The Ana Tomy of a Mercenary: from Archilochos to Alexander

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Ana Tomy of a Mercenary: from Archilochos to Alexander THE ANA TOMY OF A MERCENARY: FROM ARCHILOCHOS TO ALEXANDER By Nicholas Fields Thesis submitted to the University of Newcastle upon Tyne in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy NEWCASTLE Ut4rVERSrT 4( LLRAR'( 094 51237 1 June 1994 To Leonidas THE ANA TOMY OF A MER CENA R Y.' FROM ARCHJLOCHOS TO ALEXANDER By Nicholas Fields ABSTRA CT Xenophon. who marched so many perilous Persian parasangs as a soldier-of-fortune and survived. has probably penned the most exciting, if not the best, memoirs by a mercenary to date. Moreover, for the military historian wishing to inquire into the human as well as the political aspects of hoplite- mercenary service, the Anabasis is the only in depth eye-witness account of an ancient Greek mercenary venture available. Of course the Anabasis is partisan and, at times, the contemporary reader cannot help but think that Xenophon's imagination is running away with him a bit. Nevertheless, his inside view of the complex relationships between mercenary-captains, the employers who employ them, the troops who follow them, the Spartans who use them, and those who mistrust them, has much more than just a passing value. Throughout mercenary history the balance between these groups has always been delicate, and, needless to say, the vicissitudes tend to follow the same pattern. Mercenary service was, and still is, a rather uncertain and dangerous vocation. We only have to read, for example, Colonel Mike bare's Congo memoirs to realise this. Apart from Xenophon himself and the mercenary-poet, Archilochos, the ancient literary sources generally supply little by way of data on such matters as recruitment, conditions of service, and the basic hopes, fears, and habits of those many individual hoplites who took up the mercenary calling as a way of life. And so, in order to capture the spirit of mercenary soldiering and thus pursue more closely the pertinent questions of motives, money and the military value of professional hoplite- mercenaries, this thematic inquiry also draws upon first-hand testimonies afforded by more recent mercenary soldiers. In so doing, the inquiry has aimed at a synthesis of the available material, both ancient arid modern, and thus, one hopes, has achieved a net positive result in which not only the mercenary-captains are better illuminated, but, also, the rank and file of a mercenary army are partially rescued from obscurity and given a voice. A CKNO WLEDGEMENTS The research and writing of this enquiry has been like a long trek into the wilderness. I would not have completed it without the love and support of my wife, Helen, and the faith and guidance of my supervisor, John Lazenhy. They have my heartfelt thanks and respect. Like all travellers, I owe a debt of gratitude to the many helpful people encountered en route. For their encouragement and assistance, I thank them all. In this regard, I am particularly indebted to Guy Sanders, Penny Wilson-Zarganis, Ilaria Romeo, and Jonathan Hall. To them, a special added thanks for their companionship. Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to the British School at Athens and the Greek Government. whose financial aid eased the way. Nic Fields, Athens, April 1994. CONTENTS Preface vi I Mercenary 2 Ancient and Modern 9 3 A Free-Lance Poet 20 4 Et Ex Arcadia Ego 50 5 Gentlemen-at-Arms 75 6 Warriors for the Working Day 98 7 Society of Professionals 122 8 Situation Vacant 137 9 Political Pa'n 160 Conclusion 178 Abbreviations 180 Bibliography 186 PREFACE It is a great pity that the predominant influence still exerted upon military historians of the conventional school is that of the high priest of military theorists, Clausewitz. Many military historians are still inclined to view warfare in the ancient world in terms of strategy and tactics: to depict ancient armies as smooth military machines gliding effortlessly over a neutral terrain: and to describe ancient warfare as almost a mundane series of skirmishes, battles and sieges. The somewhat Olympian view adopted by Clausewitz and his disciples can hardly be expected to take much notice of the human involvement in war at the ground level. The perspective, however, of a more socially conscious military historian is different. From this view point, some of the highest concepts of military theory dissolve into thin air: for example, the concept of grand strategy in ancient warfare - so dear to military theorists - seems a mere chimera. To the socio-military" historian the movement of troops across the ancient landscape appears to have as much direction as ducks on a village pond. Altogether too much military precision has been given to the hurly-burly of the ancient world's endless broils. We