Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000

Baltic Security Co-operation: a Way Ahead

By Eitvydas Bajarûnas, Head of Foreign Policy Planning, MFA, Lithuania1

to appraise the main security challenges will benefit more if we are successful in Introduction of the Baltic Sea region, to examine cur- overcoming these old patterns and replace rent accomplishments of the three Baltic them with new habits of cooperation”. Many outside observers recognize countries in their security cooperation That is a most elegant expression valid achievements of Estonia, Latvia and and, in that respect, to project major fu- even today. Lithuania - which celebrate 10 years of ture tasks. Indeed, viewed from the historical per- the restored independence - in implement- spective, the Baltic Sea region has experi- ing democracy, establishing functioning What is the Baltic enced a turbulent history where major free market economy, and engaging into security agenda? European powers - Russia (in the last cen- the wider world international co-opera- tury – the Soviet Union), Germany and tion. Baltic foreign and security policies Assessing the security situation of the others - have regularly tried to exercise contributed to making them stand for Baltic countries U.S. Secretary of State M. strategic and ideological influence. stability, openness, dynamic development Albright in her speech in Vilnius in July Through out history fundamental rights and ability to cope with the many chal- 1997 presented it in such way: “... per- have been ignored. The smaller countries lenges of globalization. Commemoration haps no part of Europe has suffered more in the region have suffered dispropor- of a decade of a successful return to the from the old pattern of geopolitics than tionately through repeated occupation global community marks the right time the Baltic states ... and no part of Europe and oppression by their larger neighbors.

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For centuries they have found themselves offers the world-market excellent trade approach to an undivided Europe. A sig- in a gray zone of uncertainty, governed opportunities, a good climate of foreign nificant factor here is the present day by power not by principles of law or investments, transit routes, and a steadily Russia’s involvement in partnership rela- moral. growing network of international, gov- tionship with the Western institutions. The peace treaties of 1920 between the ernmental and non-governmental arrange- The U.S. and the EU are key players in Baltic countries and Russia were the first ments. the Baltic Sea region. Other countries in signs of Russia’s acceptance of their sov- The region has enormous potential, the region - Nordic, Poland, and Germany ereignty, although it never reconciled it- given the 90 millions people who live - also have great interests in the stability self with the loss of the Baltic countries. there, with rich natural and human re- of the area. The Soviet Russia occupied the three sources and excellent transit opportuni- Indeed, the Baltic Sea region might be countries in 1939, after Hitler donated ties. It has an investment conducive envi- considered as one of the most expanding them to Stalin in the secret Molotov- ronment, a highly skilled labor force, and regions in Europe and after the Baltic and Ribbentrop pact. The Yalta meeting of is hi-tech oriented. Polish membership in EU, the region will 1945 became a funeral for Baltic independ- The fall of the Soviet Union and other be able to reveal its entire potential. Four ence. During the Cold War the dividing totalitarian regimes in the East, the unifi- EU members – Denmark, Germany, Fin- line of Europe went across the Baltic Sea cation of Germany, restoration of inde- land and Sweden - border the Baltic Sea, region, which became a strategic backwa- pendence of the Baltic countries, Finish four others - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania ter that received little focus on interna- and Swedish membership in the EU and and Poland - are on the road to accede tional agendas. the Polish membership of NATO, fol- the Union and it is only a question of However, since the end of the Cold lowed by continuing European and Trans- time when it happens. Finally, Russia is War, the region has become an impor- atlantic integration processes all provide in a partnership and co-operation arrange- tant focal point where U.S.’, EU’s and unique opportunities for creating stabil- ment with EU (although limited because Russia’s policies are intercrossed. There is ity and well-being around the Baltic Sea. of continued Chechen war) and declares a widespread understanding that the Bal- The Baltic region has become a labora- its intention to expand her relationship tic Sea region is one of the most dynami- tory example to other parts of Europe with the Union. For these reasons the cally developing, outward-looking and for promoting closer regional coopera- Baltic Sea has been called a future “inner promising regions in Europe. The region tion, and as a test case for the Western EU lake”.

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Today, only one decade after the end nority rights and settle their disputes challenges, ambiguity and certain insta- of the Cold War and the restored inde- peacefully. bility of a wider scope that still character- pendence of the Baltic countries, the is- The Baltic Sea region today appears to ize the region, to notice if distrust, which sues of the zones of influence, boundary be safe from destructive forces that could may come to us from the past, still domi- disputes, ethnic hatred and other past cause tension among its states and for the nates relationships, if asymmetrical balance problems have become irrelevant on the moment traditional military security is of capability still remain a source of ten- security agendas of the Baltic Region. In- less relevant in this region. Problems, sions - is it possible that a Cold war type deed, immediately after the collapse of the which dominated agendas in the first years of conflict again can become pertinent in Berlin Wall, there were many warnings that of independence – the presence of Rus- the regional context? the end of the old socialist system might sian troops on the soil of the Baltic coun- These are more theoretical questions, revitalize old hatreds in Central and East- tries, a high degree of militarization in but there are many practical issues as the ern Europe. For 40 years communism had the Baltic neighborhood, tensions due to economic security, enlargement of both suppressed ethnic nationalism, frontier unsolved minority and human rights is- the EU and NATO, regional cooperation disputes and minority discontents. Today sues in Estonia and Latvia, unilateral de- and neighborhood issues, including Rus- we can see that none of these evils has pendency from the Eastern energy sup- sia and its Kaliningrad region, the U.S. come to pass - with the exception of Cau- ply etc. – no longer dominate the secu- presence and the wider security context. casus, some parts in Central Asia and rity agendas. The type of tension most Finally, not all states in the region en- Western Balkans. Everywhere else minor- likely to occur in the Baltic is not a mili- joy an equal sense of security status. ity rights have been guaranteed and exist- tary threat, but rather the highly charged, Neighbors of the three Baltic countries - ing borders were either reaffirmed or tense political situation which could turn Nordic countries - are solidly integrated changed by consent. This extraordinary into violent actions, extremist group ac- both internally and with the rest of Eu- success is above all due to the enlargement tions, drug trafficking, smuggling, illegal rope. Presently many outsiders still regard processes of the EU and NATO to the migration etc. the case of the Baltic trio as somewhat East. It has promised prosperity and sta- But even these threats are regarded as different. Although a joined community bility to potential new members in re- manageable within the existing institu- of sovereign countries, institutionally and turn for their willingness to carry tions and cooperative structures. More mentally they are still apart. This pattern through market reforms, protect mi- important is to detect what elements of of ambiguity shows that further reflec-

