Baltic Defence Review No. 11 Volume 1/2004
ISSN 1736-1257 Published by the Baltic Security Society, Riia 12, EE 51013 Tartu, Estonia. Articles of the Baltic Defence Review are also available to the subscribers of the EBSCO Host database at http:// search.global.epnet.com. Editor in Chief: Elizabeth Tromer. Editors: Tomas Jermalavicius, Kirsten Christensen, Heikko Pääbo Lay-out: Matis Karu Photo on a front cover: An official ceremony of raising a NATO flag in front of the Baltic Defence College, 2 April 2004 2 Contents
5 Editors note by Elizabeth Tromer Section III: Challenges to New 8 At the 5th Staff Course Graduation of NATO and New Regional Security the Baltic Defence College: The College Agenda Now and in the Future by Michael H. Clemmesen 93 The Central Issues for NATO Section I: Military Education by Janusz Onyszkiewicz 13 The Background and Development of 97 NATOs Security Agenda after the Baltic Defence College Higher Enlargement By Knut Kirste Command Studies Course Leadership 104 Security Dimension of the Northern of Transformation by Michael H. Clemmesen Europe after the Double Enlargement by Kestutis Paulauskas Section II: Transatlantic Relations Section IV: Perceptions and 21 U.S. Hegemony and the Transatlantic Policies of Non-Member States Alliance by Stanley R. Sloan 39 An Empire Unveiled by Jorgen Dragsdahl After Enlargement of NATO 65 The Transatlantic Security Rift and Its 117 Russia, NATO Enlargement and Implications for Baltic Security the Baltic States by Jennifer Ann Moll by Konstantin Khudoley and Dmitri Lanko 84 EU-NATO Relations: A European vision 129 Finlands Defence Policy: Sui Generis? by Jean-Francois Morel by Pauli Järvenpää
3 135 Reforms of the Croatian Armed Forces toward NATO by Neven Kranjcec
Section V: EU Enlargement and New Members 147 EU25 > 15+10 by Kristiina Ojuland 154 Estonian Security Perceptions in the Context of EU Enlargement: A Critical Discussion by Steffen B. Rasmussen
4 Editors note
he main purpose of the Baltic De- One such new initiative is the Open Foundation, whose scholars are frequent fence Review, the BDR, is to be a Seminars organized monthly for staff, stu- participants at the Open Seminars, as well place for publication of articles dents, and guests, such as defence attaches, as the piece by Captain (Navy) Jean- on Baltic defence and security issues, a staff from the Ministry of Defence and François Morel, former student at the venue where debate can be started and General Staff and others coming in from NATO Defence College in which College nourished and where relevant research by Tallinn, Helsinki and Riga, and regularly staff members from the Baltic Defence Baltic and other scholars can be presented. from the Estonian Defence College and College have participated in seminars, This volume is embracing the wider Tartu University. The speakers at these thanks to the hospitality of the Dean and security issues. It also takes into account seminars - Pauli Järvenpää, Stanley Sloan, the Commandant. The speech by Minis- that with the double enlargement of Jørgen Dragsdahl, and Janusz Onysz- ter of Foreign Affairs, Kristiina Ojuland NATO and the EU, the term Baltic may kiewicz, along with Konstantin Khudoley delivered at St. Antonys College, Oxford, again simply mean countries around the and Dimitri Lanko have agreed to con- is reproduced in this volume with spe- Baltic Sea and stop being a poor para- tribute with pieces not published before. cific permission from the Oxford Col- phrase of the Russian term Pribaltika. The purpose of Open Seminars is in a lege thanks to yet other set of recent in- The list of contributors to this vol- thought provoking way to stir up debate ternational cooperation. ume includes names from far beyond the on issues relevant to Baltic security de- Another article, by Steffen Rasmussen, three Baltic States. This is our constant bate. who worked in the College as a research ambition, and this time we have succeeded. On the same line, the College has un- assistant, is the result of the constant en- Even if the issue marks the celebration of dertaken cooperation with other institu- deavour to create a framework for inter- the 5-th graduation of the Baltic Defence tions in the world of learning, both its nal research in the institution. As in ear- College courses, it also reflects new initia- civilian and military part. The articles by lier volumes, College students are also tives and trends at the College. Jennifer Moll, supported by the Fulbright contributing here.
5 All in all, this volume expresses conti- will be the implications for the Baltic re- Finland, a member of the European Union nuity and reflects new initiatives, in par- gion? and active partner to NATO maintains ticular the Higher Command Studies In his article Security Dimensions of North- that the very survival of (its) nation state Course described by the College Com- ern Europe after the Double Enlargement is best ensured by a credible national de- mandant, and also a MA programme in Kestutis Paulauskas is provoking us to fence ever ready for territorial defence, War Studies under preparation. The end consider the future security agenda of the though also trained to become good state is of the Baltic Defence College; that Baltic Northern region by questioning peace-keepers. The logic behind the Finn- is Baltic States leadership and Baltic States the very function of Northern Europe - ish 2004 Defence White Paper soon to control of the College. The initiatives with its specific characteristics such as be disclosed- is presented by the author described above are focused to support northerness of mentality, regionality, and its for the readers to draw their own conclu- this target. aloofness towards continental Europe - within sions. The issues discussed in this volume are the changing global security order. Does Russia is not mentioned explicitly but ranging from the new post enlargement- the double enlargement actually mean that ever-present, in particular in the Finnish, NATO with focus on the Baltic and the world has become a safer place for the the Estonian, and the Latvian territorial Northern members role within it; the Baltic States and the Nordic countries?, defence arguments. Russia itself does nei- structure of Baltic defence policies and asks Paulauskas. The specifics of one of ther have a common single discourse on further development of international de- the Baltic nations and its effect on the the Alliance nor on the Baltic states join- fence cooperation, along with the coop- defence considerations are studied within ing NATO, we are told by Konstantin eration within the Alliance and with its the framework of the constructivist theo- Khudoley and Dimitri Lanko, invited to external partners. The Trans-Atlantic Rift, retical approach and the Copenhagen present the view from the other side of and the European new and old- vision school by Steffen Rasmussen in Estonian the no longer disputed, yet not officially on the EU-NATO relations is analysed in Security Perceptions in the Context of EU En- approved boarder. Three discourses; the perspective of questions like Does the largement: A Critical Discussion, while the a)Baltic states accepted to NATO to main- USA have a defence strategy at all?, Will argument of the Northern and Baltic states tain the Alliance, b)Baltic states accepted the EU finally pull itself out of its numer- aloofness towards continental Europe is to NATO to counter-balance misunder- ous crises?, and, Will it be a stronger or reinforced in Pauli Järvenpääs presenta- standing between America and the old weaker European union? Finally, What tion on Finlands Defence Policy: Sui Generis. Europe; and c)Baltic states accepted to
6 NATO to bring Russia closer to the Alli- democratic administration both assume Alliances cohesion, and that reasons for ance; are introduced within the frame- an after Bush era soon-to-be. Dragsdahl Transatlantic Rift are not constrained to work of constructivist theory and is providing us with a thorough discus- the division between Europe and the US, securitization concept concluding with the sion of a new type empire and the Baltic but also divisions within Europe. potential implications for the Baltic States dilemma within this prospective, Sloan is This line of argumentation is taken up military transformations. drawing our attention to a particular as- by Knut Kirste in NATOs Security Agenda The same theoretical approach the pect working against the tendencies for a after Enlargement. NATOs main function Copenhagen school - is favoured in the rift. Not only do Europeans and the US in the past was to ensure collective de- second part of Jennifer Molls article on Americans share political values, we also fence and guarantee the security interests the Transatlantic Security Rift and Its Implica- share market economic systems in which of its members, states Kirste. While it may tion for Baltic Security; the Ramification for markets are driven by competition, yet be difficult to decide how long ago this Baltic Security where Moll is conducting a they are governed by democratically ap- past applies, it is even more challenging discussion on Baltic unity and on the proved rules and regulations. So how to bid for NATOs future. Is it to be the United States as the primary security guar- much does it really matter, all this talk driving force of an international security antor. about a Trans-Atlantic Rift? Janusz system and the central defence related link The Transatlantic Rift and its conse- Onyszkiewicz, Polands minister of de- between the USA, Europe, Russia, and a quences for the new Baltic members of fence during the PfP years is asking in variety of partners? NATO is examined in a number of other The Central Issues for NATO from the per- The discussion items above reflect the contributions to this volume: Jørgen spective of an old new member to NATO: new situation of the Baltic States and their Dragsdahl (Denmark) and Stan Sloan Is the Alliance to remain a common de- neighbours just as they are crucial to (USA) are presenting the US and Euro- fence structure, an alliance cantered members of the next round of NATO pean perspectives, respectively. Without around mutually binding security guar- enlargement. That is what LtCol Neven mediation by the editors these two con- antees, or will it drift towards a much Kranjcec is considering on behalf of his tributors are highlighting the same aspects: looser common security structure? Play- country. are the Europeans ready for US leader- ing the devils advocates role ship and substantial burden sharing; how Onyszkiewicz is pointing out that NATOs Elizabeth Tromer will global US leadership be defined by a enlargement has negative effect on the
7 At the 5th Staff Course Graduation of the Baltic Defence College: The College Now and in the Future
By Michael H. Clemmesen, Brigadier General, Commandant
even years ago, in June 1997, the graduated. During this first year the fac- Next year, the Joint Command and Nordic and Baltic Defence Min- ulty had to form as a team, learn, prepare General Staff Course will remain the main isters decided to develop a com- - at the same time as educate the student activity of the College, supplemented with mon school for the education of staff officers. With the 5th graduation this sum- the Civil Servants Course, now increas- officers. At that time the idea of creating mer, close to 130 officers from the three ingly integrated into the staff course a common staff college was less than a year Baltic states have been educated to serve as modules. The last Colonels Course has old. general staff officers. Most have graduated graduated this summer. One year later, many more support- from the staff course, now transformed into During the five years that the school ing states joined the original group in a Joint Command and General Staff has existed the education has undergone signing the formal agreement and the sup- Course, others in the much smaller, par- a constant development, inspired by the port Memorandum of Understanding in allel Colonel Course. They have been students and new staff members, by the the NATO Headquarters, hosted by the educated together with close to 50 officers improving level of Baltic student prepa- delegation from Sweden, the lead state. from 16 different other states. During the ration, as well as by the need to adjust Immediately thereafter, the preparation latest three school years, a total of close to with vision and ambition to the emerg- work started in Tartu, and in June 2000 40 civil servants have graduated from the ing security framework of the Baltic states the first Senior Staff Course students Civil Servants Course. armed forces.
8 From 1999 till 2004, the focus of the from the earlier staff course to prepare at the end of each module plus supple- tactics-operational teaching changed sig- them better for work in NATO staffs and ment will have collected academic credits nificantly. From initially spanning the in mission areas. However, some places that can be used in the second half of a field from battalion to military region, have also been offered to NATO School complete master programme. In addition, the teaching is now starting with infan- (Oberammergau) as an extra capacity and they will have gained part of the deeper try brigade tactics and covers the joint a possibility to give a somewhat more and broader understanding of the world operational level in the final months of thorough training than that school can and their profession that will be crucial the course. This refocusing was necessary. offer in its shorter courses. The details of for military success and Alliance rel- However, it was only made possible by this potential co-operation will be clari- evance - in the future. As a benefit, offic- the junior staff courses created and con- fied in the agreed negotiations during the ers with the combination of advanced ducted by graduates of the coming months. professional education and a master de- BALTDEFCOL staff course in all three The new Alliance mission framework gree with a relevant focus will be highly Baltic states. has underlined the need to broaden all suited for participating in the further During the first years, the operational military education, making it more mind- development of the College and the other framework was territorial defence, using opening, more academic. This, of course, military education institutions of the three NATO standards and procedures. Now is of special importance in the advanced states. all teaching in the field of tactics and education of the selected best, the students The three Baltic states are deeply com- operations is either of a general character in general staff level courses. Therefore the mitted to do their bit to support the ef- or it deals with the issues and planning College is preparing to offer supplemen- fort of Alliance leaders to transform the procedures of combined expeditionary tary elements linked to the present Joint organisation by making a much larger operations. Command and General Staff Course mod- part of the available European NATO The New NATO character of the ules, making these with the supplement manpower currently 2,5 million ready education has made it possible to con- suitable within an academic war stud- and deployable. The direct contribution sider opening the NATO Operational ies framework. Those who qualify by is limited by the small size of own re- Planning module of the staff course to having the necessary bachelor degree back- sources and armed forces, however, this additional students. This possibility may ground, who have a very high level in limitation makes transformation easier to initially be used to update graduates written English, and who pass the exams accomplish. The Baltic states have no large
9 structural, attitudinal and equipment bal- The future of the College will as in last to shed. the first 5 years be dominated by a con- The leaders of the three states under- stant and dynamic adaptation to the re- stand that successful transformation to- quirements of the armed forces of the three wards relevance depends on the attitude, new NATO members as well as by a wish focus and professional effectiveness of the to be seen at the front line of Alliance emerging group of leaders of the Euro- developments. pean armed forces. To present an example of what needs to be done, the College has been encouraged by the three Ministers to develop a war college level Higher Command Studies Course dedicated to Leadership of Transformation. After running this course as a small pilot project in 2004, the follow-on 2005 course will be open to selected potential high level officers and civilian defence officials from other NATO and PfP-states as a pro- posed Allied Command Transformation Centre of Excellence project. Due to the importance of its clear NATO education requirement focus, the non-Baltic course members will have their course fees cov- ered by the Baltic sponsored project bud- get. The course and its background are presented later in the Review.
10 Section I
Military Education
11 12 The Background and Development of the Baltic Defence College Higher Command Studies Course Leadership of Transformation
By Michael H. Clemmesen, Brigadier General, Commandant
Defence Ministers as closely as possible: to stay updated during the remaining ser- Background to transform all the common Baltic states vice through the interaction of service projects, including the College into true experience, discussions with colleagues, and The course in its final 2004 form has NATO structures continuous general and professional stud- two sets of roots: ies. The needs for further education would Firstly, the gradual realisation of the The original BALTDEFCOL be covered by the NATO Defence Col- need to create a War College level course Higher Command Studies Course lege Senior Course and short, management tailored to the time and CEE requirements, oriented courses. a course that could also make it more re- Originally the College agreed with the alistic to develop qualified professional traditional Continental West-European However, the following considerations and academic senior staff members for the attitude to fourth war college level have led the College to change its mind: Baltic Defence College officer courses: it is the responsibility of The defined, formal Baltic states of- Secondly, the College endeavours to a graduate of the third and final level ficer education systems: All three states approach the ideal of the three Baltic education, the general staff officer course, included a fourth level officer education
13 in their plans, especially Estonia; the Com- of most West-European general staff of- Forces, ensuring interest in higher pro- mandant of the National Defence College ficers was to refine the structural and fessional education in the leadership of pressed continuously for an in-region doctrinal responses to a very well defined the Services and preparing future key and course. threat from the Soviet Union. This ap- leading professional College staff members. The realisation that the assumption plied to both national and NATO staff In the USMC, the motive behind creating of professional self-development was un- positions. Therefore a rather narrow op- the small (approximately 18 student) Corps realistic: The best staff officers, potential erational, professional focus was possible. War College Course was the then USMC generals and admirals, are spending an Both now and in the future, however, a Commandant General Grays wish to en- increasing part of their careers being ex- much wider both general and joint pro- sure qualified leading instructors for the tremely busy in mainly administrative- fessional understanding is required from Command and Staff College. Thus a simi- management oriented jobs. With the re- all flag rank officers, an understanding lar small course in the Baltic Defence Col- duction of the force structures, the num- they as young command and staff course lege could develop a better environment ber of positions with a clear, practical or students of major/lieutenant commander and a prepared recruiting field of quali- theoretical professional content has been rank were too immature and inexperienced fied interested persons for the College. significantly reduced. This combines with to absorb fully and thereafter develop. Finally, the need, availability, cost and the effects of the modern Western family The inspiration from the UK and focus of war college courses: The Baltic pattern, where the spouse is likely to be U.S.: When the UK created their Joint states are unlikely to field large forces and less tolerant of purely self-development Services Command and Staff College the immediate focus and contributions activities. The result is one where the staff (JSCSC), the new college adopted the Brit- are on the purely tactical level. In spite of course graduate is more likely just to use ish Army Higher Command and Staff this, their key officers and civilian defence rather than develop what he/she once Course, now as a joint three months officials should still have an, in-depth, learned. One may safely assume that this course concentrating on operational level developed professional understanding so has been one factor in the transforma- command issues. The British College un- that they advise their political leaders, play tion inertia of many Continental West- derlined the very significant benefits of a constructive role in the alliance and European armed forces. the course to both the UK armed forces develop their own military education The increasing requirement in the new and the College itself. The course acted as structures on the basics of an updated mission environment: Previously the task a bridge between the College and the understanding of the requirements and
14 the conditions of their societies. After all, closed. The main two specific benefits any Board decided that the HCSC will be arranged the total sum of their populations is half- non-American officer can gain from at- during 2004 on a preliminary basis. The course way between those of Sweden and Israel. tending a U.S. war college course be- will be evaluated before it will be arranged per- NATO is not a supranational organisation sides the general widening and deepen- manently1 . The money necessary to con- where the truth is only present with its ing professional understanding that you duct the course was granted by the ap- leading members - NATO is not the War- should get from any such course - are the proval of the proposed 2004 budget, part saw Treaty Organization. Even the small networking to key colleagues and a thor- of that money transferred from the can- member officials need a general under- ough inside knowledge of current and celled 2003-04 Colonels Course. It was a standing to serve their nations as well as developing U.S. policy issues and strate- clear premise from the discussion that the the whole Alliance. Even the small mem- gies. However, the U.S. courses are costly, course could be conducted without any bers should maintain the ability to con- something likely to create a dilemma, when additional workload for the existing di- tribute with positions and ideas. Until sponsorship runs out. recting staff the central BALTDEFCOL now, several officers from the Baltic states project was still the Joint Command and armed forces have attended the American The original project the sequence General Staff Course. armed services war college courses, with of events and decisions The proposed rotation of the course the cost sponsored by the U.S., the most January 2003-January 2004: within the circle of Nordic-Baltic Staff prominent being Lieutenant general Schools: At the Nordic Staff School Com- Johannes Kert from Estonia and Vice The BALTDEFCOL Board Meeting mandants Conference 16-18 September in Admiral Gaidis Zeibots, the present 29th January in Vilnius: The meeting was Denmark, the BALTDEFCOL presenta- Latvian Armed Forces Commander. The conducted as a normal meeting linked to tion led to a discussion of the HCSC. future BALTDEFCOL Commandant, Col the BALTSEA framework. The possibility This discussion led to a proposal of 9th Algis Vaiceliunas is presently studying in of conducting a UK-inspired, short October to the Nordic staff colleges to the compatible National Security Studies Higher Command Studies Course consider conducting such a course, rotat- Course in Canada, sponsored by that (HCSC) was discussed in the meeting, and ing among them. This would ensure a country. The UK Higher Command Stud- was warmly endorsed by Dr Peter Foot constant and relevant number of students ies Course is not open to Baltic or other of Kings College London and the JSCSC. (18-24), a development promoting com- CEE students and is likely to remain The result of the meeting was that the petition with the previous course(s) and
15 be a very cost-effective solution. It would tensification of the endeavours to adjust the and deployable. It the College succeeded also address the problem of finding a di- curriculum to the New NATO expedi- in this and became accepted as an Allied rector for the 2005 and follow-on courses. tionary focus, an increased instruction in Command Transformation Centre of The 2004 small pilot course would be NATO operational planning procedures and Excellence, it would live up to the politi- developed and run by the College Com- other relevant alliance publications and the cal intentions of the 9th February meet- mandant, parallel to his handing over to creation of a formal co-operation with the ing. The first steps were to ensure that the successor. During the following U.S-German sponsored NATO-School in the 2004 HCSC was given a focused Lead- month it became clear that the proposal Oberammergau, Germany. ership of Transformation curriculum, conflicted with the development of the 9 February 2004: The first meeting of had the right quality of core (Baltic) course course away from the operational level the new steering body, the BALTDEFCOL members and had access to high quality command and general force development Co-ordination Group took place in Oslo guest lecturers and commentators at the focus towards a clear NATO Leadership on 9th February linked to the BALTSEA se- course theme seminars. The two first of of Transformation emphasis. quence of meetings3. The meeting was briefed these steps were completed in February, about the planned HCSC and had no criti- and with generous support and other as- Towards an Allied Command cal remarks. However, the College realised sistance offered by individuals and part- Transformation Centre of from the remarks of the Baltic MoD repre- ners in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Excellence (COE) Project sentatives that something additional had to Norway, Netherlands, NATO authorities, January-May 2004: be done to put the BALTDEFCOL under the Israel, Germany and Denmark. They en- umbrella of NATO4 to see BALTDEFCOL sured that we had a significant number The BALTDEFCOL adjustment to be- in the future as an open NATO College5. of the right quality guest lecturers and come a NATO-focused institution prior to February-March 2004: As there is no could proceed. On 25th February the February 2004: Following-up the 2002 common NATO education system, the College sent a letter to the Supreme Al- Prague NATO Summit invitations to the only available option was to develop the lied Commander Transformation (SACT) Baltic states, the three Defence Ministers HCSC into a both unique and open in- via the Estonian Military Representative agreed that the Baltic military co-operations stitution that supported the NATO mem- to NATO HQ, LtGen Johannes Kert to projects should be transformed into NATO ber armed forces transformation to be- introduce the course and propose that a projects.2 In the College this meant an in- come far more interoperable, combat ready (U.S.) ACT officer participates. The first
16 contact to ACT had taken place 21st No- Cesis, Latvia on 21st-22nd April followed the vember 2003, when Adm Fernandez, SACT recommendations of the Co-ordination Final remarks Representative in Europe visited the Col- Group in relations to the 2005 budget and lege together with Gen Kert. The letter was the way ahead towards attaining CEO sta- It is important to underline that the followed by my visit to the U.S. 30 March- tus. However, the commanders also under- HCSC has not been designed to compete 02 April to ACT in Norfolk that also came lined that the implementation of the Higher with U.S. War College Courses or the NATO to include conversations in Pentagon Command Studies Course shall influence neither Defense College Senior Course. As with these (OSD and Joint Staff J5) arranged by the the quality of education nor the budget of the cur- other courses, it is at 4th officer education Estonian Defence Attaché to the U.S. rent courses in BALTDEFCOL8 . During April level with a significant presence of civilian April-May 2004: The results of the it had become clear that the course member defence officials. Even if there is some over- work to refocus and develop the HCSC slots offered to the Nordic states would not lap in the substance of the courses, this course were reported to the BALTDEFCOL Co- be used. This gave a possibility to start giv- was designed to have a different focus, espe- ordination Group meeting in Vilnius on ing the 2004 pilot course some of the out- cially relevant for the most senior officers 19th April 2004. The College also presented reach transformation focus that would and defence officials responsible for adapt- an adjusted 2005 budget proposal with a make the CEO project especially relevant ing and innovating the doctrines and struc- Baltic states sponsored HCSC open to all for the Alliance. It will now have a Danish tures better to support the current and NATO and PfP states6. All three states sup- sponsored Croatian, an Estonian spon- emerging Alliance requirements. It could be ported the adjusted budget and the way sored Serbian-Montenegrin course mem- used both to prepare for positions in the ahead to attain ACT Centre of Excellence ber and a Lithuanian sponsored - Geor- national central structures and within the status for the course project proposed by gian course member. The course started with common Alliance transformation Estonia7 . The 2005 course would maintain the introduction week 10th 13th May that organisation. Thus it is meant to supple- its clear Leadership of Transformation included a presentation by MGen Nick ment existing Alliance member institutions focus, be adjusted on the basis on the 2004 Parker, the UK JSCSC Commandant, who and capabilities. It can not be ruled out pilot course experience, and it would be earlier in his career directed the British that a combination of this course with an open to all NATO and PfP states. The three HCSC. In that way we connected to one of American War College Course or the NATO Baltic states armed forces commanders (the the main inspirations of the BALTDEFCOL Defense College Senior Course can be seen Baltic Military Committee) meeting in HCSC. as necessary for some officials.
17 It will take a major effort to have the rate directing staff including the new mentation, the transformation will in 2005 and follow-on Higher Command Stud- Deputy Course Director of the College the best case become unfocused and ies Courses used properly as a Centre of and a civilian academic of the Institute protracted. Excellence, even after it has been granted for Defence Studies, both will be gradu- As our future security may still depend that status. The three states have to con- ates of the 2004 HCSC. Such a limited on the maintenance of an effective NATO, vince other NATO and PfP states that even manning and the resulting independence the Baltic states have decided to do their if or rather because their armed forces of the staff supporting the other College small bit to catalyse transformation. are small and young, they have been free courses is only possible due to the lim- and able to set up something new and ited size of the HCSC and the role of 1 Minutes from the Baltic Defence College Board unique that could benefit all. The three external lecturers in the Course. The meeting in Vilnius, 2003 Jan 29. 2 Also clearly mirrored in the Joint Communi- states had already done that when they es- HCSC Course Director for the 2005 and que of the Ministerial Committee on 10th Decem- tablished the first combined English lan- immediately following courses will prob- ber 2002 in Riga.. guage staff college in continental Europe. ably have to be seconded from outside 3 Minutes from the Baltic Defence College Co- The Centre of Excellence is probably only the Baltic states on temporary assignment. ordination Group Meeting in Oslo, February 9, 2004. going to become a success, if the NATO 4 Final comment of Grazvydas Jasutis, the rep- states with the most transformed forces, End-bullets resentative of the Lithuanian Ministry of National the UK and U.S., adopt the course for Defence. 5 their own use, benefiting from the Baltic If NATO is to remain relevant in the Final comment of Edgars Scarenieks, the rep- resentative of the Latvian Ministry of Defence. sponsorship to save own money, having eyes of the U.S., the continental European 6 With a dedicated budget of 120.000 EUR, the their local representatives in CEE capitals alliance members must accelerate the trans- course could be conducted with 20 course mem- (the U.S. ODCs and the UK advisors or formation of their armed forces, and es- bers, and with all costs of bringing external lec- turers to the College including a significant DAs) co-operating with the local authori- pecially their armies, to become far more lecturing fee - covered by the budget. Thus the ties to identify the right candidates. ready, deployable and interoperable. course could free itself of the external sponsor- The HCSC is run as a nearly completely If nothing effective is done to de- ship necessary to conduct the 2004 course. independent activity in the Baltic Defence velop the attitude of the coming leader- 7 Draft Minutes BALTDEFCOL Co-ordina- tion Group meeting 19 April 2004, Vilnius. College, however, using the same support ship group in these states in favour of 8 Baltic Military Committee Joint Statement of staff to save resources. It will have a sepa- innovation and enhance its tools of imple- 22 April 2004.