must not, however, forget one salient fact. The nature of any war which was fought in an age before Clausewitz was shaped by the reality that military organizations were relatively primitive and armies could not depend upon the regular satisfaction of all their needs by a High Command. Broadly speaking, ancient forces were not self-sufficient, well paid, competently otticered, barrack armies. They certainly could not be carefully screened from civilian society, and therefore, to treat them as isolated entities is worse than absurd. Indeed, armies are, to this very day. projections of the societies to which they belong. More particularly, in the polis-dominated arena of ancient Greece, the relationship between city-state army and city-state society was so close that the status of hoplite and that of citizen cannot really be distinquished. And so, the ancient military historian is invited to alter his or her traditional stance and urged to move beyond the "battle-and- leaders approach. which has made military history seem so narrow in the past, and see war in a proper social context. So planting my standard firmly in the camp of the socio-military historians, what follows is not an account thickly populated with bland repetitive descriptions of campaigns or unit organizations. This thesis has one prime objective: to shed a chink of human light upon the animal I know as the Greek hop lite-mercenary. The last in-depth study conducted upon the theme of Greek mercenaries, was that of the late H.W.Parke some sixty years ago hard on its heels came G.T.Griffith's sequel which carried the theme on into the Hellenistic period. The former was primarily a narrative tracing the history of the Greek mercenary from the seventh century BC down to the end of the fourth century BC. Although vi an authoritative work, it did not seek to break with tradition. Parke's objective, therefore, was not to tackle head-on such thorny topics as, for example, the motives that prompted Greeks to leave their city-states, farms and families in order to pursue such an uncertain vocation. In addition, he did not see the need to present the hoplite-mercenary as an individual. I do not wish to rewrite Parke's work. or even that of Griffith; let them stand as they are. I certainly do not advocate that we throw the baby out with the bath water, and neglect the human drama of the battlefield. The latter becomes apparent when we consider the recent additions to the armoury of the socio-military historian, namely the two latest publications - one written and the other edited - of V.D.Hanson. Through these he strives to offer a stark portrayal of the grim and bloody realities of hoplite warfare from the point of view of the hoplite himself: Hanson, like myself, has been heavily influenced by John Keegan's masterly work, The Face of Battle. It is in the footsteps of these scholars that I shall tread. Consequently, I shall be painting upon one broad conceptual canvas an interpretation of the hoplite-mercenary both as a political commodity to be snapped up by any interested party, and as an individual member of a society of professional soldiers. vii 1 MERCENARY Friars: (giving their usual greeting to wayfarers) God give you peace! Hawkwood: God take from you your alms! Friars: We meant no offence, Sir! Hawkwood: How, when you come to me and pray that God would make me die of hunger? Do you not know that I live by war and that peace would undo me? Sacchetti Novelle clxxxi The mercenary is a professional soldier whose behaviour is dictated not by his membership of a socio- political community, but by his desire for personal gain; he owes no allegiance beyond the cash nexus. Here, the thorny questions of both motive (money) and status (serving a foreign flag) are extraordinarily complex to decipher, but in short the mercenary is defined by three basic qualities: being a specialist, being stateless and getting paid.1 The professional soldier of a Western modern army is a highly respectable member of his society; but the professional soldiers of the ancient Mediterranean world prior to the advent of the Imperial Roman war-machine were, in the main, mercenaries. To us the name is somewhat equivocal, carrying with it romantic associations of far off places with strange sounding names, as well as being tainted as slightly shady and a touch sordid. Indeed, if the profession of mercenary is not quite the oldest - though an interesting case could be made that it is a peculiarly male version of prostitution - it has effectively been around for as long as war has been waged. The mercenary soldier is to be found in almost evec' high?' ogamzed societ' criihactc history, and is certainly not extinct in our own today. History is littered with examples of powers which have had imperial responsibilities and consequently have almost invariably employed mercenaries.