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tion is needed on the place and functions kept under totalitarian regimes or dur- That is why it is of crucial importance of the Baltic security cooperation. ing the short prewar period of independ- for the EU to continue the enlargement ence fluctuating in between the East and process. EU, unfortunately, is badly con- Enlargement of West, the Baltic countries in case of EU flicted on the issue of expanding the the European Union membership would for the forthcoming Union-membership. Some countries, e.g. years be earmarked as a constituent part Germany, would like EU membership for One can say that what is happening in of the democratic West. some of its eastern neighbors, but is con- the enlargement process of the EU is that Indeed, the Baltic’s as well as other cerned about the free movement of east- Europe is returning to where it belongs, countries’ membership in the EU will have ern workers into Germany and illegal to its original sites, from which it had to a positive impact on the stability in the immigrants. EU politicians also shrink withdraw temporarily. Membership in the region and will be beneficial to its from farm-subsidy reforms regarded as EU is a precondition for modernization neighbors. Baltic Sea states regional co- necessary if the EU is to bear the cost of of the Baltic countries’ economies and operation, particularly among the states the entry of heavily agricultural states. societies as well as for fully-fledged par- of the Baltic Sea, Latvia and Estonia, as Be as it is the EU has already started its ticipation in the international commu- well as the strategic partnership with Po- journey towards the Baltics. Estonia in nity. Three small states will contribute to land, is of special importance to Lithua- 1997 became the first Baltic country to the economic, political and social progress nia. Together with the other Member start negotiations and by that making a in Europe, to the promotion of cultural States of the EU, Lithuania would con- breakthrough in Baltic geopolitics. On diversity and the development of com- tribute to strengthening the role of the December 1999 the Helsinki EU Council mon values. EU in Northern and Eastern Europe, par- approved the Commission’s recommen- At the same time, the EU’s enlargement ticularly in its relations with Russia, dation to open accession negotiations towards the Baltics is more than just an Ukraine and Belarus. At the same time, with Latvia and Lithuania. Progress in economic factor or recognition of their Eastwards enlargement of EU would in- negotiation go hand in hand with European cultural heritage. The Baltic crease political stability in the Baltic Sea progress in incorporating the EU acquis countries’ membership of the EU would region, guarantee the consolidation of into national legislation and implement- mean a dramatic shift in Baltic geopoli- democracy, rule of law, and the human ing it. The Union commits itself to be tics. For several centuries being forcefully and minority rights protection. ready to accept new members beginning

46 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 with the end of 2002. On its side, Lithua- tions between candidate countries and decision-making has already proved to nia stated it’s readiness to finalize nego- Russia is subjected to changes as well. The decrease the possibility of conflict among tiation during the year 2002 and as from candidate countries face dual EU enlarge- its members. The fact of co-ordination of the 2004 it should be ready to implement ment challenges – on the one hand, they foreign policies among EU members also EU’s requirements. Estonia and Latvia have to fulfill their membership require- decreases the possibility of external risks. have even more ambitious plans. ments and, on the other, they have to Although membership of the EU would Economic cohesion and level of inte- assist the neighboring regions of Russia be an important stability factor in the gration of the Baltic countries might even in making use of the possibilities offered Baltic Sea region only NATO can pro- suggest that three of them for practical by the EU enlargement process. vide formal security guarantees. purposes alone can be admitted to the The interdependence between Russia Of course, the strengthening of home EU during the same wave of enlargement. and the rest of Europe is emphasized in and justice affairs of the EU is on its way Such proposals have already been men- the Baltic Sea region. Today Russia is more and any future EU member will be capa- tioned from the Commission. That is not dependent than ever before on income ble to contest so called “new threats”, i.e., to say that the EU needs to have an ap- generated through exports to Europe. The smuggling, crime, etc. That, together with proach of “geopolitical entity”. It is a mere EU will remain Russia’s largest trading the increased role of EU in crisis manage- practical and pragmatic approach on how partner and the main export market for ment, would bring a stronger sense of sta- to avoid building temporary borders in its natural resources. Forty percent of bility and security to the region. between a single economic and social Russian foreign trade is with the Union. space. At the same time, case-by-case ap- The Union’s enlargement to the Baltic ESDI/ESDP proach need to be preserved and better region raises a question of security and prepared Baltic candidates should not have many in Lithuania ask - does the EU pro- Indeed, strengthening of EU’s crisis to wait for their neighbors, which are lag- vide the necessary security and stability management and military and civilian ging behind. to the region? The EU does not provide capabilities is a positive development by The EU enlargement has provided new any formal security guarantees but, of itself. Seen from a Baltic Sea perspective, dynamism to the Baltic Sea region. The course, membership in the Union will the development of the Common Euro- space of co-operation between Russia and definitely strengthen Baltic security. Regu- pean Security and Defense policy/Euro- the EU is expanding; the context of rela- lar exchange of information and common pean Security and Defense Identity, firstly,