18 Section II
Transatlantic Relations
19 20 U.S. Hegemony and the Transatlantic Alliance
By Stanley R. Sloan*
States and its allies must deal but which joined in the U.S.-led coalition that re- A Valuable Relationship are not easily subject to manipulation. The moved Saddam Hussein from power and under Stress most important of these is the emergence occupied Iraq. of the United States as the only global Beyond structural sources of difference, In recent months, Estonia, Latvia and power whose policies and actions inevita- U.S.-European disagreements are the prod- Lithuania along with Bulgaria, Romania, bly intrude on the sovereign interests of uct of choices made in democratic Slovakia and Slovenia became NATO other states, including those of friends decisionmaking processes on both sides members, fulfilling the promises made at and allies. of the Atlantic, for example concerning the NATO Prague summit of November A related structural factor is that the resources allocated for military systems and 2002. Ironically, at a time when the alli- major West European allies no longer rely operations versus resources made available ance is being enlarged both in member- on the United States to defend them for other sources of national power and ship and mission, a crisis of confidence against Russia, even though some of the influence. has developed between the United States new allies still see NATO as an important Since the advent of the Bush Adminis- and many of its European allies. hedge against Russian power. All Euro- tration, European observers and govern- To some extent, the current crisis is pean members of NATO, new and old, ments have been concerned that U.S. re- the product of structural factors in inter- now are partners with the United States spect for alliances, international law, co- national relations with which the United in the war against terror and some of them operation and organisations was being * Stanley R. Sloan is the Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative and a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the Rohatyn Center for International Affairs, Middlebury College. 21 displaced by reliance on overwhelming the Atlantic and among European states. The American side of this debate tends U.S. military force. The United States was Now, as the United States struggles to to focus on European weakness. A promi- seen by many Europeans as abandoning help establish a democratic regime in Iraq, nent neo-conservative commentator, Rob- what had been a shared Euro-Atlantic com- the question addressed here is whether the ert Kagan, has argued that the success of mitment to the rule of law, applied inter- behaviour of the United States as a hege- the European integration process, creat- nationally as well as within states. monic power has enhanced or diminished ing a zone of peace and cooperation The U.S.-European relationship has its power and influence in Europe and among countries that had warred for cen- from the early post-World War II period more generally throughout the world. turies, has also given birth to a non-use been founded on declarations of common of force ideology. According to Kagan, values and interests.1 Throughout the Why Does it Matter? This is what many Europeans believe they Cold War the United States and its allies have to offer the world: not power, but had differences concerning how best to For over 50 years, the United States, the transcendence of power.2 respond to the Soviet threat. However, Canada and their European allies have One European commentator says that the nature of the threat facilitated resolu- taken the Euro-Atlantic alliance for Kagan is absolutely right in judging that tion of differences and development of granted: maintenance of a strong, vital Americans and Europeans no longer common approaches. The new challenges transatlantic link has been at the core share a common strategic culture. Peter of non-state terrorist threats and the shad- of European and American foreign and van Ham points out that ...for non- owy relationships between such groups defence policies. Early in the 21st century, Americans, this is gradually becoming a and national governments have yielded a however, a new period of questioning has world where the U.S. acts as legislator, variety of interpretations of the nature begun. Some Americans ask: if the United policeman, judge and executioner. of the threat and how best to respond. States is the worlds only superpower, what America sets the rules by its own The September 11, 2001 attacks on the do weak, disputatious, legalistic Europe- behaviour, judges others without stick- United States produced a sense of joint ans have to offer to U.S. interests? Some ing to these rules itself....3 purpose between the United States and Europeans ask: if Europe is on its way to Such broad caricatures have recently its European allies. But the nature of the unity, with most European countries on dominated discussion of U.S.-European U.S. response, particularly with regard to board, why should Europe defer to rude, relations. They lead all-too-easily to the Iraq, has produced serious divisions across reckless, impetuous Americans? conclusion that the United States and
22 Europe are drifting apart. There is a fac- First, there is the fact that the United and economic systems. The desire to align tual foundation for such analyses. States States, Canada and the members of the with the United States while protecting tend to use the instruments of statecraft European Union share political systems themselves against excessive Russian influ- available to them. What instruments they built on the values of democracy, indi- ence provided much of the incentive for develop and fund is at least somewhat vidual liberty and the rule of law. Granted, these unequivocal commitments. They all dependent on what their history has this does not mean that these broad val- have sought to become E.U and NATO taught them. The history of the Second ues are practiced similarly in all Euro-At- members, to ensure that they are part of World War led many Europeans to con- lantic nations. And the fact that they are Europe and of the Euro-Atlantic commu- clude that military conflict is to be interpreted differently may help explain nity. avoided at all cost. Meanwhile, many the divergent paths chosen for dealing with Moreover, European and American Americans look at World War II as dem- the Iraq problem. However, the belief in market economies are the essential core onstrating that appeasement of dictators and practice of democracy remains an of the global economic system. Along with only whets their appetite for conquest. important part of the foundation for the Japan, the United States and the Euro- During the Cold War, West European Euro-Atlantic community, a factor per- pean Union are the main engines of in- nations learned that putting aside old haps best appreciated by the Baltic states ternational trade and investment, and it antagonisms allowed them to build a pros- and the others who have just joined NATO is therefore in their mutual interest to perous, stable community todays Eu- and the European Union. cooperate to make the system work. The ropean Union (E.U.). Meanwhile, deter- In addition to shared political values, economic relationship between the United ring and finally defeating the Soviet the United States and E.U. member states States and the European Union is vitally Union in the Cold War reinforced the support market based economic systems important to both. The E.U. is the largest American conviction that the demon- in which competition drives the market U.S. trade partner when goods and ser- strated willingness to use force is neces- but is governed by democratically ap- vices are added up.4 The members of the sary in dealing with potentially aggressive proved rules and regulations. Former E.U. have over $860 billion of direct in- dictatorial regimes. Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern vestment in the United States. The United However, there is more to be said about Europe and three former Soviet Repub- States has some $700 billion invested in the relevance of U.S.-European relations lics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) have E.U. states. The E.U. and the United States than such critiques reveal. worked hard to adopt western political together account for more than 40 per-
23 cent of world trade and represent almost and Europe remain committed to resolv- produced different preferences for inter- 60 percent of the industrialised worlds ing their differences in ways that balance national problem solving. Now, the even- gross domestic product. These numbers costs and benefits over time. bigger gap yields even more dramatic dif- and ratios will continue to grow.5 At the heart of the projection of doom ferences between the so-called non-use- At the end of the Cold War, some and gloom for transatlantic relations by of-force ideology Robert Kagan ascribes observers judged that the Soviet threat some analysts on both sides of the Atlan- to the Europeans and the unilateral mili- had imposed a discipline on transatlantic tic is the view that the U.S.-European se- tarism many Europeans see in the Bush trade and financial relations that would curity relationship is becoming irrelevant, administration. disappear in the post-Cold War era. Ac- NATO is dead, and the European Union Bush administration Department of cording to this view, trade differences that will never muster enough political will and Defense political appointees have tended had been controlled because of the con- resources to become a significant military to be sceptical about the willingness of frontation with Moscow would break out player alongside the United States. There European allies to make serious defence into the open with a devastating impact is a growing gap between U.S. and Euro- improvements. Granted, the European on transatlantic relations. Even though pean deployed military capabilities. The military modernisation picture is certainly the United States and Europe have con- Europeans have simply not spent enough bad, but it is not hopeless. Europe clearly tinued to struggle with a variety of trade since the end of the Cold War to keep up needs to invest much more in defence, issues most recently including U.S.-im- with the U.S. Revolution in Military Af- but the major European military estab- posed tariffs on steel imports and in- fairs in which digital technology is being lishments are trying to develop the capac- creased subsidies for U.S. farmers such used to revolutionise the modern battle- ity to conduct future operations on the differences have not shaken the founda- field. What they have spent has not al- kind of high tech battlefield that U.S. ca- tions of the relationship. This is so be- ways been spent well, maintaining mili- pabilities have created. Scheduled im- cause even though the system stimulates tary structures and equipment more ap- provements in communications, intelli- and encourages competition it also ceases propriate for the Cold War strategic en- gence, surveillance and reconnaissance, all to function effectively unless conflicting vironment than for likely 21st century weather precision weaponry, strategic interests are eventually reconciled. In spite conflicts. mobility, and force projection over the of continuing differences and the absence During the Cold War, the gap between next 15 years, if carried out, should pro- of a Cold War threat, the United States U.S. and European military capabilities duce European forces that are more ca-
24 pable of conducting operations in a great Response Force (NRF), composed mainly dination of U.S. and European military variety of battlefield conditions in coali- of European troops and equipment, de- forces that could be even more impor- tion with the United States and, to a lesser signed to deploy quickly with modern, tant in a continuing struggle against ter- extent, on their own if necessary.6 The effective forces to deal with future mili- rorism. To the extent that the U.N. Secu- question, of course, is whether political tary crises in or beyond Europe. rity Council remains an important instru- leaders will back up such plans with the The European Union and its member ment for international stability and, in required resources. states can bring together a rich package Washington, for the pursuit of U.S. policy The debate over Iraq highlighted U.S. of assets required for crisis management objectives, the roles of Britain, France and differences with some of its key European and avoidance, including diplomatic me- Russia as permanent, veto-holding mem- allies. This did not change the fact that diation, peacekeeping forces, police forces, bers of the Council remain critical. The Europe remains the prime source of al- humanitarian assistance and development question is how well the United States has lies that are willing and able to deploy aid. As one U.S.-European expert study been managing this fundamental build- substantial military forces in zones of group concluded, Although the U.S. may ing block for the U.S. role in the world. conflict far from their borders.7 More- be able to win wars without significant over, the main framework for coordinat- allied contributions, it is unlikely in many Post-Cold War U.S. Foreign Policy ing U.S.-European military cooperation, situations to be able to win the peace with- Seen From Europe NATO, has become an important instru- out military (and non-military) assistance ment for international, not just European, from European allies, whether those situ- Since the end of the Cold War, Euro- peace and security. This process took dra- ations develop within or outside Eu- pean perceptions of the United States have matic steps forward, even in the heat of rope.8 swung from concern about the United the debate over Iraq, as the NATO allies Productive functioning of the inter- States drawing inward and abandoning including opponents of U.S. Iraq policy national economic system depends on international activism, to fear of a higher France and Germany agreed to give U.S.-European collaboration. International U.S. priority on Asian than European NATO a command role in Afghanistan security problems are most easily and ef- relationships, to more recent worries and to support the Polish command in fectively handled when the United States about U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic Iraq. Moreover, also during this period and its European allies work together. behaviour. The debate in the United States of stress, the allies agreed to create a NATO NATO is a unique instrument for coor- on its post-Cold War role in the world
25 and U.S. actions suggesting one or an- international challenges (both illustrated By the end of 1993, however, the Admin- other outcome have stimulated these var- by his orchestration of the response to istration had moved to a posture empha- ied European perceptions. Perhaps because Iraqs invasion of Kuwait). Europeans sizing continuing U.S. political, eco- of the closeness of the ties across the At- largely appreciated the respect for inter- nomic, and strategic interests in Asia and lantic, even ripples in U.S. foreign policy national cooperation and organisations Europe. sometimes produce tidal waves on Euro- deployed by the Bush (41) administration For most of President Clintons first pean shores. and its efforts to build a substantial in- term, the Administration seemed to shift Since the Cold War ended, there has ternational coalition with U.N. backing between active internationalism and for- been an ongoing elite debate about the to push Saddam Husseins forces out of eign policy reticence. The mood in the role the United States should play in an Kuwait. country toward foreign entanglements was international system that is no longer In the first year of his presidency, Bill soured by the peacekeeping disaster in dominated by the bi-polar confrontation Clinton and his foreign policy advisers Somalia in 1993. The administration was of two alliance systems led by the United experimented with a number of different reluctant to get U.S. troops involved in States and the Soviet Union. approaches to U.S. foreign policy. Presi- Yugoslavia and there was a tendency more President George Bush (41) clearly be- dent Clinton sought to convert his suc- broadly toward self-deterrence conscious lieved that the United States was required cessful campaign slogan, Its the economy, avoidance of international involvements to play a strong international leadership stupid, into a pillar of U.S. foreign policy. that might cost U.S. lives and money.9 role. Some of his advisers, including some In part as a consequence of this philoso- This gave rise to European concerns that who are senior officials in the George W. phy, some Clinton Administration offi- the United States might move in isola- Bush (43) administration, apparently cials argued that Asia (rather than Europe) tionist directions. But, in 1996, as he cam- thought the United States should use its should be the central focus of U.S. for- paigned for a second term in office, Presi- position as the sole superpower to dis- eign policy because of the opportunities dent Clinton argued that the United States courage challenges to that position, even presented by growing Asian markets. Eu- was the worlds indispensable power, among current allies. George Bush (41) ropeans were worried by the suggestion suggesting that the international system nonetheless accepted the importance of that the Clinton administration would try required the active involvement of the building consensus in the United Nations to play Asia off against Europe to pro- United States to function effectively. and constructing coalitions to deal with mote U.S. trade and economic interests. Clinton maintained that such activism was
26 in the U.S. interest and the United States The Clinton administrations ap- Boris Yeltsin and Chinese leader Jiang took the lead in attempting to bring peace proach to the June 1997 Denver economic Zemin agreed on a strategic partnership to the Balkans. This sign of U.S. interest summit was seen by some participants as against those who would push the world in stabilising international crisis zones, in your face bragging about the success toward a uni-polar order. European al- particularly in Europe, was greatly appre- of the U.S. economic model (at which lies occasionally joined the critique ciated by the European allies, even if they leaders were asked to put on cowboy hats overtly. In December 1998, Chairman of were not always comfortable with the U.S. and boots for the group picture); the Defense Committee in the French lead. Clinton insistence on limiting the first National Assembly, Socialist Paul Quiles, The more assertive U.S. approach also group of candidates for NATO member- warned that NATOs 50th anniversary sum- generated European concerns about grow- ship to three countries when several Euro- mit in Washington in April 1999 should ing unilateralist tendencies in U.S. policy. pean countries favoured a larger group; not set the seal on the United States he- Even though overall foreign policy was U.S. refusal to sign the treaty ban- gemony over the alliance. seen as supporting multilateral approaches, ning anti-personnel land mines; and, In this same time period, at least one Europeans identified several early signs U.S. proposals in 1998 that NATO European observer argued that U.S. he- of U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic ten- should be able to use force even when it gemonic tendencies were different and less dencies, including: is not possible to obtain a mandate from dangerous than those of previous hege- The Helms-Burton Act that sought the UN Security Council. mons. This circumstance, Josef Joffe ar- to impose sanctions on non-U.S. firms Critics in Europe and elsewhere sug- gued, could not be seen simply in classic doing business with Cuba; gested the United States was beginning to balance of power terms. He argued the Congressional insistence on reform act like a classic, overbearing hegemonic United States was different from previ- of the United Nations as a pre-condition power, using its position of supremacy ous dominant powers: It irks and domi- for payment of U.S. arrears; in the international system to have its way neers, but it does not conquer. It tries to Hard-line sanctions toward Iran, Iraq, at the expense of the interests and prefer- call the shots and bend the rules, but it Libya; ences of other powers. Russia complained does not go to war for land and glory.10 Refusal in the mid-1990s to give up about NATO enlargement and China ad- Further, he suggested, the dominating NATOs Southern Command to a Euro- vocated a multi-polar world as an alter- U.S. position is based on soft as well as pean officer; native to U.S. hegemony. In April 1997, hard power: This type of power a
27 culture that radiates outward and a mar- change in the international environment. ket that draws inward rests on pull, not The 9/11 Shock Led by the Bush administration, a war on push; on acceptance, not on con- mentality became the core of Americas quest.11 When terrorists mounted the September world-view. Many Europeans, on the The George W. Bush (43) administra- 11, 2001 attacks against U.S. targets, the other hand, saw the attacks as part of a tion therefore came to office in 2001 fac- European allies responded with unqualified continuing struggle with terrorism rather ing a mix of European fears and expecta- sympathy and support in spite of their on- than a new phase of international rela- tions. Candidate Bush had made statements going concerns about U.S. foreign policy tions. They tended to focus on the need suggesting the U.S. should begin to pull directions. This included understanding and to deal with the causes of Islamic funda- back from some of its overseas commit- offers of support for U.S. operations in mentalist terrorism as aggressively as the ments, but the overall thrust of adminis- Afghanistan to remove the Taliban govern- United States was dealing with its conse- tration policy was in unilateralist direc- ment from power and destroy the Al Qaeda quences. These post-9/11 disconnects be- tions, at least as seen by most Europeans. terrorist network that had established itself tween Europe and the United States were The first foreign policy actions of the under Taliban protection. However, the signs of a bigger problem to come as the Bush Administration tended to raise warn- Bush administration was slow to respond Bush administration focused its attention ing flags for European governments. Uni- to many of the offers of assistance and, from on Iraq as the next target. lateral U.S. decisions not to join in the a European point of view, appeared to be International Criminal Court, to remain sending the message that the United States The Iraq Factor outside the Kyoto Protocol on green- did not appreciate or need the assistance house gas emissions and to terminate the offered. The administrations assertion that The Bush administrations approach to Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia the mission should determine the coali- Iraq produced serious divisions between were all seen as signs that the United States tion raised questions about whether the the United States and some of its key was heading in new directions based al- administration was downgrading NATO as European allies as well as within Europe most exclusively on short-term U.S. policy an instrument for U.S.-European military itself. No European government saw choices and with no regard for their im- cooperation. Saddam Hussein and his regime as benign, pact on the views or interests of its clos- In addition, most Americans saw the and all agreed that something more seri- est allies. 9/11 attacks as producing a fundamental ous needed to be done to replace sanc-
28 tions that had hurt the Iraqi people more August had made it quite clear that the tack on Iraq. However, very few Europe- than the Hussein regime. But there were administration believed Hussein would ans were convinced that the Bush admin- differences about whether Iraq possessed have to be removed by force.13 istration had any intention of suspending weapons of mass destruction, the links Many Europeans suspected that the its plans to attack, particularly given the between Husseins regime and al Qaeda, approach to the U.N. Security Council massive military build-up around Iraq that and the imminence of the threat posed was primarily designed to serve domestic had begun late in 2002. Some European by Iraq. political purposes, secondarily to firm up governments sympathised with the need Early in 2002, it was clear to many Tony Blairs support and only inciden- to remove Hussein from power, but many European observers that the Bush admin- tally to get U.N. Security Council ap- thought all other options should be tested istration was planning on removing proval. Public opinion polls late in the before resorting to the use of force. Saddam Hussein from office, with force summer of 2002 had shown that the Ameri- Early in 2003, the issue of whether to if necessary, and with or without the sup- can people favoured going to war against begin planning defensive assistance to port of the international community.12 Iraq only if the United States were sup- Turkey should it be attacked by Iraq dur- This enhanced the sense among many ported by the international community. ing a presumptive U.S.-led coalition at- Europeans that the United States had taken With the mid-term election campaigns tack on Saddam Husseins regime ex- on an arrogance of power that was in- underway, and control of the Congress ploded, threatening the very underpin- consistent with both traditional U.S. for- potentially in the balance, some Europe- nings of the alliance. On January 15, U.S. eign policy and the basis of U.S.-Euro- ans thought the administration was sim- Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul pean alliance and cooperation. ply protecting its electoral flanks. This Wolfowitz formally asked NATO to con- By the time the Bush administration, suspicion was reinforced by comments sider what supporting roles it might play at the urging of his close ally British Prime made by the Presidents political advisor, in a U.S.-led war on Iraq. Six areas of as- Minister Tony Blair, finally decided to Karl Rove, suggesting that the approach sistance were discussed, including send- take its case to the United Nations in Sep- to the U.N. was in fact desirable for do- ing Patriot missiles and AWACS surveil- tember 2002, few Europeans believed that mestic political purposes.14 lance planes to defend Turkey, the only the approach was intended to find a peace- In the end, Blairs insistence that the NATO member that borders Iraq. ful resolution of the Iraq problem. Vice U.N. string be run out prolonged the After considerable discussion within President Cheney in a major speech in attempt to get U.N. approval for an at- the North Atlantic Council, Belgium,
29 France, and Germany publicly announced form that put NATOs mutual defence Soviet control by the successful end of their opposition to allowing NATO to commitment on the line. the Cold War. For many of these coun- begin planning to provide military assis- To break the stalemate, NATO Secre- tries, the goal of eliminating one of the tance to Turkey. The three recalcitrant al- tary General Robertson and some mem- worlds most despotic dictators undoubt- lies said they were not opposed to aiding ber-states suggested taking the issue to the edly seemed more compelling than for Istanbul but believed that planning for Defense Planning Committee (DPC), in those countries which for decades had such action was premature while U.N. which France still chooses not to partici- experienced peace, democracy and finan- arms inspectors were still seeking to dis- pate. Agreement was finally reached in the cial well-being.15 The list of European arm Iraq peacefully. The initiative was seen French-less DPC when Belgium and Ger- countries that supported the war effort as an attempt by the United States to get many dropped their opposition to be- in principle was substantial.16 The U.K. pre-emptive NATO support for a mili- ginning planning possible military aid to contributed combat troops and played a tary action that was not sanctioned by Turkey. significant role in the attack on Iraq and the U.N. Security Council. Once before, The scenario illustrated to what extent in the post-war occupation. Poland took in the case of Kosovo, NATO had acted the Iraq issue had frayed political bonds charge of a post-war military region in without a Security Council mandate. In among the allies. It also demonstrated that Iraq and Spain and Italy contributed para- that case, however, all the allies agreed that NATO remains an alliance of sovereign military and intelligence units. However, Russia and China should not be allowed states, and that it works only when seri- even in countries whose governments sup- to block a military action in Europe ous efforts have been made to build a ported the war, public opinion remained deemed necessary by the NATO allies. In political consensus behind a course of strongly critical. this case, the three allies wanted to make action, particularly when that action re- The initial war against Husseins regime it clear that a NATO mandate would not quires the use of military force. in Iraq was militarily successful, resulting be sufficient to justify military action The Bush administration worked hard in the overthrow of Hussein and the even- against Iraq. The choices of the United to get as many European governments as tual capture of the former leader and States to put the issue before the alliance possible on board in support of the war. elimination or capture of most of his top and of the three allies to block the re- In addition to the Blair government, the lieutenants. But Europeans remained quested planning brought existing politi- most responsive European governments unconvinced. In the summer of 2003, cal differences over Iraq into NATO in a were those that had been liberated from when asked was the war in Iraq worth
30 the loss of life and other costs, 70% of Following the Iraq war, one influen- obligation. Conductors manage to mold all Europeans polled answered no, while tial European commentator who had ear- 80 solo players into a sympathy orchestra only 25% said yes. Even in the states lier defended the U.S. role as a benign because they have fine sense for every- whose governments supported the war, hegemon, cautioned the Bush adminis- body elses quirks and qualities because the results were negative. In states whose tration and other Americans not to sacri- they act in the interest of all; their labour government supported the war effort, fice the good will and cooperation that is the source of their authority..... Power majorities answered in the negative includ- had for decades constituted part of the exacts responsibility, and responsibility ing: U.K. (55%); Poland (67%); Italy (73%); foundation for American power. Pro- requires the transcendence of narrow self- Portugal (75%); and the Netherlands American commentator Josef Joffe re- interest. As long as the United States con- (59%). In the two leading European op- sponded to the growing U.S. unilateralist tinues to provide such public goods, envy ponents of the war, the results were even tendencies by observing that the United and resentment will not escalate into fear more emphatic: France (87%) and Ger- States would remain the dominant force and loathing that spawn hostile coali- many (85%).17 in international affairs for some time to tions.19 An in-depth analysis of European pub- come, and that no traditional power bal- Late in 2003, when it had appeared the lic following the Iraq war came to the ance would be provided by other power Bush administration was attempting to conclusion that opposition to the war was or combination of powers. However, in broaden the base of international support at least partly rooted in the perception Joffes view, U.S. self interests would not for Iraqi stabilisation and reconstruction, that the United States was acting unilater- be well served by a strategy based on a and just before George Bush was sched- ally, and without reference to interna- with us or against us philosophy like uled to call the leaders of Germany, France tional opinion. According to this analy- that deployed by President Bush follow- and Russia to ask them to forgive old Iraqi sis, ...it makes a significant difference ing the 9/11 attacks. Rather, according to debt, the administration took another whether a potential military action in- Joffe, the United States should assume the unilateral step that surprised and angered volved a unilateral U.S. move or one sup- inevitable costs that are associated with the European governments that had op- ported by NATO or the U.N. In Europe international leadership. posed the war. A directive from Deputy support increases from 36% for the U.S. Primacy does not come cheap, and the Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz acting alone to 48% for an action under price is measured not just in dollars and cleared by the White House was posted a U.N. mandate.18 cents, but above all in the currency of on the Pentagon web site making it clear
31 that only Iraq coalition members would but the three key governments all agreed had to do with (hard and soft) power be eligible to serve as prime contractors to negotiate some package of debt reduc- but did not solely rest on it. Leadership for U.S.-financed reconstruction projects tions. Irritated by the U.S. contracting is an interactive process where the leader in Iraq. This eliminated three key coun- decision, French President Chirac, Ger- is followed because he is able to convince tries Bush was about to ask for Iraqi debt man Chancellor Schroeder and Russian the followers. By taking into account the relief and others, including Canada. The President Putin all decided to handle the needs and goals of its allies and by listen- predictable reaction was immediate. Ger- debt reduction issue via normal diplo- ing to and caring about their opinion, man foreign minister Joschka Fischer said matic channels, which in this case would the United States managed to base follower- that the move would not be acceptable be through the Paris Club, a group of ship on persuasion and normative con- to Germany And it wouldnt be in line 19 industrialised nations that have col- sensus, or soft power24 . However, when with the spirit of looking to the future laborated since 1956 on easing financial the leader neglects to bring its soft power together and not into the past.20 The burdens of heavily indebted nations.22 into play in support of military actions, move undermined the diplomatic efforts would-be followers find the first occasion of Secretary of State Powell to build in- Consequences: how do perceptions to deviate. This is exactly what has hap- ternational support for Iraqi debt relief. affect policies, actions, attitudes pened in recent years and what led to the Russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov, and interests? transatlantic crisis over Iraq. spoke out in opposition to forgiveness Unilateralism whether in the hard- of Iraqs $120 billion debt, $8 billion of U.S. hegemony after 1945 was viewed nosed form deployed by the current Bush which is owed to Russia. Ivanov noted, in Europe as benevolent in the sense that administration or in the more occasional, Iraq is not a poor country.21 Washington decided to cooperate with its cushioned and velvet form of the former Just prior to release of the contracting allies rather than dominating them, that Clinton administration is seen from decision, former Secretary of State James it agreed to tame its power by being Europe a clear sign of a shifting balance Baker had been asked to travel to Europe locked into multilateral organisations, and between reliance on hard and soft power to convince key allied states to forgive that its political system was open to access in U.S. foreign policy. It provokes criti- Iraqi debt as a contribution to Iraqi re- by its allies thus offering them the op- cism because it puts at risk the interna- covery from the war. Baker received a cool portunity to influence U.S. decision-mak- tional normative consensus and under- reception in Paris, Berlin and Moscow, ing.23 As a result, Washingtons leadership mines the institutional framework25 . Be-
32 fore September 11 and certainly afterwards (vs. 55% in summer 2002) have an tion, institutions and the rule of law. In the new Bush administration interpreted unfavourable opinion of the United some respects, the Bush administration U.S. sovereignty as non-negotiable thus States.26 Extensive public opinion poll- appeared to be declaring a new global refuting international commitments that ing in early months of 2004 revealed even corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, essen- might limit the administrations leeway stronger European public scepticism tially claiming the U.S. right to intervene or force it to seek the consensus of others about the war against Iraq and question- anywhere in the world to correct wrong- where independent actions would be pre- ing of American leadership.27 doing as perceived by the United States.28 ferred. In the long run, however, this ten- The foundation for and history of U.S.- From this perspective, Europeans see dency undermines the attractiveness of the European relations since World War II themselves as defending the foundations U.S. political, cultural and societal model may help explain the intensity of Euro- of the transatlantic relations, which U.S. thereby threatening the core of U.S. soft pean feeling concerning U.S. unilateral actions have undermined. power. behaviour. The transatlantic alliance has The widespread European perception International public opinion polls con- always been based on common interests, of U.S. unilateralist and hegemonic ducted in the aftermath of the war on to be sure. But behind any cold, hard behaviour has not resulted in any formal Iraq clearly underlined this danger. Ac- assessment of national interests this rela- alliance or conspiracy to balance U.S. in- cording to a study conducted by the Pew tionship has always been fortified and fluence. However, it has increased tenden- Research Center, the rate of those people defended by a sense of common values. cies toward cooperation among European that somewhat or very much disapprove Europeans, not possessing the same de- countries in cases where U.S. policy the U.S. increased markedly in Italy, whose gree of military power and superpower choices run contrary to perceived inter- government supported the war, (38% in status as the United States, still believe that ests of two or more European states. May 2003 vs. 23% in summer 2002), in they are as responsible as is the United The most dramatic case of this to date France (57% vs. 34%), and Germany (54% States for defining and defending the was the collaboration between France and vs. 35%). The same study also highlighted common values that countries on both Germany (with a few other European a growing preparedness of these countries sides of the Atlantic say they share. From countries, Belgium, for example, on the population to loosen the NATO ties to a European point of view, the United margins) to complicate implementation the U.S. The most extreme shift was seen States has recently strayed from a shared of U.S. policy of attacking Iraq and re- in U.S.-ally Turkey where more than 80% appreciation of international coopera- moving Saddam Hussein from power.
