Ruling Coalitions, Transnational Activism, and Conservative Reaction

Dealing with Historical Issues in Japan and Germany: Ruling Coalitions, Transnational Activism, and Conservative Reaction

Yangmo Ku

B.A. August 1999, Sogang University, Seoul M.A. May 2002, The George Washington University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2010

Dissertation directed by

Mike M. Mochizuki

Japan-U.S. Relations Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University

certifies that Yangmo Ku has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy as of June 28, 2010. This is the final and approved from of the dissertation.

Dealing with Historical Issues in Japan and Germany: Ruling Coalitions, Transnational Activism, and Conservative Reaction

Yangmo Ku

Dissertation Research Committee:

Mike M. Mochizuki, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

Harvey Feigenbaum, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

Holger Schmidt, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member

iii

Dedication

To my wife, Min Ku and my mother, Bokran Kim

Acknowledgements

This dissertation could not have been completed without the generous help of many people. I want to first express my special gratitude to Professor Mike Mochizuki, who served both as my academic advisor and dissertation director with intellectual and personal generosity. His advice, balanced between warm encouragement and insightful comment, always kept me on the right track throughout the entire research and writing process. I am also indebted to committee members Harvey Feigenbaum and Holger

Schmidt, and to reviewers J.J. Suh and Lily Gardner Feldman. They offered helpful comments and suggestions on a number of earlier drafts.

Professor Youngshik Bong of American University often provided me with his valuable insights on East Asian historical issues. Professors Cheolhee Park of Seoul

National University and Wondeog Lee of Kookmin University helped make my field research in South Korea and Japan fruitful. Pastor Mikang Yang also introduced numerous interview subjects, particularly civil activists in both South Korea and Japan.

Professor Unsuk Han of Korea University helped me to find important research materials regarding the German-Polish History Textbook Commission at the Georg-Eckert Institute in Germany.

Several institutions also contributed to my field research in South Korea, Japan, and Germany. I received generous financial assistance from the Korea Foundation; the

Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies; and the Georg-Eckert Institute of

International Textbook Research. The Institute of Japanese Studies at Seoul National

University, Temple University Japan Campus, and the Georg-Eckert Institute allowed me to use their office space and research facilities.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my mother and wife. My mother, Bokran Kim, has stood behind me with utmost patience and love. My wife Min has endured the misery of being married to a graduate student, including countless lonely holidays and weekends when I had to work. She has always cheered me up and shared with me all the ups and downs in my life. I could not have completed this project without her love and support.

Abstract of Dissertation

Dealing with Historical Issues in Japan and Germany: Ruling Coalitions, Transnational Activism, and Conservative Reaction

When and why does a perpetrator state take a more penitent stance on its past injustices?

This dissertation explores the variations in Japan’s and Germany’s choice of history policy, mainly through the comparative study of common historical issues—sexual slavery, forced labor, and biased history textbooks. I test and compare two competing approaches to explain the variance in the two states’ behavior toward these historical problems.

A realist approach argues that geopolitical incentives are the driving force behind a state’s penitence regarding past transgressions. A transnational-coalitional approach— newly combined for this study—posits that a perpetrator state will adopt more penitent attitudes toward its past wrongs when transnational activism is powerful and the state is led by a progressive ruling coalition. Transnational actors push the state to adopt more conciliatory policies toward past misdeeds by disseminating information, engaging in persuasion, and exerting pressure. Progressive governing elites, who have a strong motive for promoting human rights and social justice, listen to and take into account the voices requesting redress for unresolved historical issues from transnational actors.

The case studies show that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but complementary despite the relative strength of transnational-coalitional approach. The effect of transnational activism is heightened when the target state is faced with other geopolitical incentives and/or when the target state is led by a progressive ruling coalition. The Japanese state, for example, responded to the transnational comfort

vii women movement in a somewhat conciliatory manner between 1993 and 1995 when building better ties with Asia was in its security interest and a liberal, non-LDP coalition briefly took power. Similarly, the German state took a more conciliatory stance on the forced labor issue when the progressive SPD/Green Party led a coalition government and

German business interests were at stake in the U.S. market during the late 1990s. The transnational German-Polish History Textbook Commission played a key role in improving the German historical narrative and its textbook policy regarding Poland, particularly as the progressive SPD-FDP coalition supported the Commission and such action was very much in keeping with German security interests during the 1970s. In the

2000s, on the other hand, transnational activism regarding history textbooks had a limited impact on the Japanese historical narrative and its textbook policy given, in large part, the strengthened U.S.-Japan security alliance and the conservative governing coalition led by the LDP.

viii

Table of Contents

Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...iv

Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..v

Abstract of Dissertation………………………………………………………………….vii

Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………ix

List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………..x

List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………..xi

Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………1

Chapter 2: Analytical Framework: Realism vs. Transnational-Coalitional Approach……………………………26

APOLOGY AND COMPENSATION

Chapter 3: Japan’s Dealings with Comfort Women/Forced Labor Issues……………….53

Chapter 4: Germany’s Dealings with Forced Labor/Forced Prostitution Issues...... 105

HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Chapter 5: Japan’s Postwar Historical Narrative and Textbook Policy: The Japanese-South Korean Context………………………………...... 142

Chapter 6: Germany’s Postwar Historical Narrative and Textbook Policy: The German-Polish Context………………………………………………..193

Chapter 7: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..227

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………240

Appendix………………………………………………………………………………..258

List of Figures

Figure 1 Net Power of Transnational Activism………………………………………….40

Figure 2 Analytical Model for State Behavior toward Historical Issues………………...47

List of Tables

Table 1 Korean Perceptions of Japan……………………………………………………...7

Table 2 Germany’s Coalition Governments……………………………………………..44

Table 3 Forced Laborers according to Nationality, August 1944………………………105

Table 4 German-Polish Textbook Dialogue (1977-1989)……………………………...209

Table 5 Summary of Theory Tests (Apology and Compensation)……………………..227

Table 6 Summary of Theory Tests (History Textbooks)……………………………….227

Chapter 1 Introduction

When and why do perpetrator states take a penitent stance on their past wrongs? Why has Germany been able to deal with historical issues in a more forthright manner than has

Japan? Why do their behaviors differ over time in addressing historical problems like sexual slavery, forced labor, and biased history textbooks? Under what conditions do they take more apologetic attitudes toward their past injustices and adopt more reflective historical narrative and textbook polices?

Japan and Germany inflicted tremendous suffering on huge numbers of people in the early part of the Twentieth Century. Despite considerable controversy over the numbers, their aggressive wars resulted in casualties of more than fifty million in Europe and twenty million in Asia. 1 Of these, as many as eleven million people perished in the

Holocaust due to Nazi Germany’s deliberate campaign to wipe out certain undesirable groups, including six million Jews. Although Imperial Japan did not pursue such genocidal policies, it also left behind a similar legacy of distress and resentment in Asian nations.

Both states committed a series of comparable wartime atrocities against humanity, engaging in sexual slavery and forced labor under hellish conditions. From its colonial and conquered territories, Japan forcibly drafted so-called “comfort women,” ranging in

1 Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 104-05; Thomas U. Berger, “Dealing with difficult pasts: Japan’s history problem from a Theoretical and comparative perspective,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Kazuhiko Togo, eds., East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 23-27. 1 number from 50,000 to 200,000, to provide sex for its soldiers. 2 Japan also transported hundreds of thousands of Korean and Chinese people to Japan and other colonial holdings to work as forced laborers. 3 Tens of thousands of Allied prisoners of war

(POWs) were also forced to work for private Japanese companies, including Mitsubishi and Nippon Steel. In a similar vein, more than 34,000 women were forced to work as prostitutes for German soldiers, officers of other Nazi controlled organizations, and forced laborers during the Third Reich. 4 In addition, Nazi Germany forcibly recruited about ten million laborers of two types: slave laborers (nearly half Jewish and half

Poles/Russians) who were confined in concentration camps and ghettos; the other type was almost exclusively gentile forced workers from Eastern Europe. 5

Additionally, Korea and Poland were among the nations most seriously victimized by Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. During the thirty-five years (1910-

1945) of Japanese colonization, Koreans suffered under Japan’s political, economic, physical, and cultural oppression. 6 The Japanese authorities prohibited public assembly,

2 Sarah Soh, “The Korean Comfort Women: Movement for Redress” Asian Survey , Vol. 36, No. 12, (December 1996), pp. 1226-27; Asian Women’s Fund, The Comfort Women Issue and AWF (2007) , pp. 111-16; Nicola Piper, “Transnational women’s activism in Japan and Korea: the unresolved issue of military sexual slavery” Global Networks , Vol. 1, No. 2 (2001), p. 161. 3 Petra Schmidt, “Japan’s Wartime Compensation: Forced Labor,” Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 2 (2000), pp. 4-10; William Underwood, “Names, Bones and Unpaid Wages: Reparations for Korean Forced Labor in Japan,” Japan Focus , pp. 13-16; Hye-Kyung Chung, “The Forcible Drafting of Koreans during the Final Phase of Colonial Rule and the Formation of the Korean Community in Japan,” Korea Journal (Winter 2004), pp. 31-41. 4 Nanda Herbermann, translated by Hester Baer, The Blessed Abyss: Inmate #6582 in Ravensbruck Concentration Camp for Women (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000), pp. 32-34. 5 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished Business of World War II (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), p. 206-07; Ulrich Herbert, translated by William Templer, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980: Seasonal Workers/ Forced Laborers/ Guest Workers (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 127-92. 6 On Japanese colonial rule over Korea, see Michael E. Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); Mark E. Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension, (Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp. 1-3.; Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s: From Antagonism to Adjustment , (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 6-9; Lind, Sorry States , p. 28. 2

abolished Korean newspapers and political organizations, and violently suppressed

independence movements. Koreans also suffered increasing deprivation through the

1930s as authorities diverted Korean food and material to supplement the Japan resource base strained by the Japanese-Chinese war. In the cultural sphere, colonial authorities sought to impose a Japanese identity by compelling Koreans to adopt Japanese names, to speak Japanese, and to practice Shinto (the Japanese national religion). Most of the comfort women forced into military prostitution were Koreans. In addition, approximately 720,000 Korean forced laborers had to work under inhumane conditions, many of whom died from sickness, starvation, overwork, accidents, and the brutality of their Japanese overseers. Korean men were also conscripted to work or fight in the

Japanese Army.

The Nazi invasion and occupation of Poland between 1939 and 1945 brought horrendous suffering to the Polish nation.7 More than six million Polish citizens were

annihilated by Nazi Germany. Among them were three million Polish Jews, who

perished in ghettos, concentration camps, and prisons. Poles also suffered a variety of

brutalities, including forced labor, medical experiments, and political persecution. The

capital city, Warsaw and other major cities were severely damaged. Moreover, Nazi

Germany sought to kill or deport Polish leaders, prohibited publications and art

performances in the Polish language, and minimized educational opportunities for Poles.

Under such historical backgrounds, the ways in which Japan and Germany

addressed their past wrongs has varied significantly over time. This is particularly true

7 Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 47-48; Unsuk Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ: Dokil/Poland Y ŏksa Hwahae ŭi Kil [Beyond the Division of Victimization and Victimhood: Path of German-Polish Historical Reconciliation] (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008), p. 29. 3

regarding apology/compensation for the sexual slavery and forced labor issues, as well as

the official narratives recorded in history textbooks. The Japanese government has

persistently refused to accept claims made by victims’ rights groups that represented

hundreds of thousands of Korean and Chinese forced laborers. 8 Up until the early 1990s,

the Japanese government denied any Japanese military involvement in organizing the

comfort women system by attributing it as private enterprise. In the mid-1990s, the

Japanese government issued somewhat apologetic statements regarding the comfort

women issue and also helped establish a nongovernmental fund, the Asian Women’s

Fund (AWF), though these efforts were not equivalent to the desired full-fledged state

compensation. 9 By the mid-1980s, Japan’s school textbooks began to increase their

coverage of past injustices. 10 This culminated in the mid-1990s with the inclusion of

comfort women issues in Japanese history textbooks. 11

These limited but positive changes surrounding apology/ compensation and

history textbooks ceased in the late 1990s and have in fact receded.12 Since that time, for

example, high-ranking Japanese government officials made a series of provocative

statements that either denied or whitewashed the wartime atrocities perpetrated by the

Japanese against the comfort women. In January 1999, the Japanese government “asked

publishers to make their textbook content more balanced and to reconsider their choice of

8 Berger, “Dealing with difficult pasts,” p. 28; Schmidt, “Japan’s Wartime Compensation,” pp. 15-19. 9 Sarah Soh, “Japan’s National/Asian Women’s Fund for Comfort Women” Pacific Affairs , Vol. 76, No. 2 (Summer 2003), p. 218. 10 Yoshiko Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy, 1945-2001” in Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones, eds., History Education and National Identity in East Asia (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 287-88. 11 Yoshiko Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, 1945-2007: The Japanese history textbook controversy and Ienaga Saburo’s court challenges (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 141. 12 Sarah Soh, “Politics of the Victim/Victor Complex: Interpreting South Korea’s National Furor over Japanese History Textbooks” American Asian Review , Vol. XXI, No. 4, (Winter 2003), p. 148; Sven Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society (German Institute for Japanese Studies, 2005), pp. 52-55. 4

authors” to prevent the promotion of the reflective view of history in textbooks. 13 In

2001 and 2005, the government approved biased history textbooks for junior high schools

written by the nationalist Japanese Society for Composing New History Textbooks.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo denied Japan’s coercive recruitment of comfort

women in March 2007, although he reversed his stance on the issue a month later.

In the German side, the issue of Nazi-era slave and forced labor largely remained

unacknowledged for more than half a century following the end of World War II. In the

late 1990s, however, the German state issued apologetic statements and established the

“Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation to compensate slave and forced

laborers exploited by the Nazi regime. 14 In June 2007 the Foundation completed the

payment of compensation to approximately 1.7 million people (DM 15,000 was awarded

to slave laborers and DM 5,000 to forced laborers). 15 In contrast, the German

government has paid little attention to the issue of forced prostitution in Nazi Germany

since the end of the war.16

And West German history textbooks stressed the innocence and suffering of the

German people rather than Nazi aggression and atrocities in the 1950s. 17 As the result of

governmental alarm over rising anti-Semitic vandalism, German school textbooks in the

1960s were significantly revamped to better reflect Nazi-era atrocities. Nevertheless, by

the late 1960s, German history textbooks still lacked coverage of Poland and described

13 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 144. 14 Lutz Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future,” in Michael Jansen and Günter Saathoff, eds., A Mutual Responsibility and A Moral Obligation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 15. 15 John Authers, “Making Good Again: German Compensation for Forced and Slave Laborer” in Pablo de Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 420-48. 16 Tetsuya Takahashi, translated by Kyusu Lee, Ilbon ŭi Ch ǒnhu Chaekim ul Mutnunda: Kiuk ŭi Chungchi, Manggak ŭi Yunri [Asking for Japan’s War Responsibility: Politics of Memory and Ethics of Forgetting] (Seoul: Yuksa Bipyoung Sa, 2000), pp. 196-97. 17 Lind, Sorry States , pp. 112-13. 5 the nation with negative images. The 1970s and 1980s, however, witnessed positive changes to the descriptions of Poland and German-Polish relations in German textbooks. 18

WHY DEALING WITH THE PAST MATTERS

It is necessary for perpetrator states to deal with their past misdeeds for the following reasons. First, a perpetrator state’s unresolved historical matters often prevent the state from forging amicable relationships with neighboring nations by elevating the distrust and hostility among them. 19 The fluctuating relationship between Japan and South Korea is an excellent example. 20 In the late 1990s, the two former adversaries witnessed an unprecedented improvement in their bilateral relationship. President Kim Dae Jung and

Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo declared the new Japan-South Korean partnership for the

21 st century in 1998, which included Japan’s first written apology, South Korean acceptance of Japan’s apology, and a pledge by both states to move forward. 21 Such

18 Seung-ryol Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa: Dokil-Poland Y ǒksa Kyokwas ǒ Daehwa” [National History through Two Views: German-Polish History Textbook Dialogue] in Jubaek Shin, ed., Dong Asia eseo Y ŏksa Insik ŭi Kukkyung Neomki [Crossing the Border of Historical Understanding in East Asia], (Seoul: Asia Peace and History Education Research Association, 2008), pp. 186-87. 19 Tae-Ryong Yoon, “Fragile Cooperation: Net Threat Theory and Japan-Korea-U.S. Relations,” PhD Dissertation (Columbia University, 2006), pp. 543-44: Yoon argues that “if Japan remains to be the same kind of reactive state that has been reluctantly and passively submitting to the demands of the victimized neighbors little by little, not so much change would be brought about in its relations with the neighbors. Japan, like Germany, should be a proactive state at least in disentangling the history-related issues or World War II-related issues. Only after that, the neighboring states would neither oppose to Japan’s change into a normal state nor fear it.” 20 To understand variance in postwar Japan-ROK relations, see Lee, Japan and Korea ; Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, (Stanford University Press, 1999; Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s ; Tae-Ryong Yoon, “Learning to Cooperate Not to Cooperate: Bargaining for the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization,” Asian Perspective , Vol. 32, No. 2, 2008, pp. 59-91; Yangmo Ku, “International Reconciliation in the Postwar Era, 1945-2005: A Comparative Study of Japan- ROK and Franco-German Relations,” Asian Perspective , Vol. 32, No. 3, 2008, pp. 5-37. 21 Yoshibumi Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia: How the Political Right Has Delayed Japan’s Coming to Terms with its History of Aggression in Asia , (LTCB International Library Foundation, 1999), pp. 256-58; Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh, “Security, Economy, and Identity Politics: Japan- South Korean Relations under the Kim Dae-jung Government,” Korea Observer , vol. 36, No. 4, (Winter 6

promising overtures, however, were seriously undermined by Japanese government’s

approval of Fusosha’s biased history textbooks in 2001 and Japanese political leaders’

visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. 22 These events resulted in the highest level of diplomatic

protests, the recall of Korea’s ambassador to Japan, and the suspension of shuttle

diplomacy between top leaders. By the same token, such historical controversies

aggravated popular opinion, particularly Koreans’ perceptions of Japan, as demonstrated

in Table 1.

Table 1. Koreans’ Perception of Japan (unit: percent) 23 Year 1973 1978 1984 1988 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2005 Dislike 58.6 69.9 38.9 50.6 66 68.9 65 42.6 42.2 56.6 63 Like 12.9 7.6 22.6 13.6 5.4 5.5 8 9.6 17.1 12.1 8 Source: Chungang Daily (1973, 1978); Donga Daily (1984-2005)

Jennifer Lind also holds that denials of past aggression and atrocities produce

mistrust and increase fear among former adversary states. 24 In her book Sorry States

Lind highlights the obvious contrast between postwar Japanese and German remembrance, and the notably divergent outcomes in each case. Japan has often experienced friction with South Korea, China, and Australia more than sixty years after

World War II due to its impenitent attitudes, including frequent denials by high-ranking leaders and omissions from Japan’s history textbooks. By contrast, Germany’s past adversaries have felt reassured because Germany was willing to officially acknowledge

2005), pp. 564-73: In the 1998 Joint Communique, they also adopted a series of action items to attain the goals of the joint declaration. Particularly stressing the importance of future relationship, President Kim promised to open South Korea’s mass culture markets to Japan, which had long been taboo in South Korea. 22 The issue of Japan’s biased history textbooks will be addressed in detail in Chapter 5. And, after he took power in 2001, Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi annually visited to the Yasukuni Shrine where Japan’s Class-A war criminals had been enshrined in 1978. China and South Korea strongly protested against Japan’s such provoking action. 23 Ku, “International Reconciliation in the Postwar Era,” p. 25. 24 Lind, Sorry States, p. 3. 7

responsibility for Nazi-era atrocities and influential German figures made no denials or

glorifications of the past actions. While they currently continue to monitor German

remembrance, Britain and France are reassured due to the absence of signs of

revisionism.

Second, the history problem impedes the development of security and economic

institutions in East Asia. Japan’s unrepentant stance regarding its wartime transgressions

has fed distrust and suspicions among its Asian neighbors, particularly China and South

Korea. 25 Such historically-based mistrust among regional actors has cast a dismal

shadow over the prospect of regional security cooperation in Asia, despite the existence

of a loosely operated multilateral security forum—the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Edward Lincoln also notes that “Japan’s brief history of empire continues to hinder

regionalism because of the alleged failure of Japan to apologize to its Asian neighbors for

atrocities committed during the colonial period and the war.” 26 In the 1997 Asian

economic crisis, for example, though Japan proposed the creation of a $100 billion Asian

Monetary Fund in order to constrain the financial contagion, China and South Korea

moved against their economic self-interest by rejecting the plan along with the United

States due to their lingering suspicions of Japan. 27

Third, unsettled historical issues can make it easier for the same enemies to fall

back into repetitive wars. The same adversaries have often continued to fight with one

another not always because the same conflicts of interest did not get resolved but rather

25 Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Problem of Memory,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (1998), pp. 37-49; Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security , Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80. 26 Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 37. 27 Kristof, “The Problem of Memory,” p. 44. 8 because past injustices were not treated timely and satisfactorily.28 Long-standing rivals that illustrate this pattern of conflict include Israel and the Palestinians, and India and

Pakistan. Additionally, whether or not former adversaries successfully deal with the past has important implications for future peace and stability. 29 Specific to Northeast Asia, the bilateral reconciliation between Japan and South Korea—who share the common values of democracy and free markets—is a necessary condition for establishing a stable regional order. Similarly, the Franco-German reconciliation has contributed to European integration and peacekeeping.30 Without a successful reconciliation between Japan and

South Korea, building a peaceful Northeast Asian community will be difficult. Moreover, in the long run, reconciliation between Japan and South Korea can play a critical role in the process of the future reunification between South and North Korea, a project that will require a great deal of support from Japan.

ASSESING THE EXISTING LITERATURE

The existing literature, which consists of cultural, structural, and institutional approaches, mainly seeks to explain the cross-regional variance in Japan’s and Germany’s dealings with historical injustices: Germany has been more penitent than Japan. Thus the extant literature overlooks cross-temporal changes within the same state in addressing its past

28 Yinan He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past: Post-Conflict Interstate Reconciliation in East Asia and Europe,” PhD Dissertation, (MIT 2004), pp. 16-17. 29 Ku, “International Reconciliation in the Postwar Era,” pp. 34-35. 30 For the Franco-German reconciliation and its impact on European peace and prosperity, see F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe, 1945-1967 (Stanford University Press, 1968); Stephen A. Kocs, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe’s Strategic Choices, 1955-1995 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995); Julius W, Friend, The Linchpin French-German Relations, 1950-1990 (New York: Praeger, 1991); Gisela Hendriks and Annette Morgan, The Franco-German Axis in European Integration (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001). 9

transgressions. It also pays little attention to analyzing the effect of societal and

transnational actors on the two states’ behaviors dealing with historical issues.

A frequently-cited approach is the culturalist argument that places much weight

on the divergence of culturally determined understandings of past actions. According to

Thomas Berger, culturalists argue that “Germans felt guilt over their atrocities while the

Japanese did not because the two societies had very different understandings of the kind

of responsibility that individuals and groups hold for their past actions.” 31 Under a strong

Christian tradition, German individuals and groups are accountable to a higher,

transcendent authority for their actions. Once individuals are culpable for such actions,

they should feel guilt and take compensatory actions. On the other hand, since Japan is

guided by significantly different Buddhist-Shinto religious traditions, it does not possess

an equivalent notion of guilt. In Japanese society, there are only feelings of shame that

are embedded in how one is seen by the broader community. 32 It is very important to

protect appearances and maintain a reputation for correct social performance in the shame

culture.33

A major problem with this culturalist argument is that it is not sufficient to

explain variance in political outcomes within the same culture due to its assumption of

homogeneity and endurance of culture. Although it has not been fully satisfactory to

former victims, Japan’s past efforts at apology and compensation and the degree to which

Japan adopts a reflective view of history have varied over time. In any event, the

culturalist view fails to provide the reason of why the German government paid

31 Berger, “Dealing with difficult pasts,” p. 22. 32 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1946). 33 Jeffrey K. Olick, The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 132-33. 10

reparations for slave and forced laborers in the 2000s. As Lutz Niethammer indicates,

“sixty years had passed since the practice of impressing foreigners into the wartime

workforce first began and nine out of ten of the persons concerned were no longer

alive.” 34 The culturalist perspective also has trouble accounting for Germany’s neglect in dealing with forced prostitution issues during the Third Reich. Furthermore, it is difficult to isolate culture from other factors such as socioeconomic conditions, institutional structures, and historical circumstance.

Moving beyond the culturalist approach, many scholars argue that the way in which Japan and Germany had addressed their wartime actions in the early postwar period significantly affected their subsequent dealings with historical problems. 35 They

tend to put together a variety of elements to explain this specific instance of cross-

regional difference. The first well-known factor is that a sense of “victimhood” was

prevalent in postwar Japan, whereas a sense of “culpability” was common in postwar

Germany. As Mochida Yukio posits, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

inspired a sense of victimhood among the Japanese people, thus leading to the prevention

of addressing war atrocities inflicted by Japanese soldiers. 36 On the other hand, Nazi

Germany’s clear responsibility for the Holocaust helped shape the German sense of

culpability, which spawned the thorough investigation of the Nazi crimes. In the early

34 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” p. 15. 35 Steven T. Benfell, “Why Can’t Japan Apologize? Institutions and War Memory since 1945,” Harvard Asia Quarterly , Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring 2002); Lind, Sorry States ; Berger, “Dealing with difficult pasts”; Yukio Mochida, “Ch ǒnjaeng Chaekim kwa Ch ǒnhu Chaekim [War Responsibility and Postwar Responsibility]” and Yasushi Yamaguchi, “Du Kae ŭi Hyundaesa: Yǒksa ui saeroun Ch ǒnhwanjeom e sǒsǒ [Two Contemporary History: Standing at the New Turning Point of History],” in Hiroshi Tanaka, ed., translated by Kyusu Lee, Kiuk kwa Manggak: Dokil kwa Ilbon, Du Kae ui Ch ǒnhu [Memory and Forgetting: Germany and Japan, the Two Postwar] (Seoul: Samin, 2000); Michidaka Nako, “Kwag ǒ ui Kukbok kwa Sangho Ihae ul yuihay ǒ [Coming to Terms with the Past and for Mutual Understanding],” in Myungkwan Chi, ed., Ch ǒnhu Bosang kwa Hanil ui Sangho Ihae [New Japan-Korea Partnership and the Postwar Compensation] (Seoul: Hanyang University Press, 2003). 36 Mochida, “Ch ǒnjaeng Chaekim kwa Ch ǒnhu Chaekim,” p. 34. 11

postwar period, however, the German population also focused on their own suffering,

thereby leading to the prevalence of a powerful sense of German victimization. 37 Wulf

Kansteiner emphasizes that “the culture of the 1950s is still most appropriately

characterized as a period of communicative silence about the most troublesome aspects of

the burden of the past, a silence that went hand-in-hand with noisy lamentations of

German victimhood.” 38

The second factor is that the Tokyo Tribunal was not conducted with the same

rigor as the Nuremberg Tribunal. Under the direction of the United States, International

Military Tribunals were convened in both Nuremberg and Tokyo in order to put German

and Japanese war criminals on trials. Yamaguchi Yasushi maintains, however, that while

the Nuremberg trials succeeded in strictly punishing the Nazi war criminals, the Tokyo

trials were strongly influenced by U.S. concerns over the nascent Cold War and thus

failed to thoroughly punish Japanese war criminals. 39 U.S. occupation authorities

deliberately exonerated the Japanese Emperor, in whose name the war had been pursued,

because they feared indicting the Emperor would provoke strong opposition to the

occupation.40 To reconstruct Japan as the strong anti-Soviet ally the U.S. wanted,

political, military, and industrial leaders who had been recently purged or imprisoned for

their campaign of imperial expansion were largely rehabilitated.41 As a result, though a

few were put to death, most Japanese war criminals were eventually released and

37 Berger, “Dealing with difficult pasts,” p. 23. 38 Wulf Kansteiner, “Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle: the Legacy of Nazism, World War II, and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Richard Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu, eds., The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 108. 39 Yamaguchi, “Du Kae ŭi Hyundaesa,” pp. 243-44. 40 Benfell, “Why Can’t Japan Apologize?” pp. 4-5. 41 Lind, Sorry States , p. 31 12 reentered politics or the public sphere.42 For instance, Kishi Nobusuke, who had been a member of the Tojo Hideki’s wartime cabinet, was initially imprisoned as a war criminal suspect, but was released without indictment and eventually became a prime minister.

The American handling of Japanese war crimes to some extent prevented Japan from adopting a penitent stance on its past during the postwar period. However, this argument tends to overlook the fact that postwar efforts to pursue historical justice issues had also been significantly compromised in the German context. 43 By June 1946, Konrad

Adenauer already had come to regard denazification as the cause of postwar nationalism among the German people.44 Many Germans increasingly pulled their initial support for the Nuremberg trials as their limitations became clear. According to survey data,

“support for the purges goes from approximately 50 percent soon after the start of the

Occupation to well under 20 percent by early 1949.” 45 As Norbert Frei notes,

Germany’s democratic, legally sanctioned political parties initially supported the Allies’ political purges but began making efforts to end the purging immediately following the inauguration of the West German parliament in 1949. 46

The third factor used to explain this cross-regional variation is the different geopolitical context in Germany and Japan following World War II.47 As a continental

42 Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 652; Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia , pp. 49-58: Former Premier of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew also mentioned this aspect as follows: “the de-nazification process in Europe left no stone unturned. In Asia, by contrast, the communist takeover in mainland China followed by the Korean war prevented a thoroughgoing purge of those really responsible for World War II. And that is why relics from the past have managed to creep back into the mainstream.” 43 Berger, “Dealing with difficult pasts,” p. 23. 44 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 223-24. 45 Berger, “Different beds, same nightmare,” pp. 24-25. 46 Norbert Frei, translated by Joel Golb, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. xii. 47 Thomas Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” in Thomas Berger, Mike Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds., Japan in International Politics: The Foreign 13

state and divided nation, Germany was confronted with the threat of invasion by a

powerful Red Army on the one hand and was simultaneously susceptible to political

pressure from the Allies (especially France) on the other as it needed their diplomatic

support for keeping the hope of reunification alive. Germany also needed to restore

trading relations with other European countries in order to reconstruct its economy. To

cope with these challenges, the Federal Republic chose to integrate itself into the West

through closely knit multilateral institutions, beginning with North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and the European Economic Community (ECC). As a result,

Germany opened itself to heavy pressure to confront its past from Western aligned

countries.

In contrast, Japan’s geopolitical context in the early postwar period did not

encourage Japan to seriously address its historical injustices. Japan, an island nation,

faced relatively little threat of Soviet invasion. Following the collapse of its Empire,

Japan had cut its ties with Asia and paid close attention to the West in order to promote

economic growth. East Asia was marked by a system of highly alienated bilateral

relations between the United States and its Asian allies, as opposed to multilateral

institutional structures developed in Europe. The United States was at the core of this

system and Japan found itself as number two in terms of political and economic power.

No other Asian country could deal with Japan as an equal while Britain or France could deal with West Germany even as a superior. Japan was far more insulated from political pressures from its Asian neighbors.

Policies of an Adaptive State, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 189-90; Thomas Berger, “Different beds, same nightmare: the politics of history in Germany and Japan,” AICGS Policy Report 39 (2009), pp. 27-28. 14

These psychological, structural, and institutional factors provide a partial

explanation of the cross-regional differences in addressing wartime wrongs. These

constraints did, in fact, contribute to Japan’s inability to actively address its past atrocities

following the early postwar period. Under relatively favorable conditions, on the other

hand, Germany dealt with its historical problems in a more timely and penitent manner.

Like the culturalist approach, however, these static analyses are not sufficient to explain

the cross-temporal changes in both Japanese and German attitudes toward historical

problems. Another serious problem posed by these views is their overlooking the role of

specific agents—i.e., transnational actors, conservative groups, and ruling elites—in

affecting state behavior toward historical issues. The two perpetrator states, as analyzed

in the next chapters, received strong impact from those actors’ activities in coming to

terms with historical matters.

Compared to these previous works, the two seminal books recently published in

the U.S.—Jennifer Lind’s Sorry States and Yinan He’s The Search for Reconciliation — address the politics of memory and reconciliation in Japan and Germany in a more systematic way. By developing and testing an apology theory, Lind explains the impact of Japanese and German remembrance on South Korean and French perceptions of intent and threat.48 Lind’s research supports the conventional wisdom that denying past aggression and atrocities does fuel mistrust and promotes fear among former adversaries.

Lind finds, on the other hand, that apologetic behavior is not a prerequisite for reconciliation, as shown in the Franco-German relationship that experienced substantial reconciliation with very little contrition during the early postwar period. Another

48 Lind, Sorry States, Ch. 1: Apology theory posits that while contrition decreases threat perception and elevates reconciliation, unapologetic remembrance (i.e., forgetting, denying, or glorifying past atrocities) increases threat perception and prevents reconciliation. 15

significant finding is that a perpetrator state’s contrition can generate a domestic backlash

from conservatives that then damages its relationship with former victim states. In

response to contrition, conservatives provide a competing interpretation that glorifies—as

opposed to condemns—the state’s past and justifies or even denies its wartime

atrocities. 49

Despite these important findings, however, Lind’s research does not go as far as

to address the question, “what causes contrition?” which is a main theme of my

dissertation research. Interestingly, Lind’s independent variable (i.e., apologies or

policies of remembrance) is the dependent variable that my dissertation seeks to explain.

In addition, Lind’s analysis of historical cases overlooks the German conservative

backlash to the government’s confrontation with the past. Lily Gardner Feldman states,

“While not as ferocious as the right-wing backlash in Japan, there was intense German

opposition to government and societal reconciliation behavior on a variety of

occasions.” 50 Lind pays little attention to some of the variations in Japan’s behavior

toward historical issues such as comfort women and biased history textbooks. As

analyzed in Chapter 3, without the Murayama cabinet in the mid-1990s, Japan would not

have established a humanitarian fund, the Asian Women’s Fund, to express a sense of

atonement to former comfort women.

Yinan He tries to explain the different outcomes of reconciliation processes in

postwar Sino-Japanese (shallow reconciliation) and German-Polish relations (deep

49 Lind, Sorry States , p. 4: Hence, “contrition can be counterproductive: observers will be angered and alarmed by what the backlash suggests about the country’s intentions. Such anger can mobilize nationalistic sentiment in the victim country, creating a spiral of acrimony that makes reconciliation even more elusive.” 50 Lily Gardner Feldman, “German-Polish Reconciliation in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for Japan?” The Asia-Pacific Journal , 16-1-10, April 19, 2010, p. 2. 16 reconciliation) by testing realist and national mythmaking theories. He’s research is pathbreaking in the sense that she expertly traces the delicate variations in the degree of reconciliation between the two dyads by systematically setting and measuring four indicators: expectation of war, national recognition, economic interaction, and public perception. And He’s theory of national mythmaking is a useful lens through which one can better examine the impact of historical memories on the bilateral relationship between former adversary states. The theory posits that, for instrumental purposes, ruling elites construct national myths of the conflict history, which impede long-term reconciliation. The memories of former enemy states clash as national myths glorify and whitewash the actions of their own nations and criticize that of others. Such mutually divergent historical interpretations contribute to bilateral conflict by provoking negative emotions and perceptions of the other nation’s hostile intention. Conversely, convergent narratives, produced by historical settlement (i.e., bilateral joint history research and interstate restitution measures), promote official cooperation and societal contacts and lead to deep reconciliation. 51

Despite its theoretical sophistication, national mythmaking theory suffers some holes of logic and empirical evidence. First, this theory does not adequately show the mechanism by which joint history research and restitution measures emerge and come true. Since it solely focuses on ruling elites, the theory neglects the role of other societal actors in affecting the launch and achievement of historical settlement. My dissertation research intends to fill this gap by explicating detailed dynamics of societal actors that exert significant influence on the perpetrator states’ stance on past misdeeds. Second, elite mythmaking has no room to embrace the significant variations in Japan’s restitution

51 He, The Search for Reconciliation , Ch. 1. 17 measures, particularly the establishment of the Asian Women’s Fund in the mid-1990s.

Throughout her empirical chapters, Yinan He implies that Japan’s conservative ruling elites have always made national myths for their political and instrumental purposes since

World War II, thus impeding reconciliation with its Asian neighbors.

However, national mythmaking of conservative ruling elites can be complementary to a main analytical framework of my dissertation—the transnational- coalitional approach— discussed in the next chapter. Elite mythmaking can be an important reason for a conservative ruling coalition’s reluctance to grapple with wartime transgressions. And it is important to note here that elite mythmaking theory is an analytical framework that aims not to capture the variations of a perpetrator state’s behavior toward specific historical issues but to analyze variance in the degree of reconciliation between former enemy states.

Overall, the previous literature overlooks cross-temporal changes within the same state in its focus on the cross-regional variation between Japan and Germany in addressing their past wrongs. The previous literature also pays little attention to analyzing the impact of societal and transnational actors on the two states’ attitudes dealing with historical matters. Therefore, it is not sufficient to explain within-case variations in addressing specific historical issues, including sexual slavery, forced labor, and biased history textbooks. To fill these gaps, this study develops an analytical model that can explain both the cross-regional and cross-temporal variance in states’ reckoning with these historical problems.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR STATE’S HISTORY POLICY

The insufficiency of the existing literature produces the need to search for more comprehensive explanations of the variations in a perpetrator state’s attitudes toward their past transgressions. It appears that two approaches are especially pertinent to explain the state’s history policy. The first is a realist explanation that stresses security and/or economic incentives to adopt a penitent or impenitent stance on historical issues.

The second approach is the transnational-coalitional explanation that emphasizes the importance of political and societal actors in exerting great influence on state behavior toward historical problems. I briefly summarize these approaches below and provide a comprehensive account in Chapter 2.

A Realist Explanation

Realism is not a theory but a paradigm that includes a wide variety of theories aimed at explaining state behavior and international relations. Despite the existence of these variants, realism shares the following core assumptions: (1) states are key actors in world politics; (2) states are rational and act on the basis of self-interest; and (3) there is no legitimate authority in the international system (international anarchy). Realism makes no direct predictions about the pathways toward perpetrator states’ dealings with historical issues. Given these realist assumptions, I infer a hypothesis regarding perpetrator states’ behavior in addressing historical issues: perpetrator states are more likely to take a conciliatory stance on their past misdeeds when they calculate such action is in their security and/or economic interests. As rational actors, perpetrator states will

choose a policy toward historical matters that best serves its overall security and/or

economic interests.

The Transnational-Coalitional Explanation

The transnational-coalitional approach disagrees with the realist perspective that

emphasizes the predominance of the state and thus overlooks the role of non-state actors

in world politics. Instead, it departs from a different assumption that non-state actors,

such as transnational and conservative groups, can have an independent impact on state

behavior and international relations. According to this approach, a progressive governing

coalition tends to place more value on human rights, social justice, and global peace than a conservative ruling coalition. Under this tendency, the progressive ruling coalition is more apt to voluntarily initiate processes that address its past wrongs. It also listens to and takes into account the voices and requests of transnational civil society groups.

Therefore, the ideological orientation of a perpetrator state’s ruling coalition is progressive exerts significant influence on the state’s dealings with historical issues.

Along with the nature of the ruling coalition, societal groups—i.e., transnational actors and conservative organizations—also serve as a catalyst for altering the way in which a perpetrator state comes to terms with its past actions. To address historical problems, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seek to organize a transnational activist network and promote issue resonance in the international community. Through this issue resonance, the transnational network tries to exert strong pressure on the state to correct its behavior in a penitent manner. In terms of the textbook issue, additionally, transnational actors establish and conduct regular textbook dialogues in order to reduce

history perception gaps between former adversaries. On the other hand, conservative

groups, which usually put the first priority on national pride and confidence, strive to

prevent their government and society from taking a penitent stance toward past wrongs.

To this end, they often create a broad political network with conservative politicians and

media that can have a strong societal impact. Hence, the transnational-coalitional

approach deduces the following hypothesis: when transnational activism is powerful and a perpetrator state is led by a progressive ruling coalition, the state is more likely to adopt conciliatory policies toward historical issues.

METHODOLOGY AND CASE SELECTION

This dissertation is a comparative study of historical cases that primarily adopts the

congruence procedure method. 52 To increase inferential leverage, my case studies

combine cross-case and over-time comparisons. 53 After I first explain the internal logic

of the two approaches, I infer from each of them a set of predictions on state behavior in

dealing with historical issues. My case studies explore values on the independent and

dependent variables across different time periods within each case, and then evaluate if

these values co-vary in a manner consistent with those predictions. These congruence

tests aim to find temporal correlations between the independent and dependent variables

that suggest plausibility of their causal relationship.

The main cases studied in this project are sexual slavery, forced labor, and biased

history textbooks—three historical issues that both Japan and Germany have addressed

52 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science , (Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 49-67; Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences , (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 151-232. 53 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, “Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” Comparative Political Studies , Vol. 40, No. 2, (February 2007), p. 176. 21

since World War II. These historical issues can be classified into two functional areas:

apology/compensation and historical narrative/textbook policy. The first two cases

address Japan’s and Germany’s dealings with apology/compensation regarding sexual

slavery and forced labor respectively. The second two cases shed light on Japan’s

interactions with South Korea and Germany’s interactions with Poland regarding

historical narrative and textbook policy.

I focus on the two perpetrator states—Japan and Germany—for several reasons.

First, the two states are classic cases that scholars have compared in addressing the topic

of apology and reconciliation. Second, the two cases provide substantial cross-case and

within-case variation in their admission and remorse about past offenses. Third, selecting

the two cases is close to a most similar case comparison, although they are not perfectly

matched cases. As Lind notes, “both countries suffered defeat during World War II, both

gradually gained autonomy after a period of occupation, and both were allied with the

United States in the Western alliance system.” 54 There still remains, however, variation between the two cases on other plausible independent variables—e.g. different culture, geopolitical context, and American handling of war crimes—that might matter to explain the cross-national variance. As noted earlier, for example, Japan entered into a bilateral alliance system while Germany joined a multilateral alliance. As a consequence,

Germany came under heavy pressure to confront its past from Western aligned countries, while Japan was far more insulated from political pressures from its Asian neighbors.

This structural factor provides a partial account of the cross-national differences in

54 Jennifer Lind, “Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics,” PhD Dissertation, (MIT 2004), pp. 50- 51. 22 addressing wartime misdeeds. This static analysis, however, would not be sufficient to explain over-time changes in both Japanese and German stance on historical issues.

I select three common historical issues in Japan and Germany—sexual slavery, forced labor, and biased history textbooks—on the basis of the following criteria. These cases have large over-time variance in the independent variables I am focusing on, particularly the activities of transnational activist networks. As noted above, these networks could have an impact on the dependent variable—state behavior toward historical problems—by promoting issue resonance in the international community and exerting significant pressure on the state. This allows the transnational-coalitional approach to be tested repeatedly with just three cases. In the future research, however, the transnational-coalitional approach can be also tested against other salient historical issues in both states, including war memorials and territorial disputes. Since transnational networks have not yet become actively in these issues, it would be useful to test the hypothesis that the presence or absence of transnational networks matter for a state’s dealings with historical problems.

In the history textbook issue, additionally, I select Japanese historical narrative and textbook policies regarding Korea, and German historical narrative and textbook policies regarding Poland. The two victim nations—Korea and Poland—are similar in their geographic proximity to the perpetrator states, traumatic past experiences inflicted by the former aggressors, and equally weak national power in relation to the perpetrator states in the postwar era. However, the outcomes of Japan’s and Germany’s dealings with history textbooks demonstrate great variance: the German state has by and large taken a penitent stance on its historical narrative and textbook policies regarding Poland

23 since the mid-1970s, while Japanese historical narrative and textbook policies still have an impenitent view of Korea. And the cases are “study-able” from the viewpoint of availability of evidence.

One might argue, nevertheless, that the two cases concerning history textbooks cannot be exactly comparable because Poland suffered much heavier casualties than did

Korea. No comparison of cases, however, is perfect. 55 As Berger posits, “While the atrocities of the Third Reich were unique in their brutality and scale, the suffering and loss of life attributable to the Japanese Empire were absolutely horrific by any measure.” 56 Moving beyond this concern, the two cases at least offer large within-case variations in both independent and dependent variables for theory testing. In the

Japanese cases, I broadly use primary sources including governmental documents, publications from civil organizations, interviews, media data, and relevant secondary materials. The study of Germany’s historical cases mainly draws upon secondary sources in English and Korean with personal interviews with some German scholars.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows: Chapter Two provides the operational definition of state behavior toward historical issues and lays out the theoretical arguments of the two competing analytical frameworks. Chapters Three and Four explore Japan’s and Germany’s dealings with apology and compensation for sexual slavery and forced labor during the postwar period. Chapters Five and Six address historical narratives and textbook policies in the perpetrator states, particularly Japan’s

55 Bennett and Elman, “Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” pp. 174-75; Lind, Sorry States , pp. 23-24. 56 Berger, “Different beds, same nightmare,” p. 20. 24 interactions with South Korea and Germany’s interactions with Poland regarding history textbooks. Chapter Seven summarizes the findings of the case study chapters, illustrates the theoretical and policy implications of the study, and discuss some areas for future research.

Chapter 2 Analytical Framework: Realism vs. Transnational Coalitional Approach

In the preceding chapter, I argued that the existing literature offers only a partial account of the variations in Japanese and German state behaviors towards specific historical issues—sexual slavery, forced labor, and biased history textbooks. These explanations also neglect to analyze the important roles of under-examined political and societal actors in the two states’ behaviors. Pursuant to this critical assessment, this chapter presents two approaches that contribute more complete and dynamic explanations of the variance in these nations’ dealings with their historical problems. To this end, I first show how to identify and measure different state behaviors regarding historical issues. Secondly, I operationalize the three independent variables: geopolitical incentives, the nature of ruling coalition, and the power balance between transnational activist groups and conservative organizations. Then I elaborate on the arguments and the predictions of the two approaches. In particular, the transnational-coalitional approach is a newly synthesized analytical framework—a 2x2 matrix addressing how political and societal actors can affect state behavior in dealing with historical issues. After providing the predictions and arguments derived from the analytic models, I finally present brief descriptions regarding the dynamics of party politics and ruling coalitions in the postwar

Japan and Germany.

STATE BEHAVIOR TOWARD HISTORICAL ISSUES

The dependent variable in this dissertation is the variation in state behavior in two functional areas: (1) apology and compensation regarding sexual slavery and forced labor issues; and (2) historical narrative and textbook policy. To identify and measure those state behaviors, this study partially draws on the coding taxonomy that Lind established in her dissertation. 57 Lind evaluates remembrance policies in five areas: official statements, reparations, legal trials, education, and commemoration. She codes a state’s policies of remembrance through a continuum which ranges between apologetic and unapologetic. Apologetic policies include offering apologies to former victims, paying reparations to victims, putting perpetrators of past violence on trial, and publishing history textbooks that educate the public about past wrongs. On the other hand, unapologetic policies incorporate official statements denying wartime atrocities, paying compensation to perpetrators instead of victims, and publishing history textbooks that justify or praise past violence. The continuum also includes several nuances—i.e., acknowledgement, amnesia, and self-victimhood—between apologetic and unapologetic policies of remembrance.

Building on Lind’s ideas, I define four stages of state behavior in addressing apology/compensation and history textbook issues respectively: deep penitence, shallow penitence, impenitence (or backsliding), and stalemate. An important criterion to classify these stages is whether or not a perpetrator state displays both admission and remorse about its past violence through its official statements, compensation measures, and history textbooks. This standard is based on the findings of social psychologists. As

57 Lind, “Sorry States,” Chapter 1: As noted already, Lind used apologies or polices of remembrance as her independent variable to explain perceptions of intentions and threat. 27

Lind notes, such experts have identified central components of penitence (or apology) that transcend different cultures; a penitent stance should demonstrate both admission and remorse with regard to past misdeeds. 58

When a state presents the highest value, deep penitence , in the area of apology and compensation, the state issues apologetic statements to acknowledge past wrongs and expresses regret for them to former victims. In these statements, agency is clear (i.e. X did this to Y) and apologetic words are unambiguous. The state also pays direct compensation to surviving victims for its past offenses. With regard to historical narrative and textbook policies, the state takes steps to promote a reflective view of history in school textbooks. As a consequence, the school texts include balanced assessment of historical facts and detailed descriptions of past violence committed by their state against others.

When a state is in the next stage, shallow penitence , the state issues apologetic statements, but the contents of these statements are ambiguous enough to raise doubts on the state’s sincerity. The statements express remorse but do not fully acknowledge past wrongdoing, or reflect remorse yet fail to specify the agency that committed terrible crimes. Although it makes apologetic statements, the state takes no concrete actions to compensate former victims for its past violence in order to fulfill the statements; or instead of direct state compensation, the state provides victim survivors with a certain sum of money through a nongovernmental fund to avoid assuming direct responsibility.

Regarding historical narrative and textbook policies, moreover, the state seeks to educate the public just about the minimal scope of its past transgressions.

58 Lind, “Sorry States,” pp. 38-41; Lind, Sorry States , pp. 16-18. 28

When a perpetrator state falls into the lowest stage, impenitence (or backsliding) , the state issues official statements that justify, deny, or glorify its past misdeeds.