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should benefit the European security en- partner with the WEU attentively follows “hard” security guarantees, although a sce- vironment and, at the same time, not the processes on the strengthening of nario where one EU member state is weaken but reinforce the transatlantic link European crisis management, i.e., ESDP/ threaten and the other members stay away lying at the heart of European security. ESDI. Lithuania together with other As- just because of the absent of formal defense Putting in practice the common Euro- sociated Partners with the WEU stresses guarantees is unimaginable. pean policy on security and defense con- the need for the adoption of the proper After 50 years NATO continues to cerns more than only the current EU decisions enabling Associated Partners; to guarantee and safeguard freedom and acts members, and is an issue for considera- take part in all ongoing consultations and as the prerequisite for economic and so- tion among all contributors to the secu- activities related to the European security cial prosperity. Lithuania’s membership rity and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, and defence policy in relevant modalities, in NATO would make final recognition including EU and NATO candidate coun- to join future European-led exercises and and consolidation of the chosen path of tries. operations by committing forces, having reforms. The EU is not just a club of wealthy the same obligations and rights as other Integration into NATO is interpreted nations and well functioning economies, active participants, and to contribute to differently east from us, namely Russia, but also the Union of countries with the the efforts aimed at enhancing European although it is clearly not a threat to any- increased determination to coordinate operational capabilities. That would make one. All states have the right to freely efforts in response to external political EU’s crisis management arrangements per- choose their security arrangements and and security challenges. The Kosovo cri- tinent to the Baltic Sea region as well. the path to well being. By admitting Es- sis once again has revealed the fact that tonia, Latvia and Lithuania into NATO the European countries have to have ef- NATO’s openness the Alliance would consolidate the zone fective European crisis management capa- of stability and security in Europe. It bilities in order to cope with potential NATO membership of the Baltic coun- would also in a positive way affect the crises that might occur at the periphery tries is the biggest challenges ahead of us. traditional attitudes in the East, would of Europe in the future. Neither EU membership of the Baltic help to diminish the established stere- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as active countries, nor the increased defense role otypes and would open the way for fur- applicants for NATO membership, asso- of the EU can act as an alternative to ther and closer co-operation between ciated countries with EU, and associated NATO - EU is not designed to provide NATO and Russia.

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Lithuania’s membership in NATO cure only after being integrated into The spread of weapons of mass destruc- would be an extension of the zone of se- NATO. Lithuania’s membership in the tion and international terrorism, inter- curity and stability and a reinforcement Alliance will be a historic act of Euro- nal instabilities caused by a mixture of of confidence in Lithuanian-Russian rela- pean unification, making all chances of socio-economic and political imbalances tions. Indeed Baltic membership in NATO turning back the clock impossible. The and political fundamentalism could very should be viewed as a positive factor, con- NATO enlargement should continue to well lead to crisis requiring a reaction solidating bilateral relations and ensuring deny any attempts to draw new “red lines” from NATO. A wide range of common their further progress. Their accession into in Europe. The new Euro-Atlantic secu- risks and challenges can affect Alliance NATO would be demonstration and rity system can only be envisaged if old interests. This calls for a broad, compre- proof that relations between the Alliance dividing lines are removed and the crea- hensive and joint strategy of the Euro- and Russia are reaching an entirely new tion of new ones avoided. Atlantic institutions As a democratic or- level, thereby confirming that the Alliance Though, presently the Baltic countries ganization based upon the rule of law, and Russia may not only undertake joint do not face a direct military threat they NATO must continue to show its com- operations but also coexist in close prox- still border regions with a high degree of mitment to international peace and secu- imity. Our countries joining the Alliance uncertainty and unpredictability. rity, while defending the vital direct in- would be an additional psychological In an environment of multiple chal- terests of the Euro-Atlantic region. If the guarantee, affirming the Baltics as full- lenges and risks, the significance of the Alliance continues to adapt rapidly to the fledged partners in their relations with Alliance remains important for the coun- realities of the European security, it will Russia. The accession of new members tries of the region. New risks still exist retain its strength and vitality. strengthens the Alliance and increases con- and NATO’s steady hand still saves lives One of the most important tasks of fidence and security of neighboring coun- and stops the spread of violence as it was the new NATO is to promote security tries. shown in Bosnia and Kosovo. Various integration in Europe across former di- There is no doubt that the security and local rivals and new challenges to the com- vides. There is no better way to safeguard stability of the Baltic Sea region cannot mon European security can be more ef- security and to strengthen stability in be considered separately from European fectively solved with deeper involvement Europe than by linking nations together security and stability. Just as the other and closer co-operation with partner coun- in close and binding co-operation. The Baltic States, Lithuania will be fully se- tries. Strategic Concept approved in Washing-

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ton by the NATO Heads of State and Gov- The Baltic countries are not asking for NATO’s expanded security and stability ernment in April 1999 contained a new a free seat at the table when they apply but also to the destiny of the values and concept, which could have some relevance for membership in NATO. They have principles that communism denied and for the Baltic Region. It introduced a con- proven themselves as among those who in whose name communism was resisted cept of “non-Article 5” crisis management. are able and willing to make tangible con- and ultimately brought down. NATO The document stated that an important aim tributions to secure peace and stability enlargement is a natural and continuing of NATO is to keep risks at a distance by on the European continent. The mere consequence of the emergence of an un- dealing with potential crisis outside cur- prospect of future NATO membership has divided and increasingly democratic Eu- rent Alliance’s territory at an early stage. encouraged states to make strenuous ef- rope. Integration to NATO, first of all, is forts towards democratization and reform At the 1997 Madrid Summit where based on the adherence to the common and to improve and strengthen relations three Baltic countries were indirectly values that have characterized the West- with one another. Lithuania is linked to mentioned in the “open door” part of ern part of the globe for many years and the West by the ties of culture, religion, communiqué, and two years later, at the that have united those countries to form beliefs and common values, and economy. Washington Summit, leaders of the Alli- common institutions to preserve stabil- These ties are well complimented by ac- ance made it clear that the Alliance is on ity and promote prosperity. The enlarge- tive co-operation in the fields of defense, an irreversible path of changes. The invi- ment should continue to provide a vis- foreign policy and infrastructure devel- tation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech ible and well articulated individual rec- opment. Republic to NATO was the best illustra- ognition of achievements of a country Lithuania is ready to assume the obli- tion of that. In Washington last year the that has built a viable democratic society gations and commitments under the Wash- Alliance leaders went even further in the with an expanding free market economy. ington Treaty, is fully prepared to share case of Baltic countries by naming them We do also believe that the limited capa- the roles, risks, responsibilities, benefits explicitly and recognized progress made bilities of small countries, like Estonia, and burdens of common security and by them and other aspiring countries and Latvia and Lithuania, can be most affec- collective defence and to subscribe to the reiterated NATO’s openness by setting a tive only when combined with the collec- Strategic Concept. target date - 2002 - for the next revision tive actions of other countries sharing the The admission of new members into of the enlargement process. They provided same values and interests. the Alliance is important not only to a solid mechanism - the Membership Ac-