Recommended publications
  • Baran, Karian Archit
    I Frank Rumscheid (Hrsg.) · Die Karer und die Anderen II III Die Karer und die Anderen Internationales Kolloquium an der Freien Universität Berlin 13. bis 15. Oktober 2005 Herausgegeben von Frank Rumscheid Verlag Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH · Bonn 2009 IV Umschlag: Männlicher ‘Sphinx’, Akroterion des Androns B in Labraunda (Entwurf S. Biegert auf Grundlage einer Graphik von F. Rumscheid) Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie. Detailliertere bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar. © 2009 by Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH, Bonn Redaktion: Frank Rumscheid (Kiel) Satz: Susanne Biegert (Bonn) Druck: Druckhaus Thomas Müntzer, 99947 Bad Langensalza ISBN 978-3-7749-3632-4 V Inhaltsverzeichnis Frank Rumscheid Einführung VII Beziehungen zu den Anderen Michael Meier-Brügger Karer und Alt-Anatolier aus sprachwissenschaftlicher Sicht 1 Wolf-Dietrich Niemeier Milet und Karien vom Neolithikum bis zu den ‘Dunklen Jahrhunderten’. Mythos und Archäologie 7 Alexander Herda Karki™a-Karien und die sogenannte Ionische Migration 27 Alain Bresson Karien und die dorische Kolonisation 109 Winfried Held Die Karer und die Rhodische Peraia 121 Christopher Ratté The Carians and the Lydians 135 Hilmar Klinkott Die Karer im Achaimenidenreich 149 Werner Tietz Karer und Lykier: Politische und kulturelle Beziehungen im 5./4. Jh. v. Chr. 163 Frank Rumscheid Die Leleger: Karer oder Andere? 173 Bernhard Schmaltz Klassische Leitkultur und karische Provinz? Archäologische Zeugnisse im südlichen
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Has Now Spent Five Years Under Military Occupation, and The
    Iraqhasnowspentfiveyearsundermilitary occupation,andthesufferingoftheIraqi peoplecontinues. WithgrowingpressuretowithdrawUSandUK troopsfromIraq,mercenaryforceshavebeengiven anevergreaterroleintheconflict,makinghundreds ofmillionsofpoundsforthecorporationsthat supplythem. Thecompaniesgrowricherwhile wholecommunitiesarecondemnedtothelong- termpovertywhichcomeswithwar. Despitehundredsofcasesofhumanrights abusebymercenaryforcesoverthepastfiveyears, privatearmieshavebeenimmunefromprosecution. WaronWantisleadingthecampaignforUK legislationtobantheuseofmercenaries inwarandtoregulatetheiractivitiesclosely inallotherarenas. February 2008 Stills from two ‘trophy videos’ shot by PMSCs in Iraq. The videos can be found at www.waronwant.org/pmsc War is one of the chief causes of poverty, headlines and brought scrutiny on the entire destroying schools, hospitals, industry and any industry. But this is far from the only example hopes for development. We did not need the of human rights abuse perpetrated by twin catastrophes of the Afghanistan and Iraq mercenary forces in Iraq: invasions to teach us this. But not everyone is made poorer by war. Many companies • In November 2007 an Iraqi taxi driver was thrive off conflict, and indeed have a vested shot and killed by mercenaries working for interest in seeing it continue. DynCorp International, a private military company hired to protect American diplomats. War on Want brought the problem of private armies to the public’s attention with • In October 2007 mercenaries from Australian our acclaimed report Corporate Mercenaries. firm Unity Resources Group killed two Iraqi The concerns we raised in that report have women in an attack that saw 40 shots fired now turned into public outrage, with new at their car. examples of human rights violations by mercenaries in Iraq coming to light every • In the same month mercenaries working for week.We are stepping up the pressure on UK company Erinys International opened fire the UK government to introduce legislation on a taxi near Kirkuk, wounding three civilians.