Additionally, the state simply may not mention past violence at all. It does not speak of or design any compensation scheme for surviving victims. In terms of historical narrative and textbook policies, the state declines a reflective view of history and places much weight on the promotion of national pride and patriotism in history education. It approves biased history textbooks that justify, deny, or praise past wrongs. The state may also overlook its past (somewhat) apologetic statements and policies, regressing to more unapologetic attitudes regarding apology/compensation and history textbook issues.

If a state’s position embraces stalemate , the state remains in a struggle with external groups (or individuals) without taking any significant steps to address apology and compensation and history textbook issues. Even if it seeks to take a penitent stance on the historical issues, the state may easily fail to proceed due to strong domestic opposition. Conversely, the state might resist calls for adopting a penitent stance on the historical problems, although it comes under heavy pressure from the external agents.

It is vital to note, however, that a state’s attitudes toward apology/compensation and history textbook issues do not always fall into the same stage of penitence. As illustrated in later chapters, for instance, Japan was in the stage of shallow penitence regarding history textbooks in the 1980s, but it presented impenitence regarding comfort women and forced labor issues at the time. And the Japanese and German central governments are the main actors addressing apology and compensation regarding the sexual slavery and forced labor issues. Concerning state behavior toward history textbooks, however, it is necessary to understand the structural differences in the

education system of both countries. Japan has a centralized textbook certification system

under which the central government conducts textbook screening every four year. On the other hand, Germany has a decentralized education system, so its local (state) governments have greater influence over school textbooks than the central government. 59

A REALIST EXPLANATION

Realism is a broad paradigm that encompasses many different variants. The pioneer of

classical realism was E.H. Carr. In his seminal work, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-

1939 , Carr contends that the liberal doctrine of the harmony of interests glosses over the

real conflict that is to be found in international relation—the conflict between the ‘haves’

and the ‘have-nots.’60 A central feature of the world is scarcity—there are not enough of the good things of life to go around. Carr thus posits that realists work with the world as it really is while utopians view it as they wish it to be. Hans Morgenthau, however, systematized classical realism, claiming that the aggressive and power-seeking nature of states is derived from sinful human nature. International relations are regarding states pursuing interests in terms of power. 61 Morgenthau viewed the mainspring of realism as

lying not in scarcity, a product of the human condition, but in sin, a product of human

nature.

Neorealism (or structural realism) moves beyond classical realism’s assumption

that human nature contains an innate drive for power. Neorealism posits that

international politics is shaped by states’ desires to survive in the anarchic international

59 He, The Search for Reconciliation , p. 294. 60 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1939). 61 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948). 30 system.62 Kenneth Waltz maintains that anarchy—the absence of central rule—is the most important structural feature of international realm. In a system governed by self- help, the units are compelled to try to be functionally alike—alike in the tasks that they pursue. And the structure of a system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units. Hence, international structures are defined and compared according to two basic dimensions of state placement: anarchy and the distribution of power. International structures vary only through a change of organizing principle or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units.

Neorealism has two variants—defensive and offensive realism. The basic tenet of defensive realism holds that states seek security maximization under international anarchy. Waltz argues that after a state balances against a dangerous opponent and achieves a satisfactory degree of security, there is no further need for power accumulation. 63 Offensive realism, on the other hand, posits that states seek to maximize relative power in order to survive. John Mearsheimer claims that great powers fear each other and constantly seek to alleviate this fear by maximizing their share of world power. 64 Mearsheimer believes that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the anarchic structure of the international system creates powerful incentives for

62 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979): As Waltz notes, a system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. His concept of political structure consists of three analytical components: (1) the principle according to which the system is ordered or organized; (2) the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions; (3) the degree of concentration or diffusion of capabilities within the system. Waltz’s central concern is to demonstrate the impact of variations in international structure on international outcomes, and explaining similarities of outcomes over time by structural continuity. 63 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987): Stephen Walt presents balance of threat. Walt contends that states balances against threat rather than just material capabilities. The level of threat will be assessed on the basis of four interrelated factors: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. 64 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions” International Security , Vol. 19, No.3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 31

states to gain power at the expense of rivals. To maximize the prospects for survival,

therefore, a state’s ultimate goal is to achieve hegemonic mastery of the system.

The main difference between offensive and defensive realism centers on the

question of how much power each state wants to possess. The former claims that state’s power-seeking has limits, whereas the latter maintains that states’ desire to seek power is insatiable. Mearsheimer’s states are never satisfied; they keep reaching for more power, and these power urges seem bound to collide. Waltz’s states are less fearful, more accepting of risks, more oriented toward particular nonsecurity interests, and more willing to live with only a modest amount of security. Consequently, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism predicts much higher potential for conflict and war than does Waltz’s defensive realism.

Neoclassical realism is a theory of international relations that combines classical realism with neorealism, particularly defensive realism. Neoclassical realism explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thoughts.65 Neoclassical realists argue that the scope

and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the

international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. They

argue, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect

and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening

variables at the unit level—such as decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state

structure.

65 For the detailed overview of neoclassical realism, see Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics , Vol. 51, No. 1, (October 1998), pp.144-72; Steven E. Lobell, Norin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: University Press, 2009). 32

Independent Variable 1: Geopolitical Incentives

Due to these variants, it would be difficult to infer determinate realist propositions

regarding perpetrator states’ dealings with their historical issues. This dissertation

applies one specific aspect of realism, focusing on whether or not a perpetrator state has

geopolitical incentives to seek closer ties with its neighboring countries—particularly

with former victim states. As rational actors, perpetrator states should choose history

policies that best serve their overall security and/or economic interests. Given this logic,

I infer the following hypothesis: perpetrator states are more likely to take a conciliatory

stance on their past misdeeds when they calculate such action is in their security and/or

economic interests. This hypothesis is based upon realism’s core assumption: as key

actors in world politics, states rationally act in accordance with self-interest under the

anarchic international system. 66

Since the early 1950s, Japan’s ultimate security interest—national survival—has

been largely dependent upon the U.S.-Japan Alliance, which has formed the bedrock of

Japan’s postwar foreign policy. 67 Franziska Seraphim argues that the conclusion of the

U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 ensured Japan’s internal and external security by

guaranteeing the presence of U.S. troops in Japan. 68 Under these circumstances, the fear

of U.S. abandonment would compel Japan to improve its relationship with South Korea,

as Victor Cha posits. 69 In his book, Alignment despite Antagonism , Cha presents a quasi-

66 Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization , Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn 1998), p. 658; Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International Organization , Vol. 52, No. 4, (Autumn 1998), p. 980. 67 He, The Search for Reconciliation , p. 295. 68 Franziska Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 18-19. 69 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism : Cha’s empirical studies show that during the periods of 1969-71 and 1975-79, U.S. disengagement generated greater cooperation in Japan-ROK relations, while U.S. 33

alliance model (as a variant of realism), arguing that the U.S. disengagement from

Northeast Asia generates Japan-ROK cooperation due to their multilateral symmetric

abandonment fears regarding the U.S. On the other hand, U.S. engagement in the region

leads to Japan-ROK friction because of their bilateral asymmetric abandonment and

entrapment fears. As detailed in Chapter 3, the U.S.-Japan Alliance significantly

weakened between 1991 and 1995, whereas the period from the mid-1990s witnessed the

notable strengthening of the alliance. In this regard, a realist focus on geopolitical

incentives enables the following predictions:

Prediction 1 : Japan will take impenitent attitudes toward comfort women and forced labor issues and adopt unreflective history textbooks regarding South Korea before the end of the Cold War and from the mid-1990s.

Prediction 2 : Japan will take more penitent attitudes toward comfort women and forced labor issues and adopt reflective history textbooks regarding South Korea during the period between 1991 and 1995.

On the other hand, Germany’s main geopolitical concerns during the postwar

period were caught up in two ultimate goals: (1) national survival through integration

with the West and NATO and (2) national unification. As Wolfram Hanrieder posits,

German entry into the Western alliance was actually closely related to the restoration of

German sovereignty. 70 The formation of integrative West European and Atlantic

structures exerted a decisive influence on Germany’s speedy political recovery. And as

He notes, “the goal of national unification was consensual among German elites across

the political spectrum and constituted the core of postwar German national identity.” 71

engagement during the periods of the 1972-74 and the 1980s coincided with frictions between Japan and South Korea. 70 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, “West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979: Necessities and Choices,” in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 17. 71 He, The Search for Reconciliation , p. 295. 34

As elaborated in Chapter 4 and 6, immediately following World War II, Bonn

strongly desired to rehabilitate its status in the international community. Bonn steadfastly

sought to attain unification through Western integration in the 1950s and 1960s. In the

early 1970s, Bonn adopted its new Ostpolitik that aimed to pave the way for eventual

German unification by improving relations with the Eastern bloc. 72 In the wake of

unification, however, Germany’s geopolitical incentives to seek closer ties with Eastern

bloc countries decreased significantly. Hence, realism permits the following predictions:

Prediction 3 : Germany will take impenitent attitudes toward Eastern forced/slave laborers and adopt unreflective history textbooks regarding Poland in the 1950s and 1960s.

Prediction 4 : Germany will take more penitent attitudes toward Eastern forced/slave laborers and adopt more reflective history textbooks regarding Poland from the early 1970s.

Prediction 5 : Germany will roll back its attitudes toward the historical issues following German unification.

THE TRANSNATIONAL-COALITIONAL EXPLANATION

This dissertation builds and tests a transnational-coalitional approach that purports to reveal how non-state actors—here, transnational or conservative groups—affect state behavior in addressing historical issues. The approach also stresses the impact of ruling coalitions’ ideological orientations—conservative or progressive—on state history policymaking. The transnational-coalitional approach is a synthesized analytical model that combines two independent variables—the net power of transnational activism and the nature of the ruling coalition. In this dissertation, transnational activism is defined as voluntary collective action across state borders that self-organized advocacy groups undertake in pursuit of what they deem to be the wider public interest, as Richard Price

72 He, The Search for Reconciliation , Ch. 2. 35 notes.73 A ruling coalition is equal to ruling parties (or a ruling party) that constitute(s) and lead(s) a national government. The scope of this definition is narrower than previous ones, which usually mean “policy networks” spanning state agencies and societal actors. 74

The transnational-coalitional approach has its intellectual roots in the study of transnational civil society and coalition politics that explain state policy changes in various areas, including human rights, the environment, economics, and security. For instance, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argued that transnational advocacy networks played a key role in improving the Argentine and Mexican governments’ human rights practices by documenting violations and raising international concern about them. 75 Matthew Evangelista also emphasized the roles of transnational scientist networks in promoting disarmament and respect for human rights in the USSR, thereby offering the basis of the Cold War’s peaceful conclusion.76 Another well-known case in the security arena is the international campaign to ban landmines. Transnational civil

73 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 3: Richard Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics” World Politics 55 (July 2003), p. 580: Transnational civil society groups are distinguished from “other transnational agents like private economic actors or government authorities institutionally empowered by the state. … Unlike terrorists and other transnational criminals, these transnational civil society groups eschew the deployment of armed violence for their ends.” Earlier, Thomas Risse-Kappen provided a broad definition of transnational relations, “regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization.” 74 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 1-2; Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 8-13. 75 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 79-120: The so-called ‘boomerang effect’—domestic groups reach out to international allies to bring pressure on their government to change its domestic practices—was applied to the Mexican case. When the human rights network did not exist, there was virtually no international response to the massacre of students in 1968. Only after the NGOs within and outside Mexico began to document human rights abuses and alert the press and policymakers, did the Mexican government improve its human rights practices. 76 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Cornell University Press, 1999). 36 society groups played a key role in compelling 131 states to sign the convention on the prohibition of the anti-personnel landmines in 1999. 77 Craig Warkentin and Karen

Mingst, furthermore, claimed that nongovernmental organizations triggered the failure of

OECD members in negotiating the Multilateral Agreement on Investment through their opposition campaigns. 78

Jack Snyder developed a coalitional approach to explain why some great powers pursued overexpansion, which was an often counterproductive aggressive policy. 79

According to Snyder, the myth that state’s security can be protected only through expansion was the primary cause of overexpansion by industrialized great powers, including Germany and Japan. Domestic political coalitions, including economic sectors and state bureaucracies, used the myth of security through expansion in order to justify the policies for their imperialist or military interests. Employing a coalitional framework,

Etel Solingen sought to explain regional orders and state nuclear behavior. Solingen claims that internationalist coalitions, which favor economic liberalization, often create cooperative regional orders where the coalitions are strong at home and in the region. On

77 Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization , Vol. 52, No. 3 (July 1998), pp. 613-44: Followed by the initial roles of the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), the ICBL (International Campaign to Ban Landmines), consisting of about 600 organizations in more than forty countries, acted as “norm entrepreneurs.” The ICBL used techniques including the generation and dissemination of information. NGOs unleashed the full panoply of tools geared toward information dispersion such as radio, TV, and documentary films. The information was designed to show not only the proliferation of deployed landmines but also, most vividly, their indiscriminate and devastating effects on unsuspecting civilians. Therefore, NGOs were entirely successful in generating the landmine issue that in a short time became prominent on the international agenda of states and that touched the very core of national security policy. 78 Craig Warkentin and Karen Mingst, “International Institutions, the State and Global Civil Society in the Age of the World Wide Web” Global Governance 6 (2000), pp. 237-57: Due to the strong resistance from developing countries, the MAI negotiations were secretly facilitated among the OECD members, not within the WTO in which the U.S. and the European Union originally sought to discuss the MAI. After a number of meetings for two years, the MAI Negotiating Group created the first draft of the MAI text in 1997. However, an abrupt leaking of the draft to public citizen and web brought about vehement opposition from 600 organizations in 70 countries. Those NGOs expressed strong objections by both using new media tools such as the World Wide Web and their standard repertoire: letterwriting campaigns, petitions, and public demonstrations. As a result, the OECD’s negotiations on the MAI ended in 1998. 79 Snyder, Myths of Empire . 37

the other hand, statist-nationalist and confessional coalitions that often oppose economic

liberalization are inclined to provoke armed conflicts, particularly where they prevail

throughout a region. 80 Solingen also maintains that internationalizing ruling coalitions that advocate integration in the global economy have incentives to avoid the costs of nuclearization, which impair a domestic agenda favoring internationalization.

Conversely, inward-oriented ruling coalitions have greater incentives to rely on nuclear weapons programs as a means for strengthening nationalist platforms of political survival, because nuclearization poses fewer costs for the leaders that reject internationalization. 81

Built on this preexisting literature, the transnational-coalitional approach contains two distinct features. First, the synthesized analytic model emphasizes not only the importance of international pressure (highlighted by the extant transnational civil society literature) but also the power balance between transnational and conservative groups in explaining state’s dealings with historical issues. Second, this modified analytical framework takes into account the nature—progressive or conservative—of narrowly defined ruling coalitions (that the previous coalition politics literature has not addressed) in state history policymaking. Below I first specify the two independent variables, the net power of transnational activism and the nature of ruling coalitions, and their effects on state behavior toward historical matters. Subsequently, I present an analytical model in a

2x2 matrix derived from the synthesis of the two independent variables. Finally, I will

80 Solingen, Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn : According to Solingen, the two ideal-typical coalitions form in response to the requirements of an integrating global political economy. 81 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 38

draw from the transnational-coalitional model four predictions for state attitudes in

addressing historical problems.

Independent Variable 2: Net Power of Transnational Activism

In the transnational-coalitional approach the net power of transnational activism, derived

from the mobilization of societal groups, is the first independent variable that exerts great

influence on state behavior in coming to terms with historical issues. The main societal

groups addressing historical problems in a perpetrator state are transnational activist

networks and domestic conservative (or nationalist) organizations. A transnational

activist network, which mainly consists of NGOs within a perpetrator state and in foreign

countries, pushes the state to take a more penitent stance on its wartime injustices through

disseminating information, engaging in persuasion, and exerting pressure. 82 Network

actors are often involved in exchanges such as conferences and workshops that promote

the effectiveness of their activism. To persuade or exert pressure on the state,

furthermore, they frequently seek to make connections with the media, international

organizations, and other (powerful) states. 83 In addressing history textbook issues, there

are two kinds of transnational activism: (1) to exert pressure on a target state to alter its

stance on biased history textbooks (Type I); and (2) to conduct regular textbook

dialogues to decrease history perception gaps between former adversary nations (Type

II).

82 Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics,” p. 584: The main activities that transnational activists usually pursue are: “(1) agenda setting—identifying a problem of international concern and producing information; (2) developing solutions—creating norms or recommending policy change; (3) building networks and coalitions of allies; and (4) implementing solutions—employing tactics of persuasion and pressure to change practices and/or encourage compliance with norms.” 83 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, p. 22. 39

On the other hand, conservative groups in a perpetrator state resist the pressure

from transnational networks and strongly oppose any penitent actions towards historical

matters taken by their state. Conservative reaction usually manifests itself in two ways.

The first is resistance to transnational activism; these nationalist groups place far more

weight on future glory than the reflection of their states’ past wrongs. Secondly,

conservative backlashes can arise when the perpetrator state tries to mend its attitudes

toward historical issues as a result of its own determination or transnational activism. 84

As Richard Price points out, the outcomes of transnational activism may vary according

to the intensity of a backlash from targets of activism. 85 Keck and Sikkink also highlight

that political resistance may interfere with the influence of transnational actors and exert

a strong impact on issue resonance. 86 Therefore, the power balance between

transnational activist networks and conservative groups is an essential variable that

affects the perpetrator state’s behaviors toward historical problems.

To capture this, I code the net power of transnational activism in dichotomous

terms, “strong versus weak,” based on the power balance between transnational activist

networks and conservative groups. As illustrated in Figure 1, the net power of

transnational activism is predicated on the existence of mobilized (or immobilized)

transnational activist networks and mobilized (or immobilized) conservative groups. If

there are mobilized transnational networks with immobilized conservative groups, the net

power of transnational activism is strong. But if there are mobilized transnational

84 Lind, Sorry States , p. 93: Lind provides an important finding that contrition causes a domestic backlash. According to her, “many of the gaffes that have so angered Japan’s former victims were in fact caused by Japanese contrition. In other words, efforts to apologize galvanized Japanese conservatives to deny, justify, or glorify Japan’s past behavior.” 85 Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics,” p. 586. 86 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders , p. 202. 40 networks and mobilized conservative groups simultaneously, the net power of transnational activism remains weak, as the transnational activism is dampened by conservative reaction. Furthermore, if transnational networks exist but are immobilized, the actual power of transnational activism is weak regardless of the existence of mobilized conservative groups.

Figure 1. Net Power of Transnational Activism

Mobilized transnational networks + Immobilized conservative groups = Strong Activism

Mobilized transnational networks + Mobilized conservative groups = Weak Activism

Immobilized transnational networks + (Im) Mobilized conservative groups = Weak Activism

Drawing from the transnational civil society literature, I evaluate the extent to which transnational activist networks are mobilized on the basis of two factors: (1) network density and cohesiveness, and (2) external support from the media, international institutions, and foreign governments. A mobilized transnational network will engage in regular exchanges between NGOs in a dense, unified network and enjoy a high degree of external support from the media, international organizations and other governments. An immobilized transnational network, on the other hand, does not have regular exchanges between NGOs within a sparse network. It not only suffers a sharp division among network actors in terms of movement tactics or goals, but also shows a low degree of support from the media, international organizations, and governments. In a similar vein, mobilized conservative groups strongly oppose transnational activism or their state’s penitent attitudes by establishing a unified network with conservative media, intellectuals, and political figures. Immobilized conservative groups produce few or sporadic oppositions without a solid network.

Independent Variable 3: the Nature of Ruling Coalition

The other independent variable that the transnational-coalitional approach sheds light on

is the nature (i.e. ideological orientation) of the ruling coalition in a perpetrator state.

This variable is closely related to the political opportunity structures often cited in

transnational civil society literature. As Susan Burgerman posits, “a violator state will

comply with human rights norms only if a key element of its domestic political elite, one

capable of exerting its authority over armed elements, perceives itself to be vulnerable

human rights condemnation or has concern for its country’s international reputation as a

violator state.” 87 Evangelista also contends that “transnational efforts, no matter how

extensive, may be insufficient to produce a change in policy without the opportunity

provided by receptive government leaders.” 88 Slightly modifying those insights, this

approach emphasizes the ideological orientations of ruling coalitions that impact state

behavior regarding historical issues.

The nature of the ruling coalition is coded as a dichotomy—progressive versus

conservative—in order to test this variable’s effect on the state’s attitudes toward

historical problems. Political ideologies such as conservatism and progressivism (or

liberalism) have different meanings in historical or country-specific contexts. 89 For the

87 Susan Burgerman, Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 5. 88 Evangelista, Unarmed Forces , p. 166. 89 Michael Sodaro, Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), Chapter 12; Haesook Chae and Steven Kim, “Conservatives and Progressives in South Korea,” The Washington Quarterly , Vol. 31, No. 4 (Autumn 2008), p. 77: In the United States, for instance, “conservatives generally prefer more limited government activism, less government spending, and greater freedom for the private sector. They tend to side with the business sector in labor-management relations.” Social progressives played a vital role in the abolition of slavery, women’s suffrage, and civil rights. In the South Korean context, “conservatives are fundamentally defined by South Korea’s adversarial relationship with North Korea and the U.S. role in ensuring South Korea’s security. Consequently, they see the health and security of the nation predicated on cultivating a close partnership with the United States and vigilance against the ever-menacing threat from the North. Progressives, on the other hand, radically oppose that narrative, 42

purpose of this study, however, I extract common characteristics of progressivism and

conservatism in relative terms from preexisting literature on political thought. 90

Progressivism is defined as an ideology that (1) places much value on achieving ideal

changes; (2) regards state not as a national community but as a functional entity meant to

manage society; and (3) stresses human rights, social justice/welfare, equality, world

peace, and international cooperation. On the other hand, conservatism is defined as an

ideology that (1) places much value on preserving present conditions and traditions; (2)

emphasizes state and national consciousness/identity rather than individuals or citizens;

and (3) puts great weight on national interest (i.e. economic or security) and international

competition.

Given these definitions, the transnational-coalitional approach posits that a

progressive ruling coalition would be more responsive to historical matters than a

conservative governing coalition for the following reason. Progressive ruling elites

would be more willing to address their state’s past misdeeds than conservative

counterparts as the former has a strong motive for promoting human rights, social justice,

and world peace. For progressives, reckoning with historical issues is closely connected

with actions that advance their ideological values. In this regard, progressive governing

elites are apt to voluntarily initiate processes that address its past wrongs. They are also

more likely to listen to and seriously take into account the voices and requests regarding

seeing the North more as a kin nation with which to be reconciled and the United States as a disruptive interloper.” 90 Samuel Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” The American Political Science Review , Vol. 51, No. 2 (1957), pp. 454-73; Lyman Tower Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996), Chapter 5; Dirk van Laak, “From the Conservative Revolution to Technocratic Conservatism,” in Jan-Werner Muller, ed., German Ideologies since 1945: Studies in the Political Thought and Culture of the Bonn Republic (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 147-56; Insung Chang, “Ch ŭnhu Ilbon ŭi Bosuju ŭi wa Kukka Pyosang [Postwar Japan’s Conservatism and State Representation],” Unpublished manuscript presented in an academic workshop held at the Institute of Japanese Studies, Seoul National University, Summer 2008. 43 historical problems from societal actors. Therefore, whether or not a perpetrator state’s ruling coalition is progressive exerts significant impact on the state’s behavior in dealing with historical issues.

Ruling Coalitions in Postwar Japanese and German Politics

Postwar Japanese party politics may be characterized as a long Liberal Democratic Party

(LDP) rule with a brief non-LDP interlude. The so-called 55-year system, which originated from the establishment of two unified parties, the LDP and the Japanese

Socialist Party (JSP), was a key characteristic in Japan’s postwar politics. 91 Under the

55-year system, the LDP sustained its parliamentary dominance for thirty-eight years until 1993. 92 The JSP participated in a brief non-LDP rule from 1993 and 1994 and later formed a coalition government with the LDP under JSP Prime Minister Murayama

Tomiichi between 1994 and 1996. The LDP-led coalition regained power in 1996 and

91 Purnendra C. Jain, “Party Politics at the crossroads,” in Purnendra Jain and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 11-16: The pre-1955 period witnessed frequent changes in both party alliances and government coalitions. Despite their opposing stance in terms of ideology, the conservatives and socialists formed these coalitions due to some overlap in policy preferences (e.g. to defend the new constitution) between them. The following table shows these short-lived coalition governments between 1946 and 1949. Date Prime Minister Parties June 1946 Yoshida Shigeru Liberal/Progressive April 1947 Katayama Tetsu JSP/Democratic Party/People’s Co-operative Party March 1948 Ashida Hitoshi Ditto January 1949 Yoshida Shigeru Democratic Liberal Party/Democratic Party

92 Jain, “Party Politics at the crossroads,” pp. 17-19: There were three primary reasons for LDP’s extended rule. First, the LDP gained strong support from highly influential interest groups such as big business and agriculture sector. A great majority of middle class voters also supported the party because Japan’s rapid economic development and growing prosperity were accomplished under the LDP regime. Second, the opposition parties were not effective enough to mount a serious challenge. For instance, the JSP failed to offer an economic blueprint for the nation and present appropriate policies regarding such important issues as pollution, consumer prices, and the liberalization of the distribution system and agriculture. Third, the Cold War contributed to prolonging the rule of the LDP, as the United States had a stake in keeping the pro-US LDP in power to prevent Soviet influence in East Asia. 44

continued to rule until August 2009 when the DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) won the

Lower House election.93

In contrast, a main feature of postwar German party politics is the regular

alternations between the ruling coalitions led by the CDU (Christian Democratic

Union)/CSU (Christian Social Union) and the SPD (Social Democratic Party), as

depicted in Table 2.94 Starting in 1949 when Allied control was relinquished, the

CDU/CSU formed a series of coalition governments with either the Free Democratic

Party (FDP) or smaller, short-lived groupings. After a Grand Coalition of the CDU/CSU

and the SPD between 1966 and 1969, the SPD led coalition governments with the FDP

until 1982. Then, a CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government lasted for sixteen years and a

SPD-Green Party coalition ensued following the September 1998 elections. After two

terms of SPD-Green coalition rule, another Grand Coalition made up of CDU/CSU and

SPD took office in 2005 under the leadership of Germany’s first female chancellor,

Angela Merkel (CDU/CSU). 95

Table 2. Germany’s Coalition Governments Year Chancellor Governing Coalition 1949-1966 Konrad Adenauer / Ludwig Erhard (CDU) CDU/CSU, FDP, DP 1966-1969 Kurt George Kiesinger (CDU) CDU/CSU, SPD 1969-1982 Willy Brandt / Helmut Schmidt (SPD) SPD, FDP 1982-1998 Helmut Kohl (CDU) CDU/CSU, FDP 1998-2005 Gerhard Schroeder (SPD) SPD, Alliance 90/Greens 2005-Present Angela Merkel (CDU) CDU/CSU, SPD

93 Japan Times , August 31, 2009: In this election, “the DPJ-led opposition camp secured 340 seats against just 140 for the LDP-New Komeito ruling bloc. In the opposition camp, the DPJ alone had 308.” As a result, the DPJ formed a coalition government with its two allies—the Social Democratic Party and Kokumin Shinto (People’s New Party). 94 Michael Sodaro, Comparative Politics, Chapter 17: The CDU and CSU have usually cooperated as one party, although rivalries between their leaders sometimes produce frictions. 95 Alister Miskimmon, William E. Paterson and James Sloam, eds., Germany’s Gathering Crisis: The 2005 Federal Election and the Grand Coalition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), Introduction. 45

In this study, I pay great attention to the nature of the two major parties in both

Japan and Germany—the LDP and the JSP, and the CDU/CSU and the SPD—as the

parties have alternately led postwar governments in both states. Based on their party

platforms, the JSP and the SPD can be classified as “progressive” while the LDP and the

CDU/CSU fall into the “conservative” category. In relative terms, the former put more

emphasis on human rights, social justice, equality, and peace than the latter. By the same

token, the LDP and the CDU/CSU placed a higher value on tradition, national

pride/identity, economic growth, and security than did the JSP and the SPD.

In its vision statement, for instance, the Social Democratic Party of Japan

(SDPJ)—formerly the JSP—expresses the noted progressive ideological values in

explicit and repeated ways. According to this statement, “We have to achieve a world

free of war and conflict…we are expanding freedom, equality, and peaceful

coexistence…Our aim is to guarantee equal human rights and social conditions of

participation…To respect individual dignity and human rights is important.”96 The SPD

also provides its policy platform filled with those progressive values. This platform

states, “We must fight for progress and social justice by democratic means. Committed

to the people, the German Social Democrats are accepting their tasks in the world of the

21 st century, for permanent peace and a free, fair society in solidarity. For equality and

self-determination of all people – independent of origin and gender, free from poverty,

exploitation and fear.” 97

The LDP and the CDU/CSU, on the other hand, put more emphasis on

conservative values than progressive ones. In its party platform, the LDP points out that

96 Online at http://www5.sdp.or.jp/vision/vision.htm (accessed July 24, 2010) 97 Online at http://www.spd.de/de/pdf/parteiprogramme/Hamburger_Programm_engl.pdf (accessed July 24, 2010) 46

“we are beginning to lose many aspects of the cherished culture and traditions that are unique to Japan…We are a people that deeply treasure a sense of belonging – to our families, to local communities, and to our nation.” The platform also notes that “it is incumbent on us to prove to the world that we can achieve economic growth and enrich the lives of its people by undertaking a variety of initiatives…Our party seeks to realize a

Japan that is filled with vitality and a sense of quiet pride.” 98 In a similar vein, the CDU identifies itself as “the party that promotes German unity” and emphasizes “solidarity as a nation” in its policy platform. 99 Geoffrey Roberts also states, “The CDU has become identified by the electorate as a conservative party, associated with anti-socialism and the free market economy. Its programme, though still paying lip-service to Christian values, reflects this emphasis on the economy and growth.” 100 It is necessary to note, however, that the LDP and the CDU/CSU do not entirely exclude the progressive ideological values. The parties are also concerned about those values, but put lower emphasis on them compared to the JSP and the SPD.

Therefore, since 1955 the nature of ruling coalitions in Japanese politics have generally been conservative, save for a period between 1993 and 1995 when progressive parties briefly took power. On the other hand, Germany’s postwar politics was driven by alternate conservative CDU/CSU-led periods (1949-1969 and 1982-1998) and progressive SPD-led periods (1969-1982 and 1998-2005).

98 Online at http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/jimin/houshin/index.html (accessed July 25, 2010) 99 Online at http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_13533-544-2-30.pdf?080423105009 (accessed July 25, 2010) 100 Geoffrey K. Roberts, German politics today (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 81. 47

The Synthesis of Transnational Activism and Ruling Coalition

As noted earlier, the preexisting literature lacks in-depth analysis regarding the impact of political and societal actors on a perpetrator state’s behaviors toward historical matters.

To make up for this weakness, I establish an analytical model by combining the two independent variables—the nature of the state’s ruling coalition and the net power of transnational activism. Given the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables, this dissertation posits and tests the following hypothesis: when transnational activism is powerful and a perpetrator state is led by a progressive ruling coalition, the state is more likely to adopt apologetic policies toward historical issues. As shown in a

2x2 matrix below, if the two independent variables are synthesized, there are logically four possibilities outcomes for a perpetrator state’s behavior in grappling with historical problems.

Figure 2. Analytical Model for State Behavior toward Historical Issues Ruling Coalition in Perpetrator State

Progressive Conservative

Strong I. Deep Penitence II. Indeterminate Net Power of (Shallow Penitence or Stalemate) Transnational Activism Weak III. Indeterminate IV. Impenitence/Backsliding (Shallow Penitence or Stalemate)

Prediction 6: When strong transnational activism is synthesized with a progressive ruling coalition in a perpetrator state, the state will take ‘penitent’ attitudes toward historical problems (Quadrant I).

The synthesis of strong transnational activism and a progressive ruling coalition could compel a perpetrator state to take penitent attitudes towards historical issues like sexual

slavery, forced labor, and biased history textbooks. Strong transnational activism

translates to a mixture of mobilized transnational activist networks and immobilized

conservative groups. To address those problems, NGOs organize transnational activist

networks and develop suitable strategies through exchanges like holding conferences and

workshops. Drawing attention from the media, international organizations, and other

governments, transnational networks grant such issues resonance in the international

community. In this process, a progressive ruling coalition listens to and seriously takes

into account the voices and requests of transnational networks, while immobilized

conservative groups are unable to prevent the increasing resonance of the issue in both

domestic and international arena. Through this issue resonance, transnational networks

seek to persuade and exert strong pressure on the state to rectify its behavior.

Additionally, in the textbook case, transnational networks seek to establish and conduct

regular textbook dialogues in order to reduce history perception gaps between former

adversaries. The perpetrator state thus takes up more penitent attitudes toward historical

issues.

In a similar vein, a progressive ruling coalition could voluntarily initiate processes

that address its past wrongs. For progressives, dealing with historical issues is a closely

connected with actions that promote their ideological values—human rights, social

justice, and international peace. In this case, mobilized transnational networks strongly

support the initiative, yet immobilized conservative groups have little impact on the issue.

The mechanism is almost the same as in the previous case.

Prediction 7: When there is weak transnational activism and a perpetrator state is governed by a conservative ruling coalition, the state will fall into the stage of ‘impenitence/backsliding’ (Quadrant IV).

If mobilized (or immobilized) transnational networks face mobilized conservative groups,

the former will fail to promote issue resonance enough to push a perpetrator state to

behave in a more penitent manner, as the conservative groups produce a strong backlash.

Putting much value on state and national pride, a conservative ruling coalition tends to

support conservative groups and neglect the voices of transnational activist networks.

Under such circumstances, the perpetrator state has no incentive to take penitent attitudes

toward historical matters. As a result, the state issues official statements denying their

wartime crimes, resists compensating for past violence, and approves history textbooks

that justify or praise past wrongs. Furthermore, the state may overlook its past apologetic

statements and policies, reverting to a more unapologetic stance on the issues.

Prediction 8: When there is strong transnational activism and a perpetrator state is led by a conservative ruling coalition, the state will be in the stage of ‘shallow penitence’ or ‘stalemate’ in addressing historical issues (Quadrant II).

In this instance, mobilized transnational networks could produce strong transnational activism facing immobilized conservative groups. Without powerful conservative reaction, transnational networks are able to elevate issue resonance with the support of the media, international organizations, and other foreign governments. This strong transnational activism plays a key role in pushing the state to adopt more apologetic attitudes toward historical matters. However, a conservative ruling coalition could not only avoid addressing historical issues voluntarily, but also pay little attention to the demands of transnational groups. As a consequence, the perpetrator state only takes shallowly penitent measures in response to domestic and international pressure. Or the state continues to resist calls for adopting a penitent stance, although it comes under

heavy pressure from external groups. In this case, the state revolves around the stage of

‘stalemate.’

Prediction 9: When weak transnational activism is combined with a progressive ruling coalition in a perpetrator state, the state will revolve around the stage of ‘stalemate’ or ‘shallow penitence’ (Quadrant III).

As noted earlier, weak transnational activism can be divided into two types. One is derived from the combination of mobilized transnational networks and mobilized conservative groups. The other comes from immobilized transnational networks regardless of the existence of mobilized conservative groups. In the latter case, immobilized transnational networks are unable to enhance issue resonance and thus have no significant impact on state behavior in addressing historical issues.

In the former case, however, transnational networks do have the capability to promote issue resonance with the support of the media, international organizations, and other governments. A progressive ruling coalition also listens to and carefully take into consideration these voices and requests of transnational networks. This activism, however, faces strong opposition from mobilized conservative groups in a perpetrator state. These groups often establish a unified network with the conservative media, intellectuals, and political figures. Running counter to transnational activism, conservative groups prevent societal discourse and governmental policies from leaning toward penitent attitudes in addressing historical problems.

To this end, conservative organizations take a variety of actions: they not only publish many articles and books that deny their state’s wartime atrocities but also hold their own symposia and conferences to criticize a self-critical view of history and to

51 instead foster national pride/patriotism. Using a close network that includes conservative/nationalist political figures, such conservative groups can exert direct pressure on their government that prevents movement toward a more penitent stance.

Given this situation, the state, though governed by a progressive ruling coalition, can only take shallowly penitent measures or fails to adopt any penitent stance on historical issues due to strong domestic opposition.

Chapter 3 Japan’s Dealings with Comfort Women/Forced Labor Issues

Imperial Japan forced a large number of young women to work as military prostitutes during World War II. These so-called “comfort women” 101 endured tremendous agonies under inhumane conditions and their suffering continued long after the end of the war.

Although a traumatic war crime, the issue of Japan’s wartime sexual slavery remained largely unacknowledged for more than four decades following the war. This long- overlooked issue eventually emerged as an important political and societal issue in the early 1990s. The Japanese state issued somewhat apologetic statements and helped establish a nongovernmental fund to compensate surviving comfort women in the early and mid-1990s. In contrast, however, Japan often retreated from these moderately penitent attitudes between 1996 and the mid-2000s. Why did the comfort women issue remain unaddressed for such a long time? What motivated Japan to exhibit not deep but shallow penitence regarding the historical matter in the early and mid-1990s? Why did the Japanese state backslide after taking somewhat penitent attitudes? In response to these questions, I argue that such variations in Japan’s behavior could be related not only to Japan’s changing geopolitical incentives but also to the variable net power of contemporary transnational activism and the conservative nature of Japanese ruling coalitions.

This chapter begins with an exploration of imperial Japan’s use of sex slaves during World War II. The following section concisely outlines the three phases of

101 The term ‘comfort women’ is a euphemism for ‘women drafted for military sexual slavery by Japan’ during the Asia Pacific War. In this dissertation, I use the term because most scholars have commonly used it in their works. 53

postwar Japan’s dealings with this historical issue. Subsequent sections will apply both

transnational-coalitional and realist approaches to each phase and evaluate their

explanatory power. The final section briefly examines Japan’s dealings with the forced

labor issue during the war and provides concluding remarks.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During World War II, imperial Japan forcibly drafted vast numbers of women from its

colonized and occupied countries into military prostitution. It has been estimated that

these comfort women, whose number ranged from 50,000 to 200,000, were forced into

sexual slavery for Japanese troops between 1932 and 1945.102 Comfort stations were first established in Shanghai around 1932, yet the outbreak of Japanese-Chinese War in 1937 prompted the Japanese military to adopt the general policy of establishing military brothels in various occupied locations.103 Despite the lack of accurate information,

unearthed documents and testimony show that Koreans made up about 80 to 90 percent

of comfort women, and were mostly between their mid-teens and early twenties. 104 As

Chung Chin-Sung notes, the most commonly used method of recruitment was to deceive women with false promises of employment in Japan. Among other methods were

102 Soh, “The Korean Comfort Women,” pp. 1226-27; Asian Women’s Fund, The Comfort Women Issue and AWF , pp. 111-16; Piper, “Transnational women’s activism in Japan and Korea,” p. 161; It is very difficult to determine the exact number of comfort women due to the absence of documents with comprehensive data. 103 Yoshiaki Yoshimi, Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Militiary during World War II , translated by Suzanne O’Brien (Columbia University Press, 2000) , pp. 43-51; p. 91: “Japanese, American, and Dutch official documents have confirmed the existence of military comfort stations in the following areas: China, Hong Kong, French Indochina, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, British Borneo, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, Thailand, New Guinea, the Japanese Okinawan archipelago, the Bonin Islands, Hokkaido, the Kurile Islands, and Sakhalin.” 104 Chin-Sung Chung, “Korean Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan,” in Keith Howard, ed., True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women (London: Cassell, 1995), pp. 16-19. 54

recruitment by more violent means including abduction and human trafficking, and

destitute families selling daughters into indentured prostitution.105

The Japanese imperial government and army decided to set up the military comfort women system mainly for the following three reasons. 106 The first was to prevent the rapes of civilians by Japanese troops, which often provoked strong anti-

Japanese sentiments in occupied countries. The second motive was to protect Japanese soldiers from sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) by enforcing them to exclusively use military comfort stations. The Japanese military authorities had already found the prevalence of STDs among Japanese soldiers during the Japanese advance into Siberia between 1918 and 1922 to be quite problematic. The third was to encourage the spirit of the soldiers. The military leadership believed that the extension of the war led to the weakening of their fighting spirit, thus causing many difficulties in managing occupied territories.

The conditions under which these comfort women were forced to serve as sex slaves were—unsurprisingly—harsh and traumatic. Yoshimi Yoshiaki posits that under the surveillance of military authorities, a woman would have to serve twenty or thirty men in a single day, and in extreme cases the number increased to sixty. 107 In the process, the comfort women were subject to mental anguish, sexually transmitted

105 Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 107; pp. 139-40: Sarah Soh emphasizes “not only the criminal role played by the wartime military government of imperial Japan in the exploitation of colonial subjects but also reveals the significance of local collaboration.” Soh states, “It is striking that according to the accounts of survivors, Koreans actually outnumbered civilian Japanese among those seeking profit by human trafficking, forcing prostitution and sexual slavery upon young female compatriots.” 106 Chin-Sung Chung, Ilbonkun Sung Noyeje: Ilbonkun Yianbu Munje ŭi Silsang kwa keo Haekyeol ul uihan Undong [Japanese Army’s Sexual Slavery: The Reality of Japanese Army’s Comfort Women Issue and the Movement for Its Resolution], (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2004), pp. 88-90; Yoshimi, Comfort Women , pp. 47-75. 107 Yoshimi, Comfort Women, pp. 139-151. 55

diseases, and violence from soldiers. Even following the end of hostilities, the comfort women’s plight did not necessarily improve, and in many cases, worsened.108 Many were

abandoned at their stations or were killed by retreating Japanese troops. 109 In some cases, they were forced to commit suicide along with soldiers. While some survivors were sent back to their homelands by the Allied forces, others stayed abroad because of their deep pain and humiliation. Surviving victims continued to suffer physical afflictions and mental illnesses in addition to facing significant social discrimination. 110

PERIODIZATION OF JAPAN’S DEALINGS WITH THE COMFORT WOMEN ISSUE

Postwar Japan’s dealings with the comfort women issue have gone through three phases.

The first phase, from 1945 to the mid-1980s, was marked by “impenitence”: Japan showed little care or remorse toward the historical matter, despite the publication of numerous books and articles regarding the issue in Japan. The second phase, from the late 1980s to 1995, consisted of “shallow penitence”: the Japanese state issued somewhat apologetic statements and established a non-governmental fund to compensate former comfort women. The positive effect of these statements was mitigated by the fact that the

Japanese government was not the main body behind the humanitarian fund. Between

108 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report on the mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea and Japan on the issue of military sexual slavery in wartime , Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1, pp. 14-21; Chung, “Korean Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan,” pp. 23-24. 109 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 141. 110 Yoshimi, Comfort Women , pp. 196-97: Social discrimination was another serious pain that former comfort women endured after they returned to their home. For instance, Korean former comfort woman “Kim Hak-sun married but was told by her husband that she was a filthy woman, who’d had sex with soldiers.” Another Filipina comfort woman Gertrude Balisalisa testified that “her husband treated her like a person with a contagious disease, and her parents and relatives looked down on her as if she was something filthy.” 56

1996 and the mid-2000s, the Japanese state largely maintained a state of shallow penitence in addressing the comfort women issue, but showed frequent backsliding.

PHASE ONE: 1945 TO THE MID-1980s [IMPENITENCE]

The Japanese state remained impenitent regarding the comfort women issue during this lengthy period. Specifically, the Japanese government did not issue any penitent statements regarding this issue, nor did it speak of designing a compensation scheme for the surviving comfort women. This outcome could be related to not only the absence of political and societal actors dedicated to addressing the issue but also Japan’s weak geopolitical incentives to deal with its past transgressions.

The Absence of Political and Societal Agents

Postwar Japan’s indifference to the comfort women issue was derived from the absence of political and societal agents that would critically raise the issue in Japan or in victim states, particularly Korea. 111 As Berger posits, postwar Japan was mostly governed by its conservative elites, many of whom were involved in the expansion of imperial Japan, the war against the U.S., and wartime crimes. 112 Seraphim stresses the continuities between

Japan’s wartime and postwar elites:

111 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 146-47: Ironically, the older generations who went through World War II commonly possessed knowledge of comfort women. Between the 1950s and the 1980s, “more than two hundred Japanese documents concerning the comfort stations were published in a variety of formats, such as books, magazine articles, biographies, and memoirs.” Some books indeed became best-sellers in the 1970s. By contrast, “Korean-language publications were very few in number, and none enjoyed the wide readership.” 112 Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” pp. 186-87: Berger provides three primary figures—Kishi Nobusuke, Shigemitsu Mamoru, and Kaya Okinor—who had been convicted of Class A war criminals by the Allies but returned to active politics (prime minister, foreign minister, and justice minister respectively) in the 1950s. 57

Emperor Hirohito, who had been the supreme commander of all Japanese military forces during war, weathered the transition largely unscathed; he neither abdicated nor faced any criminal prosecution but instead was declared the symbolic cornerstone of Japan’s new peace constitution. …Further, although occupation authorities ordered the closing of some wartime ministries, large parts of the social and economic bureaucracy remained intact and regained their position of power in the postwar political structure. In the early 1950s, when SCAP revoked the military purge, many a wartime politician or bureaucrat recovered his government position. 113

Indeed, a former Korean foreign minister also pointed out that Japan’s conservative leaders were reluctant to acknowledge their nation’s past misdeeds, as it would have posed a threat to their political standing. 114 It was natural for such leaders to avoid seriously pursuing the issue of who bore responsibility for the war and wartime atrocities.

In addition, conservative governing elites placed strong emphasis on the restoration of

Japan’s national consciousness and pride, which they regarded as an important psychological element needed for a successful defense policy. 115 Under the long conservative LDP rule, therefore, the Japanese government had no stake in voluntarily addressing the comfort women issue, which could have caused serious damage to its political standing and national pride.

Additionally, the main victim state—Korea—did not have the wherewithal to take the comfort women issue into account during this period, given the political and social turmoil produced by the unexpected division into the two Koreas after liberation and the ensuing Korean War between 1950 and 1953. 116 Furthermore, the patriarchal social

atmosphere in Korea, which made sex victims feel extremely ashamed while the

assailants were generally tacitly tolerated, also helped prevent former comfort women

113 Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, pp. 317-18. 114 Interview No. 14, Seoul, October 7, 2008. 115 Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” p. 188: By the same token, Japan’s progressive forces overlooked Japanese atrocities during its occupation of Asia in order to “mobilize public opinion against the threat of a remilitarization of Japan within the context of the US alliance.” 116 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 168. 58

from publicizing the issue. 117 Sarah Soh posits that “Korea’s own masculinist sexual

culture remained a major underlying socio-psychological factor that not only contributed

to the absence of public discourse on the subject but also reinforced the survivor’s self-

censorship as they silently suffered from the stigma of having been sexually defiled,

making them ethically fallen women.” 118

In addition to the absence of agents, the following two factors also contributed to the postponement of Japan’s dealings with the comfort women issue. First, the Japanese government and military authorities sought to eliminate all relevant documents immediately after the end of World War II in order to avoid its responsibility for war crimes.119 The deficiency of these materials contributed to the historical truth’s concealment. As Chung notes, “the Japanese military not only secretly operated the comfort woman system, but also instructed soldiers who were in charge to destroy records at the end of the war.”120 An unearthed Japanese military document states:

Accurate data are missing because many of the records of the 48th Division were destroyed at the end of the war, following orders from superiors, and the remainder was submitted to the Australian army. Therefore we have had to focus on the memories of the soldiers…121

Second, the comfort women issue was excluded from agenda items in the

International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946-48) because the Tribunal paid little

117 Chung, Ilbonkun Sung Noyeje , pp. 100-101. 118 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 168. 119 Chung, Ilbonkun Sung Noyeje , pp. 99-100; Soh, “The Korean Comfort Women,” pp. 1229-31; Chih- Chieh Chou, “An Emerging Transnational Movement in Women’s Human Rights: Campaign of Nongovernmental Organizations on Comfort Women Issue in East Asia” Journal of Economic and Social Research , Vol. 5, No. 1, 2003, pp. 158-59. 120 Chung, “Korean Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan,” p. 11. 121 Dai-48 shidan senshi shiryo narabi shusen jokyo [Military History Material of the 48 th Division and End of War Condition], 1946. Quoted in Chung, “Korean Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan,” p. 26. 59

attention to Japan’s war crimes committed in Asia. 122 During World War II, the U.S.

government already knew that Japan was sending a number of Korean women to China

and Manchuria in a systemic manner. 123 As Chih-Chieh Chou notes, furthermore,

numerous U.S. military documents from 1944 on dealt with the Japanese Army’s brothels

and comfort women issues. Despite this knowledge, the United States was reluctant to

punish Japanese war criminals that had designed and managed the comfort women

system as such vilification would have proven counterproductive to their Cold War

containment policy. The U.S. needed Japan as a bulwark against communism and thus

shifted its policies toward Japan from demilitarization and democratization to

remilitarization.

