Center for European Policy Analysis

March 6, 2013

Issue Brief No. 126: Russia’s Winding Path of Modernization By Jaroslav Kurfürst

ne year into Vladimir Putin’s third it clear that this was a scenario they had long presidential term, the Russian public planned. The announcements merely confirmed Oarena has undergone a notable what everyone had been suspecting for years, transformation. Among others, numerous but it was the way in which the message was legislative measures restricting civil liberties were delivered that made part of Russian society adopted and the number of trials centering on feel that everything had been decided and that defendants’ political beliefs and civic engagement the swapping of the government posts was a increased significantly. The restrictions also foregone conclusion. The fact that their vote was targeted foreign entities supporting the Russian taken for granted ahead of the parliamentary non-government sector. In fact, the 2013 Human and presidential elections mobilized social Rights Watch World Report concluded that forces, which had previously mainly rallied the country went through the worst political against corruption and around environmental crackdown in its post-Soviet history.1 And this issues. The last straw was the conduct and trend is set to continue. results of the parliamentary elections held on December 4th, 2011. According to the In 2012, Russia went through the final report published by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s worst political crackdown in its post- (OSCE) international observation mission, Soviet history. the elections had been manipulated in favor of the ruling United Russia party.2 Immediately after the elections, with a The September 2011 United Russia party section of Russian society convinced that they conference can be singled out as a defining had been rigged and should have turned out moment for the course the country has taken. It differently, the first major protests took place. was there that then-President Dmitry Medvedev It was a spontaneous public reaction driven announced that he would not be running in the by a feeling of inability to influence public 2012 presidential election and that he would affairs. The protestors coordinated their actions back the candidacy of former president and through social networks and were initially then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Vladimir themselves surprised by the sheer scale of the Putin immediately reacted by promising that, if demonstrations. Protests occurred regularly until elected, he would appoint Dmitry Medvedev to the presidential election in March 2012 and, as the post of prime minister. Both politicians made

2 OSCE/ODIHR Election observation mission, Final report: 1 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2013. Available here: Elections to the State Duma, Russian Federation, January 12, http://bit.ly/XSJP77. 2012. Available here: http://bit.ly/14t5lPM. Jaroslav Kurfürst is Director General of the Europe Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic. 1 Center for European Policy Analysis

that vote too was claimed to be rigged, they did Vladimir Putin took over responsibility for the not break off afterward either.3 As soon as he war in Chechnya even prior to his election, began his third term of office, President Putin and then proceeded to address the erosion of launched an offensive against protesters, the non- central state institutions’ authority, paving the parliamentary political opposition, as well as civic way for the centralization of political power in and political activism. He also took a series of his first presidential term of office. In 2004, he restrictive steps to counter initiatives supporting cancelled the governor elections and made the Russian civil society from abroad, mainly from posts president-appointed instead.4 Putin also the United States and Europe. Yet, measures pursued an offensive policy of strengthening the to centralize and consolidate power through state’s influence over the media. Under threat of increasingly firmer control of the public space criminalization, two of the most prominent media were nothing new and had in fact been imposed moguls — Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky throughout Vladimir Putin’s two previous terms at — abandoned Russia, leaving the mainstream the Kremlin. media to gradually pass into the hands of the state or state-owned companies. Consolidation and Its Ever-expanding Interpretation (2000–2008) The next step was to stifle the influence wielded over the political sphere by Russia’s economic When Vladimir Putin became president for the oligarchy. The most high-profile case was the first time in 2000, he entered the Kremlin with 2003 arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky — head of a clear aim of consolidating power in Russia. the oil company Yukos — and the subsequent The country, at the time, had been worn down nine-year prison sentence he was handed in by reforms and weakened by the banking crisis 2005. This case served as a warning to other of 1998, the erosion of central institutions, politically engaged oligarchs and ushered in a and the illness and flagging energy of the most new kind of relationship between the majority of powerful figure in its highly centralized political the most influential figures of Russian business system — then-President Boris Yeltsin. Russia and the Kremlin — effectively a symbiosis. felt humiliated by the North Atlantic Treaty Further, in 2006 the government passed a law Organization’s (NATO) enlargement and the that complicated the operation and registration action the Alliance had taken against the regime of non-governmental organizations, and thus of Slobodan Milosevic, carried out despite its bolstered the state’s influence over that sector as opposition. The Kremlin also felt threatened by well. the rise of Islamism and separatism in the North Caucasus. So at that point, the call for greater Modernization as a Program (2008–2012) consolidation of the country was backed by a broad public consensus and Vladimir Putin set out Dmitry Medvedev — supported by Vladimir Putin to implement the wishes of the Russian society. — won the 2008 presidential election with 70.3 percent of the votes. In the same year, Russia’s

