flumi), 38216 1347

THIRD SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of FRIDAY, the 2oth of FEBRUARY, 1948 published by

Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 REPORT ON THE AIR OPERATIONS DURING THE CAMPAIGNS IN MALAYA AND NETHERLAND EAST INDIES FROM STH ' DECEMBER, 1941 TO I2TH .MARCH, 1942. . The following report was submitted to the they were in office, but in general the survey Secretary of State for Air on July 26th, 1947, deals with the period between ist June, 1941, by Air Vice-Marshal Sir PAUL MALTBY, and the outbreak of war. It indicates the K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., Assistant Air energetic measures which were taken immedi Officer Commanding Far East Command, ately beforehand to prepare the Command foi Royal ,Air Force, from January izth to war, and points a picture of the situation as it ' February loth, 1942, and Air.*0fficer Com- existed at the outbreak of hostilities. . mandtng in Java from The narrative contains only brief reference to February nth to March izth, 1942. developments in Hong Kong, Burcma and the Indian Ocean, operational control of which *. - . FOREWORD. passed out of the hands of the A.O.C. Far East A report on the operations in Malaya and the Command soon after the Japanese had landed ISLE.I. would be incomplete without a survey in Malaya. Their presence in the Command of the situation in the Far East before war during the pre-war penod did, however,, broke out ,there. A convenient date for begin- appreciably divert attention, and work from ning such a survey is ist June, 1941, soon after pressing matters of local application, and to the date, 24th April, 1941, on which the late this degree affected preparation for war in Air Vice-Marshal C. W. Pulford became Air Malaya. Officer Commanding R.A.F. Far East Some reference is necessary to sources of Command. information on which the report is based. " A number of other newly posted Senior Official records from the Far East are few Officers also took up their new duties about and incomplete. Most of' those which were the same time, the more important amongst maintained there had to be destroyed to pre- them being Lieut.-Gen. A. E. Percival (G.O.C. vent their capture by the Japanese. The few Malaya—i6th May, 1941), which survive consist of brief situation reports C. O. F. Modin (A O.A. at A.H Q. 10.6.41), and a few files of important signals and corre- Group Captain A. G. Bishop (Group Captain spondence, now with the Air Ministry. ^ To Ops', at A.H.Q. 1.6.41) and the late Group make good the loss of the destroyed documents, Captain E. B. Rice (Fighter Defence Com- reports have since been obtained from a num- mander of and Co-ordinator of Air ber of officers who held important appointments Defences of Malaya, both newly established in the Far East Command. But these are" fai appointments, 10.7.41). from authoritative. Most of them were written Although ist June, 1941, has been chosen as in December, 1945, and January, 1946, nearly the datum line from- which to start the survey, four years after the events which they describe full recognition is given to the large amount of had taken place, during which years their preparatory work which was done by the pre- authors had been prisoners-of-war in Japanese decessors of the officers whose names are men- hands, or alternatively had been actively em- tioned above. Some reference is necessarily ployed in other theatres of war. A number of made to matters which occurred during the time important individuals who could have given -I V ~t 1348 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 valuable evidence, I regret to report, died in Britair—Code name for A.H.Q. in Java after captivity or during subsequent operations. Dis- the dissolution of Supreme Allied H.Q., crepancies have been slow and difficult to S.W. Pacific. reconcile between sources of information now A.A.C.U.—Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Unit. scattered thoughout the world, despite the ready A.H K.—Headquarters of the Dutch Com- help I have received from the authors of such mander-in-Chief at Bandoeng, Java. reports. A.I.F.—Australian Imperial Forces. On the other hand valuable information has A.L.G.—Advanced Landing Ground. been freely supplied to me from the Cabinet A.M.E. Station—Air Ministry Experimental War Library, the Air Ministry, the War Office, Station (Radar). the Colonial Office and by the authors of several A.O.A.—Air Officer in charge of Administra- other despatches relating to the War in the Far tion. East. To them also I am much indebted. A.S.P.—Air Stores Park. For the sake of brevity only those matters are (B)—Bomber. mentioned in the report which are necessary for D/F—Radio Direction Finding. establishing important events, for elucidating (F)—Fighter. the factors which governed action at the time, (F.B.)—Flying Boat. and for compiling before it is too late a reason- F.E.C.B.—Far East Combined Bureau—a ably comprehensive narrative of what happened combined service intelligence organisation in the Far East. for obtaining intelligence, under Admiralty Within these limitations every effort has been administration, throughout the Far East. made to ensure accuracy, and the report, as a (G.R.)—General Reconnaissance. whole, is believed to give a reasonably true I.E.—Initial Equipment. picture of the campaign from the air aspect— I.R.—Immediate Reserve. although doubtless it may display inaccuracies M.U.—Maintenance Unit. of detail brought about by the circumstances M.V.A.F.—Malayan Volunteer Air Force. in which it has been compiled. It should, N.E.I.— East Indies. however, contain the necessary data from which [N.F.]—Night Fighter. correct deductions can be drawn. In order, O.T.U.—Operational 'Training Unit. however, that inaccuracies may be corrected, P.R.U.—Photographic Reconnaissance Unit. readers are invited to call attention to them R T.—Radio Telephony. through the Air Ministry. R. & S.U.—Repair and Salvage Unit. S.A.O.—Senior Administrative Officer. The whole report has been written under my S.A.S.O.—Senior Air Staff Officer. direction, the first two sections on behalf of (T.B.)—Torpedo Bomber. the late Air Vice-Marshal Pulford who held his V.H.F.—Very high frequency radio. command until nth-February, 1942, two days before he left Singapore. In my opinion there is nothing in these sections, or in Section V, SECTION i. with which he would not agree. PRE-WAR PREPARATIONS. I myself took over my duties at his head- quarters on I2th January, 1942, from which SCOPE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ROYAL AIR date the report is written on my responsibility, FORCE, FAR EAST. and largely with my personal knowledge. This By mid-summer 1941 the geographical area part of the report continues in the third person of the Far East Command, Royal Air Force, for the sake of continuity in the narrative. included Hong Kong, Borneo, Malaya and Burma; then, embracing Ceylon, it stretched P. C. MALTBY, across the Indian Ocean to Durban and Air Vice-Marshal Mombasa. Royal Air Force. 2. The main functions of the Command were London. firstly to protect the Naval Base in Singapore, July 26th, 1947. and secondly, in co-operation with the Royal Navy to ensure the security of the trade routes LIST" OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT. in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The Headquarters of the Command was in G.H.Q.—General Headquarters of the Com- Singapore. mander-in-Chief, Far East. 3. In November 1940, Air Chief Marshal Sir H.Q.M.C.—Headquarters of the General Officer Commanding, Malaya Command. Robert Brooke-Popham was appointed Com- A.H.Q.—Air Headquarters of the Air Officer mander-in-Chief, Far East. He was respon- Commanding, R.A.F. Far East Command. sible for operational control and general direc- Norgroup—Code name for Group H.Q. con- tion of training of all British land and air forces trolling air operations in Northern Malaya. in Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong, for co- Abdacom—Code name for Supreme Allied ordinating the defences of those territories; and ^-Headquarters, S.W. Pacific, which formed for similar responsibilities for additional on I5th January, 1942, and absorbed British Air Forces it was proposed to locate G.H.Q. later in Ceylon, the Indian Ocean and the Bay Abdair—Code name of the Air Section of of Bengal. He set up his headquarters at the Supreme Allied H.Q., S.W. Pacific. Naval Base in Singapore where he was pro- Westgroup—Code name allotted to A.H.Q. on vided with a small operational staff, but no the formation of Supreme Allied H.Q , administrative staff. S.W. Pacific. 7 T" 4. The formation of G.H.Q. in no way re- Recgroup—Code name for the Allied Air lieved the Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Reconnaissance Group responsible for sea- Force, of- his responsibility (which was now ward reconnaissance of whole sphere of within the policy laid down by the Commander- Supreme Allied Command, S.W. Pacific. iri-Chief) for ensuring the effective co-operatiorj SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1349 of his Command .with the Naval and Military Each service accepted responsibility within Commands throughout the area, nor did it alter its own territory for providing the necessary his position vis-a-vis these Commands "or the bases, where stocks of bombs, petrol and lubri- Air Ministry and the several Civil Governments cants, peculiar to the respective air forces which with which he dealt. might use them, were to be laid down. THE BASIS OF" DEFENCE IN "THE FAR EAST. 9. Further matters of importance which were General Plan. settled at these conferences were:— (a) Responsibility for air reconnaissance 5. The general defence plan was based on over the South China Sea; this was co- an appreciation written by the Chiefs of Staff ordinated and defined. in July 1940. Briefly stated, this paper laid (6) Allied cypher and signal procedure. down that defence was to rely, in the absence (c) Allied Naval/Air recognition signal of a Fleet, primarily on air power. procedure. The Chiefs of Staff recognised that, for the 10. Concurrently with the above, the Far defence of the Naval Base, it was no longer East Command R A.F. was authorised to pro- sufficient to concentrate upon the defence of vide the means for operating general recon- Singapore Island but that it had become neces- naissance aircrait in the Bay of Bengal, sary to hold the whole"of Malaya. Their inten- Ceylon and the Indian Ocean. tion now was to replace, by the end of 1941, the existing establishment of 88 obsolete and Implications of the Plans. obsolescent aircraft by an air strength of 336 n. Here it is opportune to stress the impli- modern first-line aircraft backed up by adequate cations of the expansion programme authorised reserves and administrative units. This by the Chiefs of Staff; for the mere statement strength was allocated to the defence of Malaya that the strength was to be raised from 88 and Borneo and to trade protection in the N.E. obsolete or obsolescent aircraft to 336 modern half of the Indian Ocean; it did not include air- types conveys no true impression of the exten- craft necessary for the defence of Burma. sive preparatory measures required before this 6. On the basis of this C.O.S. paper, the force could be accommodated and operated. three Services in Malaya produced a tactical 12. It should be remembered that until the appreciation, which became the agenda of a new policy had been decided by the Chiefs of conference held at Singapore in October 1940 Staff, defence had been largely confined to the attended by representatives from all Commands vicinity of Singapore Island: thereafter it in- in the Far East This conference recommended cluded the whole of Malaya. that the C.O.S. figure of 336 aircraft should be increased to 582, which it considered the mini- 13. The first step was the construction "of mum strength of Air Forces required to meet bases. Sixteen new ones had to be found and defence commitments in the Far East. The built in Malaya, a country largely covered with Chiefs of Staffs' reply on this point stated " we secondary jungle remote from human habita- agree that 582 aircraft is an ideal, but consider tions. Of the bases in existence in the colony 336 should give a fair degree of security taking 5 needed modernisation and 2 reconstruction. into account our experiences in Middle East, Concurrently, construction of new maintenance, Malta, and Air Defence of Great Britain ". The repair and storage units was necessary, also conference also recommended that until the throughout the colony. additional air forces were provided, the Army Fighter defence had to be built up ab initio; in Malaya should be substantially reinforced. none whatever had existed hitherto. In addi- tion to bases for fighter squadrons, provision 7. Meanwhile, talks had been initiated was necessary for an extensive radar system, between the British, U.S.A. and Dutch Staffs for a modernised Observer Corps expanded on with the object of obtaining concerted action in a primitive one already existing, for communi- the event of war breaking out with . cations throughout the colony, and for Fighter 1 After the appointment of the Commander-in- Headquarters to control the whole. ^ Chief, Far East, in November 1940, further I Allied conferences were held in Singapore. By At 'the same time, 8 new bases had to be ) April 1941 agreed general plans had been drawn built in Burma and 3 in Ceylon. Refuelling bases for flying boats were needed at numerous ( up. islands in the Indian Ocean from the Andamans I Allied Air Plans. to the coast of Africa. \ 8. For the purpose of planning, it was 14. The second step was to provide the assumed that the Japanese would not be able authorised increase—the new units, the new air- to attack simultaneously at several widely dis- craft; the ancillary services and the staffs for persed places in the Far East, in particular operating them on modern lines; and finally that they would not challenge the combined the modern equipment, supplies and local re- British, American and Dutch might. It was serves for all. assumed, therefore, that Allied air forces would 15. The third step was to-'train the^whole be able to reinforce one another. Preparations Command in conjunction with the Navy^fArmy for mutual help were to be 'made as follows:— and Civil Defences' under the circumstances (a) For Malaya to reinforce the N.E.I.—4 existing in the Far East, and concurrently to Bomber Squadrons, R.A.F. introduce up-to-date methods of operating. > (b) For N.E.I, to reinforce Malaya—3 16. The whole presented a truly formidable Bomber and i Fighter Squadrons, Dutch expansion programme, made" still 'more formid- Army Air Service. able by the fact that time was short. The end ^^fc) For the Philippines to reinforce Malaya of 1941 was the date by which the Chiefs of —All U.S. Army and Navy Air Service Units Staff planned for the expanded force to be available, but only if the Philippines were ready for war. A "combination of circumstances evacuated. was, however, to result in realisation falling tar A2 SUPPLEMENTS T£E LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

'short of the inatk, dominating all being the 22. Most R.A.F. sites were in remote and prior and acute claims of the war in Europe, sparsely populated spots to which it was neces- and the Middle East. sary first to build roads. Native labour had to be collected, conveyed to the spot and ACTION TAKEN IN MALAYA TO IMPLEMENT PLANS housed. When this had been done it was-still necessary to carry to the area almost all the Development of Air Bases - building material- required. Problems of construction 17. The siting of aerodromes in Malaya was 23. Much effort was necessarily diverted to mainly influenced by the topography of the anti-malarial measures, which had to be put m country. A rugged, heavily forested mountain hand concurrently with construction in order chain runs down the centre of the peninsula to protect labour from epidemic. On comple- cutting off the eastern and western coastal belts tion, drained areas had to ibe maintained and from each other until Johore is reached al its oiled. southern end. Much of both coastal belts is 24. Supplies of material fell far short of the covered by a medley of broken hills; the rest total needs of the services and civil depart- consists of plains planted with, rubber and ments. A Joint Priorities Committee was estab- paddy, or of potential mining sites. Rainfall lished in the Spring of 1941. It sat regularly is heavy throughout the year, increasing as the and allocated supplies in accordance with the central mountain range is approached. Con- priorities decided from time to time. During stant cloud over this range handicaps flight the latter half of 1941, some shortages be- from one side of the peninsula to the other. came particularly acute. Metalling material Consequently, in order to provide reconnais- for runways was also always particularly short, sance over the South China Sea, from which a serious matter on aerodromes constantly sub- direction the threat to Malaya by sea was jected to tropical rainfall, which in itself was greatest, a number of aerodromes had to be a major handicap to rapid construction. sited on the East Coast. 25. It is clear, therefore, that the problems 18. Workable sites were difficult to obtain. which confronted the Air Ministry -Works De- Every effort was made throughout 1941 to partment were as numerous and complicated accelerate construction, but progress was not as any encountered in other theatres in war as rapid as had been hoped, despite the fact time. That it did excellent work .does not that, in some cases, sites involving a minimum alter the fact that it was severely handicapped of work were selected at the sacrifice of opera- in executing quickly a very large and urgent tional requirements. programme of expansion by the absence, par- ,19. There were n separate provincial ticularly during the 'early stages, of the government authorities in Malaya concerned accelerated administrative procedure which the with the acquisition of land; negotiations with situation demanded. •each had to be separate. In the earlier stages, delay occurred owing to misunderstanding of State of Construction, ist December, 1941 the land acquisition legislation; later, emer- 26. The locations of R.A.F. Stations and gency powers of acquisition were invoked and Establishments in Malaya and Singapore this source of delay ceased. Island, together with remarks about their state 20. Mechanical plant was very short. That of completion a few days before .war broke which was- available was in poor condition, out in the Far East, are shown in Appendix whilst, there were few personnel qualified to "A." operate or maintain it, a combination which 27. Of the occupied 'bases in Malaya, both cojistituted a primary handicap to progress. Alor Star and were old civil grounds 21. Labour generally throughout Mala};a with little room for dispersal. The buildings was insufficient to meet the needs of the defence at Alor Star had been constructed on the old expansion programmes of the three Services, R.A.F. peace-time layout and were congested and later of the Civil Government. A perma- and too near the runway. This station was~high nent Labour Committee existed but its function in the priority^ list for reconstruction when was, in practice, mainly limited to controlling opportunity offered. Both stations were in the wages in order to eliminate expensive and wasteT forefront of operations in the first days" of the ful competition between ithe three, fighting war; their deficiencies proved a great handicap. Services and Government departments. The powers- of this Committee were limited; all 28. The old bases, and the first,of those built labour was voluntary, not conscripted, and DO on the new programme, had no form of control could be exercised over the, rates paid camouflage. The ground had first been de- by civilian firms. By mutual agreement, how- forested and no attempt had been made to use ever, it was possible to arrange a certain priority, natural surroundings or irregular outlines to of employment of the labour available; and this obtain concealment. They stood out stark and was exercised to the benefit of the Royal AT bare," against the surrounding country, This Force* in Kelanfan State (in N.E. Malaya)'. was largely due to failure, before 1940 to realise, To improve the labour situation, negotiations not only in the Far East but in Europe also, were opened with the Civil Government in May, the need for dispersal and camouflage on the 1941, for forming locally enlisted works units scale which war experience proved to be to be clothed in uniform and officered by necessary. In later bases, excellent conceal- Europeans. Approval was obtained in ment was obtained by retaining natural August,^ 1941, and the matter was then put to surroundings, avoiding straight lines and using the Air Ministry, but by the time final sanction a type of construction which, amongst the ,^ees, was given it was too late to be effecting. For- was indistinguishable from the native huts. tunately an aerodrome construction unit Financial considerations, however, continued'to arrived from New Zealand at the end of prevent the. acquisition of sufficient land for October, 1941. It did excellent work. effective dispersal. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26, FEBRUARY, 1948 -1351

29. Dispersal areas and splinter-proof pens at (i) Engine Repair Depot and Universal aerodromes in Malaya were arranged on what Holding Unit: This depot was completed at was then thought to be an adequate scale based , provided with its own rail- on:-- way siding and occupied by No. 153 M.U. - (a) The scale of attack in accordance with It was designed to service squadrons based the information then available about the in North Malaya and so to reduce further the Japanese Air Services. congestion and concentration which had (b) The ultimate scale of A.A. defences to hitherto persisted at Seletar. be provided at each aerodrome. Allied Reinforcement Arrangements (c) The development of a fighter defensive . system. U.S.A. Reinforcements from the Philippines By the ist December, 1941, however, neither 32. The actual number of aircraft that might -time nor resources had permitted satisfactory be expected in Malaya, should the evacuation development of the fighter system, and few anti- of the Philippines occur, was of necessity in- aircraft weapons were available. The Com- definite; so was the amount of equipment mander-in-Chief, Far East, had laid down that peculiar to the U.S. Naval and Army Air each aerodrome was to be protected by eight Services which might accompany them. heavy and eight light A.A. guns. At no aero- 33. Reconnaissances were .carried out and drome in Malaya was this scale approached; on dispersed moorings planned for a total of 20 the outbreak "of war, some aerodromes had no reinforcing Catalmas of the United States Naval ,A.A. guns at all (for details see Appendix A, Air Service. A provisional plan for maintain- Column 5' (6)). ing them was also prepared. 30. Each base was provided with a supply of 34. The Commander-in-Chief ruled, in road metalling and labour for the repair of aero- September, 1941, that four bases were to be drome surfaces in the event of damage by prepared for accommodating B.i7's of the enemy attack".. The reason for mentioning this Air Corps; two in the North apparently trivial point will become clear later. and two in the South of Malaya. Gong Kedah and Butterworth in the North, Tebrau and Ancillary Construction Yong Peng in the South, were selected Ex- tensions of the runways to 2,000 yards at each 31. In addition to aerodromes the following were put in hand but only those at Gong Kedah important works were either completed or in were completed by the time war came. hand,on.the ist December, 1941: — \a) Combined "Army/Air 'Operations Dutch Reinforcements from N.E.I. -' Room: This was' completed and occupied by 35. In the mutual reinforcement .programme 1" H Q7 R.A,F. Far East Command (A.H.Q.) arranged with the Dutch Army Air Servi'ce.-it and H.Q. Malaya Command (H Q.M.C.) at was assumed that: — Sime Road, Singapore. (a) Three Bomber Squadrons (27 Glenn (b) Alternative- . Combined Army/Air Martins would "be based at Sembawa'ng: Operations Room.: Provided because of the (b) One Dutch Fighter Squadron (9 above-ground vulnerable position of the main •Buffaloes) would be based at Kallong: Combined Operations Room. and plans were made accordingly. (•c) Fighter Control H.Q. in Singapore: e 36. The Dutch Squadron and Flight Com- / This was ready for occupation! It had an manders concerned'visited these stations, toured . operations room, a filter room, a W.T. Malaya and werVgiven a short course in R.A.F. • station, etc. operational methods. Appropriate stocks of (d) A.M.E. Stations: The ultimate in- Dutch bombs were procured. dention was to- have 20- Radar "Stations ' 37. The Dutch Naval Air Service had been throughout^Malaya. Six stations only, all in allotted; in the initial seaward reconnaissance the vicinity of Singapore Island, were com- plan, responsibility for the area -Great pleted ,by -the ist December, 1941. Natunas-Kuehing (B. Borneo). To execute (e) Radio Installation and Maintenance this task, it had to base a Group (3 Catalinas) Unit: -This . was - partially completed at jr : of Flying Boats at Seletar. Provision was made Ponggoi, Singapore*.' <- " for this; and stocks of petrol and moorings were (/) Ammunition Park: Coristruction at also laid down at'. Kukhtan. ^ The Group re- Batak Quarry, Singapore; it -was occupied mained- under Dutch operational command. although extensions were in progress. 38. Liaison Officers of the Dutch Army Air ~~ e (g) "Storage of Petrol: „-; .... _-,, ;„; Service and the Royal Air Force were inter- v - _.(i)t Reserve storage accommodation for changed and were attached to A.H.Q. in 6,5,00 tons of aviation petrol was under Singapore.and at Dutch Army Air H.Q. in Java construction at Woodlands North, Singa- respectively. ' ; • pore. ' , (ii) Reserve storage accommodation for Preparations within R.A.F., Far East I 7,500 • tons of aviation petrol at Port ' Command. \^, . Dickson was more than 50 per cent, com- Role of Squadrons in War. , -,;," .- • • „ plete. 39. In July, 1941, a memorandum was circu- •-" (lii) Reserve storage accommodation for lated putlming the role of squadrons in war, . -930 tons at Kuantan was completed. and training syllabi were issued!- Strict super- (h) 'Universal" Holding- Unit:-,"This was, vision was imposed to enlure that foe fullest completed' and was 'occupied by 152 M.U. training value was obtained in all exercises and _at Bukit Panjang, Singapore; extensions were that. the maximum number' of' practices of in progress. This reduced the congestion and different kinds was arranged whenever a train- 'concentration of stores held at Seletar. ing flight was undertaken. ---''„'_,' ' - i 1352 SUPPLEMENT TO THifLONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 'Preparation of Initial Reconnaissance Plan. Mobility of Squadrons. 40. Seaborne invasion from the N.E. con- . 47. A high degree of mobility, was necessary stituted the. main threat to Malaya. A recon- for squadrons to fulfil their laid-down role as • naissance plan was therefore drawn up to detect the primary defence of the Far East in general, -its approach at the maximum distance, re- and of Malaya in particular, But the com- sponsibility for its execution being divided position of the forces allotted to the Far East 'amongst the Allies. R.A.F. Far East Com- included no transport aircraft; and although mand was allotted responsibility for the area A.H.Q. drew attention to the deficiency on Kota Bahru-Southern tip of Indo-China-Great several .occasions no aircraft could be pro- Natunas-Kuantan. A reconnaissance plan was vided. The Dutch Army Air Service had a prepared accordingly. Its execution necessi- fleet of some 20 Lodestars and promised assist- tated the employment of one G.R. (Hudson) ance, provided their own circumstances per- Squadron based on Kuantan and one based on mitted. In the autumn of 1941, some Lodestars Kota Bahru. The use of two Catalmas was were borrowed, and selected squadrons were superimposed to ensure an overlap - with the practised in the organisation required for Dutch area immediately to the South. moving. Squadrons were exercised in this plan from 48. A shortage of M.T. in Malaya made the their war stations. position more serious. Orders for the M.T. re- 41. When the Japanese occupied Indo-China quired were placed in the U.S.A. but they in July, 1941, A.H.Q. queried the fact that could not be met in time. There was no M.T. this reconnaissance plan made no provision for unit in the Command nor were there sufficient searching the Gulf of Siam, but G.H.Q. con- spare vehicles to form a Command pool. Indi- firmed that the limited reconnaissance force vidual units were themselves below establish- available must .be concentrated initially .upon ment in M.T. the more likely area of approach. DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG. Concentration of Squadrons in War. 49. No Air Forces were allotted for the de- 42. In accordance with the principle that fence of Hong Kong, There was a station flight squadrons were to be concentrated in the de- at Kai Tak on the mainland for target towing fence of whatever area was threatened, alterna- purposes, but apart from local reconnaissance tive locations for squadrons, dependent on the no war role was envisaged or arranged for this axis of attack, were prepared. flight. Transition "to a War Footing. 50. In the summer of 1941, an urgent request was received from Hong Kong pressing for 43. In the past, a considerable number of some fighter aircraft because of the great sup- code words had been issued, each governing port they would give to civilian morale. This the action of units in various kinds of emer- request could not be met. In case it should gency. As a whole, they were most confusing prove possible later to meet the request for and liable to result in unco-ordinated action. fighter aircraft, a Fighter Sector Control room To rectify this situation, G.H.Q. instructed all and Radar Stations were sited and plans were Commands, in May, 1941, to prepare foi three prepared for the provision of a fighter defensive " degrees of readiness " and laid down the system. general principles governing each. A.H.Q. took the opportunity to issue Units with an DEVELOPMENTS IN BRITISH BORNEO. exact description in detail of the action to be 51. Facilities for land planes in British taken on promulgation of these degrees of readi- Borneo were confined to one aerodrome and one ness. The transition to a full war footing was landing ground, at and Miri re- thereby made smooth and rapid. spectively. The former was not large enough Co-ordination of Night Flying Arrangements. for bomber aircraft but its extension was in 44. Before the autumn of 1941, arrangements hand when war broke out. Flying boat moor- for night flying had not been co-ordinated, each ings were also laid in the river nearby. There Unit employing its own method of laying out were no A.A. defences, but a of the a flare path and other lighting. A standardised , with H.Q. in Kuching, was procedure was drawn up in November, 1941, located in Borneo for the protection of- the as it was essential to ensure that all squadrons aerodrome and landing ground areas and the could operate by night with confidence and Miri oilfields. could use any aerodrome in the Command, DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA. Establishment of Air Corridors. 52. As a result of the Singapore Conference • 45. Air corridors "in" and "out of" in the autumn of 1940 (para. 6), the findings of Singapore were established and promulgated, which were generally endorsed by the C.-in-C. whilst a standardised procedure' for Far East on his arrival, the Government of " approach " to all aerodromes in the Com- Burma co-operated actively in constructing and mand was issued in July. developing the eight air bases, and additional satellite strips, considered necessary for air Establishment of Operations Rooms. operations from Burma. These^ bases stretched 46. Operations rooms were opened at each from Mergui on the Tenasserim'Coast in a half base as it became available for use, the ideal circle round the Siamese frontier to Lashio in aimed at being that squadrons on arrival should the Northern Shan states. In anticipation of find the same layout, information and pro- approval, Flight Lieutenant C. W. Bailey, cedure as that which existed at their parent Inspector of Landing Grounds at A.H.Q., had aerodromes. - This was designed to avoid the been sent by A.H.Q. to Burma in November, delay and disorganisation caused by the 1940. He had drawn up plans for extending necessity of transferring material and docu- old,, and constructing new, aerodromes. Fur- ments: it speeded up the efficiency of operations. ther, in co-operation with the Government of SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1353

.Burma, arrangements had been made for re- was to destroy communication facilities in the organising the Public Works Department so Siamese Isthmus. Land forces were to advance that it could undertake supervision, of construc- across the isthmus and conduct a " burn and tion, which was immediately. begun. . scuttle " raid on port, rail and air facilities at Prachuab Kirrikand. Their arrival was to 53. In March, 1941, H.Q. No. 221 Group synchronise with air attack from Malaya under "(Commander, Group Captain E. R. Manning) A.H.Q. arrangements. was established at Rangoon to develop these bases and to command the Air Forces located 59. The question of the Command of the in Burma. Although the Group staff was very forces in Burma had been raised on more than small, progress was so good that all bases were one occasion. Those who considered it from completed by the end of 1941 with accommoda- the angle of India's defence recommended that tion at each for some 450 all ranks. Facilities control should be by India. A.H.Q. supported for dispersal were reasonable, pens being pro- the opposite view, namely the retention of vided, as were some satellite strips. There was Burma in the Far East Command, because it a measure of A.A. protection in the Rangoon considered that effective co-ordination of the area but none elsewhere. air forces operating from Burma- and Malaya in defence of the Far East could only be 54. Co-operation with the Army hi Burma achieved by unified command. This view was was excellent. Army H.Q. in Burma and accepted. In the actual event, however, the No. 221 Group R.A.F. were in close proximity and the G.O.C. and his staff could not have control of Burma had to pass to India seven done more to assist the R.A.F. in its prepara- days after war broke out—at 0630 hours on tions. From the outset of planning in 15th December, 1941. November, 1940, the G.O.C. was in the pic- 60. Finally, reference must be made to the ture of R.A.F. development. The raising and American Volunteer Group under Colonel training of aerodrome defence troops was con- Chennault, who .was given all possible assist- sequently conducted in parallel with construc- ance, particularly in Telation to maintenance, tion. training and accommodation. R.A.F. Base, 55. During 1940, an air observer system was Toungoo, the training aerodrome for the Force, developed by the G.O.C. under the active was visited by the A.O.C. and Staff Officers direction of the Postmaster-General. From the from A.H.Q.; officers who had had fighter outset, its functions were made clear and, de- experience in Europe were sent to lecture and spite difficulties" of training, it developed and to assist in training. Excellent work was later operated usefully on the outbreak of hostilities; done by this Force, in co-operation with the control of it passed to the R.A.F. on the forma- R.A.F., in the defence of Burma. tion of 221 Group Headquarters. One Radar Station was completed at Moulmein and two DEVELOPMENTS IN N.E.I. others in the Rangoon area were nearing com- Dutch Borneo. pletion when war broke out. A Fighter Con- 61. Tn accordance with the mutual reinforce- trol Operations room was designed and con- ment plan, the Dutch allocated Sinkawang and structed in Rangoon. Samarinda in Dutch Borneo for use as bases 56. No. 60 (B) Squadron (Blenheim I's) ex for four-R.A.F.-bomber squadrons. Each of India, was located at Rangoon from February, these bases was to be provided with accommo- 1941. G.H.Q. considered it* important to dation for two bomber squadrons and to be ensure some measure of fighter defence at stocked in peace with supplies peculiar to the Rangoon; consequently, pending the availa- Royal Air Force. Their only method of supply bility of an established fighter squadron, half was by means of transport aircraft provided of No. 60 was re-equipped with Buffalo fighters by the Dutch, who deliberately avoided making for the period August-October, 1941, somewhat roads to them -through the dense jungle in handicapping the squadron's operational effi- which they .were situated, and which thus re- ciency. As soon as No. 67 (F) Squadron mained an undisturbed defence. By December, (Buffaloes) in Malaya was fully trained it was Sinkawang was ready and had bee'n inspected transferred to Rangoon; the transfer took place by the C.O. and Flight Commanders of one in October, 1941. of the squadrons allocated to it. Samarinda was not ready. < Heavy demands on No. 60 (B) Squadron for communication flights occupied much of its Sumatra. flying effort; and although it had "a very high standard of flying in monsoon conditions over 62. Permission was also obtained from the Burma, it became desirable to transfer the Dutch in the summer of 1941, to reconnoitre squadron to Malaya to bring it operationally all aerodromes in Sumatra. This was required up-to-date in practice. All its aircraft and because A.H.Q. anticipated that, in the event crews were therefore sent to Kuantan, the new of war,' Sumatra would be required for: Air/Armament Station of the Command, where (a) An "alternative air reinforcement route they arrived shortly before the Japanese from India owing to the vulnerability of the attacked Malaya. old route to Singapore via Burma and N. Malaya once the Japanese .had penetrated 57. In addition there was a flight of six into Siam. Moths used for training Burma's Volunteer Air (b) Potential advanced landing grounds for Force. The aircraft of this flight were allotted operations against the N flank of a Japanese the role of maintaining communications and advance down Malayal e£ carrying out certain limited reconnaissance. The main preoccupation -was therefore "with 58. A plan was drawn up in co-operation those aerodromes which were situated in the with the Army in Burma, the object of which Northern .half of Sumatra. • . . - ' ' . 1354 TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRU'ARY/ 63! As-the result o'f this reconnaissance, 'ex- -gemce. personnel and records in "-the Far East ttensions to the grounds at Lho'nga&nd Sabang. --had been centralised in the Combined Intelli- were put in. hand to make them suitable-for •-gence Bureau '(F.E.C.B.) which functioned jmodern aircraft.. under the cdntrol of C.-m-C. Ghina Statioii. .64. Assistance was also given to .B.O.A.C. Theoretically it served, inter alia, ithe needs of to organise-facilities at Sabang for the opera- A.H.Q. Jn practice, however, its means for tion of an alternative seaplane route Rangoon obtaining'air'information throughout the Far --Port -Blair—Sabang instead of the normal -East was totally inadequate; its staff was in- one via Bangkok. " - sufficient to cope- fully even with G.H'.Q. Air Intelligence requirements; and although the in- Java. formation it possessed was always available 65. Visits were paid to Java by a number to A.H.Q., F.E.C.B. had not the means of of staff officers from A.H.Q. who thus gained supplanting the missing intelligence machinery useful information- about Dutch maintenance at A.H.Q. establishments and resources generally. Representations .were therefore "made by A.H.Q. of the need for a thorough intelligence DEYELOPMENTS IN INDIAN OCEAN AND • • system throughout the Command. About - BAY OF BENGAL. July, a conference was held with G.H.Q., who 66. A memorandum was prepared about wished to create a second Combined Intelligence June, 1941,' and1 issued by A.H.Q. detailing Centre to serve the joint needs of A.H.Q. and the bases to be developed in this area; their H.Q.M.C. A second joint organisation of this status was defined and priority of provisioning nature would not, -however, have been suitable was laid down. By December, 1941, the posi- for building up the Intelligence organisation tion,, was as follows:— required throughout the Command at all levels Andamans and Nicobars—at Port Blair from A.H.Q. downwards. This view was and Nancowrie, moorings and petrol had been accepted. laid, and limited accommodation constructed An establishment for an Intelligence organi- for operating flying boats. Port Blair was sation for the whole Command was drawn up also 'prepared by B.O.A.C., with R.A.F, and submitted to the Air Ministry, and in late assistance, as an alternative to the route autumn, in anticipation of approval, personnel Rangoon—. , , ' were made available locally and were appointed Ceylon—H.Q. No. 222 Group was estab- to H.Q. and Units. The nucleus organisation lished, with a joint Naval/Air Ops. Room, at thus' formed was fortunately in being when Colombo.. ." hostilities broke out, but its development was China Bay—one flight of. Vildebeeste^ backward, land in "particular the information it was located here for target towing and local had collated for briefing crews was scanty. reconnaissance. This station was being developed 'as a permanent base for one: 68. According to intelligence current .in- the G.R. Squadron and one F.B. Squadron, Command, the efficiency of the Japanese Naval the accommodation for which was prac- Air Units was known to be good, but that of their Army Air Units was not high despite the - x tically completed. Ratmalana—Aerodrome was being con- fanatical valour of their personnel. structed for one G.R,, Squadron. This wrong assessment of their Artay Air Koggala—was being developed as the: Units was partly due to the 'fact that the system main base for flying boats operating in.the for collecting intelligence throughout the Far Indian Ocean. Accommodation' for one; East was only sufficient to enable F.E.C.B. to Squadron was nearly ready. obtain incomplete air information, and the re- liability of most of this was far from high. - And it was partly due to the fact that A.H.Q., Cocos -Islands , stations and squadrons possessed only the em- • . (-D i r ac t ivo n Fuel and moorings bryonic intelligence" organisation already re- Island). had been laid ancl 1 • * i J J ferreXtl 1 t;*_dl toL\J :. thlllles resulA V^OLIUtL waVY CLsO thaLJ.XO.tC sucOU^Xhi intelligenci±j.«.VJ-U^Vs.i..ftv*\es Maldives .. (Male) limited accommoda- th ieomrnand received-was not effectively •4-ij-\*-* ri-f/^TTi /-IaH 4-^\i* - - - *-- •"• « • - ' ' ' J Seychelles* (Mahe) -tion provided foi digested, promulgated or acted upon. Chagos • (Diegor-- operating flying - A particular outcome- of this state of affairs, '. Garcia). boats at each of which was destined to have far-reaching con-* Mauritius these places.. sequences in Malaya, was that the personnel of Tanganyika the Command remained unaware up to "the out- (Lindi). break'of war of the qualities of the Jap'anese ' r-r,f~~ -- -IT Were being developed fighter squsTdfoHs, Whose Zero fighters were-to Durban -I as permanent bases prove superior -in performance to our own. - Mombasa . ] for one F\B. Squad- fighter's. This naturally affected framing in our A, "", •. - ^ • ron" each. Squadrons, particularly in the tatties to be Much credit is due to the Air Ministry .Works adopted by our "fighters.. Department for tfhe great volume of construc- tion which- had been carried out in these out- The need for an Operational Training Unit. lying 'parts of the Command, as well as for '- 69. The Air Ministry had" been .unable to that'executed in Malaya, in a relatively short approve requests made during the year to estab- space" of time despite many and considerable lish an O.T.U., in. Malaya.- But in September, handicaps. • _*-..,, - ,. - • 1941, owing to. the fact that large numbers of personnel required operational training, A.H.Q. ' OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY. OF UNITS IN established-a- makeshift O.T.U.- at from \ MALAYA. - - the resources available in the .Command. Its role was:— Intelligence Organisation^. , . - r- 67.' In- June,- 1941, A.H..Q., had no Intelli-, ,(a). To train pilots for Fighter Squadrons gence Organisation of its own. All air ihtelli- who had been, for some time," arriving from" SUPPLEMENT TO TH£ LONDON 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1355 New Zealand" direct "from Service' Flying - No. 243 (F) Squadron, formed in April, Training Schools, and who" therefore lacked 1941. Personnel were found as in the case of operational training. No. 67 Squadron, but a slightly higher pro- (b) To convert" personnel of No. 36 and portion were F.T.S. personnel. No. loo (T.B.) Squadrons from ViJdebeestes No. 453 (F) Squadron, formed October to twin-engine aircraft in anticipation of their 1941. The Squadron and two Flight Com- - re-equipment with Beauforts. " -' * manders were appointed from U.K. This was ,; (c) To train pilots from New Zealand on an R.A.F. " infiltration " squadron* filled twin-engine aircraft to fill vacancies in from F.T.S's in Australia. Some of the Bomber Squadrons. personnel were not entirely suitable for a Training aircraft were provided, from Fighter Squadron, and the Squadron Com- Wirraways thrown up by No. 21 (F) Squadron mander was in Australia selecting replace- when irre-armed with Buffaloes, and by Blen- ments when war broke out. heims "borrowed from No. 34 (B) Squadron. No. 488 (F) Squadron, formed in October- The Wing Commander Training at A.H.Q. November 1941. The Squadron and two (Wing Commander Wills-Sandford) . was Flight Commanders came from U.K. This appointed Commanding Officer. The Unit had was-an R.N.Z.A.F. infiltration squadron and to be disbanded on 8th December, on the out- was filled from F.T.S's in New Zealand with break of hostilities, but it had completed most excellent material; but their standard of fly- valuable work. ing on arrival was backward. This squadron had taken over the aircraft on which No. Lack of Armament Training Facilities. " 6*7 (F) Squadron had trained, and many of 70. Up till October 1941, the only arma- these were in poor condition. ment training facilities in the Command .were No. 21 (F) Squadron, R.A.A.F., which on Singapore Island, and at an improvised air had formed as a General Purpose Squadron range near Penang. Maximum use was made in Australia and moved into the Command of the Singapore ranges, but they were very in 1940, was in October 1941 re-equipped insufficient to meet requirements. In October with Buffaloes and converted into a Fighter 1941, the new Command Armament Training - Squadron, with 12 I.E. and 6 I.R. aircraft. Station at Kuantan was opened, but there was The Squadron had been previously equipped time for one squadron only to complete a with 2-seater Wirraways, some of which were course before 'the outbreak of war. "returned to Australia, the remainder" being 71. The air firing situation was' particularly retained to assist in training Nos. 453 (F) unsatisfactory. There was an acute shortage and 488 (F) Squadrons. It will be observed, of target towing aircraft, and the few available therefore, that the pilots of this squadron were slow. \ had not been selected originally for-fighter aircraft, and some were not in fact entirely Lack of Transport and Communication Aircraft. "suitable for this role. . -. 72. The lack of transport and communication 75. The mam role of the Buffalo Squadrorts aircraft was acutely felt during the pre-war was "day defence" only, - primarily of the period ..when training'was all important. G.H.Q. Singapore area, but night "flying training was and'H.QlM.C. hadrfrequently to ask for com- instituted to ensure that pilots could, take off munication flights," aircraft for,c which had ttefore dawn and land after nightfall." ' ',' * necessarily "to be found, mainly by G.R. Squadrons. Although such requests were 76. Except for No. 488 (F) Squadron -all pruned- and co-ordinated, flights were never- the above squadrons were considered operation- theless sufficiently frequent to interfere seriously ally trained . by the outbreak of ,war. No. with the training of squadrons, many of whose 488 (F) Squadron was' deficient in squadron vital flying'hours were thus expended. Further- and flight training and was not passed as opera- more, visits to subordinate units by A:H.Q. tionally ready until the latter'half of December staff had to be correspondingly, curtailed. . 1941. Training and assessment of operational readiness had, however, been- based on an Fighter Squadrons. ... under-estimation of the enemy. The tactics thus taught and -practised proved '-unsuitable and - 73. In 'June-July 1941 a Fighter,, Group costly, against the Japanese' Navy " O '-'- Operational Cadre was formed to take - over fighter, , -which was greatly superior ' to _ 'the the training and operation of all fighter" airc Buffalo, in performance. Moreover,-advanced craft in Singapore: the Senior Officer (Group training had suffered because, prior, to the Captain E., B. Rice) at the same time being formation of an O.T.Ui, in'September .1941 appointed Air Defence Co-ordinator, Malaya.. (see. para. 69), aril pilots had joined.'their - 74. The following .Fighter Squadrons, with squadrons' without having received individual an establishment of -1,6 I.E.* and 8 T.-R. operational training. • • __•.,„• .;. Buffaloes, were formed on the dates shown:-r— - 77i The' standard of gunnery in all-squadrons -r"~ No. 67 (F) • Squadron, formed at the end was low because: — , i _ - -, ^ - r of March'1941. The Squadron and two Flight (a) Towing aircraft "we're very -slow"- and ' .Commanders to be appointed from U.K., the there* were very few of them, ; - remaining 'pilots frorrf bomber- squadrons (b) Cine gun equipment was lacking, - - within" the Command. Establishments' were ••'"completed with' "pilots- from New Zealand (c) Continual trouble was experienced with '- F.T.S's. The Squadron was transferred "to -v'.the .5 gun and synchronising gear. This was Burma in .October 1941, shortly after it',had . -largely > overcome by local-modification-by been 'passed " as operationally' ,' efficien•t' - * i»e :—an RAF as" distinct from a Dominion squadron-but-manned by Domimons'personnel. 135,6 SUPPLEMENTED THE*LONP,ON GAZETTE, .26 FEBRUARY, 1948