Weak Security Incentives and Japan’s Postwar Indemnification

The Japanese state did not have strong geopolitical incentives to address its past wrongs

committed on the Asian mainland, including the comfort women issue, during the early

postwar period. 124 In the deepening Cold War, Japan paid much greater attention to the

United States than Asia for its security and economic imperatives. Japan’s security needs

were fully satisfied by the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, which

guaranteed the presence of U.S. troops in Japan and ensured its internal and external

122 Gay J. McDougall, “Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict,” (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13), in IANFU REPORT 2: International Organization’s Report, (Seoul: Institute for Research in Collaborationist Activities, 2004), p. 74; Yoshimi, Comfort Women, pp. 171-73: In contrast, a Dutch military tribunal, which took place in Batavia (today’s Jakarta) in 1948, convicted seven Japanese military officers and four comfort station operators of forcing thirty-five Dutch women to serve as comfort women. However, the Batavia trial completely neglected similar sufferings inflicted on native Indonesians and women with other ethnic backgrounds. 123 Chou, “An Emerging Transnational Movement in Women’s Human Rights,” p. 158. 124 In contrast, West German leaders found it necessary to offer official apologies for Nazi crimes so that they could achieve integration with the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as discussed in the next chapter. 60

security. 125 This alliance agreement did not require Japan’s reconciliation with

Communist China or war-shattered Korea. In the economic arena, Japan’s primary

trading partner was the United States, although Japan depended on the import of strategic raw materials from other parts of Asia. 126 As Berger mentions, Japan soon became

number one among Asian countries in terms of economic and political power. In this

context, therefore, Japan had no compelling realpolitik concerns at the time to deal with

its past injustices in the Asian theater of World War II.

Furthermore, the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which formally dissolved

Japan’s empire and restored its national sovereignty, to some extent helped Japan avoid

seriously addressing its wartime atrocities in Asia. 127 Immediately after World War II,

the United States planned to implement a strict reparation policy toward Japan: (1) to

transfer capital facilities that could make Japan remilitarized to the Allies; (2) to collect

the reparations in kind to the extent that they do not obstruct both the subsistence level of

the Japanese people and the maintenance of the Allied occupation; and (3) to transfer

Japan’s overseas property to the Allies. In November 1945, Edwin Pauley—President

Truman’s special envoy to Tokyo—stated that “the main goal of the reparation policy is

to thoroughly eliminate the legacies of Japanese militarism. Japan’s military facilities

will be dismantled and transferred to reparation creditor nations, except for some

facilities that are necessary to sustain Japan’s economy to a minimum.”

125 Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan , pp. 18-19. 126 Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” p. 189: Japan increasingly diversified range of suppliers. 127 The following discussion of Japan’s postwar reparation is distilled from Wondeog Lee, “Ilbon ŭi Jeonhu Ch ǒri Oekyo Y ǒngu: Dae Asia Jeonhu Baesang Jeongchaek ŭi Gujo wa Ham ŭi” [The Study of Japan’s Post-war Settlements Diplomacy: Structure and Implications of Japan’s Postwar Reparation Policy toward Asia], Ilbonhak Y ǒngu , Vol. 22 (September 2007), p. 381-409. 61

This harsh reparation plan, however, was rolled back significantly for the following three reasons. First, as the Cold War intensified, the U.S. government came to recognize Japan’s elevated strategic value in preventing the spread of communism in East

Asia. Japan was viewed as an important alliance partner with the U.S. because Japan, despite its defeat in war, still possessed a high level of industrial productivity and could serve as a bulwark against Asian communism. Secondly, the U.S. desired to reduce its huge occupational expenses, and became concerned that Japan’s excessive reparations scheme could further aggravate the U.S. financial condition. Indeed, during the occupation (1945-1952), the U.S. government had to provide Japan with more than $2 billion in economic aid. Thirdly, the U.S. reflected fruitfully on the lessons learned following the excessive reparations regime applied to Germany following World War I and how it had contributed to the emergence of the Nazi regime and the subsequent outbreak of World War II.

Under these evolving circumstances, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signed the

San Francisco Peace Treaty with the U.S. and 47 other countries in September 1951.

Article 14 of the treaty clearly stipulated Japan’s duty to pay reparations for the damages it had inflicted on other nations during the war. This article, however, put an additional clause to delimit the scope of reparations, given the consideration that Japan did not have the resources to make complete reparations. As a result, the treaty made it possible for

Japan to pay reparations according to its economic capabilities at the time. Japan was thus able to decide the amount, timing, and method of reparation through negotiations with creditor nations. Of particular note was the currency of reparations—to be made not

62 in hard cash but industrial products and services. Through these reparation methods,

Japan could lay the foundation for advancing into the overseas market.

With these relaxed reparation conditions, the major Western powers—including the United Kingdom and Australia—renounced their reparation claims following the U.S. example. China and Korea, the nations most severely damaged by Japan’s aggressive war and colonial rule, were excluded from the 49 official signatories. 128 Instead of reparations, however, the two countries received economic aid from Japan much later. 129

Only did Indonesia and a few other Southeast Asian countries request and receive reparations for war damages. 130 In a series of bilateral negotiations with those countries,

Japanese negotiators “were able to hammer out ambiguously worded agreements in which they offered economic development assistance that could be interpreted as reparations, without officially having to acknowledge them as such.” 131 In this process, consequently, Japan was able to avoid directly addressing its past atrocities in Asia, including the comfort women issue.

128 For the detailed account of the exclusion of China and Korea from the signatories, see Won-deog Lee, Han-Il Kwag ŏsa ch´ ŏri ŭi w ŏnj ŏm: Ilbon ŭi ch ŏnhuch´ ŏri oegyo wa Han-Il hoedam [Starting Point for the Settlement of the South Korea-Japan Past History], (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1996), pp. 26- 38: In the late 1940s, the U.S. government supported Korea’s participation in the peace treaty as an official signatory in order to promote the national prestige of South Korea, which was at war with North Korea. Due to the Britain’s strong opposition, however, South Korea came to join the peace treaty not as an official signatory but as an observer. The rationale for the Britain’s objection was that many of the treaty provisions could not be applied to Korea, as it had never been at war with Japan. 129 Lee, Han-Il Kwag ŏsa ch´ ŏri ŭi w ŏnj ŏm, pp. 44-53; Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” p. 190: South Korea received $300 million in outright grants and $500 million in loans and credits by signing the Basic Relations Treaty with Japan in 1965. And, China received substantial amounts of Japanese overseas development aid (ODA) for decades (e.g. over 20 billion dollars in the 1990s alone). 130 Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan , p. 320. 131 Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” p. 190: “The desperate need of these countries for funds, their limited leverage vis-à-vis Japan, as well as the recognition of Japan as a key member of the US-led alliance to contain communism in Asia, all strongly encouraged these governments to settle for limited reparations instead of holding out for more.” 63

PHASE TWO: THE LATE 1980s TO 1995 [SHALLOW PENITENCE]

Japan shifted its stance on the comfort women issue from impenitence to shallow

penitence during this period. The Japanese government issued somewhat penitent

statements and set up a fund to compensate former comfort women. The humanitarian fund, however, was non-governmental and thus not a direct representation of Japan’s responsibility for past misdeeds. This shift in behavior could be related to both powerful transnational activism led by societal groups in South Korea/Japan and the brief rule of a progressive coalition government. This second phase also witnessed a rise in Japan’s geopolitical incentives to address its past misdeeds following the end of the Cold War.

The Strong Net Power of Transnational Activism

The Emergence of Transnational Comfort Women Movement

Although a number of books concerning the comfort women issue had been published

during the first phase, it was not until the late 1980s that societal actors in South Korea

and Japan began to seriously address the issue. In 1988, the Korean Church Women

United (Han’guk Kyohoe Y ŏsŏng Y ŏnhap) and Professor Ch ǒng-ok Yun conducted field research in Japan to examine the issues of military comfort women with the support of a

Japanese organization—the Association to Challenge the Prostitution Issue.132 Their research, presented at an international conference in April 1988, first raised the underlying connection between the comfort women issue in colonial Korea and Japanese men’s sex tourism in contemporary Korea.

132 Chin-Sung Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron [Social Movements in Modern Japan], (Seoul: Nanam Publishing House, 2001), p. 165. 64

Following this event, the Korean Church Women United sought to publicize the

comfort women issue while addressing the increase in Japanese men traveling to Korea

for sex tourism following the 1988 Seoul Olympics. 133 As a result, a number of Korean

women’s organizations, the majority of which were associated with Christian churches,

joined the nascent campaign calling for resolution of the comfort women issue. In

January 1989, members of the women’s groups staged a street demonstration in Seoul

against the Korean government’s plan to send an emissary to the funeral of Emperor

Hirohito. 134 As Soh notes, Korean activists seized a similar opportunity to raise the

question of reparations for comfort women when Korean President Roh Tae-woo

announced his state visit to Japan in May 1990. Prior to Roh’s visit, they issued a list of

demands to be made to the Japanese government, including its investigation of the

comfort women issue and apology of Japan’s involvement.

Meanwhile, Japanese Socialist Party member Motooka Shoji raised the comfort

women issue in the upper house of the Diet in June 1990, requesting the Japanese

government investigate the historical matter. 135 A Japanese government representative replied, “After listening to elderly people and piecing together what they say, it appears that the wartime comfort women were taken by private entrepreneurs to different places, going where the military went. Frankly, even if one were to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances, it would not yield any results.” 136 As a result, Korean women’s organizations sent an open letter to Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki before his visit to Korea in October 1990 demanding Japan’s admission of culpability, an apology,

133 Eunjeong Chung, “Hanil Chogukj ǒk Onghomang e kwanhan Y ǒngu [The Study of Korea-Japan Transnational Advocacy Network]” M.A. Thesis., (Seoul: Kyunghee University, 2004), p. 39. 134 Soh, “The Korean Comfort Women” p. 1232. 135 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron, p. 166. 136 Quoted in Asian Women’s Fund, The Comfort Women Issue and AWF , p. 117. 65

and compensation for the sufferings of the former comfort women. 137 South Korean women’s leaders also formed two new nongovernmental organizations to conduct a more systematic campaign for redressing the comfort women issue. The Korean Research

Institute of Chongshindae (KRIC), which began as a small study group in July 1990, was formed to conduct scholarly research and circulate information on the issue. The second was The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan

(hereafter the Korean Council), which was formed in November 1990 as an activist umbrella organization that consisted of thirty-seven women’s groups. 138

The Strengthening of Transnational Comfort Women Movement

The Korean Council played a key role in launching and strengthening a transnational

movement aimed at redressing the comfort women issue. 139 From its outset, the Korean

Council sought to examine this issue with the support of the KRIC. In this process, a

Korean victim first reported her suffering as a comfort woman during World War II.

Subsequently, the Korean Council appealed to the former victim—Hak-sun Kim— to

deliver public testimony on her ordeal in August 1991.140 In a press conference, Kim

stated through bitter tears that at age 17 she had been forced to serve Japanese troops as a

sex worker and even now suffers from her terrible experiences.141 Kim’s testimony

137 Soh, “The Korean Comfort Women” p. 1232. 138 Chou, “An Emerging Transnational Movement in Women’s Human Rights” pp. 159-60; Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 57: Ch ǒngsindae Research Association later changed its name to Korean Research Institute for Chongshindae (KRIC). 139 Piper, “Transnational women’s activism in Japan and Korea,” p. 162: Prior to the emergence of the comfort women issue in the early 1990s, there had been already networking efforts among many organizations (i.e., Korean Christian women’s groups and Asian Women’s Association in Japan) that protested against Japanese men’s sex tours to neighboring Asian countries. 140 Piper, “Transnational women’s activism in Japan and Korea,” p. 162; Chung, “Hanil Chogukj ǒk Onghomang e kwanhan Y ǒngu,” p. 40; Hanky ǒreh , August 15, 1991. 141 Segye Daily , December 17, 1991. 66

attracted much attention from the Japanese public, notably promoting the cooperation of

many Japanese groups with the Korean Council. Among these groups were the

Association of Japanese Women, the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA),

the National Council of Churches in Japan (NCCJ), and the Asian Women Association. 142

In December 1991, Kim and two other victims also filed a class-action lawsuit against the

Japanese government, requesting 20 million yen each.

Along with Kim’s testimony and litigation, the uncovering of official documents

in Japan significantly strengthened the transnational comfort women movement. In

January 1992, historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki unearthed several documents regarding

military comfort women at the National Institute of Defense Studies Library in Tokyo.143

The national daily Asahi Shimbun reported Yoshimi’s discovery of the official documents on January 11, 1992, notably increasing public interest in the comfort women issue. 144

These documents proved that the Japanese government had been involved in establishing and managing the military comfort women system. A key document entitled “Matters concerning the recruitment of women to work in military comfort stations,” issued on

March 4, 1938, with the authorization of the War Minister Sugiyama Hajime, reads as follows:

142 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron, pp. 167-68: Korean activists also contributed to the creation of new civic groups like the Japanese Women’s Network for Comfort Women by giving lectures and showing films related to the issues of comfort women. 143 Hirofumi Hayashi, “The Japanese Movement to Protest Wartime Sexual Violence: A Survey of Japanese and International Literature” Critical Asian Studies , Vol. 33, No. 4 (2001), p. 573; Chung, “Korean Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan,” p. 26: Military documents concerning comfort women were also found in the United States. As Chung notes, “in November 1991 a record entitled, “Headquarters, US Naval Military Government” dated Okinawa, November 1945, was discovered. In December, the report of the United States Offices of War, Information Psychological Warfare Team dated August, September and October 1944 was released.” 144 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 63; Philip Seaton, “Reporting the Comfort Women Issue, 1991-1992: Japan’s Contested War Memories in the National Press, Japanese Studies , Vol. 26, No. 1, (May 2006), pp. 103-105 67

Notice from the Adjutant to the Chiefs of Staff of the North China Area Army and Central China Expeditionary Force. …There are many things [about the rounding up of comfort women] that require careful attention. In the future, armies in the field will control the recruiting of women and will use scrupulous care in selecting people to carry out this task. This task will be performed in close cooperation with the military police or local police force of the area. You are hereby notified of the order [of the Minister of War] to carry out this task with the utmost regard for preserving the honor of the army and for avoiding social problems. 145

The appearance of documentary evidence and the subsequent media coverage motivated many lawyers, historians, and intellectuals to actively engage the issue and to view it as part of Japan’s postwar responsibility. Facing the Japanese government’s tepid reaction to the issue, concerned lawyers and historians created an executive committee in

September 1992 to host the International Public Hearing Concerning Japan’s Postwar

Compensation in Tokyo in December 1992. 146 The executive committee invited

surviving former comfort women from six countries (South/North Korea, the Philippines,

China, Taiwan, and the Netherlands) to testify at the public hearing. A former Korean

comfort woman, Soon-Ae Kang said that she was forced to serve about 30 Japanese

soldiers per day as a sex worker in Southern Pharaoh after she was kidnapped by

Japanese military police at age 13. 147 After she gave a detailed narrative over her

appalling experiences at a comfort station in Indonesia, the only non-Asian woman, Jan

Ruff-O’Herne stated, “It was my deep faith in God that helped me survive all that I

145 Quoted in Yoshimi, Comfort Women , pp. 58-59. 146 Soh, The Comfort Women , pp. 63-64; Hideko Mitsui, “The resignification of the comfort women through NGO trials” in Gi-Wook Shin, Soon-Won Park, and Daqing Yang, eds., Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 39-41: With the act of “listening” to surviving victims’ life stories, the public hearing placed much weight on legal analysis that established the survivors’ rights to individual reparation for their traumatic experiences. To this end, the executive committee also called a delegation of legal experts from various countries (the Netherlands, Canada, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan) to the historic event. 147 Chungang Daily , December 10, 1992. 68

suffered at the brutal, savage hands of the Japanese. I have forgiven the Japanese for

what they did to me, but I can never forget.” 148

Following this event, in April 1993 the executive committee established the first

nongovernmental organization committed to research on Japanese war crimes—the

Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility (JWRC). The

JWRC conducted fact-finding research and greatly supported the transnational movement

for redress of wartime sexual slavery against women. 149 Responding to the demand from

International Commission of Jurists, the JWRC issued its first research report on the

comfort women issue in June 1993. The JWRC published a quarterly journal, Senso

Sekinin Kenkyu (Report on Japan’s War Responsibility ) starting in September 1993 and provided the U.N. special rapporteur with important information on the issue.150 The

JWRC also held joint seminars to address the comfort women issue in August and

December 1993 and assisted the Korean Council in filing a lawsuit against the Japanese

government in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). 151

Meanwhile, the Korean Council strove to publicize the comfort women issue

internationally by appealing to the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in March

1992.152 The Korean Council requested that the UNHRC investigate Japanese atrocities committed against Korean women during World War II and help push the Japanese government to compensate the former comfort women who had filed lawsuit. In response to this appeal, the UNHRC placed the issue on its official agenda for the August

148 Quoted in Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 64. 149 Hayashi, “The Japanese Movement to Protest Wartime Sexual Violence” p. 574. 150 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 65. 151 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron , pp. 170-76: Their efforts to file a suit in the PCA became unsuccessful when the Japanese government finally refused to accept an agreement of the PCA lawsuit in January 1995. 152 Soh, “Japan’s National/Asian Women’s Fund for Comfort Women,” pp. 215-16. 69

1992 meeting in Geneva and allowed delegates from the Korean Council and one former

comfort woman to testify. As a consequence, the UNHRC’s Subcommission for the

Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities declared the Japanese

military comfort women system as “a crime against humanity that violated the human

rights of Asian Women and the international agreement prohibiting forced labor that

Japan signed in 1932.” 153 This initial support from the UNHRC led to the issuance of two influential reports, written by the U.N. special rapporteurs in the mid-1990s that included the comfort women issue.

The Korean Council also elicited strong support from international nongovernmental organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and the World Council of Churches (WCC). 154 While the WCC assisted with the Korean

Council’s activities at the U.N., the ICJ offered legal advice for requesting compensation from the Japanese government. 155 In November 1994, the ICJ issued a detailed report declaring that Japan had a responsibility to pay reparations to former comfort women and assist in otherwise recovering their honor. 156 In contrast to the Japanese government’s

official position, the ICJ report noted that the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Settlement

Agreement did not nullify individual compensation claims from surviving comfort

women. According to the report, the Claims Agreement failed to address the violation of

individual rights caused by war crimes against humanity by only determining reparations

153 Soh, “The Korean Comfort Women,” p. 1235. 154 Chung, Ilbonkun Sung Noyeje , p. 126. 155 Hanky ǒreh , February 14, 1993; Hyun-Seok Yu, “Transnational actors and foreign policy making in South Korea: The case studies,” Korea Observer, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 257-58. 156 Kyunghyang Shinmun , September 4, 1994; Hanky ǒreh , November 24, 1994: In September 1994, the ICJ already stated that Japan bear moral and legal responsibilities for the comfort women issue and need to take immediate actions to address the issue. 70

for material damage. Given this rationale, the ICJ recommended that as an interim

measure, the Japanese state pay US$40,000 to each survivor. 157

To build solidarity, the Korean Council also paid great attention to networking

with women’s organizations in other Asian countries whose women had suffered. The

first Asian Women’s Solidarity Forum was held in Seoul in August 1992 under the

auspices of the Korean Council. Victims and many support groups from Asian nations,

including the Asian Center for Women’s Human Rights in the Philippines and the Taipei

Women’s Rescue Foundation, attended the regional conference that formalized a

transnational network dedicated to the comfort women issue. 158 Representatives from

South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines agreed that the comfort women issue

encompassed a variety of brutal crimes committed by Japan’s militarist state, including

forced recruitment, gang rape, torture, and slaughter. 159 They also pointed out that the issue was an example of how the patriarchal system and the war had together led to the violation of women’s human rights. The resolution of the military comfort women issue, they asserted, was an important task to prevent the recurrence of such war crimes and to build a peaceful world. In the wake of this forum, there was an upsurge of the cooperation among groups in the countries of victims and groups in Japan.160

These newly networked groups actively sought to raise the comfort women issue in international conferences sponsored by the U.N., such as the 1993 World Conference

157 Soh, “The Korean Comfort Women,” pp. 1236-37: “Within a week after the ICJ statement a group of 105 lawyers (37 Koreans and 68 Japanese) released a statement that proclaimed the responsibility of the Japanese government to compensate the former military comfort women based on international laws.” 158 Chung, Ilbonkun Sung Noyeje , pp. 120-21. 159 Mihyang Yoon, “Ilbonkun Wianbu Munche Haegy ǒl ŭl wihan Asia Y ǒndae 15 Ny ǒn [15-Year Asian Solidarity for Resolving Japan’s Military Comfort Women Issue]” Ch ǒngdaehy ǒp Charyojip [The Korean Council’s Sourcebook], Vol. 12 (December 2007), p. 29. 160 Hayashi, “The Japanese Movement to Protest Wartime Sexual Violence,” p. 574. 71

on Human Rights in Vienna and the 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing. 161

During the Vienna Conference, the “Asian Women’s Forum” was launched and adopted

a resolution demanding that the U.N. investigate the Japanese army’s sexual slavery

system. 162 Representatives from the Asian groups frequently participated in preliminary

meetings for the Beijing Conference and worked as lobbyists publicizing the seriousness

of suffering inflicted on former comfort women. 163 As a result of their efforts, the

Vienna Conference clearly included “sexual slavery” as a violation of women’s human

rights under armed conflict in the Vienna Declaration. In its code of conduct, the Beijing

Conference stipulated that as sexual slavery was a war crime, perpetrator states should

investigate allegations, punish the persons in charge, and compensate surviving victims.

An important backdrop to these important achievements was mass rape occurring in

Bosnia that had begun in the spring of 1992. This event contributed to the promotion of a

feminist consciousness in the international community particularly cognizant of sexual

violence against women during armed conflict. 164

Immobilized Conservative Reaction

In contrast to this powerful transnational activism, Japan’s conservative forces did not

mobilize quickly enough to mount a significant countermovement during this second

phase. As Soh notes, “conservatives regarded the comfort women redress activism

through a small number of NGOs as noise that over time would fade away.” 165 Japanese nationalists just expressed their negative opinions of the transnational comfort women

161 Yoon, “Ilbonkun Wianbu Munche Haegy ǒl ŭl wihan Asia Y ǒndae 15 Ny ǒn,” pp. 36-37. 162 Hanky ǒreh , June 20, 1993. 163 Chosun Daily , August 24, 1995. 164 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 33. 165 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 66. 72

movement and the somewhat apologetic stance of the Japanese government regarding the

issue. In an editorial, the Sankei Shimbun lamented Japan always having to take the

blame in the sense that countries like Britain also employed foreign prostitutes

throughout its empire. 166 In the rightwing magazines such as Shokun and Seiron , furthermore, many nationalists blamed the Japanese government for ‘always’ apologizing. Particularly, Hata Ikuhiko, a prominent military historian, published an article in the June 1992 edition of Seiron that exposed the contradictions in the testimony of Yoshida Seiji, the only Japanese soldier who confessed his abduction of women to work as comfort women. 167 As Chung notes, Japanese conservative figures usually asserted that the military comfort women issue was not only a necessary evil at the time but also an even effective system aimed at protecting women in Japan’s occupied territories. 168

The Brief Rule of a Progressive Ruling Coalition

As noted in Chapter 2, a progressive non-LDP coalition and the first Socialist Prime

Minister since 1948 came to power between 1993 and 1995. 169 In contrast to the long- ruling and conservative LDP, they strove to address Japan’s injustices committed in Asia during World War II, despite strong opposition from conservative forces. Upon taking office in August 1993, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro made an unprecedented remark that characterized Japan’s past actions in Asia as an “aggressive war” (shinryaku senso) and “wrong war” (ayamatta senso). In a following speech, he also named Japan’s

166 Seaton, “Reporting the Comfort Women Issue, 1991-1992” p. 110. 167 Seaton, “Reporting the Comfort Women Issue, 1991-1992,” p. 110. 168 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron , p. 175. 169 For the detailed explanation of the most turbulent period (1993-1995) in Japan’s postwar party politics, see the Appendix. 73

presence in Korea as “colonial rule” rather than using the conventional euphemism of

“annexation.” 170 At his summit meeting in Seoul with South Korea President Kim Young

Sam, furthermore, Hosokawa issued an apologetic statement:

During Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people were forced to suffer unbearable pain and sorrow in various ways. They were deprived of the opportunity to learn their mother tongue at school, they were forced to adopt Japanese names, forced to provide sex as ‘comfort women’ for Japanese troops, forced to provide labor. I hereby express genuine contrition and offer my deepest apologies for my country, the aggressor’s, acts. 171

These statements served as a catalyst for opposition from LDP politicians. A

group of conservative LDP politicians organized the Committee for the Examination of

History, which campaigned to foster views of history that recognized World War II as

justifiable and denied the existence of the Nanjing Massacre and of military comfort

women. 172 The Committee, consisting of approximately 100 LDP Diet members,

published a book ( Daitoa Senso no Sokatsu, or Summary of the Greater East Asian War )

contradicting Hosokawa’s views. Additionally, nationalist organizations such as the

Japan Bereaved Families’ Association (Nihon Izokukai) and the Yasukuni Shrine “issued

counter-statements praising the Greater East Asian War as a war of self-defense to secure

the life and property of the Japanese people.” 173 A series of politicians’ provocative

remarks (bogen) also undermined the prime minister’s statements. In May 1994, for

instance, Justice Minister Nagano Shigeto said:

I still think the interpretation of [the Greater East Asian War] as a war of aggression is wrong. […] Japan stood at the brink of extinction, stood up and fought for its existence. At the same time, Japan seriously thought about liberating colonies and establishing the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. […] Its war objectives as such were, at the time, basically within justifiable limits. 174

170 Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy,” p. 292. 171 Asahi Shimbun , November 7, 1993. Quoted in Jennifer Lind, “Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics,” unpublished paper for the annual meeting of the APSA, Washington D.C., 2005, p. 23. 172 Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy,” p. 293. 173 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , p. 71. 174 Quoted in Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia , p. 10. 74

Despite this resistance, however, Prime Minister Murayama sought to adopt an

“anti-war resolution” or an “apology resolution” marking the 50 th anniversary of Japan’s surrender. This endeavor was also confronted with opposition from conservative politicians in Japan. To prevent the passage of the Diet resolution, in December 1994 about a half of LDP members established an organization known as The Diet Members

League for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II, headed by highly conservative Okuno Seisuke (a former minister of education). 175 Given its ultimate goal of preventing the passage of any apologetic resolution by the Diet, the League issued the statement that “we cannot approve of a resolution containing words of remorse, apology, and the renunciation of war because it would be tantamount to reconfirming biased postwar interpretations of our history, thereby creating difficulties for our nation’s future.” 176

Also at the center of the opposition movement to the resolution was the National

Committee for the 50 th Anniversary of the War, established by nationalist groups including the Shinto Shrine Headquarters (Jinja Honcho), the Military Pensioners’

Association (Gunon Renmei) and the Japan Bereaved Families’ Association.177 As Sven

Saaler notes, the National Committee actively sought to collect signatures for the purpose of preventing an apology resolution by the Diet, gathering more than five million signatures by early May 1995. The Committee, moreover, held a large-scale rally in

Tokyo, titled “Festival of Asians Living Together”, just prior to the adoption of the Diet resolution. Among the participants in the event were official representatives from some

175 Gavan McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to Correct History” in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 56. 176 Quoted in Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , p. 74. 177 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , pp. 75-76. 75

Asian countries (such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia), 39 conservative politicians,

official representatives sent by 110 Diet Members, and an audience of about 10,000

people. In a statement issued during the rally, the Committee emphasized the recovery of

Japanese national pride and demonstrated the nationalist view considering the Asia-

Pacific War as a war for Asian liberation.

Despite his political weakness, Prime Minister Murayama ultimately pushed

through a Diet resolution in June 1995. It was, however, an ambiguous statement that

satisfied no one. It expressed a sense of deep remorse and the recognition that Japan had

carried out aggression and instituted colonial rule in the past. Short of clearly identifying

the victims, however, the resolution diluted Japan’s past aggression by expressing

“condolences to those who fell in action and victims of wars and similar actions all over

the world.” 178 Given the strong opposition from the LDP—the dominant coalition

partner—and the National Committee, Murayama had no choice but to accept a

compromised statement in order to avoid the risk of ending up with no resolution at all. 179

Indeed, the National Committee had great impact on many LDP politicians, as they needed to mollify the nationalist organizations (i.e. Nihon Izokukai) so as not to lose organized votes in support of the LDP.

Although he failed to adopt a satisfactory Diet resolution, Prime Minister

Murayama made a historic statement of apology in August 1995, relating to his Socialist

Party’s initiative to reflect over Japan’s past transgressions critically. 180 Murayama said:

During a certain period in the not-too-distant past, Japan, after adopting a mistaken national policy, marched down the path to war and provoked a crisis jeopardizing the very survival of our people. Japan’s colonial rule and aggression

178 Lind, Sorry States , pp. 62-63. 179 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , pp. 72-73. 180 Cheol Hee Park, “Historical Memory and the Resurgence of Nationalism: A Korean Perspective” in Toshi Hasegawa and Kuzu Togo, eds., East Asia’s Haunted Past (New York: Palgrave, 2008), Chapter 10. 76

inflicted immense harm and suffering upon people in many countries, especially in other Asian countries. I humbly acknowledge these irrefutable facts of history, express my deep remorse once again, and offer an apology from the bottom of my heart, in the hope that no such mistake will ever be made in the future. I also offer my sincere condolences to all the victims of this period of history in Japan and abroad. 181

Shallow Penitence: Positive but Limited Progress in Japan’s Behavior

In contrast to the initial impenitent phase, the Japanese government had begun to change

its original position during this second phase. As noted earlier, the Japanese government

had denied any Japanese military involvement in organizing the wartime military comfort

stations, instead regarding them as private enterprises. Soh notes that “in April 1991 the

Japanese government replied to the Korean open letter that there was no evidence of

forced drafting of Korean women as comfort women and therefore no question of any

apology.” 182 The Japanese government also insisted that all historical issues had been resolved by the 1965 Basic Relations Treaty between Japan and South Korea. 183

Accordingly, the government had refused to conduct its investigation of the issue, let

alone to issue apology and provide reparations. 184

The first change in this official position was Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato

Koichi’s command that the pertinent governmental agencies investigate the comfort women issue at the budget committee of the House of Councilors in December 1991.185

In January 1992, Kato conceded that given the official documentary evidence and surviving victims’ testimonies, the Japanese government had been involved in

181 Asahi Shimbun , August 15, 1995. Quoted in Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia , p. 255. 182 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 63. 183 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron, p. 166. 184 Hayashi, “The Japanese Movement to Protest Wartime Sexual Violence,” p. 573. 185 Proceedings of the 122th Budget Committee at the House of Councilors (December 12, 1991) 77

establishing and managing the comfort women system. 186 Furthermore, during his state visit to South Korea in January 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi made a formal public apology for Japan’s past wrongs. In a speech to South Korea’s National

Assembly, Miyazawa said, “Recently, the issue of comfort women in the service of the

Imperial Japanese Army has come into light. I cannot help feeling acutely distressed over this, and I express my sincerest apology.” 187 He also expressed his regret and apology in the Japanese Diet for the first time. 188

In the first official investigative report of July 1992, moreover, the Japanese government admitted to the military’s involvement in the comfort women issue, although it did not acknowledge its forceful recruitment of comfort women. Kato made the following statement:

The Government had been involved in the establishment of comfort stations, the control of those who recruited comfort women, the construction and reinforcement of comfort facilities, the management and surveillance of comfort stations, the hygiene maintenance in comfort stations and among comfort women, and the issuance of identification as well as other documents to those who were related to comfort stations. … The Government again would like to express its sincere apology and remorse to all those who have suffered indescribable hardship as so-called “wartime comfort women”, irrespective of their nationality or place of birth. 189

Despite the government’s initial steps, the first report spawned strong opposition from victim survivors and their support groups in other Asian countries. Given these protests, in August 1993 the Japanese government issued a second official report that partially admitted its involvement in the forceful recruitment of comfort women. Chief

Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei announced:

186 Segye Daily , January 14, 1992. 187 New York Times, Seoul Shinmun , January 18, 1992. 188 Donga Daily , January 30, 1992. 189 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/state9207.html (accessed January 5, 2009) 78

The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere. …Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. …We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history. 190

This report, however, failed to acknowledge that the Japanese government and military were the main actors in establishing and managing the comfort women system. A

Japanese civil activist states, “The report was not fully apologetic because it did not clearly present who had established the system.” 191 In addition, the Japanese government still refused individual compensation for the surviving victims on the ground that “Japan had earlier provided reparations to, or reached agreements with, the governments concerned.” 192

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Murayama made a series of apologetic statements regarding the comfort women issue during this second phase. He commented in August

1994 that “on the issue of wartime comfort women, which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to take this opportunity once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and apologies.” 193 In July 1995, Murayama also stated:

The problem of the so-called wartime comfort women is one such scar, which, with the involvement of the Japanese military forces of the time, seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women. This is entirely inexcusable. I

190 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html (accessed January 5, 2009) 191 Interview No. 28, Tokyo, October 25, 2008. 192 Hayashi, “The Japanese Movement to Protest Wartime Sexual Violence” p. 574. 193 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/state9408.html (accessed January 5, 2009) 79

offer my profound apology to all those who, as wartime comfort women, suffered emotional and physical wounds that can never be closed.194

The Japanese government acknowledged its moral responsibility for the suffering

inflicted on the former comfort women. In December 1994, the Subcommittee to

Address the Wartime Comfort Women Issue, organized by the LDP-JSP-Sakigake ruling

coalition, issued a report stating that “Japan must, from a moral standpoint, take the

opportunity offered by the 50 th anniversary of the end of the war to fulfill its responsibility for the wartime comfort women issue.” 195 The report, however,

reconfirmed that the Japanese government could not pay compensation to individuals

because it had addressed reparation issues in accordance with the San Francisco Peace

Treaty, bilateral peace treaties, and other relevant accords.

As a consequence, instead of providing direct state compensation, the government

helped establish a nongovernmental fund, the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF), in order to

“express a sense of national atonement from the Japanese people to the surviving

victims.” 196 To implement this atonement project, the AWF contained the following

three major elements: (1) to provide “atonement money” (two million yen per person)

donated by the Japanese people to former comfort women; (2) to send a letter from the

Japanese Prime Minister to surviving victims; and (3) to disburse “about 830 million yen

from government funds over a five-year period for victims’ medical care and welfare.” 197

Therefore, compared with the first phase, Japan’s behavior toward the comfort women issue moved significantly towards a more penitent stance during this second period between the late 1980s and 1995, although it did not achieve deep penitence.

194 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9507.html (accessed January 5, 2009) 195 Asian Women’s Fund, The Comfort Women Issue and AWF , pp. 174-75. 196 Soh, “Japan’s National/Asian Women’s Fund for Comfort Women” p. 218. 197 Asian Women’s Fund, The Comfort Women Issue and AWF , p. 125. 80

Strong Security Incentives

The realist approach complements the transnational-coalitional approach in explaining

the variations in Japan’s dealings with the comfort women issue during this second phase.

As noted, the Japanese state made progress regarding apology and compensation linked to the comfort women issue although it stopped short of accepting full culpability or providing a direct state compensation. This progress can be to some extent explained by the strong geopolitical incentives that had developed and made Japan more likely to address its past wrongs. As a professor of Tokyo University notes, Japan was no longer able to overlook its Asian neighbors in pursuing its own security, economic, and political interests following the end of the Cold War in 1989.198

From a strategic standpoint, the significant weakening of the U.S.-Japan Alliance

in the early 1990s, which had been the bedrock of Japan’s postwar foreign policy, can be

construed as a clear motive for Japan’s seeking closer ties with other Asian countries. 199

The 1990-1991 Gulf War first caused a rupture in the U.S.-Japan Alliance.200 As the U.S.

led efforts against Iraq to liberate Kuwait, Washington demanded a military contribution

from Japan that was commensurate with their alliance partnership. Despite this U.S.

request, Japan provided a large sum of financial support ($13 billion) rather than

dispatching its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and cited the Peace Constitution that

198 Interview No. 21, Tokyo, October 16, 2008. 199 Mike Mochizuki, “Japan’s Changing International Role,” in Thomas Berger, Mike Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds., Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), p. 4: the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated Japan’s fear of being caught in an armed conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Japan was more exposed to address possible security threats on its own than before, as the U.S. could move back to isolationism and withdraw its military forces from the Asia Pacific. 200 Cheol Hee Park, “Jeonsu Bangwi es ǒ Jeokkuk Bangwi ro: Miil Dongmaeng mit Wihyup Insik ui Byunhwa wa Ilbon Bangwi Jeongchaek ŭi Jeongchi [From Comprehensive Security to Active Security: The Change of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Threat Perception, and the Politics of Japan’s Security Policy],” Kukje Jeongchi Nonchong [Journal of International Politics], Vol. 44, No. 1, 2004, p. 177. 81

prevented the movement of troops overseas. Despite the hefty financial contribution,

Japan received little gratitude and recognition from the U.S. or Kuwait following the Gulf

War. This incident prompted Japan to pursue “a greater international contribution in a

visible manner so as to earn the world community’s respect and to gain a voice in shaping

global policy.” 201 As a result, Japan enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law in

June 1992, which allowed Japan to send the SDF overseas as part of the UN

peacekeeping operations. 202

The U.S.-Japan Alliance faced other challenges as well in the early 1990s. Given the disappearance of a common adversary, the Bush administration began to place increased weight on economic issues while it deemphasized Japan’s strategic importance.203 At the end of Bush’s presidency, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a strategic report that took into account the reduction of the American military presence in

Asia. President Clinton, who was inaugurated in 1993, also focused on economic diplomacy and strove to rectify the trade imbalance between the U.S. and Japan. Thus the US Trade Representative (USTR) and the National Economic Council (NEC) officials were much more influential than the security experts who had enjoyed greater influence when maintaining a containment policy had been a critical driver to U.S.-Japan

201 Mochizuki, “Japan’s Changing International Role,” p. 5. 202 Interview No. 15, Seoul, October 7, 2008: Ironically, a Japanese civic activist notes, “The Gulf War functioned as a catalyst for instigating a history revisionist movement in Japan in the mid-1990s. At the sight of such national humiliation following the Gulf War, Japanese nationalists strove to make Japan a country able to wage a war through revising the Peace Constitution. However, they failed to gain a wider societal support. As a result, they launched a history revisionist movement aimed at first changing the self- critical historical consciousness among the Japanese people before accomplishing their ultimate goal—the revision of the Peace Constitution.” 203 Cheol Hee Park, “Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea,” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., Japan’s Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 187-88; Mochizuki, “Japan’s Changing International Role,” p. 4: At the time, Japan was unintentionally perceived by some US pundits as a new threat to US strategic interests, as Japan was at the peak of economic growth in the late 1980s. As Mochizuki shows, there were sensational books and novels as examples of this view, including The Coming War with Japan and Rising Sun: A Novel . 82 relations. Moreover, Japanese concerns were further aroused when the U.S. labeled

China a strategic partner. To Japan, this action signaled a significant devaluation of the

U.S.-Japan Alliance.

In addition, economic frictions had begun to impact on security policy and seriously weaken the U.S.-Japan Alliance. While Japan’s Defense Agency desired to develop a new indigenous support fighter, the FSX, the U.S. Congress and members of the Bush administration tried to prevent Japan from undertaking the project.204 The FSX crisis demonstrated that the absence of a common enemy and the poor management of the alliance relationship could easily lead to the divergence of national interests of the United

States and Japan. Japan also faced another economic challenge: “the rise of economic regionalism, such as the formation of a unified European market and the North American

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which could hamper Japan’s access to lucrative markets in the advanced industrial world,” as Mike Mochizuki notes. 205 Japan thus needed to better integrate itself with Asia, mending bridges that had remained in disrepair long after the conclusion of WWII era hostilities. Japan also needed the support of its

Asian neighbors to achieve one of its important foreign policy goals—to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. 206

Facing these new concerns and challenges, Japanese leaders might have recognized that the U.S.-Japan Alliance was no longer sufficient and that Japan needed to

204 For the detailed analysis of the FSX crisis and Japan’s search for autonomous defense production, see Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 205 Mochizuki, “Japan’s Changing International Role,” p. 4 206 Online at http://www.asienkunde.de/content/zeitschrift_asien/archiv/pdf/A100_018_022.pdf (accessed January 7, 2009): Florian Coulmas, “Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council,” ASIEN 100 (July 2006), p. 18: The government of Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi first put this agenda up front in the early 1990s because “Japan’s influence in the world organization did not reflect the fact that it was the second biggest contributor to the UN budget (20%).” 83

take proactive steps to nurture a favorable environment in Asia to protect its long-term

security and economic interests. For instance, “business leader Kobayashi Yotaro in

1991 urged Japan to re-Asianize and to learn from the German example. While

maintaining strong ties with the United States, Germany built a congenial home in

Europe as well.” 207 Berger also presents good examples to show Japan’s increased

realpolitik incentives to address its past injustices:

As early as 1991 Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki proclaimed that for Japan to play a larger regional role it would have to face up to its past and severely reflect upon its actions during the imperial period. Powerful factional leaders such as Ozawa Ichiro likewise recognized that Japan needed to address the history question more clearly and directly than it had been willing to do in the past if it were to become more engaged in world affairs. And prominent Japanese business leaders publicly warned that Japan had to acknowledge its responsibility for its past transgressions if they were to expand their business activities in Asia. 208

Accordingly, the realist approach can provide a plausible explanation of the positive changes in Japan’s dealings with the comfort women issue during this second phase; Japan issued somewhat penitent statements and established the non-governmental fund to compensate surviving comfort women because it had geopolitical incentives to address its past misdeeds. This realist approach is not sufficient, however, to account for why Japan did not go further towards a deep penitence, given such strong realpolitik concerns. 209 As described above, Japan refused to accept full state responsibility for the issue as evidenced by its establishment of a nongovernmental fund. The transnational- coalitional approach can fill this hole. A plausible reason for the Japanese government’s wan response was the too-brief rule of the progressive non-LDP coalition and, even

207 Mochizuki, “Japan’s Changing International Role,” p. 17. 208 Berger, “The Politics of Memory in Japanese Foreign Relations,” p. 195. 209 Nor can the realist approach explain why Japan did not assume a penitent attitude toward the forced labor issue either, despite the existence of strong geopolitical incentives during this period. This aspect will be discussed in a later section. 84 during that period, the still-influential conservative LDP prevented a progressive Prime

Minister Murayama from adopting deeply penitent measures toward the historical matter.

PHASE THREE: 1996 TO THE MID-2000s [BACKSLIDING]

Between 1996 and the mid-2000s, the third phase of this study, the Japanese state maintained its shallow penitence regarding the comfort women issue, though the period was also marked by frequent backsliding. During this period, Japanese prime ministers usually reaffirmed Murayama’s apologetic statement of 1995. Japan also carried out its non-governmental compensation project through the Asian Women’s Fund. However, high-ranking Japanese government officials made a series of provocative statements that either denied or whitewashed the wartime atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese against the comfort women. In addition, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro was reluctant to send an apologetic letter to former comfort women in 1996. The Japanese government also exerted pressure on the NHK (Japan’s national public broadcasting company) not to air TV documentaries showing its involvement in the wartime sex slave system. More recently, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo denied Japan’s coercive recruitment of comfort women in March 2007, although he reversed his stance on the issue a month later. A plausible cause of Japan’s backsliding on the comfort women issue lay in the rise of the systematic conservative/nationalist forces and the conservative LDP-led coalition government. This third phase was also marked by the significant weakening of

Japan’s geopolitical incentives to grapple with past wrongs in the Asian mainland.

The Weak Net Power of Transnational Activism

Strong Yet Divided Transnational Movement

During this third phase, the transnational movement was challenged by a sharp division among its component groups. The rift first appeared at the 1993 Asian Women’s

Solidarity Conference where the Korean Council raised the issue of punishing Japanese individuals who had been responsible for the establishment and management of the comfort women system. Although previous campaigns had greatly emphasized material reparations, the Council insisted that Japan’s legal responsibility should incorporate the punishment of surviving perpetrators as well as material compensation. 210 Many

Japanese activists and groups were opposed to the idea, arguing that it would be futile to punish already dead or very old people. The Japanese activists were also concerned because the Japanese emperor himself would have been at risk. Japanese politician

Shimiju Sumiko, for example, who had actively cooperated with the transnational activism, warned that if the Korean Council pursued the punishment issue, not a few

Japanese organizations would leave the transnational NGO network.211

The split among the communities of victim survivors and their supporters became even more distinct following the creation of the Asian Women’s Fund in July 1995.

According to a Japanese civic activist, “The AWF was a major cause of the division within the progressive camp in Japan. The establishment of the non-governmental fund was not an appropriate action because it was not direct state compensation for the suffering of former comfort women.” 212 Many activist groups that had persistently requested state compensation, including the Korean Council, were vehemently opposed

210 Ch ǒngdaehy ǒp Charyojip [The Korean Council’s Sourcebook], Vol. 12 (December 2007), p. 30. 211 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron, pp. 175-76. 212 Interview No. 28, Tokyo, October 25, 2008. 86

to the establishment of the AWF because they regarded it as an attempt of the Japanese

government to avoid its legal responsibilities. Even before the AWF’s inception, the

Asian Women’s Solidarity Forum promulgated a resolution criticizing what they

perceived to be Japan’s plan to evade its responsibility for war crimes by establishing the

nongovernmental fund at its 1995 conference.213 At the following 1996 and 1998

forums, representatives from other Asian countries demanded the dissolution of the AWF

and instead the enactment of a special law that would commit the Japanese state to

carrying out the compensation scheme.214 A variety of Japanese groups also formed a

unified organization called “Executive Committee for Destructing AWF,” campaigning

against the AWF through street rallies of protest, a signature-collecting movement, and

international conferences. 215

On the other hand, many of Japan’s prominent activists and organizations

supported the formation and activities of the AWF. Among them were university

professors, lawyers, the Association of Japanese Women (Nihon Bujing Kaigi), the

Association for Solidifying Japan’s War Responsibility (Nihon no Sengo Sekining o

Shikiri Saseru Kai) and Jichirou, an influential local labor union.216 There was an idea

that the compensation through the nongovernmental fund might stimulate state

compensation later. The primary reason for these groups’ support, however, was “to take

some concrete action for elderly survivors before they died without receiving any tokens

of atonement, let alone legal compensation.” 217 These groups also argued that while not a

fully satisfying outcome, the AWF was the best choice for resolving the comfort women

213 Soh, “The Korean Comfort Women” p. 1237. 214 Ch ǒngdaehy ǒp Charyojip , p. 31. 215 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron , pp.180-81. 216 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron, pp. 179-80. 217 Soh, “Japan’s National/Asian Women’s Fund for Comfort Women,” p. 224. 87

issue under Japan’s current political condition. Besides, as a professor in Tokyo

University who supported the AWF stated, “I personally acknowledge the achievement of

the Korean Council in publicizing the comfort women issue and promoting human rights

in the international community. It was not right, however, for the Korean Council to

completely disregard the atonement money from the AWF. Surviving comfort women themselves had to decide whether or not they accept AWF money.”218 In a similar vein, a

Korean diplomat ironically criticizes the Korean Council of having placed more weight on its own aims than human rights of former comfort women. 219

The fissures among these groups began to wane in 1998 when the Korean government paid an equivalent amount of atonement money (about $26,000), suggested by the AWF, to each survivor.220 Such payment was conducted under the condition that the recipients would not accept AWF money. As Soh notes, Korean government’s payment to the former comfort women was due in large part to the Korean Council’s intense lobbying of the new Kim Dae Jung administration. In addition, international organizations including the UN stated repeatedly that the AWF could not become the appropriate resolution that the aged victim-survivors expected. In this regard, the UN

Sub-commission on Human Rights accepted a final report made by Special Rapporteur

Gay McDougall in August 1998. In this report’s appendix, McDougall concluded, “the

Japanese government remains liable for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their totality to crimes against humanity.” 221

218 Interview No. 27, Tokyo, October 24, 2008. 219 Interview No. 19, Tokyo, October 15, 2008. 220 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron , p. 184; Soh, “Japan’s National/Asian Women’s Fund for Comfort Women,” pp. 228-30: In December 1997, the Taiwan government also paid about $17,000 to each survivor with the same condition as the Korean government requested. 221 McDougall, “Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict,” p. 121. 88

The report also emphasized the need for mechanisms to provide legal compensation and

to prosecute Japan’s perpetrators who were responsible for establishing and maintaining

the sex slave system.

