202s and accordingly suf­ Cant.1007s in the same area and one JU.88 fered the heaviest causualtiesv seventeen being over Burg El Arab during the evening of 4th destroyed and seventeen seriously damaged.' September. Day time interceptions, moreover, Enemy fighter casualties totalled 22 destroyed, included the shooting down of a Cant.1007 by 18 probably destroyed and 39 damaged. The Spitfires and a JU.88 by Hurricanes, both in the ME.109s, which played a predominant part in vicinity of Wadi Natrun. the enemy fighter activity, suffered 90% of the total casualties. Attacks on Ports and Leading Grounds Although during the six days battle the R.A.F. Causes of Enemy's Failure bombers were primarily concerned with attacks on the enemy concentrations in the battle area, The failure of the enemy's offensive can be raids on the Axis supply ports and aerodromes ascribed in great part to his misappreciation both were still carried out, although on a necessarily of our military position and our reactions: he more limited scale. was obviously unaware of the strength of our On the night 30th/31st August, Tobruk was positions in the Alam El Haifa area and, what bombed by 21 Wellingtons, six Halifaxes and is more important, assumed that we would, as seventeen Liberators (including eleven of the usual, join battle in the open with our arm­ U.S.A.A.F.). Many fires were started near the oured forces. Instead of the anticipated mobile main jetties and a particularly large one, ac­ tank battles, however, the enemy found himself companied by explosions, occurred near the tank checked south of Alam El Haifa and the workshops. Six Liberators were briefed to attack concentrations of tanks, armoured cars and a large tanker which, in view of the enemy's great transport vehicles presented ideal targets for the need of fuel, was described in the briefing in­ heavy artillery fire of our land forces and the structions as " the prize target of the year." The R.A.F.'s continuous day and night bombing at­ tanker was not located, however, probably due tacks. Thus, unable to make the quick break­ to the moderate visibility. through as planned, the enemy realised that the After this attack, until the night of 5/6th Sep­ longer he remained before our positions the tember, Wellingtons were used almost exclusively greater casualties he would incur; accordingly, for bombing in the battle area and the Tobruk he decided to withdraw, particularly as our attacks were continued by the heavy bombers nightly bombing was denying all rest to his only. In all, 48 effective sorties were made on battle-weary troops who were nearing the point the four nights in question. of exhaustion. % The only other Once again, it had been proved that the con­ tinued bombing of an army which has been forced to concentrate in a restricted area Axis have a decisive effect. Above all, the enemy had not the necessary previous month. supplies, especially of fuel, to keep up a sustain- Rommel had lost the reinforcement race, rt ed attack. This shortage was due to the success- was now clear that the VHIth Army was strong ful interference with his Mediterranean ship- and confident and that the next offensive would ping by the Royal Navy and the R.A.F., and be launched from our side of the Alamein line. THE FOURTH PHASE-THE TABLES TURNED

IMMEDIATELY THE. SEPTEMBER battle had into a single wing and trained together as a ceased, preparations were put in hand by the complete formation, ready to move forward VHIth Army for the opening of a full-scale of­ when the expected advance occurred. fensive on an opportune date in the latter half The light bomber strength, with the addition of October. of the U.S.A.A.F. Mitchell squadrons and the Similarly, the R.A.F. seized the opportunity arrival of a third Baltimore squadron, was now afforded by the breathing space between battles too unwieldy to be controlled by a single wing; to carry out the re-organisation, equipping and accordingly, a new wing (No.' 232) was formed training necessary before it could again play to control the two R.A.F. Baltimore and thu a full part in the coming decisive struggle. U.S.A.A.F. Mitchell squadrons, while No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing retained control of the Boston Re-O rganisation squadrons and the new No. 21 S.A.A.F. Balti­ Consequent on the arrival of American bomber more Squadron. and fighter squadrons, certain re-organisation The new squadrons needed additional aero­ was essential in respect of fighter and light dromes and these were quickly constructed. bomber formations in order to absorb these units Moreover, two landing grounds were prepared into the Middle East air striking force. immediately behind the battle area from which No. 57 Fighter Group of three P.40 (Kitty­ Hurricanes could operate during the battle period hawk) squadrons and the 12th Bombardment and thus extend their range and time on patrol. Group of three B.25 (Mitchell) squadrons had been allocated to strengthen the air force in the Rest and Training of Squadrons Western Desert. The American pilots were After the conclusion of the September battle, highly skilled, but naturally lacked experience in the Delta was still within range of the enemy's war and particularly desert operations. Accord­ long-range fighters. Accordingly, a few Western - ingly, section leaders were infiltrated into R.A.F. Desert fighter squadrons were again allocated 'o squadrons followed later by other flying person­ Air Headquarters, Egypt, for the protection of nel The Americans proved apt pupils and were Alexandria and the Cairo area. The change soon ready to take a full part in operations. from desert operations constituted a rest and The operational control of the American the proportion of the squadrons held in readi­ squadrons was vested in the A.O.C., Western ness to provide close defence was kept as low as Desert, and. an American Headquarters was at­ circumstances would allow, so that full training tached to Advanced Air Headquarters, in order could continue. to gain experience in the control of air forces in The remainder of the Western Desert fighter the field and watch over American interests. force was rested and granted time for training One of the American Kittyhawk squadrons was in turn, but sufficient squadrons were always attached to an R.A.F. Kittyhawk wing (No.239), kept in the field to meet all commitments. which was prepared to go forward in the event Owing to the static character of the ground of an advance, and the remaining two squadrons fighting, targets for the light bombers were now formed a separate fighter wing under the scarce; a small striking force only was kept at operational control of No. 211 Fighter Group. the forward aerodromes and the remainder re­ The Mitchell squadrons were attached to a newly turned to base aerodromes for rest and training. formed R.A.F. light bomber wing for operations. Meanwhile, the medium and heavy bombers With the addition of the American fighter continued their work of blasting the enemy's squadrons it was found advisable to form a se­ supply ports, the American heavy bombers now cond fighter control formation ; accordingly, being controlled by the U.S.A.A.F. Headquarters. No. 212 Group came into existence. There were R.A.F. Attacks on Ports Continued now two mobile .fighter groups in the Command, and one could be immediately transferred to an­ During the lull in the ground fighting the other sphere of operations when required. bombing of the Axis supply ports by the heavy The three Spitfire squadrons had previously and medium bomber force continued: the R.A.F. been in two wings which also included Hurri­ carried out 183 heavy and 903 medium bomber cane squadrons. They were now concentrated effective sorties against these objectives from jclusive, - and of me opposing forces and the fact that in some during the-same period "tlie^fl^A.A.F. heavy instances the enemy appeared to have prior bombers made over 120 effective sorties. knowledge of the attacks and had prepared ac­ Practically the entire medium bomber and the cordingly. Great credit, however, is due to the greater part of the R.A.F. heavy bomber effort forces concerned for the daring and initiative continued to be directed against Tobruk. Few displayed, and with slightly more luck the raids nights passed without that port receiving a visit might well have had a disastrous effect on the from 20 to 30 Wellingtons, often supplemented enemy's North African supply line. by heavy bombers, and these incessant attacks, The air commitments were all carried oui although not actually closing the port, seriously satisfactorily. In preparation for the attack, re­ hampered the enemy's reinforcement programme. connaissances were made of the Benghazi and It was estimated that from the time the port Kufra - Jalo areas, and Malta - based aircraft was re-occupied by the enemy approximately reported enemy shipping movements; Bombays 4,000 tons had been dropped on it by R.A.F. and transported supplies to Kufra for the use of U.S.A.A.F. aircraft. the Sudan force proceeding to Jalo; and night During October, aerial reconnaissance revealed bombing was carried out on Benghazi during that a larger proportion of Axis shipping was the nights immediately preceding the attack in being1 diverted to Benghazi, 250 miles to the order to deprive the garrison of sleep. * west, a tribute to the effectiveness of the On the night when the combined assaults were Tobruk attacks. Increasing attacks were ac­ made, selected areas of Tobruk and Benghazi cordingly made on Benghazi by the heavy were heavily bombed. Against the former port, bomber force and, in particular, U.S.A.A.F. 35 R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy and 66 medium Liberators did outstanding work, carrying out bomber effective sorties were carried out, and from 6th September to 22nd October over 80 against the latter 20 effective sorties were made effective sorties. A heavy raid by R.A.F. and by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers. U.S.A.A.F. Liberators on the night of 22nd/23rd September was the most damaging attack and After the combined operations were complet­ it was estimated after a close examination of ed, a Bombay rendered good service by transport­ photographs that the unloading capacity of the ing personnel wounded in the Barce and Tobruk port had been seriously impaired for several operations from a pre-arranged rendezvous to weeks, due primarily to the blowing up of a Kufra and thence to Cairo. large merchant vessel lying alongside one of the Opportunist Action Against Landing Grounds main piers. Repeated attacks on enemy landing grounds, Other enemy harbours bombed, although only particularly at Daba, Fuka and Sidi Haneish intermittently, included Matruh, Sollum and Bardia by medium bombers, and Suda Bay were made in order to limit the enemy's and Navarino by U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers. air strength. From 6th September to 22nd October, 14 heavy, 219 medium, 595 light and Combined Operations, Night 13/ 14th September 333 fighter-bomber effective sorties were carried While our land forces were holding the Ala­ out against these objectives by R.A.F. aircraft, mein line and reinforcing and training units and U.S.A.A.F. Mitchells co-operated with over ready for their offensive, patrol activity was 80 effective sorties. continuous and full local initiative was held. In The heaviest and most determined attacks addition, the Long Range Desert Group, sup­ were made on the Daba and Qotaifiya group of plemented by other land and naval units as the landing grounds on 9th October and on Fuka occasion required, carried out daring and well- landing grounds during the following night, planned operations in the rear. 9/lOth October. Photographs taken by recon­ The most ambitious series of raids were plan­ naissance aircraft on 6th October and the follow­ ned to take place on the night of 13/14th Sep­ ing two days disclosed that the enemy's forward tember. The principal attacks consisted of com­ landiuig grounds in the Daba and Qotaifiya bined operations against Tobruk and Ben­ areas were water-logged as a result of recent ghazi, with the object of blocking the respective heavy rains which, fortunately, had left our own harbours and inflicting damage on port facilities. landing grounds comparatively immune. The Simultaneously, a force from Kufra advanced decision was taken to interrupt training and or­ to Jalo in an attempt to secure the oasis as a ganise the maximum air striking force in order base from which the Benghazi party, after to seize this opportunity of delivering a decisive completing its work, could operate further blow to the enemy's air strength. Accordingly, against the enemy's lines of communication. throughout the day of 9th October, heavily escort­ Another force, drawn from the L.R.D.G., raided ed light bombers made repeated raids on the Barce as a diversion to prevent reinforcements Daba and Qotaifiya landing grounds and the going to Benghazi, and successfully destroyed same targets were attacked by fighters and aircraft on the landing ground and attacked other fighter-bombers. In all, Bostons and Baltimores objectives, including barracks. « carried out 144, Mitchells 16, and fighter-bomb­ On the whole, only limited success was obtain­ ers 32 effective sorties; escort was provided by ed from all these operations, due to the strength Kittyhawks, P.40s, Spitfires and Tomahawks which made over 200 sorties on this duty. In oir~immediately behind'.the addition, over 100 effective sorties were made F'front was considerable. by fighters on ground straffing attacks, includ­ ing 84 by Hurricanes which were particularly The Plan of Battle devastating. As a result of the combined at­ The enemy held a strong defensive line from tacks during the day, at least ten aircraft, in­ the coast west of Alamein southwards to the cluding such diverse types as the JU.52, JU.88, impassable Qattara depression, with strong JU.87, ME.110 and ME.109, were destroyed and fortified positions and continuous deep belts of over twenty-two aircraft, chiefly ME.109s, were minefields throughout its length. damaged. In addition, transport was destroyed, The enemy's land forces were disposed on the ammunition dumps were blown up, gun positions set plan of mixing up German and Italian units were put out of action and troops were straffed. so that Teutonic fortitude could inspire the Our fighters on offensive patrols and engaged weaker Axis brethren. Behind the front, German in ground-straffing and escort duties had many and Italian armour was disposed in groups : engagements with enemy aircraft, as a result 15th Armoured Division was located in the of which seven ME. 109s were shot down, four northern sector, 21st Division was in the south­ probably destroyed, and at least two ME.109 and ern sector and 90th Light Division was engaged one MC.202 damaged. Our casualties through in coast protection at Ghazal, and each division combats and determined ground opposition were had an Italian counterpart in the same locality. naturally heavy; thirteen fighters were destroy­ There was no possibility of an outflanking ed, including seven Hurricanes and four Kitty- movement; frontal attacks were alone possible hawks, and four other fighters seriously damag­ and these needed'to be on a large scale to effect ed. The bomber casualties, however, were light: any appreciable penetration. only one Baltimore was shot down and another Our land forces planned to break through the damaged enemy's positions in the northern sector. It was realised that the initial thrust could not be made In order to incapacitate the enemy's air force by our armour as the combined effects of the still more, during the night (9/10th October) 47 opposing minefields and guns would prove too Wellingtons, aided by flare-dropping Albacores, formidable: infantry would have to clear the attacked the landing grounds at Fuka, which 1 way for the tanks. Accordingly, it was planned were being used by the enemy as a forward base to use 30th Corps to make the necessary gaps in while the Baba landing grounds were unservice^ the northern minefields and at the last moment able. Bombs were dropped among dispersed our main armour was to move from its base m aircraft and four were observed to be destroyed; the Delta to assembly areas east of Alamein, in all, four large and twelve small fires were and be ready to go through the gaps made by started and several explosions were caused in 30th Corps in order to join battle with enemy the vicinity of the landing grounds, probably due armoured forces in the open country beyond. to the blowing up of ammunition dumps. Simultaneously, our troops in the central sector The enemy's air force never really recovered were to make limited attacks to draw fire from from the material damage and demoralising ef­ the main northern attacks, and troops in the fect of the raids and these opportunist attacks south were to launch an assault with the primary were of the greatest value to our imminent object of keeping the enemy's armour in this offensive. area concentrated on its own immediate from. Further, the enemy's attempts to recover were To aid the impression that the main push was lo thwarted by renewed large-scale attacks begin­ come in the southern sector, numbers of vehicles ning on 19th October against the Daba landing and tanks were concentrated in that area some grounds, which were again brought into use, and days before our attack developed. extended by night to include the main Stuka base The Army plan involved extensive changes of in the 8idi Haneish area. disposition in the battle area and the quick move of armoured forces to the front with the in­ R.A.F. Attacks on Enemy Positions evitable road congestion. It was essential, there­ After the September battle and prior to the fore, that enemy air activity should be restricted opening of our offensive, air activity in the battle in order to prevent disorganisation at this vital area was restricted, due to the scarcity of targets initial stage of the offensive. Reference has consequent in the absence of full-scale ground already been made to the R.A.F. re-organisation fighting and the need of both sides to build up and training, and an account has been given of serviceability. the opportunist attacks against the enemy's ad­ From 6th September to 22nd' October inclusive, vanced aerodromes followed by the pre-battle attacks which paralysed his air effort. It re­ R.A.F. aircraft made 24 medium and 77 light mains to be emphasised that the R.A.F. was at bomber effective sorties against enemy positions its strongest and the U.S.A.A.F. was now ready and lines of communication and fighter-bombers to give most valuable help. carried out 341 sorties. In addition, low-flying fighter attacks were made at opportune times The domination of the enemy air forces was against road and rail traffic, particularly by completed before the battle began and assurance Beaufighters, and their success in disorganising was given to the Army that air superiority could

39 Attack on a train by tivo Bisleys and four Beaufighters in progress on 9th October. be counted on. The Army moves were completed tinuous attacks were made during the first night according to plan by 22nd October without inter­ of the offensive by 66 Wellingtons and 24 ference from enemy aircraft and air reconnais­ Albacores in the northern and southern sectors. sance had been prevented. Tactical surprise was Particular attention was paid to enemy gun virtually certain. positions; many of these were silenced and the explosions caused by blowing up ammunition The Offensive Opens dumps in their vicinity rocked our aircraft at At 21.40 hours L.T. on 23rd October, the 6,000 feet. The last aircraft to leave the target heaviest artillery barrage ever witnessed in area reported that no enemy guns were then Africa preceded the VHIth Army's attacks in action. Bombs were also dropped on the leaguers along the entire front at 22.00 hours. According of the enemy's armour and encampments, causing to plan, the most determined attack was made ten fires, on of which sent up smoke to a height on a six mile front in the northern sector with of 3,000 feet. In the enemy's immediate rear, the object of making two gaps in a south­ also, considerable confusion and damage was westerly direction in the minefields and strong caused by 30 night-flying Hurricanes of No. 73 points preparatory to the passing through of our Squadron, which straffed such diverse targets armour. By dawn, 24th October, the gaps had as ammunition trucks, field guns, ammunition been made. Meanwhile, the diversionary attacks dumps, vehicles and transport repair shops. were launched by our land forces in the central During the next day, 24th October, our infantry and southern sectors. in the northern sector consolidated their posi­ In support of our attacking troops and to sup­ tions. Our armoured forces were held in read­ plement the effect of the artillery barrage, con­ iness to pass through the gaps in the enemy's

40 "That's a train that zvas!"

minefi.-Ms, but were detailed from making th:1 The attacks of the light bombers were sup­ attempt as the gaps were still commanded by plemented by sorties carried out in the northern enemy anti-tank guns. and southern sectors by escorted Kittyhawk Throughout the 'lay, a record number of light bombers, and twelve Hurricane IIDs, escorted by bomber sorties were carried out in attacks on Hurricanes, had a most successful day "busting" enemy vehicles near the gaps in the enemy's on the El Taqa plateau, scoring hits on eighteen minefields. Fourteen attacks were made on tanks. these targets which comprised 174 effective In order to ensure that enemy fighter activity sorties by Bostons and Baltimores tmd 48 by \va.s kept on a reduced scale, two attacks wei.­ Mitchells. The bombers were strongly escorted carried out on the enemy's forward landing by Kittyhawks and P.40s and some of these grounds at Dubn by twelve Bostons, six Balti­ added to the weight of the attacks by dropping mores and twelve Kittyhawk-bombers, escorted bombs. Many enemy vehicles were put out < f by Tomahawks and Kittyhawks, and direct hits action, numerous fires and explosions were; were scored on grounded aircraft. caused, and great help was afforded to our troops Constant fighter patrols were maintained over in consolidating their newly-won positions. Anti­ the battle and forward areas by Spitfires and aircraft fire from the enemy concentrations, Hurricanes. Few engagements occurred, how­ however, was intense and our light bombers ever, as enemy air activity was slight. The suffered the highest casualties to date for a most important feature of our fighter activity single day: five Bostons and one Baltimore were on this day was the providing of fighter cover destroyed and seven Bostons and three Balti­ over our armoured units assembled ready to mores seriously damaged. pass through the gaps in the enemy's minefields; •; W?LS\provided by Hur^icajves operating bombing of these concentrations by our light rBewrlandinW grounds- immediately bombers prevented any attacks from developing. L^hiridr'the battle area. Seven attacks were made against the threa­ tening concentrations in the northern sector Our Armour Advances by 100 Bostons and Baltimores and 22 Mitchells During the night 24/25th October, our armour and a number of the escorting Kittyhawks inten­ passed through the gaps in the enemy's mine- sified the attacks by bombing. Independent fields and by dawn on the next day had arrived attacks were also made by 30 well-escorted Kit­ at the open country beyond. Meanwhile, heavy tyhawks. The accuracy of 4he bombing was com­ air attacks were made by 69 Wellingtons and 16 mented upon by our land forces and its efficacy Albacores on enemy transport convoys in the is proved by the fact that no enemy attacks northern sector and large fires were started developed. Other light bomber activity included near 8idi Abd El Rahman. As on the pre­ the daily bombing of the enemy's advanced land­ vious night, No. 73 Squadron Hurricanes con­ ing grounds. tinued their straffing, but on this occasion their Attacks were again made by "tank busters" efforts were directed against targets in the of No. 6 Squadron and No. 7 Squadron S.A.A.F. central and southern areas. in the southern sector and four tanks and two The next day, 25th October, R.A.F. bomber armoured cars were immobilised. operations were directed principally against The enemy air forces were now attempting enemy transport vehicles in the northern sector to challenge our air superiority and our fighters in order to prevent their concentration prepa­ had many engagements' during the day. Enemy ratory to attempted counter-attacks. During casualties were heavy: six ME. 109s, eight MC. the morning, seven light bomber attacks were 202s and three JU.87s were destroyed; five ME. made on transport and gun emplacements by 96 109s, two MC.202s and two JU.87s probably des­ Bostons and Baltimores and 24 Mitchells, strong­ troyed!; and five ME.109s, two MC.202s, five ly escorted by Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and JU.87s and one JU.88 damaged. Our losses were P.40s, and the attacks were supplemented by 46 four fighters. It was evident that we ruled the fighter-bomber sorties. These attacks combined air over the battlefield. with the concentrated fire of our artillery achiev­ ed their'purpose, as in the afternoon our bombers Enemy Armour in the North could find no suitable targets owing to the dis­ During the night of 26/27th October, the persal of the enemy's forces. enemy brought his 21st Armoured Division from The policy of consistently attacking the Daba the southern to the northern sector and concen­ and Fuka landing grounds with the object of trated his armour in that area. curtailing enemy air activity over the battlefield On our part, the medium bombers continued was continued, escorted light bombers scoring their nightly attacks in the northern sector and many hits on blast shelters containing aircraft also bombed the Sidi Hcmeish landing grounds and starting fires. in order to limit the enemy's night bomber effort. Spitfires and Hurricanes carried out offensive Night-flying Hurricanes also carried out offen­ patrols the entire day, covering the whole front sive patrols over these enemy landing grounds. and the forward areas. Standing patrols of The next day, 27th October, concerted attacks Spitfires were now maintained over the enemy's were made by the enemy's armoured divisions advanced landing grounds; it was indeed a far and infantry in an effort to stem our advance cry from the early days, when two Gladiator in the northern sector* The assaults were all squadrons were the cream of the fighter force. repulsed by our land forces and in accomplishing Combats with enemy aircraft were more this, great help was rendered by ten attacks on frequent than on the preceding days and our enemy concentrations by 177 escorted R.A.F. and fighters came out definitely on top: six ME. U.S.A.A.F. bombers. In the meantime, fighter- 109s and one MC.202 were shot down, four ME. bombers attacked smaller concentrations of 109s probably destroyed, and eight fighters enemy transport in the central and southern damaged for the loss of one Kittyhawk destroy­ sectors where the flak was less formidable. Ad­ ed. American P.40s had a field day, being ditional bomber activity included successful responsible for destroying three of the German attacks on the docks and railway at Matruh fighters and damaging others. and the landing grounds at Fuka. That night, a large force of Wellingtons and As on the preceding day, combats with enemy Albacores continued their attacks on transport in aircraft were numerous, the heaviest casualties the battle area, but vehicles, in general, were on the enemy being inflicted during a running well dispersed. fight from Daba to the front with a heavily escorted Stuka formation. The total losses R.A.F. Bombing Prevents Counter-Attacks during the day incurred by the enemy, which On the 26th October, our infantry extended were shared equally by German and Italian air­ their break-through in the north. Enemy land craft, were seven bombers and eleven fighters forces were drawn up to make counter-attacks destroyed, seven bombers and one fighter "pro­ from the west and south-west, but the effective bables" and five other aircraft damaged. R.A.F.