October 1941. Nevertheless, pilots were still fighter squadrons in the intricate art of fighter not confident'about their armament when war defence. It had an" operational staff only," no overtook them. -administrative branches: it was in fact an 78. The Buffalo had a disappointing per- offshoot of the Air Staff of A.H.Q. formance. It was heavy and underpowered Fighter considerations in general. '-and had a slow rate of climb. Maintenance was heavy, which meant a low standard of 84. Thus an Air Defence system had been Serviceability. Wastage during training was organised by the time war came. Whilst it high, and many of the aircraft in Squadrons was by no means as efficient as it would have suffered from rough handling. The Buffalo had been if the resources, time and equipment had rno'V.H.F.-radio/ and the maximum range of not been so short, yet it provided Singapore R.T./W.T. was 9 miles, being frequently less with a scale of defensive effort which was by no means insignificant. Great credit is due when atmospherics were bad. Intercommuni- to those who achieved this result with so short cation between aircraft was unreliable. a time for preparation, outstanding amongst 79. There was one multi-seat fighter squadron whom was the late Group Captain E. B. in the Command, No. 27, a night fighter Rice. squadron equipped with Blenheim I's. Air- craft were old and in poor condition and were Bomber and G.R. Land-abased Squadrons. thus of limited value in a night-fighting role. 85. There were two and two Its conversion into a bomber squadron, for landplane G.R. squadrons in Malaya:— which personnel were available, came up for No. 62 Squadron (Blenheim!)—Alor Star. consideration but could not be adopted owing No. 34 Squadron (Blenheim IV)—Tengah. to the need for retaining a night fighter unit. No. i (R.A.A F.) Squadron (Hudson II) Observer Corps. —Kota Bahru. No. 8 (R.A.A.F.) Squadron (Hudson II) 80. In July, 1941, control of an existing —Sembawang. Observer Corps system was transferred from the Army to A.H.Q. It had been organised These two types of squadron, Bomber and chiefly as part of the civil air raid warning G.R., are bracketed together because, owing system, and needed a great deal of develop- to the small size of the total force, specialisa- ment for use in an active air defence sj/stem. tion was impracticable. Although the Hudson The personnel were enthusiastic, but unfor- squadrons were the main oversea reconnaissance tunately little time was available to train them force, the Blenheims had also to be trained in in their new duties. It was found impossible these duties! Similarly, both types of squadron to establish the necessary Observer Posts in the had to be trained in all types of bombing over jungle-clad mountainous country of Central the sea and over the land, both by day and by Malaya where there was, therefore, a serious night. gap in the-warning system. Observer Corps 86. From May, 1940, until the Spring of 1941 Operations Rooms were established at Kuala there had been severe flying restrictions im- Lumpur and Singapore, and were linked up to posed on Blenheim Squadrons owing to the lack the Dutch system in the Rhio Archipelago to of spares in the Command. During this period, the South, but difficulty was experienced in flying hours were restricted to 5 hours monthly organising the whole through lack of existing per I.E. aircraft. In Spring, 1941, selected telephone communications in Malaya and to an pilots had to be withdrawn from these squad- > acute shortage of telephone material and equip- rons to assist in the formation of the first two ment. fighter squadrons in Malaya. Radar Stations. 87. Nos. i and 8 (G.R.) Squadrons R.A.A.F. had reached a higher standard of training, but (' 81. The approved policy of priority for the it was necessary for the Australian Air Board \ development of radar facilities was:— to withdraw crews as they became fully trained / (a) Singapore Island. and to replace them by untrained crews, the ', (6) The East Coast of Malaya. former being required for the further expansion (c) Penang and the West Coast; of the R.A.A.F. in Australia. •All Stations were to look seaward with only There was, therefore, in both types of squad- restricted overland cover behind, the hinter- ron a wide variation between crews in the land being covered by the Observer Corps. degree of their training, and especially in their •82. By December, 1941, four stations were efficiency in night flyin

106. Meanwhile, during the autumn, prepara- local conditions and a Far East Command hand- tions were initiated for giving air support to the book -was printed. It was -issued in August, Chinese, on the assumption that the next 1941, to R.A.F. Units and Naval Commands Japanese move would probably be towards for guidance in carrying out all types of opera- Kunming. It was the intention to form an tions over the sea. International Air Force, consisting of R.A.F. bombers and fighters and of an American , CO-OPERATION WITH ARMY IN MALAYA. Volunteer Group under Col. Chennault, to Close Support. operate in South China. Administrative preparations were begun, petrol stocks were sent 111. Co-operation with the Army in Malaya to the Chinese airfields, and bombs and com- had not been highly developed or exercised in ponents were prepared for despatch. Early in the past. No. 21 Squadron, R.A.A.F., when November, 1941, an R.A.F. Commission was it was equipped with Wirraways, had been re- sent from the Far East to investigate operational garded hi part as an A.C. Squadron, and had conditions: it included several senior staff carried out some limited exercises with troops' officers of A.H.Q. and the station commander in the field. The methods of co-operation which of- Tengah, who were still away when the had been practised-were, however, not in line Japanese landed in Malaya. The project was with recent developments in Europe and the no small commitment for A.H.Q., as G.H.Q. Middle East. had insufficient staff to undertake all the de- 112. There was much material available at tailed planning and administration which would A.H.Q. of the experience gained in other Com- normally have been done at the level of the mands but, owing to lack of staff, the lessons higher command: much of this had necessarily had not been digested. Active steps were taken- to be done by the staff of A.H.Q., which was to remedy this, and instructions for the joint already insufficient • for dealing with its own information of Army and Air Force Units to work (paras. 96-98). cover the operations of bombers in support of troops were produced and issued in September, CO-OPERATION WITH NAVY. 1941, with the concurrence of the G.O.C., 107. A.H.Q.. had -advocated a combined Malaya Command. Similarly, instructions were Naval/Air Operations Room in Singapore to compiled and issued for joint information to co-ordinate and control the seaward air opera- cover the operations of fighter aircraft employed tions of the Command with the naval forces of on tactical reconnaissance. the Commander-in-Chief, China Station, but it 113. Classes were started for training aircrews was decided that such co-operation would be in Army organisation and tactics. Each bomber Better conducted on a G.H.Q./C-in-C. China and fighter squadron in the Command was Station level. To ensure liaison, however, a affiliated to an Army formation and was allotted Naval liaison officer was attached to A.H.Q., so many flying hours per month for combined for some months before war broke out: later a training. But owing to lack of signals equip- Naval air-maintenance officer was added. ttnent, communications were improvised and primitive, which severely restricted the type 'of 108. It was recognised that should a full scale support which could be given. - Eastern Fleet be based on Singapore, many de- tailed "arrangements for liaison would become necessary. But a full Eastern Fleet staff could Aerodrome Defence. not be assembled- owing to a shortage of naval 114. For some years before war broke out, officers; indeed, it was considered unwise to considerable difference of opinion had existed assemble one in Singapore before the situation between the Army>and the R.A.F. about the cleared, namely until a fleet arrived in Singa- siting of aerodromes on the peninsula of Malaya'.' pore and its future role could be estimated. - - ' Until 1937 the army's policy had always Five days after the outbreak of war, how- been to have the East Coast undeveloped as ever," a staff of junior Naval officers was pro- far as possible because insufficient forces were' vided for watchkeeping in the Army/Air Com- available to defend the long coast-line. bined Operations Room, a step made possible • The need then,arose for aerodromes on the when additional officers were thrown up by the peninsula well forward of the Naval base ,at loss of H.M.S.^ -Prince of Wales and Repulse. Singapore. Sites for them on the eastern side They proved adequate for subsequent needs, of the mountainous backbone of the peninsula, but had the Far Eastern Fleet remained in hitherto undeveloped, were, essential for two being in "Singapore" it would have been neces- reasons. Firstly to obtain maximum air range sary to, strengthen them in order to provide over the sea to the east, from which direction the close co-operation which would have been the threat to Malaya was greatest. Secondly in then essential. order to avoid the cloud-covered mountainous ! __ _ J} i "" Backbone which, in those days, effectively pre- 109. Co-operation with the C.-in-G,v East vented aircraft based on aerodromes on the .west Indies was close, and ^a Combined Operations side from operating over the sea on the east, Room had been established at Colombo. There the thr-eatened, side. was real understanding iof the problem facing Unfortunately there had been insufficient co- the R.A.F., particularly the difficulty, owing to operation on the spot in Malaya between the shortage of flying boats, of assisting in the con- two' interests involved, with the result that trol of sea communications in the Indian Ocean.- some of the sites selected were tactically weak There were never more than two "Catalinas, to defend.. But in the Spring, of 1941 the neces- often only one, available in Ceylon for this sary full co-operation was established between work.' the services on the spot, in this important no. Invaluable memoranda about Naval/Air matter of selecting aerodrome sites. , • matters, obtained by G.H.Q. from Coastal 115. However, those aerodromes that were Command and other sources, were available at located in' the Singapore .fortress area were well A.H.Q. These were collated and revised to suit sited for defence. They were, furthermore, 1360 SUPPLEMENT r LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 covered by the fortress A.A. umbrella. Sabo- 123. Finally, in conjunction with A H.Q. and tage was regarded as the main threat, H.Q.M.C., G.H.Q. produced about this time a particulaily during the initial stages of war. handbook on aerodrome defence which detailed -116. The defence of aerodromes on the main- the probable scale of attack to which each land was a more difficult problem. There were would be subject, the minimum defences three areas of major importance: — required, and the priority of their provision. (i) N.E. Malaya—Kelantan aerodromes. Co-operation with A.A. Defences. (ii) E. Coast Malaya—Kuantan. 124. During the latter half of 1941, A.A. (iii) N.W. Malaya—Kedah aerodromes. equipments rapidly increased in number, in It was some of these aerodromes which had Singapore especially, and demands for air co- been sited in tactically weak positions for the operation for the training of A.A. crews multi- reasons given in para 114. Some were even in plied accordingly. Special aircraft for the exposed positions close to favourable landing purpose were few, so A.A. defence exercises beaches. The desirablility, from an administra- were combined with other forms of training in tive view-point, of selecting sites close to order to make full use of flying hours. Never- existing communications and sources of labour theless, this resulted in many flying hours of had contributed to this dangerous situation. operational units, which were all too precious It meant that the Field army on the west for their own training, being expended on this coast, down which the main enemy thrust on work; yet the A.A. Defence Commander's land was expected to develop, had to make requirements were never approached. large detachments to protect aerodromes on the east coast. Photographic Survey. 117. On the east coast, the direct defence 125. Photographic survey of large areas in of aerodromes was the prime function of the Malaya for both the Army and the Civil Gov- Army. Accordingly, the Brigadiers at Kota ernment was another commitment which had to Bahru and Kuantan were, by agreement be met. It necessitated the allotment and between the A.O.C. and G.O.C., appointed training of a special flight. Aerodrome Defence Commanders in their re- spective areas. The arrangement, with certain Joint A rmy /Air Planning: Operation safeguards, worked well and resulted in good " Matador ". co-ordination of the resources available for 126. During July, 1941, a staff conference defence. was held at H.Q. Malaya Command which was attended, it is believed, by representatives of 118. The training, experience, quality and G.H.Q., H.Q.M.C., Ill (Indian) Corps and numbers of the forces manning the defences A.H.Q. It was called to consider a War Office of the aerodromes other than those at Kota project for the occupation of the Kra Isthmus Bahru and Kuantan were much under require- by a joint Army/R.A.F. force from Malaya, ments. They were mostly Indian State troops, who had had little opportunity for training in the object of which was to deny to the Japanese this specialised work. A further handicap was the port and aerodrome facilities in it (which, a general paucity of weapons of all kinds, if exploited, constituted the main threat to. particularly A.A. guns and their equipment. Malaya) by meeting and defeating him on the beaches. 119. Every effort was made to improve the defences of -aerodromes against ground attack. 127. It was evident that the development of Old tanks, armoured cars and any form of the aerodromes there by the Siamese could only weapons were sought from other Commands be linked up with the spread of the Japanese and from the U.S.A. H.Q.M.C. did its best, over Indo-China and their increasing influence but the men and weapons required could not in Bangkok. It appeared obvious that they be made available. Assistance was also given would soon contain all the facilities required by by the Naval Base and later by the Dutch. Japanese aircraft, particularly fighters, which Financial authority was given by the A.O.C. would then be able to support effectively land- in the autumn to put in hand urgent work on ings in Southern Siam and Northern Malaya. defence schemes of mainland aerodromes with- The A.H.Q. representative was consequently in out the necessity for prior reference to A.H.Q. favour, at the least, of a raid to destroy these facilities. 120. Joint Army and R.A.F. Aerodrome 128. The conference finally adopted a plan Defence Boards were set up about July, 1941, for seizing and holding the Singora area and throughout Malaya to co-ordinate defence " The Ledge " position on the Patani Road, schemes; and thereafter care was taken to but only it: — ensure that the defence aspect was considered at the outset when new aerodrome construction (a) a minimum of 24 hours' start of the was put in hand. enemy was available; (b) the opportunity occurred during the 121. Full instructions were prepared and North-East Monsoon, (0ctober/March), i.e., issued to guide local Commanders in preparing when the Japanese would not be able to denial and destruction schemes, and arrange- employ tanks off the roads. ments were made for obstructing airfields not in use. This plan was known as " Operation Matador ". The A.H.Q. representative was 122. The first two major aerodrome defence strongly pressed to state definitely what squad- exercises were held in the late summer in the rons would be available to take part in it, with presence of large numbers of Army spectators particular reference to breaking the railway run- ffor instructional purposes: one was held at ning south from Bangkok, along which it was Tengah with the co-operation of Fortress troops, presumed a Japanese advance would come con- and one at Kluang in Johore with the Australian currently with any attack from seaward. An Division. offer was made of a Singapore III flying boat to SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 16TJFEBRUARY, 1948 1361

carry a demolition parly to some suitable stretch , 133. Re-equipment of squadrons had not of railroad near the Siamese coast, but it was taken place and was not likely to do so in the not taken up. Otherwise, no definite allotment near future; Vickers Vildebeestes were still our could be made because of the meagre air main striking strength. Buffalo fighters had strength in Malaya and its many commitments. arrived, it is true, but their performance and The force available would have to depend on armament were disappointing, and inexperi- the situation at the time and on the priority enced pilots were still being trained to man of tasks aUotted by G.H.Q. to the R.A.F. as them. a whole. From the Army point of view this 134. The aerodromes in Northern Malaya on was a most unsatisfactory reply. which so much was to depend, especially during the early stages of the war, had none of the 129. At this conference the chances of execut- pre-requisites of secure air bases for occupa- ing this operation successfully appeared remote, tion in the face of the enemy. The number dependent as it was upon most accurate timing of fighters available was very inadequate for for forestalling the Japanese in the Singora- providing effective fighter 'cover. Both heavy Patani area and for doing so without precipitat- and light A.A. guns were quite insufficient. ing war with Japan or appearing to be the Dispersal arrangements for aircraft and their aggressors. Moreover, there seemed some doubt protection from blast were not as complete whether sufficient Army resources would be as was planned. And, in the absence of an available to carry it out. However, the benefits adequate air raid warning system the aero- deriving from it, if it were successful, were dromes were open to surprise attack. held by G.H.Q. to outweigh the risks involved. 135. But the role of the Command remained Careful and comprehensive plans were there- fore drawn up with the Army to move elements constant. It was not practicable to alter it. of the Hlrd (Indian) Corps by road and rail It was: — to Siam, with the R.A.F. supporting from aero- (a) To find the enemy at sea as far away dromes in Northern Malaya with such units as from Malaya as possible: then the situation at the time permitted. (b) to strike hard and often, (c) to continue attacks during the landing Control of-Army / Air Operations. operations: and (d) in co-operation with the Army to delay 130. For the control of operations in support his advance. of the Army in the north of Malaya A.H.Q. formed a nucleus Operations Group H.Q. It While real progress had been made in fitting was designated Norgroup. Its functions the Command for its allotted tasks, deficiencies were: — were still apparent in almost every aspect of its functions. (i) to command such air forces as A.H.Q. might allot to it from time to time; 136. The Army in Malaya was also still weak: its additional interim strength considered neces- (ii) to advise G.O.C. IHrd Corps on air sary to ensure security until such time as the matters and to control such air forces as air strength had been built up was not present might be allotted to Hlrd Corps. A Com- in the Colony. It was over-extended in its dis- bined IHrd Corps/Norgroup Headquarters positions, a state of affairs forced upon it by was established at Kuala Lumpur with an its many and widely scattered commitments. advanced H.Q. close to Butterworth. 137. In a country like Malaya it was not Norgroup Headquarters was formed in July, difficult for the enemy to obtain information 1941, was exercised in its functions, and was about our forces. He was well served by a then disbanded. But it was held in readiness long-established system of agents. for mobilization when required. 138. For their part the Japanese had. already 131. On Singapore Island, under G.H.Q. occupied Indo-China. While no certain infor- orders, a combined Army/Air Operations Room mation could be obtained by F.E.C.B. it was was constructed alongside A.H.Q. in Sime patent that they were building up their forces Road, Singapore. It was ready for use just there and were preparing operational facilities before war broke out. (As it was very vulner- in Siam. Japanese reconnaissance flights over able the construction of an alternative Opera- Borneo and Malaya had become so frequent tions Room was put in hand.) It functioned by October 1941 that a section of Buffaloes had at the level of A.H.Q. and H.Q.M.C. Thus been stationed at Kota Bahru to curb those G.H.Q. and C.-in-C. -China Fleet were not over Malaya. represented in it. Five days after the out- break of war, however, the latter provided a Deterioration of the Political Situation. staff to represent him in it. 139. During 1941, relations with Japan be- came increasingly strained. The attitude of the SUMMARY OF SITUATION, 22ND NOVEMBER, 1941. Siamese Government was doubtful. It pro- fessed great friendship for Britain and sent two General pre-war situation. goodwill missions to Singapore to cement this 132. Enough has been said to paint a pre- friendship. Nevertheless, the Japanese continued war picture of the Command and, it is hoped, to reconnoitre Siam and to make preparations of the vigorous efforts which were made to for utilising that country as a Base: they carry out the expansion programme authorised accelerated the provisioning of the aerodromes by the Chiefs of Staff. But the fact remains at Singora and Patani, which they also ex- that by December, 1941, the R.A.F. Far East tended to make them suitable for modern air- Command was not yet in a position to fulfil craft. As November 1941 progressed, evidence its responsibility of being the primary means- of of Japanese activities increased until, on 22flti resisting Japanese aggression. The calls of^fhe November, 1941, the information at G.H.Q's war in Europe had allowed-it to develop only disposal was sufficient to indicate that Japan a fraction of the necessary strength. was about to embark upon a further major 1362" SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 venture in South-East ~Asia. The resultant 1 fighters" at Kota Bahru, Sungei Patani and a'ction initiated by G.H.Q. «ds dealt with in' Singapore of the action they were to. take Section II. - ' . if • unidentified aircraft were sighted. Train- • ing was allowed to proceed with certain re- strictions. /SECTION II.' - 143. Commander, Norgroup, was informed NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS BASED that the following squadrons would support ON MALAYA. Operation " Matador " : — (a) No. 62' (B) Squadron (Blenheim I) EVENTS FROM 22ND NOVEMBER TO MIDNIGHT from Alor Star. 7-8TH DECEMBER, 1941. (b) No. 34 (B) Squadron (Blenheim IV) from Alor Star. G.'H.Q. Appreciation of the Situation—22nd (c) No. 21 (F) Squadron, R.A.A.F. " November; 1941. (Buffaloes) from Sungei Patani. - 140. On 22nd November, 1941, G.H.Q. \d) No. 27 (NF) Squadron (Blenheim I) issued their appreciation of the situation. from Sungei "Patani. Briefly, this appreciation considered that any further major action by Japan in the near Further G.H.Q. Appreciation—2,8th November, future would take place from South Indo-China 1941. against Siam, rather than from North Indo- 144. On 28th November, 1941, G.H.Q. in- China against the Burma road. G.H.Q. did formed A.H.Q of a report received from Saigon not, however, disregard the possibility of Japan that the Japanese intended landing troops in making a " gambler's throw " against Malaya South Siam on ist December, 1941. G.H.Q. or even against Singapore itself. G.H.Q. stated that the Japanese had adequate forces concluded that the most likely operation to carry out such a move but placed no great which would be called for on our part credence in the report. They assumed that if in -,the immediate future would be to such a convoy did leave Saigon it would travel the set plan " Matador," namely an at 15 knots or less and anchor off Nakwan or advance by our land forces into South-East between Singora and Patanf on the S.E. coast Si'afnT A.H.Q. was accordingly instructed to of Siam on the morning of either the. 3Oth make all preliminary moves and to be ready November or ist December. G.H.Q. ordered- to support " Matador " at 72 hours' notice, A.H.Q. to despatch air reconnaissances daily and was informed that this support for with a view to locating this Force, but in view " Matador " was to take precedence over the of the danger that the Japanese might, by preparations .then being made for an Inter- holding out a bait, induce us to strike the first national Air Force to operate in South China. blow and thus appear to be the aggressors, with A.H.Q. was also warned that the full recon- consequent loss of American sympathy, stated naissance plan for detecting the approach of that " a striking force will not be ordered to a sea expedition against Malaya might be attack the convoy if found ". From this day ordered later. until 3rd December, reconnaissances proceeded without event except that on the 3rd December 141. The Order' of Battle of the Far East two large cargo boats were sighted. Command in Malaya at this stage is shown in Appendix "• C ". ' 145. On 29th November, 1941, the notice for Operation '' Matador -' was shortened by' Action taken by A.H.Q. to implement Opera- G.H Q. from 72 hours to 12 hours. tion " Matador". Assumption of No. 2 Degree of Readiness. 142. A.H.Q. immediately adopted the fol- 146. On ist December, 1941, G.H.Q., lowing measures for reinforcing N. Malaya., ordered the Command to be brought to " Nov . (a) Formed Headquarters Norgroup which 2 degree "of' readiness ". The promulgation of assembled on 24th November at Kuala this degree informed the Command that " the; Lumpur alongside Headquarters Illrd Indian international situation was deteriorating " and, Corps. The Commander appointed was Wing brought it into a position to operate' at short- Commander R. G. Forbes, Station Com- notice. Inter alia it meant that the full air raid' mander, Alor Star, in the absence of the warning system was to be brought into" being.^ Commander 'designate, Group Captain A. G. Bishop, who wa,s away in South China. Arrival of Naval Reinforcements. "" (See para. 106.) 147. On the 2nd December, H.M.S. " Prince - (b) Ordered No. 21 (F) Squadron, of Wales " and H.M.S. " Repulse " arrived R.A.A.F., to move to Sungei Patani: move in Singapore as a counter-measure to continued: to be completed by 25th November. Japanese encroachment in the South-West (c) Put No. 34 (B4) Squadron (Blenheim Pacific. The former wore* the flag of Admiral' IV) at short notice to move to Alor Star. Sir Tom Phillips, the new C.-in-C., Eastern (d) Made provisional arrangements for the Fleet. . . - move of No. 60 (B) Squadron aircraft (7 Blenheims) out of Kuantan to Butterworth. Initiation of full Air Reconnaissance Plan. - This move" would be necessary if the recon- 148. On 3rd December, 1941, "orders were naissance plan were to be brought into force issued by G.H.Q. for the full reconnaissance because No. 8 (GR) Squadron, R.A.A.F. plan to be put into force on the following day. j^iiwpuld require the accommodation at Kuantan As ~a result, in the afternoon of the 3rd, a i for carrying out that plan. , Dutch group of three flying boats arrived at i(e) Instituted certain other precautionary, Seletar in accordance with prearranged plans measures, including, the., warning ' of our (isee para. 37). The reconnaissance areas. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1363 allotted to the Dutch and British respectively (6) at 12.46 i battleship, 5 cruisers, 7 were: — destroyers and 25 merchant vessels in -a posi- Dutch: Kuantan - Gr.Natunas - Kuching tion 265 miles, and on a bearing of 86°, from (British Borneo). Kota Bahru steering a course of 270°. British: Kota Bahru-Southern tip of Indo- Another Hudson of the same squadron shortly China-Gr.Natunas-Kuantan. afterwards reported another conyoy: — An extension of the reconnaissance area into (c) at 13.00 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers and the Gulf of Siam as part of routine reconnais- 10 merchant vessels in a-position 260 .miles, sance was not possible owing to a shortage of and on a bearing of 76°, from Kota Bahru aircraft. steering 270°. The task of executing the British section of 151. Information about the latter convoy was the reconnaissance plan was allotted to Nos. I subsequently amplified to the effect that it con- and 8 (GR) Squadrons, R.A.A.F., based on tained 21 merchant vessels which were cruising Kota Bahru and Kuantan respectively. Their in two lines astern. This amplification was effort was reinforced by Catalinas of No. 205 received by telephone at A.H.Q. at 1517 hours. (FB) Squadron to fill in gaps and to ensure 152. The position of the first of these convoys overlapping the Dutch. was such that it had the appearance of having The initiation of the full reconnaissance plan recently rounded Cape Cambodia and was now cancelled the special reconnaissance which had headed N.W. into the Gulf of Siam. The posi- been carried out hitherto, and involved the tion of the other two convoys was about 80 movement of No. 8 (GR) Squadron, R.A.A.F. miles S.S.E. of Cape Cambodia, the Southern from Sembawang to Kuantan. Owing to lack tip of French Indo-China; both were steering of transport aircraft and inadequate land com- west, one slightly ahead of the other. They munications, the ground personnel and equip- might, or might not, be following the first small ment of this squadron proceeded there by sea. convoy and in turn head N.W. into the Gulf of Siam. Reconnaissance- period ^t-h-bth December, One of the Hudsons ha'd been chased by an 1941. enemy aeroplane and there could be no doubt 149. On the 4th December, owing to bad that the Japanese knew that they had been weather, aircraft at Kota Bahru (No. i (GR) spotted. Squadron, R.A.A.F.) were unable to operate, 153. In the meantime, reports were received but those at Kuantan (No. 8 (GR) Squadron, of aircraft, apparently Japanese, taking photo- R.A.A F.) carried out their part in the recon- graphs at various points. G.H Q. confirmed naissance plan, as did the Dutch, with nothing that ^ no offensive action was to be taken by to report. Reports of the 'sightings of strange fighters against them, although A.A. defences submarines in the reconnaissance area had were given authority to open fire on unidentified been received, so a special reconnaissance was aircraft. - -, carried out by No. 60 (B) Squadron from- 154. As a result of the enemy sighting reports, Kuantan; but it was negative. On this day a Kota Bahru was instructed to send Hudsons Catalina took Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, from No. i (GR) Squadron, R.A.A.F., to Commander-in-Chief Eastern Fleet, to Manila. shadow the convoys. Catalinas of No. 205 On 5th December, 1941, bad weather still (FB) Squadron from Seletar were ordered to prevented No. i (GR) Squadron, R.A.A.F., at take over this shadowing from the Hudsons, Kota Bahru operating, but again the Dutch and to maintain it during the night 6/7th Reconnaissance Group and No. 8 (GR).Squad- December until relieved by Hudsons again in ron, R.A.A.F , at Kuantan gave negative re- the morning of 7th December. ports. On this day a special anti-submarine 155. On receipt of sighting reports, the Com- patrol was maintained by three Vildebeestes mand was put by G.H.Q. at "No. i degree ahead of H.M S. " Repulse " which proceeded of readiness " which meant that it was to be at slow speed en route from Singapore to " ready for immediate operations and prepared Australia. for enemy attack without prior warning." On the 6th December, 1941, three crews were despatched to Sourabaya to collect three Cata- Action taken by A.H.Q. on Enemy Sighting. linas loaned by the Dutch. The anti-submarine 156. The following action was taken by patrol in co-operation with H.M.S. " Repulse " A.H.Q. as a result of the reconnaissance reports was also maintained. received: — First sighting of Japanese Expedition—6th (a) 7 Vfldebeestes of No. 36 (TB) Squad- December, 1941. ron were despatched from Seletar to Kota Bahru. (9 were ordered but only 7 could 150. On December 6th Kota Bahru aero- proceed). Aircraft were armed with torpedoes drome was serviceable and the full reconnais- on arrival at Kota Bahru. sance plan was operated. The N.E. monsoon (6) Norgroup was informed that No. 62 was blowing; its tropical downpours periodic- (B) Squadron at'AlorfeStar was removed to ally made unaided navigation and accurate A.H.Q. control. ship recognition matters of considerable diffi- (c) No. 34 (B) Squadron was retained at culty. Tengah at short notice to move to Alor Star. A Hudson of No. i (R.A.A.F.) Squadron, (d) The one Beaufort* still in the Command Captain F/Lieut. J. C. Ramshaw, was the first was moved to Kota. Bahru to stand by there •to sight the enemy. He located two approach- for a special photographic reconnaissance re- ing convoys: — quired by G.H.Q. (see para. 162). (a) at 12.12 i Motor vessel, i minelayer * 6 Beauforts had recently been delivered, but 5 and i mine sweeper in a position 185 miles, were sent back to Australia owing to "teething", and on a bearing of 52°, from Kota Bahru, troubles with the aircraft Nos 36 (TB) and 100 (TB) steermg a course of 310°. Squadrons were due to be rearmed with this type. B 1364 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 Attempts to maintain contact with Enemy. - confirmed that flights on the 8th December 157. On the afternoon of the 6th Decembei, were to go through Bangkok. Hudsons despatched at 1620 hours from Kota (b) Was considering allowing our aircraft Bahru to shadow were unable to contact the to fire at aircraft not established as friendly. convoys, and bad weather prohibited relief air- (c) Would issue orders shortly for the re- craft being sent. The first Catalma of No. 205 connaissance of Ko Kong anchorage, which (FB) Squadron left Seletar at 18.30 hours he wished the P.R. Beaufort, now at Kota according to programmes to shadow the convoy Bahru, to carry out. during the night. 163. Shortly afterwards, G.H.Q. issued their 158. During the late evening of the 6tTi, orders for the reconnaissance of Ko Kong. The scrutiny of reports and records revealed that the aircraft left Kota Bahru at 1220 hours, but Japanese convoys were probably one hour ahead returned at 1445 hours owing to bad weather. of the positions reported. It was assumed, During the morning, the Catalina with Admiral therefore, that the convoys on rounding Indo- Sir Tom Phillips on board returned from China had turned to the N.W. into the Gulf Manila. of Siam, thus passing out of the reconnaissance area (vide para. 152). This, perhaps, appeared 164. Meanwhile at 1345 hours on the 7th at the time to explain why Hudsons despatched December, A.H.Q. was informed that air re- to shadow had not contacted the enemy; visi- connaissance from Kota Bahru had sighted a bility conditions, however, had been poor. 6,000-8,000 ton cargo vessel in the Gulf of Siam steaming west, and this was followed by 159. No reports having been received from a further sighting at 1545 hours, by a Hudson the first Catalina despatched to shadow the con- of No. 8 (R.A.A.F.) Squadron, of one other voys, orders were issued to a second Catalina, Japanese merchant vessel steering south. This before it took off to relieve the first, that if no latter vessel was stated to have a large number contact was established, a search was to be made off the West Coast of Cambodia. of men on deck in khaki. This was done because G.H.Q. considered the 165. Two Hudsons from Kota Bahru were convoy had probably anchored at Ko Kong, immediately directed on a diverging search for which it might be making as the next s.tep north of that place and 10 miles off the Siamese towards Siam. The second Catalina left Seletar coast. At 1750 hours one merchant vessel and at 0200 hours on 7th December. After it was one cruiser steaming 270° were sighted about airborne it was ordered to keep 10 miles away 112 miles north of Kota Bahru. The cruiser from the coast of Siam. No report was ever opened fire on the aircraft. At 1848 hours, received from this second Catalma, which was under conditions of very bad visibility, four afterwards confirmed as having been shot blown Japanese naval vessel^, perhaps destroyers, by the Japanese. were seen 60 miles north of Patani steaming south., Reconnaissance Plan for Jth December, 1941 / 160. For the 7th December, 1941 the Dutch 166. Owing to subsequent destruction of flying boat " Group " and No. 205 (FB) records, the exact positions of some of the ship Squadron at Seletar, and No. 8 (GR) Squad- sightings mentioned above cannot now be given ron, R.A.A.F., at Kuantan were instructed to with any certainty. continue the set reconnaissance plan covering the more direct line of approach to Singapore Resulting Action. in case a further invasion convoy should altack 167. In consequence of these reports, G.H.Q. from that direction. Such an attack would have decided, late on 7th December, not to put been most dangerous, particularly if it were " Operation Matador " into effect that night, directed against the beaches in the Mer&ing/ and issued orders for B.O.A.C. aircraft to Endau area, where a successful landing would avoid Bangkok and to use the West coast route. have gravely jeopardised the field army in Northern Malaya and might even have 168. Conditions at midnight 7th-8th Decem- threatened Singapore itself, before the same ber, 1941 were therefore:,— field army could come to its defence. • y( • No. 453'(F) Squadron at Sembawang. 176. At 0730 hours on 8th December, the No. 243 (F) Squadron at Kallang. O.C. Kota Bahru gave a resume of the night's No. 488 (F) Squadron at Kallang. operations. 17 Hudson sorties had been carried The Command was at the fullest degree of out, one transport had been destroyed and two readiness, but there was no undue alarm owing others damaged and perhaps sunk. Landing to G.H.Q's view that the Japanese expedition barges eii route! to the beaches had been was directed against Siam. attacked and casualties had been inflicted 169. A.H.Q. decided to send at first light amongst the troops in them. Intensive A.A.- on the 8th December a coastal reconnaissance fire had been experienced, particularly to the Lakon Roads, north of Singora, to accurate from a cruiser covering the landing. identify whether or not -the Japanese had Two Hudsons had been shot down and a third landed in S.E. Siam as forecast in the G.H.Q. badly damaged, leaving him still six. One appreciation (para. 140). Buffalo had also been hit. The Vildebeestes from Gong Kedah were in the air. OPERATIONS FROM STH TO 23RD DECEMBER, 177. Apparently some 8 transports covered 1941. by one cruiser and several destroyers had been Japanese landing at Kota Bahru. involved, and O.C. Kota Bahru thought all vessels had now retired to the north. He 170. At midnight 7th-8th December, the intended to carry on using the Hudsons for weather at Kota Bahru cleared, but the aero- mopping up small craft and beach parties still drome surface was extremely boggy owing to visible. At 0800 hours, he confirmed that all heavy rains. About 0030 hours on the 8th, vessels had retired to the north and that he was O.C. Kota Bahru rang up A.H.Q. and stated mopping up the few small craft left with that three ships had been seen by the beach bomb and machine-gun fire. He added that defences. This message was followed by there had been some infiltration into the another at oioo hours confirming the presence Brigade area. of these ships, stating that shelling was taking place and that Brigade H.Q. were being asked 178. Meanwhile the Vildebeestes of No. 36 to clarify the situation. On this, A.H.Q. (TB) Squadron from Gong Kedah, in heavy ordered the despatch of a single Hudson with rain, found the cruiser, delivered an attack flares to see what was happening. Before this with torpedoes which it evaded, and landed could be done, at 0115 hours definite informa- at Kota Bahru on their return. tion came through from Kota Bahru that land- 179. Nos. 8 (GR) R.A.A.F., 27 (NF), ing on the beaches by the Japanese had 34 (B) and 60 (B) Squadrons also arrived on started from 3-5 ships lying three miles off the scene and found little to attack in the area; shore. a signal sent them whilst they were airborne to search further north was not received by all Orders issued by A.H.Q. units. One flight of No. 8 (GR) Squadron at 171. O.C. Kota Bahru was immediately least received it but was unable to find the ordered to take offensive action with all avail- enemy owing to a very heavy rainstorm. able Hudsons, and to order the Vildebeestes Nos. 8 and 60 Squadrons returned to Kuantan, at Gong Kedaih to deliver a torpedo attack at No. 27 to Sungei Patani, whilst No. 34 first light. It must be remembered that the Squadron landed at Butter worth. All squadrons orders issued to O.C. Kota Bahru as a result were ordered to refuel and re-arm. i/ of G.H.Q. instructions (para. 144) specifically 180. No. 62 (B) Squaelron which had also stated that no offensive action would be taken been ordered to attack, not finding any target, against the convoy when sighted. He could proceeded north to Patani to bomb transports not, therefore, initiate the first offensive action there. This squadron (n Blenheim Fs) of the campaign without further orders. encountered fighter opposition and fairly in- 172. A H Q. also issued orders to Nos. 8 tensive A.A. fire. It carried out its attack from (GR), 27 (NF), 34 (B), 60 (B) and 62 (B) 8,000 ft. but the results obtained were not Squadrons to take off at first light and attack seen.' shipping in the Kota Bahru area whilst No. 100 (TB) Squadron was ordered to proceed to First Air Attack on Singapore.' Kuantan on the following morning and stand 181. Whilst the first landings had been taking by for orders. place at Kota Bahru, "Singapore had its first B 2 T366 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 194$