3 OSCE/ODIHR Election observation mission, Final report: 4 However, a law restoring the governor elections entered into Presidential Elections, Russian Federation. May 11, 2012. force in May 2012. As of January 2013, the Duma is working to Available here: http://bit.ly/W5aLQH. weaken the law again, increasing the influence of the Kremlin in the process.

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1993 Constitution was amended for the first time, From Elections to Demonstrations extending the presidential mandate to six years, to come into effect as of the 2012 presidential The December 2011 parliamentary elections election. Initially, President Medvedev’s four-year and the March 2012 presidential election were term gave some hope to the more liberal-minded accompanied by mass demonstrations in an parts of Russian society. When he took the helm, unprecedented show of public protest, especially the country had benefitted from an eight-year among the emerging middle class. Demonstrators Growth Domestic Product (GDP) spurt of around demanded an annulment of the rigged elections, seven percent, and the middle class was gradually an investigation of cases of manipulation, as well emerging.5 President Medvedev quickly declared as greater freedom and a stronger participatory that the modernization of Russia was a top democracy in Russia. The sheer scale of the priority and even announced a “Partnership for protests notwithstanding, what they lacked was Modernization” with several European countries. political leaders with a clear agenda. A number of figures emerged at the forefront of the demonstrations, but Measures to centralize and consolidate they had different motivations, power through increasingly firmer control and represented very diverse of the public space were nothing new. political and civic programs. These included Alexey Navalny’s nationalist anti-corruption Taking stock of his presidency, however, these activists, individual personalities like the writer hopes of modernization did not really materialize. Boris Akunin, the ultra-left political forces of Medvedev began his presidency with military Eduard Limonov or Sergei Udaltsov, and liberals action against Georgia in August 2008, and the in the vein of former Prime Ministers Boris subsequent occupation of Abkhazia and South Nemtsov and Mikhail Kasyanov. The only unifying Ossetia. And then, in 2009, the global financial principle among the leaders speaking at the crisis swept across Russia. The country’s economy demonstrations was their negative view of the was able to withstand the storm relatively ruling tandem. It was enough to bring people well, on account of massive state intervention out in the streets of Russian cities, especially with existing guarantee funds and huge foreign given the frustration with the elections. However, currency reserves accrued in previous years.6 it was far too little to offer the wider public a Nevertheless, the crisis did take its toll on the sustainable alternative vision and the hope for remainder of Medvedev’s presidential term and credible leadership. even though steady economic growth of over three percent was restored as early as 2010, From Demonstrations to Restrictive Laws his time in office is perceived as a period of The demonstrations in Russia took place against stagnation. the backdrop of the Arab Spring, and that could conceivably have influenced the response they 5 Anders Åslund and Andrew Kuchins, The Russia Balance triggered. There were similarities between Sheet, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Center events in Tunis or Cairo, and Moscow. The cause for Strategic and International Studies, 2009. was similar: the people’s frustration with the 6 Ibid.

