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ABSTRACT TADLOCK, STEPHEN KYLE. Poor ABSTRACT TADLOCK, STEPHEN KYLE. Poor in Life, Naked in Battle: Athenian Thetes as Psiloi in the Classical Age. (Under the direction of Dr. S. Thomas Parker). Most military and ancient historians have assumed that in Classical Athens the poor of the city, the thetes, served as light-armed troops (psiloi) or rowed in the fleet. A closer look at the available evidence, however, suggests that too many practical and social barriers hindered thetes from organized psiloi service until the introduction of the ephebic program in the fourth century. Before then, Athens deliberately neglected the training of thetes as psiloi, leaving these men with no means to learn how to use their weapons. Additionally, the prevailing military ethos extolled hoplites and, to a lesser extent, cavalry as the true protectors of the city. Neglecting to equip their own poorer citizens as psiloi required the Athenians to look elsewhere for light infantry. These alternative sources included mercenaries and allies from outside the city and resident aliens and slaves from within. The thetes of the city, unable to serve as effective psiloi, often followed the army anyway in hope of plunder and from loyalty to the city. These men, often called psiloi by the ancient sources, usually had little effect on the outcome of the battle and instead were used more effectively to plunder enemy land and forage for the army. Thetes were also instrumental in rowing the ships on which Athens’ naval superiority depended and thus gained many advantages. Thetes were finally trained in the use of psiloi weaponry during the fourth century, but usually served as hoplites instead, while mercenaries continued to fill the need for light- infantry. © 2012 by Stephen Kyle Tadlock All Rights Reserved Poor in Life, Naked in Battle: Athenian Thetes as Psiloi In the Classical Age by Stephen Kyle Tadlock A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of North Carolina State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts History Raleigh, North Carolina 2012 APPROVED BY: _______________________________ ______________________________ Everett L. Wheeler Julie Mell ________________________________ S. Thomas Parker Chair of Advisory Committee DEDICATION Dedicated to Annie, whose loving support made this possible, and to Hal, who I hope will one day understand why Daddy had to spend so much time at home working instead of playing with him. ii BIOGRAPHY Kyle Tadlock is originally from Hattiesburg, Mississippi and currently misses his home town. He graduated from the University of Mississippi in 2006 and then spent the next three years as a men’s clothing salesman and househusband. He is looking forward to graduating from North Carolina State after his extended stay and pursuing his doctorate. He is married to the lovely and hard-working Lee Anne Tadlock and has one son and another child on the way. He also does not enjoy talking much about himself, except perhaps in the third person. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many people made this present work possible. The biggest thanks goes to Dr. Parker, who has more than lived up to his title of “adviser” and whose encouragement and aid has made my time at State far more productive and enjoyable than it would have otherwise been. I am also greatly indebted to Dr. Wheeler taking the time to help a student he did not know with a project whose conclusions run contrary to some of his own. Dr. Sack also merits mention for teaching me so much about Greece and the Near East while also keeping me sharp. I also owe Norene Miller much for serving as a guide to and shield from the bureaucracy and red tape of the history department. Looking further back, I wish to thank Ms. Ratliff, Mr. Hinton, and Dr. Ajootian, all of whom fueled my passion for history in general and ancient history in particular in years past. Finally, I wish to thank my parents for encouraging my love of learning and for the years of support that they gave me as I did so. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vi List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ vii Chapter 1: Introduction, Definitions, and Source ................................................................1 Chapter 2: Historical Outline .............................................................................................13 Chapter 3: Thetes as Psiloi .................................................................................................33 Chapter 4: Alternative Sources of Psiloi ...........................................................................66 Chapter 5: Thetes at War....................................................................................................83 Chapter 6: Conclusion......................................................................................................100 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................110 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Modern rendering of a fourth-century hoplite ....................................................11 Figure 2: Archer in eastern costume ..................................................................................11 Figure 3: Thracian peltast with long spear .........................................................................12 Figure 4: Drawing of the Amathus bowl ...........................................................................32 Figure 5: Detail of Chigi vase showing hoplites ................................................................32 vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Aesch. Aeschylus Ag. Agamemnon Per. Persae Andoc. Andocides Ar. Aristophanes Ach. Acharnenses Lys. Lysistrata Plut. Plutus Ran. Ranae Thesm. Thesmorphoriazusae Arist. Aristotle [Ath. Pol.] Athenaion Politeia [Oec.] Oeconomica Pol. Politica Arr. Arrian Tact. Tactica Dem. Demosthenes Diod. Sic. Diodorus Siculus Eur. Euripides Andr. Andromache Hel. Helena HF Hercules furens Hdt. Herodotus Hell. Oxy. Hellenica Oxyrhynchia Hom. Homer Il. Iliad Isoc. Isocrates vii IG Incscriptiones Graecae Lycurg. Lycurgus Leoc. Against Leocrates Lys. Lysias OCD3 Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd edition Paus. Pausanias Pl. Plato La. Laches Leg. Leges Prt. Protagoras Plut. Plutarch Alc. Alcibiades Ages. Agesilaus Sol. Solon Thes. Theseus [X orat.] Vitae decem oratorum Thuc. Thucydides Xen. Xenophon An. Anabasis Cyr. Cyropaedia Eq. mag. De Equitum Magistro Hell. Hellenica Mem. Memorabilia [Ath. Pol.] Respublica Atheniensium Vect. De vectigalibus viii Chapter 1: Introduction, Definitions, and Sources Until the last few decades, history has largely been written by and concerned primarily with the deeds of men of status. Ancient Greece was no exception and the historians of that period concerned themselves mostly with the deeds of the leading politicians, thinkers, and generals. Modern historians, both ancient and military, have largely followed that tradition. The military nature of hoplites, their status, their limitations, and their origins, for instance, have been endlessly debated over the centuries. Similarly, most work on Athenian society and government focuses largely on these same “middle-class” men who held the majority of the offices and largely set the agenda of the state.1 In both of these cases, the thetes, those Athenians citizens who were too poor to be hoplites, have been largely ignored by modern scholarship in terms of their military contributions to land warfare. Most scholars simply accept the prevailing view that thetes served either as psiloi (light-armed troops) or in the fleet. The Athenian navy and those who rowed its ships have received a fair share of scholarly attention, although few historians have examined the contributions of light infantry to Classical Greek warfare.2 Those few who have, such as van Wees, have swung too far in the opposite direction by positing that every “hoplite” battle had large swarms of psiloi on both sides that were deliberately omitted from 1 The term “middle-class,” although anachronistic, is a convenient way to denote the economic status of the hoplite class. The class system of Athens will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. All dates are BC unless otherwise noted. 2 Notable exceptions are Best 1969 and Parke 1981 [1933], both of whom discuss light-armed troops, namely mercenaries. 1 the record by historians because of social prejudices.3 He also overstates the contributions of these soldiers by arguing that they often fought effectively against enemy hoplites.4 This thesis seeks both to address neglect of the thetes and to clarify their role in the land forces of Athens. The traditional view that thetes served their city as light infantry presupposes several unproven assumptions, since the evidence suggests that, with few notable exceptions, they were unable to serve effectively as organized psiloi until at least the fourth century. Before this, professional training in light weapons did not exist in Athens and, even if it had, it is likely that the thetes lacked the time to invest in such extensive drilling.5 Social and cultural pressures also mitigated against thetes serving as light infantry since such soldiers were deliberately marginalized by the hoplite class and were often associated with barbarians. Finally, service in the Athenian navy, which was both held in higher esteem and remunerated, provided
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