42 losses for the day were ent thug cut off, the enemy in combat and one ^ j field his remaining fresh for­ aircraft fire. mations and owing to the casualties inflicted on Enemy vehicles were again well dispersed these was in no shape to withstand the onslaught during the night and medium bombers operating of our land forces on the night lst/2nd November. over the battle area found few good targets. At­ A significant feature of the low-flying fighter tacks were renewed against the enemy's bomber attacks was the activity of long-range Kitty- bases at Sidi Haneish and night-flying Hur­ hawks and Spitfires in the Matruh area and west­ ricanes on interception and straffing duties shot wards to Sidi Barrani: road traffic, trucks, down a JU.88 near Daba. landing grounds, wireless stations, supply dumps Axis Counter-Attack Prevented and a variety of other targets were all attacked in an effort to produce the maximum confusion In the afternoon of 28th October, the enemy in the enemy's rear. The destruction caused was formed up in the northern sector to make a an earnest of what was to come when the full-scale armoured counter-attack in the old enemy's retreat developed into a rout. style. At once the light bomber force went into From 29th October to 1st November, the enemy action against the enemy's tanks and vehicles was still attempting to challenge our air ascen­ which were concentrated in an area three miles dancy and in consequence R.A.F. offensive patrols by two. Seven attacks were made which com­ were maintained at full pressure. prised 63 effective sorties by Baltimores, 39 by As a result of combats arising from our inter­ Bostons and 24 by Mitchells, the .bombers being ceptions on patrols, thirteen ME.109s, six JU.87s escorted by 108 Kittyhawks, 39 P.40s and 12 To­ and one JU.52 were destroyed, nine ME.109s, mahawks. So devastating was the bombing that three JU.87s and one MC.202 probably destroy­ the enemy forces were unable to concentrate and ed, and twenty other aircraft damaged. the planned attack was abandoned. This was In addition, our fighter-bombers, long-range the last occasion on which the enemy's land single-engined fighters and Beaufighters encount­ forces took the initiative. ered enemy opposition and succeeded in shooting Once again combats with enemy aircraft were down such diverse types of aircraft as JU.52s, numerous and once again the Allied fighters JU.87s and ME.109s. Special mention may be came out on top, shooting down nine fighters, made of the successful interception of a heavily probably destroying three others and damaging escorted Stuka formation by fighter-bom­ another six for the loss of two R.A.F. fighters. bers on 1st November. During the early morn­ U.S.A.A.F. P.40s again excelled, destroying four ing, Kittyhawks of No. 112 Squadron and U.S. ME.109s without loss to themselves. The enemy A.A.F. P.40s intercepted a formation of 30 JU. seemed to be unable to deviate from the set plan 87s escorted by 15 ME.109s. The Stukas were of sending over heavily escorted Stuka forma­ forced to jettison their bombs on their own troops tions in spite of the heavy losses sustained; little and then, while the P.40s prevented the enemy assistance was given to their land forces and, fighters from interfering, the Kittyhawks attack­ in fact, the Stukas often jettisoned their bombs ed the dive-bombers shooting down seven, pro­ on their own positions when threatened by our bably destroying three and damaging five others fighters. without loss to themselves. Our casualties during the four days in ques­ Reduced R.A.F. Bomber Effort tion -totalled one Wellington and eight fighters From 29th October until the evening of 1st destroyed and two Bostons and six fighters November, comparatively few targets were estab­ seriously damaged. lished for our bombers in the battle area due Vinth Army Advances to the dispersal of the enemy's vehicles and dur­ ing this time the light bombers carried out only On the night lst/2nd November, our land 150 effective sorties and Wellingtons 66, chiefly forces struck hard due west, aiming at the against small concentrations in the northern Rahman track in the neighbourhood of Tel El sector. Aqqaqir. The enemy was caught napping as he Conditions in the battle area were now suitable expected our attack along the line of the railway. for fighter-bomber employment, however, and By dawn, our armour was between the enemy's during the four days in question over 400 sorties armoured divisions and soon afterwards out Ln were made on groups of vehicles, gun emplace­ the open country. ments, encampments and suspected enemy head­ During the time that our troops were making quarters. The greatest effort was on 1st No­ their first advance, continuous attacks lasting for vember when 173 sorties were carried out by seven hours were made on the enemy's forces in Hurricane and Kittyhawk-bombers escorted by the Ghazal and Sidi Abd El Rahman areas Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and P.40s. Fourteen by 100 Wellingtons aided by 13 Albacores. Great attacks were delivered in the northern sector destruction was caused among large vehicle con­ against enemy forces which were attacking our centrations, twenty fires were started) and hits troops in order to relieve the pressure on enemy scored on the railway line and the main road. units which were encircled in the coastal area The raids were of inestimable value in limiting west of Alamem. In the fruitless effort s resistance to our push. Full pene­ tration of the enemy's defensive line was accord­ drawal and that the coast road from Doha to ingly achieved and victory was in sight. Fuka was black with traffic moving west. The next day, 2nd November, our armour went From midday, the maximum ibomber effort was ahead of our infantry. < It was attacked from diverted against these closely-packed enemy the north and the south-west by the two German columns. Formations of Baltimores, Bostons and armoured divisions. The south-westerly attack Mitchells escorted by Tomahawks, Kittyhawks was repulsed with heavy enemy losses but the and P.40s operated incessantly with fighter-bom­ attack from the north was stemmed only after bers and fighters against the slowly-moving traf­ we had been forced back and had suffered tank fic. More than 300 vehicles were immobilised, casualties. The battle ended in our favour by the anti-aircraft guns were silenced and troops were evening but it was the most bitterly contested mercilessly mown down. By dusk, transport battle of armour of all the Alamein clashes. vehicles were seen to be burning along the whole length of road from Ghazal to Fuka. In the Once again, the light bomber "shuttle service" course of the day, 254 effective sorties were made went into operation. Thirteen attacks were de­ by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. bombers, 154 by fight­ livered in the course of the day on enemy forces er aircraft on ground attacks, and 122 by fight­ massing to counter-attack in the northern sector; er-bombers. 171 effective sorties were made by Bostons and Baltimores and 40 by Mitchells, escort being The Luftwaffe's murder of fleeing civilians on provided by Tomakawks, Kittyhawks and P.40s. the roads of France was being avenged: the The effects of the attacks were most apparent Axis soldiery was having a taste of what their in the afternoon; thus, as a direct result of one air force had so often joyously inflicted. of the light bomber raids in front of our lines 200 Some of the low-flying fighter attacks were demoralised enemy troops walked over to our po­ made on targets in the central and southern sitions with hands upraised as token of surrender. sectors and IID Hurricanes located suitable tar­ That evening, a German artillery officer wrote gets in the south, scoring hits on fifteen tanks in his diary "Where are our fighters, our Stukas and a number of armoured cars and large lorries. and A.A. ? Can't see a thing of them. Tommy In comparison with our intensive effort, enemy comes every quarter of an hour with eighteen air activity was on a slight scale. Two escorted : heavy bombers." To his untutored eyes, the Bal­ JU.87 attacks were intercepted and some of the timares and Bostons appeared to be "heavy" Stukas were forced to jettison their bonibs, and bombers and this slip unwittingly pays tribute to attempts to interfere with our fighters operating the effectiveness of their attacks. over the coastal road were unsuccessful. In Spitfires and Hurricanes carried out a record combats with the enemy, eight JU.87s and six number of 374 sorties in patrols over the battle­ ME.109s were shot down, ten JU.87s and one field. Two Stuka formations were prevented ME.109 probably destroyed and ten other air­ from bombing our' forward troops and five JU. craft damaged. 87s were shot down, four probably destroyed and It was to be expected that as a result of our nine damaged and one escorting ME.109 was pro­ intensive air operations R.A.F. casualties would bably destroyed and two damaged. In other be heavy: nineteen fighters and fighter-bombers comibats, six German fighters were destroyed, were destroyed, one Boston was shot down by and a't least three damaged. Our total casual­ anti-aircraft fire and sixteen fighters and. two ties for the day were six R.A.F. and one U.S. light bombers were seriously damaged. Hurri­ A.A.F. fighters shot down, two Baltimores des­ canes, which were carrying the burden of the troyed by anti-aircraft fire and four fighters and normal fighter activity and opposed by enemy one Baltimore seriously damaged. fighters of superior performance, were extremely The bombing of the enemy's northern concen­ hard hit, thirteen being shot down and eleven trations was continued throughout the night by badly damaged. the entire Wellington force with the usual Alba­ For ten hours that night, 3/4th November, the core complement. A total of 85 effective sorties relentless bombing of the columns withdrawing was made by the medium bombers and eleven by along the coastal road was continued, particular­ the flare-dropping Albacores. These attacks ly between Daba and Fuka, by Wellingtons allowed no respite to the weary enemy forces which carried out 110 effective sorties, aided by and no opportunity for necessary regrouping. 19 Albacores. During one period of the attack,; During the night, No. 73 Squadron Hurricanes thirty fires were counted and many of these were patrolled over the battle-field, but no enemy air­ accompanied by violent explosions. Further craft were sighted. west, moreover, road traffic was straffed by The Enemy Withdraws night Beaufighters and Hurricanes. The next morning, 3rd November, seven attacks Pursuit of the Enemy comprising 94 effective sorties by escorted R.A.F. The first line to which the enemy's main force and U.S.A.A.F. light bombers were delivered withdrew ran southwards from Ghazal. Dur­ against the weakening enemy troops in the north. ing the morning, 4th November, our armour and In the meantime, our tactical reconnaissance transport moved round the enemy's southern aircraft reported that there were signs of a with­ flank. There was no to time to think of Axis The Luftwaffe's murder of fleeing eii'diaus on the roads of h'ranee was I'e'uuj az'cnyed

^

IJJU, rmans had to move fast "to fires and Kittyhawks, operating from the land­ live to fight another day." A headlong retreat ing grounds at Daba. westward ensued and the VHIth Army followed in close pursuit. Movement of the R.A.F. in Pursuit Light bombers continually bombed enemy From the moment the enemy's withdrawal positions on the Ghazal line and harassed the began, the maximum air effort had been directed enemy's transport withdrawing along the coastal towards causing havoc, confusion and delay road. In all, 141 effective sorties were carried along the enemy's restricted line of retreat. out by R.A.F. light bombers and 42 by U.S.A.A.F. The attacks at night, when the enemy's main Mitchells, and fighter-bombers and low-flying movements took place,, presented no additional fighters operated at maximum intensity. Dur­ difficulties yet, as the medium and heavy bom­ ing the night no respite was allowed to the bers could carry on from their existing bases. enemy, and bombing was continued to prevent The day attacks, once the retreat became a him effecting a stand along the Fuka escarp­ rout, were carried out principally by fighters ment. 77 Wellingtons and 13 Albacores carried and fighter^bombers, not simply because the on with the destruction along the coastal road targets were ideal for their employment, but due and on the beaches as far as Fuka, inflicting chiefly to the fact that these aircraft could be great damage on transport and tanks. At Daba, more quickly established at re-occupied landing as a result of enemy demolitions and R.A.F. grounds than the light bombers and could be bombing, fires were visible for seventy miles. more easily maintained. The fitting of long- On 5th November, remnants of the German range tanks to fighter aircraft ensured that the armoured divisions and mobile infantry attempt­ enemy could be harassed to extreme range. ed to make a stand at Fuka. The R.A.F.'s When later on in the pursuit enemy resistance intensive bombing, however, had prevented the stiffened, the light bombers were again brought enemy re-grouping his forces. Our armoured and forward and added weight to the- air attacks. motorised forces broke the German line and the An R.A.F. aerodrome reconnaissance party, pursuit of the fleeing enemy troops was resum­ which was in W/T communication with Adv. Air ed. At this time, the Germans were estimated KQ., W.D., and an R.E. aerodrome construction to have only 30 of their original 270 tanks and party went ahead with our forward troops and practically all the Italian tanks, through casual­ ensured the immediate repair of the re-occupied ties or capture, were out of the battle. aerodromes. They were aided in their task by Escorted light bomfbers and fighter-bombers sappers who cleared landing grounds which had harassed the enemy in the Fuka area during been mined as a No. £ priority job. Actually, in the morning and in the afternoon attacks were the first mad rush, the enemy left their landing made on transport concentrations near Maaten grounds in such a hurry that many serviceable Baguslh: Meanwhile, fighter patrols were main­ and hundreds of damaged aircraft were aban­ tained over our forward troops in the Fuka doned, and attempts to prevent our occupation and Sidi Haneish areas. Although enemy air by mining or rigging-up of boody traps were activity was now curtailed, German fighters at­ not really formidable until Derna was reached. tempted to break up our patrols, but without The work of the R.A.F. Regiment, also, in secur­ success. Enemy casualties in combat totalled ing landing grounds and providing protection for five ME.109s destroyed, one "probable", and units on the move was of the greatest value three damaged; we lost four fighters. throughout the pursuit. When the word was received from the recon­ Hampered by Rain naissance party that a certain landing ground The pursuit of our land forces was greatly was ready for use, the advance ground parties hampered on the 6th and 7th November by heavy of squadrons and the control formation moved for­ rain which rendered all movement off the road ward and these were followed by the air parties. impossible. Moreover, the rain rendered the Later, when distances became formidable, trans­ recently captured Daba landing ground unser­ port aircraft for the conveyance of personnel viceable for a time, and low cloud limited our and supplies were employed on a large scale day bomber activity. and enabled our fighters to hop to bases 150 From 6th to 8th November inclusive, the light miles further west at a time, much to the cons­ bomber activity was negligible, but heavy and ternation of the fleeing enemy troops. medium bombers, unaffected by the extent of the enemy's flight, kept up their night attacks Time-Tables on enemy columns retreating along the coast The following time-tables showing the rate of road between Sidi Barrani and SoUum and progress of the Vlllth Army and the R.A.F. through Half ay a pass. On the nights 6/7th, clock-like reoccupation of aerodromes when 7/8th, and 8/9th November, heavy bombers the momentum of the retreat was at its greatest made 32 and medium bombers 127 effective are revealing, not only as proof of Berlin's sorties in these areas. The day attacks were contention that Rommel was "a master of now carried out by fighters and fighter-bombers retreat" but more pertinently that our land and aijfd 6f]fena|v^, ^patfplsiv^^^tt^intained by Spit­ air forces were past masters in the art of pursuit.

46 VHIth Army's Advance ^^ ^ ^ ^ejeteSistveLy1 f&'r* 1 5th - 6th November Fuka Escarpment cuaTiorf'dr^fliPImportant base. The main part' 8th November Mutruh. of the fighter force located at Gazala was ac­ 9th November Sidi Bar rani. cordingly directed against this activity. On 11th November Halfaya. 17th and 18th November, fourteen JU.52s were 13th November Tobmk. shot down and nine JU.52s and fourteen other 19th November Benghazi. aircraft, mainly transport, were destroyed on the 23rd November Jedabya. ground. From this time, the enemy gave up using aerodromes in the Benghazi area. Fighter Occupation of Landing Grounds Meanwhile, cover for a convoy westbound to 6th November Daba, Malta was provided on 18th November by fight­ 9th November Sidi Haneish. ers operating from Gazala. It was clear that day 10th November Mischeifa. fighter protection could now be provided for such 13th November Sidi Azeiz. convoys for practically the entire route. 14th November Gambut. Offensive fighter patrols over our advancing 17th November Gazala. troops and beyond were regularly carried out, in. 19th November Martubu. spite of most unfavourable weather on many days, by Spitfires, Kittyhawks and P.40s, although The impetus of the pursuit was maintained in difficulties of supply and maintenance at landing spite of rain, which at times hindered the ad­ grounds increasingly distant from our bases ne­ vance of our armoured units and rendered land­ cessarily limited the scale of this activity. ing grounds unserviceable, and mining which From 9th to 23rd November, R.A.F. and slowed up progress on the roads and delayed the U.S.A.A.F. fighters made over 400 sorties on re-occupation of deserted aerodromes. offensive land patrols. In general, engagements with enemy aircraft were few as the Axis air R.A.F. Fighter Activity forces were hastily retiring and any tendency to hang on to landing grounds to the last minute, During the enemy's headlong retreat to Je­ as the R.A.F. had done in the previous June, was dabya the R.A.F. attacks against the fleeing thoroughly discouraged by our low-flying fighter columns were for reasons already mentioned attacks. Combats were most frequent on the delivered almost entirely by fighters and fighter- 11th November, as the speed of our advance bombers. From the 9th to 23rd November, brought our fighters into contact with the enemy R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters carried out ap<­ air forces based at El Adem and Gambut. Over proximately 700 effective sorties in fighter- the Sollum, area, No. 2 Squadrons S.A.A.F. en­ bomber and ground straffing attacks. These countered fifteen JU.87s escorted by six ME.109s. attacks on the enemy's extended lines of traffic The Kittyhawks shot down eight of the Stukas caused great havoc and confusion and the speed and probably destroyed four more. The remain­ with which the R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters ing three dive-bombers were intercepted by P.40s kept up with our land advance often enabled as they were about to land at Gambut and all them to catch enemy columns, which imagined three were shot down. As a result of other com­ themselves out of range, totally unprepared for bats on this day, six JU.52s, five ME.109s, one air attacks. JU.88 and one Fieseler Storch were shot down. Our lossers were six Kittyhawks and one P.40. A particularly masterly move was that of two Hurricane squadrons on 13th November to a desert landing ground 180 miles due east of Je^­ R.A.F. Bomber Activity dabya, while our main fighter activity was The last time during the enemy's withdrawal still against the enemy in the Jebel area. The that his transport was concentrated to provide move of the ground personnel and necessary a suitable day target for our light bomber force supplies was carried out by air transport and the was on 9th November. During that day, 24 Bos­ Hurricanes were operating on the afternoon of tons, escorted by Kittyhawks and P.40s, operated the day of arrival. Thus, to the great surprise from Sidi Haneish against tightly-packed con­ of the enemy, our fighters appeared over the centrations of vehicles between Sollum and Hal­ enemy's leading columns in the Jeddbya-Agheila faya and inflicted considerable damage. There­ area while the main Axis units were still east of after, until concentrations were located at Marble Benghazi. The results of the Hurricane attacks Arch and resistance hardened at Buerat in the were excellent. 130 vehicles were destroyed and following month, the light bombers were not 170 damaged; two aircraft were destroyed in the called upon again as difficulties of supply and air and twelve on the ground. By 16th Nov­ maintenance were too great to justify their spo­ ember, however, enemy fighter defence in the radic employment. area was strengthened and the squadrons were From 9th to 12th November, targets provided brought back, again with the help of air trans­ by enemy night moves were available for our port, to a landing ground further east. medium bombers, and on these four nights the By 16th November, the enemy's rear columns Wellingtons progressively followed the enemy had reached Benghazi. Owing to lack of columns from Sollum to Derna, making a total of 119 effective sorties. motor transport and fuel, the enemy began to After a lull during the last fortnight in November, when the enemy forces went tempo­ these ports by the enemy. Against Tobruk, rarily out of range for the fighter force and R.A.F. heavy and medium bombers carried out targets were not suitable for medium bomber 28 effective sorties on the night ,10/llth Nov­ employment, air attacks were again resumed ember, and between the 10th and 14th November, against enemy positions in December. R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. heavy bombers made 28 During the month, approximately 760 effective and Wellingtons 19 effective sorties against Ben­ sorties were made by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. ghazi. fighter-bombers against vehicle concentrations, From the night 21/22nd November onward, positions, and encampments and many ground however, Tripoli took on the unenviable dis­ straffing attacks were also made against the tinction of being the principal R.A.F. target same targets. Our fighter-bomber activity was among the enemy's supply ports, and from that particularly intensive on the 13th and 14th De­ ('ate R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. bombers kept up a cember against enemy land forces withdrawing series of constant attacks. from the Mersa Brega and Agheila positions. On 13th December from dawn to dusk a re­ With our speedy re-occupation of Cyrenaicu, cord total of 276 effective sorties were made targets thinned out for our medium bombers. Ac­ by R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters on bombing cordingly, a large proportion of the Wellington force was transferred to Malta in order, primari­ and straffing attacks against enemy transport ly, to operate against Tunisia. The work of the columns and tanks moving westward, bound for medium bombers had been magnificent. In Tripolitania. The following day the attacks were their constant hammering of the Axis supply continued but on a slightly reduced scale as suit­ ports, attacks on aerodromes, and breaking up able targets gradually thinned out as the enemy's of enemy concentrations on the battle-field, the withdrawal proceeded. medium bomber squadrons operated repeatedly at During December, the light bomber force was full pressure. The Wellingtons had played a most again brought into action although targets were memorable part in the Battle for Egypt. not comparable with those afforded by the vast concentration at Alamein. On 15th December, " On to Tripoli ! " concentrations of transport vehicles were report­ The Axis retreat from Fuka to Mcrsa Brega ed on the coastal road west of Marble Arch and in eighteen days constituted a Libyan record, but in the wadis to the south. Three attacks were even more remarkable was the success of our made by 36 Bostons and Baltimores and IS land and air forces in keeping on the enemy's U.S.A.A.F. Mitchells, escorted by Kittyhawks tail, in spite of most unfavourable weather, the and P. 40s, and these inflicted widespread delays imposed by mining, booby-traps and des­ damage. The knowledge that the dreaded light truction of roads, and stubborn enemy rear-guard bombers were again close at hand must also have actions, particularly in the Jebel El Akdar. filled the enemy with forebodings for the future. On the following day, escorted R.A.F. and At Agheila, there was an inevitable lull as U.S.A.A.F. light bombers made 64 effective our forces moved up in preparation for a stiff sorties against transport in the Nofilia area and fight, but once again the enemy evacuated his anti-aircraft batteries in the vicinity were also positions before full pressure could be brought attacked. Although considerable damage was Lo bear on him. By the end of the year, ,the done, the targets were still reported as "limited" Axis forces had withdrawn to Busrat. Thereafter, for day bomber attack. our watchword was "On to Tripoli!" The R.A.F. continued their attacks as oux ad­ The dispersal of the enemy's forces likewise vance continued. From the time the enemy began precluded the extensive use of the medium bomb­ to establish himself at Ayheila, on the 23rd Nov­ ers against them. During December, only 37 ember, the Allied bombers increased their attacks effective sorties were carried out by Wellingtons on his Tripolitanian supply ports. From that date against enemy postions and concentrations and to the end of the year, R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. all but seven of these were made on the nights heavy bombers carried out over 70 effective sor­ of 18/19th and 19/20th December against con­ ties against the port of Tripoli, and Wellingtons centrations near Buerat El Hsun where enemy also made an appreciable number of sorties resistance was again stiffening. against this all-important Axis base. In addition, While the enemy was being chased into Tripo­ constant attacks were made on Misuntta, Horns, lilaniu full reconnaissance of the forward areas Bucrat El Hsun and other bases in the enemy's was carried out by No. 40 Squadron S.A.A.F. and immediate rear. the coastal area was covered by No. 1437 Flight. Meanwhile, air attacks wore continued against This .work was of inestimable value to both our,, the enemy's Tripoli!am.an landing grounds and ex­ land and air forces. tended to the long-range bomber bases in Crete. Above all, in spite of constant unfavourable In all, from 23rd November to the end of the weather conditions, difficulties of supply, and the year over 150 effective sorties were carried out extensive damage to landing grounds by mining by R.A.F. heavy and medium bombers against at Benina, Btrka and Marble Arch, by booby these targets. traps at Merrluma and ploughing at Ghindel, Sirte and Tamet, R.A.F. Spitfires and Kitty- tions, by its* denial or. essejatf&V sui>pi|es*fco•{ the hawks maintained continuous offensive patrols enemy, ascendency over the bpposirig air forces and never lost air supremacy. and sustained attacks in the battlefield, the Air Power R.A.F. played a decisive part in the Battle for Egypt. From 20th May, a week before the Ga­ In order to crush the enemy in the Middle East, zala battles began, to the end of the year, R.A.F. the Royal Navy, Army and R.A.F. planned in aircraft based in Egypt and Cyrenaica carried unison but retained individual operational con­ out nearly 22,000 bomber and fighter-bomber ef­ trol. The three independent partners, all special­ fective sorties against land and sea targets and ists in their own particular form of warfare, were R.A.F. fighters, excluding the fighter-bomber at­ imbued alike with the one aim of destroying the tacks included in the above total, made approx­ enemy wherever he was encountered — on land, imately 50,000 sorties. on the sea and under it, and in the air. The whole power of the air, both tactical and From the opening of the enemy's campaign strategical, had been brought to bear on the ene­ in May to the final rout of the Axis forces at the my. The results achieved are significant not end of the year, the R.A.F. grew in power and only as they concern the campaigns in Africa consistently extended the scope of its activity. As but as an augury of what is to come in the final is apparent in the foregoing account of opera­ reckoning with the Nazi and Fascist Powers.

LAND AND HARBOUR RECONNAISSANCE BY AIRCRAFT BASED ON CYRENAICA/EGYPT 19/20 MAY - 29 DECEMBER, 1942. Summarised in Fortnightly Periods. Sorties include CRETE and GREECE FORT­ Tac/R P/R & V/R FORTNIGHTLY Strat/R NIGHTLY PERIODS and P/R TOTALS Land Harbour

19/20 May - 2 June ... 85 14 45 144 2/3 - 16 June 85 21 24 32 162 16/17 - 30 June 32 22 18 24 96 30 June/1 - 14 July . 123 23 22 30 198 14/15 - 28 July ... 194 18 37 43 292 28/29 July - 11 Aug. 77 20 18 34 149 11/12 - 25 Aug. 88 15 33 35 171 25/26 Aug. - 8 Sept. 43 13 27 50 133 8/9 - 22 Sept 25 16 35 35 111 22/23 Sept. - 6 Oct. 35 14 27 23 99 6/7 - 20 Oct 80 14 37 12 143 20/21 Oct. - 3 Nov. ... 77 18 49 21 165 3/4 Nov. - 17 Nov. ... 50 26 18 17 111 17/18 Nov. - 1 Dec. ... 17 20 23 15 75 16 10 1/2 - 15 Dec 28 23 77 19 15 15/16 - 29 Dec 22 14 70

GRAND TOTALS ... 1061 291 448 396 2196

* Included in LAND section — separate figures not available. Figures for SEA RECONNAISSANCE from CYRENAICA/EGYPT are attached to the article "THE WAR AT SEA — SUMMER AND AUTUMN, 1942"

49 ATTACKS by BOMBER, TORPEDO and MINE-LAYING AIRCRAFT based on CYRENAICA/EGYPT U.S.A.A AGAINST LAND TARGETS: 19/20th MAY —29th DECEMBER, 1942. KEY :. \ BRITIS Summarised in Fortnightly Periods.

Effective Sorties. (Sorties by U.S.A.A.F. are not included from 8/9th September, by which date control of certain American bomber t-quailron:-; h:iM assumed by H.Q., U.S.A.A.F.)

AERODROMES and ENEMY CAMPS, PORTS and BASES POSITIONS and LINES LANDING GROUNDS- of COMMUNICATION FORTNIGHTLY

PERIODS V CD tD 0) £•2 bJD Is bog to 3 EM 3

19/20 May - 2 June ... 32 17 49 255 71 3.T1 15 122 359 6 (6 2/3 - 16 June 9 82 9 100 172 70 212 9 667 94 8 31 31 16/17 - 30 June 20 117 17 154 196 61 33 290 12 273 120 38 38 30 June/1 - 14 July 24 386 28 438 76 49 186 311 417 1039 1072 61 61 14/15 - 28 July 77 443 69 89 130 105 93 328 195 665­ 681 1541 34 34 28/29 July - 11 Aug. 86 753 66 05 26 55 81 12 85 329 n 27 U 1 11/12 - 25 Aug. 88 411 53 552 25 24 49 129 107 255 74 34 34 98 25/26 Aug. - 8 Sept. 82 149 231 5 73 48 126 14 401 697 92 8/9 - 22 Sept 78 345 423 26 93 123 11 43 22/23 Sept. - 6 Oct. ... 69 246 315 62 162 224 4 97 6/7 - 20 Oct 22 216 238 2 55 229 149 435 9 1 1N9 20/21 Oct. - 3 Nov. ... 35 43 62 128 348 204 742 541 lit 15 9 if) 3/4 - 17 Nov 17 44 61 21 23 19 526 27(i 417 17/18 Nov. - 1 Dec. ... 22 3 ' 25 6 69 75 1/2 - 15 Dec 26 10 36 10 16 21 47 7 36 428 15/16 - 29 Dec 14 17 38 50 50 30 154

261 27 35 35 98 100 GRAND TOTALS ... 634 3289 2 4 4197 106 1359 1315 726 3506 73 2579 5294 6012 13958 21661 OPERATIONS BY FIGHTER AND FIGHTER-BOMBER AIRCRAFT BASED ON CYRENAICA/EGYPT AGAINST LAND AND SEA TARGETS. — 19/20th May - 29th December, 1942. Summarised in fortnightly periods. Ground Ground Anti-ship­ FORTNIGHTLY Offensive Attack Ground Recon­ sweep— .E.&T.E. Attack- Attack— Bomber naissance Local ping and Shipping TOTALS PERIODS Land. (includ. anti-tank Fighter- Escort Escort Defence offensive Protection Cannon) Bombers sweeps

19/20 May ­ 2 June . 619 211 258 386 125 837 10 742

2/3 ­ 16 June ... . 1755 118 37 731 776 90 501 3 887

16/17 ­ 30 June ... . 1198 69 6 508 441 11 135 52 344

30 June/1 ­ 14 July . 2655 87 23 1507 1265 20 563 54 360

14/15 ­ 28 July ... . 2101 60 14 955 800 69 .J .23 24 428

28/29 July ­ 11 Aug. . 1142 51 3 359 364 147 393 82 346

H/12 - 25 Aug. ... 559 18 265 305 126 581 42 455

25/26 Aug. ­ 8 Sept. 1665 92 18 92 946 261 797 53 380

8/9 ­ 22 Sept. ... ' 1246 48 63 20 336 349 15 392

22/23 Sept. ­ 6 Oct. 866 69 6 101 149 281 160 8 268

6/7._ 20 Oct 726 173 5 364 560 239 132 11 219

20/21 Oct. ­ 3 Nov. 3040 375 63 1290 2773 201 397 11 317 3 4 i? / ­ N ° V - ••• 639 543 32 447 282 176 24 510 17/18 Nov. ­ 1 Dec. 327 102 39 26 527 29 738

1/2 ­ 15 Dec. ... 746 34 494 165 194 488 4 970 355 15/16 ­ 29 Dec. ... 79 508 116 134 350 8 798

GRAND TOTALS 19839 2129 207 7942 9387 2260 7609 430 S184 57987 Attacks On Coastal-Traffic

A PARTICULAR FKAi'iJti; of the month be­ craft flew at sea level and whenever possible tween 20th July and 17th August, 1942, was the attacked from the sun, but even so formidable enemy's effort to improve his supply position at anti-aircraft fire was invariably put up by the El Alamein by sailing convoys of "F"-boats from guns mounted on each boat. Tobruk to Mersa Matruh. On sighting their targets the Beaufighters These "F"-boats are primarily tank-landing opened up to about 200 knots and, climbing to craft, although they are also suitable for carrying 200/300 feet, carried out individual attacks in motor vehicles, general cargo or even troops. A shallow dives. Pilots opened fire at approxima­ large number were reported to have been built in tely 700 yards, closing to 50 yards or less, using Greece shortly after the Axis occupation. Their 20 mm. ball, A.P. and incendiary ammunition. length is normally 156 feet; beam 21 feet; The action was directed mainly against the draught about 3 feet, 6 inches; and displacement engine room and fuel tanks aft. In many cases about 320 tons. They are driven by three Diesel the pilots reported that their fire ricocheted off engines developing some 130 H.P. each and their the hull and decks, but this may have been due speed is eight knots. to shallow dive attacks made from astern or at an angle to the side, because it has been esta­ For protection they have armour plating £ blished beyond doubt that the hulls of these ves­ inches thick round the bridge and floor of the sels are vulnerable to any type 20 mm. cannon bridge, with three plates (about 3 x 3£ feet long shell, and even to .303 A.P. bullets at less than and spaced about 9 inches apart) lining the sides 250 yards range. of the engine-room. Their defence is good, con­ sisting of one 75 mm. and two 20 mm. guns — Of 21 "F"-boats attacked by Beaufighters five but they are vulnerable to attack from the air, were destroyed, all of them being eastbound and as will be seen. believed fully loaded with ammunition or fuel as in four cases they either exploded or immediately Attacks by Beaufightfers caught fire; the fifth was so badly holed that it sank. In addition two were probably des­ The first striking force employed against them troyed and four damaged. These were west­ consisted of two experienced Beaufighter squa­ bound and presumably unloaded. drons on daylight offensive sweeps in flights of Balanced against these results two Beau- four or six aircraft, half of which acted as top fighters, out of 35 that made attacks, were shot cover. In an effort to achieve surprise the air­ down by return fire, five were damaged and the

"I-"-boats arc primarily tank-landin

An "F"-boat beached near Sollum after an attack..