    [Show full text]
  • 2014 Maayandonors.Pdf
    The Charles E. Smith Jewish Day School Annual Fundraising Campaign, Ma’ayan, CESJDS is deeply appreciative of the very ensures that CESJDS can provide more than a basic education. It ensures that our generous annual subsidy that we receive for Timeless lessons. each student from the Jewish Federation of children and families have the benefi t of enhancements in every area of our School. Greater Washington. Enduring values. Thank you for supporting CESJDS through Ma’ayan so that we can strengthen our Brilliant futures. School, allow others to a ord this experience, create new Jewish leaders, and ensure the best programs and teachers that our children deserve. CESJDS’s success in our extended community is due, in no small measure, to your support of our School. WWW.CESJDS.ORG THANK YOU TO THE FOLLOWING DONORS: MITZVAH SOCIETY ($25,000+) Jessica & Michael Isen Jennifer & Michael Reichbach Joan & Abe Brauner & Rabbi Jacob Blumenthal Linda & Neil Kirschner Rebecca & Steven Weisman Stephanie Cantor ’08 Marsha & Marvin Fish Catherine & Christopher Hendrix Drs. Judith & Jonathan Levin Cathy & Samuel Pearlman Robert Sniffen Marsha & Sidney Tishler Monica & Gavin Abrams Kimberly & Abraham Kader Sara Cohen Rich ’87 & Norm Rich Lisa & Jonathan Charnoff Susan & Harvey Blumenthal Rhonda Kleiner Devra ’89 & Avi Weiss Revital & Nir Carmel Rosalyn & Monroe Fisher Jordan Herling Susan Wachtel & Richard Levine Jillian Pedone Rachel Sniffen ’14 Stacy Weiner & Yoel Tobin The Bender Foundation, Inc. Lauren Kogod & David Smiley Meryl ’75 & Samuel ’75 Rosenberg Corey Cines ’07 Debra Vodenos & Samuel Boxerman Ellen & Barry Koitz Edith & Charles Weller Leah F. Chanin Miriam Fishkin Galit & Tal Hermoni Ilana Levine ’00 Kathryn & Rick Penn Tamara & Ivan Snyder Miriam & Sheldon Tommer Diane & Norman Bernstein Leslie S.
    [Show full text]
  • Copyrighted Material
    Index Note: page numbers in italics denote tables, maps, or illustrations Abdera 74 Cleomenes 237 ; coins 159, 276 , Abu Simbel 297 277, 279 ; food production 121, 268, Abydos 286 272 ; imports 268 ; Kleoitas 109 ; Achaea/Achaeans: Aigialos 213 ; Naucratis 269–271 ; pottery 191 ; basileus 128, 129, 134 ; Sparta 285 ; trade 268, 272 colonization 100, 104, 105, 107–108, Aegium 88, 91, 108 115, 121 ; democracy 204 ; Aelian 4, 186, 188 dialect 44 ; ethnos 91 ; Aeneas 109, 129 Herodotus 91 ; heroes 73, 108 ; Aeolians 45 , 96–97, 122, 292, 307 ; Homer 52, 172, 197, 215 ; dialect group 44, 45, 46 Ionians 50 ; migration 44, 45 , 50, Aeschines 86, 91, 313, 314–315 96 ; pottery 119 ; as province 68 ; Aeschylus: Persians 287, 308 ; Seven relocation 48 ; warrior tombs 49 Against Thebes 162 ; Suppliant Achilles 128, 129, 132, 137, 172, 181, Maidens 204 216 ; shield of 24, 73, 76, 138–139 Aetolia/Aetolians 20 ; dialect 299 ; Acrae 38 , 103, 110 Erxadieis 285 ; ethnos 91, 92 ; Acraephnium 279 poleis 93 ; pottery 50 ; West Acragas 38 , 47 ; democracy 204 ; Locris 20 foundation COPYRIGHTED 104, 197 ; Phalaris 144 ; Aëtos MATERIAL 62 Theron 149, 289 ; tyranny 150 Africanus, Sextus Julius 31 Adrastus 162 Agamemnon: Aeolians 97 ; anax 129 ; Aegimius 50, 51 Argos 182 ; armor 173 ; Aegina 3 ; Argos 3, 5 ; Athens 183, basileus 128, 129 ; scepter 133 ; 286, 287 ; captured 155 ; Schliemann 41 ; Thersites 206 A History of the Archaic Greek World: ca. 1200–479 BCE, Second Edition. Jonathan M. Hall. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons,
    [Show full text]
  • The Outbreak of the Rebellion of Cyrus the Younger Jeffrey Rop