33 Prior to this case, U.S. rejection of the perceived U.S. unilateralism from disagree- interpreted in Europe as a vote against Kyoto Protocol on international environ- ment with the U.S. policy in the behaviour the governments close ties to the Bush mental standards resulted in all members of these states. However, it is somewhat administration and its policies. Very few of the European Union joining together clearer that the approach taken by the Europeans shared the view of some Ameri- to criticise the U.S. position. United States to the question of whether/ cans that the March 11 terrorist bomb- Perhaps the most important impact on when to go to war against Iraq influenced ing of commuter trains in Madrid just European policies and actions has been the willingness of these governments to prior to the elections had revealed the more subtle. U.S. policy preferences and participate actively in the stabilisation and cowardice of Spaniards and Europeans initiatives are not judged simply on their reconstruction process. more generally. In any case, the ouster of merits, but also on whether the U.S. ap- It can also be argued that U.S. the Spanish government constituted the proach is a unilateral one or one designed unilateralism played a role in the attempt first clear cost to the United States of to attract broad European and interna- to convince France, Germany and Russia its perceived unilateralism. With the new tional support. Such questioning clearly to make substantial contributions to the Socialist governments promise to pull contributed to the widespread reticence in process of forgiving Iraqi debt. Although Spanish troops out of Iraq as soon as the international community to provide all three eventually decided to help out, possible, the U.S. goals of broadening active assistance to the United States in their participation has not been as gener- international involvement in the long- overthrowing Saddam Husseins regime ous as the United States would have liked. term process of stabilising and recon- with military force and then stabilizsing The reticence of these important players structing the country have been seriously and reconstructing post-Saddam Iraq. Even in the Iraqi debt forgiveness process can damaged. though the Bush administration can claim arguably be linked to their displeasure success in convincing many European states with the way in which the United States The Outlook to join in both the war and the recon- went to war and the pre-emptive exclu- struction effort, the absence of three im- sion of companies from non-coalition Looking ahead, a continued pattern of portant states (France, Germany and Rus- partners from the bidding process for perceived or actual U.S. unilateralism sia) from the coalition can be seen as at prime contracts for Iraqi reconstruction. could produce significant costs for U.S. least partly attributable to U.S. unilateralism. The March 2004 defeat of the conser- foreign policy. The long-established It is difficult to separate out the role of vative government in Spain was widely democratic governments in Western Eu-
34 rope all carry forward a strong commit- a broad, supportive international coali- nature of Russian democracy). The pat- ment to the values on which international tion. They would like the United States tern of public opinion established by the cooperation, law and organisation have to pay more attention to European Iraq affair can be reversed with changed been based since the Second World War. policy preferences in the Middle Eastern U.S. behaviour. But if it should continue, Many of these governments and peoples region (for example by adopting a more even the governments most friendly to instinctively feel that the system is not balanced stance regarding the Israeli/Pal- the United States will find it increasingly owned just by the United States. They estinian conflict) and to pursue multi- difficult to support U.S. policy objectives. believe their democracies played a role in lateral versus unilateral approaches to If the United States cannot convince more creating and sustaining the system. When both Middle Eastern issues and the war countries to join in the process of the United States attempts to change un- on terror. stabilising and reconstructing Iraq or derlying aspects of that system, and par- No U.S. allies in Europe are likely to even convince current members of the coa- ticularly when the U.S. government at- turn actively against the United States. lition to remain engaged the United tempts to do so unilaterally based on over- France, traditionally the most severe Eu- States will pay a significant long term price whelming U.S. power, they are inclined ropean critic of U.S. policy, supports in lives and national treasure trying to to question and perhaps even oppose such continued U.S.-European and U.S.- accomplish the task with limited interna- U.S. efforts. This factor will remain an French cooperation even if Paris would tional assistance. important influence on the way in which prefer to shift the balance between over- The widespread public disapproval of European democracies respond to U.S. whelming-U.S. and more limited-French U.S. policies did not keep several Euro- policy priorities and goals. influence over international develop- pean governments from supporting U.S. European governments do not wish to ments. All European governments still policies toward Iraq and joining the U.S.- see the United States fail in Iraq, as they feel strong bonds to the United States led coalition. But if the United States too would suffer consequences of a U.S. ranging from shared fundamental values continues to be seen by majorities in most defeat29 there. However, many govern- and basic interests to pragmatic consid- European countries as an overbearing, ments would undoubtedly like the United erations. hegemonic power, it will be increasingly States to come away from the Iraq expe- However, all the important states in difficult for European political parties to rience humbled by the difficulties of ac- Europe are democracies (with an appro- take positions that are openly warm and complishing security objectives without priate footnote reflecting the qualified friendly toward the United States. Euro-
35 pean governments may go along with U.S. partners to shape alternatives to such U.S. mains true, even in normal times. How- initiatives because they serve European approaches. ever, the American people do not want interests or because U.S. power is so over- Such a long-term shift in public and their government to be the worlds only whelming that they have no choice. How- governmental attitudes could seriously policeman. U.S. public opinion surveys ever, there will likely be a marked reti- undermine U.S. soft power foreign for over a decade have demonstrated that cence to be too closely identified with policy resources. At a time when the mili- the vast majority of Americans believe the the United States and its policies if such tary power of the United States remained United States should help maintain inter- identification is likely to diminish popu- superior to that of any other country or national peace, but should share such lar support at the next election. Over time, group of countries, U.S. influence could burdens and responsibilities with friends the United States could find it increas- decline, particularly in circumstances where and allies. Meeting this public opinion ingly difficult to line up support behind it had to rely on the trust and coopera- demand over the long term will require its policies. tion of other governments. On the other U.S. policies and actions that attract sup- In particular, the United States could hand, a return to more traditional U.S. port and involvement from key U.S. al- pay a large price in its relationship with foreign policy behaviour that includes a lies in Europe and around the globe. the United Kingdom for Prime Minister mix of multilateral cooperation and uni- The European NATO allies, includ- Tony Blairs strong support for U.S. lateral actions when necessary as well as a ing the seven newest members of the policy on Iraq. The widespread opinion balanced blend of hard and soft power club, can help their American ally con- in the U.K. is that Blairs alignment with would undoubtedly begin to mitigate tain its unilateralist instincts by dem- Bush accomplished nothing for the current European concerns about the U.S. onstrating their readiness and ability to United Kingdom and, in fact, under- role in the world. share international security burdens in mined British interests in the Middle East, At a time when the American people return for a seat at the decision-making in the struggle against terrorism, and in feel under imminent threat from terror- table. On the other hand, European al- Europe. This perception could lead Blair ist attacks, the President can say, as Presi- lies who are ready to critique American and future British leaders to be more re- dent Bush did in his January 2004 State behaviour but not contribute to the luctant than in the past to support con- of the Union address, that the United solution of international security chal- troversial U.S. positions and could pro- States does not need a permission slip lenges will only feed the fires of Ameri- duce more British coalitions with its E.U. from anybody to defend itself. This re- can unilateralism.
36 contributions are magnified by the willingness 15 The White House even noted in April 2003 Notes and ability of British and French forces to engage ...it is no accident that many member nations of in operations far from their borders and the inte- the Coalition recently escaped from the boot of a grating military framework provided by NATO tyrant or have felt the scourge of terrorism. All 1 Including, most notably, the 1949 North At- that enhances the value of contributions by other Coalition member nations understand the threat lantic Treaty establishing NATO. European countries. Saddam Husseins weapons pose to the world 2 Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, Policy 8 U.S.-CREST, Future Military Coalitions. and the devastation his regime has wreaked on Review, June-July 2002. 9 Stanley R. Sloan, The United States and the the Iraqi people. 3 Peter van Ham in Stanley Sloan and Peter van Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Away (Source: last accessed on January 6, 2004.) Ham, What future for NATO?, Centre for European from Self-Deterrence? Congressional Research 16 On April 3, 2003, almost two weeks after the Reform, London, October 2002. Service Report 97-78 F (Washington, D.C.: Con- opening of hostilities in Iraq, the White House 4 Canada is the largest single merchandise trad- gressional Research Service), January 6, 1997. listed some 49 Iraq Coalition members, includ- ing partner for the United States (excluding ser- 10 Josef Joffe, How America Does It, Foreign ing the following 23 European (including former vices from the calculation). Affairs, September/October 1997, p. 16. Soviet republics) states: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bul- 5 For updated figures see EU/US Facts and 11 Ibid., p. 24. garia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Geor- Figures, Delegation of the European Commis- 12 The discussion of European perceptions that gia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, sion to the United States, Washington, D.C. (Avail- follows is based on extensive conversations with Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Ro- able at , last accessed January 6, 2004). European diplomats, scholars and citizens dur- mania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United 6 See Future Military Coalitions: The Transatlantic ing the course of 2002 as well as surveys of the Kingdom and Uzbekistan. Challenge, U.S.-CREST, Arlington, Va. September popular press and public opinion poll data. 17 Date quoted is from Ronald Asmus, Philip P. 2002. (This non-governmental four nation (France, 13 Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks by Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, Power, War and Great Britain, Germany and the U.S.) project ex- the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Public Opinion: Thoughts on the Nature and amined how the development of a common Eu- 103rd National Convention, August 26, 2002. (See Structure of the Trans-Atlantic Divide, Transat- ropean Security and Defense Policy might affect the speech text at , last accessed January 7, 2004.) lantic Trends 2003, a project of the German Mar- the conduct of transatlantic coalition operations This speech, making a strong call for removing shal Fund of the United States and the Compagnia over the next 15 years. The author was a core Saddam Hussein for power, is frequently cited by di San Paolo. (Available at last accessed January participant in the project and contributor to the German observers as having been the final straw 6, 2004.) final report.) See also Robert P. Grant and Stanley forcing German Chancellor Schroeder to take a 18 Ibid., p. 12. R. Sloan, Dont Write Off the Allies, Defense strong position against attacking Iraq in the final 19 Josef Joffe, Gulliver Unbound: Can America News, March 25-31, 2002. stages of his reelection campaign. Rule the World?, the Twentieth Annual John 7 Some Asian allies, Australia, South Korea and 14 For an example of this perception, see Dan Bonython Lecture, The Centre for Independent Japan most notably, are capable of contributing Plesch, Why war is now on the back burner, Studies, Sydney, Australia, 5 August 2003. (Avail- forces to international operations, and have done The Guardian, London (Available at last accessed able at , last accessed January 6, 2004.) so, most recently in Iraq. But potential European January 7, 2004.) 20 Erin E. Arvedlund, Allied Angered at Exclu-
37 sion From Bidding, nytimes.com, December 11, 27 Susan Sacs, Poll Finds Hostility Hardening 2003. Toward U.S. Policies (The New York Times, March 21 Ibid. 17, 2004). 22 Craig S. Smith, France Gives Baker Luke- 28 The original Monroe Doctrine (1823) was warm Commitment on Iraqi Debt, nytimes.com, aimed at keeping European powers out of Latin December 16, 2003. America. President Theodore Roosevelts corol- 23 John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The lary to the doctrine, articulated in his annual Anatomy of an Institution, in John Gerard message to Congress in December 1904, declared Ruggie (ed.), Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and that in the Western Hemisphere the adherence Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Colum- of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may bia University Press, 1993), pp. 3-47; Peter F. force the United States, however reluctantly, in Cowhey, Elect Locally-Order Globally. Domes- flagrant cases of such wrongdoing [terrorism in tic Politics and Multilateral Cooperation, in todays context] or impotence [failed states in Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters, pp. 157-200; G. John todays context], to the exercise of an international Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, police power. and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars 29 Defeat meaning a U.S. withdrawal prior to (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Tho- establishing a relatively stable and peaceful Iraq mas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies. or establishing some international framework to The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy continue working toward that end. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 24 James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper & Row, 1997). 25 John Gerard Ruggie, Embedded liberalism and the postwar economic regimes, in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.) Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalization (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 62-84. 26 Meg Bortin, In wars wake, hostility and mistrust, International Herald Tribune, 4 June 2003, 1, 6. The report Views of a Changing World 2003 is available at
38 An Empire Unveiled
By Jørgen Dragsdahl*
In the US election the Democrats promise to undo the Bush revolution in foreign affairs, but United States to return to its tradition will they go far enough to satisfy the conflicting needs of the Baltic states as both EU and NATO of leadership.2 members? It is, however, far from obvious that an you think of a worse year for political set backs for Bush, did not ex- Europeans are ready for US leadership and transatlantic relations than 2003? clude the possibility of four more years. substantial burden-sharing. The Bush ad- This question was put to a senior And even if Bush is defeated, John ministration did find close allies in Eu- EU commission official last December, Kerry might pose the greatest challenge rope but, with the exception of the United and, without hesitation, he answered: to the Europeans. As a key theme in his Kingdom, none of them ventured much 2004. But, alas, 2005 is already in the com- campaign, Kerry has promised to beyond the symbolic in support of US petition. After three years of George W. revitalise NATO and lead a broad coali- interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bush in the White House many US allies tion against our adversaries.1 A likely Some limits were set by domestic opposi- looked forward to the presidential elec- contender for Secretary of State in a tion but anti-Bush sentiments also were a tion for a change in leadership. But the Kerry administration, former Clinton convenient cover hiding European inabil- joy of expectancy might this time be the national security adviser Samuel Berger ity, caused by lack of both will and mili- greatest pleasure. As the year progressed, gave the good news, in a manifesto tary resources, to play a larger role. Many US opinion polls, despite tremendous article that the world is eager for the observers claim a more fundamental clash
* Jørgen Dragsdahl is a Danish journalist with almost 30 years covering international security issues. He works for military magazines in Denmark, Danish Radio, the daily newspaper Information and has written and contributed to several books on US affairs and arms control. Internationally his articles and studies has been published by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Pacific News Service, Nuclear Times, British- American Security Information Council and others.
39 of interests is the cause of transatlantic crisis than on American policy.5 The discord. On what these interests are and divisive issue in the EU security and de- The Baltic dilemma what the clash is about no consensus ex- fence policy is America because the ists. During the last couple of years a new Unions role in managing world crisis is Such questions hang as a dark cloud debate on grand strategy in the US fo- closely related to the type of relationship over the simultaneous enlargement of both cused on American Empire. Fear of each member country wants to build with the EU and NATO. Countries in the new domination by an empire can explain why America. But even a honeymoon can lead Europe face a growing tension in their some European countries have resisted to a new transatlantic conflict. Greater role as both the American allies and Eu- accepting US leadership. But analysts dis- European unity will establish the EU as a ropeans. As an American observer with agree on the nature of this empire. Defi- stronger global actor and, according to Latvian roots, professor George Viksnins, nitions stretch from a Liberal Empire,3 some analysts, also a stronger competitor has stressed the three Baltic states in par- offering all members freedom and the for the US. ticular are beginning to face what only a pursuit of happiness, to a new American Thus, key questions are: Has the gap few years ago would have seemed an un- militarism.4 in the Euro-Atlantic relationship widened thinkable dilemma: having to choose With a Kerry administration we could to such an extent that even a Democrat between the United States and Europe.8 get the ultimate test of the differing claims. in the White House is unable to bridge They have already faced that choice. In A Democrat in the White House will ben- it? Are we really at the end of Atlanticism June 2003, the EU presidency stated that efit from a honeymoon in the transatlan- as another national security official from prospective members are expected to fol- tic relationship. A sigh of relief will go the Clinton era, Ivo Daalder, and several low the official EU position on the Inter- through European capitals. Nobody re- other scholars and policy makers fear?6 national Criminal Court. A few days later ally desires confrontation with the US, Will we see the return of rivalry among the US suspended military aid to all coun- and a change of American policy could the worlds main centers of power?7 Kerry tries refusing to sign an agreement on also remove an obstacle to European unity. can make a clean break with his predeces- immunity for US personnel from pros- As Nicole Gnesotto, director of the Eu- sors policies and remove anti-Bush senti- ecution by the Court. But, like some ropean Union Institute for Security Stud- ments as an obstacle, but will that be countries in the old Europe, the Baltic ies, noted, it is now much easier for the enough? Or, to put it more briefly, what states and other new EU and NATO mem- Europeans to agree a view on external is enough? bers prefer not to be presented with such
40 choices. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, director of is a scenario that is being studied by sev- The Baltic states can naturally, as or- Polands Centre for International Affairs eral Russian strategic studies institutes.10 dained by Larrabee, make an effort to and a former defence minister, predicts The security agenda for the Baltic states is keep American attention, but the future that countries along the eastern borders changing now when membership in both relationship is also a matter of how a US of NATO and the EU will be very pro- the EU and NATO has been obtained, administration views the strategic utility NATO, pro-American, for historical and but after extensive research the American of alliances. The Baltic states want secu- practical reasons.9 Criticism directed scholar Stephen Larrabee concluded that rity and influence, but what if the US has against the Bush-administration often is the first regional priority is to maintain overriding priorities and what if mem- characterised as incomprehensible, silly, American engagement. bership of NATO gives influence on very anti-American. But it takes two to tango. The US could little? Some studies suggest that the Bush Seen from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania now regard the Baltic problem as fixed administration has an ad hoc and tem- and Poland, a US-related security guaran- and decrease its engagement indeed, porary view of allies.14 Such signals are tee is indispensable. In the Baltic Sea area there are already signs of this happening, noticed around the Baltic Sea. The easy also Denmark, having put itself outside Larrabee warns.11 The Bush administra- division of Europe into old and new, the EU defence co-operation, places a great tion simply does not care about Europe, in pro-American and anti-American, emphasis on US relations. The US is more- says Philip Gordon, an expert on Euro- sometimes is dismissed. Atis Lejins has over seen in the area as a counter-balance pean affairs at the Brookings Institution attacked the notion, popular in the to a regional Franco-German hegemony in Washington DC.12 A former official Rumsfeld Pentagon, that NATO should and as a stabilising influence to counter in the Rumsfeld Pentagon, Thomas be a toolbox for the US. We all know, European great power rivalry. Whether Barnett, attacks a transatlantic partner- the Latvian director writes, that tools have the EU can survive as a unified institu- ship overtaken by events and favours nothing to say about how they are used. tion with a prospect of providing a secu- developing an entirely new alliance with That would be the end of the Alliance.15 rity guarantee is not certain. Atis Lejins, China, India and Russia because messy director of the Latvian Institute of Inter- wars requires allies who dont mind get- Sweet music from the Democrats national affairs, even claims that a split ting dirty.13 Baltic concerns might then EU and a rump NATO, and the possibil- not compete very well with Russian con- For anybody concerned about the ity thereby of regaining the Baltic states, cerns in Washington. transatlantic relationship listening to the
41 Democratic presidential candidates must nership with Europe. The Charter should launched a slogan that reappeared again have been sweet music. All leading con- define the threat we face in common, in the Kerry campaign: We will act with tenders expressed a strong consensus on create the basis for concerted action from others if we possibly can and alone only the need for alliances, rejected a future our allies to meet them, and offer the if we absolutely must. Repeatedly he for NATO as merely a toolbox to enable promise to act together as a first choice stressed that in an alliance you have a two coalitions of the willing, stressed the ne- not a last.17 way relationship. Nations are more likely cessity of compromise in working alliances And John Kerry will replace the Bush to share burdens if they are also sharing and highlighted addressing common prob- years of isolation with a new era of alli- decisions. 20 He blamed the Bush ad- lems. ances, because our need for allies is as ministration for not having worked with The Bush administration has often great or greater than at any time in the the allies on issues of concern to them. It acted as if our alliances are no longer past. As president he would not cede US has shown friends and partners con- important, said former governor security to any institution and adversar- tempt and in many ways sent the mes- Howard Dean in a key presentation of ies should not have doubts about his re- sage: Your security is your own concern, his foreign policy views, a speech co- solve to use force if necessary but even and your concerns are of no concern to authored by a group of former Demo- the only superpower on earth cannot suc- us.21 cratic top-officials. It can, he acknowl- ceed without cooperation and compro- Kerry started out the year 2003 with a edged, at times be frustrating to obtain mise with our friends and allies.18 most noteworthy attack on unilateralism the cooperation of allies, but America is Candidates explicitly rejected as the rights old isolationist impulse in most successful in achieving our national unilateralism and the associated policy of modern guise. At core, he explained, is a aims when our allies are by our side.16 ad hoc coalitions of the willing. familiar and beguiling illusion: That In a similar vein, former SACEUR Dean would be far more interested America can escape an entangling world, Wesley Clark promised to rebuild our in allies that stand ready to act with us that we can wield our enormous power alliances and strengthen them, so that rather than just willing to be rounded up without incurring obligations to others when America has to act we can call on as part of a coalition. Alliances train and that we can pursue our national in- the military, financial and moral resources together so they can function effectively terests in arrogant ways that make a mock- of others. He proposed a new Atlantic with common equipment, communica- ery of our nations ideals.22 During the Charter to reinvigorate the security part- tions, logistics, and planning. 19 Clark year he consistently argued for full in-
42 volvement of both NATO and the UN in politics and poor decision-making com- flect the animosities caused by the war in Iraq. While President Bush also says that bined with the terrible idea that we must Vietnam. But in both cases much of the involvement of allies is crucial, it never- selfishly pursue national interests with a foreign policy establishment either rallied theless runs roughshod over the inter- kind of 19th century Realpolitik25 . Kerry against the outsiders Goldwater was a ests of those nations on a broad range of delivered the toughest blow: Simply put, right wing extremist and McGovern was issues from climate change, climate con- the Bush administration has pursued the a candidate of the peace movement or trol to the International Court of Justice, most arrogant, inept, reckless and ideologi- kept a facade of neutrality. to the role of the United Nations, to trade, cal foreign policy in modern history.26 In this election the foreign policy elite and, of course, to the rebuilding of Iraq is split or, depending on how this elite is itself. The overriding imperative in a Carnivores fighting herbivores defined, even massively against the presi- Kerry administration will, he added, be dent and his team. Since the early nine- to replace unilateral action with collec- Rhetoric in an election campaign is not ties the US national security community tive security of a genuine nature.23 always to be taken as an expression of sin- has been involved in a debate on a grand Throughout the Democratic primaries cerity, and Democrats did compete on strategy. By the end of the decade a split candidates did not just find fault with who could provide a tough challenge had grown to proportions that led some particular Bush policies. They rejected his against Bush. But several speeches, only a observers, inspired by the dinosaur fad general approach in harsh terms rarely few are referred to here, were thoughtful after the Jurassic Park, to characterise the heard. Dick Gephardt, a prominent mem- and with more substance than normally fight as one among carnivores relying on ber of the House of Representatives, found in campaign stump oratory, and raw power and herbivores with a live blasted the cold warriors brought out no attack on an administration has and let live attitude. After 9-11 many of semi-retirement and their overwhelm- reached such heights in recent memory. herbivores did see a need for long teeth ing arrogance and lack of appreciation In 1964 the Republican challenger Barry but disagreement on fundamental elements for the subtleties of democracy building Goldwater did have quite a battle with in strategy persists and has been docu- or alliance strengthening all those nice- the incumbent, Lyndon B. Johnson. In mented in numerous policy papers and ties that intrude on their Hobbesian 1972 the election contest between the Re- studies by scholars. world.24 Wesley Clark saw pride, arro- publican President Richard Nixon and In a recent book a most prominent gance, weak leadership, pure domestic his opponent George McGovern did re- Democratic strategist, former Carter na-
43 tional security adviser Zbigniew surest way to isolate America, these ex- organisation set up in 1997 with support Brzezinski, established a stark choice for perts wrote, is to succumb to the impe- from, among others, Dick Cheney, the United States: Global domination or rial temptation and attempt to impose Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz.31 global leadership? A quest for domina- our will on others. Too many of our Also, many independent scholars use the tion can bring self-isolation, growing friends, they continued, now question term a rapidly growing list of recent national paranoia and increasing vulner- whether America is a reliable partner in books has empire as the topic. While ability to a globally spreading anti- tackling common problems.30 President Bush himself repeatedly has American virus. The land of the free stressed that the US is not an empire and can be transformed into a garrison state Republicans rehabilitate it is not striving for one, even some cen- imbued with a siege mentality.27 imperialism trist Republicans accept the term. Dimitri Brzezinski advocate a co-optive hege- Simes, president of the Nixon Center (a mony one in which leadership is ex- A Democratic president will want to think tank) finds it understandable why ercised more through shared conviction undo the Bush Revolution in foreign some balk at any mentioning of the e with enduring allies than by assertive policy and be much less assertive, says word. Many past empires gave the term a domination.28 Samuel Berger, President Michael Peters, vice-president of the bad reputation. But Simes nevertheless Clintons national security adviser, sees Council on Foreign Relations. finds it an important analytical tool to the real clash of civilisations taking place What is this Bush revolution? An see the US as an evolving modern empire within Washington. It is a clash between obvious place to look for an answer is in with profound consequences. In fact, he diametrically opposed conceptions of a phenomenon most peculiar for Euro- says, any realistic discussion of US for- Americas role in the world.29 Many peans: The rehabilitation of empire and eign policy must begin with the recog- positions taken by Democratic candidates even imperialism. This is no longer just nition that most of the world sees the were incorporated in a lengthy policy an insult socialists throw at the US. It is United States as a nascent imperial paper signed by 15 former Democratic the term now embraced by the far right. power.32 officials, likely candidates for positions The fact of American empire is hardly Rehabilitation was conducted by con- in a Kerry administration. They accused debated these days, according to Tho- servative intellectuals through books, the Bush administration of not only bad mas Donelly of Project for the New Ameri- magazines and institutes. Many articles manners but also of bad strategy. The can Century, a foreign policy were published by The National Review,
44 The Weekly Standard and The Wall Street of our country and our civilisation?34 self a name in the 1990s through travels Journal. Institutionally writers often were Peters saw a new warrior class of erratic in the worlds disaster zones chronicling situated in The American Enterprise In- primitives with no stake in civil order growing anarchy and could thus declare stitute, The Hoover Institution and arising, and this class is to be confronted with considerable weight in 2002 re-es- Project for the New American Century. by America, in the service of mankind, tablishment of order the paramount ques- For conservatives the end of communism to create a new golden age. tion for world politics in the early twenty- and the triumph of capitalism was a mixed A decisive impetus in the rehabilita- first century. A century of disastrous uto- blessing. They were left with an ideologi- tion campaign came with the new millen- pian hopes has brought us back to impe- cal belief in a free market, quite a boring nium when Irving Kristol, godfather of rialism, that most ordinary and depend- commitment. American conservatives are neo-conservatism, declared the US an able form of protection for ethnic mi- not status quo oriented but revolution- empire a reality, he predicted, soon to norities and others under violent assault ary in their zeal to change the world. Now be recognised.35 Whats the point, he ar- ( ), he declared. Despite our anti-im- they were faced with a Zeitgeist of promot- gued in an interview, of being the great- perial traditions, and despite the fact that ing self-interest over the national inter- est, most powerful nation in the world imperialism is delegitimised in public est. They felt deeply ambivalent about the and not having an imperial role? The discourse, an imperial reality already domi- culture of capitalism and its elevation of United States should play a far more nates our foreign policy.38 Writing just buying and selling above political vir- dominant role in world affairs - not what before the invasion of Iraq, a neo-conser- tues such as heroism and struggle.33 In were doing now but to command and to vative writer, Stanley Kurtz, abstained raging against the alleged timidity of give orders as to what is to be done.36 from calling the United States an empire President Clinton in asserting US power After the terror of 9-11 conservatives because we have not yet used our mili- they, for a while, found a new mission. found new receptivity for a mission to tary to secure direct and continuous con- Some started focusing on a more grand defend civilisation and freedom against trol over the domestic affairs of foreign mission. Ralph Peters, a prolific writer barbarism and terror. Max Boot, at the lands. But in Afghanistan he did see the with military background, presented a time op-ed editor at The Wall Street Jour- germ of a new American imperium, and choice to his audience in 1999: Shall we nal, called acceptance of an imperial role extended occupation of Iraq to encour- dominate the Earth for the good of the most realistic response to terrorism.37 age democratisation would be a just mankind? Or will we risk the enslavement A journalist, Robert Kaplan, made him- policy.39
45 burden. A left liberal writer, Michael ther missing from the American empire An empire of a new type Ignatieff, sees a new invention in the or only loosely institutionalized. The US annals of political science, an empire lite, is head of a Liberal empire, a volun- The Bush administration is inhabited a global hegemony whose grace notes are tary community of sovereign states, most by conservatives of differing ideologies free markets, human rights and democ- of which have mature, Liberal constitu- but its policies have clearly been influ- racy, enforced by the most awesome mili- tional regimes.42 By definition countries enced by the new imperialists. Out of the tary power the world has ever known. like Afghanistan and Iraq are thus not a so-called war against terrorism a Behind the new imperialism stands a part of the empire. A requirement for full neoimperial vision is emerging in which people who remember that their coun- membership is a constitutional break- the United States arrogates to itself the try secured its independence by revolt through in establishing Liberal institu- global role of setting standards, determin- against an empire, and who like to think tions and values thus around the Baltic ing threats and using force, professor John of themselves as the friend of freedom Sea countries like Estonia, Latvia, Ikenberry from Georgetown University everywhere. It is an empire without Lithuania and Poland, all though mem- concluded in 2002. Washington will use consciousness of itself as such, constantly bers of the empire through membership coalitions of the willing but ultimately shocked that its good intentions arouse in NATO, are not really full members the US will be unconstrained by the rules resentment abroad. But, like Ikenberry, because the constitutional breakthrough and norms of the international commu- Michael Ignatieff also acknowledges that is deemed uncertain. nity.40 an empire dictates the rules while exempt- The study is most useful by describing But what kind of empire is the Bush ing itself from other rules that go against requirements for stability in this empire administration striving for? And, by the its interest.41 and can thus indirectly explain recent way, is empire only a recent US goal? Such William Odom, head of the National transatlantic discord. Liberalism, the clas- questions have been thrashed through by Security Agency in 1985-1988, has co- sical kind, led to a separation of powers numerous contributors in the debate but authored the most original contribution. in the US constitutional order, and the little agreement is in sight. He warns against the use of terms like im- US elite developed an ideological approach A common theme is that the United perial and empire. Those words con- towards public service. This is vitally im- States is not like empires of the past, built vey notions of a hierarchy or power, sub- portant for stability in the US as barriers on colonies, conquest and the white mans ordination and dominance that are ei- against abuse of power. But the Liberal
