Baltic Defence Review No. 11 Volume 1/2004
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Chapter 2 Introduction: the Enigmatic Zukertort
Chapter 2 Introduction: The Enigmatic Zukertort The Zukertort is a symphony of irony. Why do you say that? Well, to begin at the beginning, in his annotations to the oft-quoted seminal game on his opening, Zukertort v. Black- burne 1883, Zukertort wrote that he planned to play the whole game on the Q-side. Now players typically think of the system as one long, prepared attack on the enemy’s King. Secondly, the opening is called the “Colle-Zukertort,” even though Colle practically never played it. In fact, in my own personal data- base I have many hundreds of games where Colle played what is now known as the “Colle-Koltanowski,” but not a single game where he played the Zukertort except when his opponent used the Queen’s Indian Defense. Thirdly, it is unclear why the Colle-Koltanowski and the Colle-Zukertort are so often put in the same book. We do not see books for Black containing in-depth coverage of both the Dragon and Najdorf variations of the Sicilian. We do not see repertoire books for White going deeply into both the Botvin- nik and Meran variations of the Semi-slav. Why package these two very different systems in the same text? The Enigmatic Zukertort Fourthly, a thorough inves- very much different than he tigation of the Zukertort will can if he castles early (as we show that it appears to have shall see). no real mainline! Or, rather, I would suggest the stu- its “mainline” is so tactically dent understand the Zuker- different than most of its tort as an opening in which other lines that it is hard to White presents Black the same say whether it is the mainline choice given to the protago- of the system or a popular nists at the end of the movie deviation! Ghostbusters. -
Taming Wild Chess Openings
Taming Wild Chess Openings How to deal with the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly over the chess board By International Master John Watson & FIDE Master Eric Schiller New In Chess 2015 1 Contents Explanation of Symbols ���������������������������������������������������������������� 8 Icons ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9 Introduction �������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10 BAD WHITE OPENINGS ��������������������������������������������������������������� 18 Halloween Gambit: 1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.♘c3 ♘f6 4.♘xe5 ♘xe5 5.d4 . 18 Grünfeld Defense: The Gibbon: 1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♘c3 d5 4.g4 . 20 Grob Attack: 1.g4 . 21 English Wing Gambit: 1.c4 c5 2.b4 . 25 French Defense: Orthoschnapp Gambit: 1.e4 e6 2.c4 d5 3.cxd5 exd5 4.♕b3 . 27 Benko Gambit: The Mutkin: 1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 c5 3.d5 b5 4.g4 . 28 Zilbermints - Benoni Gambit: 1.d4 c5 2.b4 . 29 Boden-Kieseritzky Gambit: 1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘c6 3.♗c4 ♘f6 4.♘c3 ♘xe4 5.0-0 . 31 Drunken Hippo Formation: 1.a3 e5 2.b3 d5 3.c3 c5 4.d3 ♘c6 5.e3 ♘e7 6.f3 g6 7.g3 . 33 Kadas Opening: 1.h4 . 35 Cochrane Gambit 1: 5.♗c4 and 5.♘c3 . 37 Cochrane Gambit 2: 5.d4 Main Line: 1.e4 e5 2.♘f3 ♘f6 3.♘xe5 d6 4.♘xf7 ♔xf7 5.d4 . 40 Nimzowitsch Defense: Wheeler Gambit: 1.e4 ♘c6 2.b4 . 43 BAD BLACK OPENINGS ��������������������������������������������������������������� 44 Khan Gambit: 1.e4 e5 2.♗c4 d5 . 44 King’s Gambit: Nordwalde Variation: 1.e4 e5 2.f4 ♕f6 . 45 King’s Gambit: Sénéchaud Countergambit: 1.e4 e5 2.f4 ♗c5 3.♘f3 g5 . -
Introduction 1. Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control of the Military: A
Notes Introduction 1. Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical State- ment,” in Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, ed. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), 380. Among those in agreement with Huntington are S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Pro- fessionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Claude E. Welch Jr., Civilian Control of the Military (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale Uni- versity Press, 1977), and in The Political Influence of the Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). Chapter 1 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1957), 3. 2. Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian Control of the Military: A Theoretical State- ment,” in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, eds., Political Be- havior: A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), 380. 3. Among those in agreement with Huntington are S. E. Finer, The Man on Horse- back: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962); Bengt Abrahams- son, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Claude E. Welch Jr., Civilian Control of the Military (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976); Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), and in The Political Influence of the Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). -
