Georgian Lessons Georgian Georgian Lessons Conflicting Russian and Western Interests
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Georgian Lessons Georgian Lessons Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe A Report of the CSIS New European Democracies Project and the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair in Southeast European Studies 1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006 author Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199 Janusz Bugajski E-mail: [email protected] | Web: www.csis.org Bugajski November 2010 ISBN 978-0-89206-606-3 CSIS CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & Ë|xHSKITCy066063zv*:+:!:+:! CSIS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Georgian Lessons Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe A Report of the CSIS New European Democracies Project and the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair in Southeast European Studies author Janusz Bugajski November 2010 About CSIS In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmak- ers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed in this publica- tion should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2010 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Cover photo: iStockphoto/Stephane Hachey Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bugajski, Janusz, 1954– Georgian lessons : conflicting Russian and Western interests in the wider Europe / Janusz Bugajski. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-89206-606-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations. 2. Russia (Federation)—Politics and government—1991– 3. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations—Former Soviet republics. 4. Former Soviet republics—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) I. Title. DK510.764.B85 2010 327.47—dc22 2010042541 Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 775-3119 Fax: (202) 775-3199 Web: www.csis.org ii contents Acknowledgments iv 1. Introduction and Summary 1 2. Russia’s State Ambitions 9 3. Russia’s Vulnerabilities 25 4. Lessons for Former Empire 44 5. U.S.-Russia: Limits of Normalization 65 6. NATO-Russia: Cooperative Adversaries 82 7. EU-Russia: Tentative Partners 99 8. Developing Western Strategies 114 About the Author 119 | iii acknowledgments I owe special thanks to the entire team in the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and the New European Democracies Project at CSIS for making this monograph possible. In particular, my profound gratitude to Program Deputy Ilona Teleki, Program Coordinator and Research Associate Besian Bocka, and all our research interns: Stacey Brethauer, Jonathan Gomez, Akos Hofstadter, Mikel Kotonika, Rilind Latifi, Gresa Matoshi, Chelsea Michta, Kathleen Murtaugh, Maria Smith, Anna Socha, Yana Stainova, Loic Poulain, Marton Ugrosdy, and Stuart Weaver. iv | introduction and 1 summary Russia’s invasion, occupation, and partition of Georgia in August 2008 initially sent shock waves throughout Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and appeared to signal a new confrontational phase in Moscow’s relations with the West. However, within weeks of the war, connections between Russia and the major Western powers and institutions were largely re- stored, and Moscow was not subject to any meaningful sanctions for its unilateral military action and division of Georgia. Most Western governments concluded that Russia was too important a country to be isolated, that sanctions would be ineffective, and that Moscow’s estrangement would be counterproductive and fuel further hostility. Moreover, the George W. Bush administration had entered its last stages, and following the election of President Barack Obama in November 2008, Washington initiated a new détente with Moscow designed to elicit Russia’s cooperation in press- ing global security challenges. One of the consequences was an avoidance of confrontation by the United States in regions that the Kremlin viewed as essential parts of its imperial patrimony. Upon longer reflection, the Russo-Georgia war consolidated specific trends in Russia’s rela- tions with the West. First, it underscored Moscow’s regional objectives and its determination to reclaim an extensive zone of dominance corresponding with the former Soviet territories. Sec- ond, it displayed a shrewd calculation by the Kremlin about the fractured and ineffective Western response, and Moscow subsequently began to test the limits of the Obama administration’s rap- prochement. Third, the August war had a profound impact on the Central-East European (CEE) and post-Soviet states most exposed to pressures from Moscow. While the former sought more tangible security guarantees from the NATO alliance, several of the latter intensified their protec- tive strategies to shield themselves from Moscow’s pressures. Additionally, beneath the veneer of Moscow’s success, the conduct of the war and the subsequent economic recession revealed Russia’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the midst of its attempted neo-imperial restoration. Russia’s Immediate Objectives Both the European Union (EU) and NATO displayed impotence in the face of Russia’s strategy to remain a dominant player in the south Caucasus region and the broader Black Sea and Caspian Basin areas. In the wake of the August 2008 war, Russia’s threatened exclusion from the Group of Eight (G-8), stalled progress toward the WTO (World Trade Organization), the temporary suspen- sion of high-level meetings of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), and the cancellation of NATO military exercises with Russian forces were viewed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Presi- dent Dmitry Medvedev as mere distractions from grand strategy. They were convinced that Eu- rope and the United States needed Russia much more than Russia needed the West and calculated that several tangible advantages would be gained from the military attack on Georgia, including: | 1 1. Transforming Georgia into an unsuccessful model of state consolidation, political democra- tization, and economic development and thereby discouraging other post-Soviet states from emulating Tbilisi’s pro-Western path. Russia’s authorities also claim that they are the guaran- tors of Georgia’s territorial unity, thereby underscoring Russia’s ability to further fracture the country by promoting ethnic and separatist conflicts. 2. Undermining the pro-U.S. government of President Mikhail Saakashvili, which is viewed as an obstacle to Russia’s reassertion of regional dominance. Officials continue to threaten Georgia with military action, having failed to achieve one of their primary objectives of overthrowing the president. Moscow can manufacture various pretexts for a new intervention, including accusations that Georgia is a transit country for Islamic terrorists or is rearming in order to restart a war against the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The goals of a new invasion would include demilitarizing Georgia; transforming Georgia into a loose confedera- tion with a weak central government dependent on Moscow; permanently stationing Russian forces inside Georgia; controlling energy supply corridors across Georgian territory; isolating Georgia from external military aid by patrolling its ports, major roads, and airfields; and estab- lishing a secure land corridor linking Russia to its military base in Armenia. 3. Terminating Georgia’s progress toward NATO inclusion as several West European states contend that a timetable toward membership would further provoke Moscow and damage Russian-European relations. Georgia’s vulnerabilities also stiffened the resistance of some Euro- pean capitals in offering NATO Membership Action Plans (MAPs) to other post-Soviet states, including Ukraine. It demonstrated European and NATO alliance divisions and the pervasive Western fear of estranging Russia because of growing energy and business connections and Russia’s purported indispensability in dealing with security challenges such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and global jihadist terrorism. 4. Enhancing Russia’s monopolization of energy supplies and transit routes and weakening inves- tor confidence in alternative energy corridors from the Caspian Basin to Europe that bypass Russian territory, including the Nabucco or southern corridor project planned to transit Geor- gia and Turkey. In addition, the widespread destruction of Georgia’s economic infrastructure and the closure of its ports by Russian forces during the August 2008 war signaled that Georgia remained permanently vulnerable to Moscow’s intervention. 5. Applying pressure on neighboring states inhabited by