53 War At Sea

SUMMER AND AUTUMN, 1942

THE BATTLE OF the Mediterranean, or the battle back at El Agheila—with practically no petrol, of sea communications, began in the winter of ammunition or food. 1940 when the British first drove the Italians Unfortunately, the British position in the for­ beyond Benghazi. Although we won the opening ward area was equally difficult. Our lines of round, we were unable to exploit our advantage communication were extended to breaking point, because the enemy's sea communications were the state of the ground was bad for mechanised more easily maintained than ours were and we forces and for aircraft, and supplies of all kinds could not step him from running the supplies he were short because we were too slow in opening needed to Tripoli and other North African ports. up Benghazi. The speed with which Benghazi was It was already clear that before any future battle opened up in November, 1942, shows what might could be won on the land, the sea battle had to have been done in December, 1941. The point be won first. was that it was not done—and Rommel's des­ The position worsened in the spring of 1941 perate venture from the El Agheila position with the Axis occupation of Greece and Crete. came off. Why this should be so is obvious when it is This venture on 21st January, which began as realized that the.entire Mediterranean area can a reconnaissance in strength with three days' be covered by bombers based on the mainland or rations only, was eventually sustained on captur­ on the strategically important islands of Sicily, ed supplies. In the initial stages, the enemy was Malta, Crete, Rhodes and Cyprus, and that the so short of fuel and other essentials that for five enemy was now in a better position than we days Rommel kept his forces grounded, dispens­ were for taking advantage of this fact. ing entirely with air support. In consequence Our land forces had to fall back to the Egyptian his land forces had to take all the R.A.F. could frontier in April and, with the Axis air force in give them. That, however, is another story. The SiciSj and Crete, our shipping routes through the point of importance here is that shortage of Eastern Mediterranean were effectively closed. supplies, due to sustained R.A.F. and Naval at­ The enemy, on the other hand, having obtained tacks on his lines of communication, rendered shorter and more easily protected shipping lanes the enemy defeatable in the winter of 1941, and to Africa, was well placed to supply and augment history was to repeat itself in 1942. the forces threatening Egypt. Having pushed us back to Gazala in February. 1942, the enemy, in order to maintain his forces No. 201 Group Formed in North Africa, had to knock out Malta and thus Throughout the summer and autumn of 1941 prevent interference with his convoys. The air the battle of sea communications continued. offensive against the island opened early in 1942, Between June and November aircraft based on reached its peak in April and, through the un­ Egypt or Malta sank 43 enemy ships out of a paralleled efforts of Malta's fighter pilots, died total of 95 destroyed. The bulk of attacks away in May. against enemy shipping was made by Malta's aircraft—373 effective sorties as against 32 from The Main Effort From Egypt Egypt. It was anticipated, however, and later During this onslaught on Malta, a larger share justified by the event, that the enemy would at­ tempt to neutralise Malta and that our offensive of the task of attacking the enemy's supply would have to be maintained from the east. In routes fell to Egypt-based aircraft, although view of this, No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Malta's effort was still sustained at as high a Group was formed in September to devote its level as possible. Through the spring, summer attention solely to defensive and offensive work and autumn of 2942 aircraft of Nos. 201 and 205 in connection with shipping. The policy was for Groups put up a magnificent performance No. 205 Group to help with long range bombing against shipping running into Tobruk and Ben­ when required and A.H.Q., Western Desert with ghazi. No. 201 Group's record in this period fighter protection at need. constitutes one of the most outstanding feats of the war and the price it had to pay for its As a result of the R.A.F.'s efforts in the success, in the shape of lost aircraft, was pro­ summer and autumn of 1941 the enemy had few portionately heavy. reserve supplies when the "Crusader" campaign That success, however, was such that when opened in November. In January, 1942, he was e lines stabilized at El Alamein in July and RHODES ^SCARPANTO

ALEXANDRIA J ATRUH •was TTtylTTg largely on sup­ A more detailed analysis of the R.A.FYs Medi­ plies captured from us during his advance. This terranean effort appears below; the American state of affairs was brought about Jointly by effort is dealt with in a separate article on Malta's, No. 201 Group's and the Royal Navys page 92. submarines' attacks on shipping in transit; by the almost nightly attacks on ports and bases The Position ait 20th May, 1942 carried out by No. 205 Group; and, after Junu, Factors affecting operations in the Eastern by the American heavy bombers who brought Mediterranean at the opening of the period under new zest and enthusiasm to the day strikes review were as follows:­ against shipping.

One that did not arrive: this Axis cargo vessel, with a list to port and ablaze from bow to stern, is seen low in the ivater just before she sank after being attacked by the R.A.F, bringing forward supplies from Alexandria to Tobruk. thereafter hea,vy bombers took up the task. Al­ though Benghazi still retained its importance "to Enemy Shipping Routes the enemy in spite of its distance from El Ala­ mem, Tobruk became a nearer -and more - con­ The main Axis shipping routes between Italy venient port for off-loading. Between the date of and North Africa were as follows (see map on Tobruk's capture by the enemy—20th June—and page 53):— its recapture by us in early November, no few­ (i) Leaving Naples, ships made for Palermo, er than 3,526 effective bomber sorties were made kept north-west of Trapani, and made against it, and 4,250 tons of bombs were dropped. landfall in North Africa near Cape Bon; Of 63 vessels definitively hit by bombing in thence they kept close inshore past Kerk­ Cyrenaican. or Western Desert harbours between enna to Tripoli, and either cut straight the above dates, 40 were hit in Tobruk, eleven across to Benghazi or hugged the coast in Mersa. Matruh and eleven in Benghazi. Two along the Gulf of Sirte. From Benghazi of the three wrecks in Benghazi harbour—known smaller craft coast-crept to Be-ma, Tobruk to bomber crews as "Harry," "George" and "John­ or Matrutfi, depending on the pisition of the ny"—which had been used as landing sfages, were enemy's forward line. destroyed in September. (ii) The alternate route from Naples was for ships to sail through the Straits of Messina Attacks on Shipping at Sea and then turn north-east and make towards A complete analysis of attacks against enemy the heel of Italy. There they joined the shipping toy aircraft from Malta and Egypt is route taken by ships sailing from Taranto given on page 61. The mounting scale of sorties or Brindisi, which followed the Greek coast and damage inflicted becomes apparent from the to Cephalonia, passed inside the island of figures given on the next page, which do not Zante, and made south either for Benghazi include attacks on submarines (see page 58). or Tobruk. The change of route by enemy shipping men­ (iii) A variation of the eastern route was for tioned can be traced in the number of vessels ships, having reached Cephalonia, to pass attacked; in the first five weeks only 12 were through the Corinth Canal, turn south for attacked from Egypt and 42 + from Malta; in Crete and thence make Tobruk or one of July the figure rose to 38 + from Egypt and the smaller Cyrenaican ports. dropped to 16 attacked from Malta; in August The enemy varied these routes according to the total of ships attacked from Egypt reached whether the greater number of R.A.F. strikes the peak figure of 69, while only 10 were at­ was from Egypt or from Malta. tacked from Malta. In May vessels using route (ii) were apt to August might well be described as the turning keep as far east as possible. This tendency was point of this battle for sea communications; for produced by an erroneous deduction on the the results—twelve ships sunk, twelve probably enemy's part. He appears to have believed that sunk, 23 damaged, with 32 -\- other attacks of the Egypt-based Torpedo-Wellingtons of No. 38 which results could not be seen—seriously affect­ Squadron, which began to operate that month, ed the strength of the Axis forces at a time when were operating from Maltoi He, therefore, mov­ they were making every effort to resume their ed much of his shipping further out of range of drive on Egypt. the dangerous island and temporarily into range Convoys of "F"-boats were employed coast­ of Egypt-ba.sed aircraft. wise between Tobruk and Mersa Matruh; these As a rule, although there were exceptions, were, however, successfully attacked by our air­ route (i) tended to be favoured until July when craft. In view of the interest of these tank- Malta's strikes forced enemy ships to keep to landing craft, which were specially built to carry the eastern route. a maximum load with the minimum risk of de­ The Results of our Retreat tection, attacks against them are described in a special article on page 50. The events which followed the opening of the Axis offensive and our subsequent retreat to El A Typical Attack on Enemy Shipping Alamein are fully described elsewhere in this A typical aeries of attacks on a convoy took Review, but the Eastern Mediterranean position place on 25th and 26th October—at a time when, resolved into two problems. The first was how with the VHIth Army attacking, the loss of to prevent sufficient reinforcement of men and supplies was particularly damaging to the enemy. material reaching the enemy before the depleted The convoy—consisting of two merchant vessels Vlllth Army was refurbished; the second was and a tanker, escorted by four destroyers—was how to provision Malta so that it could continue spotted by a Malta Baltimore north-east of its work. The first problem is discussed below; Benghazi on the afternoon of the 25th. the second, in a separate article, on page 65. Action was planned for that night from Egypt Attacks on Enemy Harbours by No. 201 Group. One bomber and three torpedo Wellingtons attacked singly, but without de­ Benghazi passed out of range of our medium finite results being seen. bombers. during the fourth week in June, and

57 Naval and Merchant Vessels.

No. of RESULTS vessels Probably Damaged Results attacked Sunk sunk unknown

Aircraft from Egypt 20 May - 30 June 35 12 1 6 5 1 - 28 July 63 + 36 + 3 2 13 20+ 29 July - 25 Aug. 149 69 + 10 11 19 29 + 26 Aug. - 22 Sept 106 + 39 + 3 1 20+ 15+ 23 Sept. - 20 Oct. " 44 18 + 1 3 14 + 21 Oct. - 17 Nov 64 29 1 2 11 15 18 Nov. - 29 Dec 10 11 1 8 1 Totals for Period 471 + 216 + 18 18 80 + 100+

Aircraft jrom Malta 20 May - 30 June 71 42 + 1 19 + 20 + 1 - 28 July 52 16 1 5 29 July - 25 Aug. 59 10 2 3 26 Aug. - 22 Sept 93 19 1 13 4 23 Sept. - 20 Oct. 44 13 — 7 6 y 21 Oct. - 17 Nov 20 10 5 3 18 Nov. 29 Dec 108 40 7 15 10 Totals for Period 447 150 + 12 15 72 + 51 + GRAND TOTALS FOR PERIOD 918 + 366 + 30 33 152 + 151 +

On the morning of the 26th a Baltimore and a Bisleys diving straight into the sea; the other Maryland carried out an early reconnaissance exchanged fire with an enemy fighter and was and the Baltimore re-located the convoy nine damaged. The fifth Beaufort aimed its torpedo miles north-west of Derna, with two JU.88s as at the smaller merchant vessel, but saw no hit. escort. It was kept under observation in spite, All these attacks were made in the face of in­ of the fact that it came within single-engined tense A.A. fire not only from the ships, but from fighter cover from the shore. the shore as well. By the afternoon the convoy was within range A second strike of four Beauforts, escorted of our day striking force; when it was about by Beaufighters, failed to locate the convoy an twenty miles from Tobruk, a strike of four hour and a half later. They intercepted five Bisleys and five torpedo Beauforts, with Beau- / HE.Ills, however, destroyed two, probably de­ fighter escort, was despatched. stroyed one and severely damaged the others. The Bisleys attacked first at 15.20 hours—and A third strike of four Wellingtons was briefed met with disaster. One, bombing from twenty for a dusk attack on the convoy, which was now feet, scored hits on the stern of the tanker, stationary just outside the entrance to Tobruk throwing debris into the air. The pilot saw an­ harbour. Direct torpedo hits were obtained on other Bisley, having scored near misses, strike the large merchant vessel, followed by an ex­ the tanker's mast on pulling away and crash; plosion, with a pall of smoke and much debris. and the other two Bisleys were seen to collide One Wellington failed to return, but was seen to and burst into flames. release its torpedo. The Beauforts attacked the target a few Between 23.30 and 01.15 hours six torpedo and minutes after the Bisleys. Two concentrated on bomber Wellingtons went out again, but all that the tanker. One scored a hit aft at the same they could find was the tanker on fire from stem time that the Bisley's bombs struck; as the other to stern, burning fiercely. prepared to attack, its torpedo dropped off, This series of attacks called forth the follow­ possibly due to A.A. fire, but having driven off ing signal from the A.O.C.-in-C.:— "My sincere a MC.202 it attacked the tanker with its front congratulations on the destruction of the enemy guns, during which time a torpedo hit was ob­ convoy yesterday night under the noses of his served immediately below the funnel. Two other shore-based defences. It was a magnificent Beauforts fired torpedoes at the larger merchant example of sheer courage, tenacity and de­ vessel, but without definite results. One saw a termination to kill." According to a German air­ large explosion on the tanker and also one of the man prisoner of war, high German officers were Smoke drifts back from this Axis supply ship hit amidships and in the hoivs by the R.A.F Such losses of war material seriously affected the strength of the Axis Forces.

on the cliffs at Tobruk watching the tanker Enemy submarine strategy changed during the come in. The British bombers, he said, went period. Up to July effort was concentrated straight into the attack, while the Italian de­ mainly against the Western Desert route. In stroyers, instead of getting on the side of the July, however, when the El Alimein battle was tanker from which the bombers were approach­ in progress, submarines began to operate in the ing, manoeuvred round to the far side and kept Levant area. During this month, as may be seen well away. Another feature of the action, ac­ from the above table, fourteen submarines were cording to the prisoner, was that during the attacked by the R.A.P., of which one was de­ attack no enemy fighters were to be seen, but finitely sunk, one probably sunk and five that when the bombers had gone, "the sky was damaged. In the next month thirteen submarines full of them." were attacked; for the rest of the year there was a steady decrease in submarine operations. Anti-Submarine Activity The majority of attacks by enemy submarines Effort against enemy submarines was maintain­ occurred at night. They normally operated singly ed almost exclusively from Egypt, since they and did not often attacks convoys which had an operated chiefly along the Cyrenaican and air escort. German U-boats showed greater skill Egyptian coast. During the period under review and determination than their Italian allies. only one anti-submarine attack was made by a Malta aircraft, the result being inconclusive. The anti-submarine policy of No. 201 Group The figures given on the next page show the was governed by the number of aircraft avail­ results obtained from the efforts made by Egypt- able. It was never possible to provide close anti­ based aircraft. submarine escort for all convoys by day and

59 r Attacks against Submarines

• ww f ASSF•iwftg'I B"'''MF »•!• • No. of RESULTS No. of Sub­ Sorties marines Sunk Probably Damaged Results attacked Sunk unknown Aircraft from Egypt. 20 May - 30 June 37 31 3 8 20 1 - 28 July 17 14 1 1 5 7 29 July - 25 Aug 15 14 1 3 9 26 Aug. - 22 Sept. • 3 3 1 1 1 23 Sept. - 20 Oct 2 2 2 21 Oct. - 17 Nov 3 3 1 2 18 Nov. - 29 Dec 1 1 1 78 66 2 6 17 42

night. When the areas in which submarines were each side of and about twenty feet ahead of the active could be accurately forecast by Naval apex of the swirl made by the submarine diving. intelligence, these areas were concentrated on. After the explosions subsided, one large air Any submarine contacted was continuously hunt­ bubble came up in the centre of the depth charge ed for some 48 hours by aircraft in co-operation patches and smaller bubbles continued to rise with surface forces. The development of this until the aircraft, having taken a number of combined procedure was one of the most im­ photographs, left 40 minutes later. The bubbles portant events in this sphere of Eastern Mediter­ were still visible from 5,000 feet, three miles ranean activity. away, and the submarine was reckoned to be Considerable economy in reconnaissance effort probably destroyed. was effected by instituting standard patrols carried out by all operational aircraft flying Activity of Reconnaissance Aircraft between coastal landing grounds. All such air­ Reconnaissance, always one of the most im­ craft were routed along the shipping routes and portant features of the war in the Mediterranean, were instructed to keep constant watch for signs was maintained systematically from both Egypt of submarines. and MaMa. Effort was divided between recon­ naissance of enemy shipping, surface or sub­ Typical Attacks on Submarines marine, and ports and harbours- A typical example of a combined operation, Aircraft based in Egypt or Cyrenaica flew resulting in the destruction of a submarine, oc­ 1,185 sorties on shipping reconnaissance; 3,731 curred on 11th July. A Walrus sighted a sub­ sorties on submarine reconnaissance (including marine in process of being attacked by H.M.S. area and close cover); and 396 photographic or "Protea" and H.M.S. "Southern Seas" south of visual reconnaissance sorties covering ports or Cyprus. Shortly after the first depth charges harbours. The effort against shipping and sub­ exploded, the submarine surfaced on an even marines varied between 154 sorties and 443 keel, heeled to port and then righted itself. The sorties in a fortnight. Peak figures were reach­ Walrus was in position 300/350 yards from the ed in the month from 12th August to 8th submarine at 700 feet. It attacked immediate­ September; the reason, as already indicated, was ly, dropping 2 x 250 lb. depth charges from a that August marked the turning point in height of 40/feet. They exploded beneath the the Mediterranean battle, maximum pressure conning tower and the submarine disappeared being maintained against the enemy's shipping. under a column of spray. There were five men Figures for harbour reconnaissance fluctuated on the deck at the time. between ten and 50 sorties in a fortnight. On Directly after the aircraft's attack, the Naval this duty, too, August saw the maximum effort vessels opened fire arid finished off the sub­ made. Towards the end of the period harbour marine. The survivors were picked up and con­ reconnaissance tended to fall off, since the ad­ firmed that one depth charge actually hit the vance of the VHIth Army robbed the enemy of submarine. his Cyrenaican harbours and brought the remain­ Another typical attack made by an aircraft ing harbours within easier reach of Malta. alone took place on 26th August, north of Malta's aircraft flew 733 sorties on shipping DamAetta. A Wellesley had just left a convoy reconnaissance and 21 sorties on submarine re­ to which it had been giving anti-submarine pro­ connaissance (nearly all anti-submarine activity tection when it sighted a periscope moving at being undertaken from Egypt, as already 6/8 knots. The aircraft, which had been flying mentioned). The reconnaissance effort against at 1,500 feet, dived to 10/15 feet and released shipping varied between seventeen and 119 4 x 250 lb. depth charges. The periscope was sorties in a fortnight. Even in MaMa'a dark still visible when the depth charges fell, two on days, until the supply situation was eased by the arrival of the November convoy, anti-shipping homing on to enemy Toffl^^J- means of S.E. reconnaissance averaged sixteen sorties a week. aircraft. After fuel became more plentiful and enemy pressure slackened after the abortive October A typical example of good co-operation be­ offensive, sortie figures jumped to an average of tween an S.E. aircraft and torpedo-bombers 40 a week. occurred on 2nd September. An enemy convoy of a 4/5000 ton merchant vessels and two de­ During the period, harbours were covered by stroyers was expected to pass Cape Spanrtivento Afo/ta-based aircraft on 192 days. at about 23.00 hours. A Malta S.E. Swordfish The Development of S.E. Aircraft and two torpedo Albacores, all belonging to the A significant feature of the period was the R.N.A.S., took off at 21.00 hours, and at 23.00 continued development and extension of the use of hours began a search north-east of Cape Spar­ S.E. aircraft. Wellingtons had been fitted with tirento, keeping 8/10 miles from the coast. S.E. equipment as far back as the summer of 1941 At 23.20 hours an echo was picked up on the but progress had been slow, mainly owing to lack port bow, distance being approximately eight of equipment and of trained crews. The situation miles. Almost continuous interference was ex­ improved, however, in the summer of 1942; from perienced on the wireless equipment, caused by both Malta and Egypt S.E. aircraft—not only enemy attempts at jamming, and the echo was Wellingtons, but Beauforts, Albacores and Sword­ temporarily lost. It was twice picked up again fish—operated widely and successfully. and twice lost. In February an S.E. sighting had been follow­ Finally at about 23.45 hours the S.E. Sword­ ed up by submarine action instead of by bombers fish sighted the enemy directly below and il­ or torpedo-bombers. Now, co-operation with the luminated it with flares for the Albacores to Navy was further developed, and submarines or attack. One torpedo was seen by all three air­ surface vessels were fitted with "roosters" for craft to hit the merchant vessel, causing a heavy

Mersa Matruh was the alternative target to Tobruk. Here arc tzvo zcrecked merchant vessels in Mersa Matruh harbour. Along the shore are destroyed store buildings and dumps and damaged jetties. (ixptosion abaft the funnel; another torpedo was Vlllth Army drove the enemy back and as the seen by the attacking aircraft's observer to strike Cyrenaican coastline fell into our hands. More the ship abaft the bridge, causing a smaller ex­ responsibility was thrown on Malta-based, air­ plosion. craft. As the island's position grew stronger, Subsequent reconnaissance found the merchant it naturally became the niore suitable base for vessel beached near Cape Spartivento Two offensive operations. Malta Albacores, one carrying a torpedo and the In the final period, from the middle of Novem­ other 6 x 250 lb. bombs, were briefed to attack ber to the end of the year, while only ten sorties on the night of the 4/5th. This they did, at were made from Egypt, Malta's aircraft made low level and in the face of A.A. fire from the 108 sorties against enemy shipping, attacked forty, merchant vessel, a destroyer and shore batteries. sank seven, probably sank eight and damaged a The results were a torpedo hit on the merchant further fifteen. Malta was paying the enemy vessel—a column of smoke rising to 60 feet— back for the privations she had earlier been and bomb hits on both the merchant vessel and forced to suffer. the destroyer. There can be no doubt that the war in the These operations on the 2nd and 4/5th Sep­ Mediterranean had a vital effect on the land tember show, as clearly as did the attacks on the battle. In the autumn the enemy was living tanker described previously, the determination largely on the supplies he had accumulated in to kill even under the most difficult circum­ the spring and summer or had captured from stances. us during his forward drive. It is certain that he was short of many essential items when our Summary of the Period October offensive developed and he was kept This period saw the Allies gaining the upper short as he fell back to 'Tripolitania. The reason hand in the Mediterranean. As already indicat­ for this shortage becomes obvious when it is ed, the tide turned in August when anti-shipping realized how unremitting were the attacks made effort by Egypt-based^aircraft reached its zenith. on enemy shipping by the Royal Navy and the Their task became easier in the autumn as the R.A.F. and how extensive was the damage done. OPERATIONS AGAINST SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN BY AIRCRAFT BASED ON CYRENAICA/EGYPT/LEVANT—MALTA (19/2Oth MAY - 29th DECEMBER, 1942) I Shipping KEY: \ Submarines These figures include attacks by American bombers.

Results of attacks from Results of attacks COMBINED Cyrenaica/Egypt/Levant from Malta TOTALS FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS «4—I O •5 « a d eS £ Q Q 13 3 6 20 6 13 + 19 + 33 25 + 19/20 May ­ 2 June '. 20 8 16 20 16 18 1 + 3 + 28 7 + 1 10 + 41 13 + *2/3 ­ 16 June U 10 IS 13 4 1 3 23 6 6 + 13 + 16 + 16/17 ­ 30 June 3 2 2 o 22 8+ 14 + 25 3 11 47 25­ 30 June/1 ­ 14 July 9 , s 7 9 41 12 24 27 68 14/15 ­ 28 July 8 7 8 83 12 20 41 83 28/29 July ­ 11 Aug...... 3 5 2 5 59 125 66 7 9 + 28+ 10 I 11/12 ­ 25 Aug 6 10 1 8 9 65 86 17 + 10 25/26 Aug. ­ 8 Sept 1 1 30+ 3 3 6 + 3 28 9 48 3 8/9 ­ 22 Sept 20 1 5+ 9 + 16 40 F 24 1 6 + 1 22/23 Sept. ­ 6 Oct 1 2 9 1 28 48 son 20 1 12 6/7 ­ 20 Oct 1 9 10 1 6 60 54 22 3 20/21 Oct. . 3 Nov 3 2 5 3 14 6 24 7 3/4 ­ 17 Nov 10 1 49 15 50 1 1 17/18 Nov. ­ 1 Dec 1 1 1 1 1/2 ­ 15 Dec 2 41 16 45 18 4 18 9 23 17 5 1 1 15/16 ­ 29 Dec 1 1 471 18 18 80 + 100 + 216­ 448 12 15 72 + 51 + 150 918 366 + GRAND TOTALS 78 € 17 67 1 1 79 68 •Includes sorties against enemy naval forces, results of attacks on which are included in MALTA section. + Symbol indicates an estimate of 1 plus vessels where number attacked is unknown. 'HIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA BY BOMBER, TORPEDO AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT BASED ON EGYPT/LEVANT - MALTA

(19/20th May - 29th December, 1942) From EGYPT KEY : These figures Include results of attacks by American bombers. From MALTA

Sunk or Probably Results TYPE Of VESSEL beached sunk Damaged unknown TOTALS

CARGO VESSELS etc. 13 28 + 47 + M/V.s (500/5,000 tons) 15 37 + 16 + 15 + 37 + (5/15,000 tons) . ... 17 12 + 39 + 1 1 (15,000 tons and over) 1 1 2 3 Tankers (5/10,000 tons) 2 6 1 3 4 (1/5,000 tons) 1 3 9 12 31 23 + 74+ "F"-Boats or Barges 6 1 8 4 10 16 Schooners and Trawlers . ... 7 1

Tugs

NAVAL VESSELS

Battleships 2 2 2** Cruisers 2 + 1 8 12 20** Destroyers 12 + 15 + 28 +

M.T.B.s

"E"-Boats

Escort Vessels (unspecified) ... 1 17 42 67 Submarines 1 1

A/A Ships

20 24 97 142 + 283 + GRAND TOTALS 12 15 72 + 52 + 151 +

Symbol -j, indicates an estimate of 1+ vessels where number attacked is unknown. *• Inclusive figures for combined attack on enemy naval forces, 15th June, shown in MALTA section. ATTACKS ON SHIPPING AND SUBMARINES AT SEA IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FROM CYRENAICA/EGYPT/LEVANT - MALTA r.' • •I- J (19/20th May - 29th December, 1942) *" '

v m \ Attacks on Shipping ~~.7 • ) ( >' „ Submarines These figures include Amer­ ican bombers. Number oiC effective sorties

Fighter- S s FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS Heavy Medium Light Bomber Totals & c o Cannon IS O. Egypt Malta Egypt Malta Egypt Malta Egypt Malta Egypt Malta