    The Outbreak of the Rebellion of Cyrus the Younger Jeffrey Rop N THE ANABASIS, Xenophon asserts that the Persian prince Cyrus the Younger was falsely accused of plotting a coup I d’état against King Artaxerxes II shortly after his accession to the throne in 404 BCE. Spared from execution by the Queen Mother Parysatis, Cyrus returned to Lydia determined to seize the throne for himself. He secretly prepared his rebellion by securing access to thousands of Greek hoplites, winning over Persian officials and most of the Greek cities of Ionia, and continuing to send tribute and assurances of his loyalty to the unsuspecting King (1.1).1 In Xenophon’s timeline, the rebellion was not official until sometime between the muster of his army at Sardis in spring 401, which spurred his rival Tissaphernes to warn Artaxerxes (1.2.4–5), and his arrival several months later at Thapsacus on the Euphrates, where Cyrus first openly an- nounced his true intentions (1.4.11). Questioning the “strange blindness” of Artaxerxes in light of Cyrus’ seemingly obvious preparations for revolt, Pierre Briant proposed an alternative timeline placing the outbreak of the rebellion almost immediately after Cyrus’ return to Sardis in late 404 or early 403.2 In his reconstruction, the King allowed Cyrus 1 See also Ctesias FGrHist 688 F 16.59, Diod. 14.19, Plut. Artax. 3–4. 2 Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander (Winona Lake 2002) 617–620. J. K. Anderson, Xenophon (New York 1974) 80, expresses a similar skepticism. Briant concludes his discussion by stating that the rebellion officially (Briant does not define “official,” but I take it to mean when either the King or Cyrus declared it publicly) began in 401 with the muster of Cyrus’ army at Sardis, but it is nonetheless appropriate to characterize Briant’s position as dating the official outbreak of the revolt to 404/3.
    [Show full text]
  • Female Property Ownership and Status in Classical and Hellenistic Sparta
    Female Property Ownership and Status in Classical and Hellenistic Sparta Stephen Hodkinson University of Manchester 1. Introduction The image of the liberated Spartiate woman, exempt from (at least some of) the social and behavioral controls which circumscribed the lives of her counterparts in other Greek poleis, has excited or horrified the imagination of commentators both ancient and modern.1 This image of liberation has sometimes carried with it the idea that women in Sparta exercised an unaccustomed influence over both domestic and political affairs.2 The source of that influence is ascribed by certain ancient writers, such as Euripides (Andromache 147-53, 211) and Aristotle (Politics 1269b12-1270a34), to female control over significant amounts of property. The male-centered perspectives of ancient writers, along with the well-known phenomenon of the “Spartan mirage” (the compound of distorted reality and sheer imaginative fiction regarding the character of Spartan society which is reflected in our overwhelmingly non-Spartan sources) mean that we must treat ancient images of women with caution. Nevertheless, ancient perceptions of their position as significant holders of property have been affirmed in recent modern studies.3 The issue at the heart of my paper is to what extent female property-holding really did translate into enhanced status and influence. In Sections 2-4 of this paper I shall approach this question from three main angles. What was the status of female possession of property, and what power did women have directly to manage and make use of their property? What impact did actual or potential ownership of property by Spartiate women have upon their status and influence? And what role did female property-ownership and status, as a collective phenomenon, play within the crisis of Spartiate society? First, however, in view of the inter-disciplinary audience of this volume, it is necessary to a give a brief outline of the historical context of my discussion.
