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09. Ch. 6 Huitink-Rood Histos Supplement ( ) – SUBORDINATE OFFICERS IN XENOPHON’S ANABASIS * Luuk Huitink and Tim Rood Abstract : This chapter focuses on Xenophon’s treatment of divisions within the command structure presented in the Anabasis , and in particular on three military positions that are briefly mentioned—the taxiarch, ὑποστράτηγος , and ὑπολόχαγος . Arguing against the prescriptive military hierarchies proposed in earlier scholarship, it suggests that ‘taxiarch’ should be understood fluidly and that the appearance of both the ὑποστράτηγος and the ὑπολόχαγος may be due to interpolation. The chapter also includes discussion of two types of comparative material: procedures for replacing dead, absent, or deposed generals at Athens and Sparta in the Classical period, and the lexical development of subordinate positions with the prefix ὑπο -. Keywords : Xenophon, Anabasis , subordinate commanders, taxiarch, ὑποστράτηγος , ὑπολόχαγος . enophon’s Anabasis has more often been broadly eulogised for its supposed depiction of the X democratic spirit of the Greek mercenaries whose adventures are recounted than analysed closely for the details it o?ers about the command structure of this ‘wandering republic’. 1 When Xenophon’s presentation of * References are to Xenophon’s Anabasis unless otherwise specified. Translations are adapted from the Loeb edition of Brownson and Dillery. We are grateful to Peter Rhodes for advice and to Simon Hornblower, Nick Stylianou, David Thomas, the editor, and the anonymous referee of Histos for comments on the whole article. Luuk Huitink’s work on this paper was made possible by ERC Grant Agreement n. B B (AncNar). 1 Krüger (E ) (‘civitatem peregrinantem’). On the command structure see Nussbaum (F) ‒E; Roy (F) EF‒; Lee ( F) ‒ , ‒ . Luuk Huitink and Tim Rood the command structure is discussed in its own right, it tends to be in relation either to the apologetic strains found in the Anabasis or to the broader theory of leadership that runs through his diverse corpus and that is sometimes historicised as a prototype of Hellenistic models. 2 The aim of this article is to focus instead on Xenophon’s treatment of the divisions within the command structure presented in the Anabasis , and in particular the diJculties raised by three military positions that make fleeting appearances in the Anabasis —ταξίαρχος , ὑποστράτηγος , and ὑπολόχαγος . The first of these nouns appears in Xenophon’s account twice (B..BF, .. E), while the two ὑπο- forms are found just once (B..B and . .B respectively—ὑποστράτηγος for the first, and ὑπολόχαγος for the only, time in extant Greek literature; there is also a single use of the verb ὑποστρατηγεῖν ( ..B)). Despite the lack of attention paid to these positions by Xenophon, the very fact that they are mentioned at all might seem a pointer to the growing professionalisation in Greek military practice that is often seen as a distinctive feature of the fourth century. 3 But what are their functions? In the case of the ταξίαρχος , its second appearance, as we shall see, has frequently led scholars to assume that it was a formal term for light-armed oJcers in the Ten Thousand. As for the ὑποστράτηγος , the contexts in which the noun and the cognate verb are used have been taken to suggest that the word denotes an oJcer who replaces a dead or absent στρατηγός; and by extension, in the absence of other contextual clues, the same model has been applied to the ὑπολόχαγος . In this article, we will point to various problems in current scholarly views about the functions of these positions, propose a new interpretation of the ταξίαρχος , and raise the possibility that the appearances of the ὑποστράτηγος and ὑπολόχαγος are due to interpolation. 2 Dürrbach (EB) remains the most detailed and hostile discussion of the Anabasis as apology; on the leadership theory see most recently Gray ( ); for the Hellenistic link see, e.g., Dillery ( ) ‒F. 3 See, e.g., Hornblower ( ) ‒ B. Subordinate Ocers in Xenophon’s Anabasis Before o?ering a detailed analysis of the internal evidence provided by the Anabasis , however, we will look briefly at two types of comparative material relevant to ὑποστράτηγοι and ὑπολόχαγοι in particular: firstly, procedures for replacing dead, absent, or deposed generals at Athens and Sparta in the Classical period; secondly, the lexical development of subordinate positions with the prefix ὑπο-. Even if the specific textual suggestions that are here proposed are rejected, these subordinate positions deserve more extensive analysis than they have so far received. Suect O cers At Athens there is little evidence for procedures when oJcers were absent or died, even though [Arist.] Ath. Pol. o?ers an account of how di?erent military oJces were elected. This account does mention that στρατηγοί and ἵππαρχοι faced an ἐπιχειροτονία each prytany, but while [Aristotle] specifies that if put on trial they are reappointed if acquitted, he does not state who is appointed in their place if they are found guilty. Nor does he o?er evidence for replacement procedures for the lesser oJcers he mentions, whether they be directly elected, like the tribal ταξίαρχοι or φύλαρχοι , or chosen by a superior, like the λοχαγοί.4 Striking evidence for the lack of a formal system in the case of a general’s temporary absence is provided by X.’s account of the prelude to the battle of Notium in . 