50 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 tion Plan (MAP) - to assist the applicants and training system, including English ing interoperability by acquiring anti-tank in preparations for eventual accession. language training, logistics, quality of life and anti-air weapons. This will enable These facts are encouraging in a way to improvement, development of infrastruc- Lithuania to defend its sovereignty and double efforts to be qualified for mem- ture, armament and equipment procure- protect its democratic values, while simul- bership in the second round of enlarge- ment, and air defence. We are creating an taneously contributing to the effective- ment. armed forces based on Western models, ness of the Alliance, contribute militarily Lithuania expects the MAP together which can be integrated into NATO and to collective defence and to the Alliance’s with an enhanced PfP program to consti- also if need function independently of new missions. The development of self- tute a very practical and membership-tai- other armed forces. defence capabilities and the development lored element of NATO’s “open door” The Programme places great emphasis of Armed Forces capabilities of operat- policy. However, even without the MAP on the need to prepare force structures, ing in conjunction with NATO or as a Action Plan Lithuania is well on the way to contribute militarily to collective de- part of the Alliance Forces are an enor- to prepare to assume membership obliga- fence and to the Alliance’s new missions. mous task requiring strong determination tions. We have worked hard to get ready Lithuania has adapted a firm commitment of our political and military leadership. for membership not for the sake of mem- to a progressive ten-year modernization The successful implementation of the bership in itself, but in the interest of and procurement programme to improve MAP mechanisms is essential for a cred- our country. its military capabilities. A ten-year armed ible and continuous enlargement process. Lithuania has prepared and submit- forces development plan foresees an ac- We note the Alliance’s readiness to pro- ted a NATO integration programme, tive military force of 25.000. We have al- vide advice, assistance and practical sup- which details the financial and military ready begun to reform our reserve force. port to the aspirant countries and in this commitments Lithuania is prepared to After completion of the reform we will context expect focused and candid feed- make to NATO. As part of these commit- have a complementary force of over one back on our preparations for NATO ments Lithuania is ready to spend 2 % of hundred thousand highly motivated re- membership. its Gross Domestic Product on defence servists who can be activated in case of a The enlargement should continue to by 2002. On the practical side we are con- crisis situation. demonstrate the credibility of the Alli- centrated on C3, the adoption of a new Lithuania is developing the overall ca- ance’s “open door” policy by launching force structure, systematized education pabilities of its armed forces and enhanc- individually tailored and membership

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oriented programmes of measures de- has turned out to be more problematic the new countries capable of contribut- signed to assist aspiring members in their and expensive than originally expected – ing to NATO, are they important in re- practical preparation for accession. Lithua- a factor that has made many member states spect of NATO’s new missions, are these nia has made significant and substantive reluctant to start new accession negotia- countries defendable etc.? progress in meeting the criteria for NATO tions. Third, the enlargement issue has moved membership, it is a fully functioning, sta- First, the second round of enlargement down on the NATO agendas. Operations ble democracy where human rights, free- definitely suffer from a lack of leadership in Bosnia and especially in Kosovo, the dom of expression, the rule of law and in the West. In the U.S. everything is over- ongoing debate on Defence Capability free and fair elections are respected. ruled by the presidential elections, which Initiative, ESDI (burden sharing), and The enlargement of NATO is a factor traditionally tend to be “inward looking”. relations with Russia are presently given for stability in Europe and the Alliance In Europe enthusiasm for enlargement is first priority. Indeed, ethnic tensions in should not close its door to well quali- decreasing drastically: Germany lost its Kosovo continue and there is little evi- fied candidates. We hope that this proc- rationale and political will (with the change dence that the World community will be ess and timely evaluation of the progress of political leadership) and even strategic able reach a political solution to the most made by individual aspirants will enable necessity (with Polish membership of difficult case in Balkan crisis any time the NATO Summit, which will be held NATO). France traditionally gives the EU soon. no later than 2002, to launch a subsequent first priority. Three Nordic Allies – Den- Fourth, growing tensions between the round of enlargement by extending new mark, Iceland and Norway – and three U.S. and Europe (and between the U.S. invitations to qualified candidates, includ- newcomers – The Czech Republic, Hun- and Russia) on the National Missile De- ing Lithuania, to start accession negotia- gary and Poland – are keeping the debate fence (NMD) issue also contributes little tions. on enlargement open, but they lack essen- to the enlargement process. Most likely Let us be frank - there is little evidence tial political influence at the negotiation the U.S. Administration will go along with at the moment that NATO’s leaders are tables. the NMD and Europe will have to decide considering inviting new countries to Second, the whole argumentation for whether to join the project or not ob- start pre-accession talks already by 2002. the second round differs from that of the serving the risk of creating a double stand- The expansion to include Poland, Hun- first round. Value-driven motives are be- ard security – one for the U.S. and one gary and the Czech Republic into NATO ing replaced by cool geopolitics: What are for the European Allies. If Europe decide

