Ideals and Pragmatism in Greek Military Thought 490-338 Bc
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Roel Konijnendijk IDEALS AND PRAGMATISM IN GREEK MILITARY THOUGHT 490-338 BC PhD Thesis – Ancient History – UCL I, Roel Konijnendijk, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. Thesis Abstract This thesis examines the principles that defined the military thinking of the Classical Greek city-states. Its focus is on tactical thought: Greek conceptions of the means, methods, and purpose of engaging the enemy in battle. Through an analysis of historical accounts of battles and campaigns, accompanied by a parallel study of surviving military treatises from the period, it draws a new picture of the tactical options that were available, and of the ideals that lay behind them. It has long been argued that Greek tactics were deliberately primitive, restricted by conventions that prescribed the correct way to fight a battle and limited the extent to which victory could be exploited. Recent reinterpretations of the nature of Greek warfare cast doubt on this view, prompting a reassessment of tactical thought – a subject that revisionist scholars have not yet treated in detail. This study shows that practically all the assumptions of the traditional model are wrong. Tactical thought was constrained chiefly by the extreme vulnerability of the hoplite phalanx, its total lack of training, and the general’s limited capacity for command and control on the battlefield. Greek commanders, however, did not let any moral rules get in the way of possible solutions to these problems. Battle was meant to create an opportunity for the wholesale destruction of the enemy, and any available means were deployed towards that goal. Far from being at odds with nobler ideals, pragmatism was itself a leading principle of tactical thought throughout the Classical period. 5 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 9 Introduction: The Case of Leuktra ......................................................................................... 11 The Limits of Greek War ................................................................................................... 11 The Rise of the Orthodox View ......................................................................................... 14 The Prussians ................................................................................................................. 14 The English .................................................................................................................... 20 The Americans ............................................................................................................... 24 A Revolution in Battle Tactics ........................................................................................... 27 The Genius ..................................................................................................................... 27 The Theories ................................................................................................................... 29 The Basics ...................................................................................................................... 32 The Problem ................................................................................................................... 37 Ideals and Pragmatism in Greek Military Thought ............................................................ 40 1. ‘Improvisers in Soldiering’: Training for War .................................................................. 45 The Question ...................................................................................................................... 45 Good Order ........................................................................................................................ 46 Skill at Arms ...................................................................................................................... 56 Improvising War ................................................................................................................ 68 2. ‘The Finest, Flattest Piece of Land’: Choosing the Battlefield ......................................... 71 Traditions ........................................................................................................................... 71 Practice ............................................................................................................................... 77 Theory ................................................................................................................................ 86 3. ‘Deployed to Fit the Need’: Forming Up for Battle .......................................................... 91 Worthless Hoplites ............................................................................................................. 91 Ways to Deploy ................................................................................................................ 102 Positions of Honour ......................................................................................................... 110 The Depth of the Line ...................................................................................................... 119 4. ‘Utterly Outmatched in Skill’: Battle Tactics .................................................................. 129 Controlling Battle ............................................................................................................. 129 The Tools of the Tactician ............................................................................................... 142 How to Win ...................................................................................................................... 150 Theory .............................................................................................................................. 160 7 5. ‘No Shortage of People to Kill’: The Rout and its Aftermath .......................................... 167 Fight or Flight .................................................................................................................. 167 A Divine Gift ................................................................................................................... 175 Last Rites ......................................................................................................................... 188 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 197 The Context of Tactical Thought ..................................................................................... 197 A New Model of Hoplite Battle ....................................................................................... 200 The Greek Way of War .................................................................................................... 207 Works Cited .......................................................................................................................... 211 8 Acknowledgements For this thesis, and for many other things, all my thanks must go to Professor Hans van Wees. It was his invitation that got me to send my application to UCL; his perseverance that secured my funding; his supervision that improved my work and my thinking in countless ways. A PhD is a long and arduous battle, and I owe a great debt of gratitude to my symmachoi . First and foremost are my fellow Leiden MPhil graduates – Harm Manders, Jeroen Bouterse, and above all Miriam Groen-Vallinga, who still insists on making me feel better than I am. Among those I met in London, Vincent Fourcade, Tim Lunardoni and Jennifer Hicks have been the greatest of friends, companions, counsellors and critics; without them, neither my works nor my days would amount to very much. In addition, my work could not be what it is without the friendship, initiative and cooperative spirit of Joshua R. Hall, Matthew Lloyd and Cezary Kucewicz, which I hope I will be able to enjoy for a long time to come. Finally, in a battle which, like those of the Greeks, has no rules, my thanks belong to Eri, who sets the rules for me. 9 Introduction: The Case of Leuktra 1 The Limits of Greek War Warriors are the product of their society and its values. Their behaviour in war is a window onto their culture as a whole. Scholars have therefore been engaged for centuries in answering a fundamental question: what sort of warfare did the city- states of Classical Greece produce? In a sequence of academic studies stretching across these centuries, scholars of Greek military history have constructed and upheld an all-embracing answer – a comprehensive set of arguments and assumptions covering all aspects of the subject from the purposes of Greek strategy to the way they held their spears. According to this traditional view, military practice was confined within very particular limits. Warfare in Archaic and Classical Greece was a ‘wonderful, absurd conspiracy’: from the late eighth century onwards, the landowning middle class of the city-states equipped itself as heavy infantry and effectively asserted a monopoly over the conduct of war. 2 These men decided their conflicts through single head-on confrontations with their well-armed smallholder counterparts from other states. Such battles were fought over farmland, on farmland, by farmer militias; they were fought only in summer,