2 11 1 8 .10 1 13 20 33 19/20 May 2 June — — 2 — 28 — — — 20 — 20 8 2 5 8 23 18 28 46 2/3 - 16 June — — — — 11 — 3 — U — U 3 8 1 15 — 4 23 27 16/17 - 30 June — — — — 3 — — — 3 — 3 3 5 16 11 + 6 3 3 22 + 25 47 + 30 June/1 - 14 July — — 1 — 8 — — — 9 — 9 * 10 — 16 24 15 3 41 27 68 14/15 - 28 July — — 1 — 7 — — — 8 — 8 21 10 — 14 38 — 83 — 83 28/29 July 11 Aug — — — — 5 —— — 5 — 5 25 ___ 18 5 22 35 1 19 66 59 125 11/12 25 Aug — — 3' — 7 — — — 10 — 10 34 + 35 11 5 26 12 28 86 + 65 151 + 25/26 Aug. - 8 Sept — — — — 3 — — — 3 — 3 1 16 6 — 9 3 13 20 28 48 8/9 - 22 Sept — — — — — — — — — — —_ 6 16 9 2 6 — 1 24 16 40 22/23 Sept. - 6 Oct — — — — 1 — — — 1 — 1 28 48 5 7 13 1 12 7 3 20 ___ — — — — 1 — 1 6/7 - 20 Oct 1 21 3 26 3 7 — 54 6 60 — 3 — 3 20/21 Oct. - 3 Nov — — 1 — 2 — — 3 10 14 24 - 6 4 7 — 4 — 3/4 _ 17 Nov — — — — — — — 1 8 10 — 31 1 49 50 — — 1 — 1 17/18 Nov. - 1 Dec — — — 1 — 1 3 — 23 3 15 4 41 45 1/2 - 15 Dec — — — — — — _ ­ 1 9 4 9 5 18 23 1 1 15/16 - 29 Dec '•••

103 129 471 + 447 918+ 109 + — 152 105 107+ 213 79 8 67 1 3 78 1 GRAND TOTALS — ••—— —••• =

65

-i pi RECONNAISSANCE - SEA From Cyrenaica/Egypt 19/20th May - 29th December, 1942) Submarines N] Shipping (Area and TOTALS TOTALS Close Cover)

19/20 May - 2 June 18 250 268 2/3 - 16 June ... 68 289 357 16/17 - 30 June ... 62 229 291 30 June/1 - 14 July 82 217 299 14/15 - 28 July ... 76 302 378 28/29 July - 11 Aug. 59 257 316 11/12 - 25 Aug. ... ' 102 319 421 25/26 Aug. - 8 Sept. 114 329 443 8/9 - 22 Sept. ... 25 196 221 22/23 Sept. - 6 Oct. 143 213 356 6/7 . 20 Oct. 94 174 268 20/21 Oct. - 3 Nov. 140 189 329 3/4 - 17 Nov. ... 78 136 214 17/18 Nov. - 1 Dec. 35 119 154 1/2 - 15 Dec. 69 283 352 15/16 - 29 Dec. ... 20 232 252

TOTALS 1185 3734 4919

RECONNAISSANCE - SEA From Malta (19/20th May - 29th) December, 1942) FORTNIGHTLY Submarine Shipping (Area and TOTALS Close Cover)

19/20 May - 2 June 56 2/3 - 16 June 43 16/17 - 30 June 47 30 June/1 - 14 July 27 14/15 . 28 July 23 " 28/29 July - 11 Aug 22 11/12 - 25 Aug 61 25/26 Aug. - 8 Sept 17 8/9 - 22 Sept 28 22/23 Sept. - 6 Oct .'. 35 6/7 20 Oct 22 20/21 Oct. - 3 Nov 32 2 3/4 - 17 Nov 71 17/18 Nov. . 1 Dec 78 1 1/2 - 15 Dec 119 8 15/16 - 29 Dec 52 10

TOTALS 733 21 Provisioning Dark Days of 1942

THE PROVISIONING OF Malta became a hazard­ Convoy "A" — that proceeding east from the ous job after our loss of Greece and Crete, but the United Kingdom — consisting of four merchant difficulties increased tenfold in the summer of vessels escorted by Naval units, passed Gibraltar 1942. In fact, the problems and risk of running on the morning of 13th June. ships through, either from the east or the west, On the night of 13/14th June, a friendly sub­ became so great that operations had to be plan­ marine reported that hostile naval forces were ned on a big scale or not at all. The following at sea on an easterly course from Cagliari off accounts are good examples of the careful timing, the north-west coast of Sicily. forces needed, and risks which had to be A Wellington VIII with a strike of three Wel­ accepted. lington Vs was despatched from Malta. The air­ It was decided to run two convoys concurrently craft carrying the flares for illuminating the to Malta in mid-June, one from the United King­ target unfortunately crashed on take-off, and dom, and one from Alexandria. They were when the remaining two located the enemy, the timed to berth within twenty-four hours of each Wellington VIII had insufficient flares left to other, with the object of splitting and reducing enable them to attack. They circled the enemy possible interception by the enemy. force of two cruisers and three destroyers, but were unable to strike, so returned to base with Strategic Bombing their torpedoes. Strategic bombing in support of the proposed The following day P.R.U. Spitfires reconnoitred operations began on 24th May, and from then ports in Sicily and Pantellaria in an effort to until 10th June Wellingtons from the island locate the enemy force, while Baltimores also dropped 152 tons of bombs in 104 sorties against made continuous patrols between Sicily and Sar­ Sicilian aerodromes and the harbours of Naples, dinia. Messina, Cagliari, and Taranto. While the con­ At last light on the 14th a P.R.U. Spitfire re­ voy operations were in progress—between 14th ported the same enemy force of two cruisers and and 18th June—aircraft based in Egypt made four destroyers leaving Palermo. Unfortunately, 181 medium and 66 light bomber sorties against it was impossible to shadow this force, as, in view enemy aerodromes in Cyrenaica and Crete, with of the fact that the enemy battle fleet had left the dual purpose of reducing hostile aircraft Taranto, three of the four available S.E. Wel­ activity in the battle zone and over the convoy. lingtons had left to shadow in the Ionian Sea Eight heavy bomber sorties were also made while the fourth remained in hand to lead a against Taranto and fifteen medium against strike. Piraeus. A close watch by Malta's reconnais­ It was thought probable that the force from sance aircraft was kept throughout for move­ Palermo^ would sail eastwards through the Straits ments by Italian naval vessels. of Messina. The R.N. Air Squadrons, therefore, maintained an S.E. patrol throughout the dark Reinforcements to Malta hours over the Straits, with a strike standing by. When the operation was planned, it was not Convoy "A" was, however, the real quarry of expected that our front line in the Desert would this force, and at midnight it was plotted by a crumble, but in the event the convoys were ac­ D.F. bearing moving westwards. Convoy "A " tually en route between the time Bir Hakim fell was warned. and the commencement of our general with­ The Convoy Attacked by Surfaces Forces drawal. However, in spite of this, reinforce­ ments of six Baltimores, six torpedo-Wellingtons, Five Beaufighters proceeding to provide cover fifteen Beauforts and fourteen Beaufighters flew for the convoy also sighted the enemy and passed to Malt.% while fourteen bomber squadrons, the the information by R/T to the directing ship at "Halverson Detachment" of Liberators, and first light. Soon after daylight the enemy open­ twelve fighter squadrons stood to in Egypt. ed fire and Convoy "A" requested an air strike. Owing to the demands imposed by the Italian Convoy "A" from the U.K. Fleet in the Ionian S&% the only available strik­ It is not within the scope of this article to give inf force left in Malta was two Beaufort®, with a detailed report, but the main events were inexperienced crews, and four Albacores of the these :— R.N. Air Squadron.

67 ., pg^lowtcover;­ protective sorties over Convoy "A," in which for the-"attack^ jvhier; f ^k#fe^ .Wh) ^ they achieved the following successes against mend&ble deterMhation in an* varea thick with esiemy aircraft:— enemy fighters, incltidihg ME.10'9Fs* with long- Probably n . range tanks which they jettisoned before at­ Destroyed. Destroyed. Damaged. tacking. 4 ME.109s 2 JU.87s 4 ME.109s The Beauforts attacked first. One secured a 3 JU.87s 1 JU.88 1 JU.87 strike which set fire to a cruiser, and the second 2 JU.88S 1 MC.200 6 JU.88S pilot, in an endeavour to make certain of his 2 BR.20S 1 BR.20 target, held his torpedo until within 300 yards 1 Cant.Z.506 1 Misc. of the vessel. 1 Float Plane Bomber The four Albacores attacked immediately after­ wards and scored two strikes on the second 13 13 cruiser, causing a large explosion amidships. One large destroyer was also possibly hit, colour being lent to the assumption by a reconnaissance Our losses were six Spitfires, five pilots being aircraft which sighted such a vessel in tow off rescued. the coast of Sidty the following day. Spitfires also patrolled off the Sicilian coast Convoy "A" was not engaged again by this to prevent enemy aircraft flying direct from surface force. At 15.00 hours on the same day eastern aerodromes in Sicily to the convoy. a further attack was made by three Albacores With the exception of two escorts and one des­ with fighter cover. A cruiser sustained two hits troyer which struck a mine, the remainder of and another destroyer was probably hit. One Convoy "A" was safely in the harbour at dawn Albacore was shot down. on 16th June. When Convoy "A" was some 220 miles-from Malta on the afternoon of 14th June, a Beau- Convoy "B" From Egypt fighter patrol was despatched to cover it. It Convoy "B," consisting of seven merchant ves­ encountered and shot down one JU.88. sels with Naval escort, sailed westward as ar­ The patrol did not leave the convoy until it ranged on 12th June. Two hundred and forty was too dark to see enemy aircraft in the air. fighter sorties were flown on cover on that and The Beaufighters had no sooner departed, how­ the next day, but no serious air attack develop­ ever, than a small number of enemy aircraft at­ ed until the morning of 14th June when the con­ tacked, but without causing any damage. voy was in "Bomb Alley" off the Ishaila Rocks. Enemy Air Attack Develops An enemy force, of 20—25 JU.87s, and a number of JU.88s escorted by twelve plus ME.109s was The first serious enemy air attack on the con­ intercepted nort - east of Tobruk by eight voy developed at 06.30 hours on 15th June. The Kittyhawks and fifteen Tomahawks. The enemy enemy force consisted of escorted dive bombers, formation was broken up and forced to jettison and in an attack from low level the merchant its bombs, and in the fight which followed one vessel "Chant" sustained direct hits and sank. JU.87 was destroyed, another probably destroyed A second attack by eight JU.87s developed an and one ME. 109 damaged. We lost two Toma­ hour later, the merchant ship "Kentucky" and hawks, but the pilots were saved. H.M.S. "Bedouin" being crippled by near misses. Attacks on the convoy continued during the These ships were taken in tow, but held up the afternoon and evening. Fighter cover was pro­ convoy to such an extent that our long-range vided by long-range Kittyhawks and Beaufight­ Spitfire cover was strained to its limit, and both day and night-Beaufighters had to be employed. ers as the convoy passed out of range Of shore- The risk produced by the convoy's slow speed based short-range fighters. eventually became too great, and the "Kentucky" One merchant vessel was sunk in an attack by and "Bedouin" were sunk by our own forces. eighteen Stukas, which made a shallow dive of 70 deg. from 1,000 feet. Other attacks during Spitfire Cover the day were unsuccessful. It had been arranged for Spitfires to take over It was now clear that protection would be re­ from the Beaufighters at 110 miles on the as­ quired throughout 15th June. This presented a sumption that the convoy would arrive at that problem since owing to losses and unserviceability distance by 08.00 hours. Actually the convoy the number of Beaufighters had fallen danger­ was still 140 miles distant at that time, but the ously low. By turning the aircraft round quickly Spitfires nevertheless took over from that dis­ small patrols were, however, maintained until tance. 19.30 hours. Enemy aircraft maintained medium pressure At no time during this day — the 15th — throughout the day and our fighter cover was had the Fighter Control a clear picture of the frequently engaged, but the enemy scored no fur­ movements and intentions of the convoy. It was ther hits on the convoy. thus difficult to make a plan that would con­ Between 06.00 hours and 22.00 hours on 15th serve the Beaufighters and bring in the Kitty- June Beaufighters made nine and Spitfires 122 hawks at the earliest moment. :

•'•>! gpflf; ~y .J0-,

The enemy had <>II!V four Jl S^is. 77/J.V photoijmf'li SIKK^S I lion til Kastelli Pediada. (See artie'e "Stratospheric h'eeou­ iiaissanee" on page (>(l).

Tanker on fire in Benghazi llar­ I'oitr This tanker f400 feet), dis­ charging at the floating pipe-line from the end of the Guiliana Mole, :eas set on fire during an attack by American aircraft on 6th A ovem­ her, VHZ. She teas still burning on the 19///, and on the 20th MIS seen to have broken her back. "V. im 1. Photograph ta'.rn during an attack by the C.S.A.AE on Benghazi on Idtli September, showing a direct hit on a merchant vessel. 2. Enemy demolition at Benghazi; there is a 42 feet gap in the Mole and the converted ;s ; the latter are used c.rclusivelv for ambulance work. 4. An M/V beached near Perdika after being attacked by Beau fighters on dth September. 5. Merchant z'cssels in Xavarino Bay; the story of the two lying alonsiite is to'.dun page X4. 1. lizci'x position of the enemy's lines, from the (Jattara Depression to the sen. :cas photographed during the summer; a striking 7'itw of the lip of the Qattara Depression.

2 ./ homhing attack on Tohntk h\' the ( S.. /..//• Dire, I hits i^ere scored on ///,• main jetty and on a merchant vessel alongside. t .\Iersa Matnih luirbnu-r, showing "l-"-hc>ats and the wreck of a merchant rvvsv/ t

I

> *, * s . * ' '

L.R.H.G. operations were often helped l>\ special pholoijruplis. A view of Hon aerodrome Attempts to hinder the k.A.F 1. "77k- first example of ploughing was on (ihindcl land­ ing grounds, on \hth December" 2. . / Z-shaped trench at Sedada. 3. A close-up of ploughing at Bir Pufan 4. "On the eve of the attack at Zem Zc>n, Churgia landing ground was ploughed." 5. "The master p'oughman of the j hind els rcas at work on Bucrat HI Hsun. .until a burst of cannon fire pul an end to his career

Two Kittyhawks broke up a torpedo attack of : This*algnal; nine escorted S.79S in the evening of the 15th, The Weiliiig ^Hifcda^ffflBMi 1tfu] . and shot down two S.79s, and during the 14th further report until ©!.2u 'hWs, wheriit and 15th the Beaufighters destroyed one RO.43, that the enemy was in position 37° 05 ft. north, one Cant.506B and probably destroyed one JU.88. 19° 15 ft. east, on the same course and at the Two R.A.F. officers, qualified controllers with recent experience as fighter squadron com­ same speed. manders, were lent by No. 252 Wing as advisors The urgency and short hours of darkness in­ to the Controller on the fighter and reserve fluenced Malta to despatch a strike of four fighter directing ship. torpedo-Wellingtons, led by the remaining Well­ ington, without waiting for sighting reports from The help given by these officers was reported the three Wellington VIIIs on patrol. as invaluable. Direction seems to have worked The enemy force was successfully located,- but smoothly — it had been agreed that it was only threw out such an effective smoke screen that.it necessary for fighters to provide high and me­ was impossible for all except one Wellington to dium cover — until the Beaufighters and mixed get in and strike. This aircraft fired two torpe­ patrols of Beaufighters and Kittyhawks took does at a large vessel seen amid the smoke. A over. Some of these patrols were mistaken as glow on the water followed, but it was impossible hostile and fired on by the convoy. Six Beau- to observe results. The remaining three aircraft fighters failed to return and a seventh was shot returned with their loads. down by another Beaufighter which was vectored on to it. Action on 15th; June At 03.11 hours on 15th June, nine Beauforts Appreciation of Enemy Action took off from Malta to attack the same target. At 11.00 hours on 14th June, an appreciation of The attack was .pressed home in the face of se­ probable enemy action was made and the follow­ vere flak. One destroyer was hit and left with a ing signal sent to Malta, No. 235 Wing and heavy list, and the two battleships also sus­ No. 205 Group from the Combined Operations tained direct hits, a large fire breaking out on Room of No' 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group. one of them. All Beauforts returned safely, the "Enemy may sail approximately 22.00 to-night. only casualty being a wounded gunner. If so intend attacking with both torpedo forces at It is pertinent at this juncture to record that approximately 09.45 in area 36.00 north 18.30 the Malta aircraft shadowing the enemy force east. Aircraft will have to fly through. Will try throughout the night made its original report to co-ordinate Liberator attack." only and nothing more until 04.20 hours. Early in the morning, Baltimores from Malta Pending further information, the C. in C. Med. were on continual patrol between Sicily and Sar­ ordered Convoy "B" to turn eastwards at 03.00 dinia, but in view of the above-mentioned signal hours. all Baltimores were despatched later on sweeps In view of the fact that the Malta report was over the Ionian Sea. not received by the Combined Operations Con­ The Italian Fleet Sails to Intercept trol Room until 06.30 hours, and that between 04.30 and 06.20 hours negative signals were re­ In the evening a Baltimore returned to base ceived from all six search patrols operating from with W/T failure after covering the southern Egypt, C. in C. Med. became concerned as to the exits to the Gulf of Taranto and reported having future course of Convoy "B." sighted an enemy force of two battleships, four In spite of the absence of sighting, it was there­ cruisers and eight destroyers on a southbound fore decided to strike and damage the enemy as course some sevently miles south of Taranto at soon as possible. Seven Liberators of the "Hal­ 18.45 hours. verson Detachment" and two Liberators of No, A P.R.U. Spitfire was sent to Taranto at last 160 Squadron were briefed and despatched by light and reported that the main enemy fleet No. 205 Group at 03.30 hours. At dawn, the force had left the port, but whereas the Baltimore des­ successfully rendezvoused over Ras Es Kamyis on cribed the departed enemy battleships as Cavours, the Egyptian coast and set course for the target the P.R.U. confirmed them as Littorios. area at 06.00 hours, gradually climbing to the This latter information, which affected bomb maximum height allowed for the attack at 14,000 loads and striking force, was not received by the feet. Combined Operations Room until 03.00 hours on At 05.40 hours two Marylands left L.G.05 to 15th June. search an area bounded by latitude 35.00 and In view of these reports, three Wellington VIIIs 36.00 north and longitude 18.10 and 19.30 east. were despatched from Malta at nightfall to patrol the Ionian Sea, while — as previously mentioned It was hoped to synchronise an attack between — Swordfish maintained patrols in the Straits of the Liberators and Beauforts, and at 06.20 hours Messina for the naval force from Cagliari, twelve of the latter were despatched, followed At 02.00 hours a Wellington from Malta sight­ fifteen minutes later by another Maryland with ed and reported one battleship, two cruisers and orders to re-locate the enemy (following the two destroyers in position 37° 30 ft. north, 19° Malta\ sighting received at 06.30 hours) and lead 35 ft. east on a southerly course at 20 knots. the Beauforts to the target. Eher sight­ There was no opposition from enemy fighters 'established the total ene­ or A.A., the latter being directed agairiSt force in the Ionian Sea to be:—one cruiser, the Beauforts below. Although four direct hits two destroyers, steaming north at 14 knots, in were claimed both on a battleship and a cruiser position 35.00 N., 18.18 E., and two battleships, respectively, accompanied by many near misses, three cruisers, nine destroyers in two columns subsequent reports showed that the speed of the travelling south-east at 18 knots in position fleet was not reduced. It has been stated that 35.22 N., 19.14 E. superficial damage only was caused due to the Two Marylands were therefore recalled from bomb load. For information, therefore, it may search patrol and stood by for shadowing. be recorded that the bomb load consisted of:— After two hours' flying, and when nearing their "Halverson Detachment" objective, the Beauforts were attacked by five 6 x 500 lb. S.A.P. fused .12 tail delay. ME.109s. Our aircraft were in four sub-flights No. 160 Squadron at the time, and upon the enemy attacking began 2 x 1,000 lb. S.A.P. fused .12 tail delay. weaving at full speed. The tactics employed by 10 x 500 lb. S.A.P. fused .12 tail delay. the ME.109s were to select the most rearward weaver and carry out individual attacks by diving On the return journey the aircraft flew in down from the beam to a position astern. Two formation at sea level to counter fighter opposi­ Beauforts were shot down in this way. The Beau- tion. Two ME. 109s were encountered and met by forts then re-formed and proceeded, but before a concentrated barrage from the whole force. they reached the target five were forced to drop One ME. 109 crashed into the sea. All Liberators out. Two developed abnormal petrol consump­ landed at base at 13.40 hours. tion which would have prevented them from reach­ A Difficult Decision ing Malta, two were forced to turn back through damage and wounded wireless operators, and the A gap in the shadowing from 09.44 until 13.30 fifth was last seen setting course for Malta. This hours — due to the lack of aircraft in Egypt— left five aircraft for the strike. and the absence of reports of results of our air attacks greatly hampered the C. in C. Med. in Synchronised Liberator and Beaufort Attack making a decision whether Convoy "B" should Co-operation between the Maryland and the proceed or not. Beauforts was most successful, the "rooster" in The enemy was re-located by a Maryland at the former being picked up at 50 miles range and 13.30 hours in position 34° 45 ft. north, 20° 55 ft. the striking force homed to within three miles. east on a south-easterly course at 25 knots. At The approach of the Beauforts appeared to 14.55 hours the shadower reported that the force produce considerable confusion among the enemy had altered course completely and was now steer­ ships which unexpectedly turned 90 deg. to star­ ing north-west. board from a position in which they were bows The C. in C. Med. decided to turn four of the on to the aircraft and so presented their broad fastest merchant vessels, escorted by H.M.S. side. The attack was made on the battleships, "Coventry" and four "Hunt" class destroyers for one certain hit being made and a second prob­ Malta at 21.00 hours. The following arrange­ able. Several good gun bursts were also put ments were therefore made:— into the bridges of two destroyers. (i) The enemy fleet was to be shadowed The opposition from the vessels was good in continuously. range and deflection and two Beauforts were hit. (ii) Malta was to maintain a patrol in the All five aircraft, however, succeeded in flying Gulf of Taranto to prevent any further through to Malta as instructed, although of the units putting to sea unobserved, two damaged aircraft one was forced to make (iii) Marylands and Beauforts were to stand a belly-landing and the second developed an by at L.G.05 for a dawn search and uncontrollable swing when the undercarriage was strike. let down which caused a wing tip to foul a crash­ (iv) The No. 205 Group Liberators were to ed aircraft lying near the runway. The Beaufort stand by for a dawn attack or alter­ was wrecked and caught fire, but the crew escap­ natively to take off at 08.00 hours. ed injury. At 20.50 hours two Wellingtons left L.G.05 to The Liberators arrived over the target while re-locate and shadow. the Beauforts were making their attack, thus In the meantime, nine Beauforts were des­ achieving the combined attack that had been, patched from Malta to attack at dusk. Owing planned. Their trip had been uneventful, except to mistakes in navigation and an adverse head­ for a few uncomfortable moments when the guns wind, which was unanticipated, the Beauforts from Convoy "B" opened up at them as they failed to find their target. Other contributing passed over. factors were :— The Italian Fleet was in position 30° 10 ft. (i) The crews had been on continuous stand­ north, 17° 40 ft. east as the eight Liberators by since the afternoon of the previous began pattern-bombing in sections of three at day, when they had carried out an even­ 09.05 hours. One aircraft ±UtfW«MB'1fflfr to base ing strike after a continuous stand-by of dtl 24 hours.

70 (ii) The crews were inexperienced in night Wit: flying and faced with the ordeal of re­ quate~ai turning to Malta in darkness. given and the certainty of~succe& They all returned safely, however, aided by surface or submarine attack too grea t be D/F priority, searchlights and floodlighting at faced. Luqa. The only way to ensure some measure of suc­ It had been intended to synchronise a Welling­ cess was to run a convoy from the west, which ton strike with the Beauforts, and shortly after had proved the lesser risk in the June movement. the latter had left Malta five Wellington Vs de­ By August Malta was in such urgent need of parted, led by a Wellington VIII. They eventu­ fuel, ammunition and other essential supplies ally found and illuminated the enemy, but once that this alternative was chosen. again an efficient smoke screen cloaked the Accordingly, a convoy of fourteen merchant vessels and only one Wellington was able to at­ vessels, escorted by two battleships, four aircraft tack. This aircraft claimed one hit on a bat­ carriers, three heavy cruisers, four A.A. cruisers tleship. and twenty-four destroyers, passed Gibraltar on At 20.30 hours C. in C. Med. decided to order the night of 9/10th August. the whole of Convoy "B" to return to Alexandria, In preparation, Malta was reinforced from both as owing to enemy air attacks and steaming the United Kingdom and the Middle East be­ about awaiting a favourable opportunity to pro­ tween 3rd and 13th August. On the 9th 83 air­ ceed, all ships were now short of both ammuni­ craft, excluding Spitfires, were available or short­ tion and fuel. ly available; by the 14th the figure had risen The enemy fleet was shadowed throughout the to 109 aircraft and Spitfire strength had risen night of the 15/16th and also located on the fol­ from 110 to 145 aircraft. lowing day, but it was out of range of a striking Preliminary Reconnaissance Activity force from Egypt. On 17th June a P.R.U. reconnaissance from In the early part of August photographic re­ Malta discovered the whole force back in Ta­ connaissance was concerned almost entirely with ranto, less one cruiser which was seen to sink by watching enemy forces that might be employed a friendly submarine. One destroyer is also be­ against the convoy. Reconnaissance was main­ lieved to have been sunk. tained over Cagliari, Naples, Taranto and as far east as Navarino. Taranto and Palermo were The Convoy Returns to Alexandria covered nine times in four days, with the result that the whole Italian Fleet was accounted for At 23.00 hours on the night of 15/16th June with the exception of two cruisers. the officer Commanding 15th Cruiser Squadron signalled the intended route home for Con­ Large concentrations of torpedo-aircraft and voy "B." fighters were seen at Cagliari, Decimomannu and This route was more than 100 miles off shore, Pantellaria and many "E"-boats at Trapani and which produced grave difficulties in the way of Pantellaria. On Sicilian aerodromes was an in­ giving both anti-submarine patrols and fighter crease of some 30 JU.88s, 20 HE.Ills and a num­ cover. ber of JU.52s and other transport aircraft. This fact was signalled to the convoy who re­ On the evening of the 10/llth a special patrol plied that the reason for being so far out was north of the Grand Harbour was made by an that four hostile submarines had been located Albacore because messages were intercepted between Convoy "B" and the Libyan coast. from German aircraft attacking a submarine in A decision was then made as to which was the this. area. The precaution was necessary since, lesser of two evils — the certainty of having to although no British submarine was in the vicin­ stand up to concentrateed air attacks from Crete ity, it could not be certain that the enemy had without aircraft cover or the uncertainty of a obligingly sunk one of his own submarines — submarine attack which might not develop. The which seemed to have been the case. latter risk was chosen. Diversionary Bombing Effort Eleven Swordfish were prepared for anti-sub­ marine patrols, but the distance of the convoy Once the convoy had left Gibraltar all avail­ during that night prevented their employment, able Malta bombers were put on to the task of and a Sunderland was substituted. The special dislocating the aerodromes from which the ene­ equipment on this aircraft failed, and it was my might menace our ships. some time before another aircraft could re­ On the Hth nine Beaufighters successfully shot place it. up Elmas and Decimomannu aerodromes in Sar­ During the night, H.M.S. "Hermione" was sunk dinia. At Decimomannu they achieved complete by a submarine. The remainder of the convoy surprise and set five multi-engined aircraft on and escort reached Alexandria safely on the 16th. fire and damaged several others; in approaching Elmas they flew low over three Italian subma­ AN ATTEMPT FROM THE WEST IN AUGUST rines leaving Cagliari, who presumably gave the The chief lesson learned from the June opera­ alarm, but in spite of intense A.A. opposition tion was the impossibility of running a convoy to they left two multi-engined aircraft and a Malta from the east without risk of serious loss. hangar on fire.