52 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 to join the NMD there will be little spare from nine aspiring NATO members came the Euro-Atlantic community and able to money left to be spend on the European together to remind NATO leaders of their bear its common responsibilities, has been defence ambitions. obligation to open the Alliance. The mes- fully integrated into these institutions. We Finally, the Russian factor still domi- sage of the meeting, which was called by call upon the member states of NATO to nates NATO’s thoughts on openness. Lithuania and Slovenia was simple - only fulfill this promise of the Washington From one side, Russia’s leadership con- when all of Europe is gathered within the Summit to build a Europe whole and free. tinues a policy with strong rhetoric against borders of NATO can we say that the We call upon the members states at the any further NATO enlargement. From the wounds of the Cold War have been healed. next NATO summit in 2002 to invite our other, the pragmatic and realistic approach In other words, we are talking about a democracies to join NATO.” with which Russia’s President Putin has vision for a stable, prosperous and uni- The declaration signifies that eastern renewed the relationship with the Alliance fied continent, allied with the United and central Europe has achieved an as- will most likely influence the enlargement States to further the common interests and tonishing solidarity. Here are nine na- process – NATO will not be in a posi- values of both. The Vilnius meeting erases tions, that 10 years ago we feared would tion to brake of cooperation with Russia the “red line” the Russians have drawn. be confused by endless ethnic disputes, by any unfriendly move (and that is how Too often in the past, neighbors have and which even today we might cynically Russia continue to view the enlargement been jostling to position themselves for predict would promote their own indi- process). inclusion in the exclusive clubs of the vidual admissions into NATO at the ex- Such a new context of the NATO en- West, but the Vilnius meeting showed that pense of their neighbors cooperating to- largement forces the Baltic countries to aspirants (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bul- wards the same end goal. choose different strategies: Instead of forc- garia, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Alba- The three Baltic States, who enjoy ing NATO to consider their candidacies nia and Macedonia) are willing to coop- strong support from their Nordic or of demonstrating their individual erate in order to obtain the common goal neighbors, have claimed to possess the qualities, a strong front of all nine NATO of NATO membership negotiations by strongest democratic credentials and will aspirants named in Washington Summit the year 2002. The statement by the nine therefore be easier to digest than their is required. read in part: “Our goal will not be reached southern rivals. Other NATO experts have Indeed, on 19 May 2000 in Vilnius, until each of us, as well as other Euro- argued that NATO’s air war in Kosovo Lithuania, the ministers of foreign affairs pean democracies sharing the values of and its large peacekeeping force in the

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Balkans proved the Alliance’s primary was immediate positive response from the aircraft weapons. Second, to achieve threat is no longer potential aggression NATO Foreign Ministers. interoperability with NATO - through by Russia but instability in southeastern The action taken by the nine nations PfP, PARP mechanisms and using both Europe. In the wake of the Kosovo war, places a huge burden of responsibility on bilateral and multilateral military coop- Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Macedo- NATO to come up with its own strategy eration. nia won lavish praise from NATO com- on how to accommodate their ambitions Strengthening bilateral military co- manders for their crucial support role. while not paralyzing the institutions of a operation with other nations is an indis- The Vilnius meeting, however, is de- military alliance that operates on a basis pensable part of general efforts to pro- signed to stop such antagonism and make of consensus. mote partnership and to develop ability the case that NATO needs to make. The to work together. Trilateral Baltic coop- nine countries hope that by banding to- Baltic defence cooperation and eration contributes to that. gether they can repeat the success of the participation in the PfP Everyone, interested in Baltic security Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; and defence, know the trilateral projects, whose joint efforts at lobbying for mem- Currently a defence development plan which all starts with “Blat-”. All these bership succeeded last year. Now, that’s a in Lithuania is on the way. It is envisaged projects are embraced by the Baltic Secu- challenge that can be heard and which will that the armed forces can function au- rity Assistance Group - BaltSea for short - demand a response in Washington and tonomously, are interoperable with and which for the purpose of improving co- the capitals of Europe. also can well be integrated into NATO ordination of bilateral assistance rendered The Vilnius Nine have achieved their structures. The development of Lithua- by the countries supporting Lithuania, end goal: They’ve set the terms of the de- nian defence structures envisages such pri- Latvia and Estonia in the field of security bate and formed a powerful lobby group orities and directions. First, to enhance and defense has been established in April to move a distracted Europe and the next self defence capabilities through the de- 1997 in Oslo. At the moment there is U.S. president (both U.S. presidential can- velopment of infrastructure, the establish- quite a number of supporting states didates - Texas Gov. George W. Bush and ment of a new military structure, and the which actively participate in the BaltSea Vice President Al Gore – in their letters improvement of force readiness through framework: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, to the conference expressed commitment training, purchases of new communica- Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the to an open-door NATO policy). There tions equipment, and anti-tank and anti- Netherlands Norway, Poland, Switzer-

54 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 land, United Kingdom and United Sta- military elite education. Finally, BaltPers, these countries undertake to train Lithua- tes. a Swedish sponsored project, involves the nian military personnel in operating the Life do not permit us to sleep on the creation of a modern military registra- transferred equipment. Lithuania expects laurels, thus the “Blat” projects are under- tion system in the form of a mobilisa- this developing trend to continue in the going rapid developments. The Baltic tion database. future. Peacekeeping battalion - BaltBat - is un- Indeed, the importance of the Baltic Lithuania is further preparing its dergoing reorganisation from a peacekeep- co-operation in the field of defence is not armed forces for participation in peace- ing to a full capacity infantry battalion decreasing. At the moment, a practical need keeping and other operations consistent enabling it to participate in all types of to organize joint procurement activities with international law. The primary em- peace operations. Most importantly the and possibilities of facilitating co-opera- phasis is placed on participation in unit needs to become part of the defence tion between national defence industries NATO-led PfP operations. Practical prepa- capabilities of the Baltic countries. The are underlined. ration is being conducted using PfP Baltic Air Surveillance Network – BaltNet The equipment procurement policy is mechanisms, and Enhanced and More - after the completion of the equipment oriented toward NATO-compatible sys- Operational PfP (EMOP) gains special installation, personnel training and radar tems, which makes Lithuania turn to the importance. The tasks in the process of connection has already started its opera- Western market, as it becomes increasingly preparation vary from adequate training tions in the beginning of the year 2000. open to the Central European democra- and interoperability to enhancing mili- Lithuania hosts the regional air surveil- cies. Lithuania has already procured weap- tary representation in the military struc- lance center, capable of being integrated ons and other defence equipment such as ture of NATO and developing appropri- into the NATO network. Lithuanian con- tactical radios, transport vehicles, coastal ate national decision-making co-ordina- tribution to the Baltic Squadron - surveillance equipment, anti-tank weapons tion mechanisms. Therefore, the Politi- BaltRon - by the end of 1999 was aug- from a number of Western countries. cal-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP mented be a mine hunter procured from Governments of the Western countries are Operations (PMF), the Operational Ca- Germany. All three Baltic countries send authorising their defence ministries to sell pabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP their officers to the Baltic Defense Col- or donate excess equipment that is being Operations (OCC), Expanded and lege - BaltDefCol - which is rapidly be- decommissioned as they downsize their Adapted PARP, Defence-Related and Mili- coming the main venue for the Baltic armed forces. Also, as part of the package, tary Co-operation, PfP Training and Edu-