46 empire is not a replica of the US federal have adhered to a well-defined grand strat- guidance. It came to him, as he later ex- government. It lacks checks and balances. egy the purpose of which is to expand plained, that there was nothing left for us The most serious danger to the American an American imperium. Bacevich de- to do but take them all, and to educate the empire, identified by Odom, is that the scribes the imperial project as as an open Filipinos and uplift them and civilize and power of its leaders is limited primarily and integrated international order based Christianize them, and by Gods grace do by their ideology that is, by the Liberal on the principles of democratic capitalism, the best we could by them, as our fellow- norms that guide their use of that power. with the United States as the ultimate guar- men for whom Christ also died.47 The Thus, to insist that the United States con- antor of order and enforcer of norms.45 Spaniards had, of course, Christianised the duct its foreign policy mainly on the basis A rich variety of views is offered by islands a while back but the argument car- of unilateralism is to promote the destruc- other contributors in numerous books ried the day. When listening to more re- tion of the American empire.43 and articles. The historian James Banner cent justifications of empire, the traditional A conservative professor from Boston dates the start of an American empire to dichotomy should not be forgotten. As University, Andrew Bacevich, also sees the 1803 when President Jefferson bought Dimitri Simes of the Nixon Center men- empire as more than an invention of Bush Louisiana from France an enormous land tions also today double standards and administration. The vision of empire was mass from the Mississippi to the Rocky deception, or at least considerable self-de- set out by President Truman in a speech Mountains and founded what Jefferson ception, have become all too common.48 at Monticello on July 4, 1947. Truman himself called an Empire of Liberty. This Many writers do not see any or few declared that nations are interdependent initiative also caused genocidal warfare redeeming elements in American imperi- and that recognition of our dependence against natives and slavery a considerable alism. Professor Benjamin Barker from upon another is essential for life, liberty, boost. According to James Banner, an the University of Maryland, a prominent and the pursuit of happiness of all man- American imperial mission took roots at anti-globalisation ideologue, believes that kind.44 The collapse of communism of- that time and a dichotomy between rhe- his countrys present leaders pursue a fered an opportunity to fulfil that vision. torical justification and actual deeds ac- reckless militancy aimed at establishing an While until then the orientation of the companied the enterprise ever since.46 At American empire of fear more awesome US policy had been primarily defensive the start of a bloody colonial war for con- than any the terrorists can conceive.49 A it now became largely offensive. Since the trol of the Philippines President McKinley huge biography on the geographer Isaiah end of the Cold War the United States allegedly prayed to God for light and Bowman (1878-1950) in the introduction
47 reveals that todays push for empire of arguments, set up some definitions for nomic and ideological (cultural) - is high- springs from two earlier attempts in 1919 what constitutes an empire and even help lighted as a proof of American empire. and 1945. The war on terrorism actually is in understanding their likely develop- But some scholars see that as insufficient a war devoted to the completion of the ment. Confusion reigns, though, because evidence. Empire also is a matter of what geo-economic globalism of the American empire is used with so many different power is used for. Empire, the writer, Distinguished Profes- definitions, and, historically, empires ap- Hegemony at times is used as syn- sor of Anthropology and Geography Neil peared in different forms. Much Ameri- onymous with empire. The word indi- Smith, states.50 Another professor, can rhetoric today is just an echo of the cates that an imperial power establish the Chalmers Johnson, decries that most Ameri- allegedly altruistic motives behind Brit- rules by which others routinely play. Oth- cans do not realize that a vast network of ish empire-building in the 19th century. ers may come to approve of the rules as American military bases on every conti- All empires are not just known for their mutually beneficiary, so that hegemony nent except Antarctica actually constitutes cruel subjugation of foreign people in far is partly legitimate. That was the case in a new form of empire.51 And veteran jour- away lands. Some European powers did much of the world after World War II. nalist John Newhouse documents the Bush promote development in their colonies. But the catch is, as professor Michael Mann assault on the world order.52 A more clas- Total loss of sovereignty did not take place from the University of California writes, sical view of imperialism is expressed by in parts of the empires that Athens or the to be hegemonic, the US has to play by Michael Klare, author of numerous books Soviet Union built in the latter case the, the rules it has established.54 If it aban- on the changing nature of warfare. Ameri- say, Estonian and Polish experience dif- dons the rules, it risks losing hegemony, can strategy now, he states, focuses on oil- fered. Also, a master plan for conquest of- and, in order to continue ruling, the US field protection, the defense of maritime ten did not exist. Empires developed step must enter a more directly repressive trade routes, and other aspects of resource by step, sometimes as a search for security. phase. That this is happening seems to be security.53 Calling the United States an empire thus a widespread fear among left-liberals in can be fitted into the historical pattern the US and in much of the rest of world. Dominion is an imperial strategy without necessarily invoking all the worst In an examination of eight possible excesses of previous empires. grand strategies, Robert Art, Professor of International relations theory is sup- Often the superior power of the International Relations at Brandeis Uni- posed to assist in cutting through the fog United States military, political, eco- versity, explores dominion and distin-
48 guishes it from superiority or pri- external behaviour and to ensure mini- forces the principle of hierarchy, but is macy, as he prefers. Dominion and pri- mally acceptable forms of internal not itself bound by such rules. In turn, macy differ in two important respects. behaviour within the subordinate states. subordinate states do not build up their First, dominion is a grand strategy; pri- Merely powerful states do the former but own capabilities or join with others when macy is not. Dominion prescribes a goal not the latter. The central one may say threatened; they call instead on their im- the triumph of American values and the necessary but not sufficient impe- perial power for assistance. In so doing, the means to achieve it: imperial rule, he rial task is the creation and management they give up a key component of state says. Primacy does not prescribe the ends of a hierarchical interstate order ( ). But sovereignty, which is direct control of of policy, only a means to achieve them. an empire must also ensure the security their own security. Second, dominion and primacy differ in and internal stability of its constituent the margin of strength they call for. Do- parts, extract revenue to pay the costs of The Bush revolution in foreign minion is absolute rule; primacy is supe- empire, and assimilate the elites of non- affairs rior influence. Dominion implies invari- imperial societies to the metropolitan core, ably prevailing; primacy means winning tasks that presuppose influence over the Dominion is a powerful temptation more often than others do.55 internal affairs of other societies. 56 for a superpower like the United States. Stephen Peter Rosen, Professor of Na- In an empire rules for the behaviour Why should a state accept threats against tional Security and Military Art at of states differ from those stressed by the its security and see its interests challenged, Harvard University, agrees that hege- scholars of the realist tradition. The if an alternative is possible through ap- mony, or primacy, is not the same as organising principle of interstate relations plication of overwhelming military empire. The issues facing an empire dif- is, according to them, anarchy. States help might? In fact, since World War II do- fer qualitatively from those facing merely themselves by balancing against centres of minion has been on the US agenda sev- a powerful state. And he provides a theo- power that could hurt them by build- eral times. retical framework for an analysis of ing up their own military power or by In the early 1950s voices, on the ex- whether contemporary American power joining with others. Rosen continues: treme right demanded a roll back of com- is imperial in nature: The organizing principle of empire munism. Former Communists and Empire is the rule exercised by one rests, in contrast, on the existence of an Trotskyites brought a radical fervour to nation over others both to regulate their overarching power that creates and en- a movement otherwise best known for the
49 isolationism represented by senator Rob- a confirmation of the utility of military tors that they need not aspire to a greater ert Taft and his warnings against a perma- power in an offensive mode. role or pursue a more aggressive posture nent global engagement which could cre- At the end of the Cold War President to protect their legitimate interests. Sec- ate an American Empire, doing what the George Bush, Sr. advocated publicly a new ond, in the non-defense areas, we must British have done for the past 200 world order to be built on cooperation account sufficiently for the interests of years57 . In the pages of National Review with the Soviet Union and a strengthened the advanced industrial nations to discour- James Burnham and other conservative UN. But his administration included of- age them from challenging our leadership intellectuals called for political warfare, ficials favouring a strategy of dominion. or seeking to overturn the established paramilitary actions and ultimately gen- Among them were the then Secretary of political and economic order. Finally, we eral war to liberate the peoples enslaved Defence, Richard Cheney, and his deputy, must maintain the mechanisms for deter- by the Soviet system. Rollback never be- Paul Wolfowitz. With the demise of the ring potential competitors from even as- came an official US policy; General Soviet Union not only a possible strate- piring to a larger regional or global role. Eisenhower could, as a president from gic partner disappeared, but also a pos- The US should aim to encourage the 1953, deflect the right wing pressure. But sible check on US power was gone. Ad- spread of democratic forms of govern- secretly a version of rollback was adopted herents to a strategy of dominion pre- ment and open economic systems. Out- in a policy of psychological warfare. sented their views in a DoD planning lined are several scenarios in which US Throughout the entire Cold War era the document, drafted by an office led by Paul interests could be threatened: Access to United States also blocked and overthrew Wolfowitz.58 The scent of imperial strat- vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf governments in the Third World deemed egy, as outlined by professor Rosen, is oil; proliferation of weapons of mass de- to be influenced by the communists or unmistakeable. struction and ballistic missiles, threats to in other ways acting against US interests. Our first objective is to prevent the U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional The second coming for rollback came re-emergence of a new rival, the docu- or local conflict, and threats to U.S. soci- during the 1980s in the Reagan adminis- ment says. It outlines three additional as- ety from narcotics trafficking. There is tration. Many neo-conservative intellectuals sociated obectives: First, the U.S must no mentioning of taking collective action got their first taste of power during these show the leadership necessary to establish through the United Nations. Instead it years, seeing in the ultimate dissolution and protect a new order that holds the states that the U.S. should expect future of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union promise of convincing potential competi- coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies formed
50 to deal with a particular crisis and which thus many observers saw him as a pup- of the empire they lead. Bush abandoned may not outlive the resolution of the cri- pet, directed by more experienced advis- the Liberal ethics, guiding and limiting sis. But if coalitions cannot be assembled, ers and groups Dick Cheney and neo- many of his predecessors, and thus passed the US should be ready to act indepen- conservatives as the foremost. But this view from just seeking primacy to seeking do- dently. is rejected by two skilled observers, former minion. How far he had strayed was best The draft was leaked to The New York Clinton National Security Council staff- illustrated when he invoked a Leninist Times and caused an uproar. A final ver- ers Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay.60 They axiom, either you are with us or against sion was toned down, but with George portray George W. Bush as coming into us, in his so-called war against terrorism. W. Bush, Jnr. as apresident the adherents office with a set of simple views and then As Robert Art stresses, dominion would of dominion got a new chance. They came leading a revolution in US foreign policy. create a global American imperium; it to the task having spent the years attack- 9-11 did not inspire this revolution; it would be an aggressive, interventionist, ing the policies of President Clinton. was already on its way. First, Bush be- unilateralist, and transformational strat- America had, they argued, become a lieved that the only way to ensure US se- egy.61 Seen in this light, the realist use Gulliver tied down by the midgets of the curity in a dangerous world was to shed of unilateralism to describe US foreign international community. The fourth the constraints imposed by friends, allies, policy is not exactly measuring up. appearance of dominion strategy was in and international institutions. Second, part a reaction to the Clinton foreign an America unbound should use its Might is right in Bush world policy, and in part a reaction to fears strength to change the status quo in the caused by the possible spread of weapons world. In claiming that Bush led his own After World War II the US was the of mass destruction. But it was also, Rob- revolution they may be overdoing an driving force in the creation of a new ert Art states, due to an arrogance born interesting argument, but Ronald Reagan international legal order built on treaties, of the knowledge that American power, did not impress intellectually either and agreements, multilateral institutions and especially its military power, bought the still was able, through stating simple prin- alliances. As tools they made exercise of United States a lot of freedom of politi- ciples, to lead his government. As stressed US power easier but they also inhibited cal maneuver.59 by William Odom and Robert Dujarric American empire and thus made the new As a presidential candidate Bush did in their study, the ideology of American world order acceptable to countries on not shine as a foreign policy expert, and leaders is most significant for the nature their way to give up empire themselves.
51 An international legal order is founded pressure from right wing radicals in Con- tor, judge, jury and executioner all rolled on the principle of equality under the gress blocked enactment of the Clinton into one, one group of American legal law. The most powerful must subject them- vision several planned treaties and re- experts claimed. And if the rule of power selves to it, even when difficult, costly or forms could not be passed. The attack on rather than the rule of law becomes the unnecessary, because superior military, the whole concept of international law was norm, then security is likely to be a casu- diplomatic or economic power would, in escalated by the Bush administration be- alty. When an influential state like the US the absence of law, secure the desired ob- fore and after 9-11. Among the victims treats legal obligations as a matter of con- jectives. Although praising this ideal, the were the Chemical Weapons Convention venience, other states will see this as a US often broke international law, but (limited US compliance), the Compre- justification to relax or withdraw from development of an international legal or- hensive Test Ban Treaty (not ratified), their own commitments, these critics der continued, often with American lead- the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty charged.62 But seen with the eyes of the ership. This order was seen as an alterna- (promises and obligations broken), the Bush administration this is an acceptable tive to conflicts and war. It could not Biological Weapons Convention (draft risk, because nobody can combine the eradicate war and breaches of law, but it protocol rejected), the UN Framework mentioned functions of police, judge, could limit the associated risks and dur- Convention on Climate Control and the executioner etc. better and with greater ing the Cold War military confrontation Kyoto Protocol (treaty obligations in power, and the US itself is an honourable that was quite an advantage. UNFCC not being met and protocol country without a need for treaties to do As this confrontation disappeared also rejected), the International Criminal the right thing. If the US is to play a the benefits of an international legal or- Court (signature called back and attempts leading role, Paul Wolfowitz prescribed der grew smaller in the eyes of some US to sabotage implementation), the Anti- before his appointment as a Deputy Sec- national security experts. The price paid Ballistic Missile Treaty (unilateral with- retary of Defence, it means demonstrat- by the worlds only superpower seemed drawal), and Geneva Conventions on the ing that your friends will be protected unnecessarily high. The Clinton-adminis- treatment of prisoners of war and the and taken care of, that your enemies will tration focused on economics and populations in occupied territories be punished, and that those who refuse globalisation, and in this context inter- (deemed irrelevant). to support you will live to regret having dependence of nations became a strong Without an international legal order done so.63 Hierarchy, in other words, argument in favour of legal order. But the powerful becomes police, prosecu- becomes a substitute for a legal order.
52 Logically, the Bush administration also a single member can block consensus and favoured position in a world order char- picked a confrontation with the UN Se- any collective action. But the Bush ad- acterized by hierarchy and US dominance. curity Council. This institution gives ministration goal is to prevent Americas And the equation works both ways: An other powers an influence not matched security from being undermined by con- absence of legal order can secure the domi- by the real power relations in an Ameri- straints imposed by other powers, includ- nant access to compliant tools for polic- can empire. Before the war against Iraq ing and perhaps most especially those ing an empire. Bush challenged the world organisation of Americas traditional allies, professor Since the end of the Cold War US se- and gave it a choice: Accept my will or James Chace said.65 Use of ad hoc coali- curity managers have focused on the become an ineffective, irrelevant forum tions helps to evade control by allies spread of weapons of mass destruction for debate! But the problem was not re- through NATO. And President Bush him- and terrorism. Both threats have been ally the challenge from Saddam Hussein, self has dismissed the need for consulta- dismissed by scholars of the realist school Professor of International Law Michael tion and agreement with allies before ac- in international relations. Professor Ken- Glennon showed, but rather an earlier tion with this philosophy: Confident neth Waltz, virtually the dean of this shift in world power toward a configura- action, that will yield positive results, pro- school, has argued that the likelihood of tion that was simply incompatible with vides kind of a slipstream into which re- war decreases as nuclear weapons spread the way the UN was meant to function. luctant nations and leaders can get behind because deterrent and defensive capabili- It was, he continues, the rise in Ameri- ( ).66 ties will increase. Thus, the gradual spread can unipolarity along with cultural of nuclear weapons is more to be wel- clashes and different attitudes toward the Military hierarchy with nukes comed than feared.67 Scholars also have use of force, that gradually eroded the as trump attacked the focus on terrorism. The term Council.64 should not, they argue, be detached from Also, the formal alliances created in an American military power becomes an particular context. Use of terrorism can, earlier era are not compatible with the indispensable guarantee of security and as Jeffrey Record of the US Army War desired hierarchy. The Washington-Treaty, interests of smaller powers in the absence College, claims, reflect rational political for example, is closely tied to a world order of an effective international legal order. choice.68 Terrorism is tactics, not an with the United Nations in a key role, Being providers of tools for the exer- enemy, William Odom and Robert and through the North Atlantic Council cise of US power might give them a Dujarric stress and for good measure add:
53 The United States, by any legal defini- fort to keep a monopoly on the forms of believe that no adversary can believe that tion of terrorism, has been the largest military power that help provide its domi- the United States can be challenged. Sec- sponsors of terrorist operations since nance.70 ondly, everybody under the shield of World War II.69 Change in the US military strategy to empire must believe that the US cannot But in an empire different forces are fit an imperial policy was signalled very be challenged. at work. Weapons of mass destruction can clearly by Secretary of Defence Donald This is more than a prescription for be used by smaller powers as a deterrent Rumsfeld during his confirmation hear- an arms race with the US itself: If chal- against the US, and terrorism can be an ing in the Senate. He repeatedly rumi- lenges are perceived, logic dictates that the effective tool in asymmetric conflicts. And nated on the concept of deterrence in US is not strong enough, and thus a for the US, using the terms of weapons novel ways. Credible deterrence, he said, continuos arms build-up is necessary. of mass destruction (an impossibly broad can no longer be based solely on the pros- What is sufficient cannot be measured in term) and terrorism (detached from con- pect of punishment. We dont want to traditional terms of military balance, like text) in an ideological campaign, provide win wars, we want to prevent them, he just spending on defence as much as the glue for an empire. Successful imperial said. We want to be so powerful and so rest of the world combined. The imperial governance must focus on justifying and forward looking that it is clear to others will-power also must be demonstrated in maintaining an advantage in the ability that they ought not to be damaging their doctrines and projection of military as- to generate military power. For Ameri- neighbors when it affects our interests, sets. can citizens and Europeans, an effort and they ought not to be doing things Elevating preventive warfare to a promi- against proliferation and terrorism can that are imposing threats and dangers to nently positioned doctrine in the national make good sense as self-defence and a us.71 The ambitious goal is no less than strategy was for this reason a necessary programme to ensure global stability a dominate the thinking of any possible step. Pre-emption and even preventive war view not shared by many others as opin- adversary, but Rumsfeld also admitted: I has always been an option, sometimes also ion polls in several Muslim countries have dont know that I really understand what exercised. Critics might, as they have, claim shown. But, as professor Rosen says, deters people today ( ). Thus the most that preventive warfare is contrary to in- viewed through the lenses of imperial important and probably only possible ternational law. But such arguments over- practice US non-proliferation policies goal is to influence the thinking of look the important point. The doctrine compose a classic case of an imperial ef- American leadership itself. They are to is to keep everybody who could come
54 under suspicion for harbouring aggres- ing weapons of mass destruction (WMD); regime change credibility. It could also sive plans against US interests in perpetual 2) Deter aspiring peer competitors; 3) give other countries protection and make fear and force them unto a track of con- Provide a hedge while exploring de- a security guarantee to them more cred- stantly sending accommodating signals. To fences and conventional alternatives; 4) ible because the American homeland will publicly claiming a right to preventive Provide options for striking some WMD seem less vulnerable and US leaders can war, in spite of international law, also facilities and deeply buried targets; 5) be perceived to have more freedom of demonstrates who is in charge. Provide a secure guarantee of American action. In the early 1990s US leaders saw nuclear power in the face of asymmetric attacks weapons as obsolete. As a Chairman of from small, despotic cuntries, failed states, Ensure minimally acceptable the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell non-state actors all with access to an in- forms of internal behaviour told Third World leaders that nuclear creasingly lethal toolbox of means. weapons is a wasted investment of lim- Development of Ballistic Missile De- In assessing American empire and its ited political and military value.72 But in fences in similar ways highlights the spe- future potential, the greatest uncertainty the Bush strategy nuclear weapons again cial status of US power. As spears and arises on what constitutes minimally ac- play a key role. They emphasize the dis- shields earlier in the history of war ceptable forms of internal behaviour tribution of power in the global military complemented each other to enable of- within the subordinate states. At the stra- hierarchy. As stated in a report from the fensive action, the nuclear arsenal and the tegic level, the Bush administration has National Institute for Public Policy, an missile shield will, it is claimed, secure advocated a new principle of limiting important think-tank for development of freedom of action. It is not very likely sovereignty if states support terrorism or the new nuclear posture, strategic nuclear that any state armed with long range mis- massacre their own people. But an em- weapons continue to play vital roles in siles will attack the US. Retaliation will be pire would be more demanding. foreseeable US defense planning.73 Be- swift and devastating. The only exception During the election campaign in 2000, sides deterring Russia and China the roles is if the US wants to depose a regime both Bush and his soon-to-be national described in this report and official docu- then threats and use of long range mis- security adviser Condoleezza Rice refuted ments from the Bush administration in- siles can be a last and desperate defence. that the US should play a significant role clude: 1) Dissuasion of rogue states and An anti-missile system could provide an- in the internal affairs of foreign coun- other adversaries from acquiring or us- swers to such threats and give a policy of tries. Prominent neo-conservatives had
55 long argued for promoting democracy But many observers read the strategy trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz, strate- abroad, and after 9-11 and during differently. To former Clinton officials gists in the Bush administration see mobilisation for war against Iraq demo- Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay it embod- globalisation as a kind of soft power that cratic imperialism came on the agenda. ied a hegemonist worldview and the will induce integration within the empire With a series of speeches in 2003 Presi- essense of the strategy is to remake the by dint of others wanting voluntarily to dent Bush joined this, in the opinion of world in Americas image.77 In Iraq, the do what we want them to do. Prestowitz many experts, utopian vision of demo- imported American staff for the Coali- finds this view naïve.79 But such cratic transformation in the Middle East tion Provisional Authority tried to imple- minimalist demands are not dramatically with Iraq as a showcase.74 In more general ment with great zeal many social reforms at odds with the practice of some former terms, the Bush administration had pub- favoured by conservatives in the US. But empires. A British historian, Niall lished the previous year a national secu- a distinction should be made separating Ferguson, even claims that all empires were rity strategy stating that the goal not only democracy-building in newly liberated based on cooperation and not primarily is a more secure world, it should also be- dictatorships and failed states from the the use of force.80 come a better world.75 Administration control imposed by empire-builders in Cooperation is also what the US ben- spokesmen went to great length in stress- all subordinated states. Andrew Bacevich efit from in financing the empire. In a ing the voluntary nature of the project. is probably close in describing the study of the US financial policy the President Bush said in a cover letter: We minimalist demands to members of the American economist Michael Hudson seek ( ) to create a balance of power that empire when he writes about the impera- claims that the US has achieved what no favours freedom: conditions in which all tive of openness and integration, given earlier imperial system had put to place. nations and all societies can choose for impetus by globalisation but guided by Americans can live beyond their means themselves the rewards and challenges of the United States. In this global order with large deficits in the trade balance and political and economic liberty. And American enterprises will enjoy free reign the fiscal budgets through forced loans Condoleezza Rice said the US would not and American values enjoy pride of place from abroad sale of US Treasury bonds.81 impose democracy on others. Our vi- and thus benefit the US most of all. US In January 2004, The International Mon- sion of the future, she explained, is not global leadership means perpetuating etary Fund estimated US foreign debt at one where every person eats Big Mac and American political, economic and cultural 40 percent of the gross national product drinks Coke ( ).76 hegemony.78 According to former Reagan an unprecedented level, the IMF said.82
56 direct terms, and Brzezinski himself added Naturally, Brzezinski, when the new A clash of two world order projects that the roles are unhealthy, for both the aims of the Bush administration became US and European nations. He, of course, clear in 2003, had to call its foreign policy If a single truth can be distilled from portrayed an American empire, but it is narrow and extremist. We need, he said, the US debate on empire it must be: It markedly different from the empire which the Europeans, we need the European makes a difference whether an empire is the US apparently has been striving for Union, and not seek to divide it up into formal or informal these forms of em- under the reign of President Bush. a fictitious new and a fictitious old.85 pire are then the outer, opposite, points Brzezinski could claim that in contrast to Splitting Europe is exactly what the Bush on a sliding scale with the degree of do- previous empires the US is not heading a administration had attempted. Colin minion being the decisive factor. hierarchical pyramid. No, in this em- Powell, almost valiantly, as Secretary of The subordinated states and their pire power is exercised through continu- State tried to deny the obvious by talk- peoples certainly experience the differ- ous bargaining, dialogue, diffusion, and ing about misunderstandings obscuring ence. Before Bush and the new imperial- quest for formal consensus ( ).84 And the real US strategy of partnerships and, ists got into the drivers seat the Europe- he, like many American foreign policy on the relations with the EU, highlight- ans knew, if they thought about it, very pundits in the early 1990s, viewed em- ing that never has our common agenda well where real power was situated in the pire as a passing stage to a truly coopera- been so large and mutually significant.86 transatlantic community. And the Ameri- tive global community. But ideologues like John Hulsman from cans knew it, too. Even years after the Cold This empire based on co-optation was the conservative Heritage Foundation, War had ended and the EU had set its rocked when the Bush administration closer in mind than Powell to the White sights on a more independent course, passed the divide separating superiority House and the Pentagon, saw an EU that Zbigniew Brzezinski could write: The and dominion. The subordinate Europe- matters only peripherally in the interna- brutal fact is that Western Europe, and ans were challenged when the empire took tional system. He advocated a general increasingly also Central Europe, remains a still more formal character, raising fears American transatlantic foreign policy largely an American protectorate, with its of the extent to which the US would seek based on cherry-picking engaging coa- allied states reminiscent of ancient vassals dominance in not only their external litions of the willing European states on and tributaries.83 It was rare, though, to behaviour but also their internal a case-by-case basis. The US has a unique see the power relations described in such behaviour. opportunity when faced with Europe
57 which is more about diversity than uni- EU acquires state-like properties. The wis- acceptable world order will determine formity.87 Richard Perle, the grey emi- dom in these predictions are based on events in the next few decades.90 nence of Bush administration hawks, to- theories from the realist school in inter- Europeans do, as the French prime gether with David Frum, former national relations predicting that a uni- minister Raffarin has said, want a dia- speechwriter for the president, suggested polar system is short lived because weaker logue among equals in the transatlantic that Americans, first of all, must acknowl- states will get together against the hege- relationship, and they also want common edge that a more closely integrated Eu- mon and that in an empire subordinate goals for the world to constitute the ba- rope is no longer an unqualified Ameri- units prefer greater autonomy and thus sis for cooperation.91 This will not be easy. can interest. Every European government will seek to get it whenever opportunity The EU is about a new world order com- should be forced to choose between Paris arises. A more advanced, related theory is parable to a spiders web. A network of and Washington.88 Gunther Burghardt, presented by Philip Bobbitt, an Ameri- mutual obligations to block unilateralism the EU ambassador in Washington, com- can academic with a considerable experi- of the strong is the goal. The European mented in May 2004: The situation has ence as a national security manager. Both peace project is governed by a few funda- never been so bad in 50 years. It is a fact the United States and Europe are moving mental principles: 1) The political is above of life that America is a hegemonic power, into a new world order where old rules the military; 2) Negotiation and compro- but the question is how that power is used. of behaviour are abandoned because they mise are the very foundation of interna- We need to know that America is open to do not adequately answer the challenges tional relations; 3) No state should be above a confident relationship, not just with of today. As often before in history, he or apart from international law. When the certain member states but with the EU as argues, the state is changing, this time into new American imperialists prefer a hierar- such.89 what he calls The Market-State. The state chical pyramid instead of a spiders web On both sides of the Atlantic experts is moving beyond the national looking characterised by interdependence they not are eyeing a nascent conflict between the for tools to effectively handle security and only strangle dialogue. They also promote antagonistic interests of states. This con- economics on the regional and global a world order in fundamental conflict with flict, they claim, is obvious when France, marketplace. The EU and the US typify European historical experience, present Germany and Russia ganged up against two out of three kinds of Market-States goals and the very identity of the Euro- the US before the war against Iraq and it he describes. Their ability to cooperate, pean Union. Peaceful coexistence is to be will become more obvious the more the relative power and differing views of an hoped for but not very likely.