air-raid shortly after 0400 hours on the 8th 187. " Matador " had been cancelled during December. Radar detected the approaching the morning, and "the Army was taking up raid at 'a distance) of 130-140 miles from positions forward of a partially prepared line Singapore (giving more .than 30 minutes warn- at Jitra. Covering forces were advancing ing). Its approach was promulgated from the north and north-east from Kedah province: Fighter Control Operations Room. Unfor- one to make contact along the line of advance tunately the staff of this room was unable to from the Singora area, the other (Krohkol) to obtain any response from the H.Qs. of the occupy what was known as the Ledge, an Civil A.R.P. organisation, with the result that important tactical feature, across the Siamese Ihe civil population received no effective warn- frontier on the Kroh-Patani road, which pro- ing, nor was the Civil Air Defence Scheme put tected the communications of the force in into effective action until it was too late. !5ome North Kedah. • 17 aircraft took part in this raid, the majority The first of these covering forces made con- of the bombs falling at Seletar and Tengah. tact with the enemy at 2130 hours on the At the latter place 3 Blenheims' of No. 34 (B) 8th, at Ban Sadao, ten miles inside Siam. The Squadron were damaged and the aerodrome other (Krohcol) reported some opposition from was cratered. Siamese forces, but continued its advance. Japanese attacks on Northern Airfields. Enemy 'landings in Sihgora 'and Patani area. 182. Between 0730 and 0800 hours, Kota 188. At 0915 hours on the 8th December Bahru, Gong Kedah and Machang aerodiomes the P.R. Beaufort returned from its recon- were attacked by bombers and low-flying naissance of the ^Lakon Roads (para. 174). fighters; except for dummy aircraft, the latter En route, it had -been heavily attacked by two were unoccupied at the time. These fighters and landed in a badly shot up con- attacks were repeated throughout the day dition, subsequently having to be destroyed. mainly by low-flying fighters, with little effect The pilot reported verbally that a large con- save in delaying the refuelling and re-armament centration of vessels was landing troops in the of aircraft at Kota Bahru. Singora-Patani area. His photographs were 183. Sungei Patani, Penang and Butter- flown back to Singapore by the remaining worth in N.W. Malaya were also attacked Buffalo fighter. Shortly afterwards, Norgroup, throughout 8th December by formations of under orders from Illrd Corps, despatched 3 from 27 to 60 bomber aircraft, with serious Buffaloes of No. 21 (F) Squadron R.A.A.F. on results. The Japanese used light bombs only, a tactical reconnaissance to Singora. This •directed against aircraft and personnel; they reconnaissance confirmed. the presence of the studiously avoided damaging aerodrome main convoy in the Singora area and also surfaces. Personnel on the spot noted that for revealed a force of about 60 Japanese air- the next few days Japanese attacks in this craft, mainly fighters, on Singora aerodrome. area frequently synchronised with aircraft landing or getting ready to take off. This Squadrons driven out oft aerodromes in N.E. indicated a leakage of information to the Malaya on 8th December. Japanese, but it was never definitely proved 189. It is now necessary to return to the that such a leakage actually occurred. Kota Bahru area. Heavy fighting had been 184. There was a particularly serious attack going on on the beaches all day, and reserves against Alor Star, delivered immediately after had been put in to try and regain the beaches No. 62 (B) Squadron had landed after its by counter attack. At 1245 news was received attack at Patani (para. 180). The aerodrome at A.H.Q. of the landing of further troops from was first bombed by 27 Japanese aircraft, one transport covered by a cruiser and several which then came down low and machine- destroyers. The Station Commander "at Kota gunned aircraft on the ground. As a result Bahru had at 1200 hours despatched 4 Hudsons No. 62 (B) Squadron had only two serviceable and 3 Vildebeestes to deal with this threat. aircraft left. It transpired later that the report of this further landing was false, but aircraft continued 185. Nos. 21 (F) R.A.A.F. and 27 (NF) mopping up barges and machine gunning Squadrons at Sungei Patani also suffered beaches. At 1530 a Hudson from Kota Bahru badly and were each reduced to 4 serviceable bombed the railway bridge across the South aircraft; and in consequence of the repeated Golok River west of Kota Bahru, but with low attacks on this airfield both squadrons, doubtful success; the crew, however, observed with their personnel, were withdrawn to Butter- that the line itself had been partially destroyed worth. It was later learnt that the guns in already at a point further eastward. the Buffaloes had given trouble and were all unserviceable from lack of solenoids. The 190. Towards 1600 hours reports received at serviceable Blenheim fighters of No. 27 A.H.Q. indicated that the situation on the Squadron had carried out periodic patrols over ground had become serious. The Station Com- N.W. Malaya without result. No 34 (B) mander reported that penetration had been Squadron at Butterworth was also senously made up to the aerodrome boundary, and that reduced. aircraft and personnel had come under sporadic fire. On his representation Ground Situation in N.W. Malaya. A.H.Q approved the evacuation of the 186. Aircraft losses from enemy attack thus aerodiome. All aircraft were ordered to gravely weakened the air forces available in Kuan tan, personnel and stores to proceed by N.W. Malaya for supporting the army, where tram, whilst the denial scheme was to be put Ihe main enemy advance on land was expected inspiration This was successfully achieved, ,. to develop. On the 8th there was little enemy and 5 Hudsons and 7 Vildebeestes arrived at air activity against our own ground forces, Kuan t; in This withdrawal as far south as owing to the enemy's concentration on the Kuanlan was unavoidable because Gong bombing of our aerodromes. Kedeih, the only aerodrome in the Kota Bahru SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1367 area that might have been used, was virtually ?6f the gth reported the presence of Japanese undefended and was in a very exposed situa- light tanks, which were observed at Ban Sadao- tion near 'the coast. moving south. 191. During the day, various reports of 197. The second attack—a mixed force of suspicious vessels off the East coast had been Blenheim I's and IY's from- Nos. 34 (B) and received, necessitating reconnaissances which, 62 (B) Squadrons—due off from Butterwprtb however, were all negative. at 1700 hours, was never launched. Just before Summary -of situation on the evening of the 8th the time of " take-off," Japanese bombers carried out a high bombing attack followed up December, 1941. by machine-gunning aircraft on the ground - 192. That night (Sth-gth December) the One aircraft only of No. 62 (B) Squadron— situation was, therefore: — Captain, Flight Lieutenant A. S. K. Scarf— (a-} The Japanese expedition to capture took off as the attack was developing; the re,- the Kota Bahru aerodrome area ' was maimng aircraft on the ground were all succeeding; and the use of aerodromes in rendered unserviceable. Flight Lieutenant this area was now denied to the R.A.F. Scarf circled the aerodrome until it became Our troops in the area were thus without apparent that no other aircraft were joining . him. He then proceeded to Singora and pressed' (6) The Japanese main forces were land- home his attack. During his approach to the ing unimpeded in the Singora-Patani area, target and subsequent get-away, A.A. fire and' covered by air operations against our aero- heavy fighter opposition were encountered, and dromes in N. Malaya Their advance towards Flight Lieutenant Scarf was mortally wounded. the north-west frontier of Malaya had already This very gallant officer felt unable to make the begun, and our forward troops had made longer ]ourney back, to Butterworth, but contact. The shipping at Singora had not managed to retain consciousness until -he been attacked, partly because the aircraft reached Alor Star, where he crash-landed with- at Kota Bahru were fully engaged locally by out injury to his crew. He died in hospital the time it was reported, and partly because that evening. He was subsequently awarded heavy Japanese air attacks against our the Victoria Cross. virtually undefended aerodromes in N.W. Malaya had seriously reduced the squadrons 198. As a result of this day's operations available on them. against Singora, A.H.Q. decided that no more (c) The Japanese Air Force was already bombing by day should take place over land operating in strength from Singora aero- until such time as fighter escort could be drome. From the narrow view point of the provided. Royal Air Force, it was apparent that the Preparations for withdrawal from the N.W. cancellation of Operation " Matador " was to have a far-reaching influence on air opera- 199. At 0900 hours on the gth, Adv. H.Q. tions in Northern Malaya. Norgroup opened at Bukit Martajim (near Butterworth), but it became evident that the Air Operations in North West Malaya—gth evacuation of the N.W. bases could not long December, 1941. be delayed. Up till this time there had been no 193. In the N W. aerodrome area, enemy air A.A. defences at Butterworth. Eight Bofors, -attacks continued, and early on the gth No. guns arrived on the afternoon of the gth but 62 (B) Squadron was forced to withdraw •from their presence was not, of course, any deterrent Alor Star to Butterworth. to high flying bombers. 194. To counter these attacks, it was decided 200. A.H.Q., therefore, issued instructions to destroy the Japanese fighters based on that all airfields on the mainland to the south- Singora. Two attacks against this aerodrome ward were to be got ready for immediate opera- were planned. The first was to be made by the tional use. At the same time, orders were aircraft of No. 34 (B) Squadron still located issued to do everything possible to improve dis- at Tengah, reinforced by No. 60 (B) Squadron, persal arrangements at aerodromes on Singa.- which had by now moved there from Kuantan. pore Island. No. 34 Squadron was ordered to land at Butter- worth, re-arm and take part in the second Evacuation of Kuantan Aerodrome on gth attack. The second attack was to be made by December. all available aircraft of Nos. 34 and 62 201. During the night of the 8-gth there were Squadrons, from Butterworth. A.H.Q. issued many reports of further landings on the East orders that both attacks were to be escorted coast, fears of which were to persist throughout by the maximum strength of Buffaloes from the brief campaign and cause many hours to No. 2E (F) Squadron, R.A A.F. be spent on coastal reconnaissance. 195. The first attack, consisting of 6 202. On the gth, two pairs of Vildebeestes Blenheims of No. 34 (B) Squadron, three of were sent at 0300 hours to sweep, the coast which were manned by crews of 60 (B) north and south of Kuantan. During the day, Squadron, was made in the early afternoon of 6 Hudsons were employed on similar duties: the 9th. Heavy fighter opposition, was whilst Catalinas extended the search area into encountered, and 3 of our aircraft were shot the South China Sea. The remainder of the down. Results of the attack were not observed, aircraft at Kuantan stood by to attack whatever but returning crews claimed that, at least, a might be found. Confirmation was obtained congested aerodrome had been hit of the large concentration of ships of all natures ' 196. No fighter escort had been available. unloading in thjp, Singora-Patani area, but no No. 21 (F) Squadron, R.A.A.F., had two air- threat * of further seaborne - attack was dis- craft serviceable only, which were on tactical covered although 3 Vildebeestes were reconnaissances for Illrd Corps. It may be despatched on a false report to attack a ship noted here that these aircraft, on the morning 60 miles east of Kuantan.- i368 SUPPLEMENTED THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

203.,However, with the destruction of air- (6) Reconnaissance to Singora and beyond, craft oh the ground in N.W. Malaya in mind, ten miles from the coast, starting at first it became evident to A.H.Q. that a dangerous light on the loth December: congestion of aircraft existed at Kuantan, par- (c) Fighter protection off Singora at day- ticularly vulnerable because there was no A. A,, light on the loth December. protection there at all. Orders were issued to The A.O.C. gave tentative replies that he O.C. Kuantan, early on the 9th, to retain 12 could provide (a), hoped to be able to pro- Vildebeestes and the 13 Hudsons of Nos. 3 vide (&), but could not provide (c). It was and 8 (GR) Squadrons, R.A.A.F., and to decided that he should go thoroughly into the despatch the remainder to Singapore. problems involved and give definite replies to 204. At noon the expected attack took place, the Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet (Rear Admiral and Kuantan was subjected to its first experi- Palliser), who remained at the Naval Base in ence of high bombing, followed up by the close 'liaison with G.H.Q. bombers flying low and shooting up at will. 210. The doubt about the reconnaissance re- A.H.Q. thereupon decided to evacuate Kuantan, quired in (6) above was due to the fact that the surviving 10 Hudsons and 8 Vildebeestes. the reconnaissance would have had to be pro- returning to Singapore. The withdrawal oi vided by Blenheim IV's based on Kuantan, the ground party from Kuantan might have and it was uncertain whether this aerodrome been better controlled. From then on Kuantan would be out of action or not. was available as an A.L.G. for refuelling only. 211. The reason why the fighter protection asked for in (c) could not be provided was Reports of a landing at Kuantan—g-ioth mainly that the northern aerodromes were December, 1941. either untenable or else had been badly damaged 205. During the night 9-ioth, reports were by bombers; this meant that the fighters would received of a landing north of Kuantan. Six have to operate from aerodromes at consider- Vildebeestes and 3 Hudsons were ordered to able distance from Singora, and, owing to the attack. The Vildebeestes found 3 small ships short endurance of the Buffalo, would have and bombed them with doubtful results, but been able to remain only a very short time the Hudsons which arrived later found no over the Singora area before having to return target although they prolonged their search of to refuel. These factors meant that a short the area past daylight. There is reason to patrol might possibly have been provided at believe that the beaches at Kuantan had been intervals at Singora, but that it was impossible fired on dunng the night, but that the enemy to guarantee appreciable fighter protection. force was only a light reconnaissance to test 212. On the evening of the 8th December the the defences, and its size had been magnified in A.O.C. confirmed his tentative replies to the the telling. Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet, and this infor- 206. Further bomb ing-of Kuantan aerodrome mation was passed by the latter to the C.-in-C. on the morning of the loth added to the un- The signal as received on board " Prince of certainty of the situation and all available Wales " expressly stated that no fighter pro- tection could be provided on loth December, bombers in Singapore were put at short notice 1941. The words " off Singora " did not ap- to await developments. Sharks from the target- pear in 'the text of the signal, but were im- towing flight carried out reconnaissance of the approaches to Singapore, whilst Blenheim IV's plied in the light of Admiral Phillips' request from No. 34 (B) Squadron, using Kuantan for (para. 209 (c)). refuelling purposes, continued reconnaissance 213. The agreed air reconnaissances were of the east coast up to 50 miles north of Singora, carried out on both the 9th and loth confirming once more the large concentration December. of shipping off the Siamese coast. 214. In the early hours of loth December 207. The false report of a landing at Kuantan a signal was received at Singapore indicating proved to have a vital bearing on the move- that the Fleet might return sooner than was ments of H.M.S. " Prince of Wales" and originally planned Apart from this no com- H.M.S. " Repulse '', and it is now necessary munication was received from the C.-in-C. and to turn to the events leading up to the sinking his position was unknown. of these two vessels. 215. Suddenly, shortly after 1200 hours on the loth December, a signal, originating from Sinking of H.M.S, " Prince of Wales " and H.M.S. " Repulse ", was received in the " Repulse "—loth December, 1941. Operations Room at A.H.Q. of enemy air 208. The C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet, Admiral Sir attacks on H.M.S. " Prince of Wales " and Tom Phillips, decided to sail on the 8th Decem- " Repulse " in a position some 60 miles East- ber, 1941, with H.M.S. " Prince of Wales " wards of Kuantan. No. 453 (F) Squadron (n and H.M S. " Repulse " accompanied by four aircraft), which was standing by specifically to destroyers, with the object of attacking the provide protection for these ships in case of concentration of Japanese transports reported their return to Singapore, left six minutes later, between Singora and Patani. He intended to only to arrive in the area, 165 miles away, to arrive in the target area at dawn on the loth find destroyers picking up survivors from these December. two great vessels. For the rest of the day^ a number of sorties by flying boats and fighters 209. Before leaving on the 8th December was carried out in connection with the return (p.m.) the C.-in-C. .asked fOF the following: — of these destroyers to Singapore. (a) Reconnaissance 100 miles to north of 216. It subsequently transpired that the the force from daylight, Tuesday, the gth Fleet had been located by Japanese reconnais- December: sance p.m. gth December, and that later the SUPPLEMENT! TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1369 same day the C.-in-C. received news of a land- 222. The withdrawal of the Aground parties ing at Kuantan (in para. 205). These two was carried out under difficult circumstances. events must have decided the C.-in-C. to aban- don the Singora operation and to close Kuantan Units had been subjected to severe and con- on the loth December. stant bombing and machine gun attacks on scantily defended aerodromes where they saw 217. Had the C.-in-C. notified his change of no effective means of hitting back, and air- plan, it is conceivable that A.H.Q. might have craft were remorselessly destroyed on the moved No. 453 (F) Squadron to Kuantan where ground without replacement. The apparent it could have stood by at call: R / T inter-com- opportuneness of the enemy's attacks (see para. munication between the two ships and the 183) and pernicious rumours of disaster in the squadron aircraft had already been arranged. land fighting added their influence. There was Some effective support might then have been no senior officer at Butterworth with sufficient given. Actually no call for assistance was sent weight to take control, and some of the per- until 'the Japanese attack had been pressed sonnel of No. 21 (F) Squadron R.A.A.F. and home, by which time intervention from Singa- No. 27 (NF) Squadron R.A.F., both of which pore was impossible. had already been driven out of Sungei Patani, 218. It also transpired later that the ships did not behave at all steadily. Other units, had been attacked by a force of high level however, maintained their order. bombers backed by a large number of torpedo- bombers, that both ships had suffered a num- 223. The difficulties of all units was intensi- ber of hits by torpedoes and had thus been fied by the wholesale, but understandable, dis- sunk. The sinking of these two ships was a appearance of unenlisted native followers— serious shock to the morale of everybody in cooks, M.T. drivers, sanitary personnel etc.— the Far East. Their loss, combined with the and only improvised arrangements were pos- American losses at Pearl Harbour, gave the sible for replacing them .by European person- Japanese an undisputed command of the sea nel at the dislocation of the latter's normal in Malayan waters. The reactions of this state work. of affairs upon the subsequent dispositions of The defection of labour spread to the rail- air units, with particular reference to the share way area. they were able to take in the land battle, will become clear later in the narrative. 224. Withdrawals were nevertheless effected successfully and, in the case of units other Arrival of Dutch Reinforcements. than those mentioned above, in good order. It 219. During the morning of 9th December was due to the untiring energy of a. small party the three Dutch Bomber (22 Glenn Martins) headed by Flight Lieutenant R. D. I. Scott, and one Fighter (9 Buffaloes) Squadrons arrived who himself drove a locomotive, that much at Sembawang and Kallang respectively in ac- R.A.F. equipment was removed south. cordance with the mutual reinforcement plan. It was found that the Dutch bomber crews were 225. In an endeavour to improve repair and not trained in night flying, and so one squad- maintenance facilities in N.W. Malaya, an ron (9 aircraft) was sent back to 'the N.E.I. R. & S U. was formed at this time from No. - to train; the intention being, on its return, to 151 M.U. at Seletar and was ordered to Taip- send ba'ck the other squadrons in succession for ing; on arrival it detached a Mobile Salvage the same purpose. As A.H.Q. had already Section to Butterworth to .assist in the work decided not to use British bomber squadrons of salving material. in their bombing role by day until fighter escort or cover could be provided (see para. 198), it 226. Meanwhile, during the commencement was obviously essential to apply the decision of the denial schemes at Alor Star on loth to the Dutch bomber squadrons, particularly as December, the sight of large fires and the their Glenn Martins were slower and no better sounds of explosions in their rear had caused protected than the British Blenheims. some concern amongst our forward troops. Orders were therefore issued to the Commander, Air Forces driven out of Aerodromes in N.W. Norgroup, that no fires were to be started and Malaya. no demolitions by explosives carried out. 220. Meanwhile in Northern Malaya it was Buildings were to be damaged only, petrol and evident that the main line of advance by the oil run to waste, and the demolition of aero- Japanese Army was from Singora across Malaya dromes with the help of explosives was to be to the Alor Star area. The advanced troops of left to Corps to co-ordinate the nth (Indian) Division were still holding a with the operations of our troops. position near the frontier but the vital Ledge position on the Kroh-Patani road had not yet Scale of Enemy Air Effort. been secured. 227. It was computed that on the 8th, gth and loth December the Japanese had used a 221. Bombing of our aerodromes in N.W. daily average of over 120 aircraft in N. Malaya, Malaya continued during the loth December mostly against R.A.F. aerodromes. Fighters and A.H.Q. decided that the area must be and some bombers were based on S.E. Siam, evacuated. From Butterworth No. 62 (B) the majority of bombers on Indo-China. It Squadron (reduced to 2 aircraft) was evacuated was estimated that over 100 aircraft were 'based to Taiping: No. 21 (F) Squadron R.A.A.F. in the Singora—Patani area and at least 280 (6>repairable aircraft) to Ipoh, where 8 Bofors in Indo^China. Types identified were:— guns had by now been installed, leaving No. ^7 (NF) Squadron (nil serviceability) still at . Righters—N

A.O.C. decided, therefore, to send the air- Air Forces driven out of North-W'est Malaya. craft and pilots of No. 453 (F) Squadron from 246. As early as the 20th December Japanese Singapore to Ipoh where they would be ser- bombers and fighters were using aerodromes viced by the ground crews of No. 21 Squadron. in the north-west, particularly Sungei Patani, It was intended to return them to Singapore and the scale of attack in the Kuala Lumpur when the rest of No. 21 Squadron had been area correspondingly increased By the after- re-equipped. noon of 22nd December these attacks had 240 No. 453 (F) Squadron arrived at Ipoh reduced the combined strength of Nos. 21 (F) on the morning of the I3th and began operating R.A.A.F. and 453 (F) Squadrons to four opera- from there, using Butterworth as an advanced tionally serviceable aircraft. landing ground. Connection was established 247. In view of the enemy's great numerical with the Observer Corps Operations Room at superiority, further attempts to reinforce these Kuala Lumpur in the hope of obtaining at least squadrons only meant dissipating aircraft from a short warning of attacks upon the station. their main role—the defence of Singapore. It was decided, therefore, to withdraw the force to 241. Operations were vigorously undertaken Singapore, and this was done on 23rd Decem- from Ipoh between the I3th and the I5th ber. It meant that operations in support .of December. Japanese convoys were attacked the Army in the north-west could be under- on the road Simpang—Alor Star—Kepala taken only by using Kuala Lumpur and other Bantas. Tactical reconnaissances were carried airfields to the south of that place as advanced out, and enemy bombers and reconnaissance landing grounds. aircraft in the area were engaged with some success, notably on the I3th when five enemy 248. These two fighter squadrons had been aircraft attacking Penang were claimed by the forced to operate under very difficult condi- squadron. As a result, it was reported that tions. Maintenance and servicing facilities had the morale of our troops sharply appreciated been necessarily primitive, whilst the warning system gave little, if any, notice of attack. 242. On the I5th December No. 21 (F) Squadron, R.A.A.F., left Singapore to re- 249. However, the unexpectedly high calibre inforce Ipoh, but owing to bad weather five of Japanese aircraft and pilots, and the superior aircraft force-landed- and crashed and only six numbers of the enemy, had proved too much aircraft got through. for them. 243. Operations in support of the Army 250. Nevertheless, the work of these seriously reduced the serviceability of No. squadrons had had a good effect on the attitude 453 (F) Squadron, and further losses were of our troops to the air, although the number caused by the intensive bombing of Ipoh aero- of enemy aircraft shot down was only small. drome, which now started. In consequence, on 251. With the withdrawal of the R. A F. from the i5th December, G.H.Q. issued an instruc- the north-west, Norgroup was disbanded, and a tion that the role of the Ipoh fighter force Liaison Officer was left at H.Q. Illrd Corps. was primarily reconnaissance for Illrd Corps: it was not to be used against ground targets, Army Situation. and wastage was not to be made good at the 252. While these operations and moves of air expense of the squadrons allotted to the defence forces had been taking place the Army had of Singapore. In practice, the squadrons in the been compelled to give more ground. On i5th north functioned mainly in- the defence of the December the Japanese forced the nth (Indian) Ipoh area, carrying out such tactical reconnais- Division to evacuate the Gurun position, and sance as was required by Illrd Corps. They threatened to push through the gap between continued in this role at Kuala Lumpur, to the division and Krohcol. A big withdrawal whjch enemy air attacks drove them on the had therefore to be made out of Kedah province 19th December. to the Krian river. Penang was thus left isolated and was evacuated on the night of Demolition of Aerodromes. i6th/i7th December. 244. The salvage of equipment from aero- dromes in north-west Malaya continued. Sungei 253. Between the I7th and 26th December Patani, Butterworth and Taiping were succes- our forces fought for the Taiping—Ipoh area, sively cleared, and all stores and personnel sent preparatory to taking up positions in the back to Kuala Lumpur by road and rail for Kampar district, which offered the best possibili- sorting. ties for prolonged defence in this part of Malaya. 245. Experience was to show that the demoli- tion of aerodrome surfaces had little more than 254. The prospects of stabilising the situa- nuisance value, and only slightly retarded the tion, however, were not good; and as early as Japanese efforts to; bring them into service for i6th December the sole Command reserve, con- their own forces. Speedy repairs were possible sisting of a Brigade Group, had been com- because: — mitted to the fighting in the north-west. (a) large stocks of road-metal had been 255. In the rest of Malaya were: — accumulated on each aerodrome for repairs, (i) A Brigade Group which was hi process' and it proved too bulky for removal and of being withdrawn from the State of denial to the enemy (para. 30)*;, Kelantan. '(&) occupation by the Japanese followed (li) A Brigade Group at Kuantan which demolition so quickly that the heavy rains was already threatened by Japanese infiltra- had no time to take effect; tion down the Trengganu coast. (c) the abundant native labour was forcibly (iii) A Division (2 Brigades) of the impressed by the enemy for repair work. Australian Imperial Forces in Johore, whose 1372 SUPPLEMENTS THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 particular role was to guard against landings 261. An average of 2 Catalina, 6 Hudson . in the area on the east coast of and 6 Glenn Martin sorties was sent out daily Malaya. from Malaya to locate the expedition, whilst (iv) The garrison of Singapore Fortress. Dutch Glenn Martins from Sinkawang in Dutch Borneo were similarly employed. On the I4th, All these formations were either already com- 6 cruisers were reported south of Saigon, and mitted actively or potentially. Adequate rein- on the afternoon of the i6th a landing was forcement for the main battle area there! ore reported at Miri, in British Borneo. The ships depended upon the safe arrival of reinforce- in the area were attacked by the Dutch in bad ments from outside Malaya. But before dealing weather on the I7th, i8th and igth. Hits were with this aspect it is 'first necessary to dispose claimed on a cruiser and transports, and several of some other matters. near misses against transports.