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cation Enhancement Programme play a NATO, role as stabilising powers in the Russian leadership in the 1990s has been major role in developing Lithuania’s cri- region. On September 18 last year 30 the reunion of the areas of the former sis response and management capabilities. Lithuanian soldiers have been sent to Soviet Union into a more of less cohe- Lithuania intends to continue to fully NATO’s peacekeeping mission in Kosovo sive unit. Russian military doctrine of that support and participate in the develop- (KFOR) where they joined a polish bat- period presented repression of Russian ment of various activities and initiatives talion which is compound unit in the speaking population in the “near abroad” in the framework of EAPC (such as con- USA brigade. as an acceptable reason for the use of mili- sultations on security issues, civil emer- tary force - and it was left to the Russians gency planning, humanitarian de-mining, Russia in the Baltic Sea region to decide when the minorities were be- small arms control etc.); the activities of ing repressed. In addition, Russians aban- PfP (exercises, implementation of train- In developing relations with Russia all doned their “no-first-use” doctrine con- ing and education programme, PfP deci- three Baltic countries seek to perform cerning nuclear arsenals. sion-making and planning etc.). Lithua- bilateral relations, which would ensure At the same time, Russia made a good nia was constantly using the EAPC to equal beneficial co-operation in spirit of name for itself in 1992-1994 by withdraw- promote practical regional security coop- good neighborhood, strengthening mu- ing its forces from the Baltic countries eration: at the end of 1998 the NATO/ tual understanding and confidence and (although, afterwards almost regretting this EAPC seminar “Developments of the Bal- extend goodwill for our countries’ inte- move). Although trade between the Baltics tic defense structures”, which took place gration into European and Transatlantic and Russia was not flourishing, Russia has in Vilnius. structures. On it side, it is in the interest shown an economic interest in elaborat- Especially close co-operation is in se- of Russia that neighboring countries are ing its relations with the Baltics not least curity field. The formation of common stable, democratic and integrated into the where the passage of goods is concerned. peace keeping battalion, known as a European institutions. In 1997 Russia shifted its Baltic policy LITPOLBAT, common military training After the collapse of the Soviet Union to a more positive stance by offering se- and participation in peace operations the Russian military doctrine and politi- curity guarantees and cooperative projects increase Lithuania’s, which is aspiring for cal thought developed the concept of the to the Baltic countries. In 1997 Russian membership in Alliance and Poland’s, “near abroad” (which also covered three President Yeltsin made, in connection which this year became a member of Baltic countries). The political aim of with Lithuanian President Brazauskas visit

56 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 to Moscow, an offer of security guaran- thereby creating a valuable bridge on eco- nia. Lithuania granted the right to ob- tees to the Baltic countries. Later followed nomic and cultural levels between differ- tain Lithuanian citizenship for all the a complementary proposal to include ent peoples. Most importantly, Russians inhabitants that resided in Lithuania up cross-security guarantees of the U.S., Ger- still need to assume responsibility for past until the declaration of the independence. many and France by Russia. The three misdeeds - the annexation of the Baltic The Russian population represents ap- Baltic countries turned down the propos- countries, the deportations of thousands proximately 8 per cent of the population als. As a rule, guarantees are offered to inhabitants, and the destruction of their of Lithuania and they enjoy full social, states threatened by third countries, but property and cultural heritage. cultural and linguistic autonomy guaran- in this case Russia proposed guarantees The 1991 bilateral Treaty between Rus- teed by the Lithuanian laws and accord- aimed at deterring threats which the Bal- sia and Lithuania reaffirmed the right of ing to international standards. tic countries perceive to emanate from each country to freely choose different It is too early to speculate on how new Russia itself. security arrangements. Numerous inter- Russian President’s foreign and security It seems that concern with Russia’s de- state treaties and inter-governmental agree- policy will be developed with regard to graded power status and wounded sense ments, including the Treaty on the Foun- the relationship vis-à-vis the Baltic States. of identity has fuelled preoccupations with dations of Inter-State Relations and a We simply hope that declared “pragma- territorial integrity. Border agreements Border Treaty, have been signed between tism” and “realism” will not develop in between Russia and Estonia and Latvia Lithuania and Russia. An Intergovernmen- to the policy of political and economic remained unsigned, although both agree- tal Commission was established in 1996. pressure that we are witnesses of in ments remain nearly ready for several years The Commission consists of eleven work- Latvia. and despite the fact that a border agree- ing groups addressing the issues of trade On our side, we support the develop- ment with Lithuania was reached. Issues and economy, energy, agriculture, trans- ment of democracy, market economy and related with Russian speaking minorities, port, archives, social affairs, science and civic society in Russia, believing that residing in Estonia and Latvia are still a culture, illegal migration, regional coop- Russia will finally go away from the “ter- high priority on their bilateral agendas. eration, properties of diplomatic missions, ritorial mentality”. Admission of Lithua- Russia needs to realize that the ethnic and financial claims. nia, Latvia and Estonia to NATO and the Russian minorities in the Baltic countries Rights of national minorities, includ- EU will facilitate the changes in Russia’s will soon become citizens of the EU, ing Russians, are fully respected in Lithua- position and will help Russia to perceive