58 It is possible that Condolezza Rice is right Europe has been estimated at 333 billion A viable transatlantic community when she claims that old arguments from dollars in 2000, and European firms in academic disciplines obscure reality be- the US had a turnover of 301 billion The eminent British military historian cause the worlds great centres of power far more than the national product of Michael Howard warns in a foreword to are united by common interests, common most nations. In total, these businesses the Bobbitt study that mankind could be dangers and increasingly common val- provided jobs for 13 million people.93 facing a tragedy without precedent in its ues.92 And it is very possible the Bush The main argument against the dreams history if the new Market States fail to administration itself has obscured that of new American imperialists is that the cooperate and slide into confrontation. reality. Neither the US nor Europe can price of empire will be too high. The Bush But realist theory, although in common afford a divorce. Economic integration administration has in fact tried a discount use by politicians and strategists alike, is is so far advanced that the price of con- version of imperialism in sending too few not necessarily a sound reflection of frontation will be prohibitive. Coopera- soldiers and too little economic support todays realities. Conventional wisdom tion and respect for international law do to Iraq and Afghanistan. In both cases might be wrong if we live in a qualita- benefit all. And the Americans and Euro- hybris America can do everything on tively new era of world politics. Few could peans do have important values in com- its own has been succeeded by going have predicted that the ideological bent mon. begging at the doors of allies and the UN. of a few top officials would steer the Transatlantic economic intercourse is And in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal a United States off the course followed for much deeper and broader than at the times very high price was paid for having cre- decades, against the better advice of its when divorce among interconnected states ated an atmosphere of lawlessness by put- traditional foreign policy elite. And just gave rise to realist theories. The end of ting the US above international law. But projecting theories based on historical the Cold War allegedly has weakened trans- even a de facto admission of defeat in Iraq, patterns of inter-state rivalry on to the atlantic ties but the 1990s actually strength- although sobering for empire-builders, relationship between Europe and the ened economic integration. By far the will not make todays challenges go away. United States is a bit lazy. Europe is, for greatest part of American investments Together, the EU and the US can move beginners, not a state, hardly even a well abroad went to Europe, and European the world but the Bush administration defined geographic entity, but much corporations have invested greatly in the strategy, its empire building, and its ideo- more, as Raffarin wrote, a state of mind. US. Business for American enterprises in logical blindness, block this possibility.
59 The claim about common American policies of President Bush. But from this which the US is exercising its power. and European values is more fragile. It is perspective surprising results also appear. When asked whether US unilateralism is a a fact, but tinged with banality that a be- The gap represents more a dislike of cur- possible threat in the next ten years, 78 lief in freedom, democracy and market rent US policies than a gap between two percent of Europeans and 67 percent of economy unites the Euro-Atlantic com- communities. A poll from September 2002 Americans listed it as an extremely im- munity and that we have common cul- leads to this conclusion: European pub- portant or important threat. tural roots. But right wing radicalism in lics look at the world in a similar way to The polls raise a question of key sig- the US has highlighted differences in at- ordinary Americans, while harbouring nificance for the transatlantic relationship: titudes, towards property, equality, social deep reservations about the conduct of If Europeans and Americans have so many solidarity, public services and power poli- certain aspects of US foreign policy.95 views in common, how come policies on tics.94 An American commentator, Rob- They, for example, agreed on the relative the two sides of the Atlantic are so differ- ert Kagan, had great success when he pro- importance of economic versus military ent? In an analysis of the latter poll, three claimed: Americans are from Mars and strength economic strength was rated scholars gave an interesting answer. Based Europeans are from Venus. His portrayal higher by 84 percent of Europeans and on fundamental attitudes to power they was even greeted with, unintended, ap- 66 percent of Americans. Either a plural- created four distinct groups: Hawks, Prag- plause by the left wing Europeans. But a ity or a majority of the public on both matists, Doves and Isolationists. This di- more correct version of this War of the sides of the Atlantic believes the World vision revealed a dramatic difference. Prag- Worlds is that the Bush administration Bank, IMF, WTO, NATO and UN should matists constitute the great middle group and its ideological backers are invaders be strengthened. And Europeans, contrary on both side of the Atlantic - 65 percent from Mars. They have swept themselves to Kagans claim, were in principle as will- in the US and 43 percent in Europe. But in the American flag, but they are a crowd ing as Americans to use force. Almost a Hawks are so numerous in the US (25 apart both on Earth and in America. year later another poll found: Americans percent), that if a leader from this group Opinion polls often are used to prove and Europeans do not live on different can win support from Pragmatists, a ma- a great, and rapidly growing, gap between planets when it comes to viewing the jority is possible. But in Europe Doves the US and Europe. Overwhelming ma- threats around them.96 This poll found are 42 percent a centrist Pragmatist can- jorities in Europe are against the Iraq war, that not only Europeans, but also Ameri- not as a leader ignore them but Hawks reject US leadership and disapprove of cans, share apprehension of the way in are extremely few, 7 percent, foreclosing
60 their appeal or possibilities for coalition. Many transatlantic tensions result less case of Iraq, for example, we had Euro- The difference between America and Eu- from the fashionable notion that our so- pean states, based on raison detat, giving rope thus is not so much a matter of dif- cieties are drifting apart, and more from the Bush administration support while ferent attitudes in the general public as very the growing evidence that they are in fact their own publics were overwhelmingly different possibilities for national leaders drawing closer together.98 Robert against the war. That is why members of when coalitions are made for elections and Hunter, ambassador to NATO during the this ad hoc coalition could only provide sustainable government. If Washington is Clinton years, claims: The destinies of symbolic support their publics would interested in restoring a viable consensus the United States and Europe are now not allow greater national sacrifice at the across the Atlantic, this analysis concluded, intertwined in such critical ways as to be level of what was claimed to be at stake. when it comes to the use of force, it must inseparable.99 We are thus faced with an issue of recognize the need to develop a rationale From this perspective conflicts in the transatlantic governance. The social real- for such action that takes the structures transatlantic relationship are not so much ity is fundamentally at odds with the sys- and requirements of European public opin- an issue of international relations as an tem of government. Empire is as unnatu- ion into account ( ).97 issue of transatlantic domestic politics, ral as dictatorship would be in the indi- American pragmatists will, while look- as Hamilton and others have suggested. It vidual democracies comprising the em- ing at Europe, see a spectrum of attitudes is becoming quite common to look at pire. In the EU concentration of power not far from their own, more hawkish inter-European relations as an issue of in Bruxelles is perceived by many as a politicians will see a dramatically differ- domestic politics but we have yet to ap- threat leaders are considered to be dis- ent scene. It is common for Democrats to proach the transatlantic relationship in tant and outside the influence of demo- stress that Europe both can and must co- similar ways. The so-called laws used by cratic processes. But the EU still provides operate. They see differences as quite natu- the realist school for analysing interaction ways of democratic control and leaders ral disagreement to be overcome through between states are not very useful any must work hard for their legitimacy. dialogue and compromise because they longer. In domestic politics we have more American leaders cannot be held account- do not constitute an unbridgeable gap. than a few rational actors and ideology able by European voters and democratic As Daniel Hamilton, head of the State plays a significant role. Popular partici- institutions. Department office for political strategy pation adds new complexity and we have This study started out posing a ques- in the Clinton administration, has said: a myriad of issues on the agenda. In the tion: How far should a new US president
61 go in reversing the Bush revolution to with the pre-eminence of American power, Americas Inadvertent Empire. Yale University restore transatlantic cooperation? The the administration has abandoned the Press, New Haven 2004. 4 Mann, Michael: Incoherent Empire. Verso. answer is that he must distance himself fundamental tenets that have guided our New York 2003. from everything that makes the empire foreign policy for more than half a cen- 5 Gnesotto, Nicole: EU, US visions of the more formal than informal. The subordi- tury: belief in collective security and alli- world, visions of the other in Shift or Rift, nate publics will not accept dominion. If ances, respect for international institutions Institute for Security Studies, Bruxelles 2004. p. 21 6 Daalder, Ivo: The End of Atlanticism. Sur- an American president wants to be the and international law, multilateral engage- vival, Summer 2003 leader of the free world he must work ment, and the use of force not as a first 7 Kupchan, Charles: The End of the American hard for his legitimacy also in Europe. option but truly as a last resort.101 Era. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 2002. p. xiv He cannot gain legitimacy through a vote, Rejection of this alternative in favour 8 Viksnins, George: New Europe, New Prob- lems. The National Interest, Fall 2003 and exactly that fact makes a permanent of four more years of empire-building 9 Quoted by Dempsey, Judy: We used to be campaign, listening and explaining, nec- will force the Baltic dilemma to the top sandwiched between the big powers. Financial essary because he can be rejected at any of the political agenda, but in this they Times, April 29, 2004 10 time. He will not get legitimacy just will not be alone. If Kerry wins, we can, Lejins, Atis in One year on: Lessons from Iraq. Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Pa- through approval from European lead- as the veteran journalist Elizabeth Pond, per 68, March 2004, p. 92 ers. And he can choose a strategy not very as a minimum hope for enough trust to 11 Larrabee, Stephen: NATOs Eastern Agende different from the one EU leaders adopted be rebuilt between the natural allies of in a New Strategic Era. RAND, 2003. p. 59 12 in December 2003 by listening to people the United States and Europe to prevent Quoted by Cohen, Roger: America has sec- ond thoughts about a united Europe. The New like Zbigniew Brzezinski who sets the goal the next clash too from being fatal.102 York Times, May 2, 2004 as a global community of shared inter- And we might even see a new and strength- 13 Barnett, Thomas: Forget Europe. How about ests, develop a web of interdependent ened progressive alliance among equals. these Allies?. Washington Post, April 11 2004 relations through the natural evolution 14 Mann, Michael: Op. cit. p 2 15 Lejins, Atis: The EU and NATO on the shores of interstate relations into an informal 1 Kerry, John: Remarks at Westminster College. April of the Baltic Sea. Diena, December 20, 2003. In governance structure.100 30, 2004. www.cfr.org/campaign2004/pub6990/ translation by BBC Monitoring Service, Decem- Indications are that president Kerry has kerry/remarks_at_westminster_college.php ber 22, 2003 2 Berger, Samuel: Foreign Policy for a Demo- understood this. He has attacked the ba- 16 Dean, Howard: Fulfilling the Promise of cratic President. Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004 America. Speech at the Pacific Council, Los An- sic premises of dominion: Intoxicated 3 Odom, William and Dujarric, Robert: geles. December 15 2003
62 17 Clark, Wesley: General Wesley Clark out- 32 Simes, Dimitri: Americas Imperial Di- 45 Bacevich, Andrew: American Empire. Harvard lines Success Strategy in Iraq. Speech in South lemma. Foreign Affairs. November/December University Press. Cambridge 2002. p. 2-3 Carolina. November 6, 2003. 2003 46 Banner, James: The Wellspring of American 18 Kerry, John. Making America Secure Again. 33 Robin, Corey: Endgame Conservatives af- Empire. The Los Angeles Times, April 30, 2003 Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations. De- ter the Cold War. Boston Review, February/ 47 Quoeted by Boot, Max: The Savage Wars of cember 3, 2003. March 2004 Peace. Basic Books, New York 2002. p. 105 19 Dean, Howard. Fulfilling the Promise of 34 Peters, Ralph: Fighting for the Future. 48 Simes, Dimitri: Americas Imperial Di- America. Op. cit. Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania 2001. p. 210. First lemma. Op. cit. p. 95 20 Clark, Wesley: General Wesley Clark out- edition 1999. 49 Barker, Benjamin: Fears Empire. W.W. lines Success Strategy in Iraq. Op.cit. 35 Kristol, Irving: The Emerging American Norton & Company. New York, 3003. p. 15. 21 Clark, Wesley: Speech at Center for American Imperium. American Enterprise Institute. Janu- 50 Smith, Neil: American Empire. University Progress, October 28, 2003 ary 1, 2000 of California Press. Berkeley, 2003. p. xiv 22 Kerry, John: Remarks at Georgetown Uni- 36 Quoted in Robin, Corey: Endgame Con- 51 Johnson, Chalmers: The Sorrows of Empire. versity. January 23, 2003 servatives after the Cold War. Op. cit Metropolitan Books. New York, 2004. p.1 23 Kerry, John: Making America Secure Again. 37 Boot, Max: The Case for American Empire. 52 Newhouse, John: Imperial America. Alfred Op.cit. The Weekly Standard. October 15 2001 A. Knopf. New York 2003. 24 Gephardt, Dick: Reconciliation and Re- 38 Kaplan, Robert: Warrior Politics. Random 53 Klare, Michael: Ressource Wars. Metropoli- newal. Speech at the Council on Foreign Rela- House. New York 2002. p. 147 tan Books. New York 2002. p. 6 tions. January 13, 2004 39 Kurtz, Stanley: Democratic Imperialism: A 54 Mann, Michael: Incoherent Empire. Op.cit. 25 Clark, Wesley: Speech at Center for American Blueprint. Policy Review, April 2003 p. 12 Progress. Op.cit. 40 Ikenberry, John: Americas Imperial Ambi- 55 Art, Robert: A Grand Strategy for America. 26 Kerry, John: Making America Secure Again. tion. Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002 Cornell University Press. New York 2003. p. 90 Op.cit. 41 Ignatieff, Michael: The American Empire 56 Rosen, Stephen Peter: An empire, if you can 27 Brzezinski, Zbigniew: The Choice. Basic the Burden. New York Times Magazine, January keep it. The National Interest. April 2003 Books, New York 2004. p. viii 5, 2003 57 Quoted in Bjerre-Poulsen, Niels: Right Face. 28 Brzezinski, Zbigniew: The Choice. Op.cit. 42 Odom, William and Dujarric, Robert: Museum Rusculanum Press. Copenhagen 2002. p. 217-218 Americas Inadvertent Empire. Yale University p. 92 29 Berger, Samuel: Foreign Policy for a Demo- Press. New haven, 2004. p. 5 58 Defense Planning Guidance 1992 (excerpts). cratic President. Op. cit. 43 Odom, William and Dujarric, Robert: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/ 30 Asmus, Ronald et al. Progressive Internation- Americas Inadvertent Empire. Op. cit. p. 204- etc/wolf.html alism. Progressive Policy Institute. October 30, 2003 207 59 Art, Robert: A Grand Strategy for America. 31 Donelly, Thomas: The Past as Prologue 44 Quoted in Bacevich, Andrew: American Op. cit. p. 89 An Imperial Manual. Foreign Affairs, July/Au- Empire. Harvard University Press. Cambridge 60 Daalder, Ivo and Lindsay, James: America gust 2002 2002. p 5 Unbound The Bush revolution in foreign
63 policy. Brookings, Washington DC 2003. p. 13- Bush see speech at The National Endowment for 89 Quoted in Cohen, Roger: America has sec- 16 Democracy , November 6, 2003 ond thoughts about a united Europe. The New 61 Art, Robert: A Grand Strategy for America. 75 National Security Strategy of the United States. York Times. May 2, 2004 Op. cit. p. 87 Washington DC, September 2002. 90 Bobbitt, Philip: The Shield of Achilles. Allen 62 Deller, Nicole et al: Rule of Power or Rule of 76 Rice, Condoleezza: A Balance of power that Lane. London 2002 Law. Apex Press. New York 2003. p. xxxv-xxxvi favors freedom. Speech at the Manhattan Insti- 91 Raffarin, Jean-Pierre: Europe can trust in 63 Wolfowitz, Paul: Remembering the Future. tute. October 1, 2002 Frances support. Financial Times. January 14, The National Interest. Spring 2000 77 Daalder, Ivo and Lindsay, James: America 2004 64 Glennon, Michael: Why the Security Coun- Unbound The Bush revolution in foreign 92 Rice, Condoleezza: A Balance of power that cil Failed. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2003 policy. Op. cit. p. 123 favors freedom. Op. cit. 65 Chace, James: Present at the Destruction 78 Bacevich, Andrew: American Empire. Op. 93 Quinlan, Joseph: Drifting Apart or Growing The Death of American Internationalism. World cit. p 216, 218. Together. Center for Transatlantic Relations. Policy Journal. Spring 2003 79 Prestowitz, Clyde: Rogue Nation. Basic Washington DC 2003 66 Quoted in Woodward, Bob: Bush at War. Books. New York 2003. p. 41 94 For an excellent exploration see Hutton, Will: Poclet Books. London 2003. p. 341 80 Expressed during debate at the American The World Were In. Abacus. London 2003 67 Waltz, Kenneth and Sagan, Scott: The Spread Enterprise Institute July 17. 2003. Transcript. 95 Poll conducted by The german Marshall Fund of Nuclear Weapons A Debate. W.W. Norton 81 Michael Hudson: Super Imperialism. Pluto of the United States. September 4, 2002 & Company. New York, 1995. p. 45 Press. London 2003. p.23 96 Power, War and Public Opinion. Transatlan- 68 Record, Jeffrey: Bounding the Globar War 82 International Monetary Fund: U.S. Fiscal tic Trends 2003. p. 2 on Terrorism. Strategic Studies Institute. Decem- Policies and Priorities for Long-Run 97 Power, War and Public Opinion. Op. cit. p. ber 2003 Sustainability. IMF January 7, 2004 14 69 Odom, William and Dujarric, Robert: 83 Brzezinski, Zbigniew: The Grand Chess- 98 Hamilton, Daniel:. Testimony in Transat- Americas Inadvertent Empire. Op. cit. p. 213 board. Basic Books. New York 1997. p. 59 lantic Partnership. Hearing of the Committee 70 Rosen, Stephen Peter: An empire, if you can 84 Brzezinski, Zbigniew: The Grand Chess- on International Relations. House of Representa- keep it. Op. cit. p. 17 board. Op. cit. p. 28 tives. June 11, 2003. p. 23 71 Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Com- 85 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Speech October 28 2003 99 Hunter, Robert: Europe Leverage. The mittee. January 11, 2001. Federal News Service at New American Strategies for Security and Peace Washington Quarterly. Winter 2003-2004. p. 91 Transcript. Conference. 100 Brzezinski, Zbigniew: The Choice. Op. cit 72 Quoted in Dragsdahl, Jørgen: USA en 86 Powell, Colin: A Strategy of Partnerships. p. 218 atomslyngel?. Danish Foreign Policy Institute. Foreign Affairs. January/February 2004 101 Kerry, John. Making America Secure Again. Fokus no. 1, 2002 87 Hulsman, John in One year on: Lessons from Op. cit. 73 National Institute for Public Policy: Strate- Iraq. Institute for Security Studies. Op.cit. p 175 102 Pond, Elizabeth: Friendly Fire The Near- gic Offensive Forces and the Nuclear Posture 88 Perle, Richard and Frum, David: !An End to Death of the Transatlantic Alliance. European Reviews New triad. March 2003 Evil. Random House. New York 2003. p. 247 Union Studies Association. Pittsburgh 2004. 74 For the most detailed vision by the president and 249 p. 96.
64 The Transatlantic Security Rift and Its Implications for Baltic Security
Jennifer Ann Moll*
or 13 years, the Baltic states1 pur- and the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- sions that have existed from the outset. sued a policy of re-integration nisation (NATO), however, is only the While highlighting the major changes in with the West; foreign policy goals beginning and there is an understandable NATO, I will also delve into current fac- were few in number and clear, which al- and widespread feeling of uncertainty for ets of the transatlantic security rift by lowed the three Baltics to conduct one of what the future holds. Both the EU and analysing the differences between security the most successful foreign policy cam- NATO have changed during the enlarge- goals of the major parties as well as differ- paigns of the last decade. Indeed, the fun- ment process and will continue to change. ences in such areas as threat assessment, damental strategic concept of the Baltic A clear understanding of Estonian, military forces, and the use of force. Ar- states which was to consolidate the ac- Latvian and Lithuanian needs will allow guing from the viewpoint that a more complishments and the positive changes each state to use its memberships to in- balanced and multilateral, not multipo- of the last decade and make them irre- fluence these organisations and advance lar, approach to international security versible2 was actualised in April and May its own interests. would be best for both sides of the Atlan- 2004 in a historic moment that changed This essay will be delivered in two parts. tic, I will assess Estonian, Latvian and the importance of geopolitics for all three. In the first half, I will give a brief history Lithuanian foreign policy documents in Membership in the European Union (EU) of the Transatlantic Alliance and the ten- order to ascertain each states foreign * Jennifer Moll is a 2003-2004 Fulbright Scholar studying in Tartu, Estonia. She recently received her M.Phil degree in International Relations from the University of Cambridges Centre of International Studies. This research was funded by a 2003-2004 Fulbright grant. The author wishes to thank her parents, Roger Franklin, Tomas Jermalavicius and one anonymous reader for reviewing this paper and providing insightful commentary.