71 Later- on the night tf the ll/12th two Libe­ turn south-west. Instead, it ran into an area r&torss :and otsro igt«Bif8i||&Jp|p attacks patrolled by our submarines, where two of the le «/fctfi<« Pantel­ cruisers were torpedoed. When it, became clear idBtlfdiMAy three that the danger from this force had lessened, rfvJ->t3cftH. iBtW e others the R.N.A.S. strike was recalled.

In order to upset activity as much as possible Enemy Attacks on the Convoy on the enemy aerodromes, all bomb loads were The enemy began to attack the convoy on the given D.A. fusing, graded from instantaneous to 11th. The first victim was the aircraft-carrier eighteen hours. "Eagle," which was sunk by a U-boat at 14.15 •hours. From that time until 21.00 hours on the Attacks on an Enemy Naval Force 13th, nine of the fourteen merchant vessels and From the morning of the 11th it became evi­ three more warships were sunk by bombs, dent from sighting reports that the convoy had U-boats or "E"-boats, or were so badly damaged been seen by the enemy and was being shadowed. that they had to be finished off by our own Beaufighters on their way to attack Elmas and forces. Decimomannu had spotted two Italian cruisers At dusk on the 11th enemy aircraft from Sicily leaving Cagliari harbour, and at 19.18 hours a re­ and Sardinia made their first attack. JU.88s at­ connaissance Baltimore reported four cruisers tacked from high-level, while Italian bombers and six destroyers 50 miles north-west of made a demonstration on the horizon. At dawn Ustica, an island north of Sicily, steering 210 on the 12th SM.79s, flying high, dropped a num­ degrees at twenty knots. ber of torpedoes, which ran wildly. At 09.30 Difficulty was experienced in keeping track of hours a large formation of, JU.88s attacked, this force because available reconnaissance crews while Italian torpedo-bombers made a further were not trained in night-flying and could not horizon demonstration. reasonably be expected to shadow until dusk and At 11.00 hours more Italians, probably BR.20s, then make a long flight home. One pilot did so, approached from the east, but when A.A. guna however, and landed safely at base, although he opened fire they jettisoned and turned back. had never done this at night before. Shortly afterwards, more JU.88s dived from out A Wellington VIII took up the search at last of the sun and one Italian fighter-bomber ap­ light and located the cruisers at 23.05 hours. proached and dropped its bombs near a ship — They now had an escort of eight destroyers, were this being the only Italian aircraft seen to fly 35 miles west-north-west of Ustica and steering over the convoy during the whole voyage. south at twenty knots. The afternoon of the 12th was quiet, but from Since it was obvious that this force intended 18.00 hours onwards three attacks were made by to intercept the convoy, another Wellington VIII, strong formations of JU.87s, 88s and HE.llls. which was on patrol, was ordered to "Contact— U-boats attacked at the same time and para­ Illuminate and Attack." The message was sent chute mines were dropped ahead of the convoy. in plain language, in the hope that the enemy, expecting our aircraft to be in the vicinity, might Fighter Protection From Malta be scared off. This ruse seemed to have been Until 19.30 hours on the 12th the Navy and partly successful, for the force changed course F.A.A. protected the convoy; six Beaufighters to 060 degrees at 01.30 hours and to 170 degrees then took over until last light. Since the two ten minutes later. Naval air control ships had by then been lost, Since the enemy had resumed a southerly there was no V.H.F. fighter direction and the course, a strike was planned, and two R.N.A.S. Beaufighters were continually fired at by our torpedo-Albacores, led by an S.E. Swordfish, own A.A. gunners. took off at 02.00 hours. At the same time, in From dawn on the 13th it had been decided order to delay the enemy as much as possible, to augment the Beaufighter escort by long-range the two Wellington VIIIs were ordered to bomb Spitfires if the distance did not exceed 150 miles the ships. This they did at 02.20 and 02.30 hours, from Malta. Although the convoy was still with the result that, although all bombs overshot, 173 miles away, the necessity for protecting the enemy again altered course to 030 degrees, the remaining ships was so vital that Spitfires still keeping to twenty knots. At 03.00 hours the were sent with the Beaufighters. Short-range force was due south of Ustica. Spitfires took over the protection between 70 and In a further attempt to turn the enemy away 80 miles from Malta. The fighters' task was still from the convoy, another plain language signal made extremely difficult by the lack of fighter was sent to the Wellingtons: "Report result of directing ships and they were still fired at in your attack and latest enemy position for Libe­ error. rators — Most Immediate." A little later, at Early on the morning of the 13th JU.88s car­ 03.45 hours, one of the Wellingtons was given a ried out the last heavy attack, although small- fake plain language order to "Contact Cruisers— scale attacks continued throughout the day. Illuminate and Attack." At 18.30 hours three merchant vessels entered Whether because of these messages or for the Grand Harbour; at 14.15 hours on the 14th some other reason, the enemy force did not again another merchant vessel arrived, having been

0 b^i^vn,^­ damaged and stopped off the Tunisian coast; To prevent possible ] lriterference, however, early on the 15th the tanker, "Ohio," was towed Malta-based Wellingtons were diverted on the in by two destroyers, with its decks almost awash, 19/20th from their effort against Tunisia, to at­ having undergone a further 24 hours of air at­ tack Sicilian aerodromes. Catania, Gerbini and tack. Comiso were bombed by a total of fourteen air­ craft. In the Catania attack, Wellingtons dropped What the Fighters Achieved their bombs just as enemy aircraft were taking From the time when they took over the con­ off. At Gerbini and Comiso bombs burst across voy protection until all the ships reached harbour the runways and dispersal areas. — 32 hours of daylight — Malta's fighters flew 414 sorties; 292 by short-range Spitfires, 97 by Attacks by the Enemy long-range Spitfires and 25 by Beaufighters. Be­ At 11.00 hours on the 18th the first attack on tween them they destroyed fourteen enemy air­ the convoy occurred off the North Cyrenaican craft, probably destroyed three and damaged coast. Six JU.88s took part, but all bombs fell nine, for the loss of one Beaufighter and four wide, and one JU.88 was probably destroyed by Spitfires, two Spitfire pilots being safe. escorting fighters. The enemy made no serious attempt to attack At 16.20 hours 26 JU.52s were seen flying the ships when they were unloading in harbour. ahead of the convoy on a north-easterly course, Such raiders as approached were driven off by escorted by two fighters. Four of our fighters fighters. The contents of the four ships were attacked and each claimed one JU.52 damaged. unloaded safely by midday on the 26th. Between 18.50 and 19.50 hours a few Italian The 47,000 tons of foodstuffs, ammunition and torpedo-bombers operated singly, but did no dam­ fuel made Malta's supply position at least tem­ age and one was probably destroyed. After dusk, porarily easier. The island had to wait three when the 15 th Cruiser Squadron was covering the months before the next convoy arrived. convoy to the north, torpedo-bombers attacked it and hit H.M.S. " Arethusa." COMPLETE SUCCESS IN NOVEMBER From daylight on the 19 th the convoy came The losses sustained by the August convoy under fighter protection from Malta for the last showed the difficulties and dangers that had to 135 miles of its voyage. Long-range Spitfires be faced in running ships either from the ea^t flew 42 sorties, short-range Spitfires nineteen or the west while the enemy remained in a sorties and Beaufighters four sorties. The wea­ strong position astride the Mediterranean. ther was very rough and three Spitfires were lost. Consequently, although Malta's supply position The convoy reached harbour without further — especially as regards "fuel — was still pre­ incident at 01.30 hours on the 20th. H.M.S. carious, no other convoy movement was attempt­ " Arethusa," which turned back after being dam­ ed until the VHIth Army had the enemy on the aged, arrived at Alexandria on the 21st. run in November. By then the situation had so The convoy was unloaded in 144 hours and the changed in the Mediterranean that it was thought 28,860 tons of supplies made possible increases in safer to pass the convoy from the east rather civil and Army rations and gave Malta's aircraft than from the west. All the merchant vessels more fuel and ammunition with which to strike got through unscathed. at the enemy. The convoy of four merchant vessels, escorted by the cruiser "Euryalus" and seven destroyers, Malta Relieved left Port Said on the evening of 16th November. In December ten more ships, including two At 07.00 hours on the 17th the 5th Destroyer tankers, reached Malta. Many thousand tons of Flotilla relieved the escorting destroyers for foodstuffs were unloaded and by the end of the fuelling at Alexandria, and at daylight on the month 70% of commodities were up to the full 18th the convoy was joined by the 15th Cruiser scale of rations. Squadron. Convoys now arrived almost without incident and ships, as soon as they were unloaded, re­ Supporting R.A.F. Effort turned safely to Egypt. Reconnaissance and striking forces were or­ Malta's "dark days" were over and the island's ganized under the control of A.H.Q., Western air force could turn from defence to offence. The Desert, A.H.Q., Egypt, A.H.Q., Malta, H.Q. No. story of these convoy movements shows the tre­ 201 Group and American Bomber Command. mendous difficulties that had to be overcome in Apart from reconnaissance, however, little ac­ keeping Malta supplied in the period of crisis. If tivity was necessary, since the enemy already the convoys had not got through, it is doubtful had too much on his hands in the Desert to take whether the island could have survived through effective action against the convoy. the summer and autumn of 1942.

73 -::/., F ions From Malta

MAY TO DECEMBER, 1942 THIS ABTICLE DEALS with the activity of Multu­ cember, refreshed with the supplies brought in based aircraft from 20th May, 1942, to the end by convoys that could now .get through far more of the year. In this period Malta's position chang­ easily, Malta gave valuable support to the cam­ ed completely. From the entry of Italy into the paign in Cyrenaica and to the new campaign that war in June, 1940, the island had been on the opened in North Africa. defensive. Now, in November, the advance of the The bombers came into their own again after Vlllth Army enabled Malta to take the offensive a period of nearly eight months in which they and so turn the tables on the enemy. had been unable to operate. How much the is­ Since the opening of the war in the Mediter­ land owes to its fighters during those eight ranean, Malta had stood in the enemy's way. months will emerge later, but the following table With the object of checking interference with his shows the extent of the damage they inflicted on sea-borne supplies, the enemy launched an air- the enemy between 20th May and the end of the offensive in the Spring that was intended to year:— knock the island out permanently. Although, however, its bomber effort was largely neutra­ Enemy Aircraft Casualties lized from early March, the island was by no means knocked out. In April and early May Probably Malta's fighters, largely re-equipped with Spit­ Month Destroyed Destroyed Damaged fires, got the measure of the attackers after much stiff fighting, and in seven weeks destroy­ 17 11 21 ed or probably destroyed 337 enemy aircraft. May June 64 15 57 From this time the fighters never lost control. July 149 38 140 In the first week of July, seeing that Malta August 49 16 28 was again interfering with convoys running sup­ September ' 15 5 14 plies up to the front, which had by then stabi­ October 132 63 163 lised at El Alamein, the enemy opened another November 47 8 18 air offensive, although on a more limited scale. December 49 7 34 In this week, having lost 95 aircraft, he called the attack off. Malta then enjoyed something Totals 522 163 475 that it had not enjoyed for a long time — a quiet period of several days and nights without an Shortage of Fuel Affects Policy alert. The vital question of the provisioning of Malta The Final Offensive Fails is dealt with separately on pages 65-71. Through­ The final offensive came in October. It failed out the period the scale and direction of R.A.F. after nine days in which a further 118 enemy effort was dictated by the fuel situation. Owing aircraft were shot down. This final attempt was to the necessity for conserving aircraft fuel, the badly mistimed. It is clear that the enemy did bombing of land targets was almost non-existent not expect the Vlllth Army's attack to materialize between the middle of June and the middle of before December or January. Since he had been November. All available fuel was needed for living largely on supplies accumulated in the keeping fighters and reconnaissance aircraft fly­ spring and summer and on what he had cap­ ing and for attacks on shipping. tured from the British, the enemy determined The June and August convoys did not mate­ to win the supply race and put his forces in the rially affect the situation and by the end of strongest possible position before the Vlllth August shortage of fuel was so acute that the Army was ready. To achieve this Malta had following notice was issued: "In order to con­ finally to be neutralized. serve Malta's stock of aviation petrol, the Air When this attack came, however, the enemy Ministry has ordered that offensive sweeps and not only underestimated Malta's ability to keep attacks on enemy land objectives should not be its Spitfires flying, but also overestimated the undertaken except when they contribute to the staying-power of his own pilots and crews. success of attacks on shipping and its escorting After defeating this offensive, Malta enjoyed air forces." comparative immunity. From being the attacked The position remained precarious until convoys it now became the attacker and exchanged blow began to arrive in November, after the Vlllth for blow with the enemy. In November and De­ Army's advance. Bombers could once again ope­ rate against land targets, and sorties immediately Over jumped from nothing to 148 in a week. „ mr^~ i^™ ^ J fifteen a week. In the final ^eriod^^fltf the end Scale of Fighter Effort of the year, when Malta had to assist both the There is no doubt that the' Spitfires were large­ Cyrenaican and North African campaigns, 128 ly instrumental in saving Malta in the summer effective sorties were made — an average of and autumn of 1942, as they had already done in over thirteen a week. the spring. In the same period Egypt-based bombers made 471 effective sorties against enemy shipping — Between May and December fighters flew 12,167 sorties, divided among the following du­ only 23 more than made by Malta's aircraft. ties:— The majority of bomber sorties against land targets were made after the fuel situation had Local defence — 8,213 been eased by the arrival of the November con­ Offensive reconnaissance — 1,580 voy. Until then only 117 sorties had been flown; Shipping protection — 1,446 afterwards there were 709 sorties. Bomber and reconnaissance escort — 372 Anti-shipping strikes — 194 Scale of Reconnaissance Effort Ground attack (fighter-bombers) — 173 In spite of the fuel shortage, reconnaissance Intruder patrols — 108 effort was maintained at a high level through­ Ground attacks (fighters) — 81 out the period. Exact figures are not available Peak figures for fighter activity were reached for either land or sea reconnaissance, but thert in the first fortnight in July (969 sorties), the were 345 plus days on which land or harbour re­ middle of August (1,255 sorties), the middle of connaissances were made and 754 plus sea re­ October (1,307 sorties) and the end of November connaissance sorties. (1,012 sorties). Continuous and systematic check was made of In the July period 947 sorties were put up on enemy shipping movements and naval disposi­ local defence against the temporarily increased tions; of activity in the dockyards; of the number enemy attack; in the August period, in addition of aircraft on Sicilian, Trvpolitanian, Tunisian and to 661 sorties on local defence, 383 sorties on Sardinian aerodromes. Special reconnaissance shipping protection and 125 sorties on offensive effort was laid on to cover friendly convoys and reconnaissance were flown in connection with the Naval movements. convoy that arrived from the west; in the October An outstanding reconnaissance was carried out period 1,267 local defence sorties were made at the end of the year. A Mosquito of No. 1 against the renewed enemy air offensive; in the P.R.U. landed at Malta on 23rd December with November period, in addition to 300 sorties on photographs of all the principal Adriatic ports, local defence, over 400 sorties were made to pro­ including the first cover of Ancona to be obtain­ tect the convoy arriving from the east. ed. Valuable information was provided of activ­ ity in Italy's shipbuilding yards at Trieste, Fiume Various aspects of fighter activity are dealt and Ancona. with later in more detail. Enemy Pressure Affects Malta's Role Scale of Bomber Effort The fluctuating scale of enemy pressure caus­ While fighter effort had of necessity to be ed the period between May and December to fall maintained continuously, bomber effort, restrict­ into three parts:— ed by the fuel shortage, fluctuated considerably. (a) May to September. Apart from the July Altogether, between May and December, Malta- offensive, a comparatively quiet period. based bombers and fighter-bombers flew 1,274 Fighters had the situation well in hand. effective sorties, divided as follows:— Bombers were restricted to sea targets Against shipping in transit — 448 by lack of fuel. The enemy, occupied to Against ports and bases — 47 2 the full in the Desert, could not turn his Against aerodromes and L.Gs. ... — 307 attention seriously to Malta, although Against camps and positions — 47 his shipping was continuously harassed by MaZta-based aircraft. The 448 effective sorties against shipping in (b) October. The resumption of heavy air transit were responsible for the definite sinking attack on the island on the Hth, after of twelve enemy ships; the probable sinking of a powerful striking force had been built fifteen; and the damaging of 72 plus, as well as up in Sicily. Spitfires smashed this of­ 51 plus cases in which results of attack were fensive in nine days — and attacks on unknown. enemy shipping still continued. During the vital battle in the desert between (c) November and December. Malta, rela­ May and July 123 effective sorties were made tively free from attack and reinforced against shipping at sea — an average of over by the arrival of convoys, turned from twelve a week. In the equally vital period be­ defence to offence. Maximum aid given tween the stabilization of the lines at El Alamem to the VIHth Army's advance in Cyre­ and the opening of the VIHth Army's offensive naica and, later, to the North African in October, when every effort had to be made campaign. to prevent supplies reaching the enemy, there

75 n Lrately. The son was that the enemy was not prepared to risk scale of enemy attack is shown, followed by the JU.88s against the Spitfires. fighters' effort to counter it and the R.A.F's of­ Eleven nights in August were free from alerts. fensive activity. The majority of the 73 bombers which approach­ ed the island dropped their bombs in the sea be­ MALTA ON THE DEFENSIVE fore reaching the coast. In September the number of alerts fell to 38 The chief events of the defensive period be­ and on ten days there were no alerts. At night tween May and September were the arrival of only eight out of 47 bombers got close enough the June and August convoys (see pages 65-(71); to bomb the island; the rest were forced by Beau- the success of the Spitfires in the first fortnight fighters to bomb the sea between five and thirty in July when they shot down 95 enemy aircraft, miles from the shore. Fourteen nights were free probably destroyed 23 and damaged another 98; from alerts. a change in fighter interceptive tactics in the sec­ ond half of July; greatly increased fighter of­ Failure of the Enemy's July Offensive fensive policy in August. At the end of June, JU.87s and 88s were seen Enemy pressure varied considerably. After the by reconnaissance aircraft to be back in Sicily. peak period in April, when as many as 400 sor­ As yet, however, few bombers flew near Malta. ties were flown against the island in one day, Early in July attacks became more intense, pressure declined abruptly. Bombing attacks both by day and by night. JU.88s, Cant.l007s were largely replaced by fighter sweeps, usually and RE.2001s, escorted by strong formations of at great height. Even these grew less in num­ ME. 109s and MC.202s, approached the island. ber until July brought a resumption of attack. Spitfires and Beaufighters met them. In a Reasons for this decline were that, in the week they shot down 95 enemy aircraft and caus­ spring offensive, the enemy suffered losses that ed the attack to break off. The best single day could not immediately be replaced; commitments was the 6th. Between 08.20 hours, when seven in Russia called for the transference of certain JU.88s with an escort of fifteen/twenty ME.109s squadrons from the Mediterranean; remaining attacked Ta Kali, and 20.55 hours, when the last aircraft were more urgently needed for the raiders were driven off, the Spitfires made 92 coming attack in the desert. sorties. They shot down six JU.88s, one Cant. By the middle of May enemy fighters and 1007, four ME. 109s and four MC.202s; probably fighter-bombers normally approached the island destroyed a JU.88, a Cant.1007, two ME.109s and in formations of between five and twenty air­ a MC.202; and damaged three JU.88s, four Cant. craft. Small numbers of bombers—usually four 1007s, eight ME.109s and two MC.202s. Against or five Cant.l007s after most of the JU.883 had this total of 37, our casualties were one Spitfire left Sicily — also operated occasionally. At night missing and seven damaged. there were often three or four alerts. Formations Altogether in July approximately 1,780 Spit­ of some six aircraft crossed the coast and drop­ fire sorties were flown. They destroyed 137 ene­ ped a few bombs. Night-flying Beaufighters my aircraft, their own losses being 36, of which made many interceptions. eighteen pilots we^re saved. At night Beaufight­ In June the enemy continued the same tactics. ers flew 61 sorties and shot down twelve enemy Bombs were dropped in only nine of the 108 day­ bombers without loss to themselves. time alerts. The greatest number of bombers to Enemy aircraft dropped approximately 550 approach the island in any one day was ten tons of bombs, mainly on the aerodromes — 285 JU.88s. Damage caused was slight. Approxim­ tons on both Ta Kali and Luqa, 58 tons on Hal ately 202 night-raiders were responsible for 65 Far, and the remaining 22 tons at random. alerts. In the first week of July the enemy put up a Changes in Fighter Tactics fresh offensive. From nine the number of In June, after the countering of the enemy's bombing attacks rose to 57 and the tonnage of spring offensive, and with more fighters avail­ bombs dropped jumped from 60 to 550 tons. The able, fighter interception tactics were changed. number of night attacks remained constant as Instead of waiting for the raiders over the is­ the number of day attacks increased; there land, fighters were sent to intercept them well 10 were 54 alerts for a total of approximately 200 the north. raiders. The result of this was seen in the successful In August enemy attack slackened further. defence early in July, when bombers were fre­ During daylight there were only two abortive quently forced to jettison their loads in the sea bombing attempts; at night only a few half-heart­ and make for base when still well clear of the is­ ed attacks. For the rest the enemy still relied on land. Proof of this is the decline by 50% in raids fighter sweeps at great height, with the object during the latter half of July and the fact that of wasting our petrol and causing strain among the tonnage of bombs dropped fell from 390 to our fighter pilots and aircraft. 160 tons. Even when the convoy from the west arrived, The enemy's reply to these tactics was to the ships were unmolested once they had reached .his own. He considerably increased the harbour. According to prisoners of f his escorting fighters. Approximately 280 fighter sorties were flown as against 90 In The ^ the first half of the month. a JU.88 ahd.iari MC.202* "p ^ Enemy fighter sweeps normally operated at JU.88, a JU.87 and an ME.109, and damaged an­ extreme height. Our fighters at the end of July other ME.109 on the aerodrome. Damage was patrolled at 20,000 feet, but the enemy kept out also caused to dispersals and buildings, and many of harm's way. Early in August Spitfires pa­ casualties inflicted on personnel. On the way trolled at 22,000 feet; the enemy kept 6,000 feet home the Spitfires straffed three schooners. higher. By the middle of September combats At the end of August, owing to the shortage of took place at between 26,000 and 28,000 feet. In petrol, fighters were again limited to interceptive October Spitfires were as high as 32,000 feet, patrols and offensive reconnaissances. waiting for the enemy to approach the island. In September Spitfires carried out a number This nervousness on the enemy's part was illu­ of anti-"E"-boat patrpls, flying at between 50 strated on the evening of the 14th August. A feet and sea-level. The normal route was to make formation flew over in search of a crippled tanker the Sicilian coast at Cape Passero, fly along the that was being towed in. Seeing that Spitfires coast to Cape ScalambiHa, keeping about a mile were airborne, however, they all dropped tnen off the Sicilian coast, and then return to base. bombs in the sea and turned for home, although by then it was too dark for the Spitfires to have Growth of Intruder Patrols engaged with much chance of success. Towards the end of August, Beaufighters began to operate on night intruder patrols over Sicily. Fighters Turn to the Offensive On the first occasion on 26/27th August, a Beau- August saw Malta's fighters turn from a pure­ fighter successfully attacked Marsala flying-boat ly defensive to an offensive role. Three "Rodeos," station with machine-gun and cannon. A DO.18 two "Circuses" and a "Rhubarb" were carried out. was shot down in flames and the chance light of a merchant vessel was extinguished. On the next The "Rodeos"—straightforward fighter sweeps night a Beaufighter scored many hits with ma- — were flown over south-east Sicily on 19th chine-gun and cannon on seaplane hangars at August and the two following days with the ob­ Syracuse. ject of testing the enemy's R.D.F. and any tac­ In September Beaufighters flew 22 intruder tical reactions he might show. On no occasion sorties over Sicilian aerodromes and ports. They did a single enemy aircraft take off. made machine-gun and cannon attacks on illu­ On the 23rd fighters and fighter-bombers co­ minated flare-paths, on "E"-boats and on sub­ operated in a "Circus" over Gela and Biscari marines at anchor. aerodromes with the main object of enticing the Bomber Effort in the Defensive Period enemy to come up and fight. Bombs were drop­ ped on Biscari aerodrome and on military build­ Almost all bomber sorties against land targets ings near Gela. Enemy fighters, however, would in the defensive period were flown in the first not be tempted on this occasion, nor three days month. After that, as already mentioned, petrol later when a low-level attack was made on Biscari shortage confined bomber operations to sea targets. aerodrome with bombs and machine-gun and In the ten weeks up to the end of July 96 ef­ cannon fire. fective sorties were flown against land targets. More concrete results came from the "Rhubarb" Attention was confined mainly to Messina and — an attack by a small formation of fighters Taranto, although attacks were also made on using cloud cover or approaching the target very Naples, Augusta, Cagliari, Marettimo and Pan­ low — against Comis'o, Biscari and Gela aero­ tellaria. dromes on the 27th. Two high-flying Spitfires Messina, with its train ferry terminus, was at­ made an independent offensive reconnaissance tacked on eight occasions between 25/26th May patrol of the battle area; 22 Spitfires in three and 6/7th June, with a total of 29 Wellington formations made ground-level sweeps over the sorties. Taranto was attacked three times on 8/ aerodromes; and seven more Spitfires covered 9th June and the following nights by two forma­ the return of the sweep to the south of Sicily. tions of eight Wellingtons and one of six respec­ The first Spitfire formation engaged a number tively. On all occasions Taranto naval dockyard of JU.88s< south of Comiso at 500 feet, destroyed was the main target. Wellingtons dropped 37 tons four of them, probably destroyed three and dam­ of H.E. bombs and over 1,250 lbs. of incendiary aged another. The Spitfires then attacked Comiso bombs, including 80 lbs. of screamer incendiaries. aerodrome, shot down an ME. 109 as it was tak­ The only attack on Augusta — by two Welling- ing off and probably destroyed at least one JU.88 tons on the night of l/2nd June — was aimed at on the ground. the submarine base. Six Wellingtons took part The second formation, attacking Biscari, des­ in the attack on Naples on 5/6th June, when troyed two JU.88s, probably destroyed a bomber nearly ten tons of bombs were dropped, including taking off, damaged others on the ground and one of 4,000 lbs. which fell in the centre of the town. Cagliari was attacked once — by seven attacked gun-posts, fuel tanks and railway yards Wellingtons — on 7/8th June. in the vicinity. On the way back they intercept­ ed three ME.109s north-west of Malta and shot Of the twenty sorties against aerodromes and landing-grounds, thirteen were made by medium one down.