Given these circumstances, the influence of groups that had supported the AWF

was weakened in Japan and abroad. The anti-AWF groups, however, continued to pursue

two different pathways for resolving the comfort women issue. First, they continued to

lobby the Japanese Diet for reparation laws.222 As Chung notes, a variety of legal groups

and the Campaign for Completing Postwar Compensation (Sengo Hoshou Jichgang

Campaign) prepared reparation bills for the Japanese Diet. After organizing a citizen

convention, moreover, a number of groups such as the JWRC and VAWW-NET Japan

(Violence Against Women in War Network, Japan) sought to constitute a fact-finding bill

to demand the Japanese Diet’s research regarding Japan’s comprehensive war

responsibility including the comfort women issue. These legal approaches were not

successful, but transnational groups including the Postwar Compensation Network have

continuously lobbied Japanese politicians, particularly DPJ Diet members to enact

reparation laws.223

These anti-AWF groups also held the Women’s International War Crimes

Tribunal 2000 in Tokyo. The Tribunal was first proposed at the fifth Asian Women’s

Solidarity Forum held in Seoul in June 1998. 224 Three organizations—VAWW-NET

Japan, the Korean Council, and the Asian Center for Women’s Human Rights

(ASCENT)-Philippines—collaborated to organize the Tribunal. 225 More than 150 NGOs

222 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron , pp. 185-86. 223 Interview Nos. 29 and 34, Tokyo, October 27 and 31, 2008. 224 Ch ǒngdaehy ǒp Charyojip , p. 31. 225 Hayashi, “The Japanese Movement to Protest Wartime Sexual Violence” p. 578. 89

in Asia supported the 2000 Tribunal and international law experts, who had participated

in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, played

important roles as chief prosecutors and judges for the event. 226 Its primary goals were

“to establish that Japan’s military sexual slavery constitutes a war crime against women,

to identify those responsible for the crime, and to record the complete findings and

proceedings of the tribunal for history.”227 The tribunal first found Emperor Hirohito

guilty of war crimes, and ascertained the responsibility of the Japanese government for

establishing and managing the military comfort women system. In the final judgment

reached in September 2001, twenty other military and political leaders were accused of

crimes against humanity. 228

Mobilized Conservative Reaction

Beginning in 1996, Japanese conservatives/nationalists launched a systematic

counterattack against the transnational comfort women movement and the Japanese

government’s softening stance on the issue. First, in right-leaning magazines, nationalists

published a number of articles arguing that Japan’s imperial war was not wrong in the context of world history at the time. 229 As Chung notes, they even asserted that the comfort women system had been a good institution that prevented local women from being raped. The nationalists further declared that all postwar reparations claims had been resolved by means of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and various bilateral

226 Mitsui, “The resignification of the comfort women through NGO trials,” p. 46. 227 Piper, “Transnational women’s activism in Japan and Korea,” pp. 163-64. 228 Hayashi, “The Japanese Movement to Protest Wartime Sexual Violence,” p. 579. 229 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron , p. 141. 90

agreements between Japan and other countries. In her seminal book The Comfort

Women , Soh illuminates this phenomenon well:

The Coomaraswamy Report submitted to the United Nations in January 1996 set off an urgent wakeup call to Japan’s conservatives. In particular, the mention of comfort women in new history textbooks for the middle school, which reflects one of the United Nations’ recommendations, sparked a strong wave of masculinist neonationalism across the country in 1996, resulting in what the feminist historian and activist Suzuki Yuko called an anti-comfort women campaign. Senior politicians, prominent journalists, and public intellectuals, including university professors, have joined forces to argue that the comfort women were nothing more than licensed prostitutes and that there is no evidence of their forced recruitment by the state or the military. 230

At the center of these systematic nationalistic campaigns was the Research

Association of Liberal Historical Perspectives (Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai) that Tokyo

University Professor Fujioka Nobukazu founded in February 1995. 231 The Research

Association emerged primarily in response to the official history textbooks released in

1994 that included the descriptions of Japan’s past wrongs, including comfort women,

Unit 731, and the Nanjing Massacre. 232 The Research Association aimed to remove all mentions of comfort women from the textbooks in order to recover damaged Japan’s national pride. It attacked the textbooks’ content, claiming that “comfort women were protected and well treated, not exploited by the Japanese military and government authorities.” 233

In support of this movement, the Sankei Shimbun published a series of articles titled “What the school textbooks do not teach (Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi),” written

230 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 66. 231 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron , pp. 140-47: Since the early 1994, Fujioka had strove to publish a series of journal articles that denied Japan’s postwar responsibility and demanded the reformation of modern history education. To effectively resist social movement regarding Japan’s war responsibility, he organized the Research Association and engaged in active public outreach programs. 232 Mikyoung Kim, “Myths, Milieu, and Facts: History Textbook Controversies in Northeast Asia” in Hasegawa Tsuyoshi and Togo Kazuhiko, eds., East Asia’s Haunted Present: Historical Memories and the Resurgence of Nationalism (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 103. 233 Hayashi, “The Japanese Movement to Protest Wartime Sexual Violence,” p. 576. 91

by Research Association authors. Additionally, in its daily editorials the Sankei launched a campaign to eliminate comfort women-related content from history textbooks.234 The

nationalist backlash in Japan reached its pinnacle in January 1997 when nationalist LDP

members and conservative academics such as Fujioka founded the Japanese Society for

Composing New History Textbooks (Atarashii Rekishi Kyokaso o Tsukurukai, hereafter

Tsukurukai). The Tsukurukai engaged in active public outreach programs, publishing

many books and holding symposia/conferences, in order to promote conservative

perspectives that emphasized Japan’s bright historical views and national pride. 235 The

Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact (hereafter SDHF) also continued to

publish a number of articles and books that denied Japan’s past wrongs such as forced

recruitment of comfort women. 236

The Tsukurukai strongly censured the self-reflective history textbooks and

published its own right-wing textbook called “the Fushosha textbook” (after its

publisher). The textbook held that “Japan’s annexation of Korea was necessary to protect

Asia from Western imperialists. Specifically, Japanese control of Korea was necessary to

prevent a hostile power from seizing it and establishing an ideal base for that country to

control Japan.” 237 While the textbook had a low adoption rate in 2002 due to the active

transnational campaign by the Asia Peace and History Education Network as well as the

Children and National Network 21 for Textbooks, it nevertheless became a locus for

further historical disputes between Japan and South Korea. This was particularly divisive

because the Japanese Ministry of Education oversees publication of history textbooks

234 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron , p. 143. 235 Kim, “Myths, Milieu, and Facts,” p. 103. 236 The Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact: http://www.sdh-fact.com/ (accessed January 13, 2009) 237 Quoted in Lind, Sorry States , p. 70. 92

every four years and the publication of such a textbook constitutes tacit approval.

Furthermore, the Nihon Kaigi (Japanese Council), a nationalist group that consisted of

many conservative politicians and scholars, played a key role in leading nationalistic

campaigns in Japan. 238

Shallow Penitence and Backsliding

As noted above, the third phase of this study witnessed the maintenance of Japan’s

shallow penitence regarding the comfort women issue. During this period, the Japanese

government generally reaffirmed Prime Minister Murayama’s apologetic statement of

1995. In October 1998, for instance, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo expressed his deep

remorse and heartfelt apology, stating that Japan caused tremendous damage and

suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea during a certain period in the past. 239

Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro also stated in the official letter sent to the former

comfort women in 2001:

As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our responsibilities for the future. I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.240

The Japanese state also carried out its non-governmental compensation project through the Asian Women’s Fund during this period. Japan went ahead with the national atonement project for former comfort women in spite of strong resistance from legal

238 Chung, Hyundae Ilbon ŭi Sahoe Undongron, pp. 152-53. 239 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html (accessed January 15, 2009) 240 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/pmletter.html (accessed January 15, 2009) 93

compensation advocates. Despite this pressure from transnational actors, the Japanese

government kept refusing to assume legal responsibility for the war crime against

humanity committed against comfort women during World War II. It also declined to

directly pay individual compensation. In addition, Japanese courts continued to mostly dismiss lawsuits brought by former comfort women. 241

This period was also marked by frequent backsliding. First, Prime Minister

Hashimoto Ryutaro was reportedly reluctant to send apologetic letters to former comfort

women in 1996. 242 According to Onuma Yasuaki, when Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi

Kozo announced the objectives of the “Asian Peace and Friendship Foundation for

Women” in June 1995, the Murayama cabinet and the directors of the AWF had an

agreement to send Prime Minister’s letter to each victim for expressing the nation’s

feelings of sincere remorse and apology. Conservative LDP Diet members were strongly

opposed to this plan, however. As soon as he came into power in January 1996, LDP

Prime Minister Hashimoto—who had been the president of the Izokukai—took a passive

stance on writing the apologetic letters. In response to this position, Miki Mutsuko, one

of the primary proponents of the AWF, accused the Japanese government of breaking its

promise and thus resigned her position in protest. Through attracting significant media

attention, this event played a critical role in compelling the Hashimoto cabinet to agree

with sending the letters to each victim.

241 Soh, “Japan’s National/Asian Women’s Fund for Comfort Women” p. 218: the only victory for the plaintiffs of comfort women lawsuits was “a 1998 district court (the Shimonoseki branch of the Yamaguchi Prefecture Court) judgement that had ordered the Japanese government to pay three Korean former comfort women 300,000 yen (about US$2,272) each for their mental anguish, caused by the state’s unlawful inaction in regard to creating a special restitution act.” 242 Yasuaki Onuma, Ilbon eun Sajoe hago sipda: Ilbonkun Yianbu Munche wa Asia Yeos ǒng Kigeum [Japan wants to apologize: the Comfort Women Issue and the Asia Women’s Fund], translated into Korean by Hyunsook Chung, (Seoul: Chonryak kwa Munhwa, 2007), pp. 75-76. 94

Secondly, high-ranking Japanese government officials conversed the previous apologetic statements by making a series of blunders that attempted to justify or gloss over Japan’s past wrongs. For example, LDP politician Okuno Seisuke commented twice in June and July 1996 that “comfort women voluntarily participated in commercial transactions and they were managed by businesses.” 243 “There were military nurses but no military comfort women,” Watanuke Tamisuke, former vice secretary of International

Trade and Industry, stated in September 1996. Another LDP politician, Shimamura

Yoshinobu, also asserted in February 1997 that “most of the comfort women were recruited by foreign prostitution rings, not by Japanese military.” 244 Another blunder was made by Nakagawa Shoichi, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, who stated that it was not possible to know whether comfort women had been forced or not.

Thirdly, the Japanese government also exerted pressure on NHK not to air TV documentaries showing its involvement in the wartime sex slave system. For instance,

“In 1997, NHK produced a documentary about the comfort women, but the Ministry of

Justice forbade the producers to make the assertions contained in the documentary, claiming there was no evidence to prove the Japanese government's involvement.”245 In addition, due to political pressure from LDP politicians, crucial alterations were made to the content of NHK documentary on the 2000 Women’s International War Crimes

Tribunal.246 LDP politicians—Deputy Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo and Economics and

Industry Minister Nakagawa Shoichi—met with senior staff of NHK to discuss the

243 Yang, “South Korea and Japan’s Frictions over History” p. 79. 244 Yang, “South Korea and Japan’s Frictions over History” p. 79. 245 Online at http://www.bowdoin.edu/news/archives/asian_studies/000010.shtml (accessed January 20, 2009) 246 For the detailed analysis of the NHK Affair, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Free Speech—Silenced Voices: The Japanese Media and the NHK Affair,” Asia Rights , Issue 4 (2005), pp. 1-21. 95

content of the program on 29 January 2001, one day before its broadcast. Tessa Morris-

Suzuki presents the last minute changes made to the content of the program following

this meeting:

A decision was also taken to expunge all references to the Tribunal’s condemnation of the late Emperor Hirohito. After the meeting with Abe, senior NHK management demanded further last minute changes. The length of the broadcast was now to be cut from 44 to 40 minutes; testimony by Chinese victims of military sexual abuse was to be excised, as was the testimony of former Japanese soldiers who spoke of the military’s responsibility for the comfort station system and of the violence inflicted on the women recruited to work there. As a result, the final version of the documentary included no visual footage of the Tribunal’s proceedings at all and no mention of its findings. 247

A Japanese journalist also points out that the NHK aired many TV programs dealing with

Japan’s wartime responsibilities in the 1970s and 1980s. NHK television producers,

however, could not easily make such programs under the pressure of the conservative

LDP-led governing coalition from the late 1990s. 248

A more recent example of the Japanese state’s backsliding on the issue occurred

in March 2007 when Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated, “there was no evidence to

support the initially accepted notion that coercion was used by the Japanese military or

government in recruiting wartime comfort women.” 249 Facing this statement, the world

media reacted swiftly and critically, as Soh notes. 250 Nevertheless, Abe further argued,

“the Japanese government would not issue an apology to comfort women in response to

passage of H. Res. 121 by the U.S. House of Representatives and that the resolution had

not been based on objective facts.” 251 Despite these fairly clear signals, however, Prime

Minister Abe later stated that “he stood by the consistent position of the government of

247 Morris-Suzuki, “Free Speech—Silenced Voices,” p. 5. 248 Interview No. 25, Tokyo, October 21, 2008. 249 Yang, “South Korea and Japan’s Frictions over History,” p. 74. 250 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 67. 251 Yang, “South Korea and Japan’s Frictions over History” pp. 74-75. 96

Japan, represented by the statement of the former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono, and

expressed heartfelt sympathy and sincere apologies to the women who suffered

immeasurable pain and hardships.” 252

The Weakening of Geopolitical Incentives to Address Past Injustices

This third phase witnessed two competing streams in Japan’s geopolitical incentives

regarding its transgressions during World War II. The notable strengthening of the U.S.-

Japan Alliance since the mid-1990s had largely satisfied Japan’s heightened security

concerns, thus weakening Japan’s need to improve its ties with Asia. On the other hand,

however, the 1997 Asian financial crisis strongly motivated Japan to escalate its

economic cooperation with Asian countries, particularly South Korea. As previously

mentioned, Japan also still needed political support from its Asian neighbors in order to

gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Thus, while the Japanese state had

diminished security incentives to address the comfort women issue during this period, it

faced significant economic and political incentives to do actively engage its regional

neighbors on the issue.

Japan benefited from a significant strengthening in the U.S.-Japan Alliance during

this third phase. The 1994 North Korean nuclear standoff with the United States was a

major catalyst for this development.253 With the collapse of the Communist Bloc North

Korea had lost its ideological, military, and economic partners. And, as South Korea

normalized its relationships with Russia in 1990 and with China in 1992, North Korea

252 Yang, “South Korea and Japan’s Frictions over History” p. 74-75. 253 Yoshihide Soeya, Ilbon ŭi Mideul Pawo Oekyo: Ch ǒnhu Ilbon ui S ǒntaek kwa Kusang [Japan’s Middle Power Diplomacy: Postwar Japan’s Choice and Idea], translated into Korean by Cheol Hee Park, (Seoul: Ohreum, 2006), pp. 127-29. 97 found itself isolated from these neighbors and former allies. The North Korean economy, which had showed signs of distress earlier, was pushed even closer to collapse by the termination of patron aid by Moscow and Beijing.254 Frequent natural disasters further worsened North Korea’s economic condition. North Korea began to develop nuclear weapons as a last resort to ensure survival of its regime.255 When the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demanded a special inspection of its nuclear facilities,

North Korea declined this request and announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993. In response to such nuclear adventuring, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions through the U.N. and seriously considered making a surgical strike. This crisis was ultimately resolved with the conclusion of the Geneva

Agreed Framework in October 1994. 256

The crisis and the specter of future problems with North Korea prompted the U.S. and Japan to seriously reevaluate their existing bilateral security alliance. Japanese authorities perceived that Japan had no constitutional measure allowing the Self-Defense

Forces to provide American troops with the rear support that would be necessary in any

254 Victor Cha and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 38: For instance, “DPRK petroleum imports from the Soviet Union dropped by more than half between 1988 (3.4 million tons) and 1992 (1.5 million tons) after Moscow terminated subsidized sales. Similarly DPRK overall trade, three-fifths of which took with Warsaw Pact countries, contracted by nearly 33 percent between 1988 and 1991 after hard currency terms of customs settlement became required for most transactions.” 255 For the detailed explanation of the 1994 North Korea’s nuclear crisis, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Basic Books, 2001), pp. 249-369; Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), pp. 143-70. 256 Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse , p. 151: According to Marcus Noland, “The essential bargain of the Agreed Framework is that North Korea would remain in the NPT, freeze operations at the three graphite reactors and related facilities, and submit to IAEA inspections of the three graphite reactor sites. In return, it would receive two 1,000 megawatt light-water reactors by a target date of 2003 (valued at roughly $5 billion), 150,000 tons of heavy oil in 1995, and 500,000 tons annually from 1996 to 2003 to replace the potential energy supply from the shut-down reactors.” 98

number of potential regional contingencies. 257 U.S. authorities also recognized Japan’s

strategic importance in order to better cope with contingent situations on the Korean

Peninsula that would cause the sacrifice of numerous American soldiers. The United

States desired to strengthen the alliance with Japan and reconfirmed its security

commitment in Asia, as exhibited by the Nye Initiative. 258 This report defined the U.S.-

Japan Alliance as the linchpin of peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in the

post-Cold War era, declaring that the U.S. would maintain 100,000 U.S. military

personnel in the region. As a subsequent measure, the two countries announced a new

U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996, which redefined the bilateral

alliance as a regional alliance for maintaining security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific

region. 259 They also established the New Guidelines for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation

in September 1997 that stipulated concrete cooperation measures between U.S. forces

and the SDF. 260

A series of subsequent incidents reinforced the U.S.-Japan security alliance during

this period, further weakening Japan’s motives for seeking closer ties with Asian

countries. The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis confirmed the need for strengthening the U.S.-

Japan Alliance, although it had been the 1994 North Korea’s nuclear crisis that provoked

257 Park, “Jeonsu Bangwi es ǒ Jeokkuk Bangwi ro,”, pp. 178-79. 258 On the restructuring process of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the mid-1990s, see Mike Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” in Mike Mochizuki, ed., Toward A True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 5-40. 259 The Washington Post , April 17, 1996; The Daily Yomiuri , April 18, 1996: In the Joint Declaration, President Clinton promised to continue the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Hashimoto also agreed to provide “increased logistical support—fuel, transport, communications, food, medical care—during peacetime.” 260 The Washington Times , September 24, 1997; The Daily Yomiuri , September 23, 1997: “Under the new agreement, Japan—long hampered by an anti-military constitution drawn up by the American army after World War II—would provide support to U.S. military operations in the region, including search and rescue, civilian evacuations and mine sweeping.” 99

the restructuring of the bilateral alliance.261 The launch of a North Korean Taepodong

missile over Japan in August 1998 similarly played a key role in encouraging Japan to

strengthen its alliance with the U.S. The launch was significant in that it posed the first

actual threat to Japan’s security since World War II.262 As Park notes, the security community in Japan was engrossed in discussing how to deal with a North Korean threat following this incident. In December 1998, the Japanese government actually made a decision to introduce intelligence satellites by the year 2003 and to participate in a joint program to develop Theater Missile Defense (TMD) with the U.S. Also enacted in 1999 and 2000 respectively were a law aimed at coping with regional security contingencies and a law that allowed Japan’s maritime security guard to investigate suspicious ships in the sea around Japan.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the U.S. served as another catalyst to reinforce the U.S.-Japan Alliance. 263 Following this unprecedented incident, the U.S. focused on a security strategy to fight against terrorism and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the U.S. needed strong support from one of its main alliance partners—Japan.264 By the same token, recognizing the American position, the Japanese government paid greater attention to establishing stronger cooperative ties with the United States. In response to the U.S. war against Iraq in March 2003, the

261 Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), Preface ix-xi: The origin of the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 was the visit of Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui to the United States in June 1995. His trip was aimed at improving Taiwan’s international image, but triggered China’s military reaction. 262 Park, “Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea,” p. 191. 263 Park, “Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea,” p. 193; Park, “Jeonsu Bangwi es ǒ Jeokkuk Bangwi ro,” pp. 181-82. 264 The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership (INSS Special Report), online at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/sr_01/sr_japan.htm (accessed January 20, 2009): Indeed, the United States had designed a new policy toward Asia and Japan at the beginning of the Bush administration in the late 2000, as the so-called Armitage report reveals. In this report, the U.S. regarded Japan as the key alliance partner in the trans-Pacific region. 100

Koizumi administration immediately declared its support for the war and promised to

dispatch the SDF to Iraq. Additionally, according to Park, “when US Defense

Department initiated its military transformation project, Japan followed the policy line set

by the U.S., given the recognition that the transformation would ultimately strengthen the

politico-military role of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region.” 265

In contrast to the prior phase, therefore, it might not have been necessary—for

security reasons at least—for Japan to actively address its past wrongs with other Asian

nations, as the notably strengthened U.S.-Japan Alliance settled the security concerns that

Japan had held in the early 1990s.

JAPAN’S DEALINGS WITH THE FORCED LABOR ISSUE [IMPENITENCE]

Apart from comfort women, the Japanese state forcibly recruited hundreds of thousands

of Korean and Chinese workers as part of its war efforts.266 Tens of thousands of Allied prisoners of war (POWs) were also forced to work for Japanese private companies, including Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Nippon Steel. Despite some statistical controversy, it is generally estimated that about 720,000 Koreans, 40,000 Chinese, and 25,000 American

POWs were deported to Japan and Japan-occupied Asia as forced laborers during World

War II. 267 These laborers had to work under inhumane conditions and many died from

265 Park, “Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea,” p. 194. 266 Underwood, “New Era for Japan-Korea History Issues”; Petra Schmidt, “Japan’s Wartime Compensation”: In addition to forced laborers, approximately 300,000 Koreans were forcibly mobilized as soldiers or civilian military personnel in the Japanese military. Also, the millions of laborers from Southeast Asia, called romusha , were forced to work for the Japanese empire across the Asia Pacific. 267 For the detailed description of the forced labor issue, see Soon-Won Park, “The Politics of Remembrance: the Case of Korean Forced Laborers in the Second World War,” in Gi-Wook Shin, Soon- Won Park, and Daqing Yang, eds., Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience (New York: Routledge, 2007); Hye-Kyung Chung, “The Forcible Drafting of Koreans during the Final Phase of Colonial Rule and the Formation of the Korean Community in Japan,” Korea Journal (Winter 2004), pp. 31-41; Underwood, “Names, Bones and Unpaid Wages”, pp. 13-16; 101

sickness, starvation, overwork, accidents, and the brutality of their Japanese overseers.268

Following the end of the war, surviving forced laborers requested their wages and savings. The GHQ (General Headquarters) also guided the Japanese government not to discriminate against foreign workers in a memorandum. At the time, however, the

Japanese government ignored all such demands.269

In the six decades that followed, the Japanese government and involved

corporations usually refused to apologize or pay compensation to the forced laborers,

save for some out-of-court settlements. 270 Japan’s impenitent stance on forced labor can

be better explained through the transnational-coalitional approach than the realist

paradigm, though these explanations are not mutually exclusive. From the realist

viewpoint, as noted earlier, Japan had few geopolitical incentives to address such

historical matters prior to the end of the Cold War. The realist perspective, however,

cannot explain why Japan continued to duck the forced labor issue between 1990 and

1995, when the Japanese state had strong realpolitik incentives to do such action.

According to the transnational-coalitional approach, the longstanding

conservative LDP leadership might not have been interested in grappling with the forced

labor issue as it could have damaged Japan’s national pride and consciousness.

Michael J. Bazyler, Holocaust Justice: The Battle for Restitution in America’s Courts (New York University Press, 2003), p. 308. 268 Schmidt, “Japan’s Wartime Compensation,” pp. 5-7: Korean forced laborers were usually assigned to the most dangerous work sites like coalmines. A previous research shows that Korean workers’ death rate was between 3.5 and 6 times higher than among Japanese workers. 269 Schmidt, “Japan’s Wartime Compensation,” p. 15. 270 Interview No. 30, Tokyo, October 28, 2008; Berger, “Dealing with difficult pasts,” p. 28; Schmidt, “Japan’s Wartime Compensation,” pp. 15-19; Christopher Reed, “Family Skeletons: Japan’s Foreign Minister and Forced Labor by Koreans and Allied POWs,” Japan Focus : Petra Schmidt offers a few instances of out-of-court settlements as follows: “Nippon Steel paid 2 million yen to the bereaved family of a former South Korean laborer. The same company, on 22 September 1997, reached a settlement with the families of eleven Korean forced laborers. Nippon Steel agreed to pay more than $163,000 in condolence money to each of them. In early April 1999 in a suit filed by South Korean Kim Kyung-suk, steel-maker NKK agreed to pay 4.1 million yen to compensate for hardships Kim had endured.” 102

Simultaneously, societal groups supporting the victims of forced labor failed to conduct a

powerful transnational campaign enough to exert great pressure on Japanese government

and industry. Until the end of the 1980s, only a single Korean victim group, the Society

for Pacific War Victims and Surviving Family Members (T’aep’y ŏngyang Ch ŏnchaeng

Hisaengcha Yuzokhoe), pursued the forced labor issue, but it made little impact. 271 The

public testimony made by the former comfort woman Kim Hak-sun in 1991, however,

prompted the rise of compensation claims made by surviving forced workers against

Japanese government and industry. The early 1990s witnessed the formation of many

Korean victim rights groups representing a number of former forced laborers, such as the

Council for Compensation of Pacific War Victims (T’aep’y ŏngyang Ch ŏnchaeng

Pihaecha Bosang Chujin Hyupuihoe). In the process of filing suits against the Japanese government and companies, these Korean groups came to form a network with approximately 100 Japanese organizations, including the Postwar Compensation Network and the Forced Mobilization Network. This transnational activism remained, however, in the legal arena, and failed to create as great a sensation domestically and internationally as the transnational comfort women movement had.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has thus far analyzed the roles of societal actors, ruling coalitions, and security incentives in Japan’s postwar behavior reckoning with the comfort women issue.

Through this case study, I find temporal correlations that suggest plausibility of some causal relationship. Transnational civil society groups could play a pivotal role in

271 Park, “The Politics of Remembrance,” p. 59; Eunjeong Chung, “Hanil Chogukjok Onghomang e kwanhan Yongu (Study of Korea-Japan Transnational Advocacy Network)” M.A. Thesis., (Seoul: Kyunghee University, 2004), pp. 54-59. 103 pushing perpetrator states to adopt more apologetic attitudes toward their past injustices.

Put differently, we would not fully understand the variations in Japan’s attitudes toward the comfort women issue without taking into account the influence of transnational activism. The Korean Council took the lead in organizing a transnational network focusing on comfort women, elevating the resonance of the issue in the international community, and exerting significant pressure on the Japanese government to respond to this unresolved historical matter.

Prior to the late 1980s, there were no political and societal actors dedicated to addressing the issue and Japan had weak geopolitical incentives to deal with its past transgressions. The early and mid-1990s showed a significant shift in behavior, which could be related to powerful transnational activism led by societal actors in South Korea and Japan as well as the brief rule of a progressive coalition government. This period also witnessed the rise of Japan’s geopolitical incentives to address its past injustices following the end of the Cold War. A possible reason for Japan’s backsliding on the issue between 1996 and the mid-2000s was the rise of the systematic conservative/nationalist forces and the return of the conservative LDP-led coalition government. This phase was also marked by the significant weakening of Japan’s security incentives to grapple with past wrongs in the Asian mainland.

104

Chapter 4 Germany’s Dealings with Forced Labor/Forced Prostitution Issues

The Nazi regime exploited a huge number of forced and slave laborers to sustain its wartime economy during World War II. These individuals suffered severely under appalling conditions and many were worked to death. Despite its criminal nature, however, the issue of Nazi-era forced and slave labor largely remained unacknowledged for more than half a century following the end of the war. This long-forgotten issue finally came to light in the late 1990s. The German state and industry issued apologetic statements and established a fund to compensate the 1.7 million surviving victims of the

Nazi forced and slave labor. I find that societal actors such as Jewish organizations and

American lawyers catalyzed a transnational movement that called upon the German state and industry to better address the forced and slave labor issue. This movement could be related to the significant improvement in Germany’s behavior toward this historical matter. Also important was the role of German progressive parties, the Social

Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party, which had made efforts to resolve the issue since the 1980s. After forming a coalition government in 1998, the SPD-Green Party coalition took active steps to deal with the issue under practical considerations—i.e. to defend German business interests in the U.S.

This chapter begins with an examination of the Nazi’s use of forced and slave labor during World War II. The next section briefly outlines the four phases of postwar

Germany’s dealings with this historical issue. Subsequent sections will apply both the transnational-coalitional and realist frameworks to each phase and assess their

105 explanatory power. The final section briefly explores Germany’s dealings with the forced prostitution issue during the war and offers concluding remarks.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During World War II, Nazi Germany forcibly recruited about ten million laborers of two types: non-Jewish forced laborers from Eastern/Western Europe, who were conquered civilian population and prisoners of war, and slave laborers (nearly half Jewish and half

Poles/Russians), who were concentration camp inmates marked for extermination. 272

Table 3: Forced Laborers (Civilians + Prisoners of War) according to Nationality, August 1944 273 Soviet Polish French Italian Dutch Belgian Others Total

2,758,312 1,688,080 1,254,749 585,337 270,304 253,648 841,540 7,651,970

As part of its war effort, Nazi Germany conscripted about 7.6 million forced laborers from its occupied territories, particularly Eastern Europe, as detailed in Table 3.

Under brutal conditions, they were forced to work in German agriculture and various industries such as mining, metal, chemicals, and construction. As a German scholar

Ulrich Herbert posits,

The working and living conditions of the eastern workers and the Soviet POWs were extremely poor while those of the Polish workers were little different. Laborers from western countries were somewhat better off, yet their situation was far worse than that of the domestic German work force. Thus, a racist hierarchy was visibly manifest everywhere in concrete practice, becoming ever more established and entrenched: Germans, workers from the West, workers from the East—in descending order. 274

272 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , pp. 206-07. 273 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future,” pp. 25-27; Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany , pp. 155-56: 7.6 million forced laborers were composed of 1.9 million POWs and 5.7 million civilians. 274 Ulrich Herbert, translated by William Templer, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980: Seasonal Workers/ Forced Laborers/ Guest Workers (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), p. 150. 106

Nazi leaders actually held diverse opinions regarding how to treat those laborers. For

instance, Albert Speer (Minister of Armaments and War Production) and Fritz Sauckel

(Chief Plenipotentiary for the Labor Effort) recognized that they would have to offer

better work conditions in order to maintain recruitment and productivity. In most cases,

however, the Gestapo and German Security Police who supervised the workers paid little attention to productivity and thus treated them brutally. 275 Due to the exploitation of these laborers, Nazi Germany was able to sustain the war effort long after its own work force had been depleted. 276 Herbert estimates that without conscript labor, Nazi Germany would have been defeated by the summer of 1943 at the latest. 277

As its military situation deteriorated in 1943, the Third Reich suffered a serious labor shortage and began to deploy concentration camp inmates as forced laborers. More specifically, during the final phase of the war (1943-45), Nazi Germany launched a massive deployment of concentration camp inmates in huge construction projects. These projects were usually aimed at expanding the system of subterranean caves built to protect the German armaments industry from Allied air strikes. Through the projects,

Nazi Germany facilitated a program of “annihilation by labor,” as Herbert calls it. A

275 Shoah Resource Center: online at http://www.yadvashem.org (accessed November 2, 2009) 276 Ulrich Herbert, translated by William Templer, Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 382-85: Herbert provides an argument that the mass forced conscription of foreign workers during World War II was not a long-term plan of the Nationalist Socialist leadership. Indeed, such a large-scale deployment of forced laborers contradicted the central principle of National Socialist ideology, which was to maintain purity of blood of the German people. A variety of dynamic factors, including war situation, economic effectiveness and ideological justification, led to the production of rapid and profound change: “between the hesitant decisions on the deployment of Poles in 1939, geared totally to temporary, short-term measures, and the gigantic organization of foreign labor deployment which spanned almost all of Europe four years later.” 277 Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany , p. 153. 107 great number of these camp inmates were worked to death under hellish conditions: deficient diet, atrocious accommodations, and the murderous, breakneck pace of work. 278

PERIODIZATION OF GERMANY’S DEALINGS WITH THE FORCED LABOR ISSUE

Postwar Germany’s dealings with the forced and slave labor issue can be divided into four phases. During the first phase, from the end of World War II to the late 1940s,

Germany was under the occupation of the Allied Powers, which convicted Nazi’s high- ranking officials and business leaders of facilitating atrocious forced labor policies at the

International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in October 1946. Despite the Nuremberg trials, however, the German state (West Germany) adopted an unapologetic stance toward the slave and forced labor issue in the second phase, which extended from the early 1950s through the late 1970s. In the third phase (the 1980s through mid-1990s), Germany remained largely unapologetic despite a subcommittee of the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, examining the issue in 1989 and the establishment of reconciliation funds in

East European countries in the early 1990s. The fourth phase emerged in the late 1990s and continued through the mid-2000s. During this period, the German state issued apologetic statements and compensated former forced and slave laborers for their suffering.

PHASE ONE: 1945 TO THE LATE 1940s

The German state held no real power to address the slave and forced labor issue during this period, as it was occupied by the Allied Powers: the United States, Britain, France,

278 Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany , pp. 172-79. 108 and the Soviet Union. Prior to the end of WWII, the Allies’ secret agency and international workers’ organizations were already very much aware of the forced labor issue in Nazi Germany. They posited that foreign slave labor was a product of practical cooperation and fundamental agreement between the Nazi government, big industry and the majority of the German population. 279 The Allies sought to deal with the Third

Reich’s forced labor policy through the International Military Tribunal convened in

Nuremberg between November 20, 1945 and October 1, 1946. The exploitation of forced labor in Nazi Germany was central to charges against leading politicians and industrialists at the Nuremberg trials. As Herbert points out, “the International Military

Tribunal proceeded on the premise that National Socialist foreigner policy had been founded on a program of slave labor, which had required the deportation of more than five million persons for purposes of forced labor, many of whom had to endure terrible cruelty and suffering.”280

As a consequence, Fritz Sauckel, Plenipotentiary-General for Labor Mobilization from 1943 to the end of the war, was sentenced to death because he had been fully responsible for the policy of forced labor and the program of slave labor. 281 The

Nuremberg Tribunal also sentenced Albert Speer, Reich Minister for Armaments and

War Production, to twenty years in prison for his role in making use of slave labor. In addition, leading representatives of Flick, IG-Farben and Krupp were tried and convicted largely due to their use and mistreatment of slave laborers. 282

279 John H. E. Fried, The Exploitation of Foreign Labor by Germany (Montreal: International Labor Office, 1945). 280 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers , p. 3. 281 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” p. 36. 282 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers , pp. 1-2 and 399. 109

Despite the Nuremberg trials and the resulting convictions, slave and forced labor did not become a main focus of attention in the early postwar period for two primary reasons. First, the forced and slave labor issue came to be overshadowed by the mass murders that had occurred in concentration and death camps like Auschwitz and

Maidanek. This phenomenon, to some extent, occurred because the Nuremberg Tribunal did not make a distinction between the exploitation of concentration camp inmates and forced laborers. 283 At the time, the Allied authorities launched a broad publicity campaign in order to rectify prevalent apathy among Germans concerning Nazi atrocities. 284 As Lind notes, newspaper articles and radio reports paid great attention to the Nazi’s extermination in concentration camps. The Occupation authorities also posted placards showing heaps of corpses with slogans such as “YOU ARE GUILTY OF THIS” in cities, towns, and Military Government offices. With picture exhibitions displayed in storefronts, pamphlets containing the most shocking images were printed and distributed.

Second, in the early postwar period the Germans failed to perceive forced labor as something connected with Nazi war crimes. As Lutz Niethammer states, “in the postwar

Germany there was hardly any perception of forced labor as having been something criminal in nature. In contrast to the Holocaust, the use of forced laborers was known to everyone. There was no medium-sized company, no small town, and almost no farm that did not employ foreign workers.”285 Herbert also provides an example to show this aspect:

Without exception, any young or adult German living in Germany during the war necessarily had some contact with foreign workers and prisoners of war. In Essen, for example, there were some 300 camps for foreign laborers within the

283 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers , p. 3. 284 Lind, Sorry States , p. 107. 285 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” pp. 36-37. 110

city limits in 1943; except for a very few suburbs, every neighborhood in town contained such a camp. In factories and on farms throughout the Reich, Germans and foreigners worked together, side by side, year after year. 286

Under this circumstance, the Germans fell short of viewing the exploitation of forced laborers and prisoners of war during World War II as something historically out of the ordinary.

PHASE TWO: THE EARLY 1950s TO THE LATE 1970s [IMPENITENCE]

The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany or FRG), having gained its independence from the Allies in 1949, initiated a reparations program that excluded compensation for forced and slave labor during this period. A plausible reason the

German state overlooked the issue of forced and slave labor was the absence of political and societal actors dedicated to addressing this historical problem. The United States also played a role in postponing Germany’s move to compensate former forced and slave laborers through the London Agreements on German External Debts of 1953. In the meantime, strong geopolitical incentives motivated West Germany to launch the postwar reparations program that focused on payments to the State of Israel and Jewish victims of the Holocaust. In this process, Jewish organizations served as a catalyst and mediator for obtaining German compensation for Nazi persecution of the Jews.

The Absence of Agents, U.S. Intervention, and Germany’s Unapologetic Stance toward Forced Labor

During this second phase, the FRG paid little attention to the issue of forced and slave labor due to the absence of political or societal agents to raise the problem. As

286 Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers , p. 2. 111

highlighted above, the German public did not perceive the forced and slave labor issue as something related to Nazi war crimes during the early postwar period. Additionally, the

Holocaust attracted much more attention from both German society and the international community. Furthermore, legitimate claimants to reparations from the Nazi’s exploitation of forced and slave labor were absent, as the great majority of forced laborers had returned to the communist bloc countries and were in no position to make any claims. As Niethammer notes,

The Soviet Union refused to represent the claims of Soviet victims of forced labor in Germany and, indeed, treated them and all Soviet POWs who had been held in German prison camps as traitors. Soviet returnees, to the extent that they were lucky enough not to be put in a prison camp on returning home, were not allowed to talk about the subject at all and they were discriminated against when it came to employment. 287

The Jewish community also overlooked the forced and slave labor issue because its own central concern was the Holocaust. 288

The Polish government, however, raised the issue of German compensation for forced labor during its normalization process with West Germany in the early 1970s.

According to Polish Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz, “several questions remained open in the two countries’ relations and awaited future resolution. These included the matter of reparations, especially for forced labor and imprisonment in Nazi concentration camps.

We believe that elementary compensation for the crimes and wrongs perpetrated by

Nazism is a moral obligation of the German Federal Republic.” 289 In response to this

demand, however, the West German government claimed that the Polish government

287 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” p. 36. 288 Interview No. 36, Braunschweig, May 7, 2009. 289 Quoted in Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, “Ostpolitik and Poland” in Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer, eds., Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 49. 112

held no right to request compensation, as it had given up war reparations by concluding a

treaty with East Germany in 1953. 290

The signing of the London Agreement in 1953, orchestrated by the United States, also contributed to the postponement of German compensation for former victims of forced and slave labor. The war-torn German state had no capacity to deal with such financial demands, which would have been claimed by more survivors of labor camps than any other group of war victims (except for expellees and war refugees). 291 The U.S. government desired to avoid repeating the disaster that occurred as a result of the reparations regime adopted after World War I. 292 The Versailles Treaty, which formally ended World War I, included the imposition of huge reparations that Germans did not think they could possibly pay. Many people think the Treaty made a second war likely.

Given the lessons learned from 1919’s Treaty of Versailles, Timothy Guinnane posits,

“The entire agreement was crafted on the premise that Germany’s actual payments could not be so high as to endanger the short-term welfare of her people or her long-term ability to rebuild a shattered economy and society.” 293 Following this basic principle, the

London Agreement declared forced and slave labor a reparation issue and postponed

addressing the issue until a peace treaty with Germany could be concluded. As a result,

German indemnification of millions of forced laborers was delayed by U.S.-directed

policy as well as the fact that the majority of potential claimants were living in the

communist bloc countries at the time.

290 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 33. 291 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” p. 40. 292 Timothy W. Guinnane, “Financial Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung: The 1953 London Debt Agreement,” Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper, No 880 (January 2004), pp. 2-8. 293 Guinnane, “Financial Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung,” p. 24. 113

Jewish Groups, the State of Israel, and Their Reparation Claims against Germany

In contrast to the forced labor case, however, Jewish organizations and the State of Israel played an active role in raising the issue of German reparations for the sufferings inflicted on the Jews. The Jewish community had been focused on the German reparations issue since the beginning of World War II. In the spring of 1940, the American Jewish

Committee (AJC) assigned a subcommittee on peace studies to conduct research concerning the Jewish situation and help defend the rights of Jews. 294 Through a memorandum, Dr. George Landauer, a Jewish refugee in the United States, emphasized that the Jews as a nation should have a right to present claims against Germany in the fall of 1943. Supporting this idea, Dr. Siegfried Moses—the future comptroller of the State of Israel—insisted that a representative Jewish agency should not only establish a claim for the heirless property of Jewish institutions, but also request reparations for Nazi persecution. In 1944, Dr. Nehemiah Robinson, head of the Institute of the Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), published a comprehensive study of the compensation issue, stating that the future German government would have to take three actions: (1) to pay individual compensation; (2) to return all sequestered property; and (3) to make collective compensation for material damages to the Jews as a nation.

After the end of the war the WJC and AJC, two of the most renowned Jewish organizations, made great efforts to obtain German reparations to further accomplish their primary goal—i.e., supporting Jewish refugees. 295 These organizations exerted pressure

294 Dean Silvers, “The Future of International Law as Seen through the Jewish Material Claims Conference against Germany,” Jewish Social Studies , Vol. 42, No. 3/4 (Summer-Autumn, 1980), p. 216. 295 Ariel Colonomos and Andrea Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews after World War II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations,” in Pablo de Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 393-94: In 1944 the World Jewish Congress already held the ‘War Emergency Conference’ in Atlantic City, whose central topic was the issue of German reparations. 114

on the Allied governments to ensure that “Germany be compelled to pay full and fair

recompense to the Jewish world for the material losses it had suffered.” 296 The State of

Israel, founded in 1948, joined these groups in requesting payments from West Germany in order to build new lives for the half a million refugees who had fled to Palestine during the Nazi period and after the liberation of the concentration camps. 297 Despite sharp opposition, David Ben Gurion, Israel’s Prime Minister, decided to demand reparations from Germany. He emphasized the needs of the young State of Israel, which faced serious economic hardships following its creation. The money collected from diaspora donations was not enough to meet the costs of the influx of people. As Ariel Colonomos and Andrea Armstrong notes, “the disapora remitted US$118 million in 1949 and US$90 million in 1950, while the country’s commercial deficit was US$220 million for 1949 and

US$282 million for 1950.” 298

Regarding German reparations to the Jews, Konrad Adenauer stated that he would rectify the wrongs committed by the Germans in November 1949, only two months after his election as the first West German chancellor. As a symbolic gesture, Adenauer offered the State of Israel goods worth 10 million DM, yet the Israelis angrily rejected his offer as a pittance. Perceiving the potential in Adenauer’s statement and gesture, however, the World Jewish Congress issued a declaration of principles for the West

German government in December 1949: (1) acknowledgement of moral and political responsibility for Nazi persecution toward Jews; (2) material indemnification; (3)

296 Ronald W. Zweig, German Reparations and the Jewish World: A History of the Claims Conference (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. 16. 297 Christian Pross, Paying for the Past: The Struggle over Reparations for the Surviving Victims of the Nazi Terror (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 22. 298 Colonomos and Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews after World War II,” p. 396: The reparations issue brought about a harsh debate in diasporic Jewish communities and in Israeli society. Many insisted that the State of Israel should not sacrifice the principles of its uniqueness by accepting compromises in the name of material interest. 115

legislation against anti-Semitism; (4) reeducation of German young people; and (5)

investigation of nationalist tendencies in the West German government. 299 Following this declaration, the Israeli government organized a meeting with Jewish organizations to formulate the Jewish claims and the means of presenting them in September 1950. The

Israeli government thus presented its reparation claims in a series of diplomatic Notes addressed to the Allied Powers during 1951. 300 An Israeli Note stated the right of Israel to make a claim against Germany and concluded with a claim of $1.5 billion, as Ronald

Zweig details.

Strong Geopolitical Incentives and Germany’s Postwar Indemnification

The initial stimulation for German reparations was derived from the framework of laws imposed by the Allies. Prior to the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the Allied Restitution Law of 1947 dealt with the restitution of goods that had been confiscated by the Nazi regime without addressing the issue of victim compensation.

This law enabled the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO) to receive about

50 million DM. In April 1949, a reparations law was put in place in the American- occupied zone, laying the groundwork for the first nationwide law on reparations enacted in 1953. And, a provision of the 1952 treaty that established the sovereignty of the

Federal Republic of Germany and ended its occupied status demanded the German authorities to prepare a federal law of reparations. 301

West Germany, however, had strong security incentives for earnestly addressing the reparation claims of Jewish organizations and the State of Israel in the late 1940s and

299 Colonomos and Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews after World War II,” p. 397. 300 Zweig, German Reparations and the Jewish World , pp. 20-21. 301 Pross, Paying for the Past , pp. 19-21. 116 the early 1950s. From a geostrategic perspective, the newly created West Germany could achieve integration with the West and the NATO by showing its repentance to the international community through the reparations. As Nana Sagi notes, “Adenauer himself pointed out political expediency more than once, saying that a settlement with the

Jews was needed for Germany’s rehabilitation. As proof that Germany had shaken off the past, condemned it, and was ready to make amends and atone as far as possible, such a settlement would make it easier for Germany to be re-accepted into the family of nations.” 302 From an economic viewpoint, Adenauer posited that despite the high cost of such reparations, Germany could eventually benefit from the good-will they would engender over the long term. 303 Given these incentives, the West German government focused on paying reparations to the State of Israel and Jewish victims of the Holocaust starting in 1950.

One of West Germany’s goals was integration in the newly formed NATO. In the late 1940s, the intensification of the Cold War—particularly driven by the Soviet’s blockade of West Berlin—triggered the decision to formulate that military alliance between the U.S. and Western Europe. On June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union cut off all

Allied access to Berlin. Such drastic action was motivated by “the fear of a revived

German threat through unification of the western zones and its integration with Western

Europe.” 304 In response, the Western Allies deployed the Berlin Airlift, which successfully carried supplies to the people in West Berlin for almost a year before the blockade was lifted in May 1949. During this operation, Western countries abandoned their hesitations and reached an agreement regarding a military alliance.

302 Sagi, German Reparations, p. 66. 303 Colonomos and Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews after World War II,” pp. 393-95. 304 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 316. 117

Following this basic accord, the question of German participation in NATO erupted. Germany held two aspects of strategic importance for the new organization.

Firstly, Germany was viewed by the NATO states as an important resource pool needed to fill Allied deficiencies. 305 It would be a great loss for the West to let Germany fall to hostile hands, as the state remained one of the five centers of industrial and military power even after the war. In addition, Germany could offer the necessary defense buffer space for Western Europe by stretching the defense line far to the east. According to

Yinan He, “given the lessons of WWII and the military balance in postwar Europe, it was widely understood that NATO’s East front would be indefensible in the face of a Soviet blitzkrieg and the defenders would have to engage in tactical retreats that cushion enemy assault and buy time for preparing counterattack.” 306

Despite such strategic importance, whether or not the Allies would welcome West

Germany into the NATO framework remained unresolved. It was relatively easy for the

United States to accept bringing Germany into NATO. The European countries, however, were somewhat reluctant to admit the Germans because they had suffered Nazi invasion and occupation only a few years prior. 307 In this context, West Germany needed to launch a reparations program so that it could regain the trust of the international community and integrate itself into the Western alliance. German entry into the Western alliance was actually closely related to the restoration of German sovereignty. As

Wolfram Hanrieder posits, the formation of integrative West European and Atlantic

305 Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “Germany and NATO: The Enduring Bargain,” in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 46. 306 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 317. 307 Martin J. Hillenbrand, “The United States and Germany,” in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 78. 118

structures could exert a decisive influence on Germany’s speedy political recovery.308

Such structures could offer mechanisms for controlling Germany and make the restoration of German sovereignty less risky for the Western powers, particularly France.

Under these geopolitical incentives, Chancellor Adenauer initiated unofficial contact between West Germany and the State of Israel through mediators. Adenauer also held the first official contact in May 1951 when he met secretly with Israel’s high- ranking government officials in Paris. 309 Following these meetings, Adenauer issued an apologetic statement at a solemn session of the Bundestag on September 27, 1951:

The Federal Government, and with it the great majority of the German people, are aware of the immeasurable suffering inflicted upon the Jews in Germany and in the occupied regions during the Nazi period…Unspeakable crimes were committed in the name of the German people, which create a duty of moral and material reparations…Initial steps have been taken in this area. But much remains to be done. The Federal Government will ensure rapid adoption of reparation legislation and its just implementation. 310

In the wake of this statement, the German government initiated an unprecedented reparations program. Indeed, there was domestic opposition to Adenauer’s reparations initiative. Opponents, including high-ranking government officials, argued that the first recipients should be German victims of the war such as widows, orphans, and expelled refugees, not Jewish victims. In the end, however, “the German government rallied around the necessity of engaging in a reparations policy, convinced that reparations best promoted German interests.” 311

Under these circumstances, in 1952 the German government began to negotiate with the Israeli delegation and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against

308 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, “West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979: Necessities and Choices,” in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 17. 309 Silvers, “The Future of International Law,” pp. 217-18. 310 Pross, Paying for the Past , p. 20. 311 Colonomos and Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews,” pp. 394-95. 119

Germany (hereafter, Claims Conference)—an umbrella organization of 23 groups. 312

Following six months of negotiations, West Germany, Israel, and the Claims Conference signed an agreement in Luxemburg on September 10, 1952. The Luxembourg

Agreement consisted of two specific measures: one was to compensate both the Jewish victims in the diaspora and the newly formed State of Israel for the pain suffered by the

Holocaust survivors who immigrated to the new state; the other to compel Germany to enact a series of laws that allowed individuals to demand compensation for their sufferings inflicted by the Nazi persecution. 313 As a result of the Agreement, Germany paid 3 billion DM ($882 million) to Israel and 450 million DM ($107 million) to the

Claims Conference between 1953 and 1965. 314

Germany also paid individual reparations through a series of the Federal

Reparations Laws, including the 1953 Federal Supplementary Law, the 1956 Federal

Compensation Law, and the 1965 Federal Compensation Final Law. Between 1959 and

1964 Germany concluded treaties with twelve Western countries to compensate their citizens suffered by the Nazi regime. Those countries were France, Luxembourg,

Norway, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, England, and Sweden. The total sum of these reparations came to approximately one billion

DM. 315 It is estimated that as of December 2001, the German government has paid more than $60 billion to 500,000 Holocaust survivors around the world under the Luxembourg

312 For the detailed discussion of the role of the Claims Conference, see Nana Sagi, German Reparations; Zweig, German Reparations and the Jewish World . 313 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” pp. 39-40. 314 Colonomos and Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews,” pp. 399-40. 315 Wondeog Lee, “Jeonhu Ch ǒri ui Il-Dok Pikyo Y ǒngu: Jeonhu Baesang Bosang ul Joongsim uro [A Comparative Study of Japanese and German Postwar Dealings: Focusing on Postwar Compensation], Kookmin University Social Science Studies , Vol. 15 (2002), p. 561. 120

Agreement, the subsequent federal indemnification laws, and the treaties Germany made with the twelve Western countries. 316

PHASE THREE: THE EARLY 1980s TO THE MID-1990s [IMPENITENCE]

In contrast to the previous phase, societal and political actors raised the issue of forced and slave labor during this period. German government and industry, however, refused to compensate former forced and slave laborers, despite their recognition of moral responsibility.317 As Michael Bazyler posits, the rationale for the German government’s opposition was that it held no obligation to compensate them because the laborers worked for private German industry during the war.318 In a similar vein, German industry was opposed to the compensation scheme, arguing that the postwar German regime, the Third

Reich’s legal successor, should take the responsibility for any payments. Bernd Graef, head of the Volkswagen archives, stated, “From a legal position the crimes of the Nazis were a state crime, and the issue of slave labor compensation must be addressed to the government, but this is recognition of our historical and moral responsibilities.” 319

German firms also contended that, under the Nazi regime’s coercion, they had no choice but to utilize forced and slave laborers to support the German wartime economy.