Chess Openings
Chess Openings PDF generated using the open source mwlib toolkit. See http://code.pediapress.com/ for more information. PDF generated at: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 09:50:30 UTC Contents Articles Overview 1 Chess opening 1 e4 Openings 25 King's Pawn Game 25 Open Game 29 Semi-Open Game 32 e4 Openings – King's Knight Openings 36 King's Knight Opening 36 Ruy Lopez 38 Ruy Lopez, Exchange Variation 57 Italian Game 60 Hungarian Defense 63 Two Knights Defense 65 Fried Liver Attack 71 Giuoco Piano 73 Evans Gambit 78 Italian Gambit 82 Irish Gambit 83 Jerome Gambit 85 Blackburne Shilling Gambit 88 Scotch Game 90 Ponziani Opening 96 Inverted Hungarian Opening 102 Konstantinopolsky Opening 104 Three Knights Opening 105 Four Knights Game 107 Halloween Gambit 111 Philidor Defence 115 Elephant Gambit 119 Damiano Defence 122 Greco Defence 125 Gunderam Defense 127 Latvian Gambit 129 Rousseau Gambit 133 Petrov's Defence 136 e4 Openings – Sicilian Defence 140 Sicilian Defence 140 Sicilian Defence, Alapin Variation 159 Sicilian Defence, Dragon Variation 163 Sicilian Defence, Accelerated Dragon 169 Sicilian, Dragon, Yugoslav attack, 9.Bc4 172 Sicilian Defence, Najdorf Variation 175 Sicilian Defence, Scheveningen Variation 181 Chekhover Sicilian 185 Wing Gambit 187 Smith-Morra Gambit 189 e4 Openings – Other variations 192 Bishop's Opening 192 Portuguese Opening 198 King's Gambit 200 Fischer Defense 206 Falkbeer Countergambit 208 Rice Gambit 210 Center Game 212 Danish Gambit 214 Lopez Opening 218 Napoleon Opening 219 Parham Attack 221 Vienna Game 224 Frankenstein-Dracula Variation 228 Alapin's Opening 231 French Defence 232 Caro-Kann Defence 245 Pirc Defence 256 Pirc Defence, Austrian Attack 261 Balogh Defense 263 Scandinavian Defense 265 Nimzowitsch Defence 269 Alekhine's Defence 271 Modern Defense 279 Monkey's Bum 282 Owen's Defence 285 St. -
Curriculum Vitae
CURRICULUM VITAE Max A.L.T. Nielsen Lieutenant General Military Representative to NATO and EU DATE OF BIRTH: November 6. 1963 PRIVATE: Married to Berit Thorsø Nielsen. Two children and three grandchildren. MILITARY EDUCATION: 1983 Conscript 1984 NCO School 1985 Control, Reporting and Fighter Control Education 1986 - 1988 Officers Basic Course 1991 Junior Joint Staff Course 1991 - 1992 Officers Advanced Course 1995 - 1996 Air Command and Staff College, US 2011 NATO Defense College, Rome, IT. MILITARY CAREER: 1984 Sergeant 1987 Lieutenant 1988 First Lieutenant 1992 Captain 1996 Major 2001 Lieutenant Colonel 2005 Colonel 2008 Brigadier General 2014 Major General 2017 Lieutenant General ASSIGNMENTS: 1984 Section Commander, Training Platoon/Air Base Skrydstrup 1987 Platoon Commander, Training Squadron/Air Base Aalborg 1988 Fighter & SAM Control Officer, C&R Group, 602 SQN Airbase/Skrydstrup 1992 Air Defence Operations Officer/ICAOC 1 Finderup 1993 Staff Officer, Training Branch/Tactical Air Command Denmark 1994 Staff Officer, Policy Branch/Tactical Air Command Denmark 1996 Chief of Air Operations Branch/Tactical Air Command Denmark 1998 Staff Officer and Deputy Head, Policy Branch/Defence Command Denmark 2000 Staff Officer Operations, 1st Office/Ministry of Defence. 2001 Chief of Staff & Acting Commandant/Royal Danish Air Force Academy 2002 Chief of Operations Branch/Defence Command Denmark 2005 Military Assistant to the Deputy Commander/NATO Training Mission-Iraq. Baghdad 2005 Chief of Executive Office/Defence Commander Denmark 2008 Chief -
A Better Defence Estate November 2016 Amended Version: December 2016 Front Cover: a II (Army Cooperation) Squadron Typhoon in Front of the Squadron’S New HQ
A Better Defence Estate November 2016 Amended version: December 2016 Front Cover: A II (Army Cooperation) Squadron Typhoon in front of the squadron’s new HQ. RAF Lossiemouth © Crown copyright 2016 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London T W9 4DU, or email: [email protected] Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. Contents Preface by the Secretary of State for Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff .......................... 5 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 6 Part A - Our Strategic Approach ................................................................................................................. 9 Part B – A Better Defence Estate Strategy ............................................................................................12 a. Royal Navy........................................................................................................................................14 b. Army ...................................................................................................................................................17 c. Royal Air Force ................................................................................................................................28 -