    [Show full text]
  • The Satrap of Western Anatolia and the Greeks
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2017 The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks Eyal Meyer University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons Recommended Citation Meyer, Eyal, "The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks" (2017). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2473. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2473 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2473 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks Abstract This dissertation explores the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies originated from the provincial capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal centers in the Persian heartland in the fifth ec ntury BC. I begin by establishing that the Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand reform initiated by Darius I, which was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative infrastructure. In the following chapter I show that the provincial administration was embedded with chancellors, scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status and that the satrapies were periodically inspected by the Persian King or his loyal agents, which allowed to central authorities to monitory the provinces. In chapter three I delineate the extent of satrapal authority, responsibility and resources, and conclude that the satraps were supplied with considerable resources which enabled to fulfill the duties of their office. After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial governors and the nature of the office of satrap has been analyzed, I begin a diachronic scrutiny of Greco-Persian interactions in the fifth century BC.
    [Show full text]
  • Traders, Pirates, Warriors: the Proto-History of Greek Mercenary Soldiers in the Eastern Mediterranean Author(S): Nino Luraghi Source: Phoenix, Vol
    Classical Association of Canada Traders, Pirates, Warriors: The Proto-History of Greek Mercenary Soldiers in the Eastern Mediterranean Author(s): Nino Luraghi Source: Phoenix, Vol. 60, No. 1/2 (Spring - Summer, 2006), pp. 21-47 Published by: Classical Association of Canada Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20304579 Accessed: 06/09/2010 12:51 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cac. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Classical Association of Canada is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phoenix. http://www.jstor.org TRADERS, PIRATES,WARRIORS: THE PROTOHISTORY OF GREEKMERCENARY SOLDIERS IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN Nino Luraghi Fot the colleagues and students of theDepattment of Classics, UnivetsityofTotonto he that mercenary soldiers 1 fact Greek had been serving for a number of powers in the southeastern Mediterranean during most of the archaic age a on hardly strikes reader engaged in general readings archaic Greek history.
    [Show full text]
  • The Helot Revolt of Sparta Greece
    464 B.C. The Helot Revolt of Sparta Greece Sparta, at first, was only the Messenia and Laconia territories, and later the Spartans (previously known as the Dorians) came and took over those territories. Those places they conquered had other residents who were captured and used them as Spartan “slaves” (also known as Helots) for the growing nation. However, these Helots were not the property of anyone or under the control of a specific person. They worked for Sparta in general, and since the Dorians couldn’t do agriculture, they made the Helots do the work. The Dorians were “Barbarians,” note them taking over territories. Unlike the slaves that we know today, these ones were able to go wherever they want in Spartan territory and they could live normal lives like the Spartans.The Helots lived in houses together for a plot of land that they worked on. They were allowed families, to go away from their house and make cash for themselves. Occasionally, the Helots would be assigned to help out in the military. However, not all Helots were happy where they were at. Around 660 B.C., the Spartans attacked the Argives, who demolished the Spartans. The report of Sparta’s lost gave encouragement to the Helots who started a revolt against Sparta, which is now known as the Second Messenian War.​ The Spartans were fighting to gain back control, but they were outnumbered seven Helots to one Spartan. The details about this war were concealed, and very little information is known about what happened in the war.
    [Show full text]
  • Aigina and the Naval Strategy of the Late Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries
    Methodisches zum antiken Atheismus 15 der Atheistenkataloge (s. Anm. 6), (c) eine kommentierte kritische Ausgabe des Diagoras und des Theodoros, die für (i1'tEOL Km' E!;OX'rlV gehalten wurden (s. Anm. 2)36). Ferner müßte untersucht werden, in welcher Bedeutung die Wörter (i1'tEO~ - a1'tE6'tT]~ und aOEßTJ~ - aOEßELu - aOEßTHw - aOEßELv in der griechischen Literatur bis zum Ende der Antike verwendet wurden. Erst dann besitzt man eine Grundlage für die Abfassung einer neuen kritischen Geschichte des Atheismus, die sich auf antike Quellen stützen und die oben erwähnten methodischen Postulate berücksichtigen wird. Wrodaw (Breslau) Marek Winiarczyk 36) Eine umfassende Bibliographie des Verfassers zum antiken Atheismus vom 17.Jh. an ist soeben erschienen in Elenchos 10, 1989, 103-192. AIGINA AND THE NAVAL STRATEGY OF THE LATE FIFTH AND EARLY FOURTH CENTURIES The following investigation examines the role which the is­ land of Aigina played in the struggle for naval hegemony between Athens and Sparta and offers insights both into techniques of war­ fare and into the balance of power at sea in the western Aegean. One important result of such an examination is the application to the classical period of the classification of Mediterranean naval warfare conducted by rowed ships into two discrete patterns, fleet operations and A!lG'tELU by small groups of ships. The general mili­ tary situation of Athens and Sparta and the political techniques available to either city for making use of their resources and for exploiting the weaknesses of their adversary affected the viability of fleet operations and raiding, the two modes of aggression.