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lack of opportunities for civic participation in President Putin also restored “defamation” the political decision-making process of central as a crime, paving the way for state control authorities and with the entrenched corruption of political commentators and publicly active in government. The means too were similar, as opposition forces. In addition, an amendment to protesters utilized social media networks for the treason law, passed in October and enacted mobilizing the demonstrations. The Kremlin might in November, was so broad in definition that it well have feared — justifiably or not — that these handed the Russian authorities a powerful tool similarities could bring about a similar outcome in to wield against any critics of government policy. Russia too. An internet regulation law, which came into force in November, also enabled the Kremlin to close And so, in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s election down sites deemed harmful by the government. to a third, now six-year long, term of office, the All these legislative pieces were widely criticized Russian state immediately set about enforcing by human rights and intergovernmental legal measures that would further restrict organizations — but to no avail. freedom in the public arena. Even before the election was held, Golos — the only Russian Finally, on December 28th, President Putin signed independent election monitoring organization — into law a bill prohibiting U.S. citizens from had been the target of administrative restrictions. adopting Russian children. This action was taken A mere month after his inauguration, on June 8th, in retaliation against the passing of the U.S. the new president signed legislation restricting Magnitsky Bill, which introduced visa bans and freedom of assembly by imposing extremely other sanctions against those involved in the high fines on the organizers and participants death of the Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, of demonstrations not sanctioned by the state. who was imprisoned after drawing attention Then on July 21st, he signed a law on NGOs, to cases of corruption at the highest levels of complicating the life of those receiving funding government and later died in custody. The very from abroad. The legislation stipulated that next day, on December 29th, the only defendant Russian organizations supported by international in the Magnitsky case was acquitted. The Duma donors and engaged in “political activities” is also currently discussing additional measures, were required to register with the government primarily intended as further retaliation against as “foreign agents” or face being shut down. the United States and any other countries Following this, the U.S. Agency for International that might adopt legislation similar to the U.S. Development (USAID) was forced to withdraw Magnitsky Act. from Russia on October 1st, after a 20-year long presence.7 And then on November 10th, Radio Besides the adoption of this series of restrictive Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) was forced to laws and regulations, last year saw a number cease broadcasting, as licenses could no longer of other cases where action was taken against be held by stations in which foreign capital critics of the Russian political leadership accounted for more than 48 percent. garner significant media attention. In August, a judgment handing down harsh prison sentences to members of the band Pussy Riot provoked a wave of international criticism. In September, 7 United States Agency for International Development, USAID in Russia. Available here: http://1.usa.gov/13FbwnQ. in connection with that case, the Duma also

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debated a questionable law on the defamation that year, the country slumped to an all-time of religion. Investigations of the protesters low in the corruption ratings maintained by arrested at a demonstration on May 6th in the Transparency International — 154th place out so-called “Bolotnaya case” also began in the fall. of the 176 countries evaluated; even though The stripping of Gennady Gudkov of his seat it improved to 133th place in 2012, corruption in the Duma, the conflict between the Russian remains one of Russia’s biggest problems.10 Even state and the banker Alexander Lebedev, and the the political leadership now openly acknowledges actions taken against opposition activists Sergei that corruption has become endemic. Civil and Udaltsov and Alexey Navalny filled the airwaves political freedoms are also subject to increasing and newspapers as well. The way the Russian criticism. Freedom House’s “freedom rating” has authorities handled the opposition activist Leonid kept Russia in the “not free” category for many Razvozzhayev, who was arrested by Russian units years, and this was yet again the case in 2013.11 in Ukraine, also received major coverage. And in terms of media freedom, according to the Press Freedom Index published by Reporters It is beyond evident that the past year has without Borders, Russia ranked 148th out of the witnessed exceptional restrictions on freedom in 179 countries evaluated in 2013.12 the Russian public space. Yet, even though Russia has come under severe The trends of 2012 are likely to carry into 2013 as criticism by human rights organizations, the Kremlin forges ahead with interventions certain quarters of the against acts of civil protest. international community and its own public, the trends of 2012 are still likely to carry into 2013 Russia’s leadership has repeatedly demonstrated as the Kremlin forges ahead with interventions that it does not see freedom and democracy as against acts of civil protest. organizing principles necessary for the overall prosperity of society. It fears the continued What Path to Modernization? erosion of government authority. But Russia Although looking at the macroeconomic figures, remains an important part of European Russia does not appear to be doing too poorly, civilization, and looking to the Chinese model it is fast approaching the limit of what the status of governance for inspiration will not bear any quo can take.8 The country’s infrastructure is fruit. Demonstrations in Russia and the continued in bad need of modernization. The April 2010 debates within its society are the response to survey by the Levada public opinion research entrenched limitations of liberty and the ever- center concluded that corruption in Russia has 10 9 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. become fully entrenched in the system. In Available here: http://bit.ly/10eSHai.