Such outcomes could be related to the weak activism of societal and political actors engaging in the forced/slave labor issue, who had only began to emerge in the early 1980s. In addition, the conservative government led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl,

316 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , p. 15; Colonomos and Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews,” p. 408. 317 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” pp. 43-44. 318 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice, p. 61. 319 Adam Lebor, “Holocaust slaves set to gain compensation,” The Independent , August 22, 1998. 121

whose central concern was the construction of a powerful national historical identity, had

little to gain from dealing with the compensation issue.

The Weak Activism of Agents at the Peak of Vergangenheitsbewältigung 320

In the early 1980s, German society witnessed the heyday of its memory politics. 321 In

other words, the Nazi past, especially the Holocaust, became one of the central subjects

in West Germany’s public sphere at the time. An important event that triggered this

social phenomenon was the broadcasting of the U.S. miniseries Holocaust in West

Germany in 1979. In seriously dealing with the question of perpetration, the series

portrayed the suffering of European Jewry and explored the everyday life of the

perpetrators. After Holocaust was broadcast, historians focused on the Final Solution and

its implementation throughout Europe, a topic that had tended to be overlooked in the

past. Television executives and filmmakers made enormous efforts to provide accurate

and emotionally engaging depictions of Nazi history. As a result, German prime time

was filled with imported productions, television fiction and documentaries that addressed

the Holocaust and the history of the Third Reich. As Wulf Kansteiner describes it:

In the early 1980s hardly a week went by without another prominently featured reenactment of fascist everyday life. For some younger viewers the simulations of history represented their first confrontation with Nazism, because the past had not been a popular subject of family lore and had also been marginalized in formal education. Occasionally, the shows triggered intergenerational discussions with older family members who had personally experienced Nazism. 322

The so-called history workshop movement also focused public attention to the

history of the Third Reich. A few academic historians and many more hobby historians

320 The phrase Vergangenheitsbewältigung means “overcoming the past.” 321 The following discussion of German memory politics in the 1980s is distilled from Kansteiner, “Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle,” pp. 122-125. 322 Kansteiner, “Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle,” p. 125. 122

launched the workshop movement in the late 1970s by relying on the history of everyday

life as an alternative to approach the history of Nazism in a tangible manner. Through

oral history and microhistory, “a multitude of local history workshops set out to examine everyday life during Fascism and understand what it might have felt like to live in the

Third Reich.” Consequently, the workshops often emphasized the fate of the Holocaust victims and their activities “represented the first attempts to reconstruct the history of local Jewish communities and their destruction by the Nazis.” Although the first postwar generation took this initiative, this movement also prompted intergenerational dialogues through the interviews that high-school students conducted with older citizens about their memories of the Nazi regime.

Into this social environment, there emerged public debate over whether the

German state had not provided Nazi victims with enough indemnification, as opposed to too much indemnification. 323 Particularly, a new debate arose about forgotten groups

(i.e., Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, victims of forced sterilization) that had been

persecuted by the Nazi regime. In a speech delivered on May 8, 1985, the fortieth

anniversary of the German surrender, President Richard Von Weizsäcker also

emphasized the long-neglected victims in his commemorating the six million Jews

murdered in German concentration camps. 324 In this process of rethinking, according to

Niethammer, the German public realized that Polish and Soviet forced laborers had been

stripped of all rights, given new findings made by historians such as Ulrich Herbert. 325

Subsequently, social Democrats and Greens took up this agenda and sought the financial

323 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” pp. 41-42. 324 Lind, Sorry States , p. 134-35. 325 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” p. 42. 123

cooperation of German companies to compensate former forced laborers within the

framework of a general legislative initiative.

The Green Party began to raise the compensation issue in the history workshops

in the early 1980s. 326 Since then, the issue has continued to be part of the small Green

Party’s platform as well as a part of Germany’s public discussions. 327 As a result of their

consistent efforts, the Internal Affairs Committee of the Bundestag looked into the forced

labor question by holding its first hearing on the issue in 1989. Despite this endeavor,

however, the Green Party’s activism failed to overcome the problems they faced in the

legislative process at the time. The end of the Cold War, however, provided a favorable

political environment in which former forced laborers in East European countries could

raise the compensation question for their sufferings by the Nazi persecution. A German

expert on this issue states, “After the fall of the iron curtain, organizations representing

former victims and veteran’s organizations in East European countries began to request

German compensation for their suffering inflicted by the Nazi regime.”328 These groups,

however, were unable to promote issue resonance in the international community, failing

to exert pressure on German government and industry to launch a compensation program

for former forced and slave laborers.

The Conservative Nature of the Kohl Government

As noted earlier, weak activism failed to push the German state to address the issue of

forced and slave labor. In addition, the conservative ideological orientation of the

CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition during this phase also prevented the government from

326 Interview No. 39, Berlin, May 12, 2009. 327 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , pp. 207-08. 328 Interview No. 36, Braunschweig, May 7, 2009. 124

moving forward in dealing with this historical matter. The conservative Kohl

government, whose primary aim was to construct a strong national historical identity, did

not have a stake in seriously addressing the long-forgotten forced and slave labor issue.

Faced with only weak external pressure, it might not have been necessary for the Kohl

government to risk damaging German national historical identity by further exposing its

past wrongs.

According to Stuart Eizenstat, “Chancellor Kohl, who supported health and

pension programs for Jewish Holocaust survivors and property restitution in the former

East Germany after reunification, steadfastly refused to open up German industry and

government to the claims of non-Jewish workers in Eastern Europe.” 329 In the early

1990s, instead of directly resolving the forced labor issue, the reunified German state offered $980 million to Reconciliation Funds in Poland, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and the

Czech Republic for general non-Jewish Nazi victims. From those funds, each victim received DM 700, a negligible amount, even in Eastern Europe. 330 This was just a political gesture that the German state took in order to satisfy the terms of the 1953

London Agreement, which stipulated that reparation issues would be deferred until

Germany concluded a peace treaty.

The Kohl government, which took power in 1982, needed to directly address the contemporary social phenomenon of Germany’s Nazi past emerging as a central topic in the public sphere in the early 1980s. Facing this trend, the Kohl administration designed governmental policies to shape the legacy of the Nazi regime directly and proactively.

The conservative ruling coalition contended that the past should be regarded as an

329 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , pp. 207-08. 330 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” pp. 43-44. 125

opportunity to build up a new and positive German historical consciousness and not just a

limiting factor to be reckoned with. To establish a strong national historical identity,

Chancellor Kohl strove to offer Germans a factually correct yet positive version of their

past. This ambitious campaign spawned a series of public blunders committed by

Chancellor Kohl and his associates:

CDU politician Alfred Dregger urged in 1982 that Germans should come out of Hitler’s shadow. Dregger contended that the German army had not committed or even known about war crimes. He said, responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich lay with Hitler and the Nazi leadership. During a 1984 visit to Israel, Chancellor Helmut Kohl made a statement regarded by many as an attempt to dodge culpability for Germany’s past. Kohl commented that he and his generation enjoyed a grace of late birth, implying that they were innocent and thus not obliged to make amends. 331

Behind this action, “Kohl was convinced that a powerful, conventional national historical identity would enhance political stability and render West Germany more predictable for its citizens, allies, and enemies. He also hoped that his campaign would put West

Germany on an equal political footing with its Western powers.” 332

PHASE FOUR: THE LATE 1990s TO THE MID-2000s [DEEP PENITENCE]

During the fourth phase under study, the German state adopted more apologetic attitudes—sixty years after Nazi-era forced labor began. While issuing explicitly apologetic statements, the state decided to establish the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation (EVZ: Erinnerung, Verantwortung, and Zukunft) in order to compensate Hitler’s forced and slave laborers for their sufferings. In July 2000, the

German Bundestag passed a law establishing the Foundation with a large bi-partisan

331 Lind, Sorry States , p. 132. 332 Kansteiner, “Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle,” p. 126. 126

majority of 556 votes (42 against and 22 abstentions). 333 In its preamble, the law recognized that “the National Socialist State inflicted severe injustice on slave laborers and forced laborers, through deportation, internment, exploitation which in some cases extended to destruction through labor, and through a large number of other human rights violations.” 334 The German government and a consortium of German companies each provided half of the Foundation’s endowment.335 In June 2007, the Foundation completed the compensation of about 1.7 million people (DM 15,000 was awarded to slave laborers and DM 5,000 to forced laborers). 336 On the basis of her interviews, a

German scholar suggests that former forced laborers were largely satisfied with German government’s recognition regarding their sufferings, as opposed to the small amount of compensation money. 337

Concerning the agreement on the level of funding for compensation of the victims of forced labor, German Federal President Johannes Rau stated on December 17, 1999:

This compensation comes too late for all of those who lost their lives back then, just as it is for all those who have died in the intervening years. It is now therefore even more important that all survivors receive, as soon as possible, the humanitarian agreement agreed today. I know that for many it is not really money that matters. What they want is for their suffering to be recognized as suffering and for the injustice done to them to be named injustice. I pay tribute to all those who were subjected to slave and forced labor under German rule and, in the name of the German people, beg forgiveness. We will not forget their suffering. 338

Rau’s successor, President Horst Köhler also reiterated this clear contrite position.

After the completion of compensation payments for Nazi-era forced labor in 2006,

Köhler stated:

333 Dieter Dettke, “Introduction,” in Genevieve Libonati, ed., The German Remembrance Fund and the Issue of Forced and Slave Labor (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2001), p. 1. 334 Jansen and Saathoff, eds., A Mutual Responsibility and A Moral Obligation , p. 174. 335 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” p. 16. 336 Authers, “Making Good Again,” pp. 420-48. 337 Interview No. 38, Berlin, May 12, 2009. 338 Jansen and Saathoff, eds., A Mutual Responsibility and A Moral Obligation , p. 173. 127

Today I can express my own gratitude and relief at the fact that the Foundation has successfully completed the task it set for itself seven years ago. Financial compensation was made to more than 1.66 million surviving victims of the Nazi regime in the course of this program.…There is no way that the wrongs these people suffered in the past can actually be made up for. The victims of these crimes cannot simply be indemnified. But the payments the Foundation made helped to promote public recognition that this wrongdoing was indeed criminal and that responsibility for it needed to be expressed in tangible financial terms. 339

A plausible cause of such significantly improved outcomes in the German state’s

behavior was the Holocaust restitution movement in the United States that had been

ignited by transnational actors such as the World Jewish Congress in the mid-1990s.

Particularly important were a series of class-action lawsuits filed in the U.S. courts

against German companies that made use of forced and slave labor under the Nazi rule.

As Eizenstat notes, “class-action suits permit a few individuals to bring a case on behalf

of hundreds, thousands, or even millions of others who have supposedly suffered similar

injuries and who can recover if the suit is successful, even though they may know nothing

about the case or even about the potential injury.”340 The U.S. government played an

important role in mediating between the German state/companies and victim groups

throughout this process. The progressive SPD-Green Party coalition was also willing to

deal with the issue, as both parties had proactively pursued the resolution of forced and

slave labor issues prior to assuming power. Facing the class-action lawsuits, furthermore,

the coalition government had additional incentives to protect German corporations’

business interests in the international market, particularly in the U.S.

339 Jansen and Saathoff, eds., A Mutual Responsibility and A Moral Obligation , Foreword by President Horst Köhler, p. 11. 340 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , p. 76: According to Eizenstat, “class-action suits are specifically recognized in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by most states of the Union. Class actions are often legal platforms to raise politically sensitive issues.” 128

The Swiss Banks Affair and Its Spillover Effect

The so-called Swiss Banks Affair was an important avenue through which the forced and

slave labor compensation question came to prominence in the mid-1990s. Beginning in

1995, the World Jewish Congress 341 launched a campaign against the largest Swiss

banks, accusing the banks of deliberately retaining money deposited with them by

Holocaust victims on the eve of and during World War II. Many Holocaust survivors and

their heirs testified that Swiss banks improperly made it for them difficult to access the

bank accounts by requesting death certificates (typically non-existent for Holocaust

victims). In the 1996 field hearing by the U.S. Senate Banking Committee in New York,

for instance, “one survivor, Estelle Sapir, famously recounted how an official at the Swiss

bank Credit Suisse had asked for her father’s death certificate. She said: I answered him,

how can I have a death certificate? I have to go find Himmler, Hitler, Eichmann and

Mengele.” 342

This Swiss issue attracted intense attention from the popular media. For instance,

a cover story in Time magazine, “Echoes of the Holocaust,” provided various detailed

stories of how Swiss banks rejected Holocaust victims’ access to their deposited funds. 343

PBS broadcasted a Frontline documentary outlining the allegations against the Swiss, and

A&E’s Investigative Reports devoted a two-hour program to the issue. 344 According to

341 World Jewish Congress: online at http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/about (accessed November 5, 2009); Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , pp. 54-55: The World Jewish Congress (WJC) was founded in Geneva in 1936 to unite the Jewish people and combat the rise of Hitler’s anti-Semitism. Since then, the WJC has addressed the interests and needs of Jews and Jewish communities and grown into a powerful umbrella group for eighty-two organized Jewish communities around the world. As the representative body of Jewish communities in over 80 countries, the WJC’s headquarters are in New York City, USA, and the group has international offices in Brussels, Belgium; Jerusalem, Israel; Paris, France; Moscow, Russia; Buenos Aires, Argentina; and Geneva, Switzerland. 342 Authers, “Making Good Again,” p. 430. 343 Johanna McGeary, “Echoes of the Holocaust,” Time , February 24, 1997. 344 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice, p. 3. 129

Bazyler, a number of books were published alleging that neutral Switzerland had profited

from its financial dealings with the Nazis. The Swiss image was damaged in particular

by the publication of The Swiss, the Gold and the Dead: How Swiss Bankers Helped

Finance the Nazi War Machine written by Swiss sociologist and politician Jean Ziegler in

1997. As a consequence, “Extravagant accusations have savaged the country for more than two years. They have caused a national debate and a crisis of identity. In the newspapers, one often reads nowadays about the end of the Swiss myth,” said Amos Elon in 1998.345

The U.S government also exerted great influence over the Swiss issue. Senator

Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY), who desperately needed political support from his large bloc of Jewish voters, held hearings on the matter before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee in April and October 1996. 346 President Bill Clinton appointed Stuart Eizenstat, then-

undersecretary for international trade at the State Department, to head a special

commission to examine the financial aspects of the Holocaust. This high degree of

political action was made possible thanks to President Clinton’s close links with Edgar

Bronfman, the billionaire president of the WJC and one of his most faithful donors. 347 In

May 1997, Eizenstat issued a report that was highly critical of Switzerland and the other

neutral nations, saying that “they profited handsomely from their economic cooperation

with Nazi Germany, while the Allied nations were sacrificing blood and treasure to fight

345 Amos Elon, “Switzerland’s Lasting Demon,” New York Times Magazine , April 12, 1998. 346 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , p. 13. 347 Authers, “Making Good Again,” p. 431. 130

one of the most powerful forces of evil in the annals of history.” 348 Unsurprisingly, the

Eizenstat report further damaged the image of the Swiss.

Beyond the political pressure from the U.S. government, a series of class-action

lawsuits in the U.S. courts also contributed to the Swiss banks ultimately deciding to

pursue settlement. Listing Gizella Weisshaus as the lead plaintiff, Edward Fagan filed

the first class action lawsuit against the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS), claiming $20

billion in damages, in October 1996. 349 Weisshaus had, in prior attempts, failed to collect

the money deposited by her father in Switzerland before the war because the UBS

demanded documentation, including an account number, which she did not have. With

the support of Holocaust historians, Michael Hausfeld filed another lawsuit on behalf of a

group of survivors just two weeks after Fagan’s. In January 1997, another set of lawyers,

whose claimant was the World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities, filed a third

class action suit against the Swiss banks. For efficiency, these three cases were

eventually “consolidated before one judge, Edward Korman, and collectively titled In re

Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation ” in April 1997. 350 Given this multifaceted pressure,

the Swiss banks agreed to sit at the bargaining table and finally decided to pay US$1.25

billion in restitution to holders of dormant wartime accounts and their heirs in August

1998. 351 As Authers notes, “This sum also included money for those who had done slave

labor in concentration camps for Swiss companies, such as Nestlé.” 352

348 Online at www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocausthp.html (accessed November 7, 2009): U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II,” Preliminary Study, coordinated by Stuart Eizenstat and prepared by William Slany. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, May 1997) 349 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , pp. 6-7. 350 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , pp. 8-11. 351 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , pp. 25-28. 352 Authers, “Making Good Again,” p. 430 131

The Rise of Forced/Slave Labor Compensation Question

The Swiss Banks Affair stimulated the question of compensation for former forced and

slave laborers. While the Swiss bank negotiations were still under way, the same U.S.

class-action lawyers set their sights on a new target—German companies that had

profited from the use of forced and slave labor during the Nazi era. In March 1998,

Weiss and Hausfeld filed the first forced and slave labor class action suit in federal court

in Newark, New Jersey, not against German companies but against the American

automotive giant Ford and its German subsidiary. 353 The suit claimed that the Ford

Motor Company had deliberately accepted considerable economic profits from the use of forced labor during the Nazi rule through its German subsidiary, Ford Werke. Ford

Werke was also accused of having earned huge benefits from its use of forced labor under inhumane conditions to make trucks for the German army. According to the complaint, by 1942 unpaid and forced laborers made up one quarter of the work force used by Ford Werke. By 1943, the proportion had increased to 50% where it remained for the remainder of the war years. The complaint also accused that Ford Werke had collected immense profits by using unpaid, forced laborers—the company’s annual profits had, in fact, doubled by 1943. Its unpaid labor supply during the war made it possible for the company to maintain its economic benefits. 354

The Ford suit served as a catalyst for fifty-six more lawsuits in California, Illinois,

Indiana, New Jersey, and New York, against German and Austrian companies for their use of forced/slave labor during World War II. 355 According to Allan Hill, the fashion designer Hugo Boss faced the accusation that his company used slave labor during

353 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , pp. 208-09. 354 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , p. 63. 355 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , pp. 64-65. 132

wartime to make the uniforms worn by the SS, the Hitler Youth, and the German

Wermacht. 356 Hill also notes that “Europe’s biggest car maker Volkswagen was at the

centre of another Holocaust lawsuit when it emerged that 400 children of slave laborers

employed at its Wolfsburg plant died of neglect and malnutrition.” The German

chemical conglomerate Degussa AG was also accused of “helping the Nazis produce the

gas used in the death camps and assisted in processing gold seized from Jews—including metal yanked from their mouth.” 357

In those lawsuits, the plaintiffs consisted of not only Jewish survivors but also

non-Jews from Eastern Europe. Polish victims of Nazi-era forced labor practices filed a

lawsuit aimed at seeking compensation from German companies having subsidiaries in

the United States that profited from forced labor under the Third Reich. After the end of

the Cold War, the German government provided Polish forced laborers with a small

amount of money (about $280), calling it humanitarian aid—not compensation—through

the German-Polish Reconciliation Foundation. These small payments only served to

provoke Polish victims and led to their filing of a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. “As

long as there was no lawsuit, German companies refused to talk. Our lawsuit is intended

to forced German businesses to talk about out claims,” 358 said Jacek Turczynski, head of

a Polish foundation who helped the plaintiffs. As Beata Pasek reports, “the Polish

survivors filed their own suit because they feared they might be excluded from a possible

settlement between the German companies and victims living in the United States.” 359

356 Allan Hall, “Holocaust survivors sue designer Hugo Boss in slave labour case,” The Scotsman , May 15, 1999. 357 Jeffrey Gold, “Holocaust survivors sue German firm claiming it aided Nazis,” The Associated Press , August 22, 1998. 358 Beata Pasek, “Poles who were Nazi slave laborers still feel victimized,” The Associated Press , April 5, 1999: 359 Pasek, “Poles who were Nazi slave laborers still feel victimized.” 133

As part of their public relations campaign, the class action lawyers heavily

publicized the forced and slave labor issue so that they could exert maximum pressure on

German companies. In the Swiss case, the lawyers shared with the press each document

that historians had unearthed regarding the complicity of European companies in wartime

financial misdeeds. 360 Similarly, the lawyers held press conferences as they filed each new lawsuit. Right after filing a lawsuit against Volkswagen and other German firms in

August 1998, Mel Weiss, one of the class-action lawyers, said at a press conference,

“Make no mistake about forced and slave labor. It was a conspiracy. These companies knew what was going on and they used it to make a profit.” 361 To shame individual

German firms, the lawyers also placed a series of full-page advertisements in the New

York Times after the Germans had put an inadequate offer on the negotiating table. As

Bazyler describes, “For Mercedes-Benz, underneath a logo of the company, the caption ran Design. Performance. Slave Labor . The ad against Bayer featured a large aspirin

with the tag Bayer’s Biggest Headache . The headline for all the ads was the same:

Justice. Compensation. Now .” 362

The Progressive SPD-Green Coalition, Business Interests, and U.S. Intervention

In contrast to the Kohl government, the progressive SPD-Green Party coalition, which

assumed power in October 1998, played an active role in dealing with the issue of

compensation for the victims of Nazi-era forced and slave labor. The ruling SPD-Green

coalition promised in its Coalition Agreement of October 20, 1998 to provide justice for

360 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , p. 7. 361 Chelsea Carter, “Horrors of the Holocaust Haunt Volkswagen,” Birmingham Post , September 2, 1998. 362 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , pp. 66-67. 134

forced and slave laborers. 363 Gerhard Schröder, the newly elected chancellor, stated, “he

was reversing the policy of his predecessor, Helmut Kohl: his government would support

the creation of a national foundation to compensate former slave laborers and others not

covered under existing German reparation law.” 364 Following this promise, Schröder’s

SPD-Green coalition established the “Remembrance, Responsibility, and Future”

Foundation to compensate the surviving victims of forced and slave labor under the Nazi

regime.

An important driving force for the coalition’s actions was the moral imperative

that the two progressive parties had maintained for many years. 365 As noted, the Social

Democrats and Greens had taken an interest in seeking financial cooperation from

German firms in order to compensate former forced laborers within a legal framework

since the 1980s. Despite initially unsuccessful outcomes, they were able to place the

agenda in the political arena while elevating its significance. Given these previous

efforts, it was natural for Social Democrats and Greens to work towards a resolution to

the long-neglected issue when they came to power. Before he took office in October

1998, as Dieter Kastrup notes, Chancellor Schröder had already prompted a group of

German industrial leaders to establish a fund for former forced and slave laborers and had

promised his political support. 366 Eizenstat also notes Schröder’s strong political will:

“He not only pressed German industry to do the right thing but led his own taxpayers to

363 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , p. 206; Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , pp. 345-46. 364 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , p. 62; Dettke, “Introduction,”p. 4. 365 Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” p. 48. 366 Dieter Kastrup, “Forword,” in Genevieve Libonati, ed., The German Remembrance Fund and the Issue of Forced and Slave Labor (Washington, DC: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2001), p. i. 135

contribute another 5 billion DM on top of their massive Holocaust reparations payments,

at a time when he was proposing massive spending cuts in popular social programs.” 367

Another notable motive for establishing such a compensation fund was the need to defend German business interests in the U.S. market. The class-action lawsuits in U.S. courts and associated publicity campaigns seriously damaged the image and interests of

German firms. In the fall of 1998, German industrial leaders expressed their fears regarding the pending suits in a meeting with Chancellor-elect Schröder. According to

Eizenstat, “The auto companies were worried about consumer boycotts, the insurance companies feared that state insurance commissioners would restrict their operations, and

Deutsche Bank that its merger with Bankers Trust would be scuttled by New York authorities in the same way the Swiss UBS-SBC merger had almost been stopped.”368

State and local governments in the U.S. also posed a threat to German firms. As Bazyler notes, “Alan Hevesi, comptroller of New York City and the architect of the sanctions that forced the Swiss banks to settle continued to threaten that state and local governments would impose sanctions on German firms if the slave labor claims were not settled.” 369

Faced with such threats, Chancellor Schröder explicitly expressed the practical considerations for establishing a fund to compensate surviving victims of Nazi-era forced and slave labor. At a press conference announcing the fund proposal ($1.7 billion financed by twelve German companies) in February 1999, the Chancellor stated that a main goal of the fund was “to counter lawsuits, particularly class action suits, and to

367 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , p. 278. 368 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , p. 213. 369 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , p. 78. 136

remove the basis of the campaign being led against German industry and our country.” 370

As Roger Cohen comments, his statement clearly aimed to end the wave of lawsuits

brought in U.S. courts against German companies that had utilized forced and slave

laborers during the Nazi regime. In March 1999, German foreign minister Joschka

Fischer said at the United Nations, “German companies should learn their lesson from the

experience of Swiss banks and should not wait until the pressure of public opinion has

grown so strong that they are forced to face up to their responsibility.” 371

Given these practical considerations, German government and industry continued

to seek settlement for the compensation issue, even though they eventually emerged

victorious in the U.S. courts. In September 1999, a legal bombshell struck the class-

action lawyers and their claimants, who had requested $20 billion in response to the

Germany’s $1.7 billion offer. As Bazyler notes, “two federal judges sitting in New

Jersey issued separate rulings summarily dismissing five slave labor lawsuits filed in the

United States,” including lawsuits against Ford and its German subsidiary Ford Werke

and German companies Degussa and Siemens. 372 This legal victory made the Germans

less fearful of American litigation, but they did not walk away from the negotiation table

in order to prevent further damage to their image.

Another noteworthy aspect of this process is the U.S. role; instead of exerting

direct pressure on Germany, the U.S. government served as a mediator between Germany

and victims during the negotiation process. Such a role for the U.S. government was

quite different from the Swiss case. As shown earlier, the U.S. took active steps to force

370 Roger Cohen, “German Companies Adopt Fund for Slave Laborers under Nazis,” New York Times , February 17, 1999. 371 Sara Silver, “Germany To Push Cos. on Restitution,” Associated Press Online , March 3, 1999. 372 Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , p. 74. 137

the Swiss banks to reach a settlement regarding their financial misdeeds during the Nazi

era. The U.S. held hearings on the Swiss Banks Affair before the U.S. Senate Banking

Committee, organized a commission to thoroughly examine the issue, and issued a report damaging to the Swiss image. Bronfman, the president of the WJC, functioned as an intermediary to enable those U.S. actions by leveraging his political connections to U.S. federal and state officials, particularly President Clinton.

The U.S. intervention in the German case, however, derived from the German government’s official request. J.D. Bindenagel, a high-ranking U.S. government official, clearly expressed that “our involvement in the slave and forced labor issue dates from last autumn, when we were asked by the German government to help facilitate a resolution of the class action lawsuits filed in U.S. courts arising from slave and forced labor during the Nazi era.”373 Facing a series of class-action lawsuits against German companies,

Schroder’s chief of staff, Bodo Hombach asked Stuart Eizenstat, who had been deeply involved in the Swiss negotiations as an undersecretary with the U.S. State Department, to help resolve the lawsuits in December 1998. 374 Given the support of the White House,

Eizenstat accepted Germany’s request and played an active role in achieving a final DM

10 billion settlement following the long and arduous negotiations. Between early 1999

and July 2000, there were three stages of negotiations: (1) reaching DM 10 billion

settlement; (2) how to allocate funds; and (3) all-embracing and lasting legal peace for

373 J.D. Bindenagel, “Holocaust Victims Compensation Programs,” in Genevieve Libonati, ed., The German Remembrance Fund and the Issue of Forced and Slave Labor (Washington, DC: Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung, 2001), p. 35. 374 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , pp. 216-17; Bazyler, Holocaust Justice , p. 62: After he took office in Octoboer 1998, Chancellor Schroder appointed Bodo Hombach to head a joint German government- industry group to design the mechanics of a national foundation to compensate forced/slave laborers. 138

German industry from claims arising from the Nazi era and World War II. 375 As a

German expert posits, the U.S. government did not want to witness the deterioration of

U.S.-German relations that would be caused by the class-action lawsuits. 376 To the U.S.,

Germany was an important economic and security partner. Indeed, Germany was “a

NATO ally responsible for a third of the GDP of Western Europe.” 377

The Absence of German Conservative Reaction

In contrast to the Japanese case, German society did not witness a conservative reaction against the compensation issue for Nazi-era forced and slave labor. As analyzed in

Chapter Three, Japanese conservatives were strongly opposed to their government’s conciliatory gestures toward former comfort women and resisted external pressure from transnational activist groups to redress such historical matters. In contrast, the Germans accepted their government’s decision to compensate former forced and slave laborers without strong resistance. While Chancellor Schröder was afraid that too high a settlement could provoke Germany’s conservative forces, 378 the concern ended up being unmerited. A public opinion study shows that “the majority of Germans supported an aid program for victims of forced and slave labor. 53% of the Germans believed that financial support was justified. 39% were against.” 379 A German scholar, moreover, posited that “conservatives did not directly react to the compensation issue, as there was a kind of consensus that Germany needed to compensate for its past wrongdoings such as

375 For the detailed narrative of the negotiation process, see Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , pp. 217-78; Niethammer, “From Forced Labor in Nazi Germany to the Foundation,” pp. 56-70; Otto Graf Lambsdorff, “The Long Road toward the Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future,” in Andrew Horvat, ed., Sharing the burden of the past (Tokyo: Asia Foundation, 2003), pp. 154-59. 376 Interview No. 36, Braunschweig, May 7, 2009. 377 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , p. 216. 378 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice , p. 255. 379 Dettke, “Introduction: The German Remembrance Fund and the Issue of Forced and Slave Labor,” p. 2. 139

forced labor. They just raised the issue of why the historical problem erupted at this time,

sixty years after World War II.” 380

GERMANY’S DEALINGS WITH THE FORCED PROSTITUTION ISSUE [IMPENITENCE]

Nazi Germany engaged in two kinds of forced prostitution during World War II. Each

branch of the German military, such as the Reichwehr and the Waffen-SS, established a

number of brothels for the troops’ exclusive use in its occupied territories to prevent the

spread of sexually transmitted diseases. As Yoshimi posits, “many of the women who

were drafted in the eastern occupied territories were forced to choose between doing

forced labor and working in a brothel reserved for soldiers.” 381 In addition, the Nazi state

forced female concentration camp inmates into prostitution to provide male slave laborers

with sexual services as production incentives. 382 It has been estimated, therefore, that

during the Nazi regime, at least 34,000 women were forced to work as prostitutes for

German soldiers, officers of other Nazi controlled organizations, and slave laborers in

concentration camps. 383

Since the end of World War II, the German government still has not dealt with the

issue of the Nazi’s forced prostitution. This outcome could be related to the following

two reasons. First, former victims of the sexual slavery remained largely silent because

they “feared being socially stigmatized or discriminated against in their postwar lives as a

380 Interview No. 36, Braunschweig, May 7, 2009. 381 Yoshimi, Comfort Women, p. 189: A historical researcher posits that “by 1942, the number of these facilities had reached five hundred.” 382 Online at http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518, druck-459704,00.html (accessed November 12, 2009): “Nazi sex slaves: new exhibition documents forced prostitution in concentration camps,” Spiegel Online , January 15, 2007. 383 Herbermann, The Blessed Abyss , p. 34. 140

result of their past experiences.” 384 Second, there were no powerful political or societal

groups dedicated to resolving the issue, although some surviving victims publicized their

suffering through a television documentary entitled “Das große Schweigen [Great

Silence]” in 1995. 385 Several women groups, consisting of Koreans, Japanese, and

Germans, formed a network to raise the issue in Berlin, but the network’s activism failed

to develop significant issue resonance in the international community. 386

CONCLUSION

This chapter has analyzed the impact of political and societal actors on the German

state’s behavior in addressing the Nazi’s forced/slave labor and forced prostitution. I

found that societal actors like the WJC and American lawyers played a key role in

leading a transnational movement aimed at compensating former forced/slave laborers

against the German state and industry. In response to this movement, the progressive

SPD-Green Party coalition was willing to deal with the issue, because the two parties

previously had an interest in resolving it. German business interests at stake in the U.S.

also prompted the German government to establish the Foundation, “Remembrance,

Responsibility, and Future.” In addition, the United States served as a mediator that

helped produce an acceptable compensation agreement between Germany and the

victims. The case of the forced prostitution during the Nazi years has not yet had

political or societal groups dedicated to addressing the issue. This may have resulted in

the German state’s indifference regarding the historical matter.

384 Herbermann, The Blessed Abyss , p. 33. 385 Tetsuya Takahashi, translated by Kyusu Lee, Ilbon ŭi Ch ǒnhu Chaekim ul Mutnunda: Kiuk ŭi Chungchi, Manggak ŭi Yunri [Asking for Japan’s War Responsibility: Politics of Memory and Ethics of Forgetting] (Seoul: Yuksa Bipyoung Sa, 2000), p. 194. 386 Takahashi, Ilbon ŭi Ch ǒnhu Chaekim ul Mutnunda , p. 205. 141

Chapter 5 Japan’s Postwar Historical Narrative and Textbook Policy: The Japanese-South Korean Context

Japan’s domestic textbook debates suddenly turned into a serious international issue due to the 1982 history textbook controversy, as discussed in a later section. Following this incident, Japanese historical narrative and textbook policy regarding its Asian neighbors, particularly South Korea, significantly improved but regressed beginning in the late

1990s. What encouraged Japan to take a more penitent stance on history textbooks in the

1980s and 1990s? Why did Japan backslide after taking somewhat penitent attitudes toward the issue? I find that diplomatic pressure from Asian countries, particularly China and South Korea could contribute to positive changes in the Japanese state’s dealings with history textbooks. To diminish the damage of its international reputation, Japan might have taken conciliatory steps such as the enactment of the Neighboring Countries

Clause in addressing the 1982 history textbook controversy. Transnational activism (i.e. textbook dialogue) between Japanese and South Korean historians, launched in the early

1980s, may also have played certain roles in correcting biased Japanese history textbooks. Since the late 1990s, however, this positive trend has been possibly reversed by a systematic revisionist movement led by Japan’s nationalist groups and the conservative LDP despite the rise of strong transnational campaigns regarding history textbooks.

In this chapter, I first outline the negative historical legacies between Japan and

Korea. Following that I concisely present three phases of Japan’s dealings with history textbooks from the year of 1945. I then look into the impact of transnational activism

142 and conservative reaction on Japanese historical narrative and textbook policies in the three phases.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The origin of the historical antagonism between Japan and Korea dates back to the 1592

Japanese invasion of Korea. These Hideyoshi Invasions (1592-1598) burned in the memories of many Koreans for centuries afterwards. In addition, the 1875 Unyo incident, the Japanese use of gunboat diplomacy to force the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa, the anti-

Japanese outbreaks that accompanied the 1882 Imo mutiny, the 1884 Kapsin coup attempt, and the Tonghak Rebellion of the early 1890s all speak to less than peaceful relationship between Japan and Korea. Yet the most significant root of historical enmity stems from Japan’s thirty-six year colonial rule over Korea (1910 to 1945). During this period, Koreans suffered under Japan’s relentless political repression, economic exploitation, attacks against the Korean culture, and infringement on their human rights.387

The expression, “a close but distant country,” became a most apt description of the relationship between Japan and South Korea since the liberation of Korea in 1945.

Both countries were geographically close but were psychologically distant. On the

Korean side, Japan was an object of hatred and anger due to the bitter memories and the legacy of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. On the Japanese side, South Korea was a disdainful counterpart prone to authoritarian political practices, persistently using Japan’s

387 On Japanese colonial rule over Korea, see Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea ; Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea ; Lee, Japan and Korea , pp. 1-3.; Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s , pp. 6-9; Lind, Sorry States , p. 28.

143

past wrongs as a means to gain leverage. 388 As a consequence, Japan and South Korea followed a fluctuating path ranging from chronic antagonism to limited cooperation during the postwar era. Although sixty-five years have passed since Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Japan-ROK relations remain frigid due to distrust and hostility. In particular, many Korean elites still perceive that the unchanged, unapologetic historical consciousness among Japanese political leaders is a major obstacle to successful reconciliation between Japan and South Korea. 389

PERIODIZATION OF JAPAN’S DEALINGS WITH HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Japan’s dealings with history textbooks since 1945 have gone through three phases. The first phase, from 1945 to the late 1970s, was a state of “stalemate” in which conservatives and progressives within Japan had hotly debated the issue of history education. The second phase, from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, was a state of “shallow penitence”: although not a full-fledged transformation, this period witnessed significant progress in amending Japan’s textbook policy and historical narrative regarding Korea. The third phase, from the late 1990s to the late 2000s, consisted of “backsliding.” The Ministry of

Education (MOE) asked publishers to make their textbook content more “balanced” and to reconsider their choice of authors in order to prevent the promotion of a reflective view of history in textbooks. The MOE also continued to authorize the Tsukurukai’s nationalist history textbooks. The reference to comfort women was erased from all seven junior high school history textbooks. The Japanese government also amended the Basic

388 Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism , pp. 10-11. 389 Interview Nos. 3, 5, 14, and 17, Seoul, September 17, 23, and October 7, 2008. 144

Law of Education by inserting a “patriotism clause” that prevents a more cooperative

spirit with neighboring countries.

PHASE ONE: 1945 TO THE LATE 1970s

During the first phase, history education in Japan was a domestic issue that conservatives

(the LDP, the MOE, right-leaning academics and groups) and progressives (teachers and

academics, the Japan Teachers’ Union,390 socialists) had fiercely contested. In an attempt

to address Japan’s war crimes seriously, progressives denied the role of ‘a strong state’ to

control society and individuals, which resulted in disastrous outcomes in the recent past.

On the other hand, conservatives regarded the progressives’ view of history as a

masochistic, and paid greater attention to fostering national consciousness and national

pride through history curricula.391

Following World War II, education reforms, instituted by the Supreme

Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), enabled progressives to carry out peace

education and record their reflective version of history in Japanese school textbooks.

Through issuing a series of directives, SCAP eliminated militarist/ultranationalist

materials from schools and suspended the teaching of moral education and emperor

390 Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan , pp. 86-107: The Japan Teachers’ Union (JTU), founded in June 1947, encompassed more than 80 percent of all teachers. As a radical political interest group, the JTU sought to exert pressure on the Japanese government regarding education as well as domestic and foreign policy problems. For postwar reconstruction, the JTU emphasized the denunciation of the wartime state’s distortion (of Shinto) and outright abuse (of education) for militarist purposes. The JTU was strongly opposed to the MOE’s control over the authorization of school textbooks and strove to mobilize popular pacifism and reflection on the war through peace education. 391 Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy, 1945-2001,” pp. 275-84; Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion, pp. 11-16. 145

idolatry. 392 SCAP also decentralized educational administration to local authorities and established a criterion to fire and hire teachers: “teachers deemed unacceptable were all career military staff, active nationalists, and enemies of the Occupation.”393 Under

American pressure, furthermore, the Japanese Diet in 1947 passed the Fundamental Law of Education, which was considered an educational constitution to replace the 1890

Imperial Rescript on Education. Placing much value on equal opportunity and coeducation, the law stated that “education shall not be subject to improper control, but it shall be directly responsible to the whole people.” 394

As the Occupation came to an end, however, conservatives launched campaigns

against what they viewed biased history textbooks, which were written by left-wing

teachers and academics. 395 For conservatives, the left-leaning textbooks were too liberal

in their stance on descriptions of war or the emperor system. Groups within the LDP and

the Ministry of Education took the leading role in the conservative campaigns with some

support of right-wing groups such as the National Committee for the Protection of Japan

(Nihon Kaigi). These campaigns aimed to reveal the ‘deplorable’ state of textbooks and

strengthen a patriotic tone in history education. In particular, conservatives harshly

criticized peace education curricula and accused the Japan Teachers’ Union of promoting

a Communist agenda. They also succeeded in enacting several laws that granted the

education minister the authority to screen textbooks and limited the political activities of

392 Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 97-98. 393 Lind, Sorry States , pp. 29-30. 394 Quoted in Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” p. 100-01. 395 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the past, looking to the future? (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 55-56. 146 public school teachers. 396 As a consequence, the Ministry of Education regained its control over history textbook content in the 1950s.

Under these circumstances, a Japanese historian Ienaga Saburo’s court challenge brought a new dimension to the struggle. Between 1955 and 1964, Ienaga had to repeatedly revise his textbook ( Shin Nihonshi ), which included descriptions of Japan’s past atrocities, due to the government’s close oversight. Believing that “textbook screening was a form of censorship,” Ienaga first filed a lawsuit against the Japanese government in 1965. During the ensuing decade-long legal fight, Ienaga first won a court battle in 1970 that ruled “state screening of textbooks was unconstitutional (e.g., a violation of freedom of expression and scholarship) and contrary to the Fundamental

Education Law (i.e., a violation of principle protecting education from improper control).” 397 The Tokyo District Court, presided by Chief Justice Sugimoto, placed much weight on citizens’ educational rights and freedom, ruling that the state had gone beyond its authority in the case of Ienaga’s textbook. It thus could be unconstitutional for the

MOE to order a change in educational content, although textbook screening in itself could not be regarded as unconstitutional as long as it only corrected obvious mistakes. 398

The Sugimoto decision of 1970 may have played an important role in changing

Japanese history textbooks. While it had forced nationalist narratives on publishers during the 1960s, the Education Ministry relaxed its standards for textbook screening

396 Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” p. 104 397 Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” p. 107. 398 Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” p. 109: “The minister of education appealed the Sugimoto decision to the Tokyo High Court. Five years later with Chief Justice Azegami presiding, that court dismissed the state’s appeal, while avoiding a direct judgment on the constitutionality of government screening. Although the decision was less clear-cut, Ienaga had won again.” 147

after the Ienaga textbook lawsuits, despite the court’s recognition of the ministry’s right

to officially approve textbooks. 399 Also, newly conducted research regarding Japan’s

past wrongs at the time might have been a great help to textbook authors who desired to

address the darker side of Japanese history. For instance, “in 1971 Honda Katsuichi

began a series of reports in the Asahi newspaper on the Nanjing Massacre and other war

atrocities Japan committed in China, based on his interviews with the survivors and data

gathered in China.” 400

As a result, Ienaga’s revised textbook received the MOE’s approval in 1973,

although it embraced more detailed descriptions of Japan’s aggression against China and

Japanese colonial rule in Korea. School textbooks, furthermore, began to mention other

wartime atrocities, such as Korean and Chinese laborers brought to Japan by force during

the final stage of World War II. Additionally, some history textbooks passed the MOE’s

screening process despite their descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre as follows: “[the

Japanese army] captured Nanjing, took the lives of numerous Chinese civilians

throughout China, and caused enormous damage to their daily lives; Immediately after

entering the city of Nanjing, the Japanese army killed and wounded an enormous number

of Chinese people, including women, children, and soldiers either no longer armed or

wearing civilian clothes.” 401 These changes in Japanese history textbooks were

significant in comparison with the texts published in the 1950s and 1960s.

399 Mitani, “The History Textbook Issue in Japan and East Asia,” p. 85. 400 Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” p. 111. 401 Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” p. 111. 148

PHASE TWO: THE EARLY 1980s TO THE MID-1990s

An Emerging Nationalist Movement in Japan

In response to these textbook changes, Japanese conservatives attempted to regain their control over history education in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Ministry of

Education assigned “Kimigayo” as the national anthem in the 1977 instruction guidelines, despite the absence of legal foundation for the action. The LDP hawks, moreover, moved quickly to address the self-critical textbooks after the LDP secured a majority of seats in both houses in 1980. They argued that Communists instigated most of the textbook revisions following the Sugimoto decision, and sought to regain control over textbook content through stricter legislation. In 1980, the Science and Technology Agency (STA) also took part in attacking civics textbooks for stressing the negative aspects of atomic power and for elevating public misgivings about its safety. 402

The 1982 history textbook controversy, however, erupted primarily due to the media report that Japanese government had strengthened its control over education and striven to dilute the depiction of Japan’s wartime atrocities. 403 As Terri Seddon illustrates, “Japan’s expansion into Manchuria in the 1930s was described as an

‘advance’ where it had been previously termed an ‘invasion’, and Japanese atrocities in

Korea in 1919 and Manchuria were described as responses to local resistance.” 404 A central point of these reports, however, was that the Ministry of Education had requested

402 Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” pp. 112-13. 403 Irie Yoshimasa, “The History of the Textbook Controversy” in Edward R. Beauchamp, ed., Education and Schooling in Japan since 1945 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), p. 67. 404 Terri Seddon, “Politics and Curriculum: A Case Study of the Japanese History Textbook Dispute, 1982” British Journal of Sociology of Education , Vol. 8, No. 2, 1987, p. 216. 149

the replacement of the term “aggression” (shinryaku) with “advancement” (shinshutsu) in

proposed history textbooks.

Upon being reported abroad, the stories triggered strong international criticism,

particularly in East and Southeast Asia. In July 1982, the Chinese and South Korean

governments made official protests, accusing the MOE of having distorted the historical

facts of Japanese militarism. In particular, the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that

Japan’s rewriting of history in school textbooks violated “the spirit of the 1972 Sino-

Japanese joint statement” and then summoned Minister Watanabe Koji of the Japanese

Embassy in Beijing to convey their objections. 405 The official party newspaper of North

Korea and the Vietnamese government also censured the Japanese government regarding the issue and demanded the correction of distorted textbook accounts. 406 And thus the history textbook problem, which had long been a domestic issue between leftists and rightists in Japan, took on an international dimension.

Given this international pressure, the Japanese government was anxious to resolve the textbook controversy quickly in order to mitigate diplomatic damage. An important backdrop to the controversy was Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko’s scheduled visit to China in autumn 1982 marking the tenth anniversary of restored diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Beijing. 407 Consequently, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi

(of the Suzuki government) issued a statement in August aimed at defusing the textbook controversy that had serious implications for Japanese relations with China and South

Korea. Miyazawa stated that “Japan would pay full heed to this criticism in promoting

405 “Criticism Mounts over Rewriting History in Textbooks” Kyodo Wire Service, July 28, 1982, in FBIS Japan. 406 Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy,” pp. 284-85. 407 Yoshimasa, “The History of the Textbook Controversy,” p. 68. 150

friendship and goodwill with the nearby countries of Asia, and the government will

undertake on its own responsibility to make the necessary amendments.” 408 In keeping with Miyazawa’s comments, the Ministry of Education announced the revision of the textbook review standards, including a new requirement—i.e. the ‘Neighboring Countries

Clause’—that “textbooks should consider modern historical relations between Japan and

Asia from the perspective of international friendship and cooperation.”409

The 1982 textbook controversy was assuaged at that point largely because the

Korean government, led by authoritarian leader Chun Doo-hwan, basically accepted this promise. 410 Korea’s easy acceptance was partly due to its ongoing loan negotiations with

Japan. Given the need to finance its Fifth Five Year Socio-economic Plan (1982-86), the

Chun regime had asked Japan for a $6 billion government loan in a lump sum, plus another $4 billion in private loans in 1981.411 The basic logic of the loan request was that the economic development of South Korea would serve as a means of establishing a

‘bulwark’ against communism, thereby helping to defend Japan. 412 The Japanese government was strongly opposed to Korea’s loan request for political and practical reasons. 413 Despite these gaps, the two sides slowly moved toward compromise. The loan issue, however, stalled due to the rise of the history textbook problem during the summer of 1982. Since it did not wish to lose the huge financial support from Japan, the

408 “Miyazawa Issues Statement on Textbook Issue” Kyodo Wire Service, August 26, 1982, in FBIS Japan. 409 Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” p. 114. 410 Nozaki and Inokuchi, “Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburo’s Textbook Lawsuits,” p. 125. 411 Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s , p. 14. 412 Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s , p. 15. 413 Isa Ducke, Status Power: Japanese Foreign Policy Making toward Korea , (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), p. 88: The first reason was that economic support connected with security issues was not possible in terms of the Japanese constitution. Second, Japan could not approve a lump sum government loan on political grounds because Japan’s economic assistance procedure called for the consideration of requests for individual development projects and their approval on a case-by-case basis. Third, $6 billion exceedingly went beyond the possible amount available for economic assistance to South Korea 151

Chun regime avoided taking a stronger stance against Japan in the final stage of the loan negotiations.