    [Show full text]
  • Ancient History Sourcebook: 11Th Brittanica: Sparta SPARTA an Ancient City in Greece, the Capital of Laconia and the Most Powerful State of the Peloponnese
    Ancient History Sourcebook: 11th Brittanica: Sparta SPARTA AN ancient city in Greece, the capital of Laconia and the most powerful state of the Peloponnese. The city lay at the northern end of the central Laconian plain, on the right bank of the river Eurotas, a little south of the point where it is joined by its largest tributary, the Oenus (mount Kelefina). The site is admirably fitted by nature to guard the only routes by which an army can penetrate Laconia from the land side, the Oenus and Eurotas valleys leading from Arcadia, its northern neighbour, and the Langada Pass over Mt Taygetus connecting Laconia and Messenia. At the same time its distance from the sea-Sparta is 27 m. from its seaport, Gythium, made it invulnerable to a maritime attack. I.-HISTORY Prehistoric Period.-Tradition relates that Sparta was founded by Lacedaemon, son of Zeus and Taygete, who called the city after the name of his wife, the daughter of Eurotas. But Amyclae and Therapne (Therapnae) seem to have been in early times of greater importance than Sparta, the former a Minyan foundation a few miles to the south of Sparta, the latter probably the Achaean capital of Laconia and the seat of Menelaus, Agamemnon's younger brother. Eighty years after the Trojan War, according to the traditional chronology, the Dorian migration took place. A band of Dorians united with a body of Aetolians to cross the Corinthian Gulf and invade the Peloponnese from the northwest. The Aetolians settled in Elis, the Dorians pushed up to the headwaters of the Alpheus, where they divided into two forces, one of which under Cresphontes invaded and later subdued Messenia, while the other, led by Aristodemus or, according to another version, by his twin sons Eurysthenes and Procles, made its way down the Eurotas were new settlements were formed and gained Sparta, which became the Dorian capital of Laconia.
    [Show full text]
  • 109 I. INTRODUCTION the Strategikon Is a Roman Military
    A C T A AThe R SCTra HT egikonA E Oa S La SOource G I —C SlavA SC andA Ra varP SA… T H I C109 A VOL. LII, 2017 PL ISSN 0001-5229 ŁUKASZ Różycki THE STRATEGIKON AS A SOURCE — SLAVS AND AVARS IN THE EYES OF PSEUDO-MAURICE, CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH AND FUTURE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES ABSTRACT Ł. Różycki 2017. The Strategikon as a source — Slavs and Avars in the eyes of Pseudo-Maurice, current state of research and future research perspectives, AAC 52:109–131. The purpose of the piece The Strategikon as a source — Slavs and Avars in the eyes of Pseudo- Maurice, current state of research and future research perspectives is to demonstrate what the author of Strategikon knew about the Slavs and Avars and review the state of research on the chapter of the treatise that deals with these two barbarian ethnicities. As a side note to the de- scription of contemporary studies of Strategikon, the piece also lists promising areas of research, which have not yet received proper attention from scholars. K e y w o r d s: Migration Period; Early Middle Ages; Balkans; Byzantium; Strategicon; Strategikon; Emperor Maurice; Slavs; Avars Received: 15.03.2017; Revised: 30.07.2017; Revised: 19.10.2017; Revised: 29.10.2017; Accepted: 30.10.2017 I. INTRODUCTION The Strategikon is a Roman military treatise, written at the end of the 6th or the beginning of the 7th century. It is one of the seminal sources not only on East Roman military history but also on the Slavs, the Avars and other peoples neighboring the Empire at the onset of the Middle Ages.
    [Show full text]