77 The airborne; one HE.Ill was destroyed and another V Catania probably destroyed. on the nights of 27/28th, 28/29th and 29/30th The enemy repeated his attack next day, using May. During the final attack one Wellington roughly the same tactics — four raids with six was approached by two enemy fighters, which or eight JU.88s, heavily escorted by fighters. Spit­ obligingly collided in mid-air with a loud explo­ fires again went to meet them north of the is­ sion. land and set up a new record for Malta. *In 147 In August and September the only attacks sorties against the enemy's 279, Spitfires destroy­ against ports and bases were made by three Libe­ ed 24, probably destroyed thirteen and damaged rators. On the night of 31st July/lst August two a further 28 aircraft. Five Spitfires were lost, aircraft were despatched to attack shipping in but two pilots were safe. Navarino Bay; after the operation they proceed­ On the 13th the Spitfires' score was eighteen ed to the Middle East. On the following night a destroyed, six probably destroyed and twenty similar operation was carried out by one Libe­ damaged; on the 14th, 23 destroyed, nine prob­ rator. ables and 24 damaged; on the 15th, fourteen des­ Against aerodromes and landing grounds, the troyed, four probables and thirteen damaged. only attacks, apart from thirteen sorties by Over a hundred Spitfire sorties were flown on fighter-bombers, were made in connection with each day against approximately 220 or 250 ene­ the August convoy movement by a total of four my aircraft. Liberators, accompanied by four flare-dropping The German radio now took the opportunity Wellingtons. On ll/12th August two Liberators to announce that during the period from 11th to and two Wellingtons attacked Decimomannu and 15th October the British lost 72 aircraft over saw all their bombs burst on the aerodrome. On Malta against the Axis loss of 23 aircraft. The the next night a similar attack was directed actual figures up to this time were 97 Axis air­ against Pantellaria. Fighter-bombers — Hurri­ craft destroyed, 37 probably destroyed and 110 canes of the R.N.A.S. — made thirteen sorties on damaged, for our loss of nineteen Spitfires, eleven Gelci, Comiso and Biscari aerodromes and mili­ pilots being safe. tary buildings in the vicinity. Results, however, On the 16th the enemy changed his tactics, were unobserved owing either to thick cloud or to splitting up his formations to cover a wider front intense A.A. fire. and approaching from several directions simul­ In August Spitfires had been adapted and mo­ taneously. A total of 260 enemy aircraft ope­ dified for carrying two 250 lb. bombs. Trials rated and were met by 125 Spitfire sorties, whose were made, but no operational sorties were flown, score was seven shot down, six probables and either in August or September, owing to the Air fourteen damaged. Six Spitfires were lost, but Ministry's ruling that petrol was not to be used three pilots were safe. against land targets. On the 17th, 18th and 19th over a hundred Spitfire sorties were flown on each day against THE ENEMY'S OCTOBER OFFENSIVE between 240 and 260 raiders. A total of thirteen October was made memorable for Malta by the were destroyed, six probably destroyed and eleven final enemy attempt to gain control of the air damaged, for our loss of five Spitfires, one pilot over the island. According to a German broad­ being safe. cast the enemy intended to "Keep the British In the last enemy attack of the offensive pe­ squadrons grounded and to deny access to the riod, at dusk on the 19th, three Spitfires and two port of Valetta." The attack opened suddenly on Beaufighters together intercepted some 40 bomb­ the 11th. By the 19th it had failed completely. ers flying in two main formations. They forced At the end of September and the beginning of nearly all the bombers to jettison in the sea, and October enemy attack had dwindled to practi­ of three that crossed the coast one JU.88 was cally nothing. Several days and nights passed shot down by two of the Spitfires. Another JU.88 without an alert. The reason was that the enemy was destroyed north-east of the island by a was concentrating on building up a large strik­ Beauftghter. ing force in Sicily. Photographic reconnaissance By now, having in nine days and nights lost 118 showed that in early October Sicilian aerodromes aircraft destroyed, 50 probably destroyed and 137 housed "about half the German bomber strength damaged, the enemy had taken enough punish­ and about a third of the whole G.A.F. in the Me­ ment. For every British pilot lost the enemy had diterranean area — a total strength, with Italian sacrificed fifteen members of aircrews; German aircraft, of approximately 600 aircraft. pilots, taken prisoners during the month, admit­ The offensive opened shortly after 07.00 hours ted that there was a general reluctance among on the 11th with a few bombers attacking Hal the G.A.F. for flights over Malta. Far. Pressure intensified throughout the day. By For ten days after the 19th, the enemy sent 18.00 hours some 70 bombers and 180 fighters over nothing except heavily-escorted fighter- had approached the island. Fifteen had been bombers, who took maximum advantage of cloud shot down, five probably destroyed and 26 dam­ cover. The last two days of October were free aged. Spitfires, which made 109 sorties, had one from air attack. aircraft missing and nine damaged. That night While Malta's fighters were defending the is­ there were four alerts; eight Beaufighters were land, bombers had not been inactive and recon­ naissance had continued as usual. No aerodrome had been unserviceable for more than half an air attack on Malta hour, and on the only night when bombers did occasional brief renewal of activity. In November not carry out shipping strikes no enemy ships enemy aircraft caused only nineteen alerts by had been within range of Malta. There were more day or night. Fighter-bombers crossed the coast attacks on shipping in the ten days up to the on only two days and bombers on only two nights. 20th than in the previous ten days. By day enemy aircraft always flew high and Beaufighters, apart from defensive night pa­ avoided combat. On the night of 18/19th De­ trols, carried out intruder patrols over Sicilian cember occurred the heaviest raid on the island aerodromes, attacking aircraft as they came in for several months. About 40 bombers operated or took off. On the night of the 17/18th a Beau- between 23.00 hours and 00.15 hours and suc­ fighter caused an HE.lll to blow up and crash ceeded in hitting nine Wellingtons as they were on the runway at Catania. In addition to this re-fuelling for a second sortie against Tunis. Two success, night Beaufighters were responsible for Beaufighters were airborne, destroyed one JU.88 four enemy aircraft destroyed, one probably des­ and forced many others to jettison their bombs troyed and another damaged. They had no losses in the sea. themselves. Fighters, not having so much work to do in The enemy, as already mentioned, derived defending the island, were able to give maximum no benefit from this attempt to knock Malta out. protection to convoys both when coming in and On the contrary his losses were extremely dam­ unloading. In November and December short- aging and, in addition, between 500 and 600 air­ range Spitfires, long-range Spitfires and Beau- craft were tied down in Sicily at a time when fighters put up 880 plus sorties on shipping pro­ they might have helped the enemy far more in tection and another 500 plus on local defence. On other spheres. 19th November fighters, with 65 sorties, protect­ ed a convoy for the last 135 miles of its voyage MALTA TAKES THE OFFENSIVE and during the next few days carried out a fur­ ther 200 sorties while the convoy was unloading Having dealt with the Axis October offensive, in Valetta Harbour. Malta proceded to hit back hard and to give full Fighters, as already shown, had already support to the operations in Cyrenaica and North turned from a purely defensive to an offensive Africa. Strikes on shipping by the R.N.A.S., role. Now, reinforced by Beaufighters and Spit­ F.A.A. and special Wellingtons continued; Wel­ fire-bombers, they paid the enemy back for the lingtons and Beaufighters were brought in and damage caused to Malta in the spring. operated widely against ports, bases, aerodromes and other targets; fighter-bombers added their Activities of the Day Beaufighters weight against aerodromes and military targets; The two squadrons of day Beaufighters that fighters covered the arrival and departure of con­ reached Malta early in November began operat­ voys, played havoc with enemy air convoys run­ ing in a general utility role on the 9th. They ning between Sicily and Tripolitania, and made soon made their presence felt. In offensive sweep's many sweeps over Sicily, seldom encountering op­ in the area bounded by Tunis — Trapani — Sirte position. Tripoli — Gabes — Tunis, they attacked shipping The main events of the period were:— with bombs, cannons and machine-guns; they in­ (a) The arrival of convoys in November and tercepted — usually in company with Spitfires December, bringing, among other essen­ — enemy air convoys on their way to and from tials, petrol and ammunition to put the Africa; they ground-straffed aerodromes; they R.A.F. once more on the offensive. shot up trains and transport columns; they (b) The beginning of operations by No. 238 escorted Beauforts on shipping strikes; they pro­ (Medium Bomber) Wing on the night tected friendly convoys. of 7/8th November. Twenty-five Wel­ The outstanding success of the Beaufighter — lingtons of Nos. 40 and 104 Squadrons Spitfire combinations was against airborne trans­ were sent from Egypt. port, on which the enemy largely relied to rush (c) The first offensive employment from men and material over to Africa. In November Malta of Spitfire-bombers. and December they destroyed over 70 transport (d) The arrival of two day Beaufighter aircraft in transit and many on the ground, as Squadrons (Nos. 227 and 272) early in well as others probably destroyed or damaged. November, and their immediate and The record day was 11th December. Six Beau- striking success against enemy trans­ fighters and eight Spitfires, on a sweep in the port aircraft. Pantellaria, Lampion, Kerkenna areas, sighted (e) The improvement in reconnaissance two formations of 32 and 30 JU.52s, JU.88s and work by the creation of No. 248 G.R. ME.llOs. Wing in December. The Spitfires first took on the escort and, hav­ (f) Two types of enemy aircraft — the B.V. ing shot down three ME.llOs and a JU.88, over­ 222 and the Merseburg — were destroy­ took the transports and destroyed two JU.52s, ed for the first time in the Mediterra­ probably destroyed another and damaged two nean area. more. Meanwhile, the Beaufighters had shot igea tour. . Another by air operations from Malta, especially most up to see what was happen- succesful Beaufighter action." down by the Spitfires. One Beau- This message referred to the aid given by Tighter was lost and two others and a Spitfire Malta's aircraft to the North African campaign, damaged. which opened on 7/8th November, and for which On the 15th, three Beaufighters escorted by Malta was reinforced. This aid consisted of al­ four Spitfires, on a sweep to the west of Malta, most nightly bombing attacks by Wellingtons on encountered fifteen JU.52s with a top and low Tunisian ports and aerodromes and by Welling- cover of sixteen plus ME. 109s about ten miles tons, Beaufighters and Spitfire-bombers on Sici­ north of Lampedusa. The Spitfires kept off the lian aerodromes; the Beaufighter offensive sweeps top cover, probably destroying one, while the already referred to; torpedo attacks on convoys Beaufighters tackled the JU.52s. Although at­ bound for Tunisia; mine-laying in the harbours tacked by the low cover, the Beaufighters claim­ of Bizerta, Tunis and Palermo; and systematic ed four JU.52s destroyed (one by an observer), checks by reconnaissance aircraft of Axis acti­ two probables and four damaged. Two Beaufight­ vity in Tunisia, Italy, Sicily and Sardinia. ers were slightly damaged, but the Spitfires were From the opening of the North African cam­ unharmed. paign to the end of December, Wellingtons flew 350 sorties against ports and bases and 128 By the end of December five or six sweeps against aerodromes and landing grounds; fighter- were being made daily by Beaufighter-Spitfire bombers flew another 118 sorties against aero­ combinations, formations being as large as four dromes. When necessary, bomber effort was Beaufighters and twelve Spitfires. switched from helping the North African cam­ Destruction of SM.82s paign to providing strategic attacks in connec­ tion with incoming convoys. Another type of aircraft that often became victim to the Beaufighters was the SM.82. On the Wellingtons began the offensive on the night evening of 12th November seven Beaufighters, on of 7/8th November with an attack on Cagliari a patrol of the Tunis — Sicily Channel, sighted aerodrome as a diversion for the Allied landing five SM.82s with German markings, 40 miles in Algeria. From that date they operated every south-east of Pantellaria, followed six miles be­ night except four in November and every night hind by another SM.82 with Italian markings. except seven in December, in spite of a good deal The Italian aircraft was the only one that escap­ of bad weather towards the end of the year. The ed, all the others being shot down into the sea. principal targets were near enough for the Wel­ lingtons to make two sorties each on many Beaufighters often flew so low in pressing nights. home attacks that one damaged a propeller on the funnel of a merchant vessel and another dam­ Heavy damage was done to port installations, aged a wing-tip on a tree when searching for aerodrome buildings, railway stations, and stores some hidden lorries. and petrol dumps. Photographic reconnaissance revealed that on several days in November, El On 24th November a Beaufighter destroyed Aouina, the chief German air base in Tunisia, the first BV.222 — a six-engined flying-boat — was rendered unserviceable because of the many encountered in the Eastern Mediterranean area. craters in the landing area; during an attack on Three Beaufighters, on an offensive sweep along Catania many Wellingtons dropped their bombs the east Tunisian coast, saw the BV. 222 going just as enemy aircraft were taking-off. north at sea level. After a chase of twenty miles, one of the Beaufighters set the port engine and Altogether, Wellingtons had dropped nearly petrol tanks on fire. The aircraft hit the sea, 850 tons of bombs by the end of the year. Ten bounced 60 feet into the air, went into the sea aircraft were lost, but the crews of two were again and blew up. saved. Spitfire-bombers, which had earlier been pre­ On 10th December three Beaufighters, airborne vented from operating by the embargo on the use to protect an incoming convoy, met three more of fuel for land attacks, began their harassing BV.222s, destroyed one, probably destroyed an­ attacks on Sicilian aerodromes in November. By other and damaged the third. the end of December they had flown a total of A Merseburg, the first of these six-engined 143 sorties, mainly against Comiso and Gela aero­ monoplane troop-carriers to appear in the Medi­ dromes. Lampedusa aerodrome, which came into terranean area, was left in flames on El Aouina use for the first time in December, was attacked aerodrome by Beaufighters on 10th November. on several occasions, in one of which bombs and Nine Beaufighters attacked in two waves and, in ground-straffing destroyed or probably destroyed Mdition to the Merseburg, destroyed two JU.90s, five SM.79s or 81s, which had been spotted there five JU.52s and one JU.87, as well as damaging by photographic reconaissance. The busiest days at least fifteen other aircraft. for the Spitfire-bombers were the last day of No­ vember and the first day of December, when Malta Helps the North African Campaign eighteen and nineteen sorties were flown respec­ On 10th November the A.O.C., Malta, received tively. the following signal from General Eisenhower:— Although many enemy fighters remained on "Most grateful for splendid support afforded me the Sicilian aerodromes, they seldom tackled the Spitfire-bombers; those that did so were inva- voy, 28,861 tons, was un A Record Number of Rescues Assistance from Army Personnel Malta's Air-Sea Rescue Service, which had Throughout the period the R.A.F. in Malta re­ saved many lives since the beginning of the war ceived valuable assistance from Army personnel set up a record in July. When a Spitfire pilot Men were provided for servicing aircraft pen- was packed up on the evening of 23rd June the building, repairing runways, bombing-up aircraft Marine Section of the rescue service brought disposing of unexploded bombs and other acti­ their total of pilots rescued to a hundred By vities. 8th July the High Speed Launch No. 128, ope­ In June as many as 2,800 soldiers were work­ rating from KaJafrana, had saved 43 pilots and ing daily for the R.A.F. In a special effort to members of air-crews — a world's record. finish pens for the arrival ,of aircraft reinforce­ The High Speed Launch No. 107, operating ments, 2,100 men were employed on one aero­ from St. Paul's Bay, had by then rescued 39 and drome alone. Later, in August, the R.A.F made the seaplane tenders a further 28, making a total of 110 saved. an urgent request for thirty aircraft pens to be repaired. Working parties of 2,000 men with 150 Enemy and R.A.F. Aircraft Casualties vehicles were provided and completed the task in a very short time. During the period the R.A.F. destroyed 522^. enemy aircraft (one was shared with the A.A. Convoy-unloading was another vital task. When gunners); probably destroyed 163; and damaged the convoy from the west arrived in August, 475. The A.A. gunners' share was 171 destroyed, 3,000 men worked in three shifts day and night,' two probably destroyed and nine damaged. with some civilian assistance, and unloaded near­ Against these figures the R.A.F. lost 197 air­ ly 5,000 tons a day, dispersing it to field dumps craft, of which 46 Spitfire pilots and two Wel­ and to consignees. A total of 32,000 tons was lington and four Beaufighter crews were saved. cleared in a week, providing approximately three Tailpiece months additional food at the ration rate then in force. During 1942, R.A.F. Fighter Command and A.A. in England destroyed 738 enemy aircraft. In November, when another convoy reached In the same period Malta destroyed 915 enemy port, 13,672 tons were unloaded and dispersed aircraft, of which 733 were destroyed by the in 60 hours by 3,200 Army personnel and civilian R.A.F. and 182 by A.A. gunners.

RECONNAISSANCE — LAND and HARBOUR From MALTA (19/20th MAY - 29«n DECEMBER, 1942)

FORTNIGHTLY PERIODS LAND HARBOURS

19/20 May 2 June 9 8 2/3 16 June ... ,"> 9 16/17 30 June ... 7 10 30 June/1 - 14 July 12 13 14/15 - 28 July 8 10 28/29 July - 11 Aug • 8 10 11/12 25 Aug 13 14 25/26 Aug. 8 Sept 14 14 8/9 - 22 Sept 10 12 22/23 Sept. 6 Oct o 5 14 6/7 20 Oct 9 12 20/21 Oct. 3 Nov 10 12 3/4 - 17 Nov 11 13 17/18 Nov. - 1 Dec 14 14 1/2 15 Dec 11 14 15/16 . 29 Dec 13 TOTALS 153 192

Above figures are by days. Precise figures of sorties are not available. Figures for SEA RECONNAISSANCE from MALTA are attached to the article "THE WAR AT SEA — SUMMER AND AUTUMN, 1942"

81 ATTACKS AGAINST LAND TARGETS BY BOMBER AIRCRAFT BASED ON MAJLTA. (19/2Oth May ­ 29th December, 1942) (Summarised in Fortnightly Periods)

AERODROMES and ENEMY CAMPS, POSITIONS, PORTS and BASES AND LINES OF LANDING GROUNDS COMMUNICATION FORTNIGHTLY FORT­ PERIODS NIGHTLY TOTALS bo 3

•/20 May - 2 June ... 24 24 13 13 3 - 16 June 42 42 /17 - 30 June June/1 - 14 July ... 1 - 28 July 4 5 28/29 July - 11 Aug. 3 6 11/12 - 25 Aug 11 11 25/26 Aug. - 8 Sept. 7 7 8/9 - 22 Sept. 22/23 Sept. - 6 Oct. ... 6/7 - 20 Oct 20/31 Oct. - 3 Nov. ... 3/4 . 17 Nov 4 4 52 52 60 17/18 Nov. - 1 Dec. ... 82 40 126 81 82 163 289 1/2 Dec. - 15 Dec. ... 142 5 147 17 10 28 28 30 205 15/16 - 29 Dec 115 5 120 26 26 4 9 155

GRAND TOTALS 411 54 742' 167 135 307 14 32 47 826 OPERATIONS BY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT — LAND AND SEA From MALTA (19/20tb May - 29th December, 1942)

Local Defen­ * Ground FORTNIGHTLY ce & cover Ground Attack Offensive Bomber to retng. —Fighters recce: Land Anti- & Recce- Intruder Shipping PERIODS offensive Attack— (Cannon and sea Shipping Escort Patrols Protection recce. F/Bombers & M/G)

19/20 May ­ 2 June ... 481 2/3 ­ 16 June ... 667 23 100 16/17 ­ 30 June 327 14

30 June/1 ­ 14 July ... , 947 14 8

14/15 ­ 28 July : 715 21

28/29 July ­ 11 Aug. ... 627 16

11/12 ­ 25 Aug 661 17 125 25 38

25/26 Aug. . 8 Sept. ... 391 3 297 16 34 o 8/9 ­ 22 Sept 416 162 37 6 15 22/23 Sept. ­ 6 Oct. 322 170 17 11 6/7 ­ 20 Oct 1267 27 3 10

20/21 Oct. ­ 3 Nov. ... 675 14 1 3/4 ­ 17 Nov. ... 144 16 157 10 14 11 17/18 Nov. ­ 1 Dec. 301 79 10 139 31 124 21 1/2 ­ 15 Dec 131 -II 4

15/16 ­ 29 Dec 141 29 1 4 284 9 40 5

GRAND TOTALS 8213 173 108 1580 194 372 81 1446

* Some ground attacks were made during the offensive recces., but no separate figures are available. e Eyes Of The R.A.F.