11 8 ladimir Putin News Conference, December 20, 2012. 2012 Freedom in the World, Russia. Available here: http://bit.ly/W5bMYP. 12 Reporters without Borders, 2013 Press Freedom Index: 9 Levada Center. Press Release: Bribes in Russia, December 5, Dashed Hopes after Spring. Available here:http://bit.ly/ 2010. Available here: http://bit.ly/168sniq. XSLCZW.

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expanding restrictions of public space. In the era of inspiration not only for politicians, but for of instant communication it is no longer possible all areas of social life, encompassing trade, the to silent criticism. More government restrictions academia and even the Orthodox Church.13 will generate more opponents, preclude the The restrictive measures silencing RFE/RL and implementation of modernization reforms, and expelling USAID, and the 2012 legislation on entrench the existing problems of the state. This NGOs in particular, attempt to effectively obstruct development would ultimately empty all meaning this historically natural partnership. But it will out of the “modernization” effort, as articulated be essential not to cut out Russian society from by the Kremlin. contacts with Europe and the United States — engagement at the societal level needs It will become increasingly apparent that the to be increased, not double-track policy approach of separating issues of decreased. common interest from difficult questoions does The recent policy not work. of the European Union (EU) and the United States has Yet, genuine modernization, rightfully identified been characterized by a double-track approach, as a priority by former President Medvedev, is separating issues of common interest from the the only avenue that will allow Russia to explore difficult questions, including concerns about its immense and extraordinary potential. Recent freedom and democratization in Russia. The legislation emphasized thwarting the influence Kremlin has reciprocated this double-track policy. of foreign entities on the Russian public stage, As a result, we have a very problematic basket of but modernization in Russia is historically issues, which exists more or less separately from associated with cooperation with Europe and the rest of the agenda. This might be comfortable the United States. This is true for the rule of for both sides, but it is not a sustainable long- Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, and for term policy. With the shifts in Russia’s political virtually the whole of Russia’s pre-Soviet history, landscape and the Kremlin’s changing policies when openness to the West brought a period of toward the EU and the United States over the prosperity and progress. In those times, Russia course of last year, it will become increasingly was well integrated into European politics and apparent that the double-track policy approach culture. Dismantling the tissue of this relationship does not work. The EU and United States will between societies in the East and the West need to adopt a more comprehensive and brought dark periods to the country. A long list strategic approach to this relationship. Critical, of studies of Russian history makes it more than but intensive engagement centered around obvious that Russia’s successful modernizers a renewed modernization effort should again welcomed — even actively promoted — foreign become a key feature of the West’s policy toward influences. The first Czechoslovak President, Russia. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, in his brilliant treatise “Russia and Europe,” illustrated in detail how 13 Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Russia and Europe, Jan Laichter interaction with the West served as a source Publishing, 1930.

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This Article is a publication of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a Washington, DC-based research institute devoted to the study of Central and Eastern Europe. Material published in the Article is original, exclusive to CEPA and not reproduced from outside sources.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of CEPA.