Preparations for basing squadrons in the N.E.I. 262. The reconnaissance activity continued, spreading south-east to the Rhio Archipelago, 256. The evacuation of the northern aero- and on the 23rd December an expedition head- dromes had been foreseen, and as this would ing towards Kuching was detected. Both eventually result in congestion of aerodromes Kuching and Sinkawang aerodromes had been on Singapore Island, A.H.Q. issued orders as attacked by Japanese aircraft on the preceding- early as the I4th December for stocks of bombs days, and the former had been " blown ". The together with refuelling and re-arming parties to Dutch aircraft at Sinkawang were withdrawn to be sent to aerodromes in Sumatra. Shortly Palembang in Sumatra on the 24th, though afterwards, two staff officers from A.H.Q. and before they were transferred they were able to an officer of the A.M.W.D. were ordered- to carry out a few attacks against the enemy Sumatra to accelerate work in connection convoy. with:— (a) providing facilities for the transit of 263. This same convoy was attacked on the reinforcing aircraft; 24th by 3 Hudsons and also by 5 Blenheim IVs of No. 34 (B) Squadron. Several near misses (&) the operation of bombers from were claimed but no positive sinkings. A Sumatra, including the selection of a Bomber Dutch submarine claimed to have sunk 3 trans- •

Arrival of Further Convoys and of Air 318. Two reinforcing bomber squadronst Reinforcements. Nos. 84 (B) and 211 (B) Squadrons, began to 310. Special attention, as the directive in- arrive on 23rd January from the Middle East. structed, continued to be paid to the provision They were diverted to Sumatra, for reasons of protection for reinforcing convoys arriving which will be related in due course. They, too, at Singapore. Further convoys came in on arrived at scattered intervals and were far from 22nd, 24th and 28th January, bringing " the complete when the enemy cut the air route. remainder of the i8th Division, except for a few Their ground crews and equipment were to units, a Brigade Group from India, two to follow by sea (para. 417). three thousand troops from Australia, and more A.H.Q. was notified that a further 48 Hurri- anti-aircraft units. canes, over and above those mentioned in 311. Five Hudson sorties were made daily para. 313, would be flown into Singapore from over wide areas around the convoys to detect H.M.S. Indomitable about the end of January, the approach of Japanese naval forces. One and that 39 more in crates were en route by Catalma was. maintained on anti-submarine sea. patrol, and during the final approach to Further withdrawal of the Army—to Singapore Singapore a fighter escort of six aircraft was Island. maintained. All other aircraft were kept at short call as the convoys approached, in case 319. Despite the arrival of reinforcements the the enemy should attack them. position on land continued to develop adversely during the second half of January. 312. Three reinforcing Catalinas arrived on 7th January and were allotted to No. 205 (FB) 320. On the west coast, the Japanese took Squadron. full advantage of their command of the sea to land behind the Army positions. Between 313. During the third week hi January, the the i6th and i8th January there was a suc- 51 Hurricanes which had arrived on the I3th cession of landings on the Johore coast between January (para. 276), were being assembled Muar and Batu Pahat, which, combined with preparatory to joining Buffaloes in the defence heavy frontal attacks, forced our troops to with- of the Island. Spares were ample but tool draw to the line Batu Pahat—Mersing. kits were scarce. 321. On the East coast, the long expected 314. On their arrival they were immediately landing in the Mersing—Endau area took place- unloaded, and the majority dispersed to pre- at Endau on 26th January. The lateral com- viously selected concealed positions, where they munications available in north Johore per- were erected and wheeled to nearby airfields mitted a junction between the Japanese forces for test; the remainder proceeded direct to in the east and west of the peninsula, while No. 151 M.U. for erection at other dispersed a Japanese advance from the Endau area points. The speed with which these aircraft threatened the communications of the main were erected was a very remarkable achieve- British forces in the west. ment (see Postscript). 322. Our losses 'in the west coast battle and the new threat from the East dictated a general 315. Twenty-four pilots from Nos. 17, 135 withdrawal of our forces to Singapore Island and 136 (F) Squadrons had arrived with them: itself, a decision which was taken on the 27th some had had experience in the Battle of January. The withdrawal was achieved in Britain. When A.H.Q. first heard of their good order. Nevertheless it had been hoped diversion to the Far East, it had been planned that the arrival of reinforcements would per- to give aircrews a spell before employing them mit the holding of a bridgehead in Johore, but in operations. This spej^ was obviously de- this now" proved to be impossible. sirable, not only because of the length of their sea voyage, but also because of the need for Air Action against the Japanese Advancer acclimatising pilots to local conditions. How- West Coast. ever, events had moved too fast and the stake 323. The Japanese exploitation of their was too high for delay to be acceptable. The superiority at sea led, on the west coast as Hurricanes had to be used immediately they well as the east, to a number of air recon- had- been erected and tested. They were in naissances and sweeps being undertaken over action as a squadron by the 2Oth January, the left flank of the Army. Attacks against exactly a week after they had been landed in Japanese-held aerodromes in Central Malaya, crate's. were also carried out. I37S SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 324. On the igth January the situation at Johore. Their loss was a severe blow, as' it Muar was reported -to be serious. Twelve had been hoped they would be available for Buffaloes carried out an offensive sweep of the the reinforcing Hurricanes; they had been area, using surplus ammunition on barges specially prepared and equipped for that pur- during their return. The latter were also pose. Seletar, which had now to be used in- attacked twice during the day by 3 Hudsons stead, was not so well equipped with dispersal escorted by Buffaloes. That night, igth/2oth points. January, 9 Vildebeestes bombed the aero- drome at Kuala Lumpur, where some twenty Air Action against the Landing at Endau. fighters had been observed by Buffaloes of 332. To turn to the East coast. On the 26th No. 488 (F) Squadron. January, at 0930 hours, Hudson reconnaissance 325. On the 2Oth January two Blenheims sighted 2 cruisers, n destroyers and two 10,000 made an offensive reconnaissance against ship"- ton vessels accompanied by barges, 10 miles ping off the coast. Later, 6 Buffaloes carried off the coast approaching Endau. (para 321). out an offensive sweep of the Muar—Gemas They were being protected by Japanese .fighters area where the Army reported heavy dive based on Kuantan. bombing against troops of Illrd Corps. They 333. The forces available for opposing them met a formation of 6 Army 97's, destroyed one were: — and forced the others to jettison their loads. " 9- Hudsons of Nos. i and 8- (GR) Squad- That evening, at last light, 7 Blenheims bombed rons, R.A.A.F. and machine-gunned Kuala Lumpur with great 21 Vildebeestes, 3 Albacores of Nos. 36 and success, claiming the destruction of over 20 100 (TB) Squadrons. ! fighters. 6 Hudsons attacked Kuantan at the 334. The attack was organised in two waves. same time. These attacks were followed up The" first wave comprised 9, Hudsons and 12 that night by 24 Vildebeestes, 12 bombing each Vildebeestes and was escorted by 15 Buffaloes aerodrome. and 8 Hurricanes; the second, 3 Albacores and 326. From the 2ist to 24th January, many 9 Vildebeestes, escorted by 4 Buffaloes and 8 requests for support of the Army in the Muar Hurricanes. area were received, but these were days during 335. Unfortunately, as the Vildebeestes and which the protection of convoys took pre- Albacores of Nos. 36 and 100 (TB) Squadrons cedence, and little was available with which to had been operating throughout the whole of the meet them. On the 2ist January, 6 Buffaloes previous night (para. 330), the first wave of carried out sweeps in the morning and after- attack oould not be launched until the early noon in the Parit Salong—Batu Pahat area; afternoon. By this time most of the Japanese 2 Albacores and 2 Buffaloes attacked <>mall troops were probably clear of their transports. boats near Batu Pahat; and 2 Albacores dropped supplies successfully for troops who 336. However, the first wave, consisting of 9 had been cut off, and thus assisted them to Hudsons and the Vildebeestes of No. 100 (TB) •extricate themselves. Squadron, was able to press its attack home, being helped by rather cloudy conditions. 5 327. On 22nd January the Japanese were in- Vildebeestes were lost. It was claimed that one filtrating from Muar to Batu Pahat. This road cruiser and two destroyers were sunk, both was attacked by 2 Albacores, i Shark and 6 transports were hit (one set on fire), and Buffaloes. More supplies were dropped by casualties were caused to troops in barges and Albacores of No. 36 Squadron to troops cut off on the beaches. In the Parit Salong area. That night, 2'2nd/ 23rd January, 21 Vildebeestes again bombed 337. With the arrival of the second wave, the Kuala Lumpur. Vildebeestes of No. 36 (TB) Squadron, the weather in the area suddenly cleared and enemy 328. On the 23rd January, 5 Buffaloes fighters intercepted the squadron before it could patrolled over the withdrawal of troops from attack. 6 Vildebeestes and 2 Albacores were the Yong Peng area (N.NE. of Batu Pahat) shot down and other aircraft damaged and air- and engaged 12 Navy ' 0 ' fighters which were crews wounded. Later, 5 Hudsons of harassing them. All available Sharks, Alba- No. 62 (B) Squadron from Sumatra arrived in cores and Wirraways attacked enemy troops on the road leading south from Muar. That night, the area and attacked barges. 23rd/24th, 12 Vildebeestes bombed Kuantan 338. The fighter escort problem had not been aerodrome. easy owing to the slow speed of the T.B. air- 329. On the 24th January, 6 Vildebeestes craft and the distance of the target from their attacked troops on the bridge at Labis on the aerodrome. During these two attacks, 12 Segamat—Singapore road, whilst 3 oihers Japanese Navy " 0 " fighters were shot down "bombed oil tanks left standing at Muar and 4 damaged for the loss of 2 Hurricanes and i Buffalo, one Hurricane pilot personally 330. On the 25th January, 12 Buffaloes accounting for 4 Japanese fighters. carried out sweeps, morning and evening, in 339. No. 36 & 100 (TB) Squadrons suffered the Kluang—Gemas—Batu Pahat area, whilst very heavily. More than half their aircraft were that night 24 Vildebeestes and 3 Albacores shot down, includirig those of both Command- carried out 2 sorties each to cover the sea ing Officers. The remainder were badly shot evacuation of a battalion 'which had been cut about, and a number of aircrews in them were off in the Batu Pahat area. During that day wounded. Both were withdrawn to Java on 5 U.S.A. Fortresses from Java bombed Sungei 29th/30th January for reorganisation after their Patani under Abdair direction. At night, 3 very gallant effort. Hudsons attacked Kuala Lumpur. ' 331. By the evening of the 25th January, Sustained Japanese Air Attacks on Singapore the airfields at Kahang, Kluang and Batu Pahat 340. During the second half of January the became untenable and were demolished, as were Japanese carried out air attacks on targets on also the strips which had been prepared in S. Singapore Island with increasing intensity. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1379 Two, and sometimes three, attacks were de- 347. The Hurricanes' first day, 20th livered by formations of 27 to 54 enemy January, was most successful. Twenty-seven bombers escorted by fighters. The main targets bombers came over unescorted and 8 were shot were our aerodromes, but a number of attacks down without loss. It appeared as if confidence were delivered against Singapore harbour, the in their decisive influence was to be justified. naval base and other military objectives. Raids This was the last occasion, however, on which were made in perfect formation despite A A. ' Japanese bombers came over unescorted. The fire, and the accuracy of bombing from heights following day 5 Hurricanes were shot down, over 20,000 feet was marked. including the C.O., S. L. Landells and a Flight 341. This continual pounding made it diffi- Commander, against no loss to the Japanese. cult to keep aerodrome surfaces serviceable. 348. From then on the Hurricanes were con- Kallang was built on reclaimed salt marsh, stantly airborne, carrying out 3 to 5 which oozed up through the bomb craters. The " scrambles " daily. Owing to their being con- drainage at Tengah had never been satisfactory. stantly outnumbered by the escorting fighters, Effective repairs were thus difficult. Rainfall which were well handled, bombers could seldom at the time was exceptionally heavy, which in be attacked. But with the realisation that itself was a further handicap to repair work. " dog-fighting " did not pay, the revised " in 342. To complicate matters further, and out " tactics adopted gradually gave in- practically all native labour, which had many creasing success. disabilities to face under air bombardment, dis- 349. The Hurricane pilots had been informed appeared. On the 7th January the Director of the characteristics of the Navy " Os " and General of Civil Defence had appointed a particularly warned of the inadvisability of Director of Labour who was to organise and getting involved in " dog-fighting " owing to control all labour, allotting it to the services in the Navy " O's " small turning circle. Despite accordance with an arranged priority pro- this, some of them had become involved in gramme. " dog-fights ", which led to casualties. There was also an acute shortage of M.T., 350. The limitations of the warning system without which labour, and the material for for Singapore have already been described labour to use, could not be transported to the (para. 302). Some help was obtained at this places where it was needed. The collection and stage from Army G.L. sets; but the short time allocation of M.T. was also placed under the of warning, 10-15 minutes, remained a great Director General of Civil Defence. handicap to efficient fighter defence. Opera- Both these measures had become acutely tional control remained restricted owing to the necessary—to provide and organise labour in lack of V.H.F. and to the unreliability of R/T. the face of repeated air raids, and in order to 351. These new aircraft were Hurricane Us. make the best use of limited supplies of motor They were fitted with desert oil filters because transport. their original destination had been the Middle 343. First priority for what labour there was, East. These deprived them of some 30 m.p.h. was given to the repair of aerodromes. The They were not quite so fast as the Navy " 0 " 'G.O.C. Malaya diverted some of his reserves, at near the ground, but as height increased the the expense of the construction of defence work, Hurricane gradually overhauled the Navy to reinforce R.A.F. labour parties. Later, " 0 " until at 20,000 feet it had an appreciable parties of 100 sailors, survivors from H.M.S. advantage in speed and climb. The Hurricane " Prince of Wales " and " Repulse ", were could always dive at higher speeds, but at all •stationed at each of the 4 airfields in the Island. heights the Navy " O " was the more manoeuvrable. 344. Heavy attacks on our aerodromes on the Island had been anticipated some weeks 352. It must be admitted here that too much .beforehand by A.H.Q. In order to augment had been expected of this handful of Hurri- the number of airfields on the Island, six sites canes. Civilians and the armed forces alike for landing strips had been selected, and work had anticipated that these modern aircraft •on them was put in hand on various dates would carry all before them. That this was not -during the latter half of December. Labour achieved was no fault of the pilots, who under difficulties slowed up their construction, and, S/L. R. E. P. Brooker, D.F.C., achieved, in as will be narrated later, they had all to be the face of overwhelming numbers, results -demolished before they could be brought into which stand greatly to their-credit. Neverthe- use. less the false hopes which had been placed 345. A considerable number of aircraft was in them reacted keenly when* they were not destroyed, or rendere'd unserviceable on the realised. ground largely because dispersal points had not 353. The average daily serviceability of been widely enough scattered in the first in- Hurricanes from the 2ist January to 28th stance, whereas, time and labour had not been January was 16, and by the latter date the sufficient afterwards to rectify this shortcoming. position as regards the 51 crated aircraft was:— Operations by Fighters in the defence of Singa- 17 destroyed (some of them at their bases). 2 repairable at Unit. pore 7 repairable at Depot. 346. During the second half of January our 21 available + 4 more in 24 hours. ^depleted fighter squadrons did their utmost to ward off the enemy's attacks. No. 21 (F) On the 29th and 30th January, 20 were avail- 'Squadron R.A.A.F. and 453 (F) Squadron were able. -mainly employed in operations in support of the 354. (During this-period the Buffaloes of Nos. .army (paras. 323-330), leaving Nos. 243 and 21 R.A.A.F. and 453 (F) Squadrons were ,488 (F) Squadron in a defensive role. To their employed mainly on operations in support of assistance now came the newly arrived the Army. ,Nos. 243 and 488 (F) Squadrons squadron of Hurricanes (paras. 314-316). had continued in their role, in co-operation 1380 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

with the Hurricanes, in the defence^ of Singa- en route, the arrangements made for the trans- pore. By the 30th January, the^miiri&ef of fer of our units to the N.E.I, were badly Buffaloes had so dwindled that all (6JJ were disorganised. Dutch Lodestars helped in these concentrated in No. 453 (F) Squadron. Nos. moves. Their assistance was invaluable. 21 R.A.A.F. and 243 (F) Squadron personnel 360. When the decision was taken on 27th were evacuated, whilst No. 488 (F) Squadron January that it would be necessary for the was retained to service the Hurricanes, together army to withdraw to Singapore Island, it be- with a few of the pilots of all these squadrons came evident at once that one aerodrome only, to replace casualties. Kallang, would shortly ibe available for use. The other three on the Island, Tengah, Sem- Effect of Japanese Advance on R.A.F. disposi- bawang and Seletar, were sited on its northern tions. coastline and would soon be exposed to ob- Decision to Transfer Units to N.E.I. served artillery fire from Johore at ranges as 355. The advance of the Japanese into Johore close as 1,500-2,000 yards: it would not be meant that our aircraft had to operate from practicable to operate aircraft from them for the four aerodromes on Singapore Island. Thus long Unfortunately Kallang itself was rapidly a dangerous congestion of aircraft on the becoming of limited use. Its surface, a crust ground had come about. The dangers of con- of marl laid on a salt marsh, was pock-marked gestion increased as enemy air attacks steadily with Ibomb craters which were most difficult to grew in violence during January. When ex- fill. Extension was impracticable, huddled as pected aircraft reinforcements should begin to it was between the sea and the built-up area arrive from the United Kingdom and the Middle of Singapore Town. Consequently, further East during January there were prospects of transfer of squadrons to the N.E.I, now became still greater congestion Dispersal beyond the inevitable. confines of Singapore Island would then become imperative. 361. On the 27th January No. 8 (GR) Squad- ron, R.A.A.F., was sent to Sumatra, and No. 356. During December, the first preparations 205 (FB) Squadron on the 28th to Java The had been- made for operating R.A.F. Units in latter on arrival in Java, was placed by Abdair the N.E.I, (paras. 256-258). On 4th January under Dutch control as part of Recgroup. No. No. 153 M.U. was moved to Java, and on i6th 205 Squadron left i Catahna at Seletar until January No. 225 (B) Group Headquarters the 30th January in connection with the arrival was formed in Singapore and moved to Sumatra of a further convoy. On the 29111 and 30th two days later in order to make preliminary January the remaining G.R. Squadron (No. i, arrangements for operating bombers from aeio- R.A.A F.) was transferred also to Sumatra dromes in that island. i 362. Thus by the end of the month the 357- 'By mid-January it was clear to A.H.Q whole of the bomber force had been compelled that the transfer of Units must be accelerated to withdraw to air bases in Southern Sumatra, even though facilities for their operation and where they were now organising with the in- maintenance in Sumatra were not yet ready. tention of providing air support from that In accordance with a prior agreement made with quarter to the army invested m Singapore the Dutch Army Air Force, that Dutch Units 363. On the 3'ist January, apart from should be moved first, a progressive with- fighters, there were left m Singapore only 3 drawal now took place from Singapoie:— Swordfish. They were still under Army con- igth January—Dutch Buffalo Squadron at trol for coast defence spotting purposes, as Kallang was withdrawn.. On arrival in the H Q M.C. at this stage still did not rule out the N.E.I, it reverted to Dutch control. Its main possibility of a landing from the sea on Singa- function was to maintain, as requisite, fighter pore Island itself. cover required for future convoys through Banka Straits. Changes in appointments in the Command. 22nd January—2 Dutch Glenn Martin To digress for a moment from the narrative:— Squadrons withdrew to Java and reverted to Dutch control. 364. With the arrival of reinforcements a reorganisation of senior appointments became 23rd-2jth January—Nos. 27 (NF), 34 (B) practicable in the second half of January. and 62 (B) Squadrons, except for small air- craft handling parties, were transferred to 365. About I7th January Group Captain Sumatra, as were also the main parties of G. E. Nicholetts replaced Group Captain A. G. Nos. i and. 8 (GR) Squadrons, R.A.A.F. Bishop as Group Captain, Operations, at A.H.Q., the .latter having been appointed to 358. Concurrently with the above moves:— command the Bomber'Group (No. 225) in (a] No. 151 M.U. was ordered to prepare Sumatra. to move to Java, less a party approximately 366. About igth January Air Commodore 100 strong who were to remain and salvage W.E. Staton arrived and began taking the and pack equipment. duties of S.A.S O. from Air Commodore B J. (&) Base Accounts and Record Offices Silly. His recent and personal experience of were ordered to Java. air operations over Europe was to prove of (c) Station H.Q. Sembawang was ordered great value to the Command to Sumatra. 367. On the 2gth January Air Commodores 359. Each Unit was instructed to proceed S. F. Vincent and H. J. F. Hunter arrived with 30 days' rations, certain barrack stores from the U.K. They had been sent by the Air and 28 days' pack-up of aircraft equipment. Ministry as Commanders designate of Fighter All ground personnel proceeded iby sea. It and Bomber Groups respectively Air Commo- will be seen later that, owing to confusion at dore Hunter was sent to Sumatra on ist Febru- the Singapore docks caused primar ily by bomb- ary, to command No.' 225 Group which had al- ing, and owing to enemy attacks on shipping ready formed at Palembang. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1381

.368. By the 30th January, owing to the 374. Concurrently with this reduction in transfer of units to the N.E.I., the A.O.C. de- strength, General Wavell approved the A.O.C.'s cided to make preparations for establishing of proposal^ that, consequent on the transfer of a rear A.H.Q., in the N.E.I. Air Commodore the bulk of the strength of the Command to Silly was sent to Sumatra as Deputy A.O.C. the N.E.I., he should proceed himself with the in order to select its site and begin its organi- mam body of A.H.Q. to the N.E.I, whence it sation would be possible to control more effectively the conduct of further air operations. It was NARRATIVE—30TH JANUARY UNTIL THE FALL OF intended to leave in Singapore a small ad- SINGAPORE. vanced A.H.Q. to maintain liaison with H Q.M.C. H Q. No. 224 (F) Group was also to Situation of the Army. remain to control fighter operations. 369. It will be remembered that the Army withdrew into Singapore Island on a' pro- 375. A.H Q. was reduced in accordance with gramme to be completed on 3ist January. This this plan, personnel being despatched to Palem- was (successfully carried out. bang in Sumatra for attachment to H.Q. No. Early in February a reinforcing convoy 225 (B) Group pending the decision about the arrived in Singapore It brought the few re- site for the rear A.H.Q. which Air Commodore maining units of the i8th Division. Silly had been instructed to find. * 370. But the position of the Army, now in- 376. On 5th February Abdair expressed dis- vested on the Island, was jeopardised by the approval of the transfer of A.H.Q. to the presence of four aircraft landing strips which N.E.I., being of opinion that A.H Q. should were being constructed to augment the airfields remain in close contact with the G.O.C. of the Island (para. 344). There was real dan- Malaya, to ensure that future air operations ger that 'the Japanese might use them for were planned in relation to the best means for establishing airborne troops behind the frontal the defence of Singapore. The A.O.C., after defences of the Island in order to accelerate an exchange of signals with Abdair on the the reduction of the garrison, a danger which subject, cancelled the transfer on 6th February. could only be averted so long as they remained He decided to remain himself with A.H.Q. in serviceable, by means of large detachments of Singapore, despite another signal he" had re- troops who could not be spared for the pur- ceived on 5th February which instructed him pose. On 3Oth January it was therefore de- to proceed temporarily to Java when it was cided to blow them, and also to accelerate the convenient for him to do so: he was badly in obstruction of other open spaces. need of a rest. But circumstances moved fast, and he declined to go until the last of his sub- Reduction of the Fighter Force in Singapore. ordinates had been evacuated (para. 394). 371. This action .restricted our fighters to the four main aerodromes of the Island, and ,377. By the 5th February it had become negatived any possibility of their further dis- clear that no suitable site for a Rear H.Q. persal. These aerodromes were under constant existed in Sumatra, and so Air Commodore bombing, and considerable difficulty was being Silly was instructed to proceed to Batavia and experienced in maintaining serviceable strips take administrative charge there. upon them Further, three of them—Tengah, Sembawang and Seletar—were sited on the ,378. Not only were personnel and equip- northern side of the Island and were therefore ment from Singapore now arriving at that port, likely to .be usable for a short time only (para. but also the ground personnel of the reinforcing 360).' squadrons. It was also anticipated that the .site for a Rear A.H.Q. would best be located .372. On the 3Oth January, therefore, Sir in the Batavia area. Archibald Wavell approved A.H.Q. plans to maintain in Singapore only a fighter strength Dislocation at Singapore Docks. of 8 Hurricanes reinforced by the remaining 379. There was a scarcity of suitable ship- Buffaloes. It was agreed that the further re- ping for conveying equipment, particularly inforcing Hurricanes now arriving in H.M.S. M.T., to the N.E.I.: a difficulty aggravated " Indomitable " should be based on Sumatra, 'because some vessels had to be loaded at their and from there not only maintain the strength moorings by means of lighters. Those which at Singapore but also reinforce it as opportunity did come alongside, of which there were many, permitted. deserve great credit. Owing to enemy air 373. To implement this policy A.H.Q.: — bombardment, ships had to be dispersed, which (a) decided to retain in Singapore for the further delayed loading. Air bombardment maintenance of the Fighter Force—an. Air also caused dock labour to disappear; its re- Stores Park, a Repair and Salvage Unit and placement-by Service personnel could not be an Ammunition Park. • on a scale adequate to meet requirements. Con- ditions at the docks became confused as the (b) formed No. 226 (F) Group with H.Q. scale and intensity of air attack increased. in Palembang and appointed Air Commodore Plans made for the embarkation of personnel Vincent the Group Commander. The staff and stores were disorganised. Units became for this Group H.Q. was to be provided split up and personnel became 'separated from partly from the reductions now possible in their equipment. Much equipment, urgently the Staff of the existing Fighter Group in required by the Bomber Force in Sumatra, Singapore and the remainder from H.Q. could not be loaded at all. In some instances, No. 266 (F) Wing, known to be arriving by owing to air attack, ships sailed before being sea in the N.E.I. fully loaded. (c)'issued orders for _the move to Java of No. 151 M.U/ less the repair and salvage Severe losses were inflicted by the Japanese party referred to in para. 358(a). air attacks on ships en route from Singapore '"" ""*' C2 1382 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

during the final 14 days of evacuation. Con- attack But they put up a stout fight, and siderable quantities of equipment*r' including throughout the first ten days of February they some 200 M.T. vehicles, were lost, all" of it were almost constantly airborne 'throughout the urgently needed in the N.E I. hours of daylight, attempting to ward off ithe constant Japanese attacks. Final Air Operations -from Singapore. 385. Most of their sorties were for the defence 380. Except for a small number of Hudson of the Island. Fighter cover was provided on sorties for convoy protection, and a sweep by 30th January for the final withdrawal of the Buffaloes over the Batu Pahat area on 28th Army across the Johore causeway; and a few January to cover the evacuation of troops cut sorties were also flown against aircraft attacking off by the Japanese advance, air operations our troop positions on the Island. On gth from Singapore itself from the last days of February, the day following the Japanese land- January to the fall of the Fortress were nearly ing on the Island, Hurricanes took off at the all carried out by fighters for the defence of the Island Bomber operations from Sumatra request of the Army and engaged enemy dive for the support of the defence of Singapore bombers, shooting down at least one are narrated an Section III. 386. A number of patrols were made for con- voy protection. One convoy reached Singapore 381. An attack was carried out on the night on 5th February. It had been shepherded of 2nd February by the Swordfish flight, through 'the Banka Straits, and during its on- released by the Army for the purpose, against ward passage towards Singapore, by recon- the aerodrome at Kluang, where .the Japanese naissance and protective patrols from Sumatra. had by now established a strong fighter force. Fighters from Singapore covered its final Subsequently this Flight had to be destroyed, approach. The "Empress of Asia" was attacked as its aircraft were in no condition to be flown and set on fire, but that was the only loss to Sumatra. incurred by reinforcing convoys. They escaped 382. The P.R. Buffalo Flight, which had func- unscathed partly because of the protection tioned almost daily with outstanding success they were given, but partly also because, under the command of Squadron Leader Lewis it must be admitted, the Japanese made since the beginning of the campaign, finally no very determined attacks against them. lost its aircraft by enemy air attacks on the In contrast, many ships leaving Singapore 7th February. This Flight had carried out over during February were heavily attacked and1 100 sorties, the majority of which had proceeded there were many losses amongst them. »as far north as Singora. Aircraft were inter- 387. The devotion to duty of the fighter pilots cepted by Japanese fighters and hit on numerous and of the ground crews who serviced their •occasions, although none was shot down. aircraft and maintained landing strips during Throughout, no armour or guns had been these last few days was exemplary. Warning rcarried • pilots had relied entirely upon evasion of attack was short, and on occasion the Japan- in order to fulfil their missions The greatest ese bombers had dropped their bombs and were •credit is due to them for the valuable work withdrawing before our fighters could reach they diu. them. But with experience of the enemy's Final Fighter Operations from Singapore. tactics results steadily improved; and on the 383 On the 3ist January the fighter strength final day of operations, (Qth February), 6 enemy of Singapore was 8 Hurricanes of No. 232(F) aircraft were shot down and a further 14 Squadron and 6 Buffaloes taken over by No. seriously damaged for the loss of 2 Hurricanes 453 (F) Squadron. The small Buffalo force and i pilot. It was significant that by 5th gradually wasted away and 453(F) Squadron February the surviving pilots were mostly ex- was evacuated to Java about 4th February. The perienced' men who had had previous battle Hurricanes were maintained from Sumatra at experience before coming to the Far East. an average daily strength of 10 aircraft. This 388. On the 4th and 5th February, Seletar, .average was maintained firstly by the arrival Sembawang and Tengah came under steady •on 2gth January of No 258 (JF) Squadron with observed shell fire, and all operations had then 15 Hurricanes. This squadron was one of to be carried out from Kallang. The Japanese several which had been convoyed from the bombers concentrated their attack on this Middle East (where they had just arrived as station, and the landing area was soon so riddled reinforcements from England) to the Far East with craters that only by constant and arduous .in H M.S. Indomitable. They had been " flown labour was a landing strip 750 yards long main- •off " south of Java and had proceeded by air tained in operation. Even so, by 6th February via Batavia and Sumatra, No 258 thence flying our pilots experienced very great difficulty in •on to Seletar. They had had a long and varied avoiding craters when taking-off and landing. passage from England, involving a sea voyage 389. On the loth February, by which time to Sierra Leone, followed by a long flight across the Japanese were established in strength on the whole breadth of Central Africa to Port the Island, all aircraft were withdrawn to Sudan, where they had embarked in H.M.S. Sumatra. G.O.C. Malaya concurred in this Indomitable. They came into action on ist decision, which was also endorsed by C.-in-C. February after a delay caused by the necessity South-West Pacific who visited Singapore the for removing all guns to clear them of anti- same day. A few Buffaloes were left, owing vcorrosion grease with which they had had to to their condition, and had to be destroyed. be protected for the journey. This squadron was relieved by 232 (F) Squadron on 3rd Feb- Results of Fighter Operations in Malaya. ruary, also ex H.M.S. Indomitable The latter 390. Total results of the fighting in the air remained in Singapore until the withdrawal of over Singapore are difficult to assess with any the last of our aircraft. accuracy, as definite confirmation of successes 384. ,These fighters were far too few in num- was in most cases impossible. Group Captain •ber to affect materially ithe scale of enerny Rice, who commanded the Fighter Force during SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1383 the whole of its operations over Malaya, esti- inhabitants having deserted it. It was malarial, mated ithat 183 Japanese aircraft were unhealthy and contained little food. The party destroyed, exclusive of others lost by them had few7 stores, practically no medicines and no during our attacks on their aerodromes. doctor After remaining at large for more than 391. It is felt that this claim may be two months the survivors were compelled to excessive, though, not by much. Reports which surrender. By then r8 had died, including Air •have been received from all sources appear to Vice Marshal Pulford and Rear Admiral establish that the Buffalo Squadrons shot down Spooner. The remainder were in a bad way. a total of 30 Japanese aircraft: others were Thus it was that these gallant officers lost their damaged and a proportion of them probably lives and that the former was unable to rejoin crashed during their return to base.i his Command in the N.E.I. It is probable that the Hurricane force Fall of Singapore. destroyed, or so seriously damaged that they 395. On ithe ijth February Singapore failed to return to base, a total of 100 Japanese Fortress was compelled to surrender. aircraft For 'this total, 45 Hurricanes were lost from all causes, including flying accidents • and enemy air bombardment. In view of the SECTION III. odds which were faced these figures speak for themselves. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BASED ON SUMATRA. Final transfer of R.A.F. to Sumatra. INTRODUCTION. 392. On 8th February the Japanese launched their attack on Singapore Island and rapidly 396. As has already been narrated in Sec- obtained a firm foothold. It now became tion II of this Report, by the i6th January, essential to transfer A.H.Q. to Sumatra in order 1942,"all Air Force units in Malaya had been to take control of the Command, whose com- driven back to Singapore Island. Even with batant units were already there, for the purpose the existing strength, aerodromes on the island of carrying on the fight in the N E.I. were already congested, they would become A nucleus staff, including the S.A.S.O. (Air more congested when reinforcements, now well Commodore Staton) proceeded by air to on their way, arrived. The scale of Japanese Palembang on loth February by order of the air attack against these aerodromes was increas- A.OC ing. It had become imperative to disperse more widely Extra elbow room was par- Sir Archibald Wavell again visited Singapore ticularly desirable because H.M.S. " Indomit- the same day, loth February He ordered the able," with 48 Hurricanes on board, was due immediate evacuation to the N E.I. of all to arrive at the end of January. If bomber remaining R.A.F. personnel, which was com- units could be transferred to Sumatra, not only menced the following day. At the same time would they be dispersed more safely, but fighter he instructed Air Vice Marshal Maltby, hitherto squadrons could then be distributed to all the Assistant A O.C at A.H Q., to take charge in aerodromes in Singapore. It was not realised the N.E.I, as soon as possible, that officer at the time how soon three of those aerodromes proceeding there by air tihe same afternoon —Tengah, Sembawang and Seletar—would be- accompanied by an addition to the nucleus come untenable (para. 360). staff which had preceded him. He was appointed by Abdair A.O.C. Westgroup in the N E.I. with General Conditions in Sumatra. effect from nth February. 397 Sumatra, an island nearly 1,000 miles 393. Aerodrome surfaces were ploughed up. long, lies west of and runs parallel to the west Bomb components, large stocks of 'petrol and coast of Malaya, but extends far to the south- much equipment which could not be got away ward Its main features are a mountain range was destroyed or rendered ineffective. But the running down the west coast throughout the volume of the whole was so great that neither whole length of the island, and a relatively time nor circumstances permitted its transfer low-lying belt of country eastward of it, con- or destruction, particularly a large quantity sisting mainly of jungle and swamp, which is salved from Malaya which was housed in the intersected by many rivers with a west to east town of Singapore where its destruction by fire trend. It is developed in scattered areas only. was impossible. Special action was taken to Roads are few, and although there are rail- destroy secret equipment e g radar apparatus, way systems in the north and south, they are signals installations etc. It is believed that not connected, and communications are con- little of immediate value to the enemy was left sequently poor From the Allied point of view to him., the chief economic importance of Sumatra was 394. On I3fch February Air Vice Marshal the oil field and refinery near Palembang, of Pulford, who had declined to leave until all which the normal outlet is to the east via R.A.F. personnel, who could be, had been Palembang river to the sea, though there is a evacuated, left Singapore. He did so at General single track railway running to the Port of Pea-rival's instigation. He accompanied a party Oesthaven in the extreme south. There was a under the orders of Admiral Spooner, R.A. radio telephone system inter-connecting the Malaya. When they sailed they were unaware principal towns in Sumatra with an external that the Japanese fleet had interposed itself connection to Java. This telephone system between Singapore and their destination, which was open and insecure. was probably Batavia in Java They were 398. At the time this Section of the Report detected, attacked from the air and their boat opens, the monsoon was still in progress over was stranded on an island of the Tuju or Seven Sumatra. A feature of this monsoon was the Islands Group some 30 miles north of Banka prevalence of torrential thunderstorms, both by Island. There the whole party, some 40 in day and night. These thunderstorms are very number, lived as best they could, the fishermen violent indeed, and they completely black out 1384 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 all visibility from aircrews flying through them, (11) Hudson Ill's en route from U.K. whose skill and endurance they test "to, the ut- which were to re-equip in succession No. most: navigation through them is fraught with 62 (B) Squadron, and Nos. i and 8 (GR) great risk. Unfortunately at this season several Squadrons, R.A.A.F. such thunderstorms were certain to be en- countered during the course of every long 402 The A.O.C also decided that, depen- flight. dent on the situation, when bomber units were located in Sumatra, either Group H.Q. would State of Aerodromes. be responsible for the selection of targets (with- 399. Up to this date, i8th January, the policy in the policy laid down by A.H.Q.) and for the of A.H.Q. had been to develop aerodromes in briefing of squadrons, or alternatively squadrons Northern Sumatra as refuelling grounds for re- would proceed to bases in Singapore and be inforcements arriving by air from India, and briefed there under A H.Q arrangements. To as advanced landing grounds for operational provide for this latter arrangement, refuelling use on the flank of Malaya. In consequence and re-arming parties for bomber units would of this policy constructional work on them had be maintained at aerodromes on Singapore been given priority over that at aerodromes in Island. At this time it,was fairly confidently the south, and it was the aerodromes in the anticipated that the situation on the ground in south of Sumatra which would now be wanted Malaya would be stabilised and that a bridge- for our squadrons to use as their main bases. head would be held of sufficient area for the By the middle of January small refuelling and deployment of reinforcements preparatory to re-armmg parties of varying strengths, up to 50, a counter-offensive being undertaken (para. had been established at the following places: — 322). That it would be necessary later to transfer fighter squadrons from Singapore was (a) Sabang (also for Flying Boats), not at this time " on the cards ". (b) Lho'nga. (c) Medan Civil Aerodrome (a large mili- tary aerodrome was also being constructed Development by No. 225 (B) Group H.Q. in this area); 403. Group Captain Bishop, on arrival at (d) Pakanbaroe, Palembang on the i8th January, decided to: — (e) Padang; (a) Establish Group Headquarters at (/) Palembang—at the civil aerodrome Palembang. known as P.I ; (b) Expand and accelerate the provision (g) a secret military aerodrome 20 miles of accommodation at P.I and P.II aero- south of Palembang known as P.II. dromes, and improve aircraft dispersal at In addition there was a strip at Lahat, and a each. field under construction by the Dutch at Oest- (c) Develop Lahat for use by bombers. haven. Wing Commander Duncan, Squadron Leader Briggs and Squadron Leader Wightwick (d) Reconnoitre the area to the south of (A.M.W.D.) were already located at Palembang Palembang for the selection and 'develop- for liaison with the Dutch in connection with ment of further landing strips. the development of these aerodromes. At the same time he put in hand reconnaiss- ance for siting an Ammunition Park, an Air DEVELOPMENT OF R.A.F. ORGANISATION Stores Park and an R S.U., which were to be IN SUMATRA. provided for the maintenance of the Force 400. A H.Q. therefore decided, on the i6th A.H.Q. were informed and approved of these January, that the time was becoming imminent decisions. when bomber units would have to be trans- ferred to Sumatra. For this reason H Q 404. P.I. was, at that time, a large ' L ' 225 (B) Group was formed at Singapore on this shaped aerodrome with two hard runways. It date, and was sent to Palembang in Sumatra possessed dispersal arrangements which were at on the i8th January, 1942. Initial appoint- once considerably developed by Dutch ments made by A.H.Q. were: — Engineers. There was no accommodation for Group Commander Group Captain A. G personnel nearer than the town, 8 miles away. Bishop. P.II was a huge natural field about 10 miles S.A.S.O Wing Commander K in perimeter with good natural cover for air- Powell. craft. It was not visible from the road, and its S.A 0. . Squadron Leader construction had been successfully kept secret Briggs. from the Japanese. Similar clearings in the A.M.W.D Squ'adron Leader neighbourhood made it difficult for air crews Wightwick to locate it from the air, even by those who Instructions to No. 225 (B) Group. had been briefed as to its location. Great care 401. On formation of the Group Head- was taken to preserve its secrecy and, although quarters, the A.'O.C instructed the Group at one time more than 100 aircraft were based Commander • — • on it, Japanese reconnaissance, which fre- quently flew over it by day and night, never (a) to establish a Bomber Group H.Q.; located it. Communications between Palem- (b) to accelerate, to the maximum, arrange- bang and P.II were handicapped because there ments for operating bomber units from was no bridge over the Palembang river, on Sumatra; such arrangements .not only to the north of which lay Palembang town and provide for all bombers then in Singapore but P.I, the river had to be crossed by a small also for the following reinforcements: — ferry which had a limit of 4 to 6 vehicles. The (i) Nos. 84 and 211 (B) Squadrons Dutch put in hand the construction of huts (Blenheim IV) then en route from Middle for accommodation of personnel at P. II East; aerodrome. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1385 405. There was a single line telephone linking Arrival of R.A.F. Units from Singapore. each aerodrome with Group H.Q's., but instru- 412? However, Japanese progress in Malaya ments and wire were not available for develop- wa!sf quicker than had been anticipated. The ing an internal telephone system on either transfer from Singapore had to be accelerated aerodrome. and expanded beyond what had first been For point to point communication a W/T contemplated. In the event, all aircraft had set was improvised which was able to link up to be based on P.I and P.II, although the per- with A.H.Q., and with Sabang and Lho'nga sonnel of one bomber squadron moved to on the air reinforcement route. Lahat on loth February, Group Captain Noble 406. A civil Dutch Observer system existed at being appointed Station Commander But Palembang, consisting of two concentric circles events moved too quickly for that aerodrome of posts round Palembang, at 50 and 100 kilo- to come into use. meters radius. There were a few posts still 413. This Report has already narrated the further out—one on the north end of Banka plans made by A.H.Q. in Singapore for trans- Island, one at the mouth of the Palembang ferring and re-organising in Sumatra and Java, river and one on Tanjong Pinang Island, just and how these plans were largely frustrated south of Singapore. Posts on the outer circle by the speed of the Japanese advance in Malaya were unavoidably somewhat widely spaced: and by the dislocation caused at the docks in most warnings came from the 50 kilometre Singapore by air attack. These plans were circle only. Communication between posts and further frustrated by Japanese action against the centre was by W/T or telephone. No shipping at sea en route to the N.E.I. Many radar was available to supplement the observer ships were sunk and others re-routed at sea system, whose volunteer operators were most to other ports. The cumulative effect was dis- enthusiastic but unfortunately had had little ' astrous. Practically all equipment destined for experience in aircraft recognition. Warnings Sumatra went 'astray. In particular no M.T. were consequently erratic. arrived except some light motor cars about the 407. With the most willing and energetic co- 8th February and a few bomb trailers. There operation of the head of the Observer Corps, were only three refuellers available. Most im- steps were immediately taken to improve the portant of all on the domestic side, few rations system. Additional posts were selected, manu- arrived and no tentage and field equipment facture of W/T sets began and additional per- On aerodromes which were practically without sonnel were trained. But events moved too accommodation, the last was a serious loss fast for these measures to take effect. The during the prevailing monsoon weather. original system only was available during the Aircraft spares were also scarce, particularly actual events which followed. those for Blenheims, with which type the two 408. The Dutch army in the N E.I. had no reinforcing squadrons, Nos. 84 and '2ii(B) A. A artillery, having been unable to obtain guns Squadrons, were also equipped. from the belligerents in Europe or from the Three month's anticipated requirements in USA. Thus the aerodromes in Sumatra had petrol, oil and lubricants had arrived at each no A.A. defences. The Dutch had already aerodrome. A limited number of bombs also had aircraft destroyed on the ground at Medan came across and these were distributed to and Pakenbaroe by Japanese low flying P.I. and P.II. fighters. 414. Local buses were requisitioned and 409. By the end of January, however, gradually came into service An organisation Abdacom was able to allot A.A. defences to for the local purchase of supplies was set up P I. and P.II., 6 heavy and 6 Bofors guns to and contracts already placed for the manu- each aerodrome, and 4 of each type to the oil facture of domestic equipment were expedited refinery at Palembang. Ships carrying ammu- and expanded. nition for these guns were unfortunately sunk 415. By the end of the first week of February and there was little ultimately available. There personnel were reasonably fed and accommo- were two Dutch armoured cars and 150 native dated. But later when large numbers arrived, Dutch troops allotted to the defence of each many unexpectedly, from Singapore, accommo- aerodrome. With the arrival of R.A.F. ground dation had to be found at short notice. Thus personnel, aerodrome defence parties were 1,500 were provided for in P.II, where pro- organised to reinforce them. vision was ready for only 250, whilst 2,500 410. There was one Dutch native regiment were housed in schools and cinemas in Palem- for the defence of the whole Palembang area, bang town. but there were no defences on the river leading Throughout, however, operational and main- to the town. On the 23rd January representa- tenance facilities remained primitive in the tions were made both to the Dutch naval and extreme. The aerodromes in Sumatra were military authorities, and to Abdacom, on the virtually landing grounds " in the blue ". inadequacy of the defences in the Palembang All the problems which faced the staff and area, but no reinforcements were available. It units were tackled with energy and spirit, is thought that plans were in hand to strengthen and 'the praiseworthy results which were the defences, as General Sir John Laverack, achieved in the face of every (handicap are a Commanding ist Australian Corps, visited great credit to both. Palembang about 25th January and indicated The Dutch gave magnificent assistance in that an Australian division might be expected all 'these local preparations, headed by the injthe near future. Presumably, owing to the Resident Palembang, who personally inspired general situation in the Far East, the move was and directed the civil authorities in their cancelled. efforts. 411. In short, the aerodrome defences were 416. From the 22nd January onwards, per- very weak and few troops were available for the sonnel and aircraft started streaming in. The defence of the area against invasion. former were in some disorder owing to loss of 1386 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