THIS ARTICLE FIRST briefly explains the organi­ Photographic Interpretation Centre (C.P.I.C.). sation which exists in the Middle East Command This section was in most immediate contact with for providing intelligence from air photographs; the events of the battle, although, as will be second, gives some idea of the scope and value seen, the whole picture was formed only by the of photographic intelligence; and, third, relates collation of intelligence from the whole area some of the more outstanding events of the covered by reconnaissance aircraft. period from May to the end of December as seen from air photographs. At the beginning of the The Function of Photographic Intelligence events dealt with here, before No. 285 (Recon­ The most important function of photographic naissance) Wing was formed on 15th July, the intelligence is to enable the enemy's strength to organisation had not yet crystallised into its be assessed. Although the reconnaissance air­ present form. craft are flown by the R.A.F., the information obtained is equally vital to all three services. Organisation Frequent cover of the enemy's naval harbours (a) Reconnaissance. gives the Navy the battle order of the enemy One squadron exists for the sole purpose of fleet. From sorties flown over the battle areas photographic reconnaissance, with its headquar­ information is obtained of enemy batteries, mine- ters and main flight in Egypt, and the other fields and other defences, and embodied on the flight operating under No. 285 Wing in the defence overprints which form the basis of Army Western Desert. Photographic work is also un­ operations. By photographing enemy landing dertaken on occasion by the Army Co-operation grounds as nearly as possible at the same time, Squadrons and by the reconnaissance squadron numbers and types of aircraft are identified and based on Malta. the disposition of forces revealed. From this it is possible to ascertain the enemy strength and In this campaign, long-range strategical re­ probable intentions. connaissance—from Sardinia to Rhodes—was What is even more important, the scale of ef­ done by Spitfires, in the west from Malta, in the fort of which the enemy forces are capable can east from the neighbourhood of HeliopoTds. be gauged by observation of lines of supply. By These aircraft have a range of 1,200 miles. Two covering ports, and to a less extent (at least in formations now operating under No. 285 Wing this theatre of war) roads and railways, an ac­ flew sorties over the nearer areas, within a range curate picture of the enemy's resources can be 600 miles from where their base happened to built up. This was the case particularly during be as the battle moved. the last campaign, when the Axis was fighting (b) Interpretation. in a country possessing none of the materials of war, and where everything its army and air Air photographs are interpreted by the Middle force needed had to be brought by sea from East Interpretation Unit (M.E.I.U.) under the Europe. control of H.Q., R.A.F., M.E. At the H.Q. of Therefore, movements of merchant shipping M.E.I.U. all records and films are stored and were followed with great interest from the full facilities maintained for processing films and Italian and Greek ports to the Axis porjs of sup­ making mosaics. ply in. Afri.ca>. Individual ships were identified, In order that photographs may be interpret­ since it was necessary not only to know the ed as quickly as possible after the reconnais­ number of ships in any one harbour on a parti­ sance aircraft lands, detachments of M.E.I.U. cular day, but to know the rate of turnover. By are established on the aerodromes from which observing the movement of individual vessels in sorties are flown. Here, films are printed and their progress from one port to another it was given a rush interpretation which is communi­ possible to gauge not only the bulk of supplies cated by signal. The photographs are then for­ carried,, and consequently the enemy's capacity warded to M.E.I.U. for detailed examination and for action, but, moreover, to forecast what he retention. There is an Advanced Interpretation would be likely to receive in the near future. Section in the Field and another at Malta. Another point is that, since the enemy has The Army Air Photographic Interpretation never been short of shipping in the Mediterra­ Unit (A.A.P.I.U.) works in close collaboration nean, identification of, and attacks on, certain with M.E.I.U. This Unit has a section with the key vessels—for instance those possessing der­ Vinth Army which interprets photographs in ricks that could unload A.F.Vs. in harbours not conjunction with the M.E.I.U. Detachment. At possessing cranes—became essential. the beginning of the year these two sections in The routes from Europe to North Africa were the Western Desert were teP^^Kkas-th;e;-G« closely shadowed by aircraft from Malta. Their reports provided information for attacks, and were correlated with those from sorties flown by was made for mp No. 285 Wing and No. 680 Squadron, and in this little procession of five or six cars. way the shipping lanes were observed. The sudden development of the five Mar*ula It was seen, for instance, that while at first landing grounds at the end of March provided" the normal route was Taranto, Corfu, Navarino, a suitable target for light bombers — Bostons Benghazi or Tobruk, torpedo attacks from Malta of the S.A.A.F. A mosaic was made and taken up off the west coast of Greece became so serious to Baheira landing ground for their first brief- that the longer route through the Corinth Canal Ing, and additions and alterations from photo­ to Suda became temporarily more popular. graphs taken on subsequent raids were incorpor­ ated in the mosaic from time to time. The It is interesting to note that as far as can disappearance of the Stukas from Martuba caus­ be judged the enemy has failed to realise the ed a feverish search on photographs of other possibilities of photographic intelligence in this landing grounds before they were located on direction. Suez was photographed once a week 14th May at Siret El Chreiba (Derna south), a at the time we were photographing Tobruk every landing ground which had not been previously day. The enemy do not seem ever to have had covered by photographs. more than four JU.86P reconnaissance aircraft in operational use, one of which was certainly, Supplying information for the Long Range De­ and another probably, destroyed between the sert Group also came within the scope of the time of the Axis advance to El Alamein and our Section. Specially annotated photographs of offensive. Moreover, from captured photographs Martuba and Derna landing grounds were pre­ the type of camera used seems to be more pared for the Fighting French for use on ground suitable for obtaining exclusively target infor­ raids, and detailed information on Benghazi mation than for detailed strategical reconnais­ was given for one of the L.R.D.G.'s daring efforts. sance. Earlier in the year Benghazi had been almost Assessment of results of our action is equally stagnant, but as the Axis began to build up important. It is not only necessary to know that supplies for their offensive, activity and inge­ one ship has been hit, but also which, in order nuity began to be displayed in using the port. that bombers may next time direct their attacks New quays were constructed, "F"-boats and on to another. On a long term policy the de­ barges were used for unloading, and at the end tailed assessment from photographs of dam­ of February the first Siebel ferry in the harbour age to industrial installations, port facilities and was identified. The frequent photographs of the communications enables the probable scale of port showed a gradual increase in shipping turn­ effort in the future to be estimated. over. At the beginning of May there were only Knowledge of what naval vessels are out of three merchant vessels of any size, but by the commission or what success has been achieved end of the month there were eleven, seven of by attacks on aircraft is also an important func­ which had arrived between the 26th and the 28th, tion of photographic intelligence. Another func­ together with four destroyers and a torpedo-boat. tion is to judge matters of tactical policy in ope­ Other signs of an impending offensive were rations, as may be done by examining the pat­ not lacking. It was seen that the enemy was terns of. bomb bursts on bombing photographs, building up his dumps and moving them for­ from which the effectiveness of the run up may ward from such localities as Coefia and else­ be gauged. where. Movement of aircraft to the forward fighter landing grounds and, as the opening day The Campaign drew near, movement of M.T. along the roads, fa) The First Phase (Before the Axis Offemsive all combined to show that an attack might be on 26 th May). expected soon. In the period before the Axis offensive opened (b) The Axis Advance (26th May to SOth June). at the end of May, the Advanced Interpretation Targets continued to be demanded as the Section was based on Gambut, and Jedabya was R.A.F. hit back during the retreat after 17th about the westward limit of cover. One of its June. Dern% Bardia, Sollum and Matruh were main tasks was to find targets for Wellingtons covered in turn, aircraft operating from diffe­ based on Qotaifiya, The landing grounds at Betka, rent landing grounds from week to week as we Derna and Martuba and the harbour at Benghazi retired. The search for the location of the G.A.F. received most attention. To brief the crews, dis­ and I.A.F. forces — in particular the Stukas — positions of aircraft and shipping as seen on pho­ caused some unexpected difficulties to Interpret­ tographs were telephoned from Gambut to Qotai­ ers in recognising on air photographs landing fiya. It was no easy matter to be audible over grounds which we had recently evacuated. two hundred miles of telephone wire, and the in­ terpretation had often to be rushed in order to There was no time in this phase of the battle, get this vital information through before the when we were constantly moving back, for the take off at 20.00 hours. Advanced Interpretation Section to issue written As our fighter strength grew, annotated pho­ reports. As soon as the prints had been ex­ tographs of dumps, camps and other targets were mained, results were telephoned to the S.I.O. — required for ground straffing. A constant search who might be near at hand or 50 miles away — and thufeft perhaps a move had to be made to the graphs on one occasion showed newly-arrived next camp. troops formed up by the side of the aircraft. When Tobruk fell on 20th June, its Importance During this phase the Advanced Interpretation as a springboard for an attack on Egypt at once Section kept our light bomber forces informed became apparent. At the time the enemy entered, of the movement of enemy aircraft on the for­ the harbour was empty except for wrecks, and ward landing grounds. A rush interpretation of jetties and port facilities were in ruins. The ene­ sorties flown during the day was immediately my lost no time in putting it in commission, and telephone to No. 3 S.A.A.F. and No. 232 Wing the three days after its capture two merchant vessels same night, and the Naval and Army Co-opera­ arrived. tion Units were informed on the latest shipping in the ports from Matruh to Derna. (c) The Static Peripd (1st July to 23rd OctoberJ. The landing ground where the section worked Intense activity was maintained by both sides was at one time shot up daily by Macchis and in building up supplies. It was of vital import­ ME.109s, and the interpreters had great pleasure ance to know as accurately as possible the in briefing light bombers to attack the raiders' amount of material reaching the Axis forces in landing grounds the same night. At the begin­ order to gauge their scale of effort. Therefore, ning of October, it was seen on photographs that reconnaissance Spitfires covered Tobruk, the the Qotoifiyia landing grounds were floodeed, and main Axis port of supply, daily and arrivals and in consequence repeated attacks caused great departures of merchantmen in the harbour were destruction among bogged fighters. noted with extreme care by the interpreters at Every effort was made to prevent supplies M.E.I.U. Suda Bay and Candia were frequently reaching the North African ports, and photo­ covered at this time, and also, to a lesser extent, graphic evidence of success of our aircraft Piraeus. Vessels were traced from Piraeus to and submarines was not lacking; particularly with Suda Bay, and finally identified in Tobruk. regard to that of torpedo-bombers based on Malta, which attacked many ships off the south­ By 14th July there were ten M/Vs and tank­ west coast of Greece and elsewhere. An ins­ ers, of approximately 28,000 tons, in Tobruk. At­ tance of success was the burnt-out hulk of a tacks by Liberators began shortly afterwards, and merchantman, previously attacked by Beauforts, constant bombing* diminished the total tonnage seen lying off shore near Argostoli on 23rd for a short time. By the beginning of August, July. Another torpedo attack by Beauforts on activity had mounted again as the enemy built an 8/9,000 ton tanker was seen on photographs up his supplies for a final — and unavailing — taken on 20th August twelve miles off Paxos. attack on the Delta on 31st August. The next day this tanker was seen near Corfu, Towards the end of October the weight of our lying stationary, with broad streaks of oil on the attacks made itself felt and shipping activity water. A merchant vessel which had been at­ again fell off. In early November eleven M/Vs, tacked by Beaufighters on 6th September was comprising some 30,000 tons arrived. Only photographed on the 9th beached 2\ miles south­ one tanker got through, early in October, and south-west of Perdika, and eight days later remained in the Bay in various positions through­ down at the stern and resting in 3i fathoms in out this period. It is thought that she was dam­ Corfu harbour. aged during a raid, as the average time spent by a ship in the harbour was from ten to twelve Another merchant vessel left Taranto between days. 26th and 27th September, arrived at Navarino by the 29th, and on 2nd October was seen Night photographs taken during this period to have alongside her a vessel from Benghazi, established the fact that shipping left the har­ to which her deck cargo was being trans­ bour at night; that tankers crossed from the oil­ ferred from the forward end, which was low in ing jetties to the south shore; and that even "F"­ the water. In such operations against shipping boats (of which at that time some thirty were over a long period the Beaufort and Beaufighter active in the harbour) dispersed in order to avoid squadrons received invaluable assistance in track­ our attacks. As a result night bombers were di­ ing down ships from the interpreters at Malta. rected towards the port facilities rather than to shipping. Intelligence of the movements of the Italian Navy was also built up on reconnaissance from An interesting sequence of events was the ob­ Malta. The Condottieri "C" class cruiser, servation of the crossing of Siebel ferries from which arrived in Messina between 18th July Greece to Tobruk. Ten with fully loaded decks and 15th August with 100 feet of bows missing, were seen by an aircraft from Malta at sea off was seen to have left by 9th September and to Levkas Island on 21st October, and then two days have arrived at Naples by the 13th. On 13th later in Pair as harbour. On the 29 th, thirteen September the "Bolzano" which, it was reported, had arrived in Suda Bay, and twelve had arriv­ had been attacked by a submarine, arrived in ed in Tobruk by 3rd November. Naples with a large hole in her starboard side. Men and material were also rushed to Tobruk Closely connected with our attacks on shipping by air. Many JU. 52s were seen on the was offensive action against enemy aircraft es­ aerodromes around Athens, then at Maleme, corting convoys. Here again photographic re­ Heraklion and finally at Tobruk, where photo­ connaissance fulfilled a vital role in enabling our aircraft to bomb effectively the Sicilian aero­ dromes upon which they were based. Meanwhile, we had been making preparations was photographed entering" the' harbour. Owing for attack. During the months at El Alamein to adverse weather conditions it was not possible every portion of the enemy's lines, from the Qat­ to photograph the vessel in the harbour the next tara Depression to the sea, had been photo­ day, but from detailed previous knowledge of the graphed. A gridded mosaic was made of the port facilities it was known that the tanker al­ whole area with prints rectified by the Survey most certainly could berth only near the pipeline Directorate. On this mosaic all gun positions, on the Giuliana Mole. American bombers were strong points, wire, minefields and other defences briefed to this effect, and the following day were were annotated. successful in locating and hitting the vessel. It was still burning when the Vlilth Army entered This provided invaluable topographical inform­ six weeks later. ation to Corps Commanders in planning opera­ tions, and was used by A.A.P.I.U. to produce a After the enemy had left the port on the 20th, complete situation overprint. Certain portions a sortie was flown to give advance information on of this overprint were enlarged to a scale of 1 the difficulties likely to be encountered by the over 12,500, on which maps of enemy batteries VHIth Army in unloading stores. PhoLographs were pin-pointed with such accuracy that our showed thac the deep-water sections alongside barrage opened with devastating effect on the the Outer and Centxal Moles were isoiaieu by first day of our offensive and many of them gaps blown at their bases, that the other con­ were put out of action straight away. verted wreck used for unloading supplies had been destroyed, and that breaches had oten made (d) The Allied Advance (23rd October to the along the edges of the quays where pits had pre­ end of the lear.) viously been seen. As during our retreat, it now became again a As the North African ports fell, there was no matter of urgency to see which landing grounds longer any need for the covering force of three the enemy would use as he fell bacK, and a 6 in. cruisers, which with five to seven descroyers matter for speculation whether he would follow had lain since Jury, protected by booais, in iva­ the procedure of June and July and use the same vanno .tsay. They were seen to have gone by 10th landing grounds. Incidentally, it is interesting November; to have arrived at Auyusca on the to nocice that the fighters moved back before llth; were reported heading north off Taurmina our break through. By 6th November there were on the 13th and were photographed in Messina 46 aircraft bacK at Stdi Barrani (mainly Scukas harbour the same day. and fighters), where up to the end oi October Tripoli which, before the fall of Benghazi, had an average of only four aircraft had been seen. been coo far behind the lines to help the enemy, On the same day there were 83 fighters at Abu then became his port of supply. Photographs taken Hamud (outside Tobruk), an increase of nearly on 21st iNoyember showed sixteen merchant ves­ 50 since the previous day. On 14th November 91 sels (approximately 33,000 tons) in the port where aircraft (including 25 JU.52s) were photographed there had been only eight on 30ch October. During on one of the Berka landing grounds, and 145 the two months between the fall of Benghazi aircraft at Marbee Arch on the eastern borders and the evacuation of Tripoli only eight mer­ of Tripolitania. chant ships of some 11,000 tons reached the port. As the Vlllth Army advanced into Tripolitania, That their number was so small is due to the sorties were flown over all defended localities and success of Allied interception. Further success the latest information incorporated in defence was achieved in bombing the harbour and in overprints and annotated mosaics by A.A.P.I.U. holding up tne unloading of supplies, at least in conjunction with M.E.I.U. Long strips of road six vessels being seen to have been damaged in were also mosaiced and annotated for "going" attacks. and topography. The enemy, on the other hand, was successful For a short while Benghazi, now the main Axis in evacuating not only active shipping, but three port of supply, was heavily attacked. The dam­ badly damaged ships as well; and effectively, age seen as a result of the three raids by Brit­ though temporarily, sealing the mouth of the ish and American Liberators on 16th, 22nd and harbour by sinking block ships. Damage «similar the night of 22/23rd September was spectacular. to that at Benghazi was done by mining quays Three vessels, with a total tonnage of 12,000 to and jetties. 13,000 tons, were destroyed, one of which, from Reconnaissance aircraft covered the town up the completeness of its destruction and the sur­ to the enemy's withdrawal and watched all his rounding devastation, must have been full of efforts to make it unuseable. As the Vlllth Army, explosives. The converted wreck on the Central having occupied Tripoli, continued to advance to­ Mole was destroyed and the pipeline on the Giu­ wards Tunisia, the eyes of the Air Force still liana Mole rendered unserviceable. looked ahead. In fact, as this article shows, The loss of the 6,000 ton tanker which was hit whatever the state of the battle and whatever the in. the harbour on 6th November was a serious rest of the R.A.F. may be doing, the work of the blow to the enemy. This vessel, which would reconnaissance squadrons never ceases.

87 ces To Make Aerodromes Unserviceable

DURING HIS RETREAT from El Alamein to ed by barrels placed in regular rows at approxi­ Tripoli the enemy employed many ingenious de­ mately 200 yards interval. These barrels were vices to make aerodromes unserviceable as he sunk about one foot in the ground and each had evacuated them. The longer the R.A.F. could he a pull-mine, explosive charge or other booby-trap prevented from using them, the more easily and attached. Barrels marking the. corner bounda­ safely could his forces withdraw. Aerial photo­ ries were slightly disarranged and so wired that graphy played a vital part in spotting the types any attempt to straighten them would cause an of obstruction to be expected, so that those whose explosion. There were approximately 1,500 mines job it was to remove the obstruction would be on each of the two landing grounds, mostly prepared. placed in regular rows fairly easy to see. One These obstructions increased in number and or two of the rows were dummies surrounded by in type as our advance carried us through Cyre­ carefully concealed anti-personnel mines. naica. Mines and booby-traps were encountered Great ingenuity was displayed in fitting booby- first, followed by special anti-personnel mines, traps to abandoned aircraft and vehicles, and barrel obstructions and, finally, by elaborate even slit trenches were mined. Occasional mines ploughing of landing areas. were scattered sufficiently far and wide as to The VHIth Army's break-through after the make any camp site suspect. Another ruse battle of El Alamein clearly took the enemy by was the use of metal ammunition boxes filed to surprise and but little attempt was made two sharp points and buried in soft sand on to render unserviceable the forward landing tracks in order to puncture passing tyres. Mines grounds. were laid round about and the bpxes filled with In the Daba area a few mines were laid shrapnel charges, set to explode at any attempt haphazardly and one or two abandoned aircraft to remove the obstruction. were fitted with booby-traps. The great quan­ tities of loot, however, and the many prisoners Anti-Personnel Mines at Marble Arch taken in the vicinity, together with the three The aerodromes at Marble Arch had been so ME.109Gs which were left almost intact, showed heavily bombed by our medium and light bomb­ that our rapid advance was not foreseen and no ers that they were thought to be almost unser­ demolition plan was carried out. Fukau, Haneish, viceable by the number of craters which pitted Matruh and Gambut areas were all similarly eva­ them. Yet over two thousand mines were laid, cuated in a hurry. Heavy rain, not enemy ac­ and clearance work, which had to be done in a tion, made many of these landing grounds un­ hurry, cost over twenty lives. serviceable for our immediate use. "&" mines were anti-personnel devices which, when stepped upon, leapt about five feet into the Mining at Derna, Benina and Berka air and discharged steel balls in all directions Derna was the first place where large-scale with great force. One man, jumping from a lorry mining was carried out. Here, photographs taken at the edge of. the aerodrome, landed on one of from a low altitude just before the aerodrome the "S" mines; three people in the vicinity were was evacuated enabled individual mines to be killed and one of the steel balls, of similar calibre clearly seen. The Martuba landing grounds were to a .45 slug, penetrated a steel petrol barrel only lightly mined and were soon in use by the 180 yards away and, although the barrel was R.A.F. Barce was reported mined, but in any full of petrol, the far side was severely dented. case its soft and sodden condition rendered it unserviceable. Ploughing at Ghindel, Sirte and Tamet In the Benghazi area both Benina and the When the Vlllth Army was grouping prior to Berka landing grounds were heavily mined. In the attack on Agheila, the Germans, while heavi­ addition, the buildings on Berka No. 1 were rid­ ly mining the roads to delay our progress, had dled with booby traps — as a certain armament time to think out an effective method of des­ officer found to his cost when trying to "lift" a troying landing grounds by ploughing up the sur­ handsome coffee urn. face and then sowing mines. The most effective furrows were cut by a square metal wedge about Booby Traps at Merduma eight inches wide, with the cutting edge bevelled Photographs of the Merduma landing grounds back at 45 degrees, but normal ploughshares on 16th December showed landing strips obstruct­ were also used. The first example of ploughing was on the jw^&f, set ^|t?^ yr^edVi|i$ work; and Ghindel landing grounds on 16th December; both photogr&piiis the; fpilowlngp n*ot5$fi^ showed that, alighting areas were furrowed in close-cut con­ although the first third of the landing ground centric patterns of great complexity resembling had been ploughed in regular straight lines, the two giant finger-prints. The next day Sirte and latter portion had been irregularly and sketchily Taniet were photographed while ploughing was furrowed as though in extreme haste. Across in progress. Two and three ploughs respectively this almost untouched area, however, a line of were being used, but owing to the nearness of some twenty barrels could be seen, probably with our forward troops there was need for greater explosive charges attached. speed than previously and the work was not so thorough. The furrows were widely spaced in in­ Efforts in the Last Phase determinate meandering patterns. In great haste ploughing was started at Mi­ Meanwhile, the master ploughman of the surata and Crispi, but little more than the pe­ Ghindels was at work at Buerat El Hsun landing rimeter was disturbed at Misurata. Similarly at ground, and although he, too, was hurried his the Bir Dufan group of landing grounds, as soon unmistakeable concentric technique was unim­ as reconnaissance showed that ploughing was paired until a burst of cannon fire from one of commencing, an almost continuous attack by our fighters put an end to his career. No further fighters and bombers drove the ploughmen and landing grounds were ploughed for some days. minelayers to shelter and eventual hurried re­ treat before they could do serious damage. Trench-Digging and Blasting At Castel Verde the enemy was less harried During the pause at the Wadi Zem Zero — and the prepared landing strips were made tem­ Umm Er B-am-l line, while our forces were build­ porarily unserviceable by widely-spaced entwined ing up supplies to attack, further landing furrows. The aerodrome at Mellaha had been grounds were rendered unserviceable. On 9th severely bombed in the last few attacks on Tri­ January across the alighting area at Sedada a poli, and here the Germans simply demolished "Z"-shaped trench was seen to have been dug. the hangars and blew more holes in the landing The remainder of the area had been irregularly area with explosive charges; no attempt at cratered by explosive charges in about thirty ploughing was made. places, and on the following day nearly forty At Castel Benito, the largest and most impor­ more charges had been blown. tant of the Tripolitaniatn airfields, 194 aircraft On the 10th the hangers were destroyed at were seen on 17th January. Heavy raids by Seni Ulid and three lines of digging appeared British and American bombers caused the num­ across the runways, somewhat prophetically in ber to go down to 50 on 21st January, when the rough form of a Union Jack. The landing ploughing of one side of the landing ground was ground was further obstructed by barrels, parts begun. Our fighters took off immediately and of wrecked aircraft and vehicles. The enemy kept up a non-stop series of ground straffing was determined to prevent a repetition of the attacks until every plough had been destroyed. Msus episode, where our fighters, operating from So successful were their attacks that the re­ a desert landing ground deep in hostile territory, mainder of the aerodrome was not ploughed, few shot up many retreating columns in the Benghazi mines were laid, and 37 flyable aircraft were area. left behind in the confusion of retreat. On the eve of the attack at Zem Zem, Chwr­ Whatever the enemy did, or tried to do, to the gia landing ground was ploughed, while strong aerodromes as he evacuated them, the R.A.F. forces of our armoured cars were pressing for­ still moved forward. The secret was that a re­ ward to secure from spoliation all possible land­ medy could always be found to counter whatever ing grounds in the Tripoli area. device was used. Even the master ploughman Photographs taken next afternoon showed of the GMndels was not proof against cannon that ploughing had started at Tauorga; fighters shells.

80 Back From The Blue

THERE HAVE BEEN many remarkable "returns provided with the intimation that if the letters from the blue" by aircrews, and many extraor­ were left unsealed they would be forwarded at dinary escapes by prisoners of war. There is an once via the Red Cross. element of luck, perhaps, in most of them, but The next few hours were whiled away playing with or without that element the qualities com­ cards or ping-pong, until at 20.00 hours the cap­ mon to all are resource, quick and clear thinking, tives ate another meal with their hosts, which courage and, last but not least, good discipline. they did not like to refuse for fear of giving of­ The two accounts reproduced here are examples fence. The food was excellent and wine and ci­ of what can be achieved under difficult, almost garettes in abundance. The evening passed hopeless, conditions. pleasantly enough, although no information re­ garding their future movements could be obtain­ 1. ESCAPE—WITH A DIVIDEND ed. When bed-time arrived they were allotted The flak from both M.Vs. and escorting vessels bed-rooms vacated by Italian officers on their was hotter than the July weather as a striking behalf, guards being placed outside the windows force of Beauforts made a low level attack and in the passage-way. against the Axis convey stealing along the west The following morning similar treatment was coast of Greece. On the second run up one Beau­ received. Although the Italians did not partake fort was badly hit, but as the aircraft dived to its of breakfast they remembered that the British Mediterranean grave the aircrew had the satis­ do and produced a good meal of eggs and excel­ faction of seeing a torpedo strike a 6,000 ton lent coffee of which, in view of the uncertainty M.V. on the starboard quarter. of the immediate future, our airmen ate as much In the minute and a half which elapsed before as they could. their aircraft sank the four airmen launched the After breakfast photographs were taken out­ dinghy and escaped drowning by a narrow mar­ side the Mess, presumably for propaganda pur­ gin, especially the pilot who had to clamber out poses, with the British and Italian officers fra­ from the submerged nose. Land was visible only ternising. The former found the situation some­ four or five miles away, and they started to what embarrassing, but a refusal would have paddle towards it. Progress, however, was pain­ been ill-timed. They were then told they were fully slow until it was discovered that they had to be transferred by air to an internment camp. forgotten to haul in the sea-anchors ! • The prisoners' hearts sank. They had pre­ Advantage had scarcely been taken of this viously decided that any possible chance of discovery when, after a few preliminary circles, escape should be seized, but had visualised a an Italian float plane landed on the water about journey by train or road; a trip in the confined a hundred yards distant. The Beaufort pilot, a space of an aircraft had not entered into their South African Lieutenant, decided to test the re­ calculations, and they did not like the prospect. ception he and Iiis crew would get as prisoners The journey to the aircraft, which turned out and swam over. To his surprise the Italian crew to be the Cant, of their rescue the previous day, received him courteously, offering him brandy gave no opportunity to discuss the new aspect of and a cigarette as he explained in pantomime affairs. The Cant.'s crew consisted of a pilot, what had happened. The other three airmen second pilot, engineer and wireless operator/ — a British Pilot Officer and two New Zealand observer, with one armed corporal acting as sergeants—were then picked up and given the escort. same hospitality by their captors, while the Cant, The aircraft took off and set course west, taxied round a land-point to a harbour in an heading, our airmen estimated, for Taranta, a island nearby. supposition which subsequently proved correct, On landing, the prisoners were taken to a the island where they had received such hospi­ camp, where an Italian officer who spoke good tality being Corfu. English acted as interpreter. He suggested that The events now about to be recorded took less as it Was now mid-afternoon, and presumably the time to enact than they will to read, for although British crew had eaten nothing for some time, no prearranged plan had been fixed, each man they might be hungry. They agreed, and were sprang into action as though the affair had been soon in the Officers' Mess tucking-in to an ap­ rehearsed. petising meal with steak and tomatoes as a basis, The Cant, had been airborne some time and accompanied by light wine. Clothes were lent everything quiet inside when one of the sergeants, to them while their own dried, and they were who was sitting a little below and facing him, later given the run of the Mess, the only restric­ suddenly hit the observer straight on the jaw tion being that they were politely asked not TO knocking him backwards. He then leaped over run away. Notepapsr and envelopes were also the failing man on to the astonished escort, seized the revolver from the fellow's waist and aircraft handed it to the South African Lieutenant, while into Malta. at the same time the Pilot Officer and the other sergeant tackled the engineer. The Italian sec­ The Lieutenant later supervised the comfort end pilot had jumped into the well forward and and settling-in of the Italians in their new home. was now fumbling with a tommy-gun, but the re­ With the aid of an interpreter he explained how sourceful sergeant forced the unfortunate cor­ much he regretted the necessity for doing what poral along in front as a body shield, impelled he had done, that war is war, and they must not him on top of the other, and in the scrimmage lake his actions personally. The prisoners were succeeded in capturing the gun. The pilot had quite cheerful, and one of them, producing a put the aircraft's nose down as if to land, but bottle of wine from his suitcase, insisted on sharing it with him, saying that he had hoped to under the immediate threat of the revolver he open it under different conditions — for the Ita­ changed his mind, obediently pulled the stick lian crew had been going on leave when they back, and let the Lieutenant take over the con­ reached Taranto. trols. The other members of the Beaufort crew armed themselves with wrenches and spanners A short while afterwards the Lieutenant had from the tool box, but there was no need to use the doubtful satisfaction of overhearing the CO. them; the Italians accepted the position philoso­ of the Spitfire squadron reprimand his pilots for phically and submitted to being bound with rope not having made a better job of shooting down and.their own belts. The British felt somewhat the Cant. ! upset at returning the Italians' former kindne«<> in this manner, and as the latter looked so un­ 2. DOWN IN THE DESERT happy they eased their bonds and made them as The starboard engine of Wellington II Z.8520 comfortable as possible. The escort corporal was an unknown quantity — a new one on which especially was in a bad way, vomiting freely, as no consumption test had been made. The Cap­ he had never flown before, but he felt better tain therefore kept a wary eye on the instru­ after he had been propped against an open ments as the aircraft headed for Tobruk one window. night during the critical days of early July. The question now was how to get the aircraft After two hours uneventful flying the star­ to Malta. Conversation with the Italians was car­ board oil-pressure needle began to oscillate ra­ ried on by signs; there were no maps or charts pidly and the pressure dropped to between 55 and 45 lbs. The Captain ordered half a gallon of oil to on board, and the speed, capacity and petrol be pumped to the starboard motor. The needle available were alike unknown quantities. The steadied and the pressure rose to 651bs. Every­ second pilot was freed and placed at the controls, thing else remained constant, oil temperature at while the Lieutenant gave him directions based 78 and radiator temperature at 95 degrees. on rough and ready calculations. It was decided Within five minutes, however, the needle oscil­ to land in Sicily and trust to luck if Malta could lated violently and the pressure -dropped again. not be reached. There were still no signs of overheating, so the At length they hit the toe of Italy, which Captain ordered another half-gallon of oil to be enabled some sort of bearing to be taken; they pumped, and repeated every twenty minutes. determined to chance the petroL position and The target was now only half-an-hour distant, make for Malta. As they journeyed south the thfe flares from. illuminating Albacores being Italians began to get excited; it was found they plainly visible over the town arid harbour. were anxious about the reception the Cant, would get from Spitfires over the island. At 00.55 hours the port radiator gauge, reading Their fears were not groundless, for as they 92 degrees, began to flicker and then became reached the island three Spitfires suddenly at­ constant. On seeing this further sign of trouble tacked. The Cant, was flying at deck level, and the Captain, much against his will, decided 10 things were somewhat warm as the fighters re­ turn back and bomb the alternative target of peatedly swooped on them. One of the sergeants Matruh. The new course was barely set when spun the guns about in an effort to show that suddenly the port oil pressure dropped to 45 Ib3. they were not going to fire, while the Pilot Of­ One gallon of oil was immediately pumped to ficer took off his vest, the only white object each engine. This had no effect on the port oil available, and trailed it out of the cockpit as a pressure, and the port radiator needle went up sign of surrender. These expedients were un­ and continued right round the gauge. The second- availing, however, and when one wing was hit pilot at once throttled back that motor, while the by both cannon and machine-gun fire the Lieu­ Captain opened the bomb-doors and jettisoned tenant ordered the Italian pilot to bring her down the bomb load. An attempt to open up the port on the water. motor again produced normal boost and revolu­ itons, but the radiator gauge needle still wan­ As they landed the engines stopped. They dered all round the clock. had run out of petrol. The island was, however, ­ in sight. Five minutes later, the port engine cut out completely and blue flames belched from the Our airmen climbed out, waving frantically to exhausts. The aircraft, which had been at 9,000 the Spitfires, who at last ceased their attacks. feet, began to lose height rapidly. After an anxious period of waiting a motor