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herself as a modern player in the Baltic if one accepts the Russian demand that sia has been one of NATO’s most impor- Sea region. countries wishing to join NATO should tant goals since the end of the Cold War. Strong Russian resistance against the not join because of the Russian opposi- Lithuania has the same goal, and has actu- Baltic membership of NATO is a well- tion, it will actually mean accepting the ally been successful in maintaining friendly known fact. But whatever psychological Russian view that these countries are in and co-operative relations with Russia. All barriers there may exist among Russia’s the Russian “sphere of influence”. The best political, economic and security-related decision-makers, they will be reinforced way to disabuse Russians of the notion questions with Russia are being solved if NATO stops the enlargement process of “sphere of influence” would be to ac- through constructive and mutually ben- short of its stated goal of a reunited, knowledge the Baltic request for NATO eficial dialogues. democratic Europe. Redrawing “red lines” membership and to put it on the Alli- Lithuania recognizes the importance on the map of Europe evidences the rem- ance’s agenda. of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and nants of old thinking. The NATO com- In contrast to Moscow’s way of think- welcomes the Alliance’s commitment to mitment to cross over these imaginary ing, NATO expansion would bring its partnership with Russia under the barriers, is the greatest assistance the West greater stability along Russia’s western Founding Act. Lithuania welcomes the can offer Russia in helping it to find its frontiers. During the Cold war the bor- involvement of Russia in restoring peace rightful place in a democratic Trans-At- der between Russia and NATO was a com- in Kosovo and is encouraged by Russia’s lantic community. This is why the inclu- pletely closed and chilly border, but to- re-engagement with NATO. As NATO’s sion of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and day it is a very relaxed border of coop- Secretary General said in Vilnius “we need other well-qualified countries in the next eration between good neighbors. NATO’s to get NATO-Russia relations back on round of the NATO enlargement could enlargement has so far stabilized Russia’s track a new European security architec- be one of NATO’s most important tasks, frontiers rather than threatened them. If ture cannot be built without Russia”. demonstrating unequivocally that NATO’s Moscow opposes enlargement because it Russia has resumed cooperation with “open door” policy is credible and firm. wishes to dominate its former satellites, NATO after having frozen contacts for We often hear from Russia’s leaders that NATO should discourage such nearly a year in disagreement over the Russia is prepared to use only political revanchism. NATO bombing campaign in Yugosla- and diplomatic means in its effort to pre- Maintenance of an open and produc- via. That is a positive development in- vent the alliance’s eastward expansion. But tive dialogue and engagement with Rus- deed.

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U.S. engagement in the region is char- the US’s commitment to help Estonia, Transatlantic links and acterize by the North European Initia- Latvia and Lithuania to deepen their in- the Baltic Sea region tive, the Barrens cooperation and the U.S.- tegration and prepare for membership in Baltic Partnership. the European Union and NATO. The Further strengthening of relations with The Charter of Partnership between the Charter declares that the integration of all European partners and with the U.S. United States of America and the Repub- the Baltic States into European and Trans- and Canada, who support the Baltic’s lic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and Atlantic political, economic, security and European and transatlantic integration, is the Republic of Lithuania, signed in Wash- defence institutions is a common goal of key priority. The U.S. geopolitical posi- ington D.C. on January 16, 1998, estab- all signatories. tion, combined with its capabilities, make lishes the institutional framework that The Partnership charter provides the a counterbalancing effect in the Baltic Sea promotes the furtherance of bilateral and framework for concrete and issue-oriented region. It has been a backbone of politico- multilateral cooperation, reciprocal sup- discussions on how the Lithuanian de- military support for the Baltic countries port to the Euro-Atlantic integration and fence establishment with U.S. support ever since the Cold war (even during, as common efforts designed for the consoli- moves forward in building self-defence it was seen in the non-recognition of Bal- dation of security, prosperity, and stabil- capabilities while simultaneously prepar- tic incorporation policy), and contin- ity within the region and Euro-Atlantic ing for Lithuania’s membership of NATO. ues to play this role. The U.S. commit- area as a whole. ment is a strong reminder that the re- The Charter underscored a common The Baltic security in a wider gion is an integral part of an Euro-At- goal of the partners to work together in European and global context lantic context. enhancing the security of all states through Some say that the Baltic Sea region is the integration of Baltic countries into The changes in the world and the ever- the one region in Europe where an U.S.- the European and transatlantic security, increasing globalization have made us all Russian confrontation is still conceivable. political, and economic institutions. The well aware not only of our own “back Thus, the U.S. has a strong stake in defus- US-Baltic Partnership Charter states the yard” but also of the wider regional and ing the potential for conflict in the re- United State’s “real, profound and endur- global issues. Having suffered through gion and promoting its stable economic ing” interest in the independence and se- occupations and destructive policy of vio- and political development. curity of the three countries and furthers lence, the Baltic countries seek to contrib-