kit and a splitting up of units through the con- arrive by sea from the Middle East. Provision fused conditions of embarkation at Singapore. for servicing them was therefore made from The situation was further aggravated because amongst technical personnel who hfad been the arrivals included units destined for^Java, evacuated from Singapore. Those surplus to which had been re-routed at sea to Palembang. requirements were sorted out • and despatched All had to be sorted and re-organised, and to Java. units for Java entrained for Oesthaven and shipped thence to Batavia. 420. Aircraft and personnel began to arrive from Singapore earlier than had been antici- 417. On the 23rd January Blenheim IV's of pated, so Wing Commander Powell, S.A.S.O. Nos. 84 and 211 (B) Squadrons began to of the Group, was appointed Station Com- arrive from the Middle East. Their ground mander of P.II until the arrival of Group personnel, who came by sea, landed at Captain McCauley on 2Qth January. The Oesthaven about I4th February. The arrival former then took over command of P.I from of the latter coincided with the Japanese Wing Commander Duncan, the latter being attack on the Palembang area (which will placed in charge of the refuelling party at be related in due course), and they had to be Pakenbaroe. re-embarked for Batavia before they could join their squadrons, which thus never had their own ground staffs with them in Sumatra. OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY No. 225 (B) Each squadron had 24 aircraft when it left GROUP. the Middle East. Sixteen of No. 84 Squadron 22nd January'-~n<\th February. arrived at P.I. 18 of No. 211 Squadron arrived on different days between 23rd January 421. No. 225 (B) Group was responsible for and I4th February (para. 318). Unfortunately reconnaissance northwards from the Sunda the change of route from Singapore to Palem- Straits to cover several convoys that went bang resulted in the loss of 3 aircraft of No. 84 through to Singapore during the last week in Squadron as a result of wrong briefing given January and the first in February. During the to them on leaving Burma about the location of passage of a convoy through the Banka Straits landing grounds in Sumatra. on the 27th January, Blenheim IV's maintained a fighter escort over it because no fighters were Dispositions arranged for Units. available in Sumatra; the Dutch Buffalo 418. On the 23rd January P.I aerodrome Squadron had by this time been withdrawn received its first air attack. Twenty-seven to Java. All other available bomber aircraft unescorted bombers dropped their loads from stood by during these periods in case convoys 22,000 feet with great accuracy, but caused were attacked by Japanese naval forces. The only slight damage to the surface of the aero- whole resources of the Group were directed to- drome. The Dutch Buffalo Squadron on the wards the protection of these convoys during aerodrome established contact with the forma- the two-day periods each took to traverse the tion and damaged at least two Japanese area for which it was responsible. bombers without loss to themselves. It was 422. On the 26th January the Endau land- now evident that our aerodromes in southern ing took place (paras. 332-339) and No. 225 (B) Sumatra were about to be bombed in their turn, in all probability with increasing severity. Group was ordered to despatch all available It was therefore decided to dispose our aircraft to the scene. A force of 6 Hudsons squadrons accordingly. Fortunately it was from No. 62 (B) Squadron and 5 Blenheim I's possible to take advantage of Japanese habits of the same squadron but manned by No. which by this time were well known, complete 84 (B) Squadron aircrews was scraped up. confidence could be placed in the fact that The Hudsons arrived on the scene during the no daylight attack would take place before late afternoon, and landed at Sembawang for 0830 hours or after 1700 hours. Other factors the night, returning to Palembang on the 27th which were taken into consideration were: — January. The Blenheims arrived too late to participate, and so were ordered to land at (a) that P.I. was best adapted to the use Tengah and await orders from A.H Q. This of fighters, and it was soon realised that part force was used on the night 27th-28th January of the Hurricane force, which was known to to bomb Kuantan, returning to Palembang on be arriving in H.M S Indomitable, would 28th January. want to use it: thus it would be advisable to minimise the number of bombers on it. 423. On 26th January 6 Blenheim IV's of (b) that P.II was suitable for all types of 34 (B) Squadron and 6 Hudsons of No. 8 (GR) medium bombers, that its existence was Squadron R.A.A.F. were withdrawn from believed to be unknown to the Japanese. operations and were sent to Java under orders Moreover it had good facilities for dispersal, of A.H.Q. in connection with the arrival of and cover from view in the scrub jungle H.M.S. Indomitable with 48 Hurricanes on which surrounded it. board. This carrier was met at a point some distance to the Southward of Java by the 419. Squadrons were, therefore, to be dis- bombers or G.R. aircraft, on which the Hurri- posed on them as follows: — canes were flown off in Squadron formations P.I. M.V.AF., Nos. 84 and 211 (B) and were navigated to Java by the former Squadrons, serviceable aircraft moving to aircraft. Meanwhile a Catalma provided anti- P.I during Japanese raid hours. submarine patrols for the carrier's protection. P.II. Nos. i (GR), 27 (NF), 34 (B) and The Hurricanes were again navigated during 62 (B) Squadrons, whose aircraft strength their onward journey to P.I, one squadron No. when they arrived from Singapore would be 258 (F) Squadron onward again to Singapore. low. The bombers and G.R. aircraft returned to P.II It will be remembered that the ground parties on 2nd February and became available again of Nos. 84 and 211 (B) Squadrons had yet to for operations. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1387 424. On the 30th January Air Commodore the 30th January wnfi orders from the A.O.C. H. J. F. Hunter, who had been appointed by to site-a Command H.Q. in Sumatra. In this the Air Ministry as Commander designate of he fwas unsuccessful and left on 6th February a Bomber Group in the Far East, arrived in Sumatra and took over Command, Group to organise the R.A.F. Base, Batavia. Captain Bishop becoming S.A.S.O. of the Group. 426. By the 30th January Singapore was clear 425. Incidentally, Air Commodore Silly, of all but fighter aircraft. The strengths, of Deputy A.O.C., also arrived in Palembang on bomber squadrons in Sumatra then were: — No. i Squadron, R A.A.F. ... 16 Hudson II Many overdue for inspection and showing signs of wear and tear. No. 8 Squadron, R.A.F. 6 Hudson III' >Not available until 2nd February. No. 34 Squadron '6 Blenheim IV No. 62 Squadron 10 Hudson III No. 62 Squadron 5 Blenheim I > Particularly poor condition. No. 27 Squadron 3 Blenheim I No. 84 Squadron | Most aircraft required inspection and 10 Blenheim IV > minor repairs, after their long flight No. 211 Squadron 4 Blenheim IV J from the Middle East. M.V.A.F Mixed Flight

427. From the 30th January-5th February, 429. Up to the 6th February No. 225 (B) as convoy duties permitted, the following Group had maintained daily reconnaissances attacks, were carried out during the nights across the South China Sea to Borneo to detect shown:— any Japanese movement southwards. 30th January-3ist January. ,0n the 6th February there were reports of a Japanese force assembling in the Anambas. 6 Blenheims—Ipoh aerodrome—using This was located by Hudson sorties; it was Pakenbaroe for refuelling. attacked on the night 7th-8th February by 3ist January-ist February. 9 Blenheims in most adverse weather con- 6 Hudsons—Alor Star aerodrome—using ditions, and again on the iith-i2th February Medan for refuelling. Hits were scored on by 10 Blenheims. the runway and aerodrome buildings. 430. Throughout this period many transit ist February-2nd February. flights to and from Singapore were carried out 5 Blenheims—Penang aerodrome—using by Hudson aircraft either escorting Hurricanes Medan for refuelling. or assisting in the evacuation of personnel. 2nd February-3rd February. Serviceability in all units was low. 7 Blenheims, 3 Hudsons—Singora docks— The M.V.A.F. at Palembang were invalu- using Medan for refuelling. able throughout in maintaining communications 4th Febraary-5th February. between P.I. and P.II. and Lahat, providing a 5 Blenheims, 4 Hudsons—Kluang aero- twice daily reconnaissance of the river drome—using Singapore for refuelling. approaches, and locating crashed aircraft. 5th February-6th February. 8 Blenheims—proceeded Medan en route ORGANISATION—No. 226 (F) GROUP. Singora: cancelled owing to bad weather. 431. It will be remembered that it had not I2th February-i3th February. been the intention until quite a recent date to 12 Hudsons—Kluang aerodrome. operate any of our fighters on aerodromes in The policy was for aircraft to arrive at the South Sumatra, but that the unexpectedly rapid advanced landing ground just before dusk, Japanese advance right up to the confines of refuel and rest. Then after delivering their Singapore island had made it impracticable for attacks aircraft either returned direct to base, them to use 'the aerodromes on the island except or alternatively refuelled again at the appro- Kallang. It now became necessary, therefore, priate advanced landing ground and returned to make arrangements for them in Sumatra. to base at first light. On account of Japanese On the ist February, 1942, Air Commodore fighter patrols, aircraft could not remain on Vincent arrived in Palembang and formed H.Q. undefended grounds in Northern Sumatra No. 226 (F) Group For this purpose he during daylight hours. brought with him personnel drawn from No. 224 (F) Group, Singapore, and absorbed those of H.Q 266 (F) Wing which was now arriving 428. These long nights in themselves imposed in Sumatra from 'U.K. (para. 373 (6)). great strain on crews, it was still the wet mon- soon season in Sumatra and torrential thunder- 432. In anticipation of the formation of a storms were prevalent, particularly at night. -Fighter organisation, and with the energetic co- Not all the crews of reinforcing squadrons were operation of the Dutch, a Fighter H.Q. Opera- up to the standard of night flying required for tions Room had already been established at such conditions, particularly in the absence of Palembang on the 25th January by H.Q. 225 radio aids to navigation: those that were (B) Group. This Operations Room was con-,, showed outstanding determination and skill, nected to a naval transmitter in the docks some and of them Wing Commander Jeudwine, C.O. distance away, for communicating with air- of No. 84 (B) Squadron, was pre-eminent. It craft. At first, orders from the Operations Con- was only rarely, that results of bombing could troller had to be relayed to aircraft: later this be observed in any detail owing to the bad arrangement was improved and the Controller conditions of visibility. was connected direct to the transmitter.

JCL 1388 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

Arrangements were made for the Gun Opera- OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY No. 226 (F) tions Room to be in the same building.- It GROUP. was also connected with the Dutch;, Civil 440. From the 2nd-5th February many sorties Observer System, which was in course of being were carried out escorting shipping proceeding improved (paras. 406 and 407). north and south through the Banka Straits 433. The role of the Group was: — On the 3rd February, nine aircraft of No. 258 (a) Defence of the Palembang area Squadron left for Singapore to co-operate with (b) Protection of shipping in the Banka a bomber force in a combined attack on Kluang Straits, by means of escort patrols and aerodrome, returning the following day. They offensive sweeps: landed at Tengah, but owing to an error on (c) Up till the gth February 1942 main- the part of that Station, the squadron was not tenance of a token force of fighters in ready to take off at the appointed time, and the Singapore. attack was a failure. 434. V.H.F. was not available, nor was D/F 441. Meanwhile, Japanese reconnaissance was for assisting homing aircraft. The absence of maintained daily over Palembang, and was the latter was a serious handicap because in- quick to note our activity. Air attacks on P.I. tense thunderstorms were frequent and fighter aerodrome took place on 6th, 7th and 8th pilots were apt to lose their bearings when February by formations of bombers escorted by negotiating them. fighters. All aircraft of the Fighter Group were based 442. On the 6th February warning was short, on P.I. aerodrome, the administrative short- and the Hurricanes, caught at a tactical dis- comings of which have already been related. advantage, lost four and claimed one Navy It had a telephone from the Operations Room " O ". No. 232 Squadron were away at in Palembang but no instruments were avail- Singapore on this day conducting operations able for dispersal points round the aerod'ome, from the Island. which slowed down the speed with which 443. On the 7th February warning was even fighters could get away to intercept an enemy shorter, and results were serious. The Japanese raid. combined a high bombing attack with a low Strength of Fighter Squadrons. attack by fighters. Three Hurricanes were 435. About 50 Hurricanes were available destroyed and n others damaged on the when the Group formed, the majority direct ground, whilst three were shot down in the air. from H.M.S. " Indomitable." The remainder In addition four unserviceable Blenheims on were part of the original consignment which had the ground, and one Hudson, which arrived arrived in crates in Singapore on the I3th as the attack was in progress, were destroyed. January. Only one Navy " O " fighter could be claimed. 436. Forty-eight flew off H.M.S. " Indomit- 444. On the 8th and i3th February fresh able " on 2oth January. All flew off with their attacks on the aerodromes took place, but more guns protected with anti-corrosion grease' with warning was received: on the 8th an incon- which they had been provided for the journey clusive interception took place, but on the i3th, Fifteen flew via Batavia and P.I. to Singapore, three Navy " O " fighters and two Army 97 arriving on the 2gth January Their guns bombers were shot "down for the loss of one were cleaned at Seletar. The remainder Hurricane. remained at P.II to have their guns cleaned 445. On the I2th February the Group was before transfer to P.I. Cleaning of these guns reinforced by Wing Commander Maguire and was a slow operation owing to lack of all the eight aircraft. These were part of a reinforcing usual facilities, and considerable delay occurred Wing, No. 226 (F) Wing which included 39 before squadrons were able to go into action. Hurricanes, a pool of 15 pilots, and the ground 437 Pilots were drawn from Nos 232, 242, crews of Nos. 232, 258 and 605 Squadrons: it 258 and 605 (F) Squadrons and operated as had arrived at Batavia by sea on the 4th two composite squadrons—Nos. 232 and 258. February. Most pilots, with the exception of the Com- 446. On the I3th February a further nine manding Officers and Flight Commanders, aircraft from Batavia arrived at P.I. Unfortu- were straight from O.T.U's., and deserve credit nately they did so while the attack on the for the spirit with which they went straight aerodrome was in progress. They were short into action. They had experienced a long of petrol, and in ensuing engagements six were sea voyage, but once again no time coald be either shot down or crashed. spared for acclimatization or training. 447. It was quite evident that the Japanese 438 When they first arrived their aircraft already realised that we were endeavouring were serviced by personnel from Buffalo squad- to establish our squadrons on P I. and that rons From the 6th February onwards how- they were devoting a very considerable effort, ever, ground personnel of No. 266 (F) Wing particularly with strong forces of fighters, to began to arrive via Oesthaven, including prevent it. advanced parties and stores with an Air Stores Park and an R.S.U. There was a deficiency of It is opportune at this juncture to digress for Hurricane tool kits, few battery starters for a 'moment. aircraft, and no battery-charging facilities were Control of operations in Sumatra assumed by available at the aerodrome: factors which con- Abdair. tributed to a low standard of serviceability. 448. It will be realised that A H.Q in Singa- 439 To improve the climb and pore had, by the end of January, much manoeuvrability of the Hurricane the four out- depleted its staff in forming the staffs of the side guns were removed, as it was considered two new Groups, Nos. 225 and.226, in Sumatra, that eight guns were ample against trie un- which were themselves much under require- armoured Japanese aircraft. ments This depletion particularly affected the SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1389 signals organisation. Firstly because its num- located and attacked a convoy consisting of bers were reduced at a time when signals traffic 25-30, "transports, heavily escorted by naval was on the increase consequent upon the split- ve'ssels, at .the northern entrance of the Banka ting up of the Command between Singapore Straits, heading towards the Palembang river. aiid Sumatra. Secondly because it was just The convoy was protected by fighters believed as this time that the trained and experienced to be from one or two aircraft carriers which lady cypher staff had to be evacuated. The were not, however, located. This was followed result was acute congestion of, and increasing up by attacks by all available Hudsons and delays in, signals traffic. This had reached such Blenheims, during which at least 6 transports a pitch on 6th February as to constitute a were sunk or badly damaged. All of these breakdown between Palembang and A.H.Q. in attacks, except the first, were unescorted and Singapore. Abdair therefore assumed opera- carried out in the face of heavy A. A. fire and tional control of all R.A.F. units in Sumatra strong fighter defence. Six to eight of our with effect from yth February. aircraft were shot down or destroyed on landing in a damaged condition, whilst the majority Formation of Westgroup H.Qs in the N.E.I. were hit to a varying degree. Nevertheless, 449 Air Vice-Marshal P. C. Maltby and the successes already achieved more than Air Commodore W. E Staton arrived in balanced those losses and dunng the night of Palembang on the loth February, and on the the I4th everything possible was done to pre- following day the former became A O.C. and pare for further attacks the following morning. the latter S.A.S.O. of Westgroup, which com- 454. The reason why no fighter escort had prised all R.A F. and R.A.A.F. Units of the been available except for the first attack was Far East Command now located in Sumatra because the Japanese had, in co-ordination with and Java. Whilst in Palembang they picked the approach of their convoy, staged a para- up a nucleus staff and moved with it on I2th chute attack on P.I. aerodrome, on which our February to Java, having first reconnoitred fighters were based. It was the only occupied South Sumatra and ascertained that no suitable aerodrome which they had located in Sumatra. site for a H Q. existed in that area. It was Presumably by attacking it they hoped to arranged that, pending the establishment of neutralize all air resistance to the convoy. As H.Q Westgroup in Java, Abdair would con- events will show, their failure to locate P. II tinue in direct control of all operations carried and neutralize it as well was to prove costly. out by Westgroup Units. However, before proceeding further it is now necessary to turn to describe events at P.I. FURTHER OPERATIONS BY 225 (B) GROUP— I2TH TO I4TH FEBRUARY. Parachute attack on Palembang I Aerodrome — 450. From the 7th February onwards, all February. reconnaissance by No. 225 (B) Group had been 455. On I4th February all serviceable discontinued under orders from Abdair, who Hurricanes were airborne, escorting 225 Group's wished to economise air effort by centralising bombers which were attacking enemy shipping all reconnaissance under the Reconnaissance in Banka Straits. At about 0800 hours the Group in Java and thereby increasing the size approach of a large hostile formation was re- 'of the striking force available in Sumatra. ported by the Observer Corps. Attempts to 451. On the I3th February, however, the divert our Hurricanes to intercept it failed be- shipping situation as known at H.Q. 225 (B) cause they were beyond R/T range. Group appeared most confused. Reconnais- 456. Shortly afterwards P.I. was attacked, sance reports made by Reconnaissance Group first by bombers with light bombs, then it was and received through Abdair showed that well shot up by the large escort of fighters, and Japanese naval forces were in strength south of finally troop carriers dropped 2 groups of para- Singapore. These reports were 5-7 hours old chutists, eaoh 150-200 strong, at two points by the time they reached 225 (B) Group owing 400-800 yards to the S. and W in the scrub to bad communications, locations of convoys jungle which surrounds the aerodrome. Simul- had by then completely changed. To confuse taneously 300 more were dropped on the oil matters still further, a stream of shipping of refinery a few miles away near Pladjoe. all kinds was at the same time passing south 457. The aerodrome defences (8 heavy and from Singapore to Jav,a despite the presence of 8 Bofors British A A guns, 150 Dutch infantry Japanese forces; friend was difficult to distin- with 2 old armoured cars and about 60 R.A.F. guish from foe. ground defence gunners of 258 and 605 (F) 452. By the I3th February (p.m.) it was felt Squadrons) warded off an attempt to rush the at H.Q. 225 (B) Group that, despite orders to aerodrome, a number of casualties occurring on the contrary, a reconnaissance must be carried both sides. out to clear the situation and ascertain whether 458. Our absent fighters, now with empty or not there was an immediate threat to tanks and guns, were diverted to P. II. and Sumatra. One Hudson of No i (GR) were subsequently employed against the main Squadron, R A.A.F., was sent in the afternoon enemy attack in the Palembang river. Some and reported a concentration of Japanese landed at P.I, not having received the diver- shipping north of Banka Island, which con- sion order, were refuelled and sent on to P. II. firmed impressions that a landing at Palembang 459. Shortly afterwards the A A. guns, was imminent All available Blenheims were having by then almost exhausted their small 'immediately despatched to attack the enemy stock of ammunition, were . withdrawn to force, but results were difficult to assess owing Palembang Town. Wing Commander Maguire to darkness and rainstorms. organised the withdrawal of unarmed R.A.F. 453. On the I4th February an offensive re- personnel at the same time. He remained him- 'connaissance of 5 Hudsons was despatched so self with, about 60 R.A.F. personnel and some a^ tn be over the area at first light. This Dutch native infantry to deny the aerodrome to I3QO SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