65 policy goals. Then, I will give recommen- Western Europeans, the lessons of World Through their involvement in the dations on how each may enhance their War II and the necessities dictated by the Working Group and the Ambassadors security within the EU and NATO frame- Cold War era demanded an organisation Committee, Belgium, Canada, France, works. that could, as NATOs former Secretary Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the General Lord Ismay remarked of NATO, United Kingdom, the United States, and Part One - The keep the Soviets out, the Americans in at the end of the process, Norway, are Transatlantic Security Rift and the Germans down. responsible for the substance of the As with the First World War, however, NATO Treaty. From the beginning, I. Forging the Alliance many Americans were keen to forget about Europeans were frustrated by the Ameri- Europe and return to a splendid isola- can representatives deliberate tactics of In the wake of the Second World War tionism. Indeed, the Marshall Plan re- caution, evasion, and circumlocution5 and its attendant destruction, two super- vealed the United States desire to get that were necessitated by the domestic powers emerged: the USSR united a vast Europe back on its feet without direct political context. And while it seems that amount of land, manpower and resources involvement. It was not until the Cold most representatives were annoyed by with a fierce command economy, and the War heated up with the Soviet blockade French tactics, the government of the United States emerged coveting its vast of Berlin that the United States Senate United States was particularly incensed amount of military hardware in addition and populace became ready to face the that France tried to lay down condi- to moral and economic power. As democ- challenges of a belligerent bipolar system. tions6 for joining a transatlantic secu- racies assembled against the Soviet Union, President Trumans re-election ensured that rity pact, because everyone knew per- the Western European powers quickly the United States would not abandon its fectly well that the French were practi- realised that, only the Americans could Western European friends and allies. cally on their knees praying for a treaty really assure any forward defense for West- Although Don Cook argues, it is cer- to sign.7 From the outset, the French ern Europe.3 With security at the fore- tainly the case that the birth of the government linked the successful comp- front of their priorities, leaders of the NATO Treaty was one of the most letion of any collective defence treaty United Kingdom began pressuring their collegiately successful diplomatic nego- to: immediate US assistance in equip- American allies to link their own security tiations in the history of free nations,4 ping French forces, a promise that the with that of Western Europe. For many tensions were evident at the outset. US would send ground forces to help
66 defend France if a war with the Soviet deems necessary, including the use of understood what Cook calls the Great Union would erupt, and French mem- armed force, to restore and maintain the Dichotomy of the North Atlantic Alli- bership in the Anglo-American Com- security of the North Atlantic Area.8 ance. Younger wrote, We [the British] bined Chiefs of Staff organisation that At the end of negotiations, twelve states and the Americans want to start building had been created in World War II. signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 up an Atlantic Community which in- Debates to hammer out Article V, the April 1949. For many Western Europe- cludes but transcends Western Europe, but key element of collective defence in NATO, ans, the belief that their security would the French still hanker after a European were also frustrating as the United States increase with an US security guarantee was solution in which the only American func- Senate demanded a re-wording after the confirmed when Stalins Soviet Union tion is to provide military and other representatives had already agreed on the announced its desire to end the Berlin aid.10 articles wording. Finally, consensus was blockade one week after the Treaty was Similarly, the British and French re- reached and, in a revolutionary change unveiled. sponded differently to the US nuclear su- in commitment strategy from its time- Until the North Korean invasion of premacy as the Soviets approached parity honoured practice of isolationism, the US South Korea in 1950, the North Atlantic earlier than the Allies had anticipated. The acquiesced to the treatys Article V: Treaty was seen as little more than a mu- Suez Crisis further distanced France as The Parties agree that an armed attack tual defence commitment. After the inva- Britain under Harold Macmillan became against one or more of them in Europe sion, however, the Allies were persuaded determined never to be isolated from the or North America shall be considered an to organise an integrated peacetime mili- United States again, while France focussed attack against them all and consequently tary command structure and to establish on establishing Europe. A growing rift they agree that, if such an armed attack the readiness of a long-term US presence was accelerated by Frances rejection of a occurs, each of them, in exercise of the in Europe, finally adding the O in European Defence Community and Gen- right of individual or collective self-de- NATO.9 As the Alliance took shape, the eral DeGaulles 1966 decision to withdraw fense recognized by Article 51 of the British and US positions increasingly France from the integrated NATO mili- Charter of the United Nations, will assist aligned, leaving France on its own. Cook tary command; the US-French relations the Party or Parties so attacked by taking argues that Kenneth Younger, a minister have never recovered. forthwith, individually and in concert of state in the British Foreign Office Despite ongoing tensions, the passage with the other Parties, such action as it during the formative NATO years best of time has proven and enhanced NATOs
67 importance. Although the basis for nalise defence-planning and legitimise USSR cast doubt on the idea of relying NATOs continued success lay in the US democracy as a form of government. on an all-European security structure, such equation of security with its demon- as the Conference on Security and Coop- strated nuclear power and its strong II. NATO and the End of eration in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE). stance against further Soviet encroach- the Cold War The Soviet refusal to accept the CSCEs ments to the West, the urgency of main- wishes with regards to the Baltic repub- taining the US engagement in European NATOs contributions to the North lics in 1991 guaranteed a minimal role security affairs produced spill-over effects Atlantic and European communities have for Russia in European security relations that few of NATOs architects could have made it a successful organisation central and led to the Baltic equation of hard foreseen. In addition to providing a to the Western world, this centrality was security needs with NATO membership, military structure and presence in Eu- furthered by NATOs role in ending the which remains today. The consensual de- rope, NATO also provided Europe with Cold War. Although of secondary impor- cision-making in the CSCE made it un- a framework of security and stability that tance compared to domestic problems able to provide protection; in compari- has allowed it to prosper. In fact, the plaguing the Soviet Union, NATO did son, NATO possessed well-functioning and security that NATO has provided since have a role in the downfall of the USSR. credible decision-making mechanisms 1949 cannot be underestimated, for with- The Alliance closed an opportunity for a built on the unity of purpose and a good out it the members of the Alliance would military solution in a bipolar world and track record for resisting Soviet threats. not have been able to advance in other shifted the confrontation to economic Yost argues, It was thus during 1991 that ways. Yost propels the argument further, and social fields. NATOs show of strength attention turned to NATO as a much The Alliance has provided a setting of within the states bordering the USSR more reliable security guarantor than the safety for the European economic inte- showed the Allies unity and desire to limit CSCE was likely to become.12 gration movement, from the European communist ideological expansion. As the importance of NATO in the Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to After all the members of NATO and post-Cold War era was being reaffirmed todays European Union.11 Addition- the Warsaw Pact had agreed in 1990 that for the Baltics, many members of the Al- ally, NATO has provided a forum to ad- security is indivisible and that the secu- liance expressed their doubts and concerns dress Europes power problems, limit the rity of each state is inextricably linked to for NATOs future. These doubts pleased scope of nuclear proliferation, denatio- the security of Europe as a whole, the a Russian government which desired
68 NATOs decline so that Russia could as- that erupted in the former Republic of ties. The Bosnian crisis had not only dis- sume more power and influence in Euro- Yugoslavia highlighted the ability of the credited the United Nations (UN) and pean security. The Rome Declaration on Alliance to add crisis management and European Community, it had also re-af- Peace and Cooperation from 7-8 Novem- peace support operations to its mission. firmed the importance of NATO to have ber 1991 by allied heads of state expresses It was not until June 1992, however, that an out-of-area military crisis response, the confusion generated by the new era. NATO ministers agreed to engage in peace which was solved by the Combined Joint The challenges we will face in this new support operations. This decision had two Task Force (CJTF) initiative. Europe cannot be comprehensively ad- important consequences: first, it blurred The CJTF initiative made it apparent dressed by one institution alone... Con- the distinction between traditional Article that the Europeans and Americans were sequently, we are working towards a new V collective defence and non-Article V frustrated with their roles in NATO. With European security architecture in which missions; and second, it required a wid- different conceptions of NATO, it is no NATO, the CSCE, the European Com- ening in the mission spectrum for many surprise that many NATO members had munity, the WEU and the Council of allied forces.15 different perspectives and policies on en- Europe complement each other.13 The The Bosnian conflict had negative re- largement as well. Although the dual en- elimination of the Soviet threat required percussions for a security-Europe because largements have made these past disagree- a new role for NATO, if it were to sur- it shattered the illusion of political cohe- ments seem inconsequential, it is telling vive at all. sion created in the wake of the Maastricht that many states, including Germany, After the Luxembourg Foreign Minis- and Petersberg meetings. Emil J. Kirchner wanted to exclude Estonia, Latvia and ter and Chairman of the EC Council of argues that one of the lessons of the Lithuania from both organisations at first Ministers Jacques Poos proclaimed the Bosnian conflict was that, there could be because they feared a mutual defence pact hour of Europe14 had arrived and that tension between the formal tasking and with former Soviet republics. The Euro- Europe could solve the Yugoslav prob- the relative capabilities of both organi- peans ambition for a European Security lem without NATO, it became increas- sations.16 While NATO suffered from a and Defence Identity (ESDI) was related ingly evident that Europe was not capable restricted mission, its military capabili- to their aspiration to have more influ- of handling the problem. Indeed, the ties were, and remain, great; the Western ence and power in Europe and thus in post-Cold War environment necessitated European Union (WEU) worked under areas of European security. The Ameri- an adaptation in NATO, and the crisis fewer restrictions and with less capabili- cans were also calling on Europeans to
69 share more of the economic burden for highlighted the relative unsuitability, defence goals and policies, however, are NATO and desired enlargement to main- political and military, of the Alliance to more threatening to the future of trans- tain the primacy of NATO. Although the perform its new missions outside Ar- atlantic cooperation. CJTF was first discussed in 1993, the de- ticle V.18 Immediately after the Cold War, cision taken at the January 1994 summit French leaders began asserting that Eu- to enact the CJTF and make collective III. A Deepening Transatlantic Rift rope did not need American leadership assets of the Alliance available, on the ba- to set its own security policy. As soon as sis of consultations in the North Atlantic While Europeans have long protested ESDI, and thus the European desire for Council, for WEU operations undertaken against the US stance towards the Middle autonomy in security and defense, was by the European Allies in pursuit of their East, Russia and China, hormone-treated launched, confusion on both sides led to Common Foreign and Security Policy17 foods, and the death penalty, it seems that suspicion and mistrust. While France, also unofficially launched a troubled the number of complaints has risen un- Germany, and the US initially supported ESDI. der the Bush administration. Europeans an ESDI, the UKs reluctance to loosen, NATOs new Strategic Concept was first have repeatedly attacked the Bush or even appear to loosen, its special rela- tested in Kosovo. Many factors, includ- administrations plans for missile defence, tionship with the US, has only just be- ing NATOs success in the preceding its policy on rogue states, and its refusal gun to subside. This, of course, occurred Bosnian conflict, a strategy relying on air to sign and/or retain international com- as the US became increasingly suspicious strikes because of a political culture against mitments, including the Kyoto Protocol, of European autonomy as a result of the land strategies, and a probable Russian the International Criminal Court (ICC), movement against the ESDI (seen by Eu- veto in the UN Security Council, led and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ropeans as being limited to strengthen- NATO to resort to force without a UN (ABM). While some look at the catalogue ing the European component of NATO) mandate. Instead of reaffirming the new of Transatlantic differences and claim that towards a Common European Security Strategic Concept, however, both sides there is an increasing value-rift, others and Defense Policy (CESDP or ESDP) became highly critical of the operation. argue that for the remarkably high level outside of NATO. US mistrust of ESDP, Frédéric Bozo argues, The conduct of the of cooperation that has endured for more which encompasses all questions of EU operation demonstrated the limits of than 50 years, these differences are rela- security and is thus seen as much more NATOs functioning in a major crisis and tively small. Differences in security and European in nature, was evident in
70 former Secretary of State Albrights con- ing. In the Kosovo operation, the US creased integration. The list, for example, ditional support for it as long as it avoided military and policymakers were angered, of French foreign policy principles pro- the 3 Ds of decoupling, duplication, and arguing that for the amount of power vided by the French government high- discrimination. Europeans had in determining a strategy, lights this point. France values its inde- While many in Washington were wor- they should have contributed more to its pendence highly, a principle which guided ried by this broadening of European se- operations militarily. Europeans, however, General de Gaulles foreign policy dur- curity and defence policies, tensions were were angered by their small role in the ing the 1960s and underpinned his deci- re-aggravated when some Europeans, par- operation, with many believing that a sion that France should develop a cred- ticularly in France, used the WEUs defi- more balanced Alliance would have resulted ible independent defence capability based nition of the Petersberg Tasks, to argue in a better strategy. Thus, while Ameri- on nuclear deterrence.20 Of course, France for a clear differentiation of responsibili- cans call for increased burden-sharing in does not mean independent in the con- ties, one in which NATOs role would be the wake of Kosovo, Europeans call for ventional sense, but in the sense that a limited to collective defense (Article V) better decision-sharing. European defence would be independent while the ESDI would be responsible for Many on both sides of the divide, of US influence. the more probable contingencies of cri- however, question the sincerity of these Emboldened by the success of its pet sis management and peace operations (non- calls. Clearly, the US enjoys its military project (Europe) and its permanent seat Article V).19 This, of course, clashed with and decision-making supremacy and does on the UN Security Council, France has NATOs Strategic Concept, which was not want to give up either, while many been the most identifiable European largely based on crisis response. Europeans do not want to increase their power pushing for Europe to act as a Indeed, European and the US com- defence burden within a structure they counterweight to the United States. Ger- plaints regarding the Kosovo operation believe will never permit a balance in de- many, however, is still largely torn between show an increasingly divided Alliance. As cision-sharing. Perhaps inevitably, Euro- the two. Although Germany wants the Europes economic power has risen, it has pean cooperation with the US in security European Union to become a full-fledged demanded an equal footing with the US, and defence led some European states to partner in all areas of global policy, it while the US demands Europe assume question a continued reliance on the US also claims the United States to be its clos- more responsibility for its own security and to further posit that Europe could est ally and partner outside the European and defence before it gains that equal foot- only be truly independent through in- Union.21 Between Frances clear desire to
71 minimise NATOs importance and Ger- plomacy leading to the most recent war that, On the all-important question of manys unclear stance, it is no wonder the with Iraq has reinforced competing con- power the utility of power, the moral- US would prefer the UK to be the voice ceptions of international security and the ity of power they [Americans and Euro- of Europe. vision of Bushs US as a unilateral super- peans] have parted ways,23 I am inclined September 11th 2001, and each sides power that is all too eager to dangerously to say that thinkers like Kagan represent response to it, further entrenched divi- rebuke the international legal system. The current problems and not the means to sions. Although the European states all authors of a recent report argue that Iraq resolve the current rift. Furthermore, just expressed their solidarity with the United was so explosive because it was the first as anti-Americanism has risen all over the States in the following days, President major crisis within the alliance to take world under the Bush administration,24 Bushs response to the attacks exposed place in the absence of an agreed-upon so might the transatlantic rift subside his unilateralist tendencies. While still danger.22 under a new US administration that does pressing for a multilateral campaign in As stated previously, the defeat of the not rely so heavily on neoconservative Afghanistan, the European Council on Soviet threat has paved the way for vari- foreign policymakers. 21 September 2001 highlighted Europes ous interpretations and policies respond- Indeed, many current tensions in the different security preoccupations by call- ing to the post-Cold War era. As the sole transatlantic alliance currently arise from ing for the broadest possible coalition superpower, the US has perceived more issues of global governance. As Brian against terrorism under the United Na- international threats, and more danger in Murphy argues, the disagreement over tions aegis, political emphasis on reac- these threats, than Europeans. While many strategic visions has less to do with judg- tivating the Middle East Peace Process Europeans call for multilateralism to ad- ments about how to preserve global hege- on the basis of the Mitchell and Tenet dress these problems, the Bush adminis- mony than about interpretations of self- reports, and humanitarian relief for Af- tration has been increasingly unilateral to interests.25 While France, Germany, and ghanistan. pre-emptively remove threats; Europeans Belgium have recently claimed an interest In the wake of September 11th, the Bush fear this will weaken the UN system built in acting as a counterweight to US hege- administration has chosen to spearhead on the renunciation of the use of force, mony, the United States has increasingly its own missions, with a coalition of the except for extreme conditions that are used its hegemonic position to fight the willing who accept American military and approved by the Security Council. Al- war on terror. Furthermore, because the operational dominance. The coercive di- though some, such as Robert Kagan claim experiment of European integration has
72 relied on diplomacy, cooperation and they get roughly 10 percent of the capa- under the Petersberg tasks of humanitar- compromise, the Europeans are more bility.27 Indeed, Alexander Moens argues ian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, willing to engage the rest of the world in that EU members continue to depend on and tasks of combat forces in crisis man- the same way. Americans have been less NATO command and control and US as- agement, including peacemaking,30 seem willing to rely, as the Europeans advo- sistance for, sophisticated intelligence, air much more manageable than Americas cate, on international law to right the transport, logistic and power projection decision to fight a war against terrorists world. capability.28 of global reach.31 Then there is the issue of capabilities. Europes main security risk has been While most European states still say In trying to meet the needs of asymmet- defined by security challenges in its pe- that European security is still wedded to ric warfare, the US military has concen- riphery, while the US has become preoc- the US security, it seems that we are cur- trated on technology to decrease the risk cupied with global security. Europeans rently on the cusp of a new arrangement to its forces. Jolyon Howorth and John have been happy to preoccupy themselves As most of old Europe turns away from T.S. Keeler illustrate this capabilities rift with the issues of crisis management and NATO to focus on European defence, it with the statistic that, the U.S. defence have built militaries centred on man- appears that a pro-American bloc con- budget is larger than the combined de- power. In fact, the only area that Europe- sisting of Poland and the Baltic states, fence budgets of the next nine states on ans claim military supremacy is in man- and led by the UK, will propel NATO the top ten list.26 With a large portion power. When genuinely operational, the for the immediate future. Despite vary- of the defence budget going to research European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) ing capabilities and different beliefs on and development, the US military has hopes to draw from 100,000 troops, 4,000 the use of force, the transatlantic link made interoperability with NATO Allies combat aircraft, 100 ships, and 100 build- remains. Just as the US security docu- more difficult because its Allies simply ings to create a 60,000 strong force which ments argue that Europe, as a natural cannot compete. Recent missions have also can be assembled and supplied. As one partner, plays the leading role in its grand exposed the expanding capabilities gap. British expert remarked, the capability gap strategy, one Lithuanian author observed Former US Secretary of Defence William is irrelevant if the Europeans can deal on that for Europe, NATO is and shall re- Cohen argued in 1999 that, NATO [Eu- a reasonable basis with the threats at hand main the anchor of the US engagement ropean] countries spend roughly 60 per- and conduct any necessary interven- in Europe and the cornerstone of Euro- cent of what the United States does and tions.29 Indeed, Europes security goals pean collective defence.32
73 Part Two - Ramifications the three separately, my analyses have con- some claim that Baltic unity disintegrated for Baltic Security firmed many more similarities than dif- when Estonia and Lithuania sought to be ferences. I shall thus proceed by speaking treated on an individual basis for EU ac- Having given a brief overview of the of Baltic Security, and illustrate with cession, their fates are very much still transatlantic security rift, I will now high- specific examples drawn from each states linked. Just as Estonia has advanced its light its ramifications for Baltic security. security concept. Nordic identity and Lithuania has claimed I will begin by examining the Security its own Central European identity, so Concepts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania A Note on Baltic Unity Latvia and Lithuania emphasise the im- to find common foreign policy goals, and Attempts by Estonians, Latvians and portance of relations with Belarus while thus will speak of Baltic security. Having Lithuanians, and especially by those in Kaliningrad is a distinct issue area for defined Baltic security goals, I will rec- power, to emphasise a distinctive state Lithuania. ommend various options to maximise identity that could be recognised by West- Despite these differences, it is very gains. ern counterparts have received much press much possible to speak of Baltic security. both in the three states and abroad. While Andres Kasekamp and Martin Sæter have I. Baltic Security Concepts the Soviet occupation of all three was their observed, At the general European level, first link of commonality, the post-Soviet all three [Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania] Having recently witnessed the success- transformation that they all have under- are facing much the same challenges and ful completion of their two greatest for- gone, and the related challenges that they sharing much the same opportunities. eign policy desires, Estonia, Latvia and continue to face, unite them as well. Neither the EU itself, nor Russia, nor the Lithuania are now official members of the As a collective defence organisation, USA has been distinguishing among the West. Long-time fears of being geopo- NATO correctly based its enlargement roles these countries are expected to play litically suspended between two political programme on the belief that Estonian, in the wider context of European secu- giants have become irrelevant, but by join- Latvian, and Lithuanian security was in- rity.33 With that in mind, I hold, as the ing the West, the Baltic states have inher- divisible. Because of the softer nature of Latvian Security Concept argues, that the ited many concerns and responsibilities. the EU, however, the three Baltic states threat endangerment to one of the Baltic Although I had originally intended to were able to advance their own distinct States countries is the endangerment threat analyse the security concepts of each of interests during negotiations. Although to all Baltic countries.34
74 Threat Perception Although tensions with Russia were tional threats, all three also place impor- Having cast aside foreign domination, intense in the first few years of indepen- tance on the active participation in main- the re-newly independent Baltic states dence, all three states currently claim, as taining peace and international stability. immediately recognised the EU and Lithuania does, that at present, the Re- By giving priority to: NATO as the key to joining the Western public of Lithuania does not observe any conflict prevention, diplomacy, and world of stability and democracy. In or- immediate military threat to national se- international legal measures. Of particu- der to strengthen the legitimacy of the curity and as a result does not regard any lar importance is the priority given to new governments at home, each state state as its enemy.36 With this declara- participating in international crisis man- looked abroad to garner international tion, it would appear that the post-Soviet agement, preventing the proliferation of support. While it was clear that NATO era is a much safer one for the Baltic states, Weapons of Mass Destruction, participat- was the only organisation capable of pro- but their memberships in such high-pro- ing in international arms control regimes, viding hard security, few recognised the file international organisations as the EU and establishing policies and legislation EUs worth as a security mechanism until and NATO have brought responsibilities to address new security challenges, dan- much later. Indeed in 2000, Toomas in addition to security guarantees. All gers, and threats.40 Hendrik Ilves, then the Foreign Minister three currently acknowledge that, the of Estonia, argued, The EU is not a secu- majority of traditional and new challenges The Use of Force and International rity organization and Estonia does not to security are transnational in nature.37 Law regard membership in the EU as a secu- While Latvia acknowledges that, the Historical precedents have left the Bal- rity guarantee. But he also added, Yet probability of a global war has decreased, tic states with the conflicting desire to for over 50 years, the Union has created the government cites the increase in prob- uphold the international legal order and the non-military basis for security and ability of regional and local crises, ille- to aid others in totalitarian regimes. With stability in Europe. The EU has done gal uncontrolled migration, and the no mention of the latter in any of the the most to add to stability in the post- spread of weapons of mass destruction as security concepts, it appears as if the Baltics communist world in the past decade.35 some of its fundamental threats.38 remain conflicted on this issue and pre- Joint memberships in the EU and NATO Lithuania adds terrorism to the list of fer ad hoc policies. The Latvian National show that stability and security are in- serious security threats.39 Because of the Security Concept States that, Upon imple- tertwined. rising importance of these unconven- menting the security policy, Latvia com-
75 plies with the principles of international sibility of democracies to defend our caution in expanding EU defence policy, law, which are incorporated in the Stat- shared values.44 because that might duplicate the existing utes of the United Nations, documents cooperation within the NATO framework of the Organisation for Security and Co- The EU and NATO and because the EU Member States cur- operation in Europe, as well as the inter- As full-fledged members of the EU and rently lack the military capacity due to national agreements binding for Latvia.41 NATO, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania now chronic under-investment. The EUs con- While Latvia complies with the prin- have three spheres of immediate foreign tribution at present should be conflict ciples of international law, Lithuania re- policy operations. All three have direct prevention, civil crisis management and lies less on international law by giving pri- relations with Russia and other Eastern resolution of low-intensity military con- ority to participation in operations led by neighbours, while they also have access to flicts.48 Latvia agrees that as European organisations that acquire the mandate of the rest of Europe as well as the United states assume greater responsibility for the United Nations Security Council.42 States. These three vectors provide flex- their own security and defence, they Estonia also, participates in the establish- ibility for each to balance different influ- should use this to play a more impor- ment of broad norms and the implementa- ences and interests. 45 Each of the three, tant role in the international crisis man- tion and development of principles.43 While however, clearly identifies the United States agement.49 the difference is slight, it is an important as their primary security guarantor, Furthermore, the three Baltics have one. It appears as if Latvia has taken a more through NATO. Kasekamp and Sæter ar- clearly pronounced that solidarity with European approach to international law gue that the Baltic states are strong the EUs Common Foreign Policy and while Lithuania and Estonia have sided with Atlanticists. They have always viewed the participation together with the EU in the the United States by acknowledging that they USA as the only credible counterbalance process of developing a European Secu- may act without a UN mandate, but prefer to Russia and as the only country that could rity and Defence Policy (ESDP) should to act with a UN mandate. With that said, guarantee their security.46 The Latvian be done in such a way that complements however, it is important to note that Latvia Security Concept, for example, states, In and strengthens the transatlantic partner- signed the Vilnius 10 letter on Iraq that sup- the sphere of common defence, NATO and ship between Europe and the United ported the US recent intervention in Iraq the USA still retain the leading role.47 States.50 As a Baltic security identity is because all ten, understand the dangers Indeed, the Estonian governments being created, Baltic security cooperation posed by tyranny and the special respon- position on the CFSP and ESDP reflects has been achieved in several fields in or-
76 der to satisfy NATO (read: US) require- concern, but the Republic of Lithuania and cooperation. All three states should ments. The Baltic Battalion, or BALTBAT, does not observe any immediate military place themselves at the forefront of is the oldest project of Baltic defence co- threat to national security and as a result organisational relations with Russia to operation.51 In addition to BALTBAT, does not regard any state as its enemy.55 offer advice and expertise as dialogue in- the Baltic Naval Squaldron (BALTRON), While this may be true, the transnational creases between Russia and both the EU the Baltic Air Surveillance Network problems, including the proliferation of and NATO. By exploiting their positions (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence Col- WMD, ethnic conflicts, and illegal migra- as the gateway between the West and lege (BALTDEFCOL) have all been de- tion, discussed in each of the security Eurasia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can signed to increase the interoperability of concepts are directly related to problems work to improve conditions on both the Baltic forces for NATO missions.52 in Russia. For this reason, it is in each sides. Closer economic and trade ties states best interests to use their new posi- should be sought to help normalise rela- II. On Russia tions in the international arena to help tions and boost mutual trust and confi- Russia and Belarus develop into fully dence. While Russian-Baltic relations have democratic countries with functioning Since the end of the Cold War, Russia been very tense, as one Estonian civil ser- market economies which would support has advocated a multipolar world in or- vant has observed, we have never in our democratic values generally recognized in der to check the hegemonic power of the history had such good relations as now, the societies of European and transatlan- US. For that reason, Russia has been ea- and this is true.53 Although the Baltic tic countries.56 ger to support some European states de- states cannot change their geographical Baltic membership in the EU and sires for an EU that will rival or counter- position, while respecting the parameter NATO should finally end Russias balance the US power. To gain conces- of non-mobility, they can, through alli- patronising belief that Estonia, Latvia and sions and aggravate tensions, Russia has ance policy, . . . modify its significance.54 Lithuania remain in Russias sphere of been trying to play the EU against NATO This is the central ramification of Baltic influence. By being forced to treat the for the past ten years, and the Baltics must memberships in the EU and NATO and Baltics as it would treat any other Euro- work to limit this as much as possible this point cannot be overstated. pean state, Russia will seem even less threat- because it directly counters their inter- All three acknowledge that the ongo- ening to Baltic security and this may pro- ests as listed in their Security Concepts. ing instability in Russia is a source of vide the platform for increased dialogue As Renatas Norkus stated of Lithuania,
77 It is going to be our primary national ensure NATO interoperabililty. With EU What Kind of the EU and NATO interest, as a member of both organiza- and NATO memberships, each state should Have the Baltics Joined? tions, to work with other members to create its own grand strategy that will set The dual enlargements have greatly al- make sure that the partnership remains out clear goals for relations with the US, tered both the EU and NATO and these strong and relevant.57 EU, and its Eastern neighbours. While Es- organisations will continue to transform As long as the US remains the super- tonia, Latvia and Lithuania must be ready as the needs and capabilities of the new power, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to deal with problems on an ad hoc basis members are incorporated. It is very pos- should work to keep NATO strong, should it be necessary, careful planning will sible, as Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. through close the US involvement in the ensure their security both domestically and Keeler suggest, that enlargement will accel- Alliance. A more European NATO would in the international arena. erate NATOs transformation from a col- be welcomed in Moscow precisely because In order to stay abreast of develop- lective defence to a collective security it would be a much weaker, indeed a ter- ments in a rapidly changing world, each agency.60 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania minally sick, NATO. In short, there is no state must be ready to have regular meet- must work to ensure that NATO does not security-Europe.58 Headlines such as, ings in order to talk about the interna- devolve into a more muscular OSCE. They Russia may be offered bigger say in Eu- tional security environment and question, want to join the Alliance because of what ropean security59 ensure the impression What do the EU and NATO do for our it was. Unfortunately, their very member- that, for now, only NATO can guarantee security? With a panel of civil servants, ship changes NATO, making it less attrac- European security. military officers, politicians and academ- tive as a military security product.61 ics, these meetings should form the basis It seems that the Baltic states have III. Policy Recommendations of each states security policies. I would sought to join the NATO of the 1950s recommend that the committees use Barry more than the contemporary NATO. For the immediate future, and as long as Buzans work on security, which holds Vaidotas Urbelis, for example, argues that the US involvement in Europe is the only that security should be each states master many of the new member states, includ- real security guarantor, the Baltics should: concept, as its basis. This would allow ing the Baltics, loathe the Russians, are work with the EU to develop its CFSP, military, political, economic, environmen- suspicious of other Europeans and are strengthen their ties with the US, and stay tal and societal factors to be considered attracted to the Americans. For them, it militarily competitive with US standards to within the security rubric. is true today what was true for many West