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ute to the security and stability of the For several years the Baltic countries lately with KFOR in the Kosovo prov- international community and to fight have participated vigorously in all efforts ince. At the height of tensions in the Bal- against modern challenges. - of the UN, OSCE, NATO and WEU - to kans in the summer of 1999 a Lithuanian Lithuania reconfirms its commitment maintain security and stability in Europe. military medical team joined the Czech to the principles of settlement of interna- Baltics are regular participants in the in- Military hospital fielded in Albania dur- tional disputes by peaceful means and re- ternational missions they contribute civil ing the NATO Allied Harbour humani- frains from the use of threat or force in experts to OSCE missions and contrib- tarian operation. Lithuanian police offic- any manner inconsistent with the purposes ute civilian police to the UN, OSCE, and ers have significantly contributed to the of the United Nations. WEU mission. authority and expertise of the OSCE If the Baltic countries want their secu- Since 1994 Lithuania has been a con- monitoring group in Croatia and the rity to be respected, they simply can not stant and fully-fledged troop-contributing Kosovo Verification Mission. Seeking to stay away from the processes outside their country to complex UN peacekeeping upgrade Lithuanian peacekeeping capabili- region. The Baltic way of dealing with operations in Croatia (UNPROFOR), ties and readiness, two major projects have the challenges as well as opportunities of Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES and UN po- been launched. Two peacekeeping battal- the modern age is twofold - through the lice support group in the Danube region), ions LITPOLBAT and BALTBAT were active participation in the UN and OSCE, Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and established with our Polish, Latvian, and and taking part in peace implementation Kosovo (UNMIK). Since the deployment Estonian neighbours. Now both battal- efforts and co-operation. of the first Lithuanian platoon within the ions are fully operational and their fur- First, the UN. In UN framework, espe- Danish Peacekeeping Battalion to the ther development is under way. Lithua- cially, on security issues the Baltics are UNPROFOR mission in the former Yu- nia is also a member of the UN Special less dynamic as they concentrate primary goslavia, some 30 civilian policemen and Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. on European issues. Lithuania seeks for a as many as 100 troops have served in the In January 1998, Lithuania joined the non-permanent seat on the UN Security cause of peace within the UN missions. Standby Arrangements System for UN Council for a term of 2004-2005, which Moreover, Lithuanian military platoons, peacekeeping operations that was set up will allow using the experience of good which hitherto total 480 troops, have to accelerate the process of deployment neighborly relations in strengthening peace served with the NATO-led missions IFOR/ of peacekeepers. Lithuania was one of the and stability at a regional and global level. SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and first countries to sign with the Memo-

60 Baltic Defence Review No. 3 Volume 2000 randum of Understanding with the UN, relations with Russia and the confidence new accessions. As it was stated by Presi- according to which 24 Lithuanian civil- and security building measures” made dent Adamkus, at the OSCE Summit in ian police officers, military observers and proposals for a more effective use of the Istanbul, Lithuania considers the possi- staff officers were put on stand-by and instruments of the Vienna Document of bility of accession to the Treaty, provided could be made available for deployment 1999. Based on the President’s Statement, the accession terms are in our national to a new mission within 30 days upon a Lithuania proposed to Russia in accord- interests. Accession terms should not im- request by the UN. ance with the provisions of the Vienna pede the development of legitimate de- There are two “OSCE type” issues, Document and on the basis of reciproc- fensive structures of new member-states, which are pertinent to the Baltic Sea re- ity to exchange a passive quota of one new CFE member-states should have a gion. One is Confidence Building Meas- additional evaluation visit beyond the right to full access to the general flexibil- ures and the second – the CFE Treaty. quota established under the relevant para- ity mechanism that will be set forth in The OSCE-wide format is best guaran- graphs of the Vienna Document and to the adapted CFE Treaty, including the tee to keep Baltic security issues on a Eu- exchange information on military forces right for Exceptional Temporary Deploy- ropean scale and to avoid artificial no- located in the territories of Lithuania and ment and an accession of the new states- tion of “regional security” to constantly Kaliningrad region in accordance to the parties to the Treaty as “groups of states” reemerge. Security is indivisible and there formats of the CFE Treaty. or “geopolitical units/regional settings” is no doubt that the security and stabil- As part of our efforts to contribute to should be avoided and individual ap- ity of the Baltic Sea region cannot be disarmament and arms control process, proach should prevail. considered separately from European se- Lithuania already last year expressed its Since the adapted Treaty will no longer curity and stability. There is no regional interest in the membership in the adopted be based on the Group to Group struc- security. One can only speak about re- CFE Treaty, which Lithuania regards as a ture Lithuania considers that there are no gional security cooperation. cornerstone of European security. Also direct linkage between NATO member- At the same time, there is still room Estonia and Latvia are interested in the ship and participation in the CFE Treaty. for improvement of the atmosphere of CFE. Internal preparations have already begun, mutual confidence in the region. Already Lithuania looked positively to the fact such as the established interagency group, 1998 Lithuanian President Adamkus in that the adapted CFE Treaty, after a rati- the Arms control and verification group his Statement “On the development of fication process is over, will be open to established in the framework of National

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Defense Staff, which will be a small, but increasingly on interdependence, coopera- competent force. tion, and the expansion of joint infra- structures and common values. Coopera- Conclusion tion in the Baltic Sea region can be a sig- nificant contribution to the enhancement Continuous attention from the West of European unity, of transatlantic rela- is essential in the development of the Bal- tions, and of East-West reconciliation on tic Sea region still undergoing a period a wider scale. of transformation. This may take the form of direct investment and trade from Eu- 1 The views expressed are those of the au- rope and North America and of enlarg- thor and do not necessarily reflect the opin- ing Transatlantic institutions, thereby ion of the MFA. Various publications made providing unique opportunities for sta- impact on author’s way of presenting the topic: U.S. Policy toward Northeastern Eu- bility and well-being around the Baltic rope, Council on Foreign Relations, 1999; Sea, and thus contributing to an integrated Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea region, Europe whole and free. On the other side, by O.F.Knudsen, Chaillot Paper 33, Paris, continuos Baltic effort to promote trilat- 1998; The Third Annual Stockholm Confer- eral cooperation is also evident. ence on Baltic Sea Security and Cooperation - The Western world needs to understand Building an Inclusive System of Security, eds. that the Baltic countries are tied to Eu- J.P.Kruzich, A.Fahraeus, by U.S. Embassy in rope historically and culturally. They share Stockholm, 1998; Baltic Sea Region. Brief. Western values and aspirations. Having Prepared by the U.S. Information Service, Stockholm, 1998. thrown off the shackles of communism and Soviet domination, the Baltics, like their counterparts in Central Europe, want to join Europe and the Euro-Atlan- tic institutions. The Baltic security rests

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