the enemy. One paratroop party had, how- limiting factor in the number of attacks was the ever, reached the road leading to P>ale.mbang speed with which re-armament and refuelling and ambushed part of the withdrawing parties, could be carried out. The Japanese in barges subsequently making a road block with over- and transports fought back for a time with A.A. turned vehicles. and small arms fire but by noo hours this, 460. Two subsequent attempts from Palem- opposition ceased. By 1530 hours all move- bang Town to reinforce the aerodrome were ment on the river was stopped and surviving driven back at the road block ajfter close barges and had pulled in to the quarters fighting. The first, at about noo thick undergrowth. Troops had dispersed on hours, was by an R.A.F. party under F.L. to the river bank, and against them attacks Jackson and P.O. Umphelby who pressed their continued. attack with determination: some of the party 466. It is difficult to assess the damage done. succeeded in reaching the aerodrome through All pilots reported upon its extent. Thousands the scrub and assisted in evacuating some of troops in barges were caught in the open by wounded and unarmed personnel. The second, machine gun fire, particularly by the Hurri- at 16.30 hours, was by a Dutch contingent canes, and very heavy casualties were inflic- which also was able to get some small assist- ted upon them. Bombing accounted for many ance and information to the aerodrome. more, whilst in addition, 3 transports were 461. Wing Commander Maguire's party, by sunk, a number of others were hit and an un- now much reduced, was running out of known number of landing craft were also sunk. ammunition, and had no water or food. Thus, 467. As a fitting finale to the day, a number this handful of men was in no position to con- of Navy ' O ' fighters were located on a strip tinue their gallant denial of the aerodrome to on the beach on Banka Island and were the enemy in face of an attack in force which destroyed by Hurricanes. It is probable that was certain to come at night He therefore these fighters were those which had been en- destroyed all material, including some unser- countered during the initial sorties of this day. viceable aircraft, and withdrew. Being cut off 468. Air action thus brought the landing to from P,alembang Town the party made its way a standstill. The Japanese were punished to the West Coast of Sumatra after an arduous heavily for their failure to locate P.II aero- trek of seven days, during which they drome. Unfortunately, there were no troops destroyed a number of stocks of petrol and or naval light craft available m the area to< some rubber factories. They there rejoined take advantage of the situation their units in Java. 462. Our aircraft at P.II meanwhile were Withdrawal from Sumatra. too busy dealing with far greater a threat to' 469. On the evening of the I4th February, be in a position to help recover P.I aerodrome, A.O.C. 226 Group returned to Palembang from now be related. P.II. Both he and A.O.C. 225 Group were informed by the local Dutch Territorial Com- EVENTShKROM I4TH FEBRUARY (P.M.)— mander that the situation was well under I&TH FEBRUARY. control and that he had every hope of eliminat- ing the paratroops. He gave the impression mese^^Qonvoy off Palembang, that a drive was to take place that night to February. ^\^ clear the area. Contrary orders evidently were 463. By I4th February (p\n.) therefore, the received later by him, because a start was made total Air Forces located in Sumatra were at during the night in burning oil and rubber P.II aerodrome. The strength assisted of: — stocks in the town, and in the destruction of •\~-32, Hurricanes. the oil refinery area -35 Blenheim I's and IV's—many of whioh 470. When A.0 C's. Nos. 225 and 226 Groups were unserviceable. saw the Dutch Territorial Commander early 3 Hudsons (the remainder of the Hudson on the morning of the I5th, they found that force was flown to Java for repairs on the the Dutch H.Q. had closed and that the Terri- I4th February). torial Commander himself considered it too- The whole was placed under the command late to restore the situation. He was himself of the Station Commander P.II, Group Captain about to leave for Lahat in the South McCauley, who was instructed by the A.O.C. 471. The Dutch Territorial Commander also No. 225 (B) Group to continue attacks on the stated that the ferries across the river and the Japanese convoy entering the Palembang River railhead facilities would be blown in one hour's- from first light on the I5th (paras. 452-4). time, with the ob]ect of embarrassing the 464. Reconnaissance on the I5th pin-pointed Japanese advance towards the South. In con- the position of transports and barges, and sequence, A.O.C. No. 225 Group ordered the revealed approximately 20 naval vessels and immediate evacuation of the town by all transports steaming "through the Banka Straits, remaining R A.F. personnel. This was effected' whilst other transports and landing craft were by road and rail to Oesthaven. in the river mouth. 472. A further "paratroop landing took place 465 The first attack, off at 0630 hours, was at P.I. later during the morning of the I5th, made by 6 Blenheims escorted by Hurricanes. and the Japanese established themselves in the It met strong fighter opposition but pressed vicinity of Palembang town. There was thus •home the attack. From then onwards until a distinct possibility that P.II. aerodrome might 1530 hours a .constant stream of our aircraft be over-run -during the night I5th/i6tb proceeded to attack the convoy, and, as all February. Also' by I5th February (p.m) stocks enemy fighter opposition had ceased, Hurri- of bombs and ammunition at P.II were almost canes were employed in shooting up barges expended, whilst food supplies were cut off. whilst bombers similarly expended their am- 473. In view of these factors and the lack of munition after dropping their bombs. The any supporting troops, Abdair approved the SUPPLEMENT ,TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 evacuation back to Java of all R.A.F. units, loading the ship to the gunwales with R.A F. and this was effected by road and rail on the eqiSiphYeht and some Bofors ammunition. At evening of the I5th via Oesthaven. All flyable the'^same time the railway track was damaged, aircraft were flown to Java, the remainder loaded rolling stock and petrol dumps were destroyed. Aircraft of Nos. 84 and 211 (B) fired, and the water by the dockside was ob- Squadrons, which had borne the brunt of the structed by pushing into the sea abandoned \ attacks during the day, finished their last sorties heavy M.T. and other vehicles. too late to proceed that evening They re- mained on the aerodrome, flying to Java on 479. That this work of salvage and destruc- the morning of the i6th February. tion proceeded unhampered by the enemy must not detract from the spirit shown by both the 474. Personnel at landing grounds in N. and R.A.F. party and the crew of H.M.S. Central Sumatra were instructed to proceed " Ballarat," who volunteered for the adventure by road to west coast ports for evacuation in with a full knowledge of the hazards involved. accordance with pre-arranged plans. As it happened, air reconnaissances from 475. Special mention must be made here of Java had made it clear that the casualties and the valuable services rendered by the General disorganisation caused as a result of our air Manager, Sumatra Railways Despite orders attacks on the convoy off Palembang during received from his superior authorities he delayed the I4th and I5th February had been so severe destruction of rail facilities and personally that the Japanese were in no state to run arranged for the trains required during the night through from Palembang to.Oesthaven at the I5th/i6th February. He himself did not leave speed which had been anticipated when the until after the departure of the last train con- port was evacuated, but Group Captain veying R.A.F. personnel. . Nicholetts and his party were unaware of this Credit is also due to Group Captain A. G. fact. Bishop for the part he played in Sumatra He put our squadrons on their feet and organised SECTION IV. the staff despite primitive circumstances. He contributed in no small degree to the success SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS BASED of the operations which were conducted in ON JAVA. Sumatra, and finally he personally supervised the successful withdrawal of the force from the INTRODUCTION. Palembang area when its position there was no longer tenable. Early Days of. War m the N.EJ. 476. At Oesthaven on the i6th February, 480. Before hostilities had broken out in the it was found that the Dutch had already fired Far East the Dutch considered that their best the bazaar and destroyed all military property. interests lay in co-operating with the British At the docks the British Military Embarkation from the outset with the object of repelling a Commandant stated that he had been given Japanese attack in its early stages. They felt orders that all personnel were to be clear by confident that, by joint means, an attack could midnight; personnel only were to be evacuated, be halted in the north and that war would not M.T. or equipment. As a result, essential never reach Java itself. and vital aircraft equipment, including that 481. Dutch air units, therefore, operated from brought from Palembang, was left behind. This ' the first day of war in 'Malaya, Borneo and the was particularly unfortunate because spare northern islands of the N.E.I. There they engines and other urgent stores for the Hurri- suffered considerable casualties. Dutch naval canes which had been landed at- Oesthaven units also played an early part and suffered with No. 41 Air Stores Park, of No. 266(F) considerably. Wing, were left behind. No. 266(F) Wing's R.S.U. similarly lost valuable equipment. . 482. Early reverses caused apprehension but A.A. guns and ammunition which had been acted as a spur to Dutch co-operation. Their brought to the port from P.I. and P.II aero- will to help was most marked although their dromes had also to be abandoned. Section IV resources were very limited. of this Report will show that the loss of this R.A.F. and A.A. equipment had serious results Formation of H~Q. S.W* Pacific Command during operations conducted later in Java. (Abda.com) in Java. Fortunately the light tanks were re-embarked, 483. On I5th January, 1942, Sir Archibald and all personnel, Army and R.A.F., were Wavell arrived in Java to take control of all evacuated., Allied Forces in the S.W. Pacific and formed his H.Q. (Abdacom) near Bandoeng. Con- 477. The evacuation of the port was covered fidence was raised by this and by the news of by a screen of R.A.F. personnel from No. 84 expected reinforcements—British, Australian (B) Squadron acting under the command of Group Captain G. E. Nicholetts, who had and American—and still further by the actual been appointed R.A.F. Base Control Officer arrival, towards the end of January and early about ten days previously. February, of the first of them. More were on the way. 478. It was unfortunate that Oesthaven was evacuated so hastily. Two days later Group 484. Even when the British forces in Malaya Captain Nicholetts, with a party of 50 volun- were, by 3ist January, invested on Singapore teers of No. 605 (F) Squadron, returned from Island, it was believed that that fortress, the Batavia to Oesthaven by sea in H.M.S. key of the Far East, would hold out for some " Ballarat " which was commanded by a Royal while. This would provide the necessary time Australian Naval Reserve officer specially ap- for adequate forces to be built up in the N.E.I, pointed for the voyage owing to his knowledge for the successful defence of the rest of the Far of Oesthaven Harbour. On arrival, early on East. the i8th, twelve hours were spent by the party Then came a series of unpleasant events. I3Q2 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 Effect in the N.E.I, of Japanese Capture of 494. Such was the situation in Batavia on Singapore and Sumatra. ... - gnr 16th February. It was from personnel and 485. On 8th February the Japanese secured equipment so placed that a maximum air fight- a foothold on Singapore Island and within a ing strength with ancillary services had to be couple of1 days its imminent capitulation became evolved, and surpluses evacuated from Java. evident. Twelve days were destined to be available for 486. On I4th February they attacked and this work before the Japanese landed in Java- overran South Sumatra, admittedly at heavy cost. The British forces, mainly air units, had R A.F. RE-ORGANISATION IN JAVA. to withdraw to Java. Situation on i6th February. 487. Between I2th and i8th February large 495. On the i6th February, the date of the numbers of personnel, evacuated from Singa- evacuation of Sumatra, the position in Java pore and Sumatra, arrived in considerable con- was as follows:— fusion m Western Java: amongst them were approximately 10,000 R.A.F. of all ranks. (a) H.Q. Westgroup (A.O.C.—A.V.M. They augmented considerable numbers of P.C. Maltby)—A.O.C. and a nucleus staff refugees who had preceded them in a steadily had arrived at Soekaboerm on I4th February growing stream from the same places and from and were organising a H.Q. there; this was other N.E.I. Islands. still known as 'Westgroup. Soekaboemi was chosen because it is centrally located in 5. At this time, mid-February, Abdacom Western Java, where all Westgroup units was still established in Bandoeng, reinforce- were being located. Westgroup assumed ad- ments were arriving and more were expected. ministrative responsibility for its units on Nevertheless it was evident now that 'Java i6th February. As it was not yet ready to would be attacked in the near future. A take operational control, this was retained by civilian exodus from Java on a grand scale Abdair, which had assumed it on 7th replaced the small stream which had been leav- February whilst units were still operating in ing for some time through Sourabaya and Sumatra (para. 448). Bata'via. (b) No. 205 (F.B.) Squadron—(Wing Congestion in Batavia. Commander 'Councell in Command) had 489. At Batavia the exodus became confused arrived in Batavia on ist February and was with incoming reinforcements and evacuees operating as part of the Allied Reconnaissance from Singapore and Sumatra. For several Group (Recgroup), using anchorages at days the harbour of Batavia, and the roadstead Batavia and Oesthaven. outside, were congested with shipping. This (c) Nos 36 and 100 (T.B.) Squadrons— unloaded as best it could. The result was that (Squadron Leader Wilkins in Command). quays, warehouses and the roads leading from Aircraft had arrived on 2g/30th January them rapidly became blocked with an inextric- from Singapore for re-organisation. After able confusion of merchandise, equipment, being based on various aerodromes they M.T., abandoned cars and goods of every de- were rejoined by their ground personnel on, scription. The town of Batavia became con- I5th February at Tjikampek. gested with personnel—outgoing refugees, in- (d) No. 153 M.U.—(G/Capt. Ridgway in coming reinforcements, incoming evacuees and command) had arrived in Java on the gth Dutch troops mobilised for defence of the January and moved to Djoqacarta, where locality. it was ready to start work on I5th January. (e) No. 152 M.U—(Squadron Leader 490. Into this confused area the R.A.F. S. G. Aylwin in command) had arrived in •evacuated from Singapore and Sumatra, Batavia on I4th February and moved on the arrived, for th^most part between 12th and i8th February. I7th to Poerbolinggo to form a transit store. (/) R.A.F. Base, Batavia (Group Captain 491. Those from Singapore had embarked Ridgway in command until i8th February there' under heavy air attack on shipping of all 1942 when Air Commodore Silly relieved kinds as it came to hand, and amongst a num- him). This base had been established in ber of civilian refugees. Units had become Batavia on the 24th January to organise the much mixed, many personnel were separated reception, sorting and despatch of personnel from units and 'many had become separated arriving by sea from Singapore and Sumatra from their equipment. It had proved im- and of air reinforcements from the Middle practicable to embark much equipment owing East and the United Kingdom. It also organ- to conditions at Singapore docks, and some of ised the reception and erecting of a number what had been embarked had been lost at sea of boxed Hurricanes. By i8th February this- through enemy action. 'base was administering 5 transit camps m 492. Units from Sumatra had also suffered Batavia 'and one at Buitenzorg. Personnel loss of their equipment by reason of the hasty- of all other units not mentioned in (a) to (e) withdrawal from aerodromes near Palembang, above passed through this base for re- and still more so by circumstances at the port organisation and disposal, a total of over in South Sumatra, Oesthaven, at which they 12,000 being handled. .had embarked: such small amount of equip- (g) Certain A.M.E. Units were installing ment as they had possessed in Sumatra, and radar facilities m the Batavia and Sourabaya which -they had succeeded in removing to Oest- areas. haven, could not be embarked and brought (h) Thirty-nine crated Hurricanes had -with-them (para. 476). been erected in Batavia during the first ten 493. An appreciable number of bombers arid days of February. Seventeen had pro- fighters had, however, reached aerodromes 'in ceeded to No. 266 (F) Wing in Sumatra, the Batavia district, though a high proportion where a number of them were lost. Twelve of them were unfit for operations. were handed over 'by Abdair to the Dutch SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1393 Army Air Force. For diplomatic reasons Re-formation of Bomber and Fighter Groups. they could not be withdrawn in spite of the 498. On i8th February H.Q. Nos. 225 (B) losses which our fighter squadrons had just and 226 (F) Groups were re-formed in skeleton sustained in Sumatra. Thus only 10 were to assist Westgroup in re-establishing their left as replacements for our squadrons. squadrons in Java. Allocation of Aerodromes. No. 225 (B) Group, under Air Commodore 496. On the evacuation of Sumatra, on i6th Hunter, re-formed in Bandoeng. Bomber aero- February, Abdair allocated aerodromes as dromes were visited and assistance given, in follows: — co-operation with the Dutch, to units to solve (a) All Hudsons to Samplak: their acute problems of housing, rationing and (b) All Blenheims to Kalid]ati: transportation. Air Commodore Hunter was (c) All fighters to Tjililitan. absorbed into Abdair on igth February to act as A.O.A.; the remaining members of Group These aerodromes had not been highly H.Q. were absorbed into H.Q. Westgroup on developed, dispersal being limited, aerodrome its arrival in Bandoeng on the 23rd February. ground defence weak, internal signals and night flying arrangements lacking. No>. A.A. defences No. 266 (F) Group, under Air Commodore were available. Vincent, took charge of Nos. 232 (F) and 605 (F) Squadrons, and of a fighter operations room 497. On the 18th February, in view of the in Batavia and its local warning system. This reduced strength of squadrons and the fact had made good progress during the preceding that no further bomber reinforcements could few days, thanks largely to the initiative of be expected, A.O.C. Westgroup decided to con- Wing Commander Bell, previously Station centrate all aircraft by types into selected Commander at Kallang, Singapore. Owing to squadrons as follows:— the highly developed nature of communica- (a) S&mplak: tions in Java, efficient operations and filter Station Commander—Group Captain rooms were quickly connected to the Dutch Brown, No I (GR) Squadron, R.A A.F. Observer 'Corps, the fighter aerodrome, the —Commander, W/Cdr. R. H. Davies. A.A. defences of Batavia, and Abdair's (later Strength 14 Hudson IIJs and 12 Hudson Britair's) operations room in Bandoeng. Two Ill's (about 12 operationally serviceable). R D.F. and two G.L. sets were quickly erected (b) Kalidjatf in the Batavia district and were also connected Station Commander—Group Captain with them. The Dutch provided the utmost Whistondale (pending availability of Group assistance, including the provision of many Captain Nicholetts) No. 84 (B) Squadron— volunteer Dutch youths and women to man Commander, W/Cdr. Jeudwine. Strength 26 the filter and operations rooms; their alertness Blenheims (about 6 operationally service- and enthusiasm could hardly have been able). bettered. (c) Tjikampek: 499. To maintain this Force it was decided No. 36 (TB) Squadron—Commander, to retain:— S/Ldr. Wilkins. Strength 9 Vildebeestes and (a) No. 153 M.U. (already organised for i Albacore. (No torpedo facilities were avail- work at Djocjacarta). able in Java.) (b) No. 81 R.S.U. (d) Tjihlitan: (c) No. 41 Air Stores Park for Unit supply. No. 232 * (F) Squadron—Commander, (d) An improvised Air Stores Park for S/Ldr. Brooker. collection and sorting of equipment. No. 605 (F) Squadron—Commander, 500. Establishments were drawn up and S/Ldr. Wright. issued; and instructions were given that all Total strength of 25 Hurricanes (about personnel surplus to establishment were to be 18 operationally serviceable). evacuated via the R.A.F. Base, Batavia, as The former had been in action since its arrival shipping became available and as far as pos- in the Far East,' in Singapore and Sumatra, sible with their original units. Preference was and had been kept up to strength by absorbing to be given in the following order, after women No. 232 (F) Squadron proper which had and children evacuees—formed units, aircrews, arrived in H.M.S. Indomitable. It was now technical personnel and selected details. very depleted again, and in turn absorbed 501. Aircraft serviceability for various practically the whole of No. 242 (F) Squadron reasons was low: the Hudson and Blenheim also from H.M.S. Indomitable—but the Squadrons had about six serviceable each, the original designation of the squadron, No. 232 two fighter squadrons not more than 18 in all. (F) Squadron, was retained. For the next few days minor operations only No. 605 (F) Squadron had hitherto been were carried out (under Abdair orders), and mainly employed in erecting Hurricanes for all efforts were directed towards improving the No. 266 (F) Wing. But it was now armed condition of aircraft and to getting ready gener- with a small quota of aircraft and came into ally for the serious operations to come. action on 23rd February. The decision to retain two fighter squadrons Am OPERATIONS i8xH TO 24™ FEBRUARY. in Java was taken in expectation of the arrival . 502. While re-organisation described above ofU.S.S. " Langley," a U.S.A. aircraft carrier, was progressing under Westgroup direction, the with a consignment of P.40 fighters on board, following operations were carried out under the with which it was hoped to arm one of them, directions of Abdair. the other retaining Hurricanes. Unfortunately 503. On the i8th February, one Hudson re- the " Langley " was later sunk when approach- connoitred the port of Oesthaven and the road ing Java and the expectation was never to Palenrbang. No signs of Japanese activity realis-ed. were observed. 1394 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 504. On the igth February all available (5) Dutch Authorities on 25th February, and per- Blenheims attacked shipping at Paienlfeang,. sonnel of Abdacom left Java on 25th and 26th On this day a bombing attack was launched February. by the Japanese against Semplak and 6 Hud- 512. Before he left Java Sir Archibald sons were destroyed. Semplak had no A.A. Wavell issued his instructions to the A.O.C. defences and dispersal facilities were poor. Britair (Air Vice Marshal Maltby). They 505. On the 20th February 4 Hudsons and were to the effect that:— 3 Blenheims again bombed shipping at Palem- (a) He was to command all R.A.F. units bang in the face of severe fighter opposition left in Java. from aircraft based on P.I. The following day (b) He would exercise Command under 2 Hudsons and 5 Blenheims continued these the orders of General van Oyen, the Dutch attacks. On this occasion it was possible to A.O.C. in Java, who, m turn, was under observe results, hits were obtained and one Command ot the Dutch C.-in-C., General ter io,ooo-ton ship was set on fire. Poorten. (c) The troops left in Java 506. On the 22nd February, Semplak, which were under command of Major-General had no A.A. defences, sustained low flying H. D. W. Sitwell who would receive his attacks by some 20 fighters. Six Hudsons were orders from General ter Poorten. burnt out and three others damaged beyond (d) To co-operate with the Dutch and to repair. As a result of this raid Abdadr go on fighting as long as they continued approved the move of the remains of No. I effective resistance. (G.R.) Squadron R.A.A.F. to Kalidjati where (e) Thereafter to do the utmost to evacuate a light battery (.8 Bofors) had by 20th Feb- remaining personnel. ruary been located as part of the aerodrome (/) To ensure that no undamaged equip- defence. Six aircraft were transferred the next ment fell into enemy hands. day, a rear party being left at Semplak to (g) As senior British Officer in- Java to repair the unserviceable aircraft on the aero- act as signals link between all British forces drome and to strip the rest of serviceable paits. in the island and their service departments Whilst they were there, another attack was in London, Delhi, Washington and Mel- sustained on 24th February, and more aircraft, bourne. unserviceable, were destroyed. (h) That no help from outside could be 507. On the 23rd February, 3 Blenheims expected for a long time. bombed 4 submarines off the coast and claimed 513. Gen. van Oyen issued instructions that that one had been sunk. the operations room, vacated by Abdair, was to be maintained for the combined use of his 508. On the 24th February, Kalidjati was H.Q. and of Britair, and that it was to be bombed by the enemy, and again twice on the organised for covering all operations in the 26th. The Bofors guns successfully prevented S.W. Pacific. This necessitated a last minute a low flying attack from developing on the augmentation of Britair's staff. latter date. 514. As the Japanese invasion fleet began its 509. Four Blenheims attacked P.I on the approach to Java, from bases in and around 25th February. By this time there were only Borneo, on 25th February, energetic action was 2 Hudsons operationally serviceable, with 9 essential for collecting and organising the neces- others repairable: the Blenheim position, how- sary personnel and material, and for establish- ever, was slowly improving. ing the contacts with the various Dutch, Ameri- can and British authorities with whom Brdtair SUPREME ALLIED H.Q. S.W. PACIFIC LEAVES was now to deal. JAVA. 515. During the following days encouraging 510. The enemy's unexpectedly rapid ad- messages were received from the- Prime Minister, vance had frustrated the hopes, originally the Secretary of State for Air, and from the entertained, of building up a large Aflied Chief of the Air Staff, emphasising the im- strength in the S.W. Pacific under the direction portance of every day which could be gained of Abdacom in Java, which was by now under by resistance in Java These were promul- imminent threat of invasion. Being without gated. appropriate forces to handle, Abdacom could FORCES AVAILABLE AND DUTCH PLAN FOR serve no useful purpose by remain-ing in the DEFENCE OF JAVA. island: on the contrary such action could only result in the loss of a valuable Allied staff, the 516. Before proceeding further with the capture of which would have given great pres- narrative of events it is advisable to give a tige to the enemy. On 22nd February its brief description- of the outstanding topo- withdrawal was ordered. graphical and climatic features of Java, of the Dutch naval, army and air resources, and of 511. It was decided that the British forces the Dutch plan of defence. remaining in the island should in future operate under the Dutch Naval and Army ' Com- Topography and Weather. manders-m-Chief in the N.E.I. In conformity 517. Java is approximately 650 miles long with this decision H.Q. Westgroup moved on with an average width of 80 miles. Its 23rd February from Soekaboemi and took over northern coast, the one 'most exposed to the H.Q. in Bandoeng vacated by Abdair. It Japanese attack, affords innumerable landing took over operational control of its squadrons beaches throughout its length. The western from Abdair on 24th February and was re- end is dominated by aerodromes in South named Britair. It was placed under the orders Sumatra. Highly developed road and rail of Maj.-Gen. van Oyen, the Dutch A.O.C., communications cover the Island, the main whose staff was already installed in Abdair's arterial lines of which run east to west: these operations room. Command passed to' the are exposed at many points throughout their SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1395 length to attack by landings on the northern (•c) To the Dutch Army was added a small coast. An outstanding feature of the island British force under the direction of Major- is its mountainous southern coast, parallel to General H. D. W. Sitwell. It consisted of a which run a series of mountainous massifs along squadron of light tanks, two Australian in- the centre of the island. During the season fantry (one a machine-gun unit with- under consideration, S.W. winds pile up tropi- out its machine guns) and a number of small cal thunderstorms on them from midday until administrative units. The whole was organised far into the night. Whilst these are raging, hastily into a mobile striking force for opera- aircraft based on aerodromes in the southern1 tion in western Java, and was under the com- (mountainous) half of the island are, for the mand of Brigadier A. S. Blackburn, V.C. most part, seriously handicapped by them. (Australian Imperial Forces). To it were Squadrons based on aerodromes along the added later an American Field Battalion- much northern coastal strip are, on the other hand, under strength, and a contingent of 450 R.A.F not so severely 'handicapped: although heavy airmen hastily armed and trained as infantry cloud and rain occur throughout the afternoon under Wing Commander Alexander. It was and night, aircraft can effectively operate at all called '' Blackforce ". It co-operated closely hours. Mornings are usually bright and cloud- with the Dutch troops (under the command less Aerodromes in the northern coastal strip of General Schilling) located in western Java are, however, sited not far from exposed land- for the defence of the Batavia area. ing beaches Their occupation was, therefore, (d) Certain British A.A. batteries were con- not unattended by risk. centrated on aerodrome defence in Western Java as follows:— Naval, Army and Air Resources. Tjilihtan—12 Bofors guns soon after I5th High Command. February. Also one battalion Australian In- 518. Bandoeng, in central western Java, was fantry relieved on 25th February by I5th the wartime seat of the Dutch Government, and Heavy A.A. Battery armed as infantry. The of Naval and Military Headquarters. The former were relieved from aerodrome defence latter was known as A.H.K. (The Dutch have duties because they were required as part of no separate air force—their navy and army- " Blackforce ". having their own air contingents.) Kalidjati—10 Bofors guns soon- after I5th February. Also some Dutch Infantry re- The High Dutch Commanders were — lieved on night 28th February/ist March iby Governor-General of N E I.—Jonkheer I2th Heavy A.A. Battery hastily armed as Dr. A. W. L. Tjardo van Starkenborgh infantry. The former were wanted for ser- Stachouwer. vice with the Dutch field army. C.-m-C. Royal N.E.I. Navy—Admiral Thus there were no Heavy A.A. guns for Helfrich. the defence of these aerodromes. The few C.-m-iC. Royal N E.I. Army—Lt.-Gen. available on the island were wanted at more ter Poorten. vulnerable places, including the Naval base at Sourabaya. Navy Air Forces. 519. A Combined Allied Fleet was based on Sourabaya, with a subsidiary base at Batavia. 521. (a) The Dutch had about 5 Bomber, It consisted of S cruisers (3 British, 2 Austra- 3 Fighter and 2 Observation Squadrons in Java, lian, i American, 2 Dutch), u destroyers (5 most of which were much depleted as the result British, 4 American and 2 Dutch) some Dutch of protracted operations in the north. Service- submannes and other auxiliary craft, and was ability of aircraft was low. They and their commanded by Vice Admiral C E. L. Helfrich, administrative units operated under Dutch con- Royal Netherlands Navy, as Commander of trol decentralised from Bandoeng. Naval Forces. He had assumed command on (b) There were 12 to 15 American heavy the nth February. bombers ' (believed to be B.iy's) and a few fighters (P.4o's). Whole serviceability was Army. low. These were located under American 520. (a) The Dutch had approximately control in east and central Java. 25,000 regular troops, made up of four regi- (c) There was also a mixed Dutch, American ments of infantry (native) with artillery, garri- and British Reconnaissance -Group based in son and ancillary uni'ts. They had a few obso- Java for seaward reconnaissance, which lete A.F.V.'s, having been unable to dbtain operated under a Dutch Commander. modern tanks .from the Allies. 'Units had been No. 205 (F.B.) Squadron formed part-of it. heavily depleted of white personnel for various (d) To this force was to be added the British reasons, from a proportion of one white to Air Contingent under Westgroup, alias Britair, five native to a proportion of one to about • whose re-organ isation has already been forty. An attempt to re-arm and to re-organise described. on modern lines had. failed because modern During the time that Abdair remained in armaments were unobtainable for the new units Java, all the above air formations acted under which had been formed for handling them. its direction, control of the first two being exer- (b) In addition there was a Home Guard cised through the Dutch A.O.C., General van of about 40,000. They were static in role, Oyen. When Abdair left Java, the latter took and necessarily poorly armed and trained. command of them all. Those in west Java' were reported to be the best, particularly those in the vicinity of Soe- Strategy -- bang near Kalidjati aerodrome (eventually to 522. An invasion of Java was considered be occupied by British 'bombers) where there most likely to approach down the east or west were about' 17000 men with twelve anfcoured sides of Borneo, ,or both. The .Dutch .High cars.. , , '- ~ ' . " Command feared simultaneous landings at both 1396 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

ends of the islands, near Sourabaya in the1 east of Sourabaya about midnight 28th February /ist and in the Sunda Straits on the west: this was March. the most difficult form of attack to parry, and 529. Meanwhile the situation on the west side it was to be expected that the enemy would of Borneo had not developed so clearly. In- adopt it. A landing in central Java was not vasion forces had been suspected in the Natuna thought to be likely. The Dutch defence plan or Anambas Islands and possibly at Muntok was laid accordingly. on ,Banka Island. Reconnaissances had failed up to 26th February to clarify the situation. Dutch Plan. 523. This was:— 530. On the 27th February, a small convoy with escort was located about 50 miles south (a) To watch, by means of air reconnais- of the southern tip of Banka Island steaming sance, as far northwards as possible on both slowly on a north-easterly course. This might sides of Borneo, and the whole of the Java or anight not be part of an invading convoy Sea—this being undertaken by the Recon- " marking time " before turning south towards naissance Group. Submarines supplemented Western Java. this watch. (&) An invasion was to be opposed as far 531. On the 28th February about noon, the out to sea as possible by air action: all situation became clearer. A convoy was bomber and reconnaissance aircraft were to sighted at that hour approximately 100 miles tbe used for the purpose when occasion aiose. north-east of Batavia steaming on an easterly (c) A Combined Allied Naval Striking course at high speed. It consisted of n trans- Force of 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers was ports; one cruiser and three destroyers were dis- based at Sourabaya and would engage the posed some 30 miles to the south and on a main threat when it appeared. parallel course. Another and larger convoy (d) Finally, should the enemy land, he was was located to the north-west: strength, course to be resisted on the beaches at certain points and speed were not clear. Both were at a only. Suitable landing .beaches were so distance which would make landings possible at numerous that only a few of the most obvious two- points in western Java about midnight. could be defended. Elsewhere the plan was 532. The moon was one day past full, wind to keep troops in local reserve and to counter- off shore, ideal conditions for landing. All was attack landings with them, the Army falling evidently set for simultaneous landings—one at back if necessary on to previously prepared the eastern end of Java probably just west of positions covered toy demolitions. Sourabaya, and two at the western end of Java (e) As a successful invasion was all too in the vicinity of Batavia. probable it was decided that there should be two centres for a final stand, a decision which BOMBER OPERATIONS 27x11 FEBRUARY was enforced by a shortage of troops and by TO IST MARCH. the great length of the island. The two 533. To revert to the night of 27th/28th chosen centres were Malang Plateau in the February. It then appeared that the major 'east and Bandoeng volcanic plateau in the threat would develop against Eastern Java. west. It was therefore decided to move No. 36 (T.B.) Squadron (9 Vildebeestes and i Albacore) at APPROACH OF ENEMY CONVOYS. once to Madioen (near Sourabaya) to co- 524. On the 25th February air reconnais- operate with American B.i7's in resisting it. sance on the east side of Borneo reported that No. 36 (T.B.) Squadron arrived at Madioen on shipping, which had been collecting for some time the afternoon of 28th February, and during the past in ports in .the Macassar Straits, was forming night 28th February/ist March earned out two up at Balikpapan, evidently hi preparation for sorties per aircraft, the first against transports, putting to sea. The invasion of Java was the second against landing barges. The first imminent. attack entailed a long search because reconnais- 525. On 26th February a convoy of more sance information with which they had been than 50 ships and transports, accompanied by briefed proved inaccurate. A convoy of 28 a strong naval escort, was located in the ships was eventually found 5 miles off the southern end of the Macassar Straits steaming Coast, north of Rembang, some 100 miles west south. of Sourabaya. Most pilots claimed hits on transports, and execution amongst the barges. 526. On the 27th February it was again Subsequent reports received from American located, now in the Java Sea, on a course and H.Q. in the area stated that attacks had been speed which would bring it to the north coast, most successful and that No. 36 (T.B.) westward of Sourabaya, at midnight 27th/28th Squadron had sunk .8 ships—the Americans February.i themselves claimed 7 others: but it has not 527. The Allied Fleet put to sea and fought been possible to verify this seemingly very high an engagement with the escort of heavy cruisers rate of success. On completion of the second and destroyers during the night 27th/28th attack, No. 36 (T.B.) Squadron returned February. The latter was very superior in direct to Tjikampek, less three aircraft which numbers, weight and metal. The Allied ships had 'been shot down including that of the C.O., were either sunk or disabled. This gallant Squadron Leader J. T. Wilkins, an outstanding action afforded the land defences another leader who was unfortunately killed. Each 24 hours' grace, because the transports turned aircrew of this squadron, operating from a away northwards at the beginning of the sea strange aerodrome, thus carried out two night action and steamed towards Borneo during the attacks in 24 hours, involving-over 15 hours night. flying in open cockpits—an excellent achieve- "528. On 28th February the transports were ment. again located steaming south at a speed which 5341 In the meantime,-Jduring 28th February, would bring them to landing-beaches" westwa-rd the threat to western Java had crystallised SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1397

(para. 531) in the form of 'two Japanese con- provided their landings with strong Navy voys approaching from the north with the ' 0 ' fighter cover. It was therefore decided evident intention of landing on 'both sides of to employ 'bombers daily during the late Batavia. afternoons (when cloud cover could be re- lied upon) and under cover of darkness, and 535. All available Blenheims and Hudsons to use all available fighters, which could look were directed against that convoy, which was after themselves, to continue the opposition, approaching the Ibeaches eastward of Batavia. during the cloudless mornings. During the night 28th February/ist March, 26 Blenheim and 6 Hudson sorties were carried •539. On completion of the night's work, the out against it from Kalidjati. The first attack Station Commander at Kahdjati, Group Cap- found it 50 miles north of Entanwetan, a point tain Whistondale, was instructed at 0700 hours, on the north coast about 80 miles east of ist March, to disperse his aircraft and to pre- Batavia: it was steaming south at high speed. pare them for further operations later in the Weather conditions were bad and 'by this time day. only one narrow stnp was serviceable on the Shortly after daybreak the Dutch squadrons aerodrome. Not all pilots were sufficiently well withdrew from Kalidjati aerodrome, under trained to cope with the conditions: of those General van Oyen's orders as it later trans- that were, some carried out three sorties each. pired, although no information that they were There is no doubt that attacks were successful going to do so was given to the A.O.C. or his and were pressed home from a low level with staff. Nor were the latter kept informed that great determination. When attacks began, 15 the Dutch counter attack had failed or that ships formed the convoy: early on ist March, the Dutch defences between the beaches and only 7 were seen anchored off the disembark- Kalidjati had not been able to put up the ation ibeach which was at Eritanwetan. At resistance it had been understood they would least three, perhaps more of its ships, are be- offer. It is probable that this failure was due lieved to have been sunk. The larger figure to 'the fact that time had been insufficient for may be an exaggeration, as other Japanese the wheels of co-operation of the recently estab- ships were seen on ist March lying off some lished staffs (see para. 514) to get run m, and miles N.W. of the main convoy. that there was a similar unestablished close touch between the aerodrome and the local 536. Disembarkation at Eritanwetan began Dutch Commander in Soebang. It had a at about oioo hours on ist 'March and con- disastrous sequel. tinued during the rest of the night, despite a number of attacks iby our aircraft while landing 540. About 1030 hours the aerodrome was was in progress. overrun by Japanese llight tanks supported by infantry in lorries—part of the force which had 537. During the night, the Dutch AO.C., landed at Eritanwetan some hours earlier— General van Oyen, advised Air Vice Marshal and the aerodrome was captured. The whole Maltby that the bomber force at Kalidjati force of Blenheims, by now reduced to 8 would be more favourably placed for opposing serviceable aircraft, being fully dispersed, was the enemy landings if it remained there than captured. 4 Hudsons which were dispersed on if it were withdrawn to aerodromes further in- the aerodrome managed to take off under fire land amongst the hills. He did not appear to of light tanks, which were by now on the aero- have much confidence in the weak detachments drome, and to reach Andir near Bandoeng. of Dutch Home Guard which were watching the river crossings on the roads leading from 541. Subsequent inquiry made it clear that the aerodrome defence party, a combination of the enemy landing at Eritanwetan to Kalidjati, Army and ,R.A F. personnel, put up a stout a distance of more than 50 kilometres. But he placed more reliance upon the Home Guard fight and covered the withdrawal of the ground personnel of the squadrons, the majority of the of a'bout 1,000 strong, supported toy about 10 armoured cars, which were located at Soebang, Bofors guns adopting an anti-tank role. It is believed that there are no British survivors a town on the road leading to 'the aerodrome. He also stated that a Dutch battalion at Cheri- of the aerodrome defence party. The Japan- bon had been ordered to counter-attack the ese appear to have given no quarter. Later the landing. The British A.O.C., therefore, de- Japanese testified to the gallant and protracted defence the aerodrome defences put up, and cided to keep the 'bomber force at Kalidjati this was supported by the number of bodies, where it was 'best placed to resist the enemy. both British and Japanese, which were found 538. It was decided to " stand down " near the aerodrome and in the woods around bombers at Kalidjati at the end of the night's it by the British salvage parties employed by operation because * — the Japanese after the capitulation of Java (a) Crews had 'been on a stretch for 36 The Dutch aerodrome defence contingent, al- hours, standing by during much of the night though it had been relieved during the night of 27th-28th February, and then operating by the newly arrived British defence party, at high pressure throughout late afternoon remained to assist in the defence It located and the night of 28th February-ist March. posts on the roads leading to the aerodrome on They had worked splendidly, had achieved the N., E., and W., the two former of which good results, and needed a rest. were overrun by the enemy's armoured ve- (b) There would 'be plenty for the crews hicles, to deal with which it had no anti-tank to do at high pressure for several days to weapons. The number of Dutch bodies which come. were later found on both sides of the roads (c) Previous experience had shown that along which the Japanese attack came, testify Blenheims and. Hudsons were particularly to the opposition it put up. vulnerable if employed in the cloudless con- 542. It has been impracticable as yet to ob- ditions which prevail during the mornings tain a clear picture of what exactly happened at this season, because the Japanese normally at Kalidjari. Surviving British witnesses of SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

consequence are few. Much still remains un- - 550. One of these landings was that which satisfactorily explained. It is hoped that time had been made at Eritanwetan (para. 536). may reveal the full facts. Twelve Hurricanes took part in opposing it, 543. The captured aerodrome was only a and in doing so encountered intense A.A. fire. few miles from Tjikampek, the aerodrome on They pressed home their attacks at low height, which No. 36 (T B.) Squadron was also resting inflicting severe casualties amongst troops in after having operated throughout the night landing craft, and set on fire at least six landing (para. 533). The latter aerodrome had no de- craft and three motor vehicles. Several later fences whatever and was in considerable dan- attacks against 'the same targets also produced ger of being overrun by the same troops which good results. had already captured Kahdjati. The Squadron 551. The other landing in Western Java had was, therefore, immediately withdrawn to occurred simultaneously with the foregoing one, Andir, and was later moved to Tjikamber in but on the extreme western beaches on either S.W Java, Group Captain Nicholetts being side of Merak in the Sunda Straits. It was in placed in command of the Station. greater strength. The remaining Hurricanes of No. 232 (F) Squadron made several sorties FIGHTER OPERATIONS IN BATAVIA AREA— against it during the morning at the request IST FEBRUARY TO 3RD MARCH 1942. of the Dutch Army: they successfully engaged Consolidation of Fighter Strength. enemy columns, including cavalry and M.T., 544. Before proceeding further it is necessary advancing along the roads from the landing to turn to earlier operations of the Fighter beaches towards Batavda. Force. 552. After the British bombers had been over- 545 It will be remembered that Nos. 232; run at Kalid]ati the fighters continued their (F) and 605 (F) Squadrons were operating ac attacks against the landing at Eritanwetan. Tjilihtan under a Sector Control (a skeleton Shortly after midday they brought to a stand- of No. 226 (F) Group) whose operations rooms still a cyclist column proceeding westwards and warnmg systems were installed in and towards Batavia. In addition three Japanese around Batavia., flying boats were destroyed on the water. 546. From iTth to 27th February 'this force 553. All No. 232 (F) Squadron aircraft was continually in action in its role of the air suffered damage an varying degree from A.A. defence of Batavia. Normal odds 'met in air fire during these operations, which were all fighting were in the vicinity of 10-1. Its opera- carried out at low level. • tions were handicapped, particularly during the 554. On 2nd March Tjililitan aerodrome was earlier part of the period, by insufficient warning under constant attack by the enemy, and the of approaching enemy aircraft. squadron was in action all day defending it 547. A Fighter Group H.Q. became Redund- and carrying out road reconnaissances hi western ant by 27th February, its squadrons and Java for the Dutch Army. The aerodrome was overhead controlling organisation being estab- also becoming somewhat exposed to overland lished by that date. The Group Commander, attack by Japanese forces which had disem- Air Commodore Vincent, and several members barked at Entanwetan; these were, by the after- of his staff, were ordered on that date by the noon, reported to be approaching Poerwokerto A.O.C. to leave Java, which they subsequently and the river crossings thirty miles or so to the did by sea. north-east of the aerodrome. Withdrawal along 548. By noon on 28th February the combined the road which passes through those places was strength of the two fighter squadrons was less already out of the question. Moreover, these than that of one. The U.S. aircraft carrier places were held by Dutch troops on similar " Langley " had been sunk by the Japanese lines to Soebang and the river crossings protec- when bringing in a full load of P-40 fighters, ting Kalidjati aerodrome; a repetition of the with some of which it had been hoped to re-arm Kalidjati debacle, involving 'the only remaining one of the squadrons Thus the last prospect British fighter squadron, was distinctly possible of keeping two fighter squadrons at reasonable during the night or following morning The strength had gone. It was decided to retain A O.C. therefore, when visiting the aerodrome No. 232 (F) Squadron which, under Squadion on this day, ordered No. 232 (F) Squadron, Leader Brooker's leadership, volunteered to now 10 Hurricanes, to move back to Andir near remain in Java. Vacancies in it were filled Bandoeng, the move of the ground parties and from volunteers in No. 605 (F) Squadron. No. aerodrome defence troops to be completed along 605 Squadron, except the volunteers who could the Buitenzorg road by the following day. be employed, was withdrawn for evacuation Group Captain Noble was appointed Station after it had handed over its remaining aircraft Commander at Andir. to No. 232 (F) Squadron on the afternoon of 555. In the early morning of 3rd March the 28th February. squadron returned to Tjihlitan from, Andir under orders issued by General van Oyen. It was air- Fighter Operations is£—yd March. borne throughout the morning repelling Japan- 549. In accordance with the decision (para. ese air attacks. At noon it was finally withdrawn 538 (c)) not to employ bombers during the to Andir, en route to which .it made a successful cloudless mornings, but to oppose the landings attack on Kalidjati aerodrome destroying during these hours by means of fighters, instruc- several enemy aircraft.' A running fight took tions were issued to No. 232 ,(F) Squadron to place with Japanese fighters from Kalidjati to employ all its Hurricanes throughout the lore- Bandoeng. noon of ist March, in, co-operation with 10 Dutch Kittyhawks and 6 Buffaloes, in attacking Withdrawal from Batavia. two Japanese landings which had occurred 556. As the Dutch announced on 3rd March simultaneously during the night in Western their intention of declaring Batavia an "open " Java. town, the operations and filter rooms; together- SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1399 with the radar stations in the vicinity, were The enemy force, which had landed in the destroyed, and their staffs were ordered to Sunda Straits, had forced the evacuation of Bandoeng on the 3rd March. Batavia, and the Dutch garrison of extreme western Java was in the Buitenzorg- OPERATIONS BY No. 205 (F.B.) SQUADRON— Soekaboemi vicinity, falling back on the IST FEBRUARY TO 3RD MARCH. final Bandoeng " stronghold.'" 557. No. 205 (F.B.) Squadron during the 562. No. 36 (T.B.) Squadron based at whole of its stay in Java operated as a unit Tjikamber attacked Kalidjati aerodrome, now of the Allied Reconnaissance Group which was full of enemy aircraft, on the nights of 2nd- responsible for all seaward reconnaissance 3rd and 3rd~4th March. On 4th March it was throughout the S W. Pacific Command. This moved to Tasik Malaja because of reports (sub- Group, under Dutch Command, took its orders sequently proved to be false) of landings in first from Abdair and then, after Abdair left S.W. Java which threatened 'the aerodrome, Java, from General van Oyen, the Dutch and because the rapid advance, authentic, of A.O.C. Britair was responsible for administra- the enemy towards Soekaboemi threatened +o tion only of 205 (F.B.) Squadron. cut the only road available for withdrawal 558. Based on Batavia and Oesthaven, 205 from it. (B) Squadron carried out reconnaissances 563. From Tasik Malaja the squadron con- between Borneo and Sumatra, and also under- tinued attacks on Kalidjati during the nights took anti-submarine patrols in the Sunda of 4th-5th and 5th-6th March, doing two sorties Straits. per aircraft on the former night. Large fires 559. When the Japanese descended upon the were caused and considerable damage was Batavia area on ist March it was ordered to done. transfer its base to Tjilitjap, an unserviceable 564. On 6th March, by which date an early flying boat having to be destroyed when it left. capitulation had been forecast by General ter The Squadron operated from Tjilitjap on anti- Poorten (See para. 577), two aircraft only re- submarine patrols until 3rd March, by which mained serviceable, and orders were given for time it could no longer be usefully employed. these to be flown north in an endeavour to The squadron was then ordered out of the reach Burma. They left on the 7th March but island, two boats going to Ceylon and one, unfortunately both crashed in Sumatra and with a damaged air-screw, to Australia. the crews were either killed or captured. FINAL AIR OPERATIONS—4TH MARCH TO 565. No. i (G.R.) Squadron, R.A.A.F., was STH MARCH 1942. ordered to fly its three remaining flyable Hudsons to Australia carrying operational 560. The position on the morning of 4th records and as many spare aircrews as possible. March was:— The first left on the night 4th-5th, the others on (a) H.Q. Britair—Bandoeng. the nights of 5th-6th and 6th~7th—all reaching (b) No. i (GR) Squadron, R.A.A.F., 7 Australia. Hudsons (3 serviceable)—Andir. 566. No. 232 (F) Squadron, now at Andir, (c) No. 232 (F) Squadron, 10 Hurricanes was given the role of carrying out periodic (all in dubious condition)—Andir. offensive sweeps against Kalidjati aerodrome. (d) No. 36 (T.B.) Squadron, 5 Vilde- It was instructed also to take advantage of beestes (4 just serviceable)—Tjikamber. any particularly favourable targets presented (e) About 450 armed R.A.F. personnel by the Japanese Army attacking Bandoeng from under Wing Commander Alexander operating the north. For the latter purpose the squadron as infantry with " Blackforce " in the established a liaison officer at the Dutch H.Q. Buitenzorg area. responsible for defences on that front. (/) About 1,900 unarmed personnel await- ing evacuation near the port of Tjilitjap, and 567. By this time no warning of impending a further 600 at Djojacarta; many other per- attack could be obtained, and the aerodrome sonnel now surplus to squadron requirements was subjected to almost continuous attack were under orders to move to the area as throughout each day. The squadron was re- accommodation became available near the peatedly in action and considerable success was port. achieved. 561. The Army situation on 4th March 568. By the 7th March fee squadron was re- was:— duced to 5 aircraft. On this day it was trans- ferred to Tasik Malaja, and by the evening Eastern Java: The enemy had made a only two aircraft remained. These two carried , successful landing on ist March west of out a tactical road reconnaissance on the morn- Sourabaya and was pressing the Dutch ing of the 8th March, and on completion of this forces in two directions—those originally in they were destroyed under orders from Bri