78 Europeans fifty years ago: to keep the late in the accession process that the Baltics shows that finding an equilibrium will not Russians out, the Americans in and the realised they were inheriting European be an easy task for the Baltic states. A sepa- Germans down.62 Enlargement, however, security architecture as well. rate issue is that voices in France in par- has altered NATO. Prior to the collapse ticular have expressed concern that the new of the Soviet Union, NATO security was The British Approach for NATO? members (especially Poland, and in the primarily tied to the US nuclear security For the time being, Baltic leaders future the Baltic states) are too prone to umbrella. As of late, talk of the nuclear should act from the British policymakers agree with the U.S. positions.65 Unlike link has all but disappeared. Similarly, the belief that any diminution of the US role these policymakers, however, I believe that role of Germany is key to the very success in European security is a loss for European varying levels and voices of pro-American of European integration, while the in- security as a whole.64 Baltic governments and pro-European security strategies are crease in NATO-Russian dialogues shows must take care to avoid repeating Tony Blairs best for the Alliance. It is very possible that Russia is as much in as out of mistake of alienating a substantial portion that the UK, Poland and Estonia, Latvia NATO. of his electorate in order to support the and Lithuania will form a pro-American Likewise, it seems that the Baltics were US policies. This problem associated with bloc within NATO. Pro-American voices hoping to join the EU of the 1970s and the British approach raises an important are especially important today and can act 1980s the body which helped Spain, point which has great security ramifications, as the British have, to keep the Alliance Portugal, and Ireland to develop at a phe- because a peoples feeling of insecurity will united while pushing the US foreign policy nomenal pace but which in security and rise when they distrust their democratically- to be more multilateral. foreign policy followed the U.S. lead.63 elected government or when that govern- The EU has undergone significant changes ment ignores their wishes on such matters On European Defence in the last decade, however, and despite of high-politics. The Baltic states caution with regards reforms, it is apparent that new members Another problem that will continue to to European desires for assuming more will not receive the same amount of sup- plague the Baltic governments is how to defence responsibility is natural when port and aid as the Poor Four received. balance Europe and the US. Jacques Chi- taken in the context that Baltic states re- Indeed, it is no longer possible to speak racs statement in February 2003 that by tain considerably more faith in the United of the EU as merely a political and eco- taking a pro-American stance, Eastern Eu- States and NATO in this regard.66 Indeed, nomic actor, but it was not until very ropeans missed an opportunity to shut up if there is ever going to be a security-
79 Europe, Europe must be willing to spend technology would assure a continued US USA in a wider framework of Baltic sea more on defence in order to gain capa- interest in Baltic security. As the British regional cooperation.69 bilities. A European Armaments Agency example illustrates, those who are able to Because of the transnational nature of is essential for the promotion of Euro- work with the US military garner the re- many of todays threats, NATOs recent pean armaments projects and the long- spect of Washington and frequently gain push to involve itself in combating the term survival of a European armaments more importance and influence in US proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- industry,67 argues Emil Kirchner. Esto- foreign policy. tion (WMD) and terrorism is beneficial nia, Latvia and Lithuania should encour- to all three Baltic states. Estonia, Latvia age developments towards such an agency, Conclusions and Lithuania should also encourage with the provision that monies for re- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have NATO and the EU to develop a com- search and development ensure top-qual- entered a new era of international poli- mon policy toward states that possess or ity European armaments that utilise the tics. For the seek to possess weapons of mass destruc- latest technology. Baltic states, it is equally important that tion or that support terrorism in any To increase its own capabilities and to the US maintains its security presence in way.70 Furthermore, as Schengen borders ensure compatibility with the US war ma- Europe and that the experiment in Euro- come into effect, the Estonian, Latvian chinery, the Baltic states should use their pean integration continues to succeed. and Lithuanian governments should work youth to create niche forces that are tech- Together, these organisations help pro- to increase NATO-EU cooperation on nologically superior. Vaidotas Urbelis has tect all aspects of Baltic independence and these matters. argued, Due to the capability gap, the security. Through joint efforts, Estonia, Clearly the Transatlantic Alliance needs US will less and less rely on European con- Latvia and Lithuania have already suc- to be more balanced, not just for the sake tribution in future operations. Because ceeded in creating a substantially more of NATO or Europe, but to increase the of this, he worries that the diminishing secure environment than the one they member states security across North importance of Europe means a decreas- inhabited ten years ago. Furthermore, America and Europe. As the Baltic states ing US interest and lower level of involve- their efforts have already strengthened the continue to work for a strong NATO and ment in the US into CE and Northern Transatlantic link by engaging the USA EU, it is important to keep in mind Bozos European affairs.68 The development of not only in the promotion of specific argument that, Today it is the prospect niche forces that rely on US-compatible Baltic interests but by also engaging the of a more assertive EU that constitutes
80 the true guarantee in such a strategic re- D.C. 4 April 1949) www.nato.int. John T.S. Keeler, Eds., Defending Europe: The EU, balancing, and hence its best hope of con- 9 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliances NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (New New Roles in International Security (Washington, York: Macmillan 2003), 64. serving a strong transatlantic relation- D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), 29. 19 Yost, 1998, 209-10. 71 ship. With the security benefits that hail 10 Kenneth Younger in his private diary, qtd. in 20 The Government of France, French Foreign from NATO and EU membership, Esto- Cook, 235. Policy Principles. nia, Latvia and Lithuania will be able to 11Yost 1998, 62. 21 The Germany Embassy in the United King- 12 pursue better relations with their Eastern Yost 1998, 49. dom, German Foreign Policy: an introduction. 13 Quoted in John Barrett, NATO Reform: Alli- 22 Henry A. Kissinger and Laurence H. Sum- neighbours. Having normalised relations ance Policy and Cooperative Security, in Ingo mers, Co-Chairs, Charles A. Kupchan, Project in the international security context, it Peters, Ed., New Security Challenges: The Adaptation Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership: Report of will be important for each state to use the of International Institutions - Reforming the UN, An Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on EU and NATO machinery to improve NATO, EU, and CSCE since 1989 (New York: St. Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Martins Press, 1996), 129. Relations 2004), 9. domestic factors, such as the regional dis- 14 Jacques Poos on ITN News, 28 June 1991. 23 Robert Kagan, The Healer, The Guardian, 3 parity of wealth, the lack of trust in gov- Yost, 193. Cited in Gow, Triumph of the Lack of March 2003. ernment and the lack of civil society net- Will, 48, 50. 24 See the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2003. works, to further strengthen each states 15 Thomas-Durell Young, NATOs Double Ex- 25 Brian Murphy, Finding Balance in the Trans- pansion and the Challenge of Reforming NATOs atlantic Security Equation, 16 September 2003, security. Military Structures, in John Boyd and Leo 26 Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, The EU, Dreapir, Eds., EU Common Foreign and Security Policy: NATO, and the Quest for European Autonomy, in 1 I will use the terms Baltic States and Baltics New Europe, New Century, Old Imperialism Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, Eds., Defend- to refer to the Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and (Merseyside: Campaign against Euro-federalism, ing Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Lithuania. 2000), 105. Autonomy (New York: Macmillan 2003), 3. 2 The Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of Na- 16 Emil J. Kirchner, Second Pillar and Eastern 27 William Cohen quoted in Elizabeth Becker, tional Defence, National Security Strategy (Vilnius, Enlargement: The Prospects for a European Secu- European Allies to Spend More on Weapons, 2002), Article 5.2.1. rity and Defence Identity, in John Boyd and Leo New York Times, 22 September 1999, pA13. In David 3 Don Cook, Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945- Dreapir, Eds., EU Common Foreign and Security Policy: S. Yost, The U.S.-European Capabilities Gap and 1950 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1989), 179. New Europe, New Century, Old Imperialism the Prospects for ESDP in Jolyon Howorth and 4 Ibid., 176. (Merseyside: Campaign against Euro-federalism, John T.S. Keeler, Eds., Defending Europe: The EU, 5 Ibid., 179. 2000), 50. NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (New 6 Ibid., 183. 17 January 1994 Summit Decision, Yost 1998, 201. York: Macmillan 2003), 83. 7 Ibid., 218. 18 Frédéric Bozo The Effects of Kosovo and the 28 Alexander Moens, ESDP, the United States 8 NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, Danger of Decoupling, in Jolyon Howorth and and the Atlantic Alliance, in Jolyon Howorth
81 and John T.S. Keeler, Eds., Defending Europe: The 38 The Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, 50 The Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of Na- EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia tional Defence, National Security Strategy 2002, Ar- (New York: Macmillan 2003), 27. 2002, Article 2.1. ticle 6.1.2.1. 29 Yosts interview in London, 28 June 2000, in 39 The Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of National 51 In May 2003, the Defence Ministers of the Howorth and Keeler, 92. Defence, National Security Strategy 2002, Article 4.1.1. three Baltic states decided to terminate the project 30 Western European Union, Council of Minis- 40 Ibid., Article 5.2.3.3.2. and replace it with other forms of co-operation ters, Bonn, 19 June 1992, Petersberg Declaration, Para- 41 Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, The between the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian graph 4 of Part II, On Strengthening WEUs National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia land forces which yet remain to be determined. Operational Role. 2002, Article 1.2. 52 Estonian Ministry of Defence, Baltic Defence 31 President George W. Bush, The National Secu- 42 The Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of Na- Cooperation, (Tallinn, 2002). rity Strategy of the United States of America, Septem- tional Defence, National Security Strategy 2002, Ar- 53 Authors interview in Tallinn, April 2003. ber 2002. ticle 6.1.3.7. 54 Hans Mouritzen, Focus and Axioms, in 32 Eitvydas Bajarunas, The Interests and Efforts 43 Republic of Estonia, National Security Concept Hans Mouritzen, ed., Bordering Russia: Theory and of Lithuania, in Georg Klöcker, Ed., Ten Years of the Republic of Estonia, (Tallinn, 2001), Article 2.5. Prospects for Europes Baltic Rim (Aldershot: Ashgate after the Baltic States Re-Entered the International Stage 44 Mihaela Gherghishan, Vilnius 10 sign letter 1998), 7. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2001), on Iraq, EU Observer, 06.02.2003. 55 The Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of Na- 220. 45 Vaidotas Urbelis, Changes in US Global Se- tional Defence, National Security Strategy 2002, Ar- 33 Andres Kasekamp and Martin Sæter, Estonian curity Strategy and their Implications for ticle 2.4. Membership in the EU: Security and Foreign Policy As- Lithuania, in Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, 56 Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, The pects (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International (Vilnius: Strategic Research Center 2003), 58. National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia Affairs, 2003) 10. 46 Andres Kasekamp and Martin Sæter, Estonian (Riga,2002), Article 3.1. 34 Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, The Membership in the EU: Security and Foreign Policy As- 57 Renatas Norkus, Lithuanias Foreign and National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia pects (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Security Policy Agenda Beyond 2004: Challenges (Vilnius, 2002), Article 3.1. Affairs, 2003), 32. and Opportunities, in Baltic Defence Review, no. 35 Thomas Hendrik Ilves, The Estonian Per- 47 The Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, 9, vol 1/2003, p. 117. spective on EU and NATO Enlargement, in Sven The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia 58 Colin S. Gray, NATO and the Evolving Structure Arnswald and Marcus Wenig, Eds., German and 2002, Article 2.1. of Order in Europe: Changing Terms of the Transatlan- American Policies Towards the Baltic States: The Per- 48 Andres Kasekamp and Martin Sæter, Estonian tic Bargain?, Hull Strategy Papers #1, (University spectives of EU and NATO Enlargement (Germany: Membership in the EU: Security and Foreign Policy As- of Hull: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1997), 81. Nomos Verlagsgesselschaft 2000), 83. pects (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International 59 EUObserver, 26 February 2004. 36 The Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of Na- Affairs, 2003) 31. 60 Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, The tional Defence, National Security Strategy 2002, Ar- 49 The Republic of Latvia, Ministry of Defence, EU, NATO, and the Quest for European Au- ticle 2.4. The National Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia tonomy, in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, 37 Ibid., Article 2.3. 2002, Article 2.1. Eds., Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest
82 for European Autonomy (New York: Macmillan 2003), New Europe, New Century, Old Imperialism (Mersey- 14. side: Campaign against Euro-federalism, 2000), 61 Julian Lindley-French, Dilemmas of NATO 57. Enlargement, in Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. 68 Vaidotas Urbelis, Changes in US Global Se- Keeler, Eds., Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and curity Strategy and their Implications for the Quest for European Autonomy (New York: Lithuania, in Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, Macmillan 2003), 190-1. (Vilnius: Strategic Research Center 2003), 46. 62 Vaidotas Urbelis, Changes in US Global Se- 69 Atis Lejin, The Baltic States, Germany, and curity Strategy and their Implications for Lithua- the United States, in Sven Arnswald and Marcus nia, in Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, (Vilnius: Wenig, Eds., German and American Policies Towards Strategic Research Center 2003), 49. the Baltic States: The Perspectives of EU and NATO 63 Christopher Bobinksi, Polish Illusions and Enlargement (Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesselschaft Reality in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, Eds., 2000), 60. Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO, and the Price 70 Henry A. Kissinger and Laurence H. Sum- of Membership (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie En- mers, Co-Chairs, Charles A. Kupchan, Project dowment for International Peace 2003), 242. Director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership: Report of 64 Paul R.S. Gerhard, The United States and Euro- An Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on pean Security, Adelphi Paper 286 (London: IISS, Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign 1994), 20. Relations 2004), 7. 65 Karl-Heinz Kamp, The Dynamics of NATO 71 Frédéric Bozo, The Effects of Kosovo and the Enlargement, in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Danger of Decoupling, in Jolyon Howorth and Trenin, Eds., Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO, John T.S. Keeler, Eds., Defending Europe: The EU, and the Price of Membership (Washington, D.C.: NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy (New Carnegie Endowment for International Peace York: Macmillan 2003), 73. 2003), 190. 66 Zaneta Ozolina, The EU and the Baltic States in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, Eds., Am- bivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace 2003), 209. 67 Emil J. Kirchner, Second Pillar and eastern enlargement: The prospects for a European Secu- rity and Defence Identity, in John Boyd and Leo Dreapir, Eds., EU Common Foreign and Security Policy:
83 EU-NATO Relations: A European vision
By Captain (Navy) Jean-François Morel*
n analysis of relations between Member States decided in December 2000 vision in the field of security and defence) the European Union and NATO in Nice to establish politico-military struc- and the work on the future European Con- is far from being a comparison tures. The first uniformed officers thus stitution have all paved the way for new of like organisations. On the one hand, began working with their civilian colleagues European defence projects. NATO is a political-military Atlantic Alli- in Brussels at the General Secretariat of the In the light of the evolving and at ance which has been in existence for 54 European Union. times extremely complicated circum- years and which has embarked in the past In 2003 the Military Staff carried out stances on both sides, it is not surprising few months on a process of transforma- the strategic planning for the first two mili- that there should be transatlantic tensions, tion aimed at adapting its existing struc- tary peace-keeping operations in the history against a background of disagreements on tures to the new and rapidly evolving of the EU, one in the Former Yugoslav the Middle East, leading to crises of ma- threats of our century. On the other hand, Republic of Macedonia and the other in turity between the EU and NATO1 , mu- the European Union is a unique the Democratic Republic of the Congo, tual suspicion, accusations of competition organisation, its Member States having both of which have been successfully com- 2 , and even the view that one organisation created common institutions to which they pleted. The experience of these operations, is a threat to the future of the other. delegate part of their sovereignty, particu- enlargement (which will increase the popu- larly in the economic, financial, environ- lation of the EU to nearly half a billion Closer relations mental and even legal spheres. The Mili- inhabitants producing about a quarter of tary Staff of the European Union was not world GNP), the recent European Security Strat- In the course of 2003, however, rela- set up until June 2001, after the fifteen egy (which has provided the EU with a shared tions between the military staffs became
* Captain (Navy) Jean-François Morel is a Chief Executive Officer at the EU Military Staff.
84 closer and more regular, particularly as a tion Concordia in the Former Yugoslav briefings on the steps being taken to im- result of the so-called Berlin Plus agree- Republic of Macedonia, which had access prove military capabilities and adapt them ments, which strengthen the EUs opera- to NATO military assets and capabilities. to new needs. Despite differences in meth- tional capability and provide a framework Operation Concordia concluded in mid- ods between the EU and NATO, countries for the strategic partnership between the December 2003 and is considered to have which are members of both organisations two organisations in the area of military been a success on the ground. The do not have forces assigned exclusively to crisis management. Proxima police mission, launched by the one or the other organisation: thus, since In practice, the officers concerned are EU towards the end of 2003, opens a new the forces come from the same pool, im- often the same: many of those recently phase with civil objectives, made possible provements made by one will necessarily assigned to the EU Military Staff have by the successful conclusion of the mili- benefit the other as long as there is some acquired considerable experience of tary phase. basic coordination. NATO in the course of their careers and There are also other regular official In short, contacts between the two regularly receive training from NATO. contacts at all levels: between the organisations take place in an atmosphere Like the operational forces, the military Secretaries-General of NATO and the of cooperation. Both sides seem to be staffs of the two organisations are taken Council of the EU, between the Ambassa- working to minimise the repercussions from the same pool of officers, share the dors of the respective Member States at of the differences on Iraq. With the prepa- same working methods and social codes, meetings of the EUs Political and Secu- ration of a new EU operation in Bosnia and the same networks of contacts. More- rity Committee and the North Atlantic and Herzegovina, involving a military over, movement in the opposite direc- Council, and between senior military rep- component with access to NATO assets tion is beginning to take place: officers resentatives at meetings of the military and capabilities, 2004 may see movement finishing their assignments with the EU committees of the two organisations. towards a new equilibrium. Military Staff are sometimes seconded These ongoing contacts enable informa- again to NATO, particularly to the Inter- tion to be exchanged, particularly in rela- Fundamental issues not yet national Military Staff in Brussels or the tion to operations and capability. resolved SHAPE Military Staff in Mons 3 . A EU-NATO working group on mili- This naturally facilitated the planning tary capabilities has been meeting regu- Nevertheless, such an equilibrium in and implementation of the EUs Opera- larly for the last few months for mutual relations between the two organisations
85 is far from having been achieved, with of NATOs European command options an attempt to take on wider responsibili- differences on fundamental issues remain- (including the role of the European ties on the European continent? ing between proponents of greater au- Deputy to the SACEUR4 ) and the use of Secondly, the success of Operation tonomy for European security and de- Alliance assets and capabilities identified Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Re- fence policy and those who insist on in advance by the Alliance. Giving cre- public of Macedonia was not achieved closely linking the control of European dence to the idea that the Berlin Plus ar- without some ill feeling. An analysis of military action to NATO. This is reflected, rangements might actually reflect the whole the lessons to be drawn from the opera- in practice, in friction in relation to a EU-NATO relationship can be viewed as tion reveals a number of stumbling blocks, number of vital issues. an attempt to wield influence over fields particularly in relation to the command First, although the Berlin Plus arrange- which legally fall outside the scope of structure used by NATO, the sharing of ments have been implemented by an EU Berlin Plus: in particular, work on im- information, and the establishment of the operation with access to NATO resources proving military capabilities, arrange- EUs operational headquarters within assets and capabilities, there are differing ments for associating non-EU NATO SHAPE. These difficulties need to be resolved interpretations as to the scope and field members with European operations and as far as possible before the launch (follow- of application of Berlin Plus. Must the the use of an alliance members resources ing NATOs SFOR mission in Bosnia and EU systematically consult NATO prior to for an EU military operation. Herzogovina) of a new more global EU all military operations even if it does not Some ambiguity surrounds the role of operation which will also make use of NATO intend to use Atlantic Alliance resources? the European Deputy SACEUR, who is military assets and capabilities. In this regard, there was surprise in some regarded by the Alliance as the strategic Finally, the creation of rapid reaction quarters that NATO was not consulted coordinator and as being well-placed to forces is one of the big challenges facing when the fifteen Member States decided resolve conflicting demands. The broad the two organisations. The NATO Response to launch the Artemis military operation interpretation of this role is of concern Force (NRF) was set up last year, and a in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to proponents of greater autonomy for British-French-German proposal this year in conjunction with the UN but without European defence: does it refer to strate- seeks to create within the EU tactical battle recourse to NATO. gic coordination within the Alliance it- groups of 1,500 men, which would be able The arrangements cover assured access self or does it represent a desire to go to participate in European operations to NATO planning capabilities, the use beyond the strictly NATO framework in without recourse to NATO. This initia-
86 tive is of particular interest to the United vention, civil and military capabilities, and Nations, which shares the EUs European Union initiative partnership. It recognises in particular multilateralist vision and concern for Af- that none of the new threats identified rica. In the light of the evolving conditions are purely military: terrorism; prolifera- Although the missions of the NRF and on both sides, how are we to identify tion of arms of mass destruction; regional the EUs Rapid Reaction Force are poten- those factors which are already playing a insecurity, which often directly or indi- tially different, they will both be calling part in the basic trend and will impinge rectly affects European interests; and on the same pool of rapidly deployable in the future on the EU-NATO relation- organised crime, of which Europe is a national forces. How are the implications ship? prime target. of this to be managed? While it is true From a European standpoint, there In combating these threats, which that future crises in different parts of the appears to be potential for the Union to would be accentuated if they were to world will not necessarily require large enjoy a certain degree of initiative. In materialise concurrently, the EU plans to military forces, this issue will remain a particular, the aspiration (which, in truth, use a combination of the civil and mili- concern until the mobility and is recent) to build a genuine Common tary instruments available to it. In par- interoperability of the various military Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), ticular, it will reinforce and broaden the tools has developed sufficiently to limit given new impetus by enlargement, could range of military tasks that can be carried potential friction. help clarify this debate. It is against this out by European defence to prevent con- The decision on which organisation is backdrop that the development of the flicts or restore peace. to participate in an operation will depend European Security and Defence Policy Finding an appropriate combination largely on political considerations, par- (ESDP) is taking place. of military and civil instruments is one ticularly the degree of involvement of the The European Security Strategy was ap- of the major challenges facing the EU, United States. However, factors such as proved by the fifteen Member States in firstly in relation to the future of Bosnia the nature of the specific operation in December 2003 on the basis of a proposal and Herzogovina, where the EU is pre- question and the simultaneous conduct from the High Representative for the paring to launch a global mission follow- of other operations will influence the CFSP. Inconceivable before 2003, it pro- ing NATOs SFOR military mission. The choice of organisation to intervene in vides a common strategic vision for the Union has been engaged in a police mis- specific cases. Unions external action, founded on pre- sion there for over a year a follow-up to
87 the one conducted by the United Na- Member States can oppose progress if which envisages a Union Minister for For- tions5 which aims to assist in the devel- they so wish. eign Affairs, under whose authority a Eu- opment of the local police force and is Many of the Member States Ministries ropean External Action Service would be set scheduled to conclude at the end of 2005. of Defence have bodies in which officers up, composed of personnel from the Gen- A combined strategy is therefore being from the three armed services, diplomats eral Secretariat of the Council (i.e. poten- put in place in order to create, more gen- and civilian analysts, frequently from uni- tially both civilian and military), from erally, a true European perspective for the versity backgrounds, work together. Such the Commission and personnel seconded Western Balkan countries. bodies enable different visions and areas from the national diplomatic services. The Achieving this aim will require, in prac- of expertise to contribute to tackling cur- Union Minister for Foreign Affairs would also tice, greater civilian-military cooperation, rent politico-military problems. No such have authority over Union delegations in firstly within the European Union itself, structures exist formally at EU level, al- third countries, which would also be made where very significant improvements are though civilian-military cooperation is up of staff with a broad range of experi- necessary. While the documents produced one of the EUs main objectives. Approved ence. This would undoubtedly improve in the field of security and defence are in 2000 in Nice, the EUs politico-military the EUs capacity to evaluate world devel- already often common to the different structures are based on those of NATO, opments, and to analyse, plan and coor- EU bodies, the experts who prepare them which no doubt facilitated the negotia- dinate European actions. have probably gone as far as they can in tions when they were being defined; how- Other provisions in the draft Consti- cooperating under the current institu- ever, they do not provide an optimum tution will probably help to get the Eu- tional framework. It needs to be asked response to the wish to combine civil and ropean Security and Defence Policy prop- how a Community structure such as the military instruments in dealing with the erly off the ground. Whereas at present European Commission, which has its threats facing us today. the EU cannot legally launch operations own decision-making process for imple- in the territory of one of its Member menting powerful civilian instruments, Institutional advances States, the solidarity clause would is to be made to fit in with the authorise assistance to any Member State politico-military structures of the EU The necessary institutional advances which fell victim to a terrorist attack or a Council, which are controlled on an in- should take place with the future Consti- natural disaster, through the mobilisation tergovernmental basis, i.e. any of the tution for Europe, the draft version of of all possible EU instruments, including
88 military assets (e.g. helicopters, mobile on more binding commitments while re- requires progress in the field of the Com- medical installations, decontamination maining within the framework of the Union. mon Foreign and Security Policy if in- equipment). This opens a significant field The potential resulting improvements in consistencies and imbalances are to be for international civilian-military coop- military capabilities in terms of the avoided. Moreover, the importance of the eration. The dramatic events since 11 Sep- interoperability of materials, training and entity resulting from the accession of ten tember 2001 have heightened awareness operations, etc. would contribute to increas- new countries in 2004 will be such that it of the threats to populations and high- ing the credibility of European aspirations. will no longer be able to ignore its re- lighted the scope of the action that needs The new structures and crisis management sponsibilities in Europe and in the wider to be taken at international level. procedures are meaningless if they fail to world. And the process is not yet over: in Closer cooperation could even cover produce a range of credible capabilities to the near future other countries will be mutual defence in the event of one of the cope with the challenges facing the enlarged fulfilling their European vocation. Strat- participating States being the subject of Europe. Furthermore, such efforts cannot egies are thus being put in place vis-à-vis armed aggression on its territory. Discus- but benefit the Atlantic Alliance. the EUs partners and neighbours such as sions on this issue seek to reassure those the United Nations, the United States, concerned about the possible weakening Need for patience Russia, the countries of the Near and of NATOs collective defence. For the Middle East, and all those countries on Union, however, the challenge takes on The development of the European the borders of the enlarged Europe. another meaning in the context of its own Union is governed essentially by its own This acceleration in development is logical development: is it really possible internal logic and takes place at its own really very recent, and the major effort to pursue European construction and sometimes irregular rhythm. An area of that has begun will require time to sus- expect to share a community of destiny prosperity, security and structured diver- tain the necessary political will, stabilise without solidarity capable of defending sity is gradually being put in place, not institutional aspects, optimise procedures major interests? in opposition to any other entity but and acquire operational capabilities that Finally, the possibility of structured co- because it responds to an internal need meet European aspirations and are effec- operation in the field of defence, which is which has reasserted itself in one way or tive on the ground. also excluded under the current Treaty, is another. More specifically, the integration The development of a new strategic intended to enable Member States to take achieved to date in many spheres now environment will inevitably have an im-
89 pact on existing arrangements. It appears to its policies: Washington has for some 5 On 1 January 2003 the European Union Police that three conditions will need to be ful- time past encouraged the development and Mission succeeded the UNs International Police Task Force, which had been in place for seven years. filled if harmonious relations are to exist adaptation of European military capabili- between the European Security and De- ties. It shares strategic objectives, particu- fence Policy and NATO in the future. larly the fight against terrorism and against First, the EU must successfully build the proliferation of weapons of mass de- on its unique position as a global struction, with the Europeans. Making a organisation and combine in a credible practical input to these objectives in their way the civil and military instruments own way, and thereby demonstrating the available to it: this implies that it must significant contribution which Europe- equip itself with the necessary resources ans can make to achieving the long-term and adapt them regularly to evolving se- objectives they share with the Americans, curity needs. would boost mutual confidence and re- Secondly, NATO itself needs to bring spect. about its own transformation, find its new Against this background, the very de- role in the world and preserve the ways velopment of the European Security and in which a significant and confident link Defence Policy would seem to make for with the US partner can be maintained. the clarification of transatlantic relations. Finally, the EU needs to convince the United States, on the basis of experience 1 Laurent Zecchini Le Monde, 27 October of the ground, that it is capable of mak- 2003. 2 Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to NATO ing a contribution in the field of secu- (Press conference on 30 September 2003). rity and defence. Thus, while it has be- 3 Specifically, the first Director-General of the come ever more natural for Europeans to EU Military Staff, Lieutenant-General Rainer share sovereignty in broad areas, the US Schuwirth, is now Chief of Staff of SHAPE. 4 The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is an strategic vision views its allies essentially American General; his deputy, the Deputy in terms of their potential contributions SACEUR or DSACEUR is a British General.
90 Section III
Challenges to New NATO and New Regional Security Agenda
91 92 The Central Issues For Nato
By Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz*
As an alliance we have never been stronger. We have never been more united. We have reliability, efficiency, and solidarity epito- never been more resolved to move foreword together. mized in famous Article 5 security guar- antees. Everybody believed that in case of Paul. D Wolfowitz, Munich, Feb. 2nd, 2002. an aggression, once Article 5 was invoked, it was NATO which would take care of obody would say, that this confronting the aggressor and organising statement reflects the present 1. Reaffirm basic principles a collective response involving every mem- day reality. One can argue, was ber country. this statement true even at the time of the First is the question what does NATO Unfortunately it did not happen after year 2002? Right after 9/11 the question want to be? Everybody knows what September 11th, and the debates over Is NATO still relevant? was asked by many NATO used to be for the whole Cold addressing Turkeys security concerns prominent politicians on both sides of War period and even afterwards. The goals during the Iraq crisis cast a shadow of the Atlantic. Iraq has not dispersed the of the alliance were repeated in the Strate- doubt not only on Article 5 but even on clouds over the future of the Alliance. The gic Concept adopted in Washington in Article 4. Declaration of one of the mem- general feeling is that NATO is on a cross- 1999. According to this document, ber states that combat troops sent to Af- road. De Gaulle once said that all alliances NATOs essential and enduring purpose ghanistan would be withdrawn in case are like roses they wither and decay. If is to safeguard the freedom and security fighting broke out contributed further NATO does not want to share that fate of all its members by political and mili- to the destruction of the faith in the Ar- some serious issues have to be addressed. tary means. NATO developed an aura of ticle 5. * Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Relations (Warsaw, Poland) and a former Minister of National Defence of Poland.