91 The Captain took over frbirT the second-pilot • -• lines it was decided to strike a course on 120 de­ and gained partial control by 6,000 feet although grees across the Svwa road towards the Qattara the Wellington was almost unmanageable. It Depression. took fifteen minutes to bring the machine round A fresh start was made on this course at 09.30 from heading north into the sea on to a bearing hours, and the little party of six men slogged of 180 degrees, losing height all the time. At 3,000 doggedly on; the only living or moving thing in feet some of the petrol was jettisoned. the vast expanse of desert. By 12.15 the heat be­ In the meantime the wireless-operator had came overpowering and they were forced to rest. been trying to get through a W.J.R. and later a There was no shade, so they covered their heads W.V.P. message. The Captain was unable to with helmets and jackets and spread out a para­ order an S.O.S. as it took both hands to hold the chute. By 14.00 hours the heat was unbearable, so Wellington and he could not use the microphone. the Captain allowed each man his first mouth­ He motioned the second-pilot to go to the rear of ful of water, and rationed it from then onwards the aircraft and the navigator warned the crew at one mouthful per hour. A parachute was cut to prepare for a crash landing. The Navigator , up for foot bandages and head protection, and then took up a position by the astro-dome and the remainder laid out-as a ground signal. After reported no sign of the ground; the altimeter re­ another hour they could stay still no longer, so gistered 1,000 feet. The aircraft was flying at picking out a pole with a disc on top visible in 75 miles per hour in a more or less stalled posi­ the distance as their objective, they started tion when the Captain suddenly saw the ground again. Everyone was weakened by the heat, and a few feet below, although the altimeter still progress was slow. registered 800 feet. He could not get any more At last the notice board was reached, and power from the starboard engine, and just had gave them their first definite pin-point, for on the time to centralise the aileron controls before the disc was written the name Bir el Qattrini with crash. the grid reference. The water from the well was The impact was taken on the front turret and dirty, but their thirst was too great to worry pilot's cabin, and as she settled down the bomber about trifles, and the risk of it being poisoned skidded the last few yards on the bomb beams. had to be accepted. The well was surrounded The crew escaped injury, except the second Wire­ by mounds of stones in whose shade they rested less Operator who cut his face on some obstruc­ until the evening, when sufficient scrub and wood tion. The aircraft, in spite of the rough ground, was found for a fire on which they boiled seven was intact, and the few tongues of flames licking gallons of water and made three pints of tea. The round the starboard airscrew were soon extin­ Rear Gunner collapsed with heat stroke but re­ guished. vived under treatment with cold compresses, and After destroying the I.F.F. installation with an before going to sleep at 19.30 hours everyone axe (the detonator failed to explode), the party took some quinine tablets. removed their equipment from the aircraft and During the night the Captain awoke and fired took stock of their assets. These were :— nine Verey cartridges to attract the attention of four water bottles aircraft passing overhead, but without result. one thermos flask The following morning the Captain and Navi­ iron rations gator again reviewed their position. Two alter­ six tins of tomato juice natives presented themselves: (a) to continue to one signalling mirror head east for the Siwa road some thirty miles two parachutes distant with the risks of not finding water and one map—1/1,000,000 Alexandria area, being picked up by the enemy, or (b) to head one navigator's 02 compass for the nearest well which was estimated to be one axe twenty miles away, with the risk of being defi­ two first-aid outfits nitely short of water if they miscalculated. At one Verey pistol with 30/40 cartridges length the second route was decided upon be­ two torches. cause it lay in the track followed by our bom­ A start was then made to walk due south, bers and also because, if the well were missed, away from the lights on the horizon in the north the railway was only two miles further and of­ and north-eavt which denoted enemy activity. fered a possibility of supplies. The secret documents were torn into shreds and The first meal—one tin of bully beef between buried in three separate places en route. the six men and three biscuits each—was then By 05.10 hours good progress had been made eaten, and at 08.00 hours the second day's trek in spite of the rough going, and a halt was made. began. They carried, in addition to the original While the rest slept the Captain and Navigator • water supply, a two gallon drum and three bot­ explored a large mound of stones nearby which tles of boiled water plus five bottles of unboiled turned out to be an underground water cistern water. The drum and beer bottles were found at full of dirty water. They subsequently located Bir el Qattrini which had evidently been used by this spot as Bir el Darweli. They had no idea much traffic. of their exact position, except that they were After walking for nearly four hours the heat south-east of Sidft Barrani. After a short dis­ again overpowered them, and a halt was made cussion on the best way of reaching their own by a small cairn of stones. This afforded no shade, however, and from mid-day until sun­ knew I k ; iittte / collbquaaj T jAifabic, f iijtmr down the airmen lay under the parachute, but swarmed up the rope/ 'V 4 J '.| £^L ,. _r without much relief. On this day the scorching The Arabs were very curious about Hie war rays of the sun affected them all and by 16.00 situation, and needed persuading that the air­ hours no one could do more than crawl; speech crew were really English. After the usual beat­ was almost unintelligible through swollen tongues ing about the bush, and with the help of an and cracked lips. Water was still rationed at "Escape Chit", it was agreed that two Arabs one mouthful per hour, but the second Wireless with two camels would return after dark, equipp­ Operator and Rear Gunner became so low and ed for the journey, and guide the party the 200 weak that their ration was doubled. kilos to El Alamein. The Arabs then entered At sundown spirits began to revive, aided by the well with the Captain, brewed some tea and one tin of tomato juice diluted in three-quarters gave the airmen some dates and "V" cigarettes. of a bottle full of water. Half-an-hour later the Relations became very friendly, and when the Captain permitted another whole bottle of water crew was told that the well was Bir Bethmeyl to be drunk, which considerably revived them, they felt pleased with the accuracy of their and at 21.00 hours they were able to break camp navigation over twenty miles of desert to a pin­ and continue. Progress was again very slow, point. The airmens' kit, especially the para­ and after two miles (which took an hour) the chute, was admired by the visitors; when they Rear Gunner stopped and said. he could go no had left and the parachute was found to have further. The Captain thereupon ordered two gone with them, an air of scepticism prevailed hours sleep, but remained awake himself to fire that they would not return as promised. the Verey pistol at our aircraft passing over Preparations for departure were proceeded westward. Nine machines were signalled and with in spite of that view, and as the final load S.O.S's flashed with a torch, without receiving was about to be hauled up by the Navigator, he any response. The march was resumed at mid­ shouted that he could hear an aircraft approach­ night, but could be maintained only in spells of ing, while almost simultaneously the Rear Gun­ twenty minutes walking with ten-minute rests. ner, who was also assisting, fired off a couple Another long halt became necessary at 02.00 of Verey cartridges. The Captain shinned up the hours and everyone slept. Two hours later an­ rope as fast as he could, and, seizing a blanket, other start was made, and after an hour's walk­ held it up as a windsock while the aircraft, a ing they came to a small but steep escarpment Baltimore of No. 1437 Strat/R. Flight, made an­ on the top of which was a deserted strong posi­ other circuit and landed. tion, with a circular protecting wall some five In a few seconds the position was explained to feet high. Previous experience had shown the the Baltimore crew who were searching for an necessity for stopping in the shade during "the aircraft which had come down in the desert the day, and they commenced to erect a cover across previous night. They agreed to take the Wel­ the compound, using blankets and tent canvas lington party, and assisted in hauling out of the found there. A thick fog came up as day broke, weir the two members who were too weak to and an attempt was made to eat, the issue being climb the rope. The Wellington Captain had some one tin of sardines shared among them, with misgiving about putting six men as well as the three biscuits per man. Baltimore's crew of four in the aircraft in view of the rough ground, but the Baltimore pilot While waiting for the fog to clear they dis­ made a good job of the take-off and flew them cussed the situation and concluded that their safely to Wadi Natrwn. objective, the well at Bir Bethmeyl, must be within a two mile radius. Visibility improved a The following recommendations which the little later and accordingly a search was begun Captain and crew subsequently put forward are in three directions. The Captain discovered some of interest. wrecked transport half-a-mile away containing (1) A ten-gallon water tank in a Wellington sufficient bully beef to last a fortnight if care­ is too heavy to carry. A rack of smaller cans fully rationed. He arrived back as another which could be carried individually would be member of the crew reported that he had found better. a petrol can with about a pint of fresh water (2) The crew's own water bottles should be beside a deep shaft in the ground. Further in­ stored aft out of the way of crash damage. vestigation, after descending the shaft by a 25 (3) A special S.O.S. cartridge is needed. foot knotted rope, resulted in the discovery of (4) Passing aircraft which observe a signal an underground cavern with three water pools. should make some recognition sign. It was decided to stay in the cavern until they (5) Water purifiers should be a standard part had sufficient strength to resume the attempt to of rations. reach our lines. They all had a good drink, (6) Flying boots are unsuitable for desert stripped and bathed. walking. Crews should always take other shoes It was very damp in the well and at noon one and headgear. Sunglasses are essential. of the crew went over to the compound to fetch (7) A small sextant would be useful for fix­ the blankets. A few minutes later he called ing positions. down the shaft that a number of Arabs had ar­ (8) Adhesive tape in First-Aid kits is too nar­ rived and the Captain, the only person who row and small to be effective.

93

L_ • I The U.S.A.A.F. Into The Middle East

AMERICAN-BUILT AIRCRAFT, flown by R.A.F., tours, was well within its capability. At the last S.A.A.F. and R.A.A.F. squadrons, had proved their minute, however, it was decided that the return­ worth months before the United States' entry ing aircraft should land at Habbaniya, which into the War and long before the Army Air considerably increased the distance to be cover­ Corps, as it was first named, arrived on the de­ ed. One of the reasons for this change of plan sert airfields. By the beginning of 1942, in fact, was the impracticability of thorough immediate the steady flow of Tomahawks, Kittyhawks, dispersal at the Fayid aerodrome on the return Marylands, Bostons and Baltimores pouring into of the bombers. Egypt from the American factories had im­ On 11th June, thirteen aircraft were service­ measurably strengthened the R.A.F.'s reconnais­ able and these were airborne shortly after 23.00 sance and striking power; Liberators and For­ hours. The B.24s adopted unorthodox tactics; no tresses, also, had made a few operational sorties attempt was made to rendezvous and arrive over but were not then present in sufficient numbers the target in concentration, but, flying at great to play an appreciable part in the air war against height, bombs were dropped by individual air­ the Axis. The arrival of U.S.A. pilots and ground craft through breaks in the cloud, or failing crews was eagerly awaited. these, at the estimated time of arrival. In these circumstances, the damage inflicted was not as The B. 24s. great as that anticipated. The long journey back to Iraq also proved difficult and several aircraft The first detachment of the United States Ar­ were obliged to land in Turkey. my Air Corps arrived in the Middle East Com­ mand in early June, 1942, shortly after the ene­ Thus, the first big venture of the U.S.A.A.C. my had launched his attack on our Gazala line. in the Middle East was disappointing. The Ame­ This B.24 (Liberator) detachrhent, commanded ricans, however, showed their true form only by Col. Halverson, was in transit to China, but three days later in an attack on heavy units of arrangements were made with Washington to en­ the Italian Fleet. aible it to pause in Egypt long enough to carry It was learned that Italian warships were out an important operation against certain Rou­ steaming down from Taranto to intercept a manian oil refineries. Later, following a change Maita-bound convoy. Accordingly, under ar­ of policy, American reinforcements of aircraft rangements made with No. 205 Group, crews originally intended for the Far East were divert­ were briefed to attack these vessels. After ed to the Middle East Command and the Halver­ marshalling up in sections off Ras El Kanayis son Detachment, as it was termed, stayed to at dawn on 15th June, the formation of seven ( form the nucleus of an American air striking B.24s and one Liberator of No. 160 Squadron force which quickly adapted itself to desert con­ climbed to 14,000 feet and three hours later sight­ ditions and gave invaluable aid throughout the ed the Italian Fleet 220 miles east of Malta. The Battle for Egypt. B.24s, attacking in sections, gave an example of accurate pattern-bombing. Had the B. 24s> To carry out the U.S.A.A.C.'s spectacular Mid­ then been equipped to carry 2,000 lb. instead of dle East d§but — the attack on the Astra Ro­ 500 lb. bombs the Italian vessels would have mana refineries at Ploesti (a few miles north of suffered severe losses. As it was, the damage Bucharest) — the American Commander decid­ inflicted was not crippling, but this in no wise ed, for reasons of security and maintenance, to detracted from the skill and determination shown assemble his aircraft at Khartoum. They were in pressing the attack home. then to be flown up to their operational base Fayid, in the Sues canal zone, in time only for The B.24s were returning at sea level when final preparations to be completed. The opera­ they were attacked by two enemy fighters; one tion was planned and carried out entirely by of them, an ME. 110, was shot down into the American personnel. water. Thus, the U.S.A.A.C. chalked up its first The Ploesti flight involved making a round trip combat success and demonstrated the intense fire of 2,000 miles, without taking into consideration power which can be brought to bear on opposing the necessity of making detours over the Aegean aircraft by heavy bombers flying in close form­ to avoid violating Turkish neutrality. As the ation. B. 24 had a range of 3,000 miles, the flight The American efforts immediately after the ini­ to and from Fayid, including the necessary de­ tial attacks mentioned abov^ was directed on an ever-increasing scale against the enemy's supr . ... . pHpM for an ply ports, although enemy convoys were still at­ introduction to desert warfare because activity tacked whenever the opportunity arose. The on either side was not intense due to the need Vinth Army was now beginning to fall back, for building up serviceability in> readiness for and on 20th June Tobruk, an admirable port for full-scale air operations when the Axis offensive supplying his advancing army, fell into Rom­ was resumed. mel's hands. From that time, B.24s added The B.25s first confined their activity to at­ weight to the incessant R.A.P. Wellington at­ tacks on enemy bases, particularly Matruh, and tacks on this port. From the time that Tobruk the advanced landing grounds-at Daba and Qotai­ was lost until it was re-occupied by the Vinth fvya. When Rommel launched a major attack on Army in November, the American heavy bomb­ our Alamein positions during the first few days ers carried out nearly 200 effective sorties in September, however, the small B.25 detach­ against this target. When, in consequence of the ment was fully prepared to co-operate with the Wellington and heavy bomber attacks on Tobruk, R.A.F. and S.A.A.F. light bombers in< pounding the enemy diverted an appreciable portion of his the enemy's tank and transport concentrations shipping to Benghazi, 250 miles to the west, the in the Deir El Ragil area. The B.25 effort at American heavy bombers also hit out at this this stage could not be extensive as it was still supply port, carrying out approximately the virtually a token force, but during those fateful same number of effective sorties as against September days the B.25s operated to maximum Tobruk. capacity and learned lessons which stood them In their attacks on the enemy's ports, the in good stead in the later battles. heavy bombers did not confine their attention to In the re-arrangement of the Middle East Air the two principal African supply ports alone, Forces which preceded the Vinth Army's offen­ but bombed Matruh and Sollum and struck fur­ sive on 23rd October, the B.25 Squadrons (form­ ther afield with heavy attacks against Suda Bay, ing the 12th Bombardment Group) operated in Heraklion, Navarino and other Mediterranean close co-operation with the R.A.F. Baltimore bases. squadrons. An- outstanding feature of the B.25s in this The American heavy bomber attacks during pre-offensive period was their participation in the months of July to November on enemy con­ the consistent attacks on the enemy's forward voys and dock installations and shipping at landing grounds at Daba, Fuka and Sid-i Haneish the enemy's main ports were invaluable in help­ which did so much to limit the enemy's air ef­ ing to cut the Axis supply line, and contributed fort both before and after the Vlllth Army greatly to the enemy's failure to conquer Egypt. launched its assault. From 6th September to 22nd Once vthe enemy had been forced out of Cyre­ October, the B.25s carried out over 80 effective naica, the B.24s continued to check the Axis off- sorties against these objectives; their attacks loading of supplies by attacks on the main Tri­ in company with Bostons and Baltimores on the politanian ports and, later, on the Tunisian bases water-logged landing grounds at Qotaifiya and of Tunis, Sfax and Sousse. Some indication of Daba on 9th October were specially noteworthy. the extent of the attacks on Tripoli before its When battle was joined with the Axis forces capture by our land forces is provided by the fact on 24th October, the B.25s played their part in that the bombs dropped on the harbour instal­ the light bomber "shuttle service" by carrying lations by the American heavy bombers exceed­ out nearly 50 effective sorties against enemy ed 459,000 lbs. • Further west, by January 15th, tank and vehicle concentrations. It is worthy of 1943, the Middle East based B.24s had dropped mention, also, that all fighter and bomber air­ 941,000 lbs. of bombs on Sousse, 156,000 lbs. on craft then operating by day over the battle­ Tunis and 107,500 lbs. on Sfax. field, with the exception of Spitfires and Hurri­ Moreover, during the last month of 1942, the canes, were of American construction. B.24s reached out across the Mediterranean to The B.25s co-operated with the Bostons and strike at Naples and these attacks were supple­ Baltimores in bombing the Axis columns until mented in the New Year by raids on Palermo 5th November, by which time the enemy's con­ and Messina. centrations had been broken up and the retreat­ By the end of 1942, the Ninth U.S. Air Force, ing forces were receiving short shrift from the as it was officially named in November, included R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. fighters and fighter- three heavy bomber groups — the 376th, 98th bombers following up close behind. and 93rd. Nearly 200 missions had been carried Suitable targets were not available for day out by 15th January, 1943, comprising over 1,400 bombers again until the middle of December, sorties; attacks had been*-made on ports, ship* when enemy concentrations were located in the ping, transport columns, aerodromes and road Marble Arch and Nofilia areas. The B.25s were traffic, and it is estimated that five million then brought up to join the R.A.F. light bomb­ pounds of bombs were dropped on these targets. ers in attacks on transport and gun positions and made 24 effective sorties on 15th and 16th The B. 25s. December. Thereafter, no opportunity presented itself for effective day bomber employment until B.25s (Mitchells) made their first operational the advance into Tripolitania brought targets sorties in the Middle East in mid-August, 1942. near and istituted only 23% of the Allied fighters on striking r£fl!£e W Qle* Jmied

OFFICIALLY IT IS known as the West African hills of Central Nigeria to the province of KANO. Reinforcement Route, but pilots of the Aircraft Here the vegetation thins out to a park-like Delivery Unit, who have spent any length of growth and the rich red soil supports arable time flying on it, call it simply "The Route". farming, giving the countryside the appearance "The Route" runs across Africa from the Gold of a mighty rolling red and green quilt. Coast to Egypt and was first used in September, The earlier stages of this leg, from Lagos to 1940, by a convoy of Blenheims. It soon be­ the rivers, present one of the major "bogies" of came one of the most important air reinforce­ the trip. Apart from the fact that the dense, ment routes to the Middle Bast. In the period forests afford the barest hopes for a safe, far covered in this Review—from 20th May to 29th less a successful, forced-landing, there is an al­ December, 1942—1,455 new aircraft were flown most perennial belt of low cloud over the area. to Egypt on this route. This presents the alternative either of flying low The work done by the pilots and ground crews in the sticky heat and weaving round patches engaged along the route was so valuable to the of low cloud—with the prospect of being trapped war in the Middle East that it won this tribute if the weather clamps down—or of climbing over from Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder:— the clouds and taking a chance on picking up "I would like you to let the Ferry Pilots know a good pin-point over the Niger where, unac­ from me that although they are not taking an countably, there is nearly always a break in the active part in the battle, and may think their cloud. efforts pass unnoticed, that is not so. I take the "Nearly always" is said advisedly since on one keenest interest in their work and watch daily occasion, after labouring up to 15,000 feet and the progress of reinforcements along the route. weaving through anvil cumulus which "towered Without their loyal, ever-willing and tireless up even higher, a convoy broke cloud in the assistance our recent successes would have been vicinity of Kano, completely lost. The leader impossible." retrieved the situation by landing on a road and asking the way, so that with the sun well down The First Leg from West Africa in the sky and the merest suggestion of petrol The western terminal of the route is TAKORADI in the tanks, the convoy made the aerodrome. an the Gold Coast. Here the machines are as­ Kano has a magnificent set of runways and, sembled and tested and the convoys marshalled. although it has lately acquired an efficient con­ From a purely flying viewpoint, the testing does trol system, it still has an unique device for not require great skill, but it needs an experienced advising the arrival and departure of aircraft. eye to spot those "snags" which, however trivial All day and every day a native, clad in tradi­ initially, may later develop into major defects, tional costume—loose white cotton smock, drain­ thereby causing the aircraft to be grounded at pipe trousers and large floppy straw hat—stands some remote staging post. in the taxying apron and warns the locality of The heat and humidity are the most trying aircraft movements by blowing on a six-foot features of the first leg of the route from Tako­ metal horn. He knows only two bars of four radi along the lagoon-ridden coast to LAGOS, notes each, but what he lacks in versatility he although during the seasons of the "Big Rains" makes up for in lung power. they are run a close second by thunderstorms and line-squalls. These line-squalls, which can be Dangers of the Harmattan met anywhere along the route as far east as the The next stop after Kano is MAIDUGURI, Central Sudan, consist of a solid wall of rain and which lies on the eastern frontier of Nigeria. Be­ cloud drifting along at gale force on a front and tween these two posts the terrain is flat and feat­ to a depth of anything up to a hundred miles. ureless and, therefore, has only a few pin-points; a hammer-headed lake, a large village and at last The meteorologists along the route have a most responsible task, for on them may rest the safe a dusty white road rolling into Maiduguri. This arrival of the convoy. Yet so sudden and violent lack of topographical character is a serious are the changes in weather conditions that handicap, for it is on this leg that the dust haze earefully-calculated forecasts may easily prove which the north winds bring down from the wrong. desert, and which is known locally as the Har­ mattan, can be at its worst, lowering visibility Low Cloud Over Nigeria to as little as 500 yards. Even in its milder forms the Harmattan is a perpetual source of From Lagos, the route strikes north-east over worry, and an unwary pilot, robbed of horizon, miles of dense forest, past th confluence of the e has found himself wondering why the next fellow rivers Niger and Kaduma, over the barren rocky

97 is diving, only to find on checking his instru­ And, incidently, it is very much of an occasion ments that it is he who is hanging on his fan. when they have any beer there! At Maiduguri the pilot begins to feel that he The Most Trying Stretch of the Trip is making progress. Apart from the seven or so hours flying now behind him and the geogra­ To KHARTOUM via EL OBEID is another 560 phical changes, the natives are very different miles over monotonously flat country, which stead­ from the chocolate-coloured, small-boned, soft- ly deteriorates into 100% desert as the Nile Valley spoken boys of the coast and central Nigeria. is approached. The average time taken to fly Here- they have marked negroid features, their from Obeid to Khartoum is just over an hour, skins are darker and their dialects harder and but that stretch is recognised as the most trying- harsher. and boring of the whole trip. At remote staging posts such , as this, the The last 1,000 miles from Khartoum north­ ground crews must be men of parts or they will wards is the easiest part of the run. The route never cope with the many difficulties which crop follows river and railway, making navigation up for which there is no answer in K.R.s and simple and forced-landing prospects good. Even A.C.I.s nor in any service manual. so no convoy can afford to relax, for occasional fierce sandstorms get up, blotting out vast areas, The Little-Known Chad Area and these "haboobs" have exacted their price-in East of Maiduguri as far as LAKE FITRI some damaged aircraft and men's lives. 300 miles away, extend the vast swamps and For the last day the convoy flies on, following many rivers which constitute the Chad inland the green ribbon of the Nile Valley or the dimly- drainage basin. Only such widely dispersed discerned line of the railway threading across posts as Fort Lamy and Ati afford a decent the desert to WADI HALFA. Here the aerodrome landing ground and safe asylum in an area about is, or rather was, a large expanse of sand which, which little is known. Consequently the leg bet­ for nine months of the year, is under a shim­ ween Nigeria and the Sudan is overshadowed by mering heat haze, making landing extremely uncertainty and doubt, which persist until the difficult. twin lakes of Adre, the last post in French From Haifa, the river is the guide into the Equatorial Africa, are passed and EL GENEINA Delta area. Aswan Barrage is passed away to is pin-pointed. starboard as are the ruins of ancient Thebes; This staging post's chief claim to fame lies As.ayut and El Fayowni come up and are passed, in its matchless natural camouflage. In addi­ until at last the Pyramids herald journey's end. tion to .this somewhat doubtful attribute it has another noteworthy claim in that it is one of What Pilots Must Expect the most remote and inaccessible R.A.F. units To negotiate the route successfully the attri­ in the world; the next white outpost lies 200 butes required are patience, adaptability and the miles over a range of mountains and its base ability to know when not to fly. The pilot must and only source of supply is 700 miles away. stooge along all day in constantly varying con­ From there to EL FASHER by air is a compa­ ditions; become inured to an ever-changing diet ratively short run over the twin peaks of Barra and a different set of insects each night; and, SymbaH—the highest point on the route. El Fasher above all, must never allow himself to "be jockey­ itself is virtually an oasis, although the sur­ ed into a position from which he can extricate rounding country is not desert proper but sup­ himself only by damaging his aircraft. ports camel thorn and prickly grass. In addition there is the constant risk of disease For a time the chief feature of this staging —particularly malaria. Yet some of the Aircraft post was Leo the lion cub, whom some of the Delivery Unit pilots fly as much as 80 hours' ground crew had found when he was a few days solo a month, as well as some 50 hours' old and reared in semi-captivity. He would passenger flying. Most of the pilots can fly at come bounding out to meet the convoys and his least three types of modern operational aircraft; sudden appearance under a mainplane shook The pilots are of many nations—British and many pilots who had not been there before. Dominion, Polish, Yugo-Slav and French. One Inevitably Leo outgrew his playfulness and is of- them is 56 years old and another was a now in Khartoum .uoo. Luftwaffe pilot in the last war. To ferry crews Fasher is now renowned main­ Flying over "The Route" is not a soul-stir­ ly for one thing—its unchangeable breakfast. It ring occupation, yet it has its compensations. is a safe bet that if you dropped in there to­ There are few things which give the pilot a morrow you would be given a cereal followed greater sense of satisfaction than the last touch by scrambled eggs and a minute piece of kidney. down of a successful convoy. Stratospheric

THE LONG WHITE vapour trail of a single enemy behind it. On one occasion a Spitfire came level reconnaissance aircraft flying at a great height with it at 41,000 feet, but at the critical moment became a familiar sight in the cloudless blue the fighter's engine failed. On another occasion sky over the Delta aind Canal zone during the the guns jammed. After a while, to prevent the summer months of 1942. It was a JU.86 carry­ oil freezing and keep the guns warm in the ing cameras but no guns, equipped with a intense cold, the practice was adopted of firing pressure cabin for stratospheric flying. short bursts from 30,000 feet upwards. The The problem was, how to get high enough to pilots went into strict training, cutting out all attack it ? alcohol, nearly all smoking, and going early to On its first appearance Hurricanes 'made an bed. Distentions, bends and occasional paralysis attempt but could not get within several thousand at the great heights attained increased their feet. All available Spitfires were fully occupied troubles. in the Western Desert operations, from which A certain amount of success was achieved in none could be spared to intercept a single re­ July and early August; on three occasions a connaissance aircraft, and no other aircraft had JU.86 was damaged, in one of which—it was a possible chance of attaining the ceiling re­ learned later—a bullet pierced the pressure quired. cabin, the pilot passed out, and the observer flew There existed, however, a short distance from the aircraft home. The Spitfires were still Alexandria, No. 103 Maintenance Unit, special­ handicapped by having to fire from below, how­ ising in the repair, fitting and testing of Spitfires ever, and more drastic measures became neces­ for desert work, and it occurred to the test pilots sary to obtain a higher ceiling. that Spitfires on test might be used to attempt One of the two Spitfires was stripped right interception. A conference was held ' between down; R/T was removed, all the armour taken the Commanding Officer and Chief Engineer out, the large battery replaced by a smaller one Officer of the maintenance unit, the Command­ and only two machine-guns left. The second ing Officer of the Controlling Sector and the test Spitfire retained its R/T and four machine-guns. pilots, as a result of which Spitfire VCs were The two aircraft then flew as one section until used on 25th June. The effort was disappoint­ the one with R/T, controlled from the ground, had ing; the Spitfire's ceiling fell short of the JU.86's guided the other to within sight of the vapour estimated height of 40/42,000 feet by some trail, and the latter then went on up ahead. Even distance, and the large twin-engined monoplane so the pilots found they could not reach the with its tremendous wing span continued itp JU.86 until most of their petrol had gone, and photography undisturbed. as they usually followed it out to sea they had It was evident that ordinary aircraft on test to risk not having enough for the return journey. were of no use, and that the test and operational On one occasion a pilot landed with only five sides of the maintenance unit would have to be gallons left, and on another the aircraft glided separated. Two Spitfires were therefore set in with dry tanks; but the test pilots were now aside to be specially prepared, and four pilots thoroughly on their mettle and in spite of this posted to the M.U. to fly them. The latter were risk they sometimes took off thirty gallons short of no help, however, as only the three test.pilots of full load. could stand the strain or had enough experience On 24th August the chief test pilot (a man of to get their aircraft up to the necessary altitude. 38) spent over half-an-hour above 43,000 during The engineers made various experiments with which he blacked out at least once and suffered the engines and used different types of airscrews, great pain from bends. His perseverance, how­ but it became more and more apparent that ever, was well rewarded; he came level with weight was the governing factor, and as time the JU.86 at 46,000 feet, and destroyed it by passed more and more was stripped from the setting the starboard engine on fire. aircraft; the desert tray and various pieces

In the next issue:

HISTORY Round the Bend; Capture of Tripoli; Entry into Tunisia from the East; Entry into Tunisia from the West. MALTA Changes from a staging post and outpost to a springboard for attacks on Tunis and Italy. THK KXEJIY'S LAST DAYS IN TRIPOLI THE ORGANISATION BEHIND MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY THE WORK OF THE R.A.F. FILM UNIT DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIGHT BOMBER ON NIGHT OPERATIONS WHAT HAPPENED IN MADAGASCAR etc*.,

PREPARED BY AIR STAFF - OPERATIONS RECORDS III HEADQUARTERS, ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EAST

FOOTNOTE The basic sources of the information contained in the historical articles are the Sortie Repoits (R.A.F. Form MIA), returned by formations under R.A.F. Middle East Instruction Number 34, amd the Operations Record Book, R.A.F. Form 540.