The Emergence of Type II Transnational Activism

At the time, societal actors in South Korea had difficulty in actively addressing the issue of Japanese history textbooks because they were under the tight authoritarian rule. The

1982 textbook controversy, however, served as a catalyst for initiating a conversation about the shared history between Japan and South Korea on the societal level. 414 Due to

these textbook problems, citizens and historians in the two neighboring countries came to

pay greater attention to their own and each other’s historical consciousness

simultaneously. As a result, textbook authors and historians sought to introduce a

bilateral history conversation modeled on the German-Polish history dialogue and began

to consider the possibility of launching a similar history conversation between Japan and

the ROK in the future.

In 1982-1983, Bando Hiroshi and Moon Kisang published articles that explained

the establishment of the German-Polish history dialogue and its twenty-six

recommendations in the journals ‘History Review’ ( Rekishi Hyoron ) and ‘History

Education’ (Yǒksa Kyoyuk ) respectively. 415 In September 1982, some textbook authors

including Nishigawa Masao formed an organization—the Association for Social Studies

414 Jaejeong Jeong, “Hanil Yoksa Daehwa ui Gudo [Framework of Korea-Japan History Conversation]” in Youngjak Kim and Wondeog Lee, eds., Ilbon un Hankuk ege Mueos inga [What is Japan to Korea?] (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2006), p. 93: In 1976, Korean historians and history educators invited their Japanese counterparts to begin a history conversation to re-appraise the historical meaning of the Chosun (Korean dynasty before Japanese colonial rule)-Japan friendship trade treaty concluded in 1876. But the event did not continue. 415 Jubaek Shin, “Hanil gan Ryoksa Daehwa ui Mosaek kwa Hyupryok Model Chaki, 1982-1993 [Finding a Dialogue on History between Korea and Japan and its Partnership Model]” in Jubaek Shin, ed., Dong Asia eseo Y ǒksa Insik ui Kukkyung Neomki [Crossing the Border of Historical Understanding in East Asia], (Seoul: Asia Peace and History Education Research Association, 2008), pp. 16-32. 152

Textbook Authors (Shakaika Kyokasho Shipichusha Kondankai)—to oppose MOE

pressure and analyze the meaning of the German-Polish history dialogue and associated

changes to the German textbook system. Another important organization was the

Research Association of Comparative History and Education (Hikaku Rekishi Kyouiku

Kenkyukai), which committed to hosting an international symposium every five years to

discuss history textbook problems in East Asian countries.

Not until the late 1980s, however, did Korean and Japanese scholars actually

commence the first practical history textbook dialogue with the formation of the Japan-

South Korea Joint Study Group on History Textbooks. The idea of creating the

organization originated in 1989 with South Korean historian Lee Taeyoung and Japanese

professor Fujisawa Hoei. During his research in Germany, Lee came to realize the

necessity of a history textbook dialogue between Japan and South Korea after reading

Fujisawa’s book titled Doitsu-jin no Rekishi Ishiki—Kyokasho ni miru Senso Sekinin

(German Awareness of History: Responsibility for War as Represented in Textbooks).416

In his book, Fujisawa presented in depth that Germany had engaged in bilateral

consultations with various nations such as Poland that had been victimized by the Nazis

via international textbook dialogue. Upon returning to Korea, Lee suggested the launch

of a Korea-Japan joint textbook research project following the German-Polish model and

Fujisawa finally agreed to accept the proposal in summer 1990. To prepare for the

project, Lee and Fujisawa respectively established the Korea International Textbook

Research Institute (Kukche Kyokwas ǒ Yonguso) and the Japan-Korea History Textbook

Research Association (Nikkan Rekishi Kyokasho Kenkyukai).

416 Shin, “Hanil gan Ryoksa Daehwa ui Mosaek kwa Hyupryok Model Chaki, 1982-1993,” p. 33. 153

The Japan-Korea Joint Study Group, which had no direct involvement with either the Korean or Japanese government, held four international meetings, twice in each country, between the spring of 1991 and the fall of 1992. 417 Open to the public, each meeting attracted approximately 100 people and discussed key historical controversies regarding modern Japan-Korea relations (1876-1945) as recorded in Japanese high school history textbooks. The most significant contribution of the study group was to provide the first opportunity to assess Japanese high school history textbooks from both Japanese and Korean perspectives. The group also served as a channel for establishing cooperation on history textbook research between the two nations. The Study Group did not continue, however, primarily due to the lack of financial support. The group was disbanded in

March 1993 after publishing a detailed report of its discussions, titled Kyokasho o Nikkan kyoryoku de kangaeru (Thinking about textbooks with South Korean-Japanese cooperation ). 418

The study group revealed the wide gap between the historical consciousnesses of

Korean and Japanese scholars, although they generally agreed that the history of Japan-

Korea relations was primarily one of Japanese aggression and Korean resistance. One of the most significant differences arose over how to define the scope of Japan’s twentieth- century wars and how to recognize responsibility for said wars. Japan’s progressive scholars, for instance, identified the “Asian theater of World War II as the Fifteen Years’

War.” They regarded the war as a series of wars that began with the Japanese invasion of the northeastern China (Manchuria) in 1931 and ended with the Japanese surrender to the

417 Kazuhiko Kimijima, “The Continuing of Japanese Colonialism: The Japan-South Korea Joint Study Group on History Textbooks” in Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 203-04. 418 Shin, “Hanil gan Ryoksa Daehwa ui Mosaek kwa Hyupryok Model Chaki, 1982-1993,” pp. 38-39. 154

Allied Powers in 1945. 419 Criticizing the concept of the Fifteen Years War as

discounting Japan’s colonization of Korea, Korean scholars viewed the war as either a

fifty-year war beginning with the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) or a forty-year war

beginning with the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).

Japanese Historical Narrative and Textbook Policy: Shallow Penitence

During this second phase, the most notable change in Japan’s textbook policy was the

adoption of the Neighboring Countries Clause, a result of the 1982 textbook controversy.

The MOE also demanded that textbook authors not replace the term “aggression” with

“advance” and only requested that citations be offered when referring to the number of

victims of the Nanjing Massacre. 420 These policy changes affected, to some extent, the

historical narrative in Japanese history textbooks. They might have played a key role in

leading authors to write about Japan’s past wrongs from the victims’ perspective. For

instance, an editorial staff member at publisher Osaka Shoseki said:

For several years before the official protest from the Chinese government to the Japanese government in 1982, textbooks reviewed by the Education Ministry frequently came back with the recommendation that advance be used instead of invasion . Our company hadn’t used invasion in its textbooks from the start. After the Asian Neighbors Clause was added and the contents of the school course guidelines were revised, however, we started using invasion ourselves. 421

Yoshiko Nozaki provides more detailed examples:

Descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre in textbooks continued to become more commonplace, more detailed, and more explicit. Textbooks referring to the number of Nanjing Massacre victims as exceeding two hundred thousand (the number of victims is one of the most controversial issues relating to the massacre) passed the textbook screening. All of the 1984 editions of junior high history textbooks, all 1985 editions of high school Japanese history textbooks,

419 Kimijima, “The Continuing of Japanese Colonialism,” pp. 208-09. 420 Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy,” p. 286. 421 Yoshimasa, “The History of the Textbook Controversy,” p. 4. 155

and six out of seven of the 1986 editions of elementary school social studies textbooks included some description of the Nanjing Massacre. 422

Running counter to this progress, however, in 1986 the MOE approved the first

nationalist textbook in postwar Japan, Shinpen Nihonshi (A New History of Japan ),

written by one of Japan’s primary nationalist groups, the National Conference to Defend

Japan (Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi, established in 1981). 423 The organization ultimately aimed to revise Japan’s 1946 Peace Constitution, which stationed Japan to a pacifist role in international relations and prohibited her from keeping her own armed forces. After criticizing Japan’s apology for its textbooks, which it saw as a diplomatic humiliation, the nationalist group began to develop its own history textbook for high school students in the spring of 1984 and submitted it to the MOE in the summer of 1985.

Although it underwent a series of revisions following the MOE’s instructions, the nationalist history textbook finally passed the 1985-86 screening process due mainly to political pressure. At the time, Prime Minister Nakasone supported the organization’s textbook implicitly, given his strong desire to reconstruct a Japanese identity through a nationalist reform of education. 424

Although not a full-fledged transformation, the late stage of the second phase witnessed significant progress in amending Japan’s textbook policy and historical narrative in textbooks. With the adoption of the Neighboring Countries Clause, the activities of the Japan-South Korea History Textbook Research Group between 1991 and

422 Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy,” p. 287-88: Nozaki adds that “The late 1980s and early 1990s saw continuing improvement in the content of Japanese history textbooks. This did not mean that the MOE halted its censorship or abandoned its nationalistic bias. For example, it strongly pressed local schools to implement nationalistic policies, including the hoisting of the Hinomaru flag and the singing of the Kimigayo anthem at school ceremonies.” 423 Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations , pp. 56-57. 424 Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy,” pp. 288-89. 156

1993 may have had a positive impact on the content of Japanese history textbooks, as

many Japanese textbook authors were the Research Group’s members. 425

A Korean historian Jeong Jaejung highlights three notable changes in Japanese

history textbooks during this period.426 First, compared to their previous editions, new textbooks largely increased descriptions of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. Most textbooks added the content of forced conscription/labor/prostitution, harsh Japanese assimilation policies, and Korean resistance movement toward Japanese colonialism.

Second, the textbooks increasingly dealt with current affairs of the Korea-Japan relationship from a historical perspective. For example, they addressed the issues of forced mobilization and A-bomb victims in the context of postwar compensation as well as the discrimination problem of ethnic Koreans in Japan in the context of human rights.

This attempt corresponded well with the ultimate goal of history studies that fostered an ability to help resolving current historical issues. Third, the new textbooks introduced humanitarian thoughts and actions of some Japanese figures, including Ishibashi Tanzan who had remained critical to Japan’s invasion of Korea and its colonialism. As Jung posits, this aimed to encourage young generations (who studied history) to pay close attention to improving Japan-Korea relations with courage and hope.

Lind provides many other examples that track the improvement of Japanese history textbooks, which detailed Japan’s atrocities during its colonial rule over Korea:

Some books detail policies during the Korean occupation; a junior high school text reports, Japan was to rule Korea by military force as a colony, inflicting indescribable suffering on the Korean people. The text Osaka Shoseki says, the new government stationed Japanese troops and police throughout the peninsula

425 Toshiki Sakai, “International Exchange on Textbooks in Japan: An Interim Report” in Andrew Horvat, ed., Sharing the burden of the past (Tokyo: Asia Foundation, 2003), p. 102. 426 Jaejung Jeong, “Hanil Y ǒksa Daehwa ui Gudo [The Composition of Korea-Japan History Dialogue],” in Youngjak Kim and Wondeog Lee, ed., Ilbon eun Hanguk ege Mueot inga [What is Japan to Korea] (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2006), pp. 80-82. 157

to suppress the resistance. In schools Korean children were forced to learn Japanese language and history. Another text comments that through such policies Japan sought to deprive Koreans of their ethnic awareness and pride. One textbook features a sidebar about a Korean slave laborer’s experience, and concludes, violence [against the workers], together with accidents and malnutrition, led to the death of an astonishing 60,000 people out of the approximately 700,000 Koreans brought forcibly to Japan. 427

Particularly, admitting its forceful recruitment of comfort women, the Japanese government ensured in the 1993 Kono statement that “we hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history .” 428 Given this declaration, textbook

authors were justified in addressing comfort women issues in their textbooks. The issue

of comfort women, consequently, was addressed in all twenty-two Japanese history

textbooks approved for use in high schools save the first nationalist textbook Shinpen

Nihonshi . All of them received MOE approval in the textbook screenings of 1992-93 and

1993-94. All seven middle school textbooks including references to comfort women

were also authorized in the MOE’s screening of 1995-96. In addition other social studies

textbooks, such as geography and world history, addressed comfort women by 1997. 429

For example, a footnote in one text says: “Not a few Korean women were also taken

forcibly to China and elsewhere to serve as comfort women.” A footnote in another text

reads: “Conscription systems were put into effect in Korea and Taiwan under which

Koreans and Taiwanese were sent off to the battlefield. Some of their women too were

427 Lind, Sorry States , p. 71. 428 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html (accessed April 25, 2009) 429 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 141: A middle school textbook at the time included the following paragraph: “In colonized Taiwan and Korea, the compulsory draft was implemented. There were also women who were forced to accompany the military to the front as comfort women. Because the labor force inside the country [Japan] was limited, approximately 700,000 people from Korea and 40,000 from China were taken by force and made to work in places such as coal mines.” 158 obliged to work in comfort stations for troops in the battle zone.” 430 In reality, nevertheless, there was no detailed descriptions and discussion about the atrocities of the military comfort women system in the textbooks.

PHASE THREE: THE MID-1990s TO THE LATE 2000s

The Weak Net Power of Transnational Activism

A Systematic Revisionist Movement in Japan

The mid-1990s witnessed the emergence of a revisionist history movement that aimed to push back what conservatives deemed to be a masochistic (i.e. self-critical) view of

Japanese history and to foster national pride and citizens’ allegiance to the state. 431 This revisionist movement differed from previous conservative campaigns in the sense that conservative NGOs, media outlets, and politicians closely collaborated to achieve the noted common goals. The main trigger for this revisionist campaign, as a Japanese civil activist notes, was the inclusion of references to comfort women in Japanese middle and high school textbooks in the mid-1990s.432 Soh confirms this aspect by stating “the mention of comfort women in new history textbooks for the middle school, which reflects one of the United Nations’ recommendations, sparked a strong wave of masculinist neonationalism across the country in 1996.” 433 According to Japanese scholars, the

1990s provided a structural environment in which a revisionist history movement emerged and strengthened in Japan: conservatives and nationalists wanted to restore national pride in historical consciousness given the weakening of Japanese confidence

430 Quoted in Lind, “Sorry States,” p. 103. 431 Sangil Han, “Ilbon Sahoi ui Wookyunghwa: Ryoksa Suchungjuui rul Chungsimuro [Moving toward the Right in Japanese Society: Focusing on Historical Revisionism]” in Hosub Kim, ed., Ilbon Wooik Yongu (Seoul: Chungshim, 2000), pp. 236-37; Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , p. 25. 432 Interview No. 15, Seoul, October 7, 2008. 433 Soh, The Comfort Women , p. 66. 159

produced by its long economic recession, the rise of China, and the diminishing power

gap between Japan and South Korea. 434

A number of conservative societal groups in Japan participated in the history

revisionist movement. 435 Among those organizations, the Showasha Research Institute

(SRI)—led by Nakamura Akira—played an active role in promoting the neo-nationalist

movement, as Han Sangil notes. In February 1996, Nakamura established the Research

Institute in order to decline the self-critical view of history and promote national pride in

Japanese history education. The SRI regularly held seminars for young people aimed at

informing the truth of Japan’s contemporary history and at awakening national

consciousness among them. The SRI also arranged popular meetings and demonstrations

to request the revision of self-critical history textbooks. Another activity conducted by

the SRI was to send the LDP ‘a request for textbook revision’ to the effect that school

textbooks based on a masochistic view of history were not appropriate to foster the youth

who would lead Japan in the next generation. The SRI, furthermore, launched a

campaign to urge local councils to adopt the resolution that demanded the elimination of

descriptions of comfort women and Nanjing Massacre in history textbooks. This

campaign was supported by other nationalist organizations, including the Association for

Japanese Public Opinion and the Youth Association to Request Textbook Revision.

Fujioka Nobukatsu, an education professor at the University of Tokyo, was a

central figure in invigorating the neo-nationalist campaign in the public arena. Although

he had originally been part of the progressive camp, he converted to the right after

434 Interview Nos. 21 and 22, Tokyo, October 16 and 17, 2008. 435 Han, “Ilbon Sahoi ui Wookyunghwa: Ryoksa Suchungjuui rul Chungsimuro,” pp. 242-44: Han introduces many societal groups that had taken part in the history revisionist campaign, including the Association for Japanese Future, the Council of Young Japanese People, the Association to Protect Japan, National Education Council, the Nihon Kaigi, and the Tsukurukai. 160 returning from a year of studying in the United States in 1992. During that year, he experienced a sense of humiliation at the sight of the Japan’s response to the Gulf War.

Deeply impacted by several books, such as Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars and

Richard Minear’s Victor’s Justice , Fujioka perceived Japan’s will to protect its security to be lacking and came to consider the “Greater East Asian War” as “a just war.” 436 He also held the view that the postwar Japanese peace constitution presented an obstacle preventing the emergence of a proper Japanese sense of nationalism.

Given his suddenly transformed perspective, Fujioka actively sought to promote the new nationalist movement among the public. He published many articles in education-related journals such as Shakaika Kyoiku, most of which criticized Japan’s postwar history education and textbooks for their masochistic view and the lack of national pride. 437 To launch a more systematic campaign, he organized the “Research

Association of Liberal Historical Perspectives” (Jiyushugi Shikan Kenkyukai) in early

1995. The primary reason for founding the organization was to remove the descriptions of Japan’s past wrongs, including comfort women, Unit 731, and the Nanjing Massacre, that had been published in the 1994 history textbooks. 438 Over the course of the year in the newspaper Sankei Shimbun , the Research Association issued a series of articles titled

“What the school textbooks do not teach (Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi),” that played a pivotal role in popularizing the neo-nationalist movement for re-appraising Japanese history. 439 Additionally, the Association held a variety of symposia and conferences to criticize current history education and request the revision of history textbooks.

436 McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to Correct History,” pp. 63-65. 437 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, 1945-2007 , p. 143. 438 Kim, “Myths, Milieu, and Facts,” p. 103. 439 Han, “Ilbon Sahoi ui Wookyunghwa: Ryoksa Suchungjuui rul Chungsimuro,” pp. 222-23. 161

At the center of the history revisionist movement, however, was the Japanese

Society for Composing New History Textbooks (Tsukurukai). The Tsukurukai was

established in late 1996 by Fujioka and his colleagues including the German literature

scholar Nishio Kanji. Nishio states, “Why should Japan be the only country that should

teach 12- to 15-year-old kids bad things about itself? I think it is ridiculous, and very sad

and tragic that Japan cannot write its own patriotic history.” 440 Unlike other societal groups, the Tsukurukai boasted a significant membership (peaking at 10,000 in 1999) and received strong support from a wide array of prominent figures in Japanese society, including scholars, columnists, art historians, businessmen and many politicians.

Particularly notable was the group’s political support from LDP Diet members. Publicly aligning himself with the Tsukurukai, for instance, former Minister of Education

Machimura Nobutaka declared in 1998 that Japanese history textbooks were “lacking in balance and over-emphasizing Japan’s responsibility for the war.” 441 The Tsukurukai was also able to obtain a wider societal influence on account of strong support from

Japan’s nationalist media, including the Fuji Television Network and the Sankei

Shimbun . As discussed later, furthermore, the Tsukurukai remained at the heart of history textbook controversies with neighboring Asian nations due to the publication of its biased school textbooks.

The Tsukurukai’s primary goals were 1) to re-appraise Japanese history along conservative and nationalistic lines; 2) to delete all reference to comfort women from history texts; and 3) to ultimately produce and disseminate a new history textbook for

440 Howard W. French, “Japan’s Resurgent Far Right Tinkers with History,” New York Times , March 25, 2001. 441 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , pp. 80-81. 162

Japanese junior high schools. 442 Given these objectives, the Tsukurukai conducted a

variety of activities, including around 150 symposia, conferences, and lectures annually,

some of which attracted up to 1,500 participants. Following its inaugural symposium in

March 1997, the Tsukurukai issued its first publication, featuring articles written by its

central figures that forwarded a historical narrative highlighting national pride and

demanded the removal of comfort women-related content from junior high school texts.

The organization and its members also published many other books criticizing postwar

history education and supporting historical revisionism, some of which became

bestsellers. Between 2000 and 2001, the Tsukurukai drafted a new history textbook for

junior high schools, submitted it to the MOE for examination, and eventually received

MOE’s approval.443

Slightly Weakened but Persistent Neo-Nationalist Movement

The Tsukurukai suffered a decrease in its power after its defeat in the 2001 textbook

adoption fight. It was reported that its membership decreased by 30 percent, dropping

from above 10,000 in 2001 to 7,840 in 2004. 444 This decrease was also partly due to the

secession of some executives that held anti-American views in 2002. Particularly notable

among them was Kobayashi Yoshinori, one of the Tsukurukai’s founding members and

famous for his manga. In 1998, Kobayashi published a book titled On War (Senso-ron ),

which was a collection of manga from his regular series in the biweekly journal Sapio

442 McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to Correct History,”pp. 56-57; Han, “Ilbon Sahoi ui Wookyunghwa: Ryoksa Suchungjuui rul Chungsimuro,” pp. 226-28. 443 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , pp. 41-42. 444 Takeshi Fujinaga, “Ilbon Sahoe wa Saey ǒkmo Kyokwas ǒ rul dul ǒssan Nonui [Japanese Society and the Debate of Tsukurukai’s Textbook]” in APHEN, ed., Yǒksa Insik ul dul ǒssan Jahwasang, Oibu ui Sis ǒn (Seoul: APHEN, 2008), p. 30. 163

that later became a famous bestseller. This book’s content was all about war and showed

a generally positive posture toward Japan’s past wars and wars in general. His

withdrawal, therefore, significantly impacted Tsukurukai’s influence over its younger

members, as his manga had been popular.445

Despite these diminishing circumstances, however, the Tsukurukai sought to gain

the support from nationalist groups and LDP hawks in order to increase its textbook

adoption rate for 2005. 446 One of the most supportive nationalist organizations was the

Japan Conference (Nihon Kaigi), which has struggled to revise the war-renouncing

Article 9 of the Constitution. Having reflected upon their mistakes in 2001, the LDP

hawks in 2005 strongly supported the activities of the Tsukurukai. A partial reason for

the LDP’s strong support was that the revised 2005 Tsukurukai textbook held a more pro-

American tone because anti-American figures like Kobayashi had seceded from the

organization. 447 This provided a favorable environment in which the LDP hawks—who

usually hold a pro-American inclination—could support the Tsukurukai’s textbook

campaigns.

In June 2004, Abe Shinzo, then-chief secretary of the LDP, emphasized in an

official letter that history education was an important national task closely related to the

revisions of the Education Fundamental Law and the Constitution. Thus both central and

local governments should pay great attention to furthering the adoption of the

445 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , pp. 31-33: “With his provoking mix of graphics and hard- hitting text, Kobayashi sets out to cure the young generation of Japanese of their passivity and to change social attitudes from what he sees as rampant individualism to an emphasis on the common good, with loyalty to the state taking first place.” 446 Yoshifumi Tawara, “Saey ǒkmo Kyokwaso Chaetaek ul dull ǒssan Sanghwang kwa J ǒji Hwaltong ǔi Hyunsang kwa Ch ǒnmang [Situation of the Tsukurukai textbooks’ adoption and prediction of non-adoption campaigns], APHEN, ed., Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Seungli: 2005 Kyokwas ǒ Undong Paeks ǒ, p. 119. 447 Fujinaga, “Ilbon Sahoe wa Saey ǒkmo Kyokwas ǒ rul dul ǒssan Nonui,” p. 30. 164

Tsukurukai’s textbooks. Kawamura Takeo, an education minister at the time, also issued

a statement that advocated the new Tsukurukai history textbooks in a symposium

sponsored by the Tsukurukai and the LDP. Kawamura praised the textbooks for

preventing Japanese youth from losing their national pride. 448 In the 2005 party convention, the LDP also put the first priority on the revision of the Education

Fundamental Law and the adjustment of biased history textbooks. During the May 2005 textbook adoption process, local LDP organizations often held a series of meetings to support the adoption of the Tsukurukai’s textbooks. Even Prime Minister Koizumi buttressed the Tsukurukai by appointing its supporters like Nakayama Nariaki and

Machimura Nobutaka education and foreign ministers respectively. 449

It is important to note that during this third period, the neo-nationalist movement— primarily led by the LDP, the Tsukurukai, and the Nihon Kaigi—focused on the history textbook problem and the revision of the Basic Law of Education at the same time. Nationalist forces contended that if a revised the Basic Law of Education included patriotism and respect for history and tradition, they could change the content of other history/civics textbooks into one similar with the Tsukurukai’s texts. They believed that even if they managed to push the Tsukurukai texts adoption rates above 10 percent, they could not foster within people the willingness to sacrifice their lives if the other 90 percent of textbooks still presented a self-critical and masochistic view of history. 450 So,

448 Yoshifumi Tawara, “Saey ǒkmo ui Choikun Donghwang [Recent Stream of the Tsukurukai]” in Hanil Yondae 21, ed., Hanil Yoksa Insik Nonjaeng ui Metahistory [Meta History in the Debate of Korea-Japan Historical Consciousness], (Seoul: Puri wa Ipari, 2008), pp. 92-94. 449 Tawara, “Saey ǒkmo Kyokwas ǒ Chaetaek ul dull ǒssan Sanghwang kwa J ǒji Hwaltong ǔi Hyunsang kwa Ch ǒnmang,” p. 119. 450 Tawara, “Saey ǒkmo Kyokwas ǒ Chaetaek ul dull ǒssan Sanghwang kwa J ǒji Hwaltong ǔi Hyunsang kwa Ch ǒnmang,” pp. 119-20; Takashima Nobuyoshi, “2005 Y ǒndo Fushosa Kyokwas ǒ Chaetaek kwa Hwanghu Banghwang [Adoption of 2005 Fushosa Textbooks and Its Future Direction], APHEN, ed., Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Seungli: 2005 Kyokwas ǒ Undong Paeks ǒ, p. 230. 165 for the neo-nationalist forces, history textbook issues were closely related to the revision of the education law. Since the late 1990s, the LDP hawks had been attempting to revise the education law in collaboration with nationalist groups including the Nihon Kaigi and the Society for the Demand for a New Basic Law of Education, whose membership was almost identical to the Tsukurukai. 451

The Strengthening of Type I and II Transnational Activism

This third phase witnessed the strengthening of both Type 1 and Type II transnational activism regarding history textbooks. First, the expansion of educational exchanges between Japan and South Korea was a notable phenomenon. While only researchers had participated in the previous history dialogue, after 1995 both teachers and students began to take part in joint projects between the two countries. For instance, South Korea’s

National Assembly of History Teachers and Japan’s Association of History Educators exchanged reports on classroom activities. Student-level associations between South

Korea’s Rowan Middle School and Japan’s Joetsu Kyoiku Daigaku Fuzoku Middle

School, and between University of Seoul and Hiroshima Women’s college also emerged.452 Despite having been disbanded in 1993, Japanese members of the Japan-

Korea Joint Study Group continued to organize individual study groups with South

Korean historians and teachers. In 1995 a study group, led by Chung Jae-Jeong and

Kimijima Kazuhiko, published a travel guidebook for high school and college students, which dealt with the modern and contemporary history of South Korea ( Ryoko gaido ni

451 For further discussion of nationalist movement regarding the revision of the Education Law, see Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , pp. 84-89: Saaler argues that the ultimate goal of the nationalist forces is to revise the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution. 452 Jaejeong Jeong, “South Korea-Japan History Reconciliation: A Progress Report” in Andrew Horvat, ed., Sharing the burden of the past (Tokyo: Asia Foundation, 2003), p. 108. 166 nai Ajia o aruku: Kankoku —Walking in the Asia not found in travel guides: South

Korea ). 453

Particularly significant was a joint research program, initiated in late 1997, between the History Textbook Research Association of Seoul City University and the

History Education Research Association of Tokyo Gakugei University. 454 As Sakai

Toshiki notes, the creation of the Tsukurukai had much to do with the launch of the history dialogue because both Japanese and Korean scholars became deeply concerned about the negative impact of right-wing forces on the improvement of Japan-ROK relations. Each history association had approximately 20 members and they held joint symposia twice yearly (once in South Korea and once in Japan). In the first stage

(symposia 1-4, December 1997-June 1999), each side critically examined its own textbooks and then analyzed disputed points in Japan-Korea relations from the prehistoric era to contemporary times and sought advisable approaches. As an outcome of the symposia, a book composed of 37 articles was published in both nations. In the second stage (symposia 5-8, January 2000-July 2001), participants discussed advisable standards for writing history textbooks, issuing eighteen textbook proposals. Owing to the research project, Seoul City University and Tokyo Gakugei University “signed a general agreement to promote ties and conduct an active program in both faculty research and student exchanges.” 455

Another important facet of Type II transnational activism regarding history textbooks was the Korean National Commission for UNESCO (United Nations

453 Sakai, “International Exchange on Textbooks in Japan,” p. 102. 454 Sakai, “International Exchange on Textbooks in Japan,” pp. 103-04; Chung, “South Korea-Japan History Reconciliation,” p. 109. 455 Sakai, “International Exchange on Textbooks in Japan,” p. 103. 167

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) forum on history textbooks held in

September 1997 with the support of the German Commission for UNESCO in Seoul. 456

Participants in the forum included German, French, and Polish scholars and UNESCO

officials in addition to Korean and Japanese scholars who had actively participated in

prior history dialogues. They introduced other international textbook dialogue

experiences (i.e. German-Polish and German-French textbook dialogues) from Europe

and discussed how to apply these lessons to the Japan-South Korea case. The UNESCO

forum thus marked as the first opportunity that Korean and Japanese scholars sought to

find practical measures for the cooperative authorship of a common history textbook. 457

Nevertheless, the international forum was limited because the Japanese Commission for

UNESCO, which was affiliated with the MOE, refused to take part in the meeting. The

reason for its absence was that under the screening system, Japan UNESCO could not

force textbook authors to accept recommendations from history dialogues. It also

expressed that there would be no different opinions between Japan and Korea because

Japanese history textbooks already went through sufficient revisions. Since then, Japan

UNESCO has continued to decline the invitations of its Korean counterpart to organize a

history textbook conversation between the two nations. 458

456 Korean National Commission for UNESCO, Final Report: UNESCO Forum on History Textbooks for the 21 st Century , 1997. 457 Jubaek Shin, “Dong Asia Hyung Kyokwaseo Daehwa ui Bonkyokjeokin Mosaek kwa Hyupryok Model Chaki, 1993-2006 [Finding a Dialogue for East Asian Type History Textbooks and its Partnership Model]” in Jubaek Shin, ed., Dong Asia eseo Yoksa Insik ui Kukkyong Nomki [Crossing the Border of Historical Understanding in East Asia], (Asia Peace and History Education Research Association, 2008), pp. 60-61. 458 Shin, “Dong Asia Hyung Kyokwaseo Daehwa ui Bonkyokjeokin Mosaek kwa Hyupryok Model Chaki,” pp. 64-65. 168

The 2001 Textbook Controversy and Transnational Activism

The 2001 approval of Tsukurukai’s new history textbook for Japanese middle schools

played a pivotal role in furthering both Type I and Type II transnational activism

regarding history textbooks. Korean NGOs strongly protested the Japanese government’s

decision and campaigned to prevent the adoption of the distorted textbook with the aid of

progressive and pacifist Japanese civil groups. These campaigns helped increase the

importance of the Japanese history textbook issue in Korean society. 459 On the other

hand, significant efforts to promote a bilateral dialogue on history and to write common

history textbooks for Japan and South Korea emerged on both governmental and societal

levels.

Once the draft version of the new Tsukurukai history textbook became publicly

available in 2000, widespread protests arose in Japan and abroad. Many Japanese

historians and history teachers expressed their misgivings about the text’s chauvinism

and fundamental inaccuracy. 460 Their complaints focused on the textbook’s presentation of Japan’s foundational myths as historical facts and the characterization of the Asia-

Pacific War as a war of Asian liberation. A number of Japanese historians, such as Wada

Haruki and Arai Shinichi, issued signed statements denouncing the content of the

Tsukurukai textbook and requesting its revision.461 A Japanese NGO, the Center for

Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, criticized the textbook as inappropriate as a teaching material. 462 In addition, the Historical Science Society of

Japan (Rekishigaku Kenkyukai) released a booklet that highlighted definite distortions of

459 Interview No. 13, Seoul, October 6, 2008. 460 Nozaki, “Japanese Politics and the History Textbook Controversy,” p. 296. 461 Hanky ǒreh , March 19, 2001. 462 Tomoko Hamada, “Contested Memories of the Imperial Sun: History Textbook Controversy in Japan” American Asian Review , Vol. XX, No. 4, (Winter 2002), pp. 26-29. 169

historical fact and dozens of mistakes that had been neglected in the MOE’s screening of

the Tsukurukai’s volume. 463 Other NGOs in Japan, including Peace Boat and the YWCA

(Young Women’s Christian Association) later participated in this protest against the

Tsukurukai’s biased history textbooks. 464

It was ultimately, however, the Korean NGOs that launched systematic

transnational activism (Type I) to redress the distortions of Japanese history textbooks. 465

Even before the newly constituted Ministry of Education and Science (hereafter

MOES) 466 announced its approval of the Tsukurukai’s new history textbook,

representatives of numerous Korean NGOs held a press conference in March 2001 to

declare their plan to establish a new organization named Ilbon Y ǒksa Kyokwas ǒ Waegok

Parochapki Undongponbu (the Headquarters of the Movement to Correct Distortions of

Japanese History Textbooks).467 They visited the Japanese embassy in Seoul to protest

and held a Pan-Asian Day of Action to censure the revisionist history textbook in Seoul,

Pusan, and Tokyo with the cooperation with Japanese NGOs. Inspired by these activities,

Korean Internet users demonstrated in cyber space; overloading the home pages of the

Japanese MOES and the Tsukurukai. In reaction to the MOES’s final approval

announcement of the textbook in April 2001, the movement’s representatives (which

included ninety civil organizations) decided to replace their ad hoc activism with a

463 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , p. 60. 464 Interview No. 12, Seoul, October 1, 2008; Interview No. 33, Tokyo, October 29, 2008. 465 Chung, “Hanil Chogukjok Onghomang e kwanhan Yongu,” p. 61. 466 Due to ministerial reorganization, the MOE became the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology in 2001. Its short form was named Monbukagakusho , the Ministry of Education and Science (MOES). 467 Sunhyuk Kim, “Civil Society in Democratizing Korea,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Democratization (Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 84-85: the ROK democratization opened a new horizon for NGO activities in South Korea. As Korean society democratized, freedom of association made it possible for citizens to create a variety of civic organizations, supporting public concerns over the environment, women’s issues, and human rights. 170 durable coalition organization, the Asia Peace and History Education Network (hereafter

APHEN) that replaced the existing Ilbon Kyokwas ǒ Parochapki Undongponbu.468

Among the primary organizations in the network were the National Labor Union of

School Teachers and Staff, the Research Institute of Historical Issues, and the Korean

Council.

The main goal of APHEN at the time was to request the correction of

Tsukurukai’s history textbooks and to prevent the adoption of the textbooks in collaboration with Japanese NGOs. 469 In June 2001, APHEN played a central role in holding a series of rallies in front of Japanese embassies of seventy-one countries in order to protest against the Japanese government and to call on the international community to join the campaign. 470 APHEN’s executive committee members also participated in the

Asia Solidarity Emergency Convention, held in Tokyo on June 11, 2001, to prevent the adoption of the distorted textbook. 471 The activists, including about five hundred members from Japanese NGOs such as the Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21

(Kodomo to Kyokasho Zenkoku Net 21, hereafter Network 21), staged a symbolic event to create a “human chain” by surrounding the Ministry of Education building. At the protest, they accused the Japanese MOES of approving the new history textbook, despite its running counter to the Neighboring Country Clause, the 1995 statement of Prime

Minister Murayama, and the 1998 South Korea-Japan Joint Declaration. 472 In mid-July and August 2001, as the deadline for the local education boards to make their final

468 Soh, “Politics of the Victim/Victor Complex,” p. 164-65. 469 Interview No. 16, Seoul, October 7, 2008: A Korean civic activist states, “As time went by, promoting common historical consciousness among Korean, Japanese, and Chinese people became one of the central aims pursued by APHEN.” 470 Munhwa Daily , June 13, 2001. 471 Donga Daily , June 12, 2001. 472 Soh, “Politics of the Victim/Victor Complex,” p. 165-66. 171

decisions came near, APHEN purchased ads in Japanese newspapers to prevent the

adoption of the new history textbook after conducting a campaign to raise funds.

APHEN also persuaded Korean local governments to send letters requesting their

Japanese sister-cities not to adopt the textbooks.473

A vociferous protest movement, organized and coordinated by Japanese NGOs

such as Network 21, served to reverse the first decision to adopt Tsukurukai’s history

textbooks, made by the Shimotsuga District’s textbook selection committees. 474 As soon

as the media report of the initial decision was released, the Shimotsuga selection board

received a flood of protests from across the country by telephone, fax, and e-mail.

Throughout the movement, the Internet was also a useful tool for Network 21’s

campaigning and network-building. 475 Other organizations, including the Center for

Documentation of School Textbooks (Kyokasho Joho Shiryo Sentai) and the Printers’

Union (Shuppan Roren), lobbied committees in Shimotsuga. 476 After Shimotsuga’s

experience, however, no other selection committees chose the Tsukurukai’s textbooks.

Given these efforts, the Type I transnational activism initiated by APHEN and

Japanese NGOs ensured that the Tsukurukai’s textbooks ultimately achieved an adoption

rate of merely 0.039 percent of the market. Specifically, “only nine private schools,

along with special schools (yogo gakko) for the disabled in the prefectures of Tokyo and

Ehime (where selection is decided by prefectural administration), selected the Tsukurukai

473 APHEN, Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Sungli: 2005 Kyokwas ǒ Undong Paeks ǒ [four years’ activism, Korea-Japan citizens’ victory: 2005 activity report for textbook movement], (Seoul: APHEN, 2005), pp. 17-20. 474 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 147: “Although each city or town in Shimotsuga had its own local education board, decisions on textbook adoptions were to be made at the level of the (consolidated) Shimotsuga District.” 475 Isa Ducke, “Activism and the Internet: Japan’s 2001 history-textbook affair” in Nanette Gottlieb and Mark McLelland, eds., Japanese Cybercultures (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 209-11. 476 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , p. 65. 172

textbooks. In April 2002, precisely 521 copies of Tsukurukai texts were delivered to

Japanese junior high schools.” 477 This amounted to a dismal failure for the Tsukuruaki,

which had originally aimed to gain ten percent of market share.

The success of this textbook non-adoption campaign in 2001 triggered the

creation of the Korea-Japan-China Transnational Network (hereafter, KJC Network),

which aimed to prevent the distortion of Japanese history textbooks and to support the

development of other practical alternatives. 478 The primary actors in the KJC Network

were the Asia Peace and History Education Network in Korea, the Children and

Textbooks Japan Network 21, and the Beijing Institute for Social Science. It is

significant to note that Chinese civil organizations began to participate in transnational

activism regarding history textbooks in East Asia at this point. As a Korean civil activist

notes, “Chinese groups’ participation in the Network expanded the bilateral history

textbook problem between Japan and South Korea into the issue of Asian peace and

education.” 479 The KJC Network placed great emphasis on four different tasks: the

establishment of a regular peace forum, the publication of a common history textbook,

the conduction of a yearly youth camp for history education (Type II), and the

development of a more systematic campaign to block the adoption of unsuitably

nationalist textbooks (Type I).480

The first notable activity of the KJC Network was to hold a meeting, the

Historical Consciousness and East Asia Peace Forum, in March 2002 that aimed to bridge

477 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , p. 65. 478 Chung, “Hanil Chogukjok Onghomang e kwanhan Yongu,” p. 65. 479 Interview No. 13, Seoul, October 6, 2008. 480 Mikang Yang, “Dong Asia ui Hwahae rul wihan Simin Sahoe ui Yoksa Daehwa (The Civil Society’s Dialogue on History for Reconciliation in East Asia)” in Joobaek Shin, ed., Dong Asia eseo Y ǒksa Insik ui Kukky ǒng N ǒmki , (Asia Peace and History Education Research Association, 2008), pp. 138-53. 173

the chasm of historical consciousness among Korean, Japanese and Chinese people.

Since then, the peace forum has been alternately held in one of the three countries once a

year. At each forum, scholars, teachers, and civil activists from each nation presented

and discussed research that had been undertaken on a specific topic. The main theme of the first forum was to figure out Japan’s history distortion by focusing on the problems in the Tsukurukai’s history textbook. In the following years, the KJC Network expanded the scope of the forum’s subjects beyond Japanese textbook issues. In the 2003 Tokyo forum, for instance, the Network critically evaluated Korean and Chinese textbooks as well, and sought to link history education with human rights issues. Another topic addressed at the 2004 Seoul forum was how historical consciousness had been reflected in institutions other than history textbooks, such as museums and mass media. The peace forum played an important role in providing social space to regularly discuss the gaps of historical consciousness among the three nations. 481

Following the first peace forum, the KJC Network initiated a joint history

textbook writing project, given the consensus that a common historical narrative of past

conflicts would promote reconciliation between the three countries. In August 2002, the

trilateral history textbook writing committee, which consisted of fifty-three members

from the three nations (twenty-three from the ROK, thirteen from Japan, and seventeen

from China), first gathered in Seoul. The majority of the committee members were

history scholars or researchers, yet some middle-school teachers and NGO activists from

South Korea and Japan also became active members of the trilateral committee. Without

any governmental support, they held thirteen international workshops and undertook six

revisions over three years. As a result, in 2005 the KJC Network finally published a

481 Yang, “Dong Asia ui Hwahae rul wihan Simin Sahoe ui Yoksa Daehwa,” pp. 139-40. 174 common history textbook: “ A History that opens to the Future: The Contemporary and

Modern History of Three East Asian Countries .” 482 Zheng Wang provides a succinct analysis of the primary differences between the common textbook and the three nations’ other textbooks:

First, it does not present history from a single country’s perspective but, rather, makes special efforts to create a jointly recognized interpretation of history among the three nations. The book primarily focuses on the interactions between the three East Asian countries. It points out that the history of the three neighboring countries cannot be understood separately. Second, this book uses a “reflective narrative” to replace the “victor narrative” and “victim narrative.” The traditional national history textbooks in the three countries use both a “victor narrative” and a “victim narrative” to account for past conflicts and violence. Contrarily, this book encourages its readers to explore the deep roots and causes of historical tragedies, to reflect on past mistakes and to learn from history. Finally, this textbook introduces students to the difficult and complicated process of reconciliation. Students will be able to learn that the three countries have differences over the interpretation of some historical events and that the historical issues have been barriers to establishing healthy relations. 483

Another important project driven by the KJC Network was a history experience camp in South Korea, Japan, and China. The youth camp, launched in 2002, was held in one of the three countries each a year. While participants in the first and second years only came from Korea and Japan, Chinese youths have taken part in the event since 2004.

The average number of participants in the annual camp amounts to two hundred people, including program staff and forty middle/high school students from each nation. 484 The

main goal of the youth camp is to provide an environment in which young students can

promote understanding of historical problems and share historical consciousness through

lively discussions and fieldwork that examines the traces of Japan’s past atrocities.

482 Yang, “Dong Asia ui Hwahae rul wihan Simin Sahoe ui Yoksa Daehwa,” pp. 141-43; Zheng Wang, “Old Wounds, New Narratives: Joint History Textbook Writing and Peacebuilding in East Asia” History & Memory , Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2009), pp. 106-07. 483 Wang, “Old Wounds, New Narratives,” pp. 121-22. 484 Yang, “Dong Asia ui Hwahae rul wihan Simin Sahoe ui Y ǒksa Daehwa,” pp. 147-53. 175

Although there have emerged a variety of youth exchange programs in East Asia, 485 the

KJC Network’s youth camp is unique in terms of encouraging practical history dialogues

between young students in the neighboring nations. It was also reported that after camp,

participants have formed a continuous network and joined various history-related

campaigns and events organized by the KJC Network. 486 In recent years, college

students who participated in previous sessions as middle or high school students have

served as staff aides and shared their former experiences of the youth camp. 487

The 2005 Textbook Controversy and Systematic Textbook Non-adoption Campaign

In April 2005, another round of textbook controversy erupted due to the MOES’s re-

approval of a revised edition of the Tsukurukai New History Textbook. 488 Following

their failure in summer 2001, the Tsukurukai made great efforts to increase the adoption

rate of its history textbooks. Much attention was thus paid to solidifying its links with

right-wing politicians in the LDP, who often took main posts either in the party or in the

Koizumi administration. Additionally, Koizumi Junichiro, who had become a Prime

Minister in April 2001, was a strong supporter of the Tsukurukai during his term. 489

Given this political support, the Tsukurukai exerted significant pressure on the MOES to

485 Interview No. 6, Seoul, September 25, 2008; Interview No. 7, Seoul, September 25, 2008; Interview No. 18, Seoul, October 9, 2008; Interview No. 20, Tokyo, October 16, 2008: Among Korean groups that have held youth exchange programs with Japanese counterparts are Seoul YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Association), the KNCC (National Council of Churches in Korea), and the Anglican Church of Korea. Their programs are generally aimed at promoting mutual understanding of culture, peace, and history. 486 Chung, “Hanil Chogukj ǒk Onghomang e kwanhan Y ǒngu,”p. 69. 487 Eunjeong Chung, “Efforts Made by Civic Societies for the Settlement of Historical Conflicts in Northeast Asia” in the booklet of a scholarly symposium, History Education and Reconciliation: Comparative Perspectives on East Asia (Georg-Eckert-Institute and Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008), p. 467. 488 The MOES conducts its textbook screening for middle school texts every four years. 489 Interview No. 23, Tokyo, October 17, 2008: As a professor of Keio University notes, “Prime Minister Koizumi initially had a will to resolve history problems with Asian neighbors, but eventually used them for his political purposes.” 176

amend some textbook adoption policies—i.e. to exclude the influence of history teachers

from the textbook adoption process in local education committees. Increased

nationalistic sentiment in Japan, caused by the abduction cases of Japanese citizens by

North Korea, also provided the Tsukurukai with a favorable political environment for its

textbook adoption campaign. 490 Hence, the Tsukurukai confidently set out their goal of

gaining ten percent of market share in the 2005 round of textbook adoption.

In response, civil organizations that had played a central role in criticizing the

Tsukurukai released a series of protest statements immediately after the announcement of

the MOES’s screening results. The Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 issued a

joint statement with other fifteen civil groups that contended the dangerous textbooks

should not be given to children as the books sought to distort history, revise the

constitution, and make Japan able to wage war. 491 In another statement, sixty-two

Japanese history researchers and educators declared that the Tsukurukai’s textbook was

unsuitable for history education because it could lay the ground for restoring arbitrary

and exclusive history education. At a news conference in Seoul, the Asia Peace and

History Education Network stated:

After the painful defeat in 2001, the Japanese rightist group is now back with 'revenge' with new version of distorted history textbooks written in a more sophisticated and dangerous way. Now that the textbooks are authorized by the Japanese ministry, we will concentrate on campaigning against the textbooks, dissuading Japanese schools from choosing those books. 492

In order to redress the shortcomings of their (successful) 2001 textbook

movement, the APHEN launched a more systematic campaign for preventing the

adoption of the Tsukurukai’s distorted history textbooks in conjunction with Japanese

490 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan , p. 148. 491 Fujinaga, “Ilbon Sahoe wa Saey ǒkmo Kyokwas ǒ rul dul ǒssan Nonui,” pp. 17-18. 492 Quoted in The Korea Herald , April 6, 2005. 177

NGOs. 493 In the early June 2005 when Japan’s textbook selection process began,

APHEN and its allied Japanese NGOs held an international symposium in Seoul to

discuss how to effectively conduct the 2005 textbook non-adoption movement. In the

meeting, they devised a notably different campaign strategy: to establish a network

connecting the three primary actors—i.e. local civil groups, local governments, and

politicians. This idea was originally derived from the Japanese NGOs’ assessment that in

the previous movement it had been very successful for Korean local governments to send

letters demanding Japan’s counterparts with sister partnerships not to select the

Tsukurukai’s textbooks. In the trilateral network, Korean local governments were to

expand cultural/economic exchanges with their Japanese sister-city counterparts and send

the non-adoption request letters. 494 With Japanese NGOs, local civil groups in Korea

aimed to support the textbook non-adoption movement by providing human and material

resources. Korean politicians, furthermore, were to support the activities of local

governments and take part in the non-adoption campaigns, conducted by both Japanese

and Korean civil groups, in Japan.

Pursuant to this scheme, APHEN selected twelve Korean localities with vibrant

civil activism and sister partnerships with Japanese cities. Following the symposium,

APHEN and representatives from fourteen Japanese NGOs visited those local

493 APHEN, Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Seungli, p. 105. 494 As indicated in the Table below, the ROK democratization in the mid-1980s brought about a significant proliferation in the number of sister partnerships between local governments in Japan and South Korea. Prior to the democratic transition, the total number of sister partnerships between Japanese and Korean local governments was 19. By 2004, the number of sister partnerships increased to 76. Period Number established Total Before 1984 19 19 1985 – 1994 34 53 1995 – 2004 23 76 Source: Korea Local Authorities Foundation for International Relations (http://www.klafir.or.kr: accessed April 28, 2009) 178 governments, which included the major cities of Seoul, Incheon, Taejeon, and Taegu, to rally their support. 495 They also paid visits to local civil groups—e.g. the Seoul Young

Korean Academy (Heungsadan) and the Teachers’& Education Workers’ Union

(Ch ǒnkyocho) in Anyang and Taegu—that had expressed an interest in taking part in the movement. Enlisting the aid of Korean politicians was another significant outcome of the delegation’s visit. Among the particularly supportive politicians were several members of Korean National Assembly, such as Lee Hyehoon from Seochogu District and Kim

Heesun from Tongdaemungu District, and Lee Cheonwoo, a member of the Anyang municipal assembly. These networking efforts played a critical role in promoting mutual understanding and laying groundwork for the 2005 textbook non-adoption movement in

Japan.