STRATEGIC FORUM National Defense University
January 2020 STRATEGIC FORUM National Defense University About the Authors Håkon Lunde Saxi, Ph.D., is an As- Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic sociate Professor at the Norwegian Defence University College. Bengt Total Defense and Implications Sundelius is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the Swedish Defense University. Brett Swaney is an for the Baltic Sea Region Assistant Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for Na- tional Strategic Studies, at the National by Håkon Lunde Saxi, Bengt Sundelius, and Brett Defense University. Swaney Key Points ponsored by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and the Swed- ish National Defense University, this paper is the second in a series of ◆◆ Nordic states (Norway, Sweden, and Finland) efforts to enhance Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forums dedicated to societal resilience through unique the multinational exploration of the strategic and defense challenges faced by “total defense” and “comprehen- S sive security” initiatives are unlikely the Baltic states. The December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy described to change the near-term strategic Russia as “using subversive measures to weaken the credibility of America’s com- calculus of Russia. Over time, how- ever, a concerted application of to- mitment to Europe, undermine transatlantic unity, and weaken European insti- tal defense in harmony with Article tutions and governments.”1 The U.S. and European authors of this paper, along 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty will with many others, came together in late 2017 to explore possible responses to aid in the resilience to, and deter- rence of, Russian hostile measures the security challenges facing the Baltic Sea Region (BSR). -
Baltic Security and Defence Review 2013
Baltic Security and Defence Review ________________________________________________________ Volume 15, Issue 2 2013 Baltic Security and Defence Review is the bi-annual publication of the Baltic Defence College © 2013, Baltic Defence College, All rights reserved ISSN 1736-3772 (print) 1736-3780 (online) Editorial Board Editor: Dr. James S. Corum, Dean, Baltic Defence College Deputy editor Mr. James Rogers, Baltic Defence College Harold E. Raugh, Jr., Ph.D. Command Historian, V Corps Lt. Col. John Andreas Olsen PhD, Norwegian Air Force, Dean, Norwegian Defence University College Dr. Augustine Meaher, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College Dr. Hannu Kari, Finnish National Defence University Dr. Maja Ericksson, Swedish National Defence Academy Erik Mannik, International Centre for Defence Studies Dr. Olaf Mertelsmann, Tartu University Dr. Margarita Seselgyte, Vilnius University Lithuania Dr. Zaneta Ozolina, University of Latvia Layout: Oliver Toots Cover and print: www.ecoprint.ee Electronic version of the Baltic Security and Defence Review can be accessed on the website of the Baltic Defence College at www.bdcol.ee All articles of the Baltic Security and Defence Review are also available through the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at www.isn.ethz.ch All inquiries should be made to the Baltic Defence College, Riia 12, 51013 Tartu, Estonia, ph: +372 717 6000, fax: +372 717 6050, e-mail: [email protected] Disclaimer: The Baltic Defence College publishes the Baltic Security and Defence Review as -
The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League
The Cyber Defence Unit of the Estonian Defence League Legal, Policy and Organisational Analysis Kadri Kaska, Anna-Maria Osula, LTC Jan Stinissen Tallinn 2013 Disclaimer This publication is a product of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (the Centre) and it represents the views and interpretations of the Centre. This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO and is designed to provide an independent position. Third-party sources are quoted as appropriate and the Centre is not responsible for the content of the external sources referenced in this publication. The Centre assumes no responsibility for any loss or harm arising from the use of information contained in this publication. Copies of this publication may be distributed for non-profit and non-commercial purpose only. Contact NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Filtri tee 12, Tallinn 10132, Estonia [email protected] www.ccdcoe.org 2 Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5 1. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 7 NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY COLLABORATION IN ESTONIA ............................................................................................... 7 ESTONIAN DEFENCE LEAGUE .................................................................................................................................... -