In Java, i/th February-8th March EVENTS LEADING UP TO SURRENDER OF About 32 enemy aircraft were shot down JAVA. (8 by No. 605 Squadron and 24 by 232 576. Conference at Dutch Headquarters. At Squadron) of which about 15 were destroyed 1800 hours on the 5th March, the Dutch Com- during the closing days in Java, 2nd to 8th mander-in-Chief, Lieut.-Gen. ter Poorten, con- March. Heavy casualties were also inflicted vened a conference at his H.Q., A.H.K. in on enemy troops which landed on Java at Bandoeng. The Air Officer Commanding, Eritanwetan and Merak, particularly the Britair, and the General Officer Commanding former. British Military Forces in Java, Major-General H. D. W. Sitwell, and representatives of their During the combined periods about 60 Hurr"- staffs, were summoned to this conference. It canes were lost, chiefly on the ground, by was also attended by senior officers of the enemy attacks .on our inadequately defended Dutch C.-in-C's. staff. aerodromes. 577. At this conference the Dutch Com- mander-in-Chief stated:— PROGRESS OF EVACUATION. (a) That the situation was grave: the 570. Throughout the period under review, enemy had practically overcome the northern evacuation of surplus R.A.F. personnel pro- defences of Bandoeng and was also rapidly ceeded as fast as shipping permitted. Units closing in from the west. were concentrated for evacuation as they be- (b) That morale was at a low ebb and that came surplus "to requirements. They were kept it was possible Bandoeng might fall very together as units as far as possible, and as ship- soon. When the enemy penetrated the outer ping accommodation allowed. Towards the defences, the C.-m-C. did not propose to de- end, when accommodation became extremely fend that town, which would be declared an limited, priority was given to aircrews and open city. It was full of refugees and could technical personnel whose value in other not in any case hold out for long. theatres of war was greatest. (c) That no guerilla warfare was possible or would be attempted 'by the Dutch. There 571. On the 23rd February, owing to enemy was great hostility amongst the native popu- action, Batavia "was closed as a port and the lation towards the whites, and without the R.A.F. Base, Batavia, with its ancillary transit help of the natives guerilla warfare could not camps, was progressively transferred to possibly be successful. All his staff were Poerwokerto, adjacent to T]ilitjap in South emphatically agreed that such warfare was Java, the sole port still open. Tjilitjap was out of the question. also subjected to air bombardment, and ships (d) That "owing to difficulties of com- leaving it to attack by Japanese light naval munication, Dutch G.H.Q. could operate forces. On the 27th February, S.S. " City of only from Bandoeng. They could not exer- Manchester " was torpedoed off Tjilitjap whilst cise control from elsewhere and so would not approaching the port to assist in the evacuation. move from Bandoeng. (e) That resistance was to be carried on 572. From the ist March onwards, little elsewhere under the direction of local com- movement from the port took place. It was manders if possible and in accordance with finally closed on the 5th March leaving on the an order issued by Queen Wilhelmina of island about 2,500 R.A.F. personnel whom it Holland that there should Ibe no surrender to had been intended to evacuate, but for whom the Japanese. He then added an unexpected no shipping was made available. rider—that he had instructed his troops to disregard any order that he might subse- 573. 'On 5th and 6th March .about 8 seats quently issue to them to cease fighting: they were allotted to the R.A.F. in Dutch Lodestars; were to disobey it and to go on fighting. the Dutch had been using these aircraft to 578. In subsequent discussion the Com- evacuate personnel to Australia. The Lodestar mander-m-Chief -was informed by General service ceased on the 6th March, thus closing Sitwell that the British would certainly con- the last evacuation channel from Java. tinue to fight on as long as any of the Dutch did so. When -Dutch resistance ceased, then he 574. A handicap experienced throughout che must reserve to himself the right to decide his evacuation of surplus R.A.F. personnel was the actions in accordance with the circumstances at difficulty which many of the Dutch had in the time. The Commander-in-Chief also in- understanding the necessity for sending out of formed the A.O.C. that A.H.Q. and Andir the island, at "a time when it was about to be aerodrome in Bandoeng must not be defended invaded, personnel who appeared to them to in the event of the Japanese entering the town. be soldiers: they could not realise that our air- The Commander-in-Chief was then asked to men were untrained as such and were of great allot an area in the hills in which the British value in their real role as airmen for prosecution Forces could concentrate and continue resist- of the war elsewhere. Informed Dutch authori- ance. After some discussion he allotted an ties appreciated the matter, but many failed area near Santoso to the southward of Ban- to grasp its truth. This is said in no crrtcal doeng. Its choice appeared to ibe influenced spirit; the Dutch outlook is easily understood. more as a means of escape to the south coast But it must Ibe stated in part explanation of the than as a stronghold; emphasis had to be laid loss in Java of a number of surplus airmen. on the fact that it. was wanted for the latter purpose. 575. During the period i8th February on- wards, nearly 7,000 R.A.F. personnel \\ere British move into the Hills. evacuated, leaving a total of about 5,000 in 579. In consequence the G.O.C. and the Java. A.O.C. British Forces went to Santosa at first SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1401

right on the 6th March to reconnoitre. The 585. At the same time it was confirmed that remainder of A.H.Q. and other Army and the remainder of the personnel, who were un- R.A.F. personnel in the area of Bandoeng, ex- armed, were to stand fast and surrender. The cept the ground party at Andir, were moved Dutch G.O.C. of the Poerwokerto area, under to Tasik Malaja the same day. whose direction Air Commodore Silly had placed the Poerwokerto contingent in accord- 580. The distribution of Air Force personnel ance with his instructions, ordered them to on the 6th March (p.m.) was:— move further west because unarmed forces (a) Tasik Malaja, preparing for would be an embarrassment in a locality where defence, with Army Units also he intended to resist the Japanese advance. ordered there .. 900 This was done under his arrangements and the (£>) Contingent with " Blackforce " 450 contingent arrived at Tasik Malaja on 8th (c) Andir area, aerodrome staff March (p.m.). It had suffered severe casualties and units ...... 850 owing to its rail convoy having been ambushed (d) Poerwokerto area awaiting en route. evacuation, under Air Commodore 586. On yth March (p..m.) A H K declared Silly's orders ...... 2,500 (e) Detached from units, stragglers, Bandoeng, Tasik Malaja and Garoet " open " escape parties, etc., in south central towns. This action had been anticipated for Java ...... 400 Bandoeng but in respect of the other two it came as a complete surprise, and it did not Total 5,100 assist the concentration of the British Forces in the hills, which was by now in progress. 587. Early on 8th March moves to the con- 581. The orders issued to the various con- centration area in the hills began. A com- tingents on the 6th March were:— bined Army/Air H Q. was established at' (a) The Andir contingent was to surrender Tjikadjang with W/T station alongside to com- •because Bandoeng was being declared an municate with the Air Ministry, etc. " open " town, and on that day there was no transport to move them. Order to Surrender received from Dutch H.Q. (&) The Poerwokerto contingent was to 588. At about 0900 hours 8th March, a rough place itself under the orders of the local Dutch • translation of a broadcast by the Dutch C.-in-C. Commander, stand fast and surrender. There was received at British H.Q. at Tjikadjang. was no alternative as the men were unarmed It had been promulgated in the name of all and had very slender rations and other re- the Allied Forces in Java as well as in that sources. They would have been an of the Dutch. At about 1030 hours it was embarrassment to a final stand in the hills, telephoned through in English by, it is believed, yet would have had to share its hardships Colonel Gulik the Dutch Air Staff Officer at and any retribution which might be meted A.H.K., who had come for the purpose to out. They were therefore less likely to come Garoet at the foot of the hills. It was to the to harm if they were not associated with effect that " all organised resistance " in Java further resistance. had ceased and that troops were to offer no (c) The Tasik Malaja contingent was to further resistance to the Japanese. Colonel defend to the last the aerodrome area, where Gulik said that the Dutch C -in-C. had can- the G.O.C. and A.O.C. would rejoin them celled his instructions about disregarding sur- if a.better place for continuing the fight was render orders and that he intended this order not found. to be obeyed. The last was quite unexpected. 582. Reconnaissance of the Sasntosa area on 589. The A.O C. received this message and, 6th March drew a blank. Not only was the in the absence of the G.O.C., who was recon- terrain unsuited for defence by a small force, noitring the area and allocating defence posi- but the local Dutch had no defence plan, ob- tions, he first sent a despatch rider to inform viously did not want fighting to occur there, the G.O.C., and then, feeling that further clari- and were only too ready to assist the British fication was desirable, went himself to Garoet to the coast. to make further enquiries. 590. At Garoet the Dutch Resident, Heer 583. As the result of a suggestion from Koffman (the District Civil Administrator) who General Schilling, who was most helpful to the had on ,the previous day, yth March, strongly British in their wish to continue resistance, the emphasised the difficulties of local supplies and area south of Tjikadjang was reconnoitred on accommodation, and had been apprehensive yth March. ' It was found more suitable for about the prospects of a " massacre of whites " protracted defence. It was therefore decided if guerilla warfare was attempted particularly to concentrate all army units and all armed amongst the difficult natives of the Garoet district, R.A.F. personnel in the defence of that area. now on 8th March re-emphasised his belief in 584. In conformity with this decision orders the dangers of a native rising if fighting in the were issued to the following to move to the hills was attempted. He called in other authori- area on 8th March: — ties to support his opinion—amongst them the (a) The Andir contingent, for whom trans- District Regent (Native District Administrator). « port was now available; and 591. The A.O.C. rang up A.H.K. and spoke (6) the Tasik Malaja contingent. (it is believed) to Colonel Gulik who confirmed that the Dutch C.-in-C. had cancelled his order, Both of these contingents were armed. In and that he intended his latest instruction, namely addition, " Blackforce " and all other British for fighting to stop, to be obeyed. 'He said Army Units in Java were also ordered to the that all Dutch troops were complying. The area. The total combined force was about A.O.C. then telephoned to several other Dutch 8,000 strong. centres and found this to be so in each instance. F 1402 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 592. Whilst he was so engaged, A.H.K. again force, in its new and future role, namely in rang him up at the Resident's House. The Staff infantry fighting about which it knew nothing, Officer doing so specifically enquired whether particularly of jungle fighting. Indeed, 'many the British were going to fight, whether General A.A. gunners recently rearmed as infantry were Sitwell had full control of " Blackforce ", and in little better case. whether the last could be persuaded to'stop 595. Yet something might have been done fighting. To these questions he was given non- but for the quandary in which the British commital answers except an assurance that had now been placed by reason of the Dutch " Blackforce " would definitely obey any orders C.-in-C's. broadcast (para. 588). This had General Sitwell might issue. The A.O.C. was been promulgated on behalf of the British given a further urgent message from the Dutch forces, as well as on that of the Dutch, but C.-in-C., which it is understood was telephoned without consultation with the A.O.C. or through from Kalidjati, where at that time the G.O.C. and although-the British intention to Dutch C.-in-C. was negotiating terms "with the continue resistance was well known to the Dutch Japanese C.-in-C. The message pressed for C.-in-C. The broadcast contained the phrase action to be taken to stop " Blackforce " blow- " All organised resistance having now ceased." ing up any more bridges to cover their with- This phrase had an important bearing. It was drawal to the hills, as this action was handi- believed to have the effect in international law capping the negotiations. It is not known how of-placing those who continued to resist out- the information about blowing the bridges side the protection of belligerent rights and south-east of Bandoeng reached the Japanese at subject- to summary execution if captured. The Kalidjati many miles to the north. This infor-- Japanese were likely to exercise their rights in mation made it clear that the Japanese already the matter. The problem which now faced the knew our intention and whither we were with- A.O.C. and G.O.C. was how to sort out the drawing into the hills. force, now in a state of movement over a wide 593. The A.O.C. then returned to Tjikadjang area, into those who were willing to face such where he met the G.O.C. and Brigadier Black- consequences and those who were not. The burn at 1330 hours,, when the situation was as latter could not be given legal orders to continue follows: — fighting under such conditions as bandits against their will. The next problem was to> (a) Troops were arriving in the concentra- reorganise the former into a fighting force well tion area, the last being due during the night. clear of the latter and of the 2,900 unarmed They possessed small arms and ammunition R.A.F. contingent which had by now moved and a few Bofors guns, but as had been ex- unpleasantly close, although still in the plains, pected, no mortars, aircraft or artillery. (para. 585). One alternative was to send the Although personnel were tired and many were " bouches inutiles " down to the plains to poorly clad and kitted, particularly R.A.F. surrender and for the former to fight where personnel evacuated from Singapore, morale f they were. But Japanese revenge on those appeared on the whole good. who submitted themselves under such circum- (6) Administrative arrangements were, how- stances was already too well known to permit ever, grave. Only 3^ days' rations had so far adoption of such a course. The other alter- accompanied the force. Army convoys had native was for the volunteer contingent to> experienced considerable obstruction when move to, and reorganise in, a new defence area. collecting stores, and the dump in Bandoeng But this was impracticable. The Japanese was reputed to be destroyed (news later to already occupied Bandoeng, through which led. prove false). There might be time to collect all roads to the hill country in the S.W. some more, but this was not certain. Petrol extremity of Java, where lay the only other was limited to what vehicles had in their remote spots which might be suitable for tanks. The combined British/Australian guerilla resistance: the country elsewhere was Field Hospital in Bandoeng could not be too highly developed and too well served by moved to the hills because it was alieady numerous roads. The Japanese quite clearly overloaded with patients. Hospitalisation knew where the British had withdrawn and was therefore totally impracticable, and their intention, and were free to follow up- medical supplies limited to those carried by quickly, as was their habit. It was thus im- units, which were few and of a first aid practicable by now to reorganise anything nature only. Water was everywhere polluted effective. by reason of native habits, water carts were few and effective sterilization was impractic- 596. In these circumstances the A.O.C. and able. Stomach troubles were already in G.O.C., regretfully decided that .they must evidence. 'comply with the order to surrender. The order as received from A.H.K. was accordingly issued 594. Given local co-operation and time these to units about 1430 hours. handicaps could have been overcome, but there appeared to be prospect of neither. The Dutch Orders were also issued: — had ceased fighting everywhere and, to say the (a) To destroy arms and warlike stores- least, were not being helpful. The natives might, likely to be of value to the enemy, except or might not, turn against the whites: warning a limited amount of transport. about them had been received, and in any (6) For all ranks to observe absolute reti- case they were unlikely to assist. And'time cence if questioned for military information» had suddenly become unexpectedly short now by the enemy. that the Japanese knew about the movement. A signal was sent to the R.A.F. H.Q. Signal Much had still to be done in reorganising, in Section for transmission to the Air Ministry to preparing positions for defence and in solving the effect that the orders to surrender were administrative difficulties. Time was now par- being complied with. The reasons why this ticularly short for training the R.A.F. contin- signal did not get through are contained in gent, which comprised about one-third of the paras. 610-613. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948, 1403

Escape Organisation. kept waiting all night they were assembled at 597. Col. van der Post, a British officer 0730 hours I2th March for the formal signing of believed to be of South African Dutch descent, the surrender terms before General Maruyama. had remained in Java in order to organise a 602. In front of a number of Japanese means -of escape after the foreseen occupation witnesses General Maruyama undertook that of the island by the Japanese. He initiated prisoners would be treated in accordance with plans for assembly points in the mountains the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1929, to the southward of Batavia and tried to an undertaking which was recorded in writing. organise shipping and boats for surreptitious 603. An undertaking that the British and evacuation from the mountainous S.W. coast. American troops would obey all orders of the Lack of time prevented his plans maturing. Japanese was also included. An attempt to Great credit is due to this officer for his introduce the word " lawful " before the word activities, attended as they were by considerable " orders " was refused by General Maruyama personal risk at the hands of the enemy, a fact who stated that it was unnecessary since he was of which he was well aware. In anticipation giving P.O.W's. the protection of the Geneva of Col. van der Post's plans succeeding, Convention, under which no unlawful orders authority was given by the A.O.C. for the by the Japanese Army would be possible. It issue from public funds of 2,000 guelders to * was evident that further insistence on the in- each of twenty individuals to finance the clusion of the word " lawful " might lose the attempt; action was to be taken by Air Com- grant of the terms of the Geneva Convention. modore Staton to select them. It was, therefore, erased from' the original 598. Despite the necessity for abandoning Instrument of Surrender, which was retained the organised escape scheme, many still wished by General Maruyama. to make an attempt to leave Java. The hazards involved by the doubtful attitude of the natives i$th—20th March. and the malarial nature of the country were 604. Arms and equipment were subsequently pointed out; if nevertheless they wished to per- surrendered at Garoet, all equipment and severe in their attempts they were assisted by weapons in possession of the R.A.F. except advice and the advance of money from the some M.T., a number of rifles and bayonets, funds already drawn for the organised escape some field glasses and minor equipment, having scheme. been destroyed. Some difficulty arose about this, but an explanation that it was a point of POST-CAPITULATION PERIOD, 8ra—3ora MARCH, honour with the British not to let arms fall 1942. undamaged into the enemy's hands was 8th—loth March. accepted. 599. By 2200 hours 8th March the concentra- 605. On I7th March all senior officers were tion in the hills, as ordered, was complete. summoned to Garoet for the first cross-examina- Distribution of Royal Air Force personnel tion by the Japanese Intelligence Staff: a few was: — other officers who happened to be nearby also became involved. So far as the G.O.C. and In Tjikadjang area, in the 1 hills, armed 2,200 (approx.) A.O.C. were concerned, it was conducted Tasik Malaja and other entirely correctly. Refusals to answer questions, areas, in the plains, based on the Geneva Convention of 1929, were unarmed 2,500 ( „ ) generally accepted. , x Stragglers, detached and in 606. Brigadier S. R. Pearson was, however, hospital in Bandoeng ... 400 ( „ ) faced by a firing party but, on still refusing to speak, was pardoned. Pilot Officer R. L. Cicurel was threatened with mutilation but, still refusing, was also pardoned. 600. On 9th March a second order was 607. On 2oth March occurred a further received from A.H.K., containing instructions deliberate and flagrant 'violation of the Geneva to collect arms, to display white flags and to Convention. General H. D. W. Sitwell, Air make surrender arrangements with the nearest Commodore W. E. Staton, Brigadier S. R. Japanese General. The A.O.C. accordingly Pearson, Group Captain A. G. Bishop and went to Bandoeng on gth March and on loth Colonel A. E. Searle, U.S. Army, went to March contacted Lieut General Maruyama, the Bandoepig ostensibly to attend a conference. Japanese Commander in the Bandoeng district. They were, instead, subjected to interrogation From him were received instructions about for military information "by Major Saitu, an collecting arms and troops and handing them Intelligence Staff Officer. The first four were over to Japanese representatives. Accommo- subjected to a month's rigorous imprisonment, dation and promises to help with supplies were which in Japanese hands is truly rigorous, for also obtained. He forbade communication with refusing to answer questions, after which they outside countries, but implied when pressed, were released. Whether or not representations without committing himself fully, that prisoners made by the Dutch Representative of the Inter- would be treated in accordance with the Geneva national Red Cross in Bandoeng and by Col. Convention of 1929. E. E. Dunlop, C.O. of the Australian Hospital in Bandoeng, to General Maruyama's H.Q. had nth—i2th March. any effect in bringing about their release will 601. On nth March the four Senior Officers never be known; but there is reason to believe (British A.O.C. and G.O.C.: Australian- that this may have been the case, because these Brigadier Blackburn: American—Col. Searle) events coincided in time. were summoned to Garoet. They were con- 608. The Japanese subsequently endeavoured ducted during the night from there to Bandoeng. to extract information from aircrews of Nos. The true reason was not told them. After being 232 (F) Squadron and No. i (G.R.) Squadron, F 2 1404 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948,

R.A.A.F., and from other individual officers REFLECTIONS ON THE FAR EAST CAM- and - airmen, with almost complete lack of PAIGN, DECEMBER, 1941, TO MARCH, success, in spite of protracted brutal treatment 1942. in many cases. They then gave up all attempts SCOPE OF REPORT. to obtain it. More than once, their Intelligence 614. This paper reports on only one aspect Officers afterwards stated that the British had of the compaign of 1941/42 in the Far East— pro/ed obstinate and stupid about the matter the air aspect. Weaknesses are admitted where and had suffered accordingly. Credit is due to they are believed to have existed. the above named individuals, who were the first to set an example of compliance with orders Tlje air aspect was, however, only one of to observe complete reticence in spite of brutal several. An account which discloses its weak- treatment, as it is due to those who subsequently nesses, but not those of the other aspects, is followed their lead. liable to leave an impression that the air was primarily responsible for the downfall of 609. The later treatment of P.O.W.'s, with Malaya. This was not the case. little regard to the terms of the Geneva Con- vention of 1929 which had been accorded to 615. In order to counteract this tendency it them on surrendering, is too well known to need is necessary, therefore, to refer to weaknesses further elaboration in this report. elsewhere which played their part. This is done hereunder in no carping spirit, but in Breakdown of Signals Communication with Air recognition of their causes and of the efforts Ministry. made by those who endeavoured to overcome 610. The original site chosen on 7th March them. It is done for one reason only—to (p.m.) for the Signals Station near Tjikadjang counterbalance a one-sided examination and to proved unsuitable for communication with out- throw the whole into perspective. Weaknesses side countries, screened as it was by the lay in many places. Failure in Malaya was surrounding mountains. It was, therefore, a combined failure brought about firstly by moved about noon 8th March towards the coast, the unpreparedness of the Empire as a whole in an attempt to find a suitable position. for war, and then, when war came, by the needs of far more vital theatres of war on the 611. A technical breakdown, caused by other side of the world and in the seas which contamination of the Diesel fuel of the T. 1087 served them. high power transmitter, followed by a road accident which damaged the transmitter itself, WEAKNESSES IN THE FIGHTING SERVICES. presented this set being used again. 616. In Malaya, the old policy of restricting 612. Attempts were made that evening to the defence of Singapore to the immediate come into action with another, a low power, vicinity of the Island had been replaced by one set were at first forbidden by the Commander of defending the whole of Malaya. In con- of the Dutch troops into whose area the station formity with this policy the Chiefs of Staff had had by now moved, and who by this time, was authorised large army and air force increases. strictly obeying the terms of surrender. These In the absence of the Fleet, defence of the orders forbade further communication with the Far East was to depend primarily on a mobile outside world. Despite them a T. 1082/R. air defence. Pending provision of the increased 1083 Vanette set was brought into action but air strength, the army needed additional interim it failed to establish communication with strength, over and above its ultimate total, to Melbourne, Ambala or Air Ministry. Several ensure security in the meantime. signals were broadcast by this means for three 617. The Japanese attacked whilst this policy hours on the 'morning of 9th March in the hope was.being implemented. The air force and the that they would be picked up. Amongst them army had by then received only a part of the was the signal which informed the Air Ministry modern equipment and reinforcements which that the orders to surrender were being complied had been estimated to be necessary. The vital with (para. 596). and pressing needs of the war in Europe and It subsequently transpired that these sijjmals the Middle East, which had passed through a were not picked up although at the time the long and very critical period, had proved of operator believed that they had been. overriding importance. The result was that the forces in the Far East were attacked in 613. Subsequent attempts by the Signal positions which could only have been defended Station to contact H.Q. and reciprocal attempts if the full strength planned by the Chiefs of by H.Q. to find the new position of, the station, Staff had been available. failed to establish touch before the staff oi this station had to destroy their equipment Mutual Naval and R.A F. Support. because: — 618. The Air Force in Malaya was not yet (a) It was believed. that the last signals in a position to deny the waters off Malaya to for despatch had been sent: a seabprne invasion. It possessed, neither the (6) Current reports of the imminent arrival necessary aircraft nor secure aerodromes, and of Japanese troops (subsequently proved to the enemy proved altogether too strong in the be false) made it necessary to destroy com- air -once he had obtained a footing in South promising documents and the set itself, to Siam and North Malaya. avoid capture in accordance with, strict instruc- 619 The " Prince of Wales " and " Re- tions which the A O.C. had issued a few days pulse " were lost in a gallant attempt to help previously on the subject of preventing the the army and air force in their predicament in capture of cyphers and secret equipment. .North Malaya. . The attempt was made in the These were the circumstances in which the .face of a strong shore-based Japanese Air report of the'final surrender of the British troops -Force but without the. corresponding air sup- in Java was not received by- their respective ,port, either carrier-borne or •shore-based. There- Governments. ' r after it was progressively impracticable for the SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1405 Navy, other -than the lightest units, to remain forces were able to fill those aerodromes with in Malayan waters, particularly in the absence aircraft, maintain them there at full strength, of such support. and from them gain and fully exploit the advan- 620. The freedom of the seas which the enemy tages of air superiority in the land, sea and air gained by his use of air power both at Pearl battles. Harbour and off the coast of Malaya, was They possessed what we had not—balanced such that he was virtually free thereafter to harmony by land, sea and air, their forces in hit when and where he liked. The consequences which elements were strong enough to play their to the army and air force dispositions and respective parts and to support one another operations in Malaya were profound. No fully. criticism is levelled, the war against and Italy had stretched our resources as never Joint Navy/Army /Air Co-operation. before. The small forces which were available 626. Two lessons emerge from the foregoing in the Far East were faced with overwhelming factors:— circumstances and were too weak to overcome Firstly, that only by full co-ordination of the advantages which the enemy gained in the the fighting services—in strength, organisation first and most vital days of the campaign. In and methods of operating—can success be short, neither the Air Force nor the Navy was achieved. in a position to support the other. Secondly, that the issue of a modern war largely depends on the struggle for secure Mutual Army I Air Support. • air bases, which all three fighting services 621. The enemy army proved to be more have a joint responsibility for obtaining, effective than had been expected: our army defending and maintaining. had a number of shortcomings. It is not for this paper to say what they were or to expand That side which is successful, and which upon them: it is appropriate only to say that denies its opponent the advantage of secure they existed and that the army, in consequence, air bases, dominates the whole theatre of war was unable to play its part adequately in the within air striking range. It has then every provision of secure air bases for our air forces. prospect of success, while its opponent has but The root cause was the same, namely the over- little. riding calls of the war in Europe and the Middle THE CIVIL COMMUNITY. East. . Shortages of Labour and Material. 622. When war came, the construction of aerodromes in Malaya had outstripped the pro- 627. Civil interests and the fighting services vision of air forces to occupy them. But the competed keenly for labour, M.T.., construc- aerodromes had had to be defended—a factor, tional material and equipment, all of which amongst others considerably more important, were in short supply (see paras 21 and 24). which led to the army adopting a forward Before war came it was difficult to obtain access policy. The army had insufficient troops for to land for the construction of aerodromes and the purpose, particularly in the absence of the other installations (see para. 19), particularly additional interim strength it required pending if its acquisition affected the production of full Air Force expansion. It became widely rubber or tin, which were Malaya's most impor-. scattered in trying to meet all its commitments, tant contribution to the war in Europe and- and was defeated in detail. which her administrators had been enjoined to 623. The R.A.F., although inadequate for the raise to a maximum. task, had to occupy these forward and ineffec- 628. The complicated administrative tively defended aerodromes. There it suffered machinery in Malaya, which comprised numer- severe losses which could not be replaced, and ous states with varying constitutions, was slow it was driven out. to .produce results. Speed was further handi- 624. Thereafter the army had to fight in capped by the multiplicity 6*f nationalities— northern and central Malaya without any air Chinese, Malay, Indian and European—who support, and to face an enemy whose air sup- populated Malaya and whose interests and out- port was constant and strong. It was not until look varied widely. the Japanese advance brought the land battle Native Labour. within effective range of aerodromes on Singa- pore island, that- our army could be supported 629. Experience confirmed the unreliability from the air. Even then this support fell far of unenlisted. natives .employed as domestics, short of the scale demanded by the situation, as M.T. drivers and for construction and re- although it was the maximum available. The pairing- damage to aerodromes. They dis- enemy's air support remained undiminished. appeared en bloc, as did many • native em- Neither service was in a position to support the ployees of the railways, whenever bombing other or to fulfil its commitments: both suffered started or the siren sounded. At critical severely in attempting to do both. moments dislocation occurred to the domestic life of R.A.F. stations, and to road and rail Mutual Support between Japanese Forces. movements 625. The Japanese, on the other hand, had 630. It is imperative in these days of air sufficient*forces to support one another. Their warfare to enlist all native personnel on whom naval and air forces were adequate to cover dependence is to be placed in war. If enlisted, the initial landings of their army, and to give and officered by trained leaders, the natives in its subsequent expeditions virtual freedom of the Far East proved to be most reliable. Tin's action to strike where and when they liked. was demonstrated by the R.A.F. Special Tech- Their army was strong enough to hold the nical Corps of enlisted Chinese, Malays and countryside as it was overrun, and in particular Indians, whose service in Malaya and Java to defend the aerodromes it-captured. Their air during the war was exemplary. 1406 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948,

Outlook in Malaya Towards War. 633. Two lessons were learned: — 631. A word on this subject is necessary be- Firstly, the. most drastic and comprehen- cause it had its effect upon preparation for war sive measures are necessary to shake up a in the Far East. community which has long lived in peace into Considerable criticism, much of it -unjust, a realisation of the dangers of war and of has been levelled against the civil population of the need to take timely action to prepare Malaya, although, unfortunately, there was jus- for it. This is particularly true if a com- tification for much of it. But it must be re- munity is of such a complex political and membered that Malaya had been enjoined to economic structure as that which existed in spare no effort to raise business output to a Malaya. maximum in support of the war in Europe, Secondly, the success of the fighting ser- particularly of rubber, tin and of dollars for vices is largely dependent upon the whole- financing foreign exchange. It was thus natui al hearted, thoroughly organised and, where .that many in Malaya should have felt that necessary, trained support of the civil com- Malaya's best contribution to the war in geneial munity. lay in this direction—and no one will deny that UNITY OF COMMAND. the response they gave was a great contribu- 634. In the Far East the Higher Direction tion to the war in Europe. of War, and of preparation for it, was not uni- Nevertheless their efforts in this direction had fied until the formation, in January, 1942, its effect on Malaya's preparations for her own more than a month after war had broken out, defence, because the calls of the latter could ,of H.Q. Supreme" Command, S.W. Pacific, only be met by diverting effort from the former. under General Sir Archibald Wavell. It must have been most difficult at times for those in responsible positions, in administrative 635. Before this date many and complicated and business circles alike, to hold the correct channels of control had existed between Minis- balance between these diametrically opposed tries and the Chiefs of Staff in the United interests. Kingdom on the one hand, and, on the other, In short, the calls of the war in Europe had the Civil Government and Service Commanders its effect upon the civilian side of preparation in Malaya. They varied in degree. G.H.Q. for war in Malaya as it had on the fighting had operational but not administrative respon- services. sibility for the army and the air forces; while in the case of the navy its responsibility was 632. Despite these difficulties much was done limited to co-operation with the naval C.-in-C. on the civil side towards preparing for war. in the Far East. 'G.H.Q. had no administrative Yet much remained to be done when war came. staff, which handicapped its operational staff Shortages of equipment and, still more impor- in appreciating in full detail the true state of tant, lack of • thorough training resulted in affairs in the subordinate commands (para. voluntary organisations not being ready, some 103). The situation was further involved by more some less, when war broke out. Credit is additional channels of communication with the due to those who volunteered to play their Australian and Dutch Governments, and by part and who, when war overtook them, played varying control of the forces which they con- it despite many a handicap. But it is unfor- tributed to the defence of Malaya. tunate to have to state that there were appreci- able sections of the community, particularly 636. Such complicated machinery is unlikely amongst its Asiatic element, which might have to work efficiently during times of emergency been more interested and might have done when speed in preparing for war is paramount. more towards putting Malaya's defences on a It has even less chance of success in war itself. sound footing. 637. From this emerges the lesson that respon- In this respect a belief was widely held that sibility for the defence of any region which is Singapore defences were in reasonably good exposed to attack is better centralised in a order, and that war was not imminent in any Higher Command, both during the preparatory case. More than one official pronouncement period before war and during war itself. This on the subject had the unintentional effect of Higher Command should have full operational fostering a false sense of security and of sup- and administrative authority over the three porting the view that business output came fighting services, and also strong representation first, despite other official pronouncements in all matters affecting the civil population. which were made with the express object of 638. In short, control should be comprehen- combating complacency. Again that state- sive, and, in particular, administrative respon- ment is made in no critical spirit. The former sibility should not be divorced from opera- pronouncements were made for very good 'tional responsibility. The outcome of war reasons. But they must be mentioned because is likely to be in proportion to the observance of their effect on civilian and service personnel of this lesson. Unity of Command enhances the alike. The general atmosphere inevitably prospect of success: lack of it invites failure. affected the latter, who had to live in it from POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE OUTBREAK day to day. Only the more informed and OF WAR. ^ imaginative of both communities could be ex- pected to foresee the future with accuracy and Handicap imposed on Air. Striking Force. to remain unaffected. Nevertheless there were 639. At the outbreak o'fAvar, politie'afl; circum- many, amongst the civil community as well as stances, which made it imperative for us to in the services, who foresaw the danger and who avoid any action that might precipitate war, strove to accelerate readiness for war. To them or that might make us appear to be the aggres- the greatest credit is due. But despite their sors, were partly responsible (but only partly efforts the general atmosphere militated against —see paras. 641'and 671) for preventing the the progress of which they aimed and had a small air striking force that was available in grave effect upon preparations for war. Malaya being used in the role for which it had SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 •1407