93 So, the question arises, will NATO re- it to be. It applies first of all to the US. of their armed forces. Procurement of main, first of all, a common defense struc- Tool box concept reduces NATO from large transport planes; British and French ture, an alliance centered around mutu- an important forum of transatlantic po- plans to build new aircraft carriers are ally binding security guarantees, or will litical debate to a minor technical instru- good examples of these efforts. NATO it drift towards much looser common ment of American policy. However, if the Response Force could be a visible sign of security structure? US loses an interest in NATO, the Alli- change from ground defence posture of True, the classical type aggression , ance will be doomed. Without US leader- the Alliance to new missions. under present political circumstances, is ship, it is very likely NATO will not be a Equally important are radical changes rather remote. However, it would be im- dynamic, innovative structure and soon in the command structure. Swift imple- portant to remind what was said in Wash- will become another WEU. On the other mentation of these changes will be essen- ington in 1999, namely, that notwithstand- hand, strong and attractive NATO should tial for the reliability of the Alliance. In ing positive developments in the strategic not be seen as detrimental to justified and response to potential threats, it is the environment and the fact that large scale legitimate ambitions to make CFSP and SACEUR who will play the central role. conventional aggression against Alliance is ESDP important factors. However, as far as out of area actions very unlikely, the possibility of such a threat are concerned, the most likely regions that emerging over longer term exists. The crisis 2. Strengthen NATO military NATO as a whole might be engaged are of credibility of security guarantees already capabilities the wider Middle East, and Central and prompted some debates in NATO border East Asia (Africa, as Congo recent opera- countries about the need to pursue more The best way to make NATO not only tion shows, could be easily handled by national approach to basis security require- relevant but indispensable for the secu- Europeans alone, either under NATO or ments. If this issue is not promptly ad- rity of Europe against old and new threats, EU flag). This is why SACEUR would be dressed, we may see a destruction of one it is necessary to improve NATO capa- rather SAC World. of the greatest NATO achievements that is bilities. NATOs shortcomings were Only after the completion of this task, an internationalisation of the defence among the reasons for the US to go it NATO will be able to address new chal- policy in Europe. alone in Afghanistan. It is worth notic- lenges. To perform these duties, the sec- Naturally, NATO cannot be something ing that various European countries em- ond hat SACEUR wears (the commander else then what the member countries want barked on programmes of modernisation of the US and EUROCOM) would not
94 help that much. Taking into account the ing a preemptive action, more compre- are quite routine and rather dull events above-mentioned areas NATO could be hensive definitions of aggression and could be transformed into a vibrant fo- engaged, there is no single US command terrorism, as well as under what condi- rum debating important issues. which could be given to SACEUR as a tions a non-Article 5 missions could be replacement of the EU Command. On the carried out without the UNSC mandate 4. Integrate new member states other hand, in Kosovo, General Clark was ( but only with unanimous support of and maintain the cohesion in two chains of commands, one US and all NATO countries), etc.. Other, per- of the Alliance one NATO which created a lot of bad haps more important, political issues for feelings among Europeans who felt being a common debate are Israeli-Palestinian The process which may have a nega- bypassed by the US line. That is why it conflict, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or tive effect on the cohesion of the Alli- might be better to separate NATO com- Caucasus. ance is the process of expansion. The mand posts (including SACEUR) from the It is worth mentioning that NATO is common defence in a situation when national ones. not only a defence alliance. NATO is also there is no obvious well-defined enemy a hard core of a very extensive system of can be permanently, structurally 3. Strengthen NATO as a political concentric circles of cooperation in secu- organised in reliable fashion is only transatlantic forum rity issues. Going from the centre out- when there is a strong bond of common wards we have: NATO, candidates to values, perceptions, interests, and shared One of the reasons why NATO is in NATO, EAPC, PfP countries and coun- political culture between member coun- crises is the rift between the US and Eu- tries from outside the PfP but cooperat- tries. Hopefully, the forthcoming round rope, and to a lesser extent, divisions ing with NATO on various peacekeeping of expansion will not affect this founda- within Europe. Although the threat per- missions. On top of that we have NATO- tion of NATO, especially when the ef- ceptions on both sides of the Atlantic Russia Council, NATO-Ukraine Commis- fort will be made to integrate fully all are very much the same, there are seri- sion, Mediterranean Dialogue, North new member states. Further enlargement, ous differences about how to deal with Atlantic Assembly with observer countries, however distant, involving countries like them. Therefore, NATO should become etc.. It is clear that the political potential Croatia or Ukraine, may not adversely a central forum to discuss such issues of this system is far from being exhausted. affect the Alliance either. On the other like the sufficient conditions for wag- In particular, the EAPC meetings which hand, potential membership of for
95 example Russia may create an insur- loyalties, traditions, beliefs. We were with mountable problem in foreseeable future. 5. Restore the attachment to the you then, we are with you now. Your A group of prominent political figures indivisibility of the US and hopes are our hopes and your destiny is such as Bronislaw Geremek, Jacques European Security our destiny. Lanxade, or Klaus Nauman rightly said: an expanded NATO with Russia linked One of the greatest dangers of the post Let us hope that on the 50th anniver- to it could well be so political that its 9/11 and post Iraq period is a feeling that sary of that day, we shall be able to say defence guarantee would look hollow. the US does not need Europe and vice a that again. NATO would no longer be used in crisis. versa. However, there are very good rea- It would be the end of NATO a disaster sons to believe that decoupling the US for Europe and a severe blow to Ameri- and European security would have disas- can national interests. trous consequences. This is why we all need To preserve the cohesion of the Alli- more evidence that we are still together. ance of 26 or more member states, it seems The US should therefore become a self- necessary to introduce some disciplinary limiting super power. It means that even measures. As things are at this moment, if the US can carry out an operation like NATO membership is a one-way street. in Afghanistan alone, it would be worth- There is no way of getting rid of a coun- while to sacrifice some efficiency for the try which challenges basic principles of sake of taking at least some European part- the Alliance or can paralyse functioning ners. Symmetrically, if Europeans saw the of its structures. Therefore, there must a need to launch another operation in Af- legal possibility to limit the participation rica, it would be important to have at of such a country in some NATO institu- least a symbolic American contingent. tions or fora or, in more drastic cases, suspend or exclude a country which may On the 40th anniversary of the D Day, put the very existence of the Alliance at President Reagan said, we are bound to- risk. day by what bound us then the same
96 NATOs Security Agenda after Enlargement
Dr. Knut Kirste*
ith the accession of Estonia, door policy as documented by inviting and to guarantee the security interests of Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, the heads of government of Albania, its members. With the latest round of Slovenia, Bulgaria and Roma- Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Repub- enlargement, this includes new responsi- nia in late March 2004, NATO has com- lic of Macedonia to attend the accession bilities, in particular regarding air defence pleted its biggest enlargement round ever. ceremony in Washington on 29 March. arrangements for the three Baltic states Since then, more than 45 million addi- Second, because the Alliance is unlikely and Slovenia. Before the new members tional citizens have joined the Euro-At- to grant itself and its new members much joined the Alliance, an interim solution lantic Alliance. Today, roughly 40% of time for celebration and will soon return was found to ensure collective support NATOs nations are former socialist or to address the major security challenges for those countries currently not able to communist states. This is historically sig- facing NATO in the 21st century. provide for their own air defence. Within nificant because with this second round their capabilities, however, the new mem- of enlargement since the end of the Cold Contribution to the security and bers themselves will soon and indeed al- War, the Alliance has come closer to stability of the Euro-Atlantic area ready have become active providers of realising a vision of Europe whole and and beyond security, if only in certain niche areas, free. At the same time, this enlargement initially. has been remarkably non-dramatic: first, As in the past, one of NATOs main Protecting Allies security interests and because NATO will continue its open functions is to ensure collective defence its populations against new risks, includ- * Dr. Knut Kirste is with the Public Diplomacy Division, NATO IS. The views expressed are the authors and do not represent those of NATO.
97 ing the complex challenge of international rity concept: Today, the issue was not so sponsibility for guaranteeing the peace. In terrorism, has become a major task for much how many states NATO would have the medium term, until the NATO Sum- NATO. This can only be done by work- to defend. Rather, the issue was how many mit in Istanbul, the Alliance is expected ing closely with other international states would act as potential allies in times to install five additional Provincial Re- organisations and institutions which can of crisis.1 construction Teams (PRTs) in bring their specific strengths to bear. The Afghanistans Northern and Western prov- Alliance for its part has responded with a Afghanistan inces. It is obvious that NATO has a high military concept for the defence against level of ambition in Afghanistan but the terrorism, including elements of anti-ter- Afghanistan, where NATO took over expectations from the international com- rorism, counter-terrorism, consequence the command function of the ISAF in munity and indeed from the Afghan management and increased cooperation August 2003, is the first example for such people themselves may far exceed what with Partners, other states and interna- a more global perspective of the Alliance. NATOs nations are ultimately prepared tional organisations. In future, NATOs This serious and long term commitment to do. Nevertheless, NATO is committed role in combating international terror- is also a test case for how well the 26 Allies to its ISAF operation, and the new Secre- ism will have to be further refined, ad- and their Partners can muster the mili- tary General has made clear that the Alli- dressing issues such as the renegade con- tary capabilities needed to expand the so ance must not fail in Afghanistan. In this cept, cyber terrorism, better intelligence far limited mission beyond Kabul in or- context, the Alliances new members al- sharing and increased cooperation with der to help the Karzai government project ready contribute significantly - within the EU. its power and influence throughout the their means and capabilities - to NATOs Over the last few years, NATOs role country and to help secure the elections new operations.2 has also evolved beyond its classical de- scheduled for September. It is worth men- fence function and also includes provid- tioning that NATOs mandate in Afghani- Balkans ing security and stability on a more glo- stan differs from the role it played in the bal scale involving both Allies and Part- Balkans: in the former, the roughly 6.500 Afghanistan will prove once again what ners. The U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Alliance troops from 34 contributing has already been demonstrated in the Nicholas Burns, in a Senate hearing, has nations have a peace supporting mandate, Balkans: todays peace keeping and peace eloquently formulated NATOs new secu- while in the latter NATO had the full re- support operations require a long term
98 political and military commitment. The matism and trust, including by develop- Regardless of what happens next in Iraq, recent wave of unrest in Kosovo has ing joint approaches to the fight against there seems to be an emerging pattern of prompted NATO to review its planned terrorism, the proliferation of weapons cooperation between NATO and the UN troop reductions in the province.3 of mass destruction and civil emergency for many conceivable conflict scenarios. NATOs Kosovo commitment will be a planning. The new members with their While the UN will provide political le- lasting one for years to come. Now, other own rather pragmatic perspective on gitimacy and take the lead in coordinat- institutions must address the political, NATO-EU relations may accelerate and ing reconstruction and nation-building economic and social dimension of the add a positive momentum to this sensi- efforts, NATO can provide the security unfinished Kosovo business, including tive institutional process. relevant aspects of crisis management. The the pending status question. Alliance is better suited than the UN in In Bosnia and Herzegovina, by con- New Operations? combining both multilateral security trast, things look more promising and policy and military effectiveness. On the NATO will turn over a successful mili- It is widely believed that by the time one hand, today NATO offers a coopera- tary peace support operation to the EU of the Istanbul Summit, the Alliance will tion framework for 26 Allies, 20 diverse later in the year but will retain some re- engage in a debate about what - if any - Partners and a number of countries linked sidual functions in Bosnia. Both role it should play in Iraq. NATOs Secre- to the Alliance by a more or less struc- organisations are currently working on a tary General has repeatedly made clear that tured security dialogue. The old notion sensible distribution of roles for NATO the Alliance stands ready to assist if it is of NATO representing exclusively the and the EU after the hand-over. This is being called upon by a legitimate interim West, i.e. the United States and its Euro- an important test for the new strategic Iraqi government and if the proper con- pean Allies, today is as anachronistic as Partnership between NATO and the Eu- ditions, including a United Nations Se- the Cold War. This can help NATOs cred- ropean Union under the 2003 Berlin-Plus curity Council mandate, exist. Given ibility and acceptability. On the other agreement. In the longer term, NATO NATOs ongoing challenge in Afghani- hand, if nations muster the political will and the EU must extend their co-opera- stan and continuing operations in the and if the ongoing military transforma- tion beyond the purely military-techni- Balkans, any potential role for the Alli- tion of the Alliance is successfully com- cal aspects and start working together on ance in Iraq in the medium term will nec- pleted, NATOs military structures and a political-strategic level, based on prag- essarily have to be a limited one. mechanisms can provide very effective
99 military solutions to global security prob- ity should be ensured as scheduled by nations are to deliver on their ambi- lems. October 2006. The NRF is clearly de- tions. New members can and should signed for and capable to perform fu- make an important contribution to this Political and military ture high-end military operations but process by creating forces that can be transformation NATO is also increasingly more active of net value to the Alliance. in peace support operations beyond its Efficient political decision making and traditional area of operation. Afghani- Reform and Extension effective military capabilities are therefore stan may just be a first example of fur- of Partnerships key elements on which NATOs future ther operations to come. In that con- depends. The new Alliance has significantly text, the Alliance still needs to generate NATOs Partnership concept has been increased its political and operational substantial force contingents for extended an essential tool for the Alliance ever since ambitions, and those ambitions will have peace keeping and peace support opera- the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. By to be matched by appropriate military tions in far away places. Efforts are be- accepting seven new members from Cen- capabilities. ing made to significantly increase nations tral and Eastern Europe in March 2004, That is why NATO needs to carry output and usability targets, i.e. increas- NATO has come markedly closer to trans- through with its ongoing military and ing the number of troops that can be forming itself from a largely inward look- political reform process. One part of actually deployed in theatre. In addition, ing traditional defence alliance of the Cold the equation are obviously better mili- making NATOs force generation pro- War to an outward looking, Partnership tary capabilities. In this context, the cess, i.e. the way in which nations agree oriented security organisation. Today, NATO Response Force (NRF) is de- to commit troops to a NATO operation, NATO offers a range of diversified coop- signed to provide the Alliance with an more responsive to operational require- eration opportunities for members, Part- effective and rapid military tool capable ments, will be one of the greatest chal- ners, third countries and other interna- of mastering todays military challenges lenges for the Alliance. Political decision tional organisations, in particular the UN, in a new threat environment and on a making, force generation for individual the EU and the OSCE. The further high end level. The progress achieved operations and the Alliances overall de- strengthening of these Partnerships con- in building up the NRF so far is im- fence planning process must be better tinues to remain a top priority on pressive and final operational capabil- coordinated in future if NATO and NATOs agenda.
100 trusted partner. This emerging Partner- ance, when contemplating the future of Individual Partnerships ship will have to become more operational its Mediterranean Dialogue, should not and will also have to take a close look at think in much more ambitious terms. After The recent enlargement process will some of the more controversial issues such all, countries such as Jordan and the further accelerate a process already started as the fulfilment of Russias 1999 Istanbul United Arab Emirates have already been at the NATO Summit in Prague, allow- commitments with respect to the with- included in NATOs peace keeping op- ing Partners to individualise their coop- drawal of Russian troops from Georgia erations in the Balkans. eration with NATO. Partners as diverse and Moldova and the related ratification In light of a cooperation initiative with as Sweden and Kazakhstan with consider- of the adapted CFE Treaty. the Greater Middle East, an idea initially ably different security requirements launched in spring by the United States, rightly expect a diversified approach when Mediterranean Dialogue and Germany and others, NATO has started dealing with the Alliance. As NATOs first Cooperation with the Middle East? to consider what useful role it could play partner country, Georgia in April sub- in engaging the region. Any such NATO mitted an Individual Partnership Action It is also likely that the NATO will fur- role would have to be in close concert Plan, signalling the beginning of a truly ther reach out to enhance and intensify with other - initially more relevant - tailor made approach. NATOs successful its existing dialogue with seven Mediter- organisations for such cooperation, such Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) ranean nations as these countries can of- as the G-8, the World Bank or the EU. must also become more operational, for fer the Alliance a different perspective and However, the Alliance is prepared to play instance by including Partners even more historical experiences. This is particularly an important support function in the in efforts to combat international terror- true in the field of international terror- area of security dialogue with those ism. With seven new members joining the ism, and it is to be hoped that the present countries and some form of a coopera- NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Russia dialogue can be transformed into more tion initiative is expected to be issued at Partnership will enter into a new era but operational cooperation, including, even- NATOs Istanbul Summit in June. In ad- despite the new composition of the Coun- tually, some form of practical coopera- dition, NATO is expanding its dialogue cil, the Alliance will continue a remark- tion similar to the PfP type activities such and Partnership concept to nations far able process started in 1997 of turning as training, or the reform of the security beyond its traditional sphere of influ- Russia from a long term enemy into a sector. There is no reason why the Alli- ence, including nations such as Japan, Aus-
101 tralia, New Zealand and most recently ers. In such a world of institutional prag- may be a promising step in that direc- China. matism, there is no place for artificial ri- tion. valry or dogmatism. Since March 2003, A Web of Institutional NATO has established a structured coop- The Future Partnerships eration in crisis management with the European Union, called Berlin Plus. This NATO as a traditional defence alliance Close cooperation and coordination series of agreements regulates how NATO with a limited regional focus on territo- with other international organisations and can support the EU with operational plan- rial defence has become irrelevant, over- security related institutions has become a ning, assets and capabilities as well as with taken by events and new challenges emerg- precondition for successfully addressing a command structure for EU-led opera- ing over the last few years. NATO as a ever more complex international security tions. The hand-over to the EU of NATOs mere toolbox for coalitions of the will- challenges. Today, no single one SFOR Mission in Bosnia and ing using its military infrastructure would organisation can effectively deal with all Herzegovina will be a test case for the two be problematic. More flexibility, however, aspects of international security, from organisations ability to work together including opting outs and varying coali- conflict prevention to crisis management smoothly. NATO has also started earlier tions of NATO Allies with different part- and pots-conflict nation building. In ad- this year an internal review process of its ner nations for different scenarios may dition, most countries have adopted a relations with the UN and the OSCE aim- be a promising although unpopular sce- rather pragmatic position on the opera- ing at further strengthening effective struc- nario to address some of the more diffi- tional roles of international organisations. tures and mechanisms for cooperation. cult security challenges for the future. After Which institution nations will choose and In addition, international organisations all, the ISAF is such an example of a suc- support in a given conflict scenario de- and institutions, including the Alliance, cessful coalition of the willing under a pends on individual organisations prob- must learn to work more closely with NATO framework. lem solving capacity, i.e. its ability to de- NGOs which are already an important What appears to be emerging is an Al- liver effective solutions. This in turn de- factor in all present peace support opera- liance which is becoming the driving force pends more and more on an tions. The concept of Provincial Recon- of an international security system and organisations ability and willingness to struction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, which is the central defence related link deal effectively with other relevant play- combining military and civilian assets, between the United States, Europe, Rus-
102 sia and a variety of Partners. This group 1 See Nicholas Burns, Expanding the Alliance of of countries will jointly but not neces- Democracies, The Wall Street Journal, 29 March 2004. sarily always together address todays 2 All new NATO members contribute troops to security challenges: International terror- NATOs Balkan operations as well as either to ism, the proliferation of weapons of mass the ISAF or Operation Enduring Freedom. By destruction and failed states. Such an Al- April, six of the seven new countries also partici- pated with their own troops in the Polish-led liance also manages to draw in the periph- multinational division in Iraq. ery of the Euro-Atlantic area, for example, 3 Indeed, the Alliance, within hours after the by extending the Mediterranean Dialogue events on 19 March, has deployed additional or by offering a cooperation initiative troop contingents to Kosovo and is re-engaging itself in the province. with the countries of the wider Middle East. Together with other international organisations and institutions, in particu- lar the UN and the EU, this alliance ac- tively supports the international commu- nity by providing security and by stabilising crisis areas. Most of this scenario is already a real- ity today. It can be fully implemented if NATO as an organisation successfully masters the challenges of transformation initiated at the Prague Summit in 2002. Ultimately, it requires that nations under- stand their responsibilities as Allies and positively respond to NATOs new level of ambition.
103 Security Dimension of Northern Europe after the Double Enlargement
By Kestutis Paulauskas*
he contemporary society faces two the decision makers and the academics is region. It does not seek to grasp the full kinds of threats: mentally con- to recognize the real threats among the range of issues related to the security di- structed ones and real ones. Liv- constructed ones. This is a particularly mension of Northern Europe in the wake ing in an unpredictable world many people outstanding challenge in the case of North- of ongoing political integration. Instead including decision makers are inclined to ern Europe where stereotypes and old the paper focuses on one yet very impor- see threats everywhere: in the neighbour- thinking clichés are abundant. tant aspect what is the function of North- hood, in a bad weather forecast, in the There are scores of articles and studies ern Europe in the changing global secu- eyes of a passer-by. Luckily, most of these produced on the subject of the Northern rity order? threats are the fruits of imagination and European security and implications of the To answer this question, the paper dis- stereotypes and a food for thought for double enlargement. One can hardly come cusses a possible construction of security the academic community. However there up with strikingly new insights that were identity of Northern Europe, building are also real dangers if somebody points overlooked by other analysts. The goal of on theoretical constructivist assumption a gun at you and shoots, you will not re- this paper is not overly ambitious, yet it that the number of military troops is not flect on the flying bullet you will act try- does raise a few provocative suggestions the only thing that counts in international ing to escape it. The real challenge for both about the future security agenda of this politics national and collective identity,
* Kestutis Paulauskas is a PhD scholar at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius, Lithuania. This paper was presented at the Workshop on Political Integration and Northern Dimension of the EU, held by the Södertörns högskola - University College in Stockholm on 17 April 2004.
104 values, culture and mentality are of no Northern Europe as well. In the broad- their geographic location in the North- lesser importance. The paper also discusses est geographical sense one could draw ern part of Europe. Most of these coun- the nature of security challenges that the the border of Northern Europe around tries share some very common history Northern European countries face in the the North Atlantic, Greenland, the Spitz- from early interaction among the Vikings wake of the 21st century and argues that bergen, the Barents Sea area, the five and the Baltic tribes to the wars of the certain misperceptions of actual threats Nordic countries, North-Western Rus- 17th century between Sweden, Lithuania persist among these countries causing cer- sia, the three Baltic states and the north- and Russia. In addition, Finland and the tain inadequacy of their security policies. ern shores of Poland and Germany. For three Baltic states shared a common des- Northern Europe seems to be a quiet cor- the purposes of this particular paper I tiny as a part of Russian Empire in the ner of the world far away from hotspots will focus on the so-called Nordic-Baltic 19th century and the interwar indepen- of violence and unaffected by the virus Eight, assuming that they form the core dence. of terrorism. Yet this appearance is de- of what could be identified as Northern Yet the history of statehood of all 8 ceptive and it is only a matter of time Europe. nations is rather different. Denmark, Swe- when the ripples of conflicts and instabil- What is so special about security of den and Lithuania were among the great ity in various regions will reach North- Northern Europe? In what ways is it dif- powers of Europe throughout the middle ern Europe. The paper finally tackles se- ferent from, say, security of the Balkans ages while Norway, Finland, Latvia and curity-related institutional framework of or the Caucasus? Does the term North- Estonia have been struggling hard to pre- Northern Europe, outlining its shortfalls ern only specify the geographical loca- serve their national identities. In the and opportunities. The paper rounds off tion of the region, or does it have addi- modern times, only Sweden and Denmark with a prophecy about the future of the tional cultural, psychological or social lived through an extensive period of state- region. meaning? What does the Europe part hood, Norway, Finland and Iceland es- of Northern Europe refer to: Europe as a tablished their complete independence in Constructing identity for the community of nation-states, Europe as a the first half of the 20th century, the Bal- Northern Europe community of values, a Christian Europe tic states escaped from the Soviet rule only or Europe of liberal democracy? There is in 1991. The legitimate question about the lim- one obvious commonality inherent to Apart from history there are also dif- its of Europe is equally applicable to both the Nordic and the Baltic states ferences in culture, language and religion.
105 Most importantly, the eight countries Northerness of mentality. All eight Peace culture. Peaceful settlement of have different ideational relationship to countries share the same cautious and disputes and arms control are other char- Europe and the Western civilisation as a sometimes suspicious approach towards acteristic features shared by most of the whole. If the Nordic countries have a international politics. Non-interference, Nordic and Baltic states. Tradition of strongly established Western and European self-restraint, self-exclusion, a sense of re- neutrality has strong roots in most of these identity (including non-EU countries), the moteness from the hotspots of the world countries. Presumably peacekeeping ef- Baltic states are still undergoing a diffi- are among the predominant elements of forts also enjoy wide public support in cult mental transition from perceiving this mentality. It is by no means to say the whole region, especially if these ef- Europe as something exogenous and there- that the Nordic and the Baltic states do forts are undertaken under the auspices fore dangerous towards perceiving Europe not participate in the world politics it of the UN and fall strictly within the realm as indispensable intrinsic value of national is more about how they proceed on the of international law. identity. The double enlargement did world arena. It is a mentality of small ra- Humanity and tolerance may be con- provide institutional framework for this tionally minded countries that are fully sidered as yet another constituent element transition but the true mental and cul- aware of the minor role they can play and of the Northern European identity. Hu- tural breakthrough may take another gen- modest level of ambitions they can pur- man rights, the rights of ethnic, religious, eration. sue in world politics. sexual minorities, social justice rank very The existence of a strong common re- Regionality. Some analysts refer to high in the value system of the Northern gional identity shared by the Nordic and Northern Europe as the vanguard of a Europeans. These values are reflected in the Baltic countries is arguable at best. At future Europe characterised by dense lev- their security policies as well. least sub-regional identities among the els of regionalisation. Indeed regionalism Aloofness towards continental Europe. Po- Nordic countries and the Baltic states for is at the heart of the Northern European litical and security self-identification with obvious reasons seem to be much stron- identity. The network of national, sub- continental Europe is not very strong in ger than a common Northern European national and international, governmental the minds of Northern European public identity. However certain constituent el- and non-governmental, private and pub- and elite. There are two non-EU coun- ements of what could be defined as an lic organizations, agencies and institutions tries, Denmark has opted out of the ESDP, emerging security identity of Northern is so dense that national borders are al- Sweden said no to euro, Finland is against Europe can be traced. most completely disregarded. collective defence role of the EU, the Bal-
106 tic states historically and mentally are more nuclear missiles were deployed in the Bal- turned into a regional state with very lim- attached to the United States than Europe tic republics and Kaliningrad; the Kola ited political, economic and even mili- when it comes to hard security guaran- peninsula was another major Soviet mili- tary (except nuclear force) leverages to tees. tary base area. For NATO, securing air- affect international politics. Any analysis of security dimension of space and sea communication lines above Until the double enlargement there was Northern Europe must take into account and around Northern Europe was of pri- a clear security agenda for Northern Eu- the identity features discussed above. mary strategic importance in order to rope, that consisted of two main objec- deny the Soviet Union access to the At- tives: 1) assist the efforts of the Baltic states Security agenda prior to the lantic. The US kept large air base in Ice- to reintegrate with Europe politically and double enlargement land while NATO had developed an ex- mentally, 2) facilitate transition of Russia tensive contingency plan for the defence from an expansionist authoritarian empire During the Cold War Northern Eu- of Norway. Even the two neutral coun- into a Western-style democracy that would rope was never a top issue on the security tries Finland and Sweden throughout the be in cooperation but not confrontation agenda of the two superpowers and their Cold War were arming heavily and pre- vis-à