Using the trilateral network, Korean and Japanese NGOs launched the so-called

“Japan campaign” to prevent the adoption of the Tsukurukai’s history textbooks in the late June of 2005. 496 The Japan campaign centered on twelve localities, including Ehime

Prefecture and Toshima/Suginami Wards in Tokyo, both of which had shown a high possibility of adopting the Fushosa textbooks. With Japanese local NGOs, the Korean representatives of the trilateral network began to visit Japan’s regional/local education committees to deliver their non-adoption request letters and hold textbook-related symposia. In the meetings, the network members not only explained the negative impact of the textbook adoption on Korea-Japan relations, but also emphasized that their real desire was to promote peace between the two neighboring countries. They also donated the common history textbook, History that opens to the Future , written by the KJC

495 APHEN, Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Seungli , p. 18 and pp. 107-09. 496 APHEN, Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Seungli , p. 19 and pp. 127-28. 179

Network to each education committee. These actions aimed to demonstrate that civil

groups had jointly worked to provide alternatives and develop a shared historical

consciousness among East Asian nations.

In an attempt to further animate the textbook movement, APHEN commenced a

nationwide fundraising campaign in Korea in order to place opinion ads in Japanese

newspapers. 497 Among many people who supported the campaign were Korean governmental officials, politicians, reporters, military officers, civil activists, and

teachers. 498 The campaign consequently made it possible to publish the opinion ads

fourteen times in ten Japanese national/local newspapers, including the Asahi, Yomiuri ,

and Mainichi Shimbun , covering audiences from Hokkaido to Okinawa. In particular,

APHEN placed the ads twice on major local newspapers in the areas like Ehime and

Kumamoto Prefectures that were most inclined to adopt the Tsukurukai’s textbooks. The primary focus of the opinion ads, whose contents were very touching, was to persuade the

Japanese public by directly expressing Koreans’ thoughts on the topic. The opinion ads attracted the Japanese public’s attention, significantly helping Japanese civil groups to conduct their textbook non-adoption campaign. 499

Another activity that APHEN engaged in was to highlight the problems with

Japan’s history textbooks internationally. APHEN initiated an international campaign by

participating in the Northeast Asian Commission of the GPPAC (Global Partnership for

the Prevention Against Armed Conflict) held in New York in July 2005. 500 With a

497 Hanky ǒreh , July 5, 2005. 498 Hanky ǒreh , July 7, August 3, 2005. 499 APHEN, Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Seungli , pp. 20-21 and pp. 185-89: In the 2001 textbook campaign, the APHEN only once put the opinion ads on Japanese newspapers. 500 Yonhap News , July 17, 2005. 180

Japanese NGO Peace Boat, 501 which had served as a secretariat for the Commission,

APHEN held a workshop named “Peace Education and Historical Reconciliation” in order to raise the Japanese textbook issues during the GPPAC meetings. In front of the

United Nations building, APHEN distributed leaflets to describe Japan’s history distortion and exhibited photographs that illustrated Japan’s past atrocities, such as sexual slavery and the Nanjing Massacre. 502 An international symposium, “From History

Conflict to Trust-Building: A Discussion of Japan’s New History Textbooks,” that discussed the problems of Japan’s history distortion with scholars from other nations was also held. In addition, APHEN gave lectures regarding historical conflicts between Japan and Korea to about 500 participants at the plenary meeting of the Korean School Council in the United States. 503

Given this dynamic (Type I) transnational activism, once again the adoption rate of the Tsukurukai’s textbooks remained very low, amounting to 0.39 percent of market share (4,912 copies in total). It was only Tokyo’s Suginami Ward and Otarawashi in

Tochigi Prefecture that selected the new history textbooks out of 583 Japanese public middle school adoption districts although some other national and private schools in

Tokyo and Ehime/Shiga Prefectures also adopted the textbooks. 504 While the 2005 adoption rate increased to some extent in comparison with 2001 (0.039%), the result was still another dismal failure for the Tsukurukai that had begun the textbook adoption

501 Interview No. 33, Tokyo, October 29, 2008; http://www.peaceboat.org/english/wtpb/index.html#history (accessed May 2, 2009): Peace Boat was formed due to the eruption of the 1982 textbook controversy in Japan. “Peace Boat’s first voyage was organized in 1983 by a group of Japanese university students as a creative response to government censorship regarding Japan’s past military aggression in the Asia-Pacific. They chartered a ship to visit neighboring countries with the aim of learning first-hand about the war from those who experienced it and initiating people-to-people exchange.” 502 Chosun Daily , July 21, 2005. 503 APHEN, Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Seungli, pp. 22-23; pp. 155-61. 504 APHEN, Sany ǒn ui Hwaltong Hanil Simin ui Seungli, p. 221. 181 process with a far more favorable political environment than in 2001. A professor at

Tokyo University even called this the end of the Japanese history textbook problem. 505 A

Japanese journalist, on the other hand, points out that despite such a low adoption rate, it would have been completely unimaginable for middle schools to adopt those nationalist history textbooks thirty years ago. 506

Dynamic Transnational Activism and Korean Government’s Responses

During this third period, the dynamic transnational activism might have significantly affected the Korean government’s interactions with Japan in two different ways.

Although not the only cause, the Korean NGOs’ vibrant protest activities exerted strong pressure on the Korean government to take a stricter stance on Japanese textbook problems. On the other hand, transnational activism also played a key role in stimulating cooperative measures between the two governments, including the construction of a history dialogue system on the governmental level.

A notable incident of the first type was the Korean government’s abruptly changed attitudes towards Japan under President Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002) in reaction to the 2001 textbook controversy. In 1998, President Kim Dae Jung and Prime Minister

Obuchi Keizo had declared the new Japan-South Korean partnership for the 21 st century.

Their joint communiqué included Japan’s first written apology, South Korea’s acceptance of Japan’s apology, and a pledge by both states to move forward. 507 They also adopted a series of action items to attain the goals of the joint declaration. Highlighting the significance of their future relationship, President Kim promised to open South Korea’s

505 Interview No. 27, Tokyo, October 24, 2008. 506 Interview No. 25, Tokyo, October 21, 2008. 507 Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia , pp. 256-58. 182

mass culture markets to Japan, which had long been taboo in South Korea. 508

Immediately following the communiqué, Korea-Japan relations underwent a short

honeymoon period lasting only until the eruption of the textbook controversy in 2001.

Anxious to preserve this goodwill, the Korean government initially took a cautious and

conciliatory stance towards the problems posed by the Japanese history textbooks. 509

In a significant turnaround, however, in February 2001 the Korean government

stated that it would actively respond to the textbook issues. 510 As soon as the MOES announced the approval of the Tsukurukai’s history textbooks in April 2001, the Korean government issued a protest statement that strongly requested a fundamental response to prevent Japan’s distortions of history. 511 Following these statements, the Korean

government actually took a series of serious actions to appease the growing anti-Japanese

sentiment among the Korean public. It recalled its ambassador to Japan (an action

regarded as the highest level of diplomatic protest) and publicly raised the responsibility

of the Japanese government for the distorted history textbooks at the United Nations’

Human Rights Commission in Geneva. 512 In May 2001, the Korean government conveyed further documents demanding that the Japanese government correct Korea- related contents in Japanese history textbooks. 513 In response to Japan’s inaction (except

508 Moon and Suh, “Security, Economy, and Identity Politics,” p. 564. 509 Won-deog Lee, “A Normal State without Remorse: The Textbook Controversy and Korea-Japan Relations, East Asian Review , Vol. 13, No. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 21-22. 510 Kyunghwang Shinmun , Munhwa Daily , February 19, 2001. 511 Statement of Korean Foreign Ministry (April 3, 2001), in Wonsoon Lee and Jaejeong Jeong, eds., Ilbon Yǒksa Kyokwas ǒ, Mueosi Munje inga [Japanese History Textbooks, What are Problems?] (Dongbang Media, 2002), p. 170. 512 Kyunghwang Shinmun, Munhwa Daily , April 10, 2001. 513 Soh, “Politics of the Victim/Victor Complex,” p. 159. 183

for correcting two out of the twenty-five items), the Korean government then postponed

its cultural market opening to Japan and ceased security exchanges in July 2001. 514

The second case showing the impact of the vibrant transnational activism on

Korea’s governmental behavior surrounds the decision to establishing the Korea-Japan

Joint History Research Committee in October 2001. Along with their strong protests, as noted earlier, Korean NGOs also sought to find practical ways to address such historical problems. Prior to a summit meeting between Korean President Kim and Japanese Prime

Minister Koizumi scheduled for October 2001, the NGOs continued to request that the two governments adopt fundamental measures to resolve the textbook problems between the two nations. 515 A variety of Korea-Japan history dialogues on the societal level also functioned as a backdrop for the governmental decision. Under these circumstances, the two leaders agreed to set up the Joint Committee by stating, “the Korea-Japan Joint

History Research Committee will be established to promote an accurate and mutual understanding of historical facts and historical perspectives regarding the issue of history textbooks. It will consist of approximately ten history academics or professionals from each country.” 516 Through numerous meetings and discussions, the Research Committee produced approximately forty research articles between May 2002 and May 2005. The

Committee failed, however, to directly deal with the problems posed by Japanese history textbooks due to haphazard Japanese participation.517

514 Hanky ǒreh , July 13, 2001. 515 Chung, “Hanil Chogukj ǒk Onghomang e kwanhan Y ǒngu,”p. 64. 516 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofat.go.kr/help/search/index.jsp (accessed May 3, 2009) 517 Jaejeong Jeong, “Korea-Japan Historical Conflicts and History Dialogue” in Daesong Hyun, ed., Historical Perspectives of the Koreans and Japanese (Seoul: Nanam, 2008), p. 239. 184

As a distinguished feature in the 2005 textbook controversy, meanwhile, the

Korean government took the initiative in addressing the historical problems instead of merely reacting to pressure from civil and political sectors. One of the most important reasons for the government’s change in attitude was the territorial dispute over the

Dokdo/Takeshima islets that coincided with the 2005 textbook flare up.518 In February

2005, a Japanese prefectural assembly decided to enact a bill designating February 22 as

“Takeshima Day”, taking the Japanese name of the disputed islets. On the same day, the

Japanese ambassador to South Korea claimed Japan’s sovereignty over Dokdo at a press conference for the foreign media held in Seoul. 519 Facing these provocative actions, the

Korean government took a harsh stance on the issue in March 2005, outlining a new

Japan policy doctrine and even declaring a “diplomatic war” with Japan. 520 As a professor of Seoul National University notes, “President Roh Moo-hyun made efforts to promote cooperation with Japan during the early phase of his term, but he felt a sense of betrayal at the sight of Japan’s such provoking actions.” 521 Under these circumstances, the Japanese government further provoked the Koreans by authorizing the Tsukurukai’s textbooks that not only contained Japan’s claims of sovereignty over Dokdo but also excluded past wrongs such as sexual slavery and forced labor. 522

Another important characteristic of the 2005 controversy was that the Roh Moo- hyun administration (2003-2007), whose slogan was Chamy ǒ Chungbu (participation

518 Byungwoo Ahn, “ Hanguk Sahoe ui Insik kwa Daeeung (Consciousness and Response of Korean Society)” in APHEN, ed., Yǒksa Insik ul dul ǒssan Jahwasang, Oebu ui Sis ǒn [Portrayal of Historical Understanding, External Views] (Seoul: APHEN, 2008), pp. 115-16. 519 ChungAng Daily , February 24, 2005. 520 Park, “Historical Memory and the Resurgence of Nationalism in Korea,” p. 198: In his chapter, Park articulates well that “the political use of historical controversy in Korea is no longer an effective tool of political maneuvering.” 521 Interview No. 14, Seoul, October 7, 2008. 522 Donga Daily , April 6, 2005. 185

government), had developed a very cooperative relationship with civil groups regarding

historical problems. As noted earlier, the Roh regime supported the transnational

textbook non-adoption movement explicitly. 523 The Korean government also established

a government-funded research institute called the Northeast Asia History Foundation to

better manage history-related issues in September 2006. The foundation has conducted a

variety of projects on historical issues with civil organizations. One of the most

prominent projects is the annual “International NGOs Conference on History and Peace”

(hereafter, the NGO Conference). The NGO Conference aimed to effectively resolve

historical conflicts in East Asia by establishing a global network of cooperation. With

the support of the History Foundation, over 120 representatives from twenty countries,

including the U.S., Germany, Japan, China, Poland, and Russia, took part in the 2007

NGO Conference held in Seoul that attracted about 10,000 attendees. 524

Japanese Historical Narrative and Textbook Policy: Backsliding

During this third phase, the heyday of more reflective history textbooks in Japan was possibly ended by the strong nationalist textbook movement that gained traction in the mid-1990s. As noted earlier, many revisionist groups, particularly the Tsukurukai actively sought to reassess Japan’s history following nationalist lines, remove all reference to comfort women from history texts, and publish a new history textbook for middle school students. Collaborating with the hawkish members of the opposition parties, the LDP conservatives made great efforts to reverse the self-critical changes in contemporary history textbooks. Moreover, Prime Minister Hashimoto, who had been a

523 Fujinaga, “Ilbon Sahoe wa Saey ǒkmo Kyokwas ǒ rul dul ǒssan Nonui,” p. 19. 524 Chung, “Efforts Made by Civic Societies for the Settlement of Historical Conflicts in Northeast Asia,” p. 468. 186

president of the nationalist group Nihon Izokukai, was also intent on reforming the

textbook screening system. 525

Given these circumstances, progressive changes to Japan’s textbook policy and historical narrative in textbooks were rolled back significantly. The first sign of change was the remarks of a Hashimoto cabinet education minister, Machimura Nobutaka—who held actual authority over the textbook screening process—in a special committee meeting of the Diet’s Upper House in June 1998. Signaling his intention to intervene at the textbook authorizing and adoption stages, he stated that “history textbooks lacked balance and that the MOE was deliberating on ways to improve the situation.” In January

1999, “the MOE asked publishers to make their textbook content more balanced and to reconsider their choice of authors.” 526 This action was taken to prevent the promotion of the reflective view of history in textbooks.

Another big change was the significant decrease of the descriptions of Japanese wartime atrocities and its colonial rule over Korea. Firstly, reference to comfort women was erased from the 2002 editions of all seven junior high school history textbooks.

According to Nozaki,

In the new drafts for 2002 textbooks, three of the seven textbooks completely removed all such references. Among the four texts that still contained references to the issue of comfort women, one draft text included only the sentence “many Korean and other women were sent to the front,” whereas the previous edition referred to the issue in three different sections and included a photo of former Korean comfort women requesting compensation and Japanese supporters. Another two texts referred to comfort women only briefly, using the phrase comfort facilities. Only the last text used the actual phrase comfort women, and this was the only text that had expanded its discussion from the previous edition. 527

525 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 144. 526 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 144. 527 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 145. 187

Secondly, the 2002 editions made fewer references to Korean resistance to Japanese rule.

For instance, the two draft texts, submitted by Tokyo Shoseki and Osaka Shoseki,

eliminated the lines referring to the Korean independent movement and anti-Japanese

movements.528 Thirdly, the term “aggression” was replaced by “advance” in several new

editions. 529 As Nozaki illustrates, the two textbooks, submitted by Tokyo Shoseki and

Osaka Shoseki, removed the term “aggression.” Fourthly, there was also backsliding in

descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre and the Three-Lightening Strategy (sanko sakusen,

the Japanese wartime military strategy “kill all, burn all, and loot all). 530 Two out of four

textbooks that referred to the “Nanjing Massacre” in the previous editions changed it into

the “Nanjing Incident.” Six out of seven textbooks presented the number of its victims in

the 1997 editions, but four textbooks switched the number into “many” or “a number of”

in the new ones. And only one referred to the Three-Lightening Strategy in the 2002

editions, while five out of seven textbooks mentioned it in the 1997 editions. Clearly,

historical interpretation in these Japanese textbooks had regressed considerably from the

previous editions’ narrative, although this was partly related to the overall reduction (30

percent) in the length of the textbooks. 531

528 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 145; Asia Peace and History Education Research Association, Yŏksa Insik ŭl tull ŏssan Chahwasang, Oebu ŭi Sis ŏn [A Portrait surrounding Historical Perception, External Views], (Seoul: S ǒnin, 2008), p. 228-29. 529 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 145; Wonsoon Lee and Jaejung Jeong, eds., Ilbon Y ǒksa Kyokwas ǒ, Mueosi Munche inga [Japanese History Textbooks, What are Problems], (Seoul: Dongbang Media, 2002), p. 154. 530 Lee and Jeong, Ilbon Y ǒksa Kyokwas ǒ, Mu ǒt i Munche inga , pp. 215-16. 531 Lee, “A Normal State without Remorse,” p. 23. 188

Another sign of backsliding in Japan’s textbook policy was the MOE’s

authorization of the Tsukurukai’s nationalist history textbooks in April 2001. 532 As

Saaler notes, the textbook contained many problematic aspects:

It paid great attention to the equality of Japan’s development with the West and the superiority of Japan’s historical development compared to other Asian countries; it expressed discriminatory and condescending views of Japan’s neighbors who are presented as inferior and lagging behind in development throughout their history; it portrayed Japan’s imperialism in the 1930s and 1940s as a purely defensive measure directed against the penetration of the European powers and the U.S. into East Asia; it presented the wars conducted by Japan from 1931-1945 as wars for the liberation of Asia; and it made no mention of war atrocities and the consequences of Japanese colonialism, or of resistance to Japanese colonization and occupation within the Asian nations affected. 533

This historical viewpoint definitely ran counter to the Neighboring Countries Clause, which ensured the perspective of international friendship and cooperation.

Also problematic was the specific content addressing Korea in the Tsukurukai’s textbook. In the ancient history section, for instance, the textbook stated as a fact “Japan established and operated a military outpost, Mimana , on the southern Korean peninsula and asserted that while Japan was an independent state, Korea was a protectorate of

China.” 534 Besides, it described Japanese colonial rule of Korea between 1910 and 1945 as conducive to the Korea’s development and modernization, while it did not refer to

Japan’s assimilation policies and its brutal suppression of resistance at all: “The colonization of Korea was described as a natural process arising from geographical factors, and made unavoidable by the impact of European imperialism in East Asia. In

532 Soh, “Politics of the Victim/Victor Complex,” p. 148: “The draft version of the Tsukurukai textbook failed to pass the first round of the screening process, amid civilian protests against the textbook in Japan as well as abroad. In December 2000, the Japanese Ministry of Education advised the Tsukurukai to correct over a hundred items. After going through two rounds of the screening process, the new history textbook finally received certification in April 2001.” 533 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion, p. 52. 534 Lee, “A Normal State without Remorse,” p. 24. 189

this view, Korea lacked any will of its own and was a mere appendage of Japan,

subservient to Japanese security needs.” 535

During this third period, furthermore, the Japanese government took a series of measures to maintain and promote the nationalist view of history in Japanese textbooks, despite the dynamic Type I and II transnational activism. First, the MOES approved and reapproved the Tsukurukai’s middle school history textbooks in 2005 and 2009, even though they held basically the same nationalist view of history as the 2001 edition. The

2009 edition maintained the just and glorious description of Japan’s past wars. It also kept excluding references to Japan’s wartime atrocities, including comfort women.

Compared with the 2005 edition, the 2009 textbook paid greater attention to justifying the

Japanese annexation of Korea and glossing over its colonial rule of Korea. The textbook also whitewashed the massacre of Koreans that occurred right after the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake by denying the involvement of Japanese military/police and highlighting only the plight of Japanese victims. 536

Second, the Japanese government amended the Basic Law of Education by inserting a “patriotism clause” in 2007, preventing a more cooperative spirit with neighboring countries. 537 During the American occupation, the Basic Law of Education was designed to preclude a revival of prewar nationalism and mitigate advancing patriotism. As noted above, Japanese conservatives had long sought to revise the 1947 education law, given their assertions that the law placed too much weight on individual rights over the public good and contributed to the erosion of communities and rising

535 Saaler, Poltics, Memory and Public Opinion , p. 55. 536 Jubaek Shin, “2009 Y ǒndo Jiyusapan Saey ǒkmo Kyokwas ǒ ui Naeyong kwa Munjej ǒm” Online at http://ilovehistory.or.kr [Asia Peace and History Education Network, accessed May 3, 2009] 537 Kim, “Myths, Milieu, and Facts,” p. 113. 190

juvenile crime. Across the country conservative politicians strove to bring patriotism into

the classroom. For instance, “Tokyo's nationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara, punished

hundreds of teachers for failing to force their students to sing the national anthem and

stand before the national flag during school ceremonies. Other school districts started

grading students on their patriotism.” 538 Although Japan’s opposition parties were

opposed to the amendment of the 1947 education law, the ruling coalition—the LDP and

New Komeito—finally succeeded in passing of the bill to revise the law. 539 The revised education law, which emphasized “love of country” and “tradition,” handed greater control over schools to politicians.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the variations in Japanese historical narrative and textbook policy regarding South Korea, particularly following the 1982 history textbook controversy. I found temporal correlations suggesting plausibility of some causal relationship.

Diplomatic pressure from Asian countries would be conducive to the positive changes in

Japan’s dealings with history textbooks. The enactment of the Neighboring Countries

Clause was possibly due to Prime Minister Nakasone’s strong desire to mitigate the damage of Japan’s international reputation. On the other hand, Type II transnational activism (i.e. textbook dialogue) by Japanese and South Korean historians, launched in the early 1980s, may also have played certain roles in correcting biased Japanese history textbooks. From the late 1990s onward, however, this positive trend was probably reversed by a systematic revisionist movement led by Japan’s nationalist groups and the

538 New York Times , December 16, 2006. 539 The Japan Times, December 16, 2006. 191 conservative LDP, despite the rise of strong transnational campaigns regarding history textbooks.

192

Chapter 6 Germany’s Postwar Historical Narrative and Textbook Policy: The German-Polish Context

Immediately following World War II, the Allies instituted extensive education reforms in order to expunge nationalistic historical narratives from West German schools. Despite

Allied educational reform, early West German history textbooks stressed the innocence and suffering of the German people rather than Nazi aggression and atrocities. In the

1960s, however, German history textbooks were significantly revamped in order to better reflect Nazi-era atrocities. These alterations were the result of governmental alarm over rising antisemitic vandalism. Nevertheless, by the late 1960s, German school textbooks still lacked coverage of Poland and when they did describe the country, did so with negative images. The 1970s and 1980s, however, witnessed positive changes to the descriptions of Poland and German-Polish relations in German history textbooks.

Why did Germany adopt conciliatory historical narratives and textbook policies regarding Poland between the 1970s and 1980s when they had elected not to make such changes while making other significant edits in the 1960s? I argue that the progressive ruling coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democratic Party

(FDP) combined with Chancellor Brandt’s Ostpolitik paved the way for the emergence of the German-Polish History Textbook Commission. From its inception, the Textbook

Commission might have played a key role in realizing the positive changes in German history textbooks regarding Poland through active history dialogues. Conservative reaction against the Textbook Commission’s activities rose in the mid-1970s yet rapidly

193

declined in the early 1980s, and failed to reverse the improvements in German school

textbooks.

In this chapter, the negative historical legacies between Germany and Poland are

first outlined. Following that, light is shed upon the impact of the progressive SPD-FDP

governing coalition and Brandt’s Ostpolitik on the emergence of the Textbook

Commission. The Textbook Commission and its activities are then examined as is the

rise and fall of conservative reaction against its activism. Finally, the changes in German

historical narratives and textbook policies toward Poland are discussed.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Animosity between Germany and Poland dates back to the partition of Poland by Prussia,

Russia, and Austria between 1772 and 1795. Poles lived under colonial rule from then

until the end of World War I. During the colonial period, they lost “the right to use the

Polish language in public affairs and teach Polish literature and history in schools,

especially in Prussian and Russian held areas.” 540 Under such circumstances, it was

natural for the Polish nation to harbor antagonistic feelings toward Prussia/Germany.

Hostile perceptions of Germany reached their apex following the Nazi invasion and

occupation of Poland between 1939 and 1945, which resulted in the death of over six

million Polish citizens. 541

Germans, on the other hand, came to harbor negative images of the Poles upon witnessing the collapse of the Polish aristocratic state at the end of eighteenth century,

540 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” pp. 309-10. 541 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 29. 194

believing that Poles were disorderly, inefficient, and extravagant. 542 These unfavorable

sentiments significantly worsened after millions of Germans were expelled from

Prussia’s eastern territory (the region east of the Oder-Neisse River) in the wake of World

War II. These mass expulsions were driven by the Allies’ assertion that “Poland was

deprived of half of its territory in the East and received extensive German territory in the

West as compensation.” 543 During the subsequent two decades, Poland strove to defend

its newly established border, whereas the German Federal Republic did not recognize the

Oder-Neisse border. 544

THE PROGRESSIVE SPD-FDP COALITION AND ITS OSTPOLITIK

The end of the SPD’s grand coalition with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and

the Christian Social Union (CSU) in 1969 marked a substantial political change in West

Germany.545 In its place, an SPD-led coalition with the FDP arose and took control of the

Bundestag with Willy Brandt assuming the role of chancellor. The FDP’s move to the left played a critical role in the establishment of this new coalition. To cope with serious internal strain, the FDP, which had once shown a nationalist orientation, sought to replace its old CDU allegiance with the formation of a coalition government with the SPD.546 As

William Griffith notes, this regime change was, to some extent, derived from “West

542 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 29. 543 Wlodzimierz Borodziej, “Co-operation in History Textbook Writing: The Polish-German Experience” in Korean Commission for UNESCO, ed., Final Report of UNESCO Forum on History Textbooks for the 21 st Century , pp. 1-2. 544 Seung-ryol Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa: Dokil-Poland Y ǒksa Kyokwas ǒ Daehwa” [National History through Two Views: German-Polish History Textbook Dialogue] in Jubaek Shin, ed., Dong Asia eseo Y ŏksa Insik ŭi Kukkyung Neomki [Crossing the Border of Historical Understanding in East Asia], (Asia Peace and History Education Research Association, 2008), pp. 167-69. 545 Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer, “Ostpolitik and the World, 1969-1974: Introduction” in Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer, eds., Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 5. 546 Fink and Schaefer, “Ostpolitik and the World, 1969-1974,” p. 5. 195

German modernization, urbanization, and secularization, which strengthened its

willingness to change and the belief that change could be effective.” 547 This change reflected the SPD’s gradual rise since 1959, when the party had begun to attract the middle class through strategies like “nationalization of industry and neutralization in foreign policy.”

The transfer of political power to the new SPD-FDP coalition contributed to the adoption of a new policy toward the Eastern bloc (so-called Ostpolitik) that the SPD had publicized since the 1960s. Between 1966 and 1969, the grand CDU/CSU and SPD coalition promoted Ostpolitik, but had failed to yield successful outcomes. The

CDU/CSU opposition prevented the grand coalition from making the minimal concessions—recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and East Germany—that Moscow requested. 548 The SPD-FDP coalition’s Ostpolitik differed, however, from the grand coalition’s version in the following aspects. First, the Brandt government elevated its new Ostpolitik to the same priority level as West European unification and the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Second, the new coalition laid considerable importance on détente with the Soviet Union, East Germany, and other East European countries. Adopting such realistic policy priorities did not mean the abandonment of the coalition’s ultimate goals of self-determination and reunification, but was rather a sign that they recognized that they could be accomplished only in the very long term. 549

Certainly, the East-West détente that significantly weakened inter-bloc confrontation between the two superpower rivals—the United States and the Soviet

Union—constituted a favorable international environment for the Brandt government to

547 William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (The MIT Press, 1978), p. 173. 548 Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany , pp. 169-70. 549 Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany , pp. 174-81. 196

conduct a more open-minded and flexible type of Ostpolitik. 550 From the late 1960s

through the mid-1970s, both superpowers sought to diminish the risk of large-scale

armed conflicts through negotiations and inter-bloc agreements including the May 1972

Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). 551 As Thomas Banchoff notes, NATO and

Warsaw Pact states jointly established the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe (CSCE) and initiated Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks (MBFR).

Given these international détente efforts, the Brandt government could safely seek to promote inter-Germany contacts through a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union and its

Eastern European allies.

Brandt’s Ostpolitik was rooted in both moral and political considerations. Brandt preferred to openly confront Germany’s Nazi past and supported both dialogue with

Israel and reparations in the early postwar period, though the SPD played down the memory issue after its defeat in the 1949 elections. 552 Brandt also wished to address the atrocities of World War II by restoring diplomatic relations with East European countries. 553 As foreign minister for the grand coalition, Brandt declared in 1968 that

“Bonn must respect and recognize the existing boundaries in Europe, including the

Western boundary of Poland (the Oder-Neisse line).”554 Deeply cognizant of

550 Fink and Schaefer, “Ostpolitik and the World, 1969-1974,” p. 5. 551 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” 339-41; Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 61-68. 552 Mike Mochizuki, “Regional Reconciliation: East Asia versus Europe,” Charles Burress and Mike Mochizuki, ed., Reconciling Rivals: War, Memory and Security in East Asia , Chapter 17. 553 Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, “Ostpolitik and Poland” in Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer, eds., Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and Global Responses (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 40. 554 Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany , p. 149. 197

contemporary political and territorial circumstances, Brandt recognized that “this status

quo could not be changed through force or a policy of isolation.”555

Particularly striking in Brandt’s efforts to reconcile with Poland was his kneeling before the Monument to Heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto in 1970. According to Krzysztof

Ruchniewicz, “Chancellor Brandt’s visit to Poland in December 1970 was expected to be a routine event: an official greeting at the airport, the laying of wreaths, the signing of the

Warsaw Treaty, and holding political talks with Gomulka. The visit was to end with a press conference.”556 The unexpected, however, took place during Brandt’s ceremonial activities. As a gesture of contrition, Brandt fell to his knees in front of the Ghetto monument after laying a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. His longing for reconciliation with Poland, additionally, is clearly illustrated in one of his contemporary publications:

Recognition of Poland’s western border is a key element of our proposal to renounce the use of force against our neighbors. Good relations with Poland are particularly important for us. Precisely as our relations with France are a pillar in our policy toward the West they are a pillar in our policy toward the East. Our position toward this country, which has a proud tradition in European history, also stems from the fact it suffered particularly heavily due to [Germany’s] aggression. We recognize Poland’s striving to ensure its existence at last within secure borders and its aversion to being a ‘state on wheels.’ Reconciliation with Poland is our moral and political duty. 557

Brandt’s Ostpolitik still, however, addressed the concerns of Realpolitik. As Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer note, “Willy Brandt’s initiatives emerged from his frustration with the Cold War stalemate in Europe. With the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961,

Germany’s division was tightly sealed. Brandt and his close adviser Egon Bahr

555 Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, Germany’s Foreign Policy towards Poland and the Czech Republic: Ostpolitik Revisited (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 132. 556 Ruchniewicz, “Ostpolitik and Poland,” pp. 45-46. 557 Willy Brandt, Friedenspolitik in Europa (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1968), p. 186. Quoted in Ruchniewicz, “Ostpolitik and Poland” p. 40. 198

recognized that the German problem would not be solved by the superpowers, who

seemed content with the two-state-solution.” 558 Based on their recognition that this status quo was unlikely to be altered by other actors, Brandt and Bahr sought to make their nation an active player capable of pursuing its own interests by creating a new approach to managing the Cold War system. As the result of their new brand of Ostpolitik, the

SPD-FDP coalition was able to sign bilateral treaties with Moscow and Warsaw in 1970 and ratify them in the Bundestag two years later. 559 After concluding a Basic Treaty in late 1972, both Germanys simultaneously became members of the United Nations in

September 1973. Subsequently, the Brandt government established diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

The continuity of Brandt’s Ostpolitik between 1969 and 1989 is notable, surviving despite the transition from a social-liberal to a conservative-liberal coalition government in 1982-83. 560 This power transfer led to a change of rhetoric, with new

Chancellor Helmut Kohl putting greater emphasis on Western integration and reunification. Without significant deviation, however, the conservative coalition government actually continued to pursue the Brandt-era Ostpolitik in its relations with

East Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. As Yinan He notes, Brandt’s

Ostpolitik left a profound legacy, “which had convinced many Germans, including conservative elites, that Germany’s democracy, national security, and unification all hinged on its reconciliation with the eastern neighboring countries.” 561 In this regard,

Timothy Garton Ash states, “there is no break in the continuity of Brandt’s Ostpolitik.

558 Fink and Schaefer, “Ostpolitik and the World, 1969-1974,” p. 2. 559 Fink and Schaefer, “Ostpolitik and the World, 1969-1974,” p. 4. 560 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 31-34. 561 He, The Search for Reconciliation , p. 92. 199

As Brandt laid it down, and Schmidt played it in, so it is advanced by Kohl. Kohl

himself also had declared: despite all the party-political disputes of the last decades, we

may speak in this connection, with pride, of our policy.” 562 Hence, the progressive SPD-

FDP ruling coalition and Brandt’s Ostpolitik provided the favorable political environment necessary to the emergence of the German-Polish History Textbook Commission and the important work it undertook from the early 1970s.

THE GERMAN-POLISH HISTORY TEXTBOOK COMMISSION’S TYPE II TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM

The first attempt to initiate a history textbook dialogue dates back to the mid 1930s, when

Józef Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany at the time, proposed the creation of a

German-Polish Common Commission in order to address the anti-Polish views prevalent in German textbooks. 563 Despite Germany’s reluctance, the Lipski proposal finally produced a series of meetings on German-Polish history textbook issues between 1937 and 1938. In theses dialogues, the Germans tried to modify the descriptions of German history in Polish textbooks, whereas the Poles actively sought to insert more Poland- related content, including the role of Poland in Eastern Europe, into the German textbooks. Although showing, to some extent, the potential for revising both states’ textbooks, the dialogues ended without success due to worsening political circumstances, such as the annexation of Austria by Germany in the late 1930s.

In the 1950s, however, Enno Meyer—a German high-school history teacher— made great efforts to resume the textbook dialogue and revise insufficient, biased

562 Ash, In Europe’s Name , p. 33. 563 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 67-69. 200

descriptions in both German and Polish history textbooks. 564 In March 1956, he issued a

book with forty-seven themes criticizing aspects of both nations’ textbooks (particularly

Germany’s) with the support of exiled Polish historians and the Braunschweig-based

Georg-Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research. Meyer’s critiques brought

positive responses from both German and Polish historians. In a letter sent to Meyer, for

instance, a Polish professor stated, “although having different views over some points, I

would put much emphasis on your strong will to gain the objectivity. I anticipate that we

succeed in attaining the promotion of mutual understanding through persistent academic

works regarding German and Polish history.” 565 Despite these efforts, however, hopes

for a bilateral historians’ dialogue were suddenly dampened by the Warsaw Pact’s

intervention of the Hungarian Revolution in November 1956 that also strained Poland’s

relationship with the West. 566

A turning point for bilateral textbook dialogue occurred with the establishment of the German-Polish History Textbook Commission in 1970 under the auspices of the

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).567 As noted earlier, Brandt’s Ostpolitik laid the groundwork for the launch of the Textbook

Commission, as in the 1970 Warsaw Treaty the Brandt government formally recognized the Oder-Neisse border that had long constituted the most provocative problem in the

564 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 70-81. 565 Enno Meyer, Wie ich dazu gekommen bin: Die Vorgeschichte der deutsch-polnischen Schulbuchgesprache 1948-1971 (Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert Institute, 1988), pp. 35-36. Quoted in Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 78. 566 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 355. 567 Robert Maier, “Minjokju ŭij ŏk Y ŏksahak ŭi Munje wa Keukbok [Problem and Resolution of Nationalistic History Studies]” in Jubaek Shin, ed., Dong Asia eseo Y ŏksa Insik ŭi Kukkyung Neomki [Crossing the Border of Historical Understanding in East Asia], (Seoul: Asia Peace and History Education Research Association, 2008), pp. 231-33. 201 bilateral relationship.568 A current member of the Textbook Commission suggests that without political support from the Brandt government, the Textbook Commission could not have emerged in the 1970s. 569 Under such relatively favorable political circumstance,

Georg Eckert, who had taken a leading part in the Franco-German textbook dialogue in the 1950s, played a pivotal role in establishing the German-Polish Textbook

Commission. 570 In 1965 Eckert went to Warsaw with a German delegation in order to conduct an informal dialogue concerning mutual textbook revision and the initiation of historians’ conference, yet failed to attain practical outcomes. At the 1970 UNESCO

General Conference held in Paris, Eckert—then chair of the German Commission for

UNESCO—discussed the possibility of improving both nations’ history textbooks through academic exchanges with his Polish counterpart, Wladyslaw Markiewicz.

Following a year’s preparations, the Textbook Commission was officially launched in

February 1972 when the German and Polish delegations met in Warsaw to initiate the bilateral textbook dialogue. Given the spirit of the UNESCO, they agreed to participate in the dialogue to promote peace and mutual understanding.

Operation and Activities of the Textbook Commission

The German-Polish History Textbook Commission was based on the following two principles. First, both German and Polish views should be considered with balance in discussing all cases. 571 According to Seung-ryol Kim, a Korean expert on German history, historians from both countries who participated in the Textbook Commission

568 Borodziej, “Co-operation in History Textbook Writing,” p. 2. 569 Interview No. 35, Braunschweig, May 6, 2009. 570 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 85-87. 571 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” pp. 176-78. 202 analyzed how their national and relational history was described in their counterpart’s textbooks. After presenting and comparing their research results, the participants sought to find divergent historical interpretations and important but overlooked historical facts.

Not only did they strive to ameliorate factual errors, but they also aimed to extract common historical interpretations. If they failed to reach consensus, however, they offered descriptions of different narratives simultaneously.

The second foundational principle of the commission was its independence from governmental influence, particularly on the German side. 572 With political backing, West

Germany’s foreign ministry provided the Textbook Commission with financial support for such activities as academic conferences and publications. Keeping the government’s influence in check, however, required that a chair of the German Commission for

UNESCO be solely in charge of holding the Commission’s scholarly workshops.

Afforded protection by the UNESCO umbrella, the Textbook Commission itself decided the themes, contents, and participants of the meetings, thus minimizing the impact of federal and local governments. The way in which members of the UNESCO

Commission selected its chair also played important roles in preventing the exertion of political pressure.573 Even after the CDU-led coalition government took power in 1982, the Textbook Commission was largely kept independent from governmental influence without any changes in concept or members. Chancellor Kohl stated, “All of us want reconciliation and understanding with Poland. I evaluate that the activities of the

Textbook Commission have significantly contributed to the German-Polish reconciliation.

572 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past” p. 356; Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” p. 179: It is usually speculated that the communist government of Poland intervened in the activities of the Polish Textbook Commission. 573 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 88-89. 203

This commonly applies to both German and Polish participants in the bilateral textbook

dialogue.” 574

During the 1972-1975 textbook dialogue, the German-Polish Textbook

Commission at times witnessed tough, emotional discussions and nearly underwent a

negotiations breakdown in its last phase. 575 One of the most controversial issues was the

debate over the concept of “expulsion” (Vertreibung). Instead of that strongly evocative

word, Polish members of the Textbook Commission preferred the use of “forced moving”

(Zwangsaussiedlung), “residents’ transfer” (Bevölkerungverschiebung), and “evacuation”

(Evakuierung).576 All of the German members, on the other hand, insisted on using

“expulsion,” as the notion corresponded most closely with the past experiences of

approximately ten million Germans. This deadlock was ultimately resolved thanks to

Germany’s conceding that the process of “expulsion” would be divided into four stages:

refuge (Flucht), evacuation, forced moving, and migration. As Robert Maier posits,

personal will and the friendship between the Commission leaders—i.e. Eckert and

Markiewicz—played a key role in breaking through the stalemate. 577

Through these efforts, in April 1976 the Textbook Commission published the

“Recommendations on History and Geography Textbooks” (hereafter Recommendations), which were “uniform proposals for the authors of textbooks and history researchers in both countries.” 578 To achieve the publication of the Recommendations, German and

Polish historians held scholarly meetings twice a year between 1972 and 1975 in Warsaw

574 Thomas Strobel, “Die gemeinsame deutsch-polnische Schulbuchkommission 1972-1989: Ein spezifischer Beitrag zur Ost-West-Verständigung,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte , 45. 2005, pp. 263-64. Quoted in Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 92. 575 Interview No. 37, Braunschweig, May 11, 2009; Wlodzimierz Borodziej, “The German-Polish Textbook Dialogue,” in Andrew Horvat, ed., Sharing the burden of the past (Asia Foundation, 2003), p. 37. 576 Maier, “Minjokju ŭij ŏk Y ŏksahak ŭi Munje wa Keukbok,” p. 238. 577 Maier, “Minjokju ŭij ŏk Y ŏksahak ŭi Munje wa Keukbok,” p. 233. 578 Borodziej, “Co-operation in History Textbook Writing,” p. 2. 204

and Braunschweig alternately, discussing German-Polish relations covered in their

history and geography textbooks. As Yinan He explains, “the Recommendations

included 26 topics ranging from the Teutonic Knights in the ancient history, to the three

partitions of Poland in the 18 th century and Polish nation’s struggle for independence,

Nazi occupation and Polish resistance movement, and such contemporary events as the

postwar territorial alterations, and migration of ethnic Germans.” 579 The next section explores the primary characteristics of the Recommendations.

Characteristics of the Common Recommendations

The cornerstone of the Recommendations was the recognition of Germany’s past wrongs and the Oder-Neisse border. 580 The ninth clause of the Recommendations, for instance, expressed the partition of Poland in the 18 th century: “to bridge divided territories,

Frederick II—king of Prussia—made use of Europe’s political situation advantageous to himself and pursued the first Polish partition in 1772. The Polish partition treaty was politically important to Prussia. Prussia’s participation in the Polish partition was the consequence of Frederick II’s power politics (Machtpolitik).” 581 Its thirteenth clause articulated Bismarck’s oppressive policies toward Poland by stating “in dealing with

Prussian policy to Poland, one should mention cultural strives and suppressive actions such as the abolition of Polish classes and the deportation of people without Prussian

579 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 356. 580 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” pp. 180-83. 581 Klaus Zernack, “Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Uiwonhoi ŭi Kongdong Kwonkoan [Common Recommendations of the German-Polish Textbook Commission] (1976),” in Unsuk Han, ed., Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ [Beyond the Division of Victimization and Victimhood: Path of German-Polish Historical Reconciliation], (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008), pp. 246-47. 205 nationality.” 582 Fully three of the Recommendations’ clauses (the 19th, 20th, and 24th), acknowledged the Nazi’s aggression and oppression of Poland.

After the failure of making Poland a satellite state, Hitler decided to wage a war against Poland to resolve the issue in 1939. The Danzig problem was just an excuse to him. In this situation, Poland had to give up its independence or defend itself. [19 th ] In the case of the Second World War, one should adequately describe the Nazi’s occupation policy and its results imposed on the Polish people. And it must be clearly shown that Hitler’s ultimate goal was not so much the dissolution of the Polish state as the removal of Polish intellectuals and culture, the suppression of the Polish people, and the colonial rule over Poland. [20 th ] The Nazi’s violent rule over Poland served as a long burden in German- Polish relations. Due to Hitler’s oppression politics, Poland underwent far more serious sacrifice than other occupied countries [24 th ]. 583

The 21st and 26th clauses showed that both German and Polish sides reached a final

agreement about the formation of the Oder-Neisse border. According to the 21st clause,

“the Potsdam Conference was unable to resolve the opposition of various views regarding

the scope of Poland’s new west territory. The Allied Powers, however, conceded that

prior to the Conference, the national sovereignty of the region had already been

transferred to the Polish authorities.” 584 Additionally, it expressed that “there had been

sharply opposing interpretations of the Potsdam decision in the Cold War period until the

mid 1950s. After the beginning of détente policies, public recognition of the territorial

changes caused by World War II increased among western Allied Powers and finally

West Germany.” The 26th clause, which described the normalization process between

the two states, stated:

From the February of 1970, systematic negotiations began due to Poland’s proposal in May 1969. As a result, the Warsaw Treaty was concluded between the People’s Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany on December 7, 1972. During the process, the two states recognized the previous borderline settled in the Potsdam Agreement as the Polish western border. With the unconditional respect of territorial perfection, both nations confirmed that the current borderline would not be intruded now and in the future. They declared

582 Zernack, “Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Uiwonhoi ŭi Kongdong Kwonkoan,” p. 250. 583 Zernack, “Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Uiwonhoi ŭi Kongdong Kwonkoan,” p. 259 and pp. 264-65. 584 Zernack, “Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Uiwonhoi ŭi Kongdong Kwonkoan, p. 260. 206

that they would never lay claim to each other’s territory. The Warsaw Treaty laid groundwork for fundamentally normalizing and improving the German-Polish relationship. 585

Given basic framework outlined in the Recommendations, the two sides were able to critically examine their own views concerning excessive nationalism and negative

historical images of each other. 586 In this regard, some clauses in the Recommendations

were intended to dissolve the mythification of national history. As Seung-ryol Kim

explains, for example, the first clause criticized a historical narrative that claimed the

historical sovereignty of the German-Polish borderland based on ancient history.

Escaping from a Western Europe-centered historical view, the second clause put equal

emphasis on the state formation of Poland and West European countries in medieval

times. 587 The fifth clause contributed to removing, to some extent, the prejudice that

German immigrants were not only the messengers of a developed culture but also the

possessors of excellent skills that developed barren lands that the Poles had been unable

to cultivate in medieval times. 588

The Textbook Commission also strove to clarify the truth of fixed, mythified

historical images. The most well-known negative images of Poland included expressions

such as “Polish Empire Assembly” and “Polish Economy.” According to Kim, the

former symbolized the chaotic and divided Poland that resulted from the aristocracy’s

exercise of unconstrained veto power (liberum veto). 589 Prussians thought that the division of Poland was a primary reason of why the Polish Aristocratic Republic collapsed at the end of 18 th century. The latter came to describe anarchic and unclean

585 Zernack, “Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Uiwonhoi ŭi Kongdong Kwonkoan, p. 267. 586 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” pp. 183-85. 587 Zernack, “Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Uiwonhoi ŭi Kongdong Kwonkoan,” p. 239. 588 Zernack, “Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Uiwonhoi ŭi Kongdong Kwonkoan,” p. 242. 589 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” pp. 186-87; Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 35-40. 207

conditions as well as ineffective and wasteful attitudes, in contrast to Germans’ superior

nature like order/diligence/frugality. After World War I, moreover, the Germans came to

hold additional negative perception of the Poles, believing that they had imposed

atrocities on the German people who had lived as a minority in Polish territory. By the

same token, the Poles held negative images of the Germans, including that they were

corrupt, brutal burglars, and swindlers. 590 These images gradually strengthened

following Bismarck’s oppressive policies towards Poland. Following WWII and Nazi

aggression, these perceptions had come to dominate the Poles’ images of the Germans.

Many clauses of the Recommendations, consequently, tried to ameliorate these

negative historical images. 591 For instance, the seventh clause demanded the active consideration of the independent development and achievements of Polish culture in

German history education. 592 The eighth clause expressed the excellence of the Poles: “it should be emphasized that during the Age of Enlightenment, Poland was one of the most dynamic centers in European culture. For example, the Knights School and the National

Education Commission established in 1765 and 1773 respectively were pioneering works in Europe.” 593 The tenth clause also highlighted the Poles’ desire for independence and their untrammeled spirit, stating, “after losing independence, the Polish nation was not satisfied with the occupation of foreign powers. Rather, they launched a campaign for freedom and independence.” 594 In the 20th clause, an attempt to modify negative images of the Germans was revealed: “it is appropriate to distinguish the German from a fascist

590 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” p. 187. 591 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” p. 188. 592 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 244. 593 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 246. 594 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 247. 208

and to regard Germany’s resistance toward the Nazi as a part of the great European

resistance movement in Polish textbooks.” 595

Despite their laudable contents, the usefulness of the Recommendations was constrained by their avoidance of certain sensitive topics, including the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Katyn Massacre due to Cold War constraints and

Polish government pressure. 596 The German members of the Textbook Commission recognized that the Polish members were limited by the pressure exerted by the Soviet

Union. The Polish government ordered its textbook commission members to be very cautious when dealing with these delicate issues.597 Due to these considerations for the

Soviet Union, therefore, the Textbook Commission had to informally discuss such topics and ultimately excluded them from the Recommendations completely.