5 Alcibiades is described by X. as leaving his pilot ( τὸν αὑτοῦ κυβερνήτην ) Antiochus in charge of the Athenian navy ( HG . .)—an appointment described by Krentz as ‘exceptional’ and explained by the fact that ‘no generals were available’. 6 Even in the absence of other generals, it is 4 See Rhodes (B) F‒EE on the details of the discussion of ‘elective military oJcials’. 5 For the rest of this article, ‘X.’ stands for the author Xenophon, ‘Xenophon’ for the character. 6 Krentz (E) BE. See also Jordan (F ) BE‒B, esp. Luuk Huitink and Tim Rood remarkable that Alcibiades gave the command to his pilot—a professional, unelected position. As for the death or deposition of a general, the first clear evidence for Athenian procedures comes a few years before Notium. 7 In /B Nicias, the only remaining general of the Athenian force in Sicily after the deposition of Alcibiades and the death of Lamachus, sent to Athens to ask to be replaced himself. The Athenians instead chose two men on the spot, Menander and Euthydemus, as additional στρατηγοί (Th. F..: προσείλοντο ), until Nicias’ new colleagues Demosthenes and Eurymedon (who were already στρατηγοί) should arrive. It seems likely that Menander and Euthydemus were made στρατηγοί in addition to the regular ten, having previously served as subordinate oJcers (perhaps ταξίαρχοι ). 8 Whatever the earlier status of the replacement generals, the example of the Athenian force in Sicily reveals clearly that there was no automatic system for replacing missing στρατηγοί.9 This procedure seems to be confirmed, moreover, by the aftermath of the battle of Arginusae in : after two στρατηγοί had died and seven had been deposed, the Athenians chose in addition to the single remaining στρατηγός (πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ εἵλοντο , X. HG .F.) two new στρατηγοί, evidently leaving a board of only three for the rest of the year. 10 In Classical Greece, it is Sparta that provides the best evidence for procedures on the deaths of military leaders. 7 ML BB, a casualty list with two generals from one tribe in the same year, is possible evidence for replacement, but it is also possible that two generals from that tribe were elected initially; see Fornara (F) . 8 Develin (E) , ; Alcibiades had been deposed the previous year ( /), so the new στρατηγοί are not a straight replacement. For a di?erent view of the Sicilian command, see Hamel (E) ‒ . 9 The expedition was distinctive in that the three initial generals were sent αὐτοκράτορες (Th. .E. , .), but this point does not undermine the broader argument. 10 There is further evidence for the remaining years of the Pelopon- nesian War: for / Lysias was probably su?ect for Archestratus (Rhodes (B) B); in / Eucrates was chosen after the battle of Aegospotami (Lys. E.). For fatalities among generals in the Classical period, see Pritchett () F‒BE, Hamel (E) ‒. Subordinate Ocers in Xenophon’s Anabasis B Some of this evidence concerns the navy. Diodorus presents the ναύαρχος Callicratidas learning from a seer before the battle of Arginusae that he will die in the battle (B.E.). That he proceeds in a speech to proclaim Clearchus as his successor implies that there was no fixed replacement. But Diodorus’ narrative is evidently suspect (Callicratidas’ foreknowledge matches the dream attributed to one of the Athenian generals (B.F.)). 11 From the evidence of X.’s Hellenica and the lexicographer Pollux, however, it has generally been assumed that there was in fact a ‘vice- admiral’, the ἐπιστολεύς, who would take over in the event of the admiral’s death (the only other occurrence of the Spartan position is at Plu. Lys. F. , evidently drawing from X.). The first evidence for this position is when Hippocrates, ἐπιστολεύς for Mindarus, sends a letter to the Spartans explaining that Mindarus is dead ( HG .. B). The next is when, owing to the rule that a ναύαρχος could not serve twice in succession, Lysander is sent as ἐπιστολεύς instead (HG ..F). The Hellenica subsequently o?ers further evidence of an ἐπιστολεύς taking over on the death of the ναύαρχος (.E.); of an oJcer called by the hapax ἐπιστολιαφόρος acting in the same way (. ); and also of an ἐπιστολεύς being left in charge of a separate contingent by the ναύαρχος ( .. –). This idea of the position is also presented by Pollux (.), though with the support of a false etymology: οὕτω γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ στόλου διάδοχος τοῦ ναυάρχου (‘this was the name for the nauarch ’s successor in charge of the expedition’).
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