been primarily trained—to hit the enemy con- mobility. Its fighters displayed unexpected all- voys at sea, as far away and as often as pos- round qualities. They and the Japanese medium 'sible. The consequence was that the. enemy bombers had ranges of 1,500 to 1,600.miles was able to establish himself firmly ashore in which enabled them to operate from bases out a neutral country before action could be taken of our reach. Their normal operational height against his convoys. was 20,000-24,000 feet where they were immune from any of our A.A. gun defences. Japanese Operation Matador. torpedo-bombers proved to be unexpectedly 640. The political factor was also partly effective. responsible for preventing the initiation of the 647. It is difficult to assess the precise air planned British advance into Siam. The con- strength the enemy deployed against Malaya. sequences were far-reaching: those affecting the At the time, it was thought that he had 700 Air Force were immediate. The enemy was able first line aircraft based in South-Indo-China, to establish his squadrons in strength in Siam with adequate immediate reserves, as against within easy striking distance of our virtually our 158 obsolete and obsolescent types with defenceless aerodromes in northern Malaya. practically no reserves. Many of our aircraft were thus destroyed with little accomplished, and our squadrons were Japanese Army and Naval Forces. driven out. Thereafter they were unable to 648. It is not for this paper to explain the give air support to the ,army in its battles in extent to which these were under-estimated, northern and central 'Malaya. except to say that his army proved to be more 641. In passing, it is legitimate to reflect that effective than it was believed to be, and that had the reconnaissance into the Gulf of Siam the Japanese ability to strike so strongly and been greater on 6th December after the Japanese simultaneously in several directions in the convoys had been sighted, and on yth December Pacific had not been anticipated. (paras. 150-169 and 671), and had the object Need for an Intelligence Corps. of the Japanese, expedition been disclosed thereby, it might, well have had an influence 649. It is therefore appropriate to suggest here on the decision to initiate operation " Mata- that our mistakes can only be attributed to dor ", or brought about its cancellation earlier lack of an adequate Intelligence organisation. than was the case. True, a combined services intelligence organisa- tion was in existence for obtaining naval, mili- Japanese Action. tary and air information throughout the Far 642. The Japanese, on the other hand, chose East (F.E.C.B.—see para 67) but it was inade- the moment for attack that was most opportune quate for the purpose. In the East an In- for themselves. In doing so they brushed aside telligence system of any real value takes years political hindrances—as indeed they had done to build up and requires considerable funds at .whenever it suited them during their succes- its disposal. That it should be a combined sive encroachments into the South-Western organisation to serve the needs of all the defence Pacific. Services -goes without saying. It is suggested that a specialised Intelligence Corps will be 'Lesson. essential in the future: that only by this means 643. The lesson which emerges is that when can continuity of knowledge, experience and the initiative lies in the hands of a prospective contact be maintained: and that the appoint- enemy, as it did in the Far East, it,is highly ment of individuals, as an incident of their ser- dangerous to depend upon a plan of defence vice careers, can no longer be relied upon to which may be frustrated by political considera- fulfil requirements. tions. WEAKNESS OF JOINT ARMY /Am FORCE WEAKNESS OF ALLIED INTELLIGENCE. INTEREST. *Under-estimation of Japanese Strength. Army I Air Force relations. 644. P.ut bluntly, the-enemy's true value was much, under-estimated. Although he was' known 650. There has been much exaggerated talk ;to possess some good military (the word is used about the poor relations which existed between in its widest sense) qualities, conspicuous the Army and R.A.F. in Malaya. That there amongst which was a fanatical valour, it was was foundation for it in limited quarters is believed that he would display weaknesses, unfortunately true during the time immediately hitherto undisclosed, when he came face to face before the arrival of the late Air Vice-Marshal with the modern forces >of the British Empire Pulford and Lieut.-General A. E. Percival, who and the U.S.A. quickly took steps to .put matters right. ' Un- fortunately, honestly held differences of opinion 645. There is reason to believe, from the ex- about defence matters between their pre- perience of those 'who underwent military in- decessors had led to weaknesses which had not terrogation as prisoners-of-war in Japanese been fully rectified by the time war came. The hands, that the enemy took deliberate steps in two chief matters are hereunder" (paras. '651 and 'peace-time 'to mislead her potential enemies into 652), under-estimating her fighting forces. They them- selves on the .other hand were no't deluded about Army /Air Support. qQur tiflje value: they were 'too well- informed - 651. Organisation of, and training in/ air by along-established organisation of agents. support for the army was in a primitive state of development in both services. There was Japanese Air Forces. ~ • •a marked lack of specialised equipment for the 646. The qualities of the Japanese Air Force purpose, and there were but few persons in both came as a complete surprise;—in numbers, per- services who had had appreciable experience formance and quality of equipment, training in "co-operation between air and ground forces; and experience of its personnel, and in its particularly,modern experience. .The result .was 1408 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 that neither party in Malaya knew much about again the war in Europe had its effect: its urgent the technique of co-operating with the other needs absorbed all but a few experienced when war came. officers. Siting of Aerodromes in N. Malaya. 659. These faults demonstrated the weakness 652. Unfortunately the selection of several of an over-centralised organisation and of a aerodrome sites in Malaya had been made with Command which lacks a sufficient percentage insufficient regard to the needs of their tactical oi trained staff officers. A Headquarters which defence. Until the middle of 1941, sites had suffers from either fault cannot withstand the been chosen without sufficient consultation strain of war. between the army and air force authorities con- Allied Air Forces. cerned. Sited as they were, in positions tac- 660. The British air striking force which was tically difficult to defend, these aerodromes available in the Far East was in numbers far 'imposed an unnecessary strain on the army in below that which the Chiefs of Staff considered the ultimate event. It is only fair to point out, necessary to ensure a reasonable degree of however, that they were strategically necessary security, even against the calculated Japanese if the R.A.F. was to fulfil its allotted role in strength which, as already shown, was under- the defence of Malaya. estimated. Insecurity of Aerodromes. 661. In quality our aircraft were obsolescent 653. Our aerodromes, particularly in N. or obsolete. Squadrons had not been Malaya, were far from being the secure air modernised. Their signals and navigational aids bases which could properly be occupied in the were primitive or out of date. Radar warning face of a strong enemy. There were neither was limited to the immediate vicinity of Singa- the fighter aircraft, nor sufficient A.A. pore. Their armament was in some respects defences, nor an effective warning system poor. to ensure reasonable defence against air - ' 662. Several fighter squadrons had formed attack. The enemy could, and did, destroy shortly before the war broke out and were not our aircraft on the ground in N. Malaya almost adequately trained. Others had recently re- at will, and our squadrons were driven out of armed and were still unfamiliar with their air- the aerodromes there within a matter of days. craft. A high proportion of fighter pilots had 654. These same aerodromes were invaluable joined their squadrons straight from F.T.S.'s to the enemy. He had the necessary air forces without O.T.U. training. to occupy them as they were captured, and he All were troubles which would have been put had the means of defending them from all forms right but for the war in Europe. of attack. Change of Personnel. 655. From this emerges the lesson that aero- dromes may be a liability rather than an asset 663. A sweeping change of personnel by unless there are sufficient forces, both air and posting and drafting occurred during the summer ground, available to prevent the enemy captur- and autumn of 1941. Those who were relieved ing and using them. In other words—provision had been over-long in the Far East and it was of defences must go hand in hand with aero- time they went. A high proportion of those drome construction. who replaced them came straight from training establishments without having had unit experi- WEA,KNESSES IN AIR FORCE MATTERS. ence. No criticism of those responsible is Over-centralisation in A.H.Q. intended: it was assumed that there would be time for them to settle down before war broke 656. A.H.Q. had to deal directly with eight out. When war unexpectedly came the Com- superior and collateral authorities. The area mand contained a high percentage of personnel it controlled stretched from Durban to Hong who had much to learn about the application of Kong. The majority of its units were located what they had been taught or about their new in Malaya. (See Appendices A and C). duties in service units. Many were new to the 657. When war came in 1941 the formations tropics. Much credit is due to them for the •in Burma and the Indian Ocean were trans- manner in which they strove to play their part. ferred to another Command. Nevertheless, It is unfortunate that circumstances hi Europe A.H.Q. still had to handle a large number of had prevented the change being spread over a units with many different functions, and to do longer period by being started sooner. so simultaneously in a land battle, in seaward Inadequate Training. operations and in air defence. It had to admini- ster direct the operational units engaged in them 664. Personnel were willing, but the means as well as a large number of administrative for training them were inadequate because the units, many of which were unexpectedly in- demands elsewhere had drained resources. volved in mobile operations for which they Many courses of instruction were improvised were not fully prepared. It had no intervening locally, during the summer and autumn preced- bomber, coastal or administrative groups to ing the war, to make good short-comings in which to decentralise in Malaya. training of aircrews, administrative and other perspnnel of all ranks, but they were too late 658. Even if the staff had contained an to produce the results required. adequate number of experienced staff officers, such a high degree of centralisation would have1 665. In particular there were weakn|sses in been difficult to exercise efficiently. But most the training of fighter squadrons which had of the staff were inexperienced, although the}' been based on the assumption that the enemy were willing and many were able men. The was of poor quality. load had consequently to be carried by a few 666. The imperative necessity for personnel able and experienced officers whose numbers to be fully trained in their duties before they were quite inadequate to cope with the situation have to face a trained enemy needs no further —either before war broke out or after. Here emphasis. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1409

Reserves. Squadron at Kuantan -had to be directed to con- 667. Reserves of aircrews and aircraft were tinue its initial role of searching in an area far inadequate; even the first casualties could not to the south and eastward of the probable posi- be fully replaced. Spare parts, for engines, air- tion of the lost Japanese expedition for fear frames, armament, and M.T. in particular were of a still more dangerous but possible attack, short. Squadron strengths consequently "be- namely one directed against southern Malaya came abnormally low at the outset and re- where a successful landing, particularly on the mained so. Endau/Mersing beaches, would have been very dangerous indeed. It is impossible to resist The need for adequate reserves in a theatre the inference that reconnaissance dispositions of war cannot be over-emphasised. Unfor- were strongly influenced by a conclusion at the tunately it had been impossible to build up time that the lost Japanese expedition might reserves in Malaya because supplies had been be proceeding against the Bangkok area of aibsorbed in supplying critical theatres in Siam. It is easy to be wise after the event, Europe, particularly in the Middle East and but the reconnaissance effort which was Russia. directed into the Gulf of Siam appears to have 'Morale. been small, bearing in mind its great area and the possible courses open to the Japanese con- 668. As perhaps is liable to happen when a voys which were known to be in it. force is confronted by an unexpectedly superior enemy, there was a loss of morale by a small Initial Action at Kota Bahru. section of the Command in the early days of the war. Trials had been severe, and had 672. Only those who have given insufficient come before those concerned had had time to thought to the matter could venture to criticise adjust themselves to their unpleasant and un- the station commander at Kota Bahru for not foreseen circumstances. Lack of sufficient ex- having launched his aircraft to the attack on perienced officers undoubtedly contributed to receipt of the news, at 0030 hours on 8th the trouble, many of whom were newly com- December, 1941, that ships were lying off the missioned and were not versed in their respon- coast. It is equally easy to criticise the A.O.C. sibilities. for ordering away only a reconnaissance to clear up the situation. But that both were Such incidents] were few, and should not be correct in doing as they did, in the circum- exaggerated. But they serve to emphasise the stances which existed at that particular need for giving all ranks that vital training moment, is beyond doubt. War had not broken which alone enables inexperienced troops to out: Pearl Harbour had not been attacked and withstand their firsit novel shock of war. Such the U.S.A. was still neutral: there was grave incidents also serve to enhance the credit of risk that the Japanese might stage a bait in those who did maintain their morale, and who order to induce us to strike the first blow, and did their duty as was expected of them, and by doing so reinforce that section of the they comprised the great bulk of the force. American Public which was then strongly op- Mobility. posed to America entering the war, a danger against which all in Malaya had been warned 669. Few units were properly organised for emphatically by G.H.Q. Admittedly 45 mo'bile warfare. M.T. was very scarce and minutes were lost before the first air action was there were no transport aircraft. Each move taken, but it is merely academic to conjecture involved appreciable interruption in operations, what might have happened if it had been taken caused loss of valuable equipment and subse- at once. quent reduction of efficiency. The lack of transport aircraft was particularly felt when Main Japanese Landing at Singora not squadrons had to be transferred from Malaya to attacked. Sumatra, and thence later to Java: they suf- 673. It may fairly be asked why the initial fered considerable loss and disorganisation Japanese landing at Singora was not attacked during the enforced sea passage in the face of on 8th December, as this was the best target the enemy and without naval cover, the pro- for our air striking force. The answer is that vision of which was quite impossible at the it was not realised, until too late, that it was time. in fact the enemy's main effort, although 670. The lesson was demonstrated that ability Singora had long been recognised as the area to take part in mobile operations, without loss in which a Japanese expedition against Malaya of operational efficiency, is dependent on cor- was likely to be landed. The enemy, moreover, rect organisation and provision of suitable achieved a tactical • surprise because our air transport. A liberal scale of air transport is reconnaissance failed to maintain contact with essential in those cases where long distances, the main Japanese convoy, which was not sea crossings or other natural obstacles are found again until landings at Singora were well involved. under way. By the time that the situation was fully realised, all our available aircraft had INCIDENTS DURING THE CAMPAIGN. been launched against the Kota Bahru sub- sidiary attack. Before their objective could be Air Reconnaissance of approaching Japanese changed to Singora, our own aerodromes in Convoy, jth/8th December. Northern Malaya were undergoing so heavy a<; 671. Contact with the Japanese expedition scale of air attack that another effective force? at sea was lost on 6th December and was not for opposing the Singora landing could not be regained, except for a few ships sighted on the launched from. them. afternoon of 7th December. Admittedly weather conditions were bad in the Gulf of Attempt to Neutralise Enemy Air Bases. Siam during this vital period. Nevertheless 674. As soon as our Squadrons had 'been only a small air reconnaissance effort was made driven out of the aerodromes in Northern for re-establishing contact. No. 8 (R.A.A.F.) Malaya, our army was in turn subjected to 1410 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 heavy air attack. Its A.A. protection was quite gave ungrudging help—in defence of aero- inadequate and it had no fighter cover. Our dromes at cost to its vulnerable points; in work- own aircraft were therefore employed in the ing parties and native labour to repair aero- early stages of the campaign against enemy dromes at cost to the construction of military aerodromes, in an effort to give immediate relief defences; in maintaining signals communications to our troops. ' This was not successful. The and in many other ways. In particular, thanks .enemy's reserves were sufficient to replace at are due to Lieutenant-General A. E. Percival once the small casualties which our attenuated for all that he did, in conjunction with the squadrons could inflict. Moreover, he had the late Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, during the means to repair rapidly the damage our months immediately before war. broke out, to squadrons inflicted on his aerodromes. re-establish good relations between the two 675. The lesson was again learnt that little services. Had the latter officer survived I know relief can be obtained by attacking the aero- how strongly he would have expressed these •dromes of an enemy who has the means for views. replacing' or repairing damage, particularly if The Royal Navy in Malaya. 'such attacks are of little weight. 681. The R.A.F. owes much to the Royal Reinforcements. Navy also. Nothing that was requested was 676. The reinforcements which the R.A.F. refused if it was available; frequently it was received arrived too late to save the situation. given at cost to itself—working parties for aero- By the middle of January, when the first few drome repair, for replacing stevedores and came on the scene, the aerodromes which they labour which had deserted the docks under had to use in Singapore were already under con- bombing: facilities in the dockyard workshops, stant and heavy bombing. Reinforcements and in many other ways. Thanks are particu- "which came Jater had to use aerodromes in larly due to the late Rear Admiral Spooner, Sumatra which were little more than clearances R.N., who lost his life in attempting to escape in the jungle, for by this time, namely late' with the late Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, and January and early February, the enemy was .in whom the- latter would wish to commend to possession of the whole of the mainland of your notice for all that he and his subordinates Malaya, and three out of the four aerodromes did for .the R.A.F. in Malaya. on the Island of Singapore were under observed artillery fire. The Merchant Navy. 682. Much credit is due to the Merchant Navy'. 677. Hurricane reinforcements arrived in It rendered the R.A.F. devoted service in bring- .batches at intervals, and had to be thrown into ing into Singapore reinforcements and supplies the battle against greatly superior numbers and at a critical time, in transferring units to the at tactical disadvantage caused by the lack of N.E.I., and in evacuating several thousands of effective warning or efficient R/T control. The personnel from Singapore and later from the great majority of their pilots: had never been N.E.I. This work was done at great hazard in action before, and some had been at sea for in waters exposed to surface, submarine and as long as three months. air attack. A number of ships and seamen were 678. About half the bomlber reinforcements lost in the doing of it. I wish to record our that 'were" despatched reached Malaya.' They deep appreciation to the masters and crews who arrived in driblets of two and three aircraft at did so much for us at such cost to them- a time — the result of circumstances along a selves. ' „• •' 1 ~ lengthy and insufficiently developed air rein- forcement route. They had to be used piece- Civilians in Malaya,. meal, without their own ground crews, and not 683. A tribute is also due to the civilians, men as complete units. No time could be allowed and women, who put" themselves and their for acclimatising and training them in local con- means at the disposal of the R.A.F. Of them ditions. ' -Extremes of weather caused naviga- there were many—nurses, business men, clerical tional difficulties to which crews were strange. staffs, tradesmen, welfare workers, contributors Adequate ground and radio aids, to which of material and money, and others. Their assist- many were accustomed; were lacking. ance and good-will were invaluable at a most , 679. The very important lessons were difficult time. To them the R.A.F. owes a real "demonstrated that reinforcements ,must, in debt of gratitude. order to be effective, arrive as complete units, with, aircraft, aircrews, specialised equipment, The Dutch in the Far East. servicing crews and sufficient stocks and re- 684. It must be remembered that the Dutch' serves. They are merely frittered rapidly away pinned their faith to collective Allied resistance if they arrive piecemeal. They must' have ade- in the Far East, and that they lost part of their quate bases from which to work, and they gain Air Force and of their Navy to the common much if they are given time to obtain experi- cause before the Japanese reached Java at all. ence of local conditions before being engaged When their hopes of successful resistance dis- in battle. In short, the more -orderly and appeared, and only a small British force methodical their arrival and their preparation remained to replace tn'e forces the Dutch them- fpr battle, the -greater their chances of success selves had sacrificed, their isolated position versa. came home forcibly to them. POSTSCRIPT. •685. -Moreover, everything that the Dutch community possessed -was in the' N.E.I. To- The Army, in Malaya. • wards the end it-was obvious to them that the 680. T wish to pay a .tribute to the help which whole of it, including their families, -must in- the R.A.F. received from the army in Makya. evitably fall into the hands of'the Japanese. Despite its own acute needs and shortages it They 'had already experienced incidents • of SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 -1411

Japanese savagery in Borneo. They were con- matter ot fighters. Their own aircraft, on,the sequently reluctant to continue guerilla resist- other hand, were many of them obsolete and ance in Java-in the circumstances in which they old, and were difficult to maintain owing to finally found themselves. It was only then, technical shortages and poor facilities for over- when the British wanted to go on fighting after haul work. Their aerodromes possessed little the general capitulation in Java, that differ- protection against air attack, sometimes none ences arose as to the best line to pursue. at all. They flew long distances by night over 686. Nevertheless, I want to express my jungle-clad country in the face of violent tropi- jthanks to the Dutch Their wish to help was cal thunderstorms with the help of only rudi- unbounded. They fulfilled their planned under- mentary navigational aids; towards the end with takings to the full. Special recognition is due none at all. It is difficult to overstate the to those of them who, as a result lost their lives cumulative effect of the hazards which they in Malaya's defence. When arrangements had faced. , They deserve the very greatest praise to be made to transfer the R.A.F. to the N.E.I., for the way in which they consistently carried their Army, Air Force and Civil Administra- out their missions despite these hazards and tion placed everything at our disposal. As a despite casualties. community the Dutch refused the British 692. At the risk of selecting examples which nothing—labour, materials, money and help of may prove invidious to other units, against every kind were ungrudgingly given—frequently whom no reflection is intended, I would par- at considerable sacrifice. The devotion of their ticularly mention the following: — doctors and nurses to our sick and wounded Fighter Defences of Singapore. was outstanding. The Royal Air Force owes 1 a debt of gratitude to these people. 693. Credit is due to the spirited leadership of the late Group Captain E. B. Rice, Fighter Recommendations for meritorious service. Defence Commander of Singapore, and of the . 687. I have already reported to the appro- late Wing Commander R. A. Chignell, his priate branch of the Air Ministry the names of Chief Air Staff Officer. Both were outstanding those whose services were particularly in their selfless devotion to duty. They were meritorious, and whom I recommend for primarily responsible for the good morale which honours, awards and mention in despatches. the small fighter force at Kallang maintained •But I want to bring to your notice here the throughout the campaign in the "face of a numer- units mentioned hereunder, and also to name ous and better armed enemy. The steadiness a -few individuals who rendered particularly of the ground personnel of this fighter station meritorious service but who, I regret to report, is also worthy of mention. are no longer alive. No. 4 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit. Air Vice-Marshal C. W. Pulford, C.B., O.B.E., 694. This flight, flying unarmed and unarm- A.F.C. oured Buffaloes, unfailingly carried out their 688. This officer, despite ill health, worked photographic missions deep into enemy terri- unceasingly and uncomplainingly to overcome tory dominated by a very superior enemy the many difficulties with which he was faced fighter force. Its service throughout the when preparing 'his Command for war and Malayan campaign was most valuable. after hostilities had broken out. He never No. 232 (F) Squadron. flinched from meeting an overwhelming situa- tion with very inadequate means. No man 695. This unit, under the leadership of the could have striven - more wholeheartedly to late Squadron Leader R. E. P. Brooker D.S.O., carry a burden which was far beyond one man's DlF.C., who volunteered to take command at capacity. All his decisions were reached with a critical moment, was in constant action from complete disregard for self and entirely in the the time it arrived in Singapore in mid-January interests of what he felt to be his duty accord- 1942 until fighting ceased in Java. It inflicted ing to the situation and to his instructions. severe casualties on the enemy in the air, in landing craft and on the ground. It volunteered 689. He refused to leave Singapore himself to remain in Java as the last fighter squadron. until all his men had been evacuated. He lost Great credit is due to all ranks of a magnificent his life in a last-minute attempt to follow his squadron, drawn as they were from the ranks Command to the N.E.I, (see para. 394). His of several different fighter units. selfless devotion to duty and his loyalty to all those around him, both senior and junior, were Nos. 36 and 100 (TB) Squadrons. an inspiration to all. 696. These two squadrons attacked the enenry; landing at Endau on 26th January, 1942, Personnel of the R.A.F. Far East Command. covered as it was by numerous Zero fighters, 690. I am confident that the late Air Vice- whereas their own fighter escort was unavoid- Marshal Pulford would wish me to place on ably small. They pressed home their attacks record the praiseworthy manner in which the on their obsolete Vildebeeste torpedo-bombers personnel, of all ranks, under his Command regardless of casualties, amongst whom I regret carried out their duties. I know 'how deeply to report were lost the Commanding Officers of he appreciated the loyal support they gave both squadrons, the late Squadron Leaders him. R. F. C. Markham and I. T. B. Rowland. After being reorganised into a composite' squadron Aircrews. in Java, and after having patched up their old 691. The aircrews of our squadrons, of the aircraft, they again pressed home attacks against Royal Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force the enemy convoys which were invading that and Royal New Zealand Air Force alike, con- island, this time at night, again suffering casual- sistently met the calls- that were made upon ties and the loss of'their squadron commander, them despite the enemy's great superiority in the late Squadron Leader J. T. Wilkins. Such numbers and equipment, especially in the • gallant conduct speaks for itself. 1412 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

No. 84 (B) Squadron. maintenance organisation of the command 697. This unit arrived as a reinforcement which was brought about by circumstances that much strung out after a long flight from the first overloaded and then disrupted it. Middle East. Its crews set a fine example of 704. I will mention only one name, that of throwing themselves into the fight at once under the late Wing Commander E. B. Steedman, many handicaps. Particular credit is due to whose unflagging efforts did much to inspire the Commanding Officer, the late Wing Com- others to overcome their difficulties. He sub- mander J. R. Jeudwme D.S.O., O.B.E., sequently lost 'his life as a prisoner of war for D.F.C., whose leadership and courage were a refusing, it is believed, to divulge technical great inspiration to others. He led a small information about Spitfires. His spirit remained party which escaped from Java in an open boat unbroken to the end. across the 1000 mile crossing of the Timor Sea to Australia, a typical example of his spirit. Personnel in the N.E.I. M.V.A.F. 705. Those who landed m unavoidable dis- organisation in the N.E.I, were required to 698. At a critical .time of the fighting m reorganise into a fighting force within a few Southern Malaya, a number of successful days with very limited resources indeed. I wish reconnaissances were carried out by this unit to express my gratitude to them for the very to locate bodies of our troops who had been loyal manner in which they gave their best cut off by the enemy, and to locate the enemy's services, in particular to our squadrons who had infiltrating forces. These reconnaissances were to face a well organised enemy in overwhelming performed in unarmed Moth aircraft (originally numbers. Their behaviour is particularly the property of Malaya's flying clubs) at tree creditable, coming as it did after many reverses, top height O'v^er a battle field dominated by and was in the best tradition of the Service. Japanese Zero fighters. Their value was great to the Army, then closely engaged with the Finally, I am indebted to all those who, at enemy. Pre-eminent in this work was the late the end, were willing, despite shortage of arms, Flight Lieutenant Henry. Dane, M.V.A.F., lack of training, and lack of most essentials, whose qualities as a leader and a man were a to fight in the hills in a form of warfare byword amongst those who knew him. His about which they knew nothing, namely in example was largely responsible for the excellent infantry warfare and in the jungle at that, and work done throughout by the M.V.A.F. to do so against an enemy whom they knew to be well-equipped and highly trained in this Technical Personnel. form of fighting. That they were unable to put their willingness to the test was no fault of 699. A word of recognition is due to the theirs. I wish to place on record my gratitude Technical Personnel of the Command. for the loyal response they gave to the call made 700. Before war broke out they handled great upon them. Their conduct deserves the highest quantities of stores and equipment which arrived praise. in Malaya greatly in excess of the new stations' power, and that of the Command's backward SUMMARY. maintenance organisation, to absorb them. 706. One can summarise in a few words the Many aircraft were erected'and rapidly passed reason for the initial reverses in the Far East. into commission and many others were ovei- hauled during the period of the Command's 707. We lost the first round there because expansion. we, as an Empire, were not prepared for war on the scale necessary for'the purpose. When 701. During the war itself, technical personnel war broke out in Europe it absorbed the worked untiringly in most difficult circum- Empire's resources to such an extent that only stances. Aircraft and equipment had to be a fraction of the strength could be deployed dispersed as a protection against bombing, which had been calculated to be necessary for mostly to improvised dispersal points in rubber withstanding Japanese aggression in Malaya— plantations or scrub. There they were erected, navy, army, air force and civil organisation overhauled and serviced with little or no alike being much below the required mark. protection against tropical downpours. When Japan attacked she proved to be even more formidable than had been expected, 'the 702. An example of such work was the erec- result being that she swamped our under- tion of the first 50 Hurricanes which • arrived developed defences before they could be in Singapore in mid January 1942; it was a supported. particularly fine feat. Within a few days all were ready to take the air, the first in under 48 708. Mistakes undoubtedly occurred, as they hours: during that time they had been unloaded always do in war when the unexpected happens in crates at the docks, conveyed many miles on the scale that it did in the Far East. But by road to scattered hide-outs in rubber planta- credit should ^be given to those on the spot tions, and there rapidly erected despite tropical who did theirfrbest to take the first brunt of rain, blackout conditions at night and a great the enemy's)-overwhelming strength with in- shortage of specialised tools. adequate means,, and who gained thereby the H' r • necessary time for other forces to be collected 7.03. It would be invidious to select any to prevent' his further advance towards particular unit for special mention. Suffice it Australia and India. to say that most meritorious technical work of all kinds was performed by units throughout P. C. MALTBY, the command at all stages of the operations in Air Vice-Marshal. Malaya and the N.E.I, under very severe con- ditions. Not least of these handicaps was an London, almost complete breakdown of the backward 26th SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1413

APPENDIX To Report on R A F Operations in Malaya and N E.I , 1941-2. SITUATION AT RAF. STATIONS IN MALAYA—STH DECEMBER, 1941.

(a) Peace Scale of Defences Bombs (a) Aircraft shelters Location Accommodation Runways State of (Approx. (b) Concentration Accommodation (b) A.A. Guns weight) Scale of (c) Troops Accommodation NORTH-WEST: MALAYA A lor Star (a) i B Squadron Hard i — 1,400 i Squadron (a) Yes 250 tons. yds (b) 4—3" guns. (c) i Coy. Infantry (Bahawalpur) Butterworth (a) i GR Squad- Hard i — 1,600 Hutted (a) Yes Incomplete. 250 tons. ron yds , being ex- 2 Squadrons. Oc- (b) None until 10 12 41 tended to 2,000 cupied. Then 8 Bofors. yds. 2nd in (c) Bahawalput Inf. Btn hand (less 2 Coys ) Jabi (6) i B Squadron Hard 1,400 yds i Squadron only, (a) — NiL Graded but not just commenced (b) — surfaced ' (c) — Kuala Ketil Satellite for Tarmac 1,400 Guard Room ; (a) Nil Nil. Sungei Patam, yds Petrol, oil and (6) Nil bomb stores (c) i Coy. Bahawalpur Inf. Lubok Ktap (a) i B Squadron Hard Hutted — 2 Squad- (a) - Nil. i — i ,600 yds rons nearing com- (b) Nil i — 1,200 y'ds pletion Partly (c) Nil partly graded occupied Malakoff Satellite for i, 600 yds Grad- No buildings com- Nil Nil. Lubok Kiap. ing not com- pleted plete Panang Civil Airfield Limited grass Nil. Nil. Nil. airfield Sungei Satellite for 2,000 yds (1,400 No buildings com- Nil Nil. Bakap Butterworth yds soled but pleted not surfaced). Sungei (a) 2 F Squadrons Grass Hutted : 2 Squad- (a) Not quite finished. 250 tons. Patani r — 1,400 yds rons Partly (b) 7—3-7" guns i — 1,200 yds occupied (c) Btn HQ and i Coy. Indian State Troops. NORTH-EAST MALAYA Gong Kedah (b) i B Squadron Hard Hutted : i Squad- (a) Yes • nearly 100% 250 tons. i — 2,000 yds ron Ready and (b) 2—3" partly occupied (c) i . Pltn Mysore Inf. Kota Bahru (a) i B Squadron Grass • Hutted : 2 Squad- (a) Yes : nearly 100% 250 tons. • i — i, 600 yds rons. Being ex- (b) 4—3" guns Being extended tended. (c) i Btn Inf (less i Coy) Machang (b) i F Squadron Hard. Hutted 2 Squad- (a) Just started 50 tons. i — i, 600 yds rons partly com- (b) Nil i — i ,200 yds pleted (c) 2 Coys Mysore Inf in hand. EAST MALAYA Kuantan (b) i B Squadron, Grass Hutted 2 Squad- (a) In hand 100 tons. i GR Squadron i — 1,500 yds. rons Complete. (b) Nil i — 1,200 yds. (c) 3 Coys 5th Sikhs CENTRAL MALAYA Ipoh (b) 2 B Squadrons Grass plus tar- Hutted : 2 Squad- (a) Nil Nil. mac rons Nearly com- (b) Nil i — 1,400 yds pleted Partly (c) i Coy. Indian State occupied Troops. i MG Platoon Sttiawan Civil Airfield Grass : Guard Room only (a) Nil Nil. i — 1,000 yds. (6) Nil i — 800 yds (c) i Coy (less i Pltn) Indian State Troops Taiping Satellite for Ipoh Grass plus tar- Requisitioned cot- (a) Yes Nil. mac tages Hutments (b) Nil i — 1,400 yds in hand (c) i Coy and i M G Pltn Indian, State Troops SOUTH MALAYA Batu Pahat Civil Airfield Grass • Petrol and oil stores (a) Nil 50 tons. Satellite for i — 1,400 yds only. (b) Nil Kluang (c) i Pltn A I F Inf. Bekok (a) i Squadron 2,000 yds \ Nil Nil (Labis) 1,400 yds f Nil surveyed only Kuala Civil Airfield Grass Completed (a) Nil 50 tons. Lumpur 1,315 yds Occupied by 153 (b) Nil MU (c) i Coy Indian State Troops i M G Pltn Kluang a) 2 F Squadrons, Grass : Hutted 2 Squad- (a) In hand 50 tons. i F Squadron i — 1,200 yds rons. Nearing (b) Nil (Dutch). i — i, 600 yds. completion (c) i Btn (less i Coy and Hard runway Mostly occupied i Pltn ) arid Johore commenced. Military Forces Details. 1414 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948

(a) Peace Scale of Defences JLsf_rllT3rtrnl~iQl U *>. Accommodation State of (a) Aircraft Pens (approx. Location Runways (b) A A. Guns (b) Concentration Accommodation weight) Scale of (c) Troops Accommodation SOUTH MALAYA' — cont Kahang (b) i GR Squad- Grass Hutted : 2 Squad- (a) In Hand 50 tons ron. i — 1,400 yds. rons In hand. (b) Nil i — 1,300 yds (c) i Coy A I F. and Johore Military Forces Details Port Civil Airfield Grass (tarmac in Nil (a) Nil 10 tons. Swettenham centre) . (b) Nil i — 1,000 yds. (c) i Coy and i MG Pltn Indian State Troops. Tebrau Hard i Squadron only. (a) In hand Nil. i — 1,200 yds. and Squadron in (b) Nil i — 2,000 yds. hand (c) A I F Infantry in in hand. vicinity SINGAPORE ISLAND Kallang (a) i B Squadron Complete (Civil 2 Squadrons (a) Yes 10 tons (plus Airfield) Grass (b) Under cover of A. A ammuni- 1,400 yds defences Singapore tion). Town. (c) i Coy Jmd Inf Seletar (a) 2 TB Squad- Complete. Grass 3 Squadrons and (a) Yes 500 tons. rons 1,400 yds M U Dispersed (b) 8 Bofors. Within , i FB Squadron hutted accommo- defended zone of Naval dation partly Base A A cover completed (c) i Btn. (less i Coy) Kapurtala Inf Sembawang (a) 2 B Squadrons Grass 2 Squadrons (a) Yes 1,000 tons. 1,380 yds F A A. adjacent (b) Nil Within defended < Construction of zone of Naval Base 2 hard runways A A cover. deferred (c) i Coy Kapurtala Inf Tengah (

Location Unit No. Type Degree of Completion on 8th December, 1*941 (i) (2) (3) (4) MALAYA EAST COAST . Kota Bahru COL. Not technically complete Kota Bahru ... TRU. Some construction done Kuantan Under construction Endau Under construction Mersmg 243 MRU Operational. Bukit Chunang 5H C.OL Operational. Ayer Besar ... T.R.U Under construction. MALAYA : WEST COAST Penang Three stations One partly complete Batu Phat . . C.OL. Partly completed. Tanjong Kupang 512 CO.L Operational MALAYA : JOHORE Kota Tinggi 5i8 COL Operational late December, 1941. Bukit Dlnd^ng Crews on site. Not quite complete \ Did not function. Sungei Kahang Work neanng completion J Over-run by enemy. SINGAPORE ISLAND Seletar R I.M.U Operational. Tuas 243 T.R U. Operational 15 i 42. Tanah Merah Besar 250 M.RU Operational Serangoon 308 T.R U. Operational December, 1941. Changi Jail LD/CHL Operational December, 1941. . . '

JAVA . WEST • i Batav^a (East) . . T.RU. Operational February, 1942 j Batama (West) TRU Operational February, 1942 | Angelor Army G.L. Operational February, 1942. Lebuan Army G L Operational February, 1942. Tanara Army G L Operational February, 1942 ' ', JAVA EAST Modong American G L Operational 22 2 42. Parmakassen American G L. Operational 24 2 42 ; Sitoebondo • American G L Operational 24 2 42 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 26 FEBRUARY, 1948 1415

APPENDIX "C" to Report on R.A F. Operations in Malaya and N.E I 1941-2 RAF. ORDER OF BATTLE IN MALAYA 22«rf November, 1941 AIR HEADQUARTERS, SINGAPORE A OPERATIONAL UNITS SINGAPORE ISLAND I. Seletar Station Commander—Group Captain H. M. K Brown. (a) No. 3&(TB) Squadron—Commander—Wing Commander R N McKern.—12 Vildebeestes (b) No ioo(TB) Squadron—Commander—Wing Commander A. W. D Miller.—15 Vildebeestes. (c) No 205 (GR) Squadron—Commander—Wing Commander L. W Burgess—3 Cataknas (d) P R Flight—Commander—Squadron Leader C. G R Lewis —2 Buffaloes. 2 Sembawang Station Commander—Group Captain J. P J. McCauley (R A A F ) (a) No 8(GR) Squadron, R A A F —Commander—Wing Commander F N Wright —8 Hudson II. (b) No 2i(F) Squadron, R A A F.—Commander—Squadron Leader W. F. Alshorn.—10 Buffaloes. (c) No 45 3 (F) Squadron—Commander—Squadron Leader W J Harper—12 Buffaloes 3. Tengah Station Commander—Group Captain F E Watts (a) No 34(B) Squadron—Commander—Wing Commander G. P Longfield —17 Blenheim IV., (b) No 4 A A C U —Commander—Squadron Leader N. W. Wright —5 Sharks, 5 Swordfish, 2 Blenheim I. 4. Kallang Station Commander—Wing Commander R. A Chignell. (a) No 243(F) Squadron—Commander—Wing Commander G. B M. Bell—12 Buffaloes. (b) No 488(F) Squadron—Commander—Squadron Leader W. G. Clouston —9 Buffaloes. 5. Fighter Control in Singapore—Group Captain E. B Rice , MAINLAND OF MALAYA 6. Kota Bahru Station Commander—Wing Commander C H Noble. No. i(GR) Squadron, R A A F.—Commander—Wing Commander R. H. Davis—7 Hudson II. 7. Kuantan Station Commander—Wing Commander R. B Councell No 6o(B) Squadron—Commander—Wing Commander R. L Vivian. (From Rangoon for training at Armament Practice Camp)—7 Blenheim I 8. A lor Star Station Commander—Wing Commander R G Forbes No. 62(6) Squadron—Commander—Wing Commander J. Duncan —10 Blenheim I. 9 Sunget Patam Station Commander—Squadron Leader F R C Fowle No 27(NF) Squadron—Commander—Squadron Leader F. R C Fowle —10 Blenheim I 10. Butterworth—Care and Maintenance —i/c—Flight Lieutenant R D I Scott 11 Kluang Station Commander—Wing Commander W. R Wills-Sandford—Improvised O T.U. 12 Kuala Lumpur Norgroup H.Qs —Wing Commander R G. Forbes NOTES • (a) Aircraft shown are those serviceable as at 22nd November, 1941. (b) A further 40 Buffaloes were repairable within 14 days (c) For other Squadrons, there was an average of 2 or 3 aircraft per Squadron repairable within 14 days.

B MAINTENANCE UNITS. 13. No 151 MU. . Seletar... Group Captain C T. Walkington. 14. No. 152 M U. . Bukit Panjang, Singapore Squadron Leader S. G. Aylwm. 15. No. 153 M.U. .. Kuala Lumpur Group Captain M. W. C Ridgway. 16. No. 81 R. & S U. Kluang Wing Commander H. Stanton. 17. "Z" MU. Batak Quarry, Singapore Flight Lieutenant J. H. Cocks. 18. RIMU. Seletar. Squadron Leader T. C. Carter.

C. MISCELLANEOUS UNITS 19. Radar Units (Four operational) Wing Commander N. Cave. 20. R N.Z.A F. Aerodrome Construction Unit Squadron Leader Smart. 21. Transit Camp, Singapore . . . Squadron Leader O. G. Gregson. 22. S.S. " Tung Song " . . Pilot Officer G. T. Broadhurst. » S.S. " Shenkmg " Pilot Officer C. E. Jackson.

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