Democratizing Communist Militaries
Democratizing Communist Militaries Democratizing Communist Militaries The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces Marybeth Peterson Ulrich Ann Arbor To Mark, Erin, and Benjamin Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1999 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America V∞ Printed on acid-free paper 2002 2001 2000 1999 4 3 2 1 No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson. Democratizing Communist militaries : the cases of the Czech and Russian armed forces / Marybeth Peterson Ulrich. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-472-10969-3 (acid-free paper) 1. Civil-military relations—Russia (Federation) 2. Civil-military relations—Former Soviet republics. 3. Civil-military relations—Czech Republic. 4. Russia (Federation)—Armed Forces—Political activity. 5. Former Soviet republics—Armed Forces—Political activity. 6. Czech Republic—Armed Forces—Political activity. 7. Military assistance, American—Russia (Federation) 8. Military assistance, American—Former Soviet republics. 9. Military assistance, American—Czech Republic. I. Title. JN6520.C58 U45 1999 3229.5909437109049—dc21 99-6461 CIP Contents List of Tables vii Acknowledgments ix List of Abbreviations xi Introduction 1 Chapter 1. A Theory of Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Postcommunist States 5 Chapter 2. A Survey of Overall U.S. -
Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance
Research Report C O R P O R A T I O N STEPHEN J. FLANAGAN, JAN OSBURG, ANIKA BINNENDIJK, MARTA KEPE, ANDREW RADIN Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance Introduction The governments and citizens of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the Baltic states—are subject to daily Russian strategic information operations and propaganda activities that are part of campaigns designed to undermine trust in their institutions, foment ethnic and social tensions, and erode confidence in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) KEY FINDINGS collective defense commit- ■ Total Defense and Unconventional Warfare (TD/UW) techniques and ments. These three countries forces can support deterrence, early warning, de-escalation, defense are also vulnerable to low-level, against invading forces, and liberation from occupation during the hybrid, and full-scale attacks by course of a hybrid or conventional conflict. Russian special operations and ■ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are committed to enhancing the size and regular military forces deployed capabilities of their national guards and reserve forces and increasing close to their borders. In light whole-of society resilience and resistance efforts. All three countries of these concerns, and given are improving and expanding their small special operations forces. the imbalance between Russian ■ The United States, other NATO allies and partners, and the European and NATO conventional forces Union could take further concrete steps to support the development deployed in the Baltic region, of Baltic TD/UW capabilities by strengthening cooperation on crisis these governments and others management, intelligence sharing, civilian resilience, and countering Russian information warfare and hybrid attacks. -
Danish Defence Expenditure 2021
Danish Defence expenditure 2021 The total budget amounts to 26.4 billion DKK in 2021 according to the Danish Finance Act for 2021. The appropriations are primarily based on The Danish Defence Agreement 2018-2023 of January 28, 2018, Supplemental Agreement for the Danish Defence 2018-2023 of January 29, 2019 Agreement of new fighter aircraft of June 9, 2016. The appropriations are distributed among main accounts, activity areas and budget areas (see table 1- 3 below). Table 1: Overview of the appropriations 2019-2020 (current prices) and 2021-2024 (based on 2021 prices) Current prices Based on 2021 prices 2020 Year (Million DKK) 2019 (Accounting) (Accounting) 2021 2022 2023 2024 Total 23.516,0 25.225,0 26.383,2 26.928,3 29.463,2 26.256,6 12.11. Central management 414,7 503,0 1.561,6 1.891,9 2.321,6 2.134,5 Ministry of Defence 374,4 423,2 411,6 406,1 405,9 399,4 Central reserves and initiatives 1) 40,3 79,8 1.150,0 1.485,8 1.915,7 1.735,1 Reserves and budget regulation 2) - - - - - - 12.12. Personnel 1.935,4 1.944,8 1.941,6 1.932,6 1.917,0 1.899,3 Danish Defence Personnel Agency 393,1 398,9 402,0 402,9 408,2 402,9 Danish Defence Personnel Agency, Functional operations 966,0 939,7 965,3 950,6 913,8 886,5 Danish Defence Personnel Agency, Centrally Managed Units 90,8 58,4 61,4 61,4 61,4 61,4 Danish Defence Personnel Agency, Compensations 485,5 547,8 512,9 517,7 533,6 548,5 12.13.