German-Polish Textbook Dialogue after the Recommendations

The Textbook Commission regarded the Recommendations as the foundation for future dialogue, rather than the final result of their work. Thus, the both sides decided to hold annual symposia, in Germany and Poland alternately, at the 9th commission meeting in

1976. The main goal of the symposia was to provide teachers and textbook authors with more detailed information on the themes of the Recommendations by introducing more in-depth research products. 598 Following the scheme, as illustrated in Table 4, historians from both nations gathered annually to deal with important periods and themes in the bilateral relationship. After each meeting, they published their research in both countries

595 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 260. 596 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 358. 597 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 105-06; Borodziej, “Co-operation in History Textbook Writing,” p. 4. 598 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 119-21. 209 at the same time. While previous meetings had demonstrated the two sides’ strong desire to justify descriptions of their own national history, the subsequent symposia failed to produce such phenomenon. This was possible, Unsuk Han has posited, because experts had been able to overcome national prejudices and build mutual understanding through active dialogue in the preceding nine meetings between 1972 and 1976. A German member of the Textbook Commission stated that both sides made it possible to reach significantly more similar historical narratives through their continued discussions in the

1980s.” 599

Table 4. German-Polish Textbook Dialogue (1977-89) 600 Date Place Theme Participants Ger Pol 10 6/ 2-5, 1977 Langkut (P) German/Polish resistance movement 15 20 during WWII 11 5/ 16-21, 1978 Deidesheim (G) German-Polish relations between 1831 20 11 and 1848 12 6/ 5-10, 1979 Olsztyn (P) Roles of Schlesien and Pommern in G-P N/A N/A relations in Medieval Ages 13 5/ 27-6/1, 1980 Munster (G) Poland and Germany in the 21 16 Enlightenment Ages, reforms in constitution and education 14 6/ 9-14, 1981 Zamosc (P) Schlesien and Pommern in German- N/A N/A Polish relations between 16 th and 18 th century 15 11/ 16-20, 1982 Braunschweig National history in historical descriptions 20 17 (G) of Germany and Poland 16 5/ 25-29, 1983 Warsaw (P) German and Polish industrialization until N/A N/A 1914, social upheavals, labor movement 17 6/ 11-17, 1984 Augusburg(G) German-Polish relations between 1919 19 14 and 1932 18 5/ 28-6/ 2, 1985 Novogard (P) Germany and Poland between the Nazis’ 16 22 emergence and the end of World War II 19 5/ 20-25, 1986 Saarbrücken German-Polish relations until the 1975 19 19 (G) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 20 6/ 1-6, 1987 Poznan (P) Academic accomplishments of German- 17 35 Polish history dialogue 21 5/ 24-29, 1988 Oldenburg(G) Educational accomplishments of German- 18 20 Polish history dialogue

599 Interview No. 37, Braunschweig, May 11, 2009. 600 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 136-37. 210

In the 1990s, the Textbook Commission aimed to attain its original purpose—i.e.

to fundamentally improve school textbooks and classroom teaching. Indeed, while the

symposia of the 1980s served as a means of academically supplementing the (briefly

described) Recommendations, they had failed to produce an effective educational

instrument to convey the content of the Recommendations. 601 Hoping to remedy this, in

1989 the Textbook Commission agreed to publish “a handbook for teachers

(Lehrerhandbuch )” on German-Polish relations after the Middle Ages. To achieve this goal, a group of 36 historians from both countries had to closely cooperate with one another for a decade, all the while adjusting their different perspectives and choosing mutually acceptable historical documents. Ultimately, these efforts resulted in the publication of a teachers’ handbook in 2001, which consisted of analysis, pedagogical self-reflection, and documents. The handbook thus offered practical aid to teachers in the classroom. Moving beyond production of the handbook, furthermore, the German and

Polish governments agreed to issue a joint history textbook by 2011, following the example of the Franco-German common history textbook published in 2006. 602

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CONSERVATIVE REACTION

The advent of the Recommendations in the mid 1970s brought about very different responses from German and Polish societies. In Poland, the Recommendations only had a circulation of several thousands due to the authorities’ opposition of a wider distribution. 603 Additionally, there was no lively discussion or critique over the contents

601 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, pp. 133-35. 602 Unsuk Han, Dokil ui Yoksa Hwahae wa Yoksa Kyoyuk [Germany’s Historical Reconciliation and History Education] (Seoul: Shinseowon, 2008), pp. 337-56. 603 Borodziej, “Co-operation in History Textbook Writing,” p. 5. 211

of the Recommendations, as Poland’s civil society was quite stunted under the

communist dictatorship of the period. 604 Instead, Polish society’s primary concern was over the extent to which West Germany incorporated the Recommendations into its school textbooks and classrooms. 605 This focus was well illustrated in the statement of a

Polish journalist who stated, “The Germans should support the Textbook Commission’s efforts more actively than they have until now in order to transform the scholars’ endeavors into constructive results. That is, the Commission’s theoretical accomplishments are preceding the advance of practical textbook changes in West

Germany.” 606 The Polish focus on righting German wrongs was further illustrated when

Wladyslaw Markiewicz, then the chair of the Polish Textbook Commission, resigned in

1983 following accusations of being excessively concessionary towards the Germans. 607

In the German public sphere, on the other hand, controversial and persistent

debates over the contents of the Recommendations and their implementation took place

in the 1970s.608 A former member of the Textbook Commission notes that at the time

there were four different positions regarding the Recommendations in German society:

(1) to fully accept the Recommendations as a rule; (2) to largely accept their spirit,

though not word by word; (3) to accept some parts of the Recommendations yet discard

others; and (4) to completely disregard them. 609 Among the active participants in these

debates were the German Bundestag (Federal Diet)/the Landtags (State Diets), high-

604 Adam Krzeminski, “Poland Unron es ŏ ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Munje [German-Polish Textbook Problem in the Polish Media], translated into Korean by Seung-ryol Kim, in Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, ed., Zum wissenschaftlichen Ertrag der deutsch-polnischen Schulbuchkonferenzen der Historiker 1972-1987 (Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert Institute, 1989), p. 173-86. 605 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” p. 194. 606 Krzeminski, “Poland Unron es ŏ ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Munje,”p. 179. 607 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 108. 608 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 101. 609 Interview No. 37, Braunschweig, May 11, 2009. 212 ranking politicians, the League of History Teachers, the Education Labor Union, the

Society of Textbook Publication, and the Association of Expellees. 610 Through interviews and newspaper articles, many German members of the Textbook Commission not only offered their own views on the textbook negotiations and the Recommendations, but also sought to correct inaccurate information and intentional distortion of their works.

The Teachers’ Labor Union and churches in particular supported the Recommendations and the Commission’s activities. The former was one of highly influential groups in

German society in the 1970s and the latter had made great efforts to improve German-

Polish relations from the 1960s. 611

As Jörg Hoensch illustrates, members of the mass media, including broadcasting, national/local newspapers, and magazines, also covered the activities of the Textbook

Commission, the contents and problems of the Recommendations, and the serious disputes surrounding these issues in detail. For instance, while TV news programs announced the process of the textbook negotiations, many other programs for current political affairs, such as ARD’s Weltspiegel and ZDF’s Auslandsjournal, offered in-depth and practical analysis of the Textbook Commission’s activities. Frankfurter Allgemeine

Zeitung and Die Welt were most active national newspapers that dealt with the issues.

Among the weekly magazines to offer comments on the Recommendations were Die

Zeit, Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Das Parlament, and Deutsche National-

Zeitung .612 In the academic arena, many doctoral dissertations also dealt with the

610 Jörg K. Hoensch, “Seodok Y ǒron es ǒ ui Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ǒ Kwonkoan e daehan Nonui [Discussion of the German-Polish Textbook Recommendations in West German Public Opinion],” translated into Korean by Seung-ryol Kim, in Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, ed., Zum wissenschaftlichen Ertrag der deutsch-polnischen Schulbuchkonferenzen der Historiker 1972-1987 (Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert Institute, 1989), p. 147. 611 Interview No. 37, Braunschweig, May 11, 2009. 612 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ǒron es ǒ ui Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ǒ Kwonkoan e daehan Nonui,” pp. 147-49. 213

educational concept of the Recommendations, providing a historical background of the

Commission’s works.

Conservative Linkage: CDU/CSU, the Expellee Association, and Media

The strongest antagonism to the Recommendations was primarily derived from anti-

communist conservatives in Germany. 613 Among the main opponents were the

Association of Expellees, the conservative opposition party CDU/CSU, and nationalist

newspapers such as Deutsche-National Zeitung. Their chief critiques can be summarized

with the following three points: (1) the German members of the Textbook Commission

overlooked historical truth and ceded excessive ground to the Polish national position; (2)

the German members were not composed of appropriate experts on East European issues;

and (3) the Recommendations trivialized the pain and sacrifice of expelled Germans by

using ‘transfer’ instead of the concept of expulsion explicitly. 614

Running counter to general media’s support of the Recommendations, Deutsche-

National Zeitung sharply censured the German participants in the textbook dialogue for

being the accomplices of Pan-Slavist agitators. 615 According to Hoensch, the newspaper

also denounced the participants as masochists—German historians who supported

Brandt’s humiliating diplomacy and sought to stamp out nationalism in German history

textbooks. 616 Similarly, Bayern-Kurier , a newspaper from Bavaria, where the CSU took

power, described the Recommendations as “distortion for the sake of amity.” It went on

to express that German students ran the risk of studying history based on the Polish

613 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” p. 190. 614 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 102-03. 615 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” pp. 357-58. 616 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ŏron eso ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Kwonkoan e daehan Non ŭi,” p. 153. 214

perspective in the future. Deutscher Ostdienst , the Association of Expellees’ newspaper, also articulated its concern that the history of German-Polish relations was being distorted to the advantage of Poland’s nationalist trend. The reason, the paper claimed, was because there had not been a balanced and suitable selection of experts on East

European countries in the Textbook Commission.

Herbert Hupka—a CDU member of the Bundestag and vice-chairman of the

Expellee Association—was one of most vocal figures to issue harsh criticisms of the

Textbook Commission and its Recommendations. He claimed that the Textbook

Commission sacrificed historical truth and sought to make unacceptable compromises through communist historical distortion. 617 According to him, the Recommendations followed the Polish intention to spread its communist views of history in textbook negotiations, due to German commission experts’ lack of academic capability and nationalist political consciousness. Hupka also asserted that with communist historians, it was not possible to conduct academic debates free from the influence of the Polish communist party.

Following the publication of the Recommendations in April 1976, serious disputes erupted over their implementation between the SPD and the CDU/CSU in each

Landtag (state diet). 618 Although the signing of a German-Polish cultural agreement in

1976 ensured that the Recommendations would be reflected in school textbooks, the federal government had no significant impact on the Lander (states) that were actually in charge of their own curricula. Most CDU/CSU members refused to adopt the

Recommendations because they thought that it would be improper for German historians

617 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ǒron es ǒ ui Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ǒ Kwonkoan e daehan Nonui,” pp. 154-55. 618 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 106; He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 356. 215 who held no political responsibility to discuss and decide politically sensitive national issues such as the Oder-Neisse border problem. 619 A CDU/CSU spokesman denounced federal chancellor Helmut Schmidt in February 1977 when he persuaded state governors to accept the Recommendations and sought to soothe the emotional debates on the topic. 620 The spokesman claimed that Chancellor Schmidt had no political and moral authority to usher in an agreement with the Polish communist dictator in school textbooks.

Once the federal government and education ministers in the SPD-led Länder declared it necessary to implement the Recommendations, conservative actors—i.e. the CDU, the

Expellee Association, and the nationalist media—accused the German members of the

Textbook Commission of violating the German constitution and eroding national interests. 621

The Bavarian Land, in particular, was strongly opposed to the acceptance of the

Recommendations. In an article of the journal Schule & Wir , Bavaria’s education ministry declared it would not accept the Recommendations for several reasons.622 First, the article asserted, the Recommendations distorted the tremendous suffering and sacrifice the expelled Germans experienced by changing expulsion (Vertreibung) to transfer (Verschiebung). Second, they maintained a silence about the negative impact of the Soviet Union on the Hitler-Stalin Treaty and postwar territorial alterations. Third, given the recognition of East Germany as an independent state, the Recommendations were consistent with the communist view that two states were formed in the German territory in 1949. Therefore, CDU/CSU-controlled Länder such as Schleswig-Holstein,

619 Interview No. 36, Braunschweig, May 7, 2009. 620 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ŏron eso ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Kwonkoan e daehan Non ŭi,” p. 156. 621 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ǒron es ǒ ui Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ǒ Kwonkoan e daehan Nonui,” p. 155. 622 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 107. 216

Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg, which had a large proportion of refugees and expellees,

were opposed to the Recommendations. On the other hand, Länder ruled by the SPD,

including North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg, Bremen, Hessen, and West Berlin,

supported the Recommendations as the guidelines for textbook authorization and as a

reference for classroom teaching. 623

It is important to note that the German conservatives’ opposition to the

Recommendations constituted a part of their larger opposition to the SPD-FDP coalition

government’s Ostpolitik. 624 A German scholar argues that because Brandt’s Ostpolitik

was ascendant in the early and mid-1970s, the opposition party CDU/CSU aimed to

regain its power by attacking the Recommendations. 625 Hoensch also raised the

possibility that the Association of Expellees, which had been politically defeated in the

battle to create and implement the Warsaw Treaty, longed to restore lost territories and, at

least, secure compensation by harshly criticizing the Recommendations in a new

battleground—textbook revision. 626 As the conservatives’ attack reached its zenith, the

Expellee Association published the Alternative Recommendations for the Treatment of

German-Polish History in Textbooks in 1978.

The previous critiques placed much weight on the contemporary history included

in the Recommendations, yet these Alternative Recommendations—authored primarily

by Professor Josef Menzel of Mainz University—covered much longer periods, striving

to inspire a German nationalist perspective. 627 Reaching back into the past as far as

possible, the Alternative Recommendations buttressed the historical justifications for

623 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 357. 624 Interview No. 35, Braunschweig, May 6, 2009. 625 Interview No. 37, Braunschweig, May 11, 2009. 626 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ŏron eso ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Kwonkoan e daehan Non ŭi,” p. 158. 627 Han, Kahae wa Pihae ŭi Kubun ul Neom ŏ, p. 107-08. 217

German claims over its former eastern regions. 628 In interpreting German influence in

Eastern Europe, Menzel’s report also highlighted the superiority of German culture in terms of politics, law, economics, and organizations that had greatly contributed to the civilization of the eastern areas. The Alternative Recommendations, furthermore, put great emphasis on the following points: (1) although the Warsaw Treaty recognized the

Oder-Neisse border, its effect became diluted in the process of Germany’s domestic debates; (2) all Germans who moved to West Germany from the eastern region of the

Oder-Neisse border after World War II were expellees; (3) many human casualties took place during the expulsion process; (4) the role of Russia or the Soviet Union was larger than that of Germany in the partition of Poland and the Nazis’ aggression toward Poland; and (5) there were Nazi sympathizers in Poland. 629

The Weakening of Conservative Camps in the 1980s

The appearance of the conservatives’ Alternative Recommendations attracted some public attention in the late 1970s. The Expellee Association and its supporters praised

Menzel’s report as a usable alternative to the Recommendations produced by the

Textbook Commission that conservatives had deemed unacceptable. The Alternative

Recommendations, they also asserted, corrected a distorted history, thus helping to restore the historical truth. 630 As Hoensch explains, this support was immediately reported in a variety of media, including Die Welt , Münichner Merkur, Mainzer

Allgemeine Zeiting , and Bayern-Kurier . Additionally, Dr. Hupka—one of the

628 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ŏron eso ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Kwonkoan e daehan Non ŭi,” p. 159. 629 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” pp. 193-94. 630 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ŏron eso ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Kwonkoan e daehan Non ŭi,” p. 159. 218

Recommendations’ strongest opponents—worked to widely spread the justice of

Menzel’s report in the Bundestag, academic forums, and the press.

During the late 1970s, another political event contributed to the conservatives’

influence and discouraged the Recommendations’ supporters. In October 1978,

Chancellor Schmidt expressed a cautious, if inadequately informed, critique regarding

Polish attitudes at a convention of historians: “in textbook negotiations, the Polish

historians who received official authority from the state tended to fulfill their views more

resolutely than German counterparts without any restraints. Just as one should not

deceive the other, so one should not be deceived by the other.” 631 In response, the Polish

criticized German textbooks; claiming they were still steeped in a Cold War perspective.

With public backing for the Alternative Recommendations temporarily stronger, by the

beginning of 1979 it was difficult to find influential remarks supporting the commission’s

Recommendations.

Despite this unfavorable atmosphere, however, the German-Polish Textbook

Commission held successful discussions regarding the roles of Schlesien and Pommern

during the Middle Ages at the 12 th meeting held in June 1979. 632 According to Hoensch, a lawyer’s article in Frankerfurt Allgemeine Zeitung , titled “historical distortion in

German schools,” pointed out that previous critiques of the Recommendations had been too harsh and instigated debates in the newspaper’s letters page. This article served to create a public dialogue that turned the tide against the Alternative Recommendations.

Also, the FDP’s floor leader claimed in October 1979 that although it would not be right to literally enforce the Recommendations, Germany should incorporate their spirit into

631 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ŏron eso ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Kwonkoan e daehan Non ŭi,” p. 160. 632 Hoensch, “Seodok Yŏron eso ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Kwonkoan e daehan Non ŭi,” p. 160. 219

school textbooks within the framework of social and constitutional order. In the same

vein, the SPD’s floor leader proposed the use of school textbooks that reflected the

Recommendations and were in keeping with the spirit of the 1976 German-Polish cultural

agreement.

The early 1980s witnessed a significant weakening of the conservative campaign for the Alternative Recommendations due to several factors. First, there was a positive change in the Germans’ view of the Poles in the early 1980s. Following the eruption of

Solidarity Movement in Poland, the Germans began to develop sympathetic attitudes toward the Poles to the extent that even the conservative party CDU launched a campaign to help the Poles. 633 The second was the Kohl government’s adoption of a conciliatory textbook policy. Chancellor Kohl’s address in April 1985 played a pivotal role in neutralizing conservative attacks against the Textbook Commission and its

Recommendations. Kohl stated that the Textbook Commission greatly contributed to promoting mutual understanding and reconciliation with Germany’s East European neighbors. Kohl promised to fully support the activities of the Textbook Commission. 634

The third factor was the Alternative Recommendations’ failure to deeply permeate

German society, primarily because they were trite, and people’s perceptions had already begun to change thanks to the positive effect of the Recommendations. 635 Finally, as time went by, public concern over the textbook issues was weakening. 636

633 Interview Nos. 35 and 37, Braunschweig, May 6 and 11, 2009. 634 Hoensch, “Seodok Y ŏron eso ŭi Dokil-Poland Kyokwas ŏ Kwonkoan e daehan Non ŭi,” p. 161-62. 635 Interview No. 37, Braunschweig, May 11, 2009. 636 Interview No. 35, Braunschweig, May 6, 2009. 220

POSTWAR GERMAN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE AND TEXTBOOK POLICIES

Beginning in the late 1950s, West German history education underwent a momentous

change to reflect greater coverage of past atrocities. As Lind notes, “Early West German

history education (shaped by Allied educational reform) acknowledged Nazi aggression

and atrocities but emphasized the innocence and suffering of the German people.

Although the socialist opposition was arguing for more remembrance, the West German

people preferred not to think about the victims of Nazi terror.” 637 Local and federal

officials sought to address the inadequate treatment of Nazism in school textbooks upon

witnessing the rise of contemporary anti-Semitic vandalism, including desecration of

synagogues and Jewish cemeteries. To address this serious problem, educators and

officials issued directives for political education to prevent the rise of neo-Fascist youth

organizations. 638 The German government addressed foreign criticism of German

textbooks by taking part in multilateral textbook commissions sponsored by UNESCO.

Many schools also sought to adopt the first West German textbook, The Burden of Guilt:

A Short History of Germany, 1914-1945 that provided detailed and articulate descriptions

of the Nazi period.

Despite these notable changes, German school textbooks still lacked adequate

coverage of Poland and depicted Germany’s eastern neighbor with negative images prior

to the end of 1960s. According to Wlodzimierz Borodziej, “German textbooks devoted

very little space to Poland. When they did say something about the eastern neighbor,

they recalled the grievances suffered from the Treaty of Versailles to the so-called

637 Lind, Sorry States , pp. 112-13. 638 Lind, Sorry States , pp. 129-30. 221

expulsion of the German population from the former eastern lands after 1945.” 639 Kim

Seung-ryol also confirmed that coverage of Poland in German history education was very limited after the Second World War, yet what little German school textbooks did incorporate still maintained negative views of Poland. 640 Under these circumstances, then, ordinary German people held indifferent feelings toward Poland and these texts kept alive “the Weimar myth that the Poles were lazy, incompetent, and disgraceful.” 641

The 1970s-1980s, however, witnessed significant positive changes to the contents of German history textbooks, particularly their descriptions of Poland and German-Polish relations. A prominent example was the publication of the history textbook titled Die

Reise in die Vergangenheit (Trip to the Past ) in 1972. 642 The textbook’s introduction stated, “The descriptions of German-Polish relations in this text were based on the

Recommendations that the Textbook Commission had adopted.” 643 As Zbigniew Kulak notes, a teacher’s manual that accompanied the textbook ascribed Poland’s three partitions to its weakness, but also maintained that the partition process carried out by

Poland’s neighboring countries was violent and unjust. It also emphasized the necessity of overcoming the West Europe-centered historical perspective rooted in German history.

The teacher’s manual also quoted or cited the Recommendations four times to supplement explanations in textbooks for students. For instance, the student text states

639 Borodziej, “Co-operation in History Textbook Writing,” p. 5. 640 Kim, “Du Kae ǔi Sisun uro Barabon Minjoksa,” pp. 168-69. 641 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 358. 642 Borodziej, “Co-operation in History Textbook Writing,” p. 4: “In the Federal Republic, where there is no federal ministry of education and the schools are under the authority of the lands, there were numerous textbooks for each level of education and in each land.” 643 Zbigniew Kulak, “Seodok kwa Poland Sai ǔi Kyokwas ǒ Sujung ǔi Sungkwa mit Munje dul [Accomplishments and Problems of Textbook Revision between Germany and Poland]” translated into Korean by Seung-ryol Kim, in Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, ed., Zum wissenschaftlichen Ertrag der deutsch- polnischen Schulbuchkonferenzen der Historiker 1972-1987 (Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert Institute, 1989), p. 68. 222

“in the 10 th century, the Polish state was established in the eastern region of German

empire. Although it was initially divided and dependent on the German emperor, Poland

became a powerful state in the 14 th century.” The teacher’s manual added the following explanations: “the destiny of the Polish state is as varying as that of German-Polish relations and until today the interpretations of its history, especially of the Medieval Ages, considerably differ. Not until the beginning of 1972 did German and Polish representative historians make the Recommendations to deal with German-Polish relations in school textbooks of the both countries.” 644 With the inclusion of the full text of the Warsaw Treaty, the textbook also enabled a fuller discussion of the Brandt’s

Ostpolitik that greatly contributed to German reconciliation with Poland. 645

Consequently, the textbook corresponded well with the spirit of the Recommendations.

The development of the Recommendations in the 1970s might have played a key role in altering the content of German history textbooks. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer conceded that it would be hard to clearly demonstrate an exact causal nexus between the

Recommendations and text changes in school textbooks. 646 He posited, however, that the

Recommendations exerted great influence on textbook authors, examiners, and publishers, thereby helping to alter historical narratives in school textbooks. It was very important,

Ernst Hinrichs explained, for West Germany to accept the spirit of the Recommendations

644 Kulak, “Seodok kwa Poland Sai ǔi Kyokwas ǒ Sujung ǔi Sungkwa mit Munje dul, p. 66. 645 Kulak, “Seodok kwa Poland Sai ǔi Kyokwas ǒ Sujung ǔi Sungkwa mit Munje dul, p. 69. 646 Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, “1976 Ny ǒn Dokil-Poland Kwonkoan Balpyo ihu Dokil Y ǒksa Kyokwas ǒ ǔi Sujung [Revision of German History Textbooks after the 1976 German-Polish Recommendations],” translated into Korean by Seung-ryol Kim, in Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, ed., Zum wissenschaftlichen Ertrag der deutsch-polnischen Schulbuchkonferenzen der Historiker 1972-1987 (Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert Institute, 1989), p. 1. 223 in new editions of existing school textbooks as well as in newly published textbooks. 647

A German scholar also states that the Recommendations had a profound impact on

German society in the sense that the German people in the 1960s were not familiar with

Germany’s past maltreatment of the Poles, but this fact became basic knowledge following the release of the Recommendations. 648 Despite the absence of official Länder guidelines, a number of school teachers freely read the Recommendations and incorporated reflections from them in their history classes. In 1982, furthermore, the

Georg-Eckert Institute evaluated thirteen editions of history textbooks used by different

Länder, concluding that “the coverage of Poland reached the level of other major

European countries such as France, and showed the tendency to further expand. Also, more than 90 percent of the changes in the textbook clearly suggesting that West German textbook authors and publishers had incorporated the Recommendations into textbook production.” 649

Jacobmeyer undertook an in-depth analysis that showed the positive impact of the

Recommendations on German textbooks in their descriptions of Polish history and

German-Polish relations. 650 According to the study, textbook revision usually took place in parallel with the structure of the Recommendations. 14 out of 26 clauses in the

Recommendations dealt with the history of the 20 th century. Along with them, school textbooks underwent frequent revision to their contemporary history sections. After examining text changes in three history textbooks published between 1976 and 1988,

647 Ernst Hinrichs, “S ǒmun [Introduction]” translated into Korean by Seung-ryol Kim, in Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, ed., Zum wissenschaftlichen Ertrag der deutsch-polnischen Schulbuchkonferenzen der Historiker 1972-1987 (Braunschweig: Georg-Eckert Institute, 1989), p. iii. 648 Interview No. 37, Braunschweig, May 11, 2009. 649 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” p. 358. 650 Jacobmeyer, “1976 Ny ǒn Dokil-Poland Kwonkoan Balpyo ihu Dokil Y ǒksa Kyokwas ǒ ǔi Sujung,” pp. 4-63. 224

Jacobmeyer presented four different patterns in textbook revision: (1) more detailed descriptions of pre-existing information and the correction of wrong information; (2) the addition of omitted information; (3) the supplement of information over German-Polish relational history; and (4) the sophistication in the assessment of historical facts.

At the policy level, the SPD-FDP coalition government continued to support the transnational activism of the Textbook Commission and the conciliatory revision of history textbooks given the impetus of its Ostpolitik. The federal government made sure to reflect the Recommendations in school textbooks when signing a German-Polish cultural agreement in 1976. Even the transition from a social-liberal to a conservative- liberal coalition government in 1982-83 failed to prevent the Textbook Commission from making good on its goals. Chancellor Kohl, as noted earlier, promised to keep supporting the Commission’s activities in 1985.

On the state level, the SPD-controlled Länder continuously supported the

Recommendations, regarding them as guidelines for textbook authorization and as a key reference for classroom teaching. Länder governed by the CDU/CSU were initially opposed to the Recommendations but they began to express understanding of and respect to the efforts of the Textbook Commission in the late 1970s. As Yinan He explains, a

CDU-controlled Land Rheinland-Pfalz distributed both the Recommendations and

Menzel’s report to all secondary schools in the state.651 The state of Saarland was willing to accept the spirit of the Recommendations in history education. Even the government of Bavaria, which had most harshly opposed to the textbook cooperation, allowed the

Recommendations to be used as one type of teaching materials in schools.

651 He, “Overcoming Shadows of the Past,” pp. 357-58. 225

CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed the question of how and why Germany was able to employ conciliatory historical narratives and textbook policies toward Poland during the period of the 1970s-1980s. I found temporal correlations that suggest plausibility of some causal relationship. The SPD’s ascension and Brandt’s Ostpolitik provided the favorable political environment in which the German-Polish History Textbook Commission emerged in the early 1970s. Under the auspices of the progressive SPD-FDP ruling coalition, the Textbook Commission might have played a pivotal role in promoting a reflective view of history and rectifying negative images of the Poles in German school textbooks.

This analysis has implications for history textbook dialogues and historical reconciliation between former adversary states. An essential precondition for successful textbook dialogues is the strong and steady political support from a progressive ruling coalition, particularly in a perpetrator state. Compared to a conservative ruling coalition, a progressive coalition is more apt to address historical problems in good faith, as it usually put greater emphasis on social justice and human rights than economic development and security interests. Equally important are the consistent activities of transnational actors such as the Textbook Commission that are not at the mercy of conservative attacks or governmental intervention. As the German-Polish case illustrates, furthermore, successful history textbook dialogues can contribute to the achievement of historical reconciliation between former enemy states by repairing history perception gaps among nations.

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Chapter 7 Conclusion

To examine the variations in a state’s choice of history policy, this dissertation tested two competing approaches—realism and the transnational-coalitional model—against common historical issues in Japan and Germany: sexual slavery, forced labor, and biased history textbooks. The former posits that when geopolitical incentives are strong, a perpetrator state is more likely to take penitent attitudes toward historical issues. The latter hypothesizes that when transnational activism is powerful and a perpetrator state is led by a progressive ruling coalition, the state is more likely to adopt penitent policies toward historical issues.

This chapter first assesses the relative explanatory power of realism and the transnational-coalitional approach against the main evidence in the case studies. The following section presents primary findings and contributions. Subsequently, I provide the theoretical and policy implications of my dissertation research. Finally, I discuss important areas for future research.

THEORY ASSESSEMENT: REALISM VERSUS TRANSNATIONAL- COALITIONAL MODEL

Chapters 3-6 tested the two approaches against the historical evidence of Japan’s and

Germany’s dealings with historical issues, including sexual slavery, forced labor, and biased history textbooks. Table 5 and 6 illustrate the results of both cross-case and within-case investigations regarding two functional areas, apology/compensation and history textbooks respectively. I argue that the transnational-coalitional model possesses

227 more explanatory power than realism for cross-case and within-case variations in state behavior toward historical issues. The two approaches are not, however, mutually exclusive and are complementary in many regards.

Table 5: Summary of Theory Tests [Apology and Compensation] Predictions Realism Transnational- Outcomes Coalitional Model Japan : 1950s- Impenitence Impenitence Impenitence Comfort late 1980s Women late 1980s- Penitence Shallow Penitence Shallow Penitence 1995 1996- Backsliding Backsliding Backsliding mid 2000s Forced 1945- Multiple Impenitence Impenitence Labor mid 2000s Predictions

Germany : 1950s- Impenitence Impenitence Impenitence Forced 1970s Penitence Labor 1980s- Penitence Impenitence Impenitence mid 1990s Backsliding late 1990s- Impenitence Deep Penitence Deep Penitence mid 2000s Forced 1945- Multiple Impenitence Impenitence Prostitution mid 2000s Predictions

Table 6: Summary of Theory Tests [History Textbooks] Predictions Realism Transnational- Outcomes Coalitional Model Japanese 1950s- Impenitence Impenitence Stalemate Textbooks 1970s (toward 1980s- Impenitence Shallow Penitence Shallow Penitence South mid 1990s Penitence Korea) late 1990s- Backsliding Backsliding Backsliding mid 2000s German 1950s- Impenitence Impenitence Impenitence Textbooks 1960s (toward 1970s- Penitence Deep Penitence Deep Penitence Poland) early 1980s mid 1980s- Penitence Shallow Penitence Deep Penitence mid 2000s Backsliding Deep Penitence

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As illustrated in Table 5 and 6, realist predictions fit the state behavior outcomes in only half of the total fourteen sub-cases. It is true that geopolitical incentives might be an important driving force that enables a perpetrator state to take a conciliatory stance on its past transgressions. For example, in response to strong request from Jewish organizations, Germany began to take penitent steps to compensate Holocaust victims in the early 1950s, given its realpolitik incentives to rehabilitate its status in the international community. From the early 1970s, Germany had geostrategic incentives to seek closer ties with Eastern bloc countries in the sense that it could pave the way for eventual national unification under East-West détente. Considering these incentives, the German government strongly supported the German-Polish History Textbook Commission, which played an important role in correcting biased German historical narrative regarding

Poland. The early and mid-1990s also witnessed the significant weakening of the U.S.-

Japan Alliance and Japan’s somewhat penitent attitudes toward the comfort women issue at the same time.

Realism’s main weakness, however, is that this interest-based approach often holds multiple predictions within a certain period, but the dependent variable shows one specific outcome without variation. The Japanese government, for instance, has largely maintained impenitent attitudes toward the forced labor issue since the early 1950s, although its geopolitical incentives varied notably. The German government had variable realpolitik incentives between the 1950s and mid-1990s, yet it did not change its impenitent stance on the forced labor issue until the mid-1990s. Nazi-era forced prostitution also falls into this category because the German government has disregarded this issue regardless of variance in realpolitik concerns. These findings, therefore, imply

229 that geopolitical incentives themselves are not a sufficient condition for a perpetrator state’s deep penitence.

On the other hand, the transnational-coalitional model explains twelve of the sub- cases, posting a much higher successful rate than realism. This approach only fails the tests of Japanese behavior regarding history textbooks in the 1950s-1970s and German behavior regarding history textbooks between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s. Prior to the

1982 history textbook incident, the Japanese government maintained “stalemate” status despite the absence of transnational actors addressing Japanese history textbooks. This phenomenon was due in large part to the legal struggle between the Japanese government and domestic progressive intellectuals and groups (i.e., Ienaga Saburo and the Japan

Teachers’ Union).

The power transfer from progressive to conservative governing coalition in the early 1980s did not bring about backsliding in German stance on history textbooks regarding Poland. Though requiring further research, the reason for this outcome could be the influence of the deeply rooted Ostpolitik during détente on German society. In this regard, Yinan He notes, “In the 1980s, the enduring impact of Ostpolitik had planted deep roots of morality, justice, and reconciliation in the mainstream German psyche so that even the conservative ruling party could not resume pernicious mythmaking or withdraw from the policy of restitution to Poland.” 652

Nevertheless, realism and the transnational-coalitional model are not mutually exclusive but are, in fact, complementary in explaining the variations of state attitudes toward historical matters. Empirical evidence suggests that the effect of transnational activism becomes higher when the target state has geopolitical incentives and/or when the

652 He, The Search for Reconciliation , p. 296. 230

target state is led by a progressive ruling coalition. The Japanese state responded to the

transnational comfort women movement in a somewhat conciliatory manner between

1993 and 1995 when building better ties with Asia was in its security interest and a

liberal, non-LDP coalition briefly took power. Similarly, the German state took a

conciliatory stance on the forced labor issue when the progressive SPD/Green Party led a

coalition government and German business interests were at stake in the U.S. market

during the late 1990s. The German-Polish History Textbook Commission played a key

role in improving German historical narrative and textbook policy regarding Poland,

when the progressive SPD-FDP coalition supported the Commission and such action was

pursuant to German security interests in the 1970s. In the 2000s, on the other hand,

transnational activism regarding Japanese history textbooks had a limited impact on

Japanese historical narrative and textbook policy, given the strengthened U.S.-Japan

security alliance and the governing coalition led by the conservative LDP.

MAIN FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

This dissertation has three key findings with implications for international relations

theory and for policy making. First, I find that transnational civil society groups play a

pivotal role in compelling perpetrator states to adopt more apologetic attitudes toward

their past injustices. Neither Japan nor Germany took proactive steps to pay

compensation for their past wrongs before victims or organizations representing the

victims seriously raised the issues. The Korean Council took the lead in organizing a transnational network focusing on comfort women, elevating the resonance of the issue in the international community, and exerting significant pressure on the Japanese

231 government to respond to this unresolved historical matter. In a similar vein, the World

Jewish Congress and American lawyers led the Holocaust restitution movement, which served as an engine for altering Germany’s stance on the forced labor issue. Also striking was the role of the German-Polish History Textbook Commission, a transnational actor that contributed to positive changes in German historical narratives and textbook policies concerning Poland.

Secondly, strong transnational activism may function as a double-edged sword that complicates the resolution of historical issues by forcing a perpetrator state to make too many concessions. This finding challenges the common assumption that vibrant civil society smoothes the way to the resolution of historical contentions between former adversaries. Evidence from the transnational comfort women movement supports this assertion. The Korean Council initially demanded that the Japanese government offer an apology and compensation for the suffering of former comfort women; but as its transnational campaign gained momentum, the Korean Council expanded their demands to include punishment of the Japanese figures responsible for the establishment and management of the sex slave system. This would have implicated the Japanese emperor, which provoked opposition from Japanese groups who had supported the Korean

Council, in addition to the usual nationalist groups.

Further evidence for the potential harm of excessive transnational activism can be found in the Holocaust restitution movement. American class action lawyers requested too much compensation ($20 billion) for Nazi-era forced labor. In response to this excessive demand, the German government and industry almost withdrew from negotiations with the lawyers regarding the compensation for former forced laborers.

232

The U.S. government managed to prevent the breakdown of negotiations only through its

active intermediation.

My third finding counters the conventional wisdom that there was no significant

backlash against official acts of contrition in West Germany. I find that several German

political figures were strongly opposed to the German reparations program toward the

State of Israel and the Claims Conference in the early 1950s. 653 Among the opponents of reparations were Chancellor Adenauer’s first finance minister, Fritz Schäffer; the prime minister of Baden-Württemberg, Gebhard Müller; and the Bavarian minister of justice,

Josef Müller. These high-ranking government officials did, however, seek to achieve their goals behind the scenes, because anti-Semitism was politically taboo in the Federal

Republic. The German society also witnessed a conservative backlash against the

Common Recommendations that the German-Polish History Textbook Commission issued in the mid-1970s. Such reactions were led by the Association of Expellees, the conservative opposition party CDU/CSU, and nationalist newspapers such as Deutsche-

National Zeitung. These actors harshly criticized the Recommendations, claiming that the German members of the Textbook Commission overlooked historical truth and ceded excessive ground to the Polish national position.

In addition to the findings presented here, this dissertation makes two major contributions to the literature on memory and reconciliation in East Asia and Europe.

The first addresses the theoretical weakness in the previous literature by establishing an analytical framework—the transnational-coalitional model—that provides an explanation of the variations in state behavior toward historical issues. Using the dynamics of key

653 Pross, Paying for the Past , pp. 8-9; Colonomos and Armstrong, “German Reparations to the Jews after World War II,” pp. 394-95. 233 political and societal actors as independent variables, the analytical framework explains how and why Japan and Germany have dealt differently with historical problems over time. As a rule, the extant literature merely offers descriptive narratives of various historical problems, thus failing to provide useful analytical models.

The second contribution fills the gaps in the empirical studies concerning historical matters between former adversary states. In the existing English language literature, many scholars have dealt with transnational redress movements regarding sexual slavery and forced labor issues yet have overlooked transnational activism regarding history textbook issues in both Japanese-Korean and German-Polish relations.

In this regard, it was very difficult to understand how political and societal actors have addressed biased history textbooks in these regions. This project offers detailed information on the activities of transnational actors and conservative groups that may have affected the two states’ historical narrative and textbook policies.

THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This dissertation holds several implications for international relations theory. First, this study contributes to the debates in international relations on whether or not transnational civil society matters. The realist and neo-liberal approaches emphasize the predominance of the state, thus overlooking the role of non-state actors in world politics. As Richard

Price notes, the structural power of capitalism is highlighted in an era of globalization and the world polity school of sociology focuses on structural explanations of global

234

cultural scripts. 654 The first wave of constructivism, which sought to establish that norms

matter, also neglects agency by focusing on the structural influence of norms. 655

As noted in Chapter 2, however, for the last two decades many scholars have paid great attention to agents—particularly transnational civil society groups—by analyzing their impact on state behavior regarding human rights, the environment, economics, and even security. Along with these analyses, this project supports the importance of transnational civil society in global politics, which plays a critical role in altering state behavior toward historical problems. Put differently, we would not fully understand the variations in a perpetrator state’s attitudes toward historical matters without taking into account the influence of transnational activism. The study, nevertheless, does not suggest that transnational civil society actors replace governments or take over their decision- making authority. 656 Instead, given the power of the state, they aim to inform and persuade governments to accept or give up certain policies or positions. In this regard, this study accepts Thomas Risse’s suggestion that “rather than analyzing transnational and inter-state relations in zero-sum terms, it is more useful to study their interactions and interpenetration.” 657

Second, my dissertation sheds light on a domestic source of foreign policy, the ideological orientation (i.e. progressive or conservative) of ruling coalitions. In relative terms, a progressive ruling coalition is more responsive to historical issues than a

654 Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics,” pp. 581-86. 655 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50 (January 1998) 656 Rebecca Johnson, “Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty,” in Ann M. Florini, ed., The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo and Washington: Japan Center for International Change and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 77; Paul Wapner, “Politics beyond the state: Environmental activism and world civic politics,” World Politics , Vol. 47. No. 3, (April 1995), pp. 311-40. 657 Thomas Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, ed., Handbook of International Relations (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), p. 255. 235 conservative governing coalition. My case studies reveal that compared to a progressive government, a conservative governing coalition does not address historical problems with enough commitment to reach a stage of deep penitence, even when both transnational activism and geopolitical incentives (security and economic interests) are strong. In the

1990s, for instance, Japan was faced with a powerful transnational comfort women movement and strong realpolitik incentives. Under these circumstances, Japan responded to the comfort women issue in a somewhat conciliatory manner, but failed to provide the state-led compensation program. A plausible reason for the government’s wan response was the rule of the progressive non-LDP coalition had been too short and the conservative LDP prevented a progressive Prime Minister Murayama from adopting deeply penitent measures toward the historical matter.

In relation to this aspect, individual leaders who place emphasis on “presenting an honest history, upholding justice, fulfilling moral responsibility of their nation” matter in the resolution of historical issues.658 It is difficult for the leaders, however, to make significant progress in the issues if they do not have strong support by a progressive ruling coalition. For example, the first Socialist Prime Minister Murayama since 1948 was committed to dealing with Japan’s injustices committed in Asia during World War

II. An important project led by Murayama was to adopt an “anti-war resolution” or an

“apology resolution” marking the 50 th anniversary of Japan’s surrender. However, his endeavor was confronted with strong opposition from the conservative LDP, the dominant coalition partner, and eventually resulted in adopting an ambiguous and compromised Diet resolution that satisfied no one. On the other hand, Chancellor

Schröder, who had addressed the compensation issue for former forced laborers, was able

658 He, The Search for Reconciliation , pp. 298-99. 236

to successfully resolve the matter with the unfaltering support from the progressive SPD-

Green Party coalition.

This dissertation also holds an implication for policy. Given my findings, there

are two kinds of transnational activism regarding history textbooks. The first is a

conventional form of transnational activism that exerts pressure on a perpetrator state to

change its behavior toward historical narrative and textbook polices. The second is an

activism that seeks to deepen mutual understanding and fill the gaps in historical

perception by undertaking textbook dialogues between NGOs in former adversary states.

The former was much stronger than the latter in the case of Japan, while the reverse was

true in the German case. In this regard, textbook cooperation and historians’ dialogue

should be viewed as an effective means to resolve the issue of biased historical textbooks.

My case studies suggest that joint textbook commissions need financial and political

support from its governments, particularly from the perpetrator’s side, in order to obtain successful outcomes. Instead of government officials, however, professional historians should take the lead in history dialogue because their academic integrity makes them relatively more impervious to the desire to make instrumental use of history. 659 The

German-Polish History Textbook Commission, financially supported by the governments of the SPD-run West German states, was composed of professional historians and was far away from governmental interference. 660

659 He, “Overcoming the Shadow of the Past,” pp. 424-25. 660 He, The Search for Reconciliation , p. 79. 237

FUTURE RESEARCH

In this dissertation, I tested realism and the transnational-coalitional model against two perpetrator states’ behavior in dealing with two functional areas—apology/compensation and history textbooks. A caveat that this study has is that findings can only be suggestive because they derive from congruence tests and only two case studies. The current research thus can be advanced in two ways. The first is to demonstrate causality between the variables through detailed process-tracing of the decision-making process in Japan and Germany that led to various policy and behavioral outcomes. The second way is to apply those analytical frameworks to more cases and to determine whether or not findings from the two state cases travel elsewhere: for instance, other perpetrator states such as Turkey, Austria, and Russia.

It is also necessary to conduct further research regarding the changing dynamics of domestic backlash against contrition in Germany. In other words, we need to examine not only why domestic backlash did not often occur in Germany, but also why such periods did not last long when they did occur. As shown in my case studies, the late

1970s witnessed a strong backlash in German society against the Common

Recommendations that the German-Polish History Textbook Commission issued. This reaction did not, however, last for very long. A plausible reason for this, I argue, was the positive change in the Germans’ view of the Poles in the early 1980s, caused by the eruption of Solidarity Movement in Poland. But further research is necessary to better understand the sudden decline of conservative backlash in this case. On the other hand,

Germany had no significant backlash against its heartfelt apology and compensation for

Nazi-era forced and slave labor in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Why did no domestic

238 backlash occur at this time? As Lind notes, it is important for scholars to comprehend the dynamics of backlash so that they can offer responsible recommendations regarding the use of contrition in post-conflict peace building. 661

661 Lind, “Sorry States,” pp. 409-14. 239

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Appendix The Dynamics of Japanese Party Politics, 1993-1996

This appendix examines the process of power transition from conservative to weak

progressive ruling coalitions in 1993 and their swift swing back to conservative

governing coalitions happened in 1996. A substantial change in Japanese party politics

arose in July 1993 when the LDP lost its majority in the lower-house election. 662 A main

reason for this outcome was the loss of many influential party members to new parties

like the Shinseito and the Sakigake after the prior ruling LDP government had been

paralyzed by a series of political scandals. 663 Even though it remained the largest party in both the upper and lower houses following the general election, the LDP was unable to prevent other parties from forming a non-LDP coalition. As a consequence, the thirty- eight years of LDP rule ended in August 1993, and a seven-party coalition government was created under an anti-LDP banner. Hosokawa Morihiro, the leader of the Japan New

Party (JNP), was nominated as a new Prime Minister.

The non-LDP coalition government, however, failed to maintain its power for long due to frictions within the coalition, the adoption of a new electoral system, and policy failures—especially over the national welfare tax. 664 The seven parties in the coalition government were not able to find any common policy goals—except for political-reform legislation—to bind them together. Furthermore, Hosokawa was

662 Masaru Kohno, Japan’s Postwar Party Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 135- 36. 663 Kohno, Japan’s Postwar Party Politics , p. 137: For instance, Kanemaru Shin, who had long been considered the most influential politician in Japan, was arrested in early 1993 because he violated the political contribution regulations and the income tax law. In September 1992 he was convicted for accepting five hundred million yen from a trucking company, Sagawa Kyubin. During the investigation, he was found to be hiding a large amount of money from the tax office. 664 Gerald L. Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 134-36. 258

politically weakened by his own small party’s lack of influence in the coalition. He was

also constrained by the Takemura-Ozawa rivalry and the animosity between Ozawa and

the Socialists. Despite his popularity with the public, Hosokawa resigned in April 1994

when he was accused of corruption. In his stead Hata Tsutomu of the Shinseito, a new

party established by former LDP members, took office. Given the increasingly uncertain

political scene, however, the Hata administration was in office for only sixty-five days

and collapsed shortly after the JSP left the coalition.

In June 1994, the LDP returned to power upon forging a three-party coalition

government with the JSP and the Sakigake. The LDP and the JSP were traditionally opponents to the extent that the former had long accused the latter of damaging political stability and the national interest. Nevertheless, LDP leaders made the decision by reinterpreting postwar Japanese political history, as an alliance with their former adversary—the Socialist Party—was the only way to return the LDP to power. 665 While

the historic LDP-JSP comprise triggered the ascent of socialist Japanese Prime Minister,

Murayama Tomiichi, the LDP held the real power in the new coalition government.666

Hence, the period between 1993 and 1995 witnessed a weak progressive ruling coalition.

The Japanese ruling coalition, however, swung toward conservatism following the

LDP’s 1996 return to power in both name and reality. Murayama, the weak leader of an

LDP-JSP-Sakigake coalition government, resigned in January 1996 and Hashimoto

Ryutaro of the LDP—who had been a president of a nationalistic organization, Japan’s

Bereaved Families Association (Nihon Izokukai)—became the next Prime Minister. 667

The Socialist Party (renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan in 1996) remained in

665 Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics , pp. 188-90. 666 Nozaki, War Memory, Nationalism and Education in Postwar Japan, p. 142. 667 Curtis, The Logic of Japanese Politics , pp. 170-71. 259

the coalition under Prime Minister Hashimoto until just before the July 1998 upper-house

election. The party, however, had no actual power since it no longer held any cabinet

positions.

The JSP, which had been the most powerful opposition party facing the

conservative LDP under the 1955 system, turned into a minor party after losing in two

general elections. The party’s fall was primarily derived from the following two factors.

First, the JSP lost its long-held identity by deciding to abandon its party line regarding

several major postwar political issues. Among them was its opposition to the U.S.-Japan

Security Treaty, to the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and to the Hinomaru flag and the

Kimigayo anthem. Second, the new hybrid electoral system that the Hosokawa administration instituted, which combined a single-member plurality with a proportional representation system, struck a significant blow to the JSP.668

In contrast, the LDP was fundamentally able to solidify its power given the

absence of a powerful opposition from the JSP despite some constraints posed by the

other coalition parties. 669 The LDP still had to constitute a coalition government

including minority parties that often requested policy changes as well as posts in the

Cabinet as the LDP had difficulty winning an absolute majority in either the upper or

lower house. However, since it was not feasible for the opposition parties to construct an

ideological or organizational power base against the LDP, they generally worked to align

themselves with the LDP and join the LDP-led coalition government. In this regard, the

LDP held a strong policy decision-making position within the coalition government.

668 Cheol Hee Park, “Ilbon Chungkye esoui Shinbosu Seryok ui Sungjang kwa Hankuk eui Hamui [the Growth of Neo-conservative Power in Japanese Politics and Implications for Korea],” in Young-jak Kim and Won-deog Lee, eds., Japan in the Globalized World (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2006), p. 99. 669 Lee, “A Normal State without Remorse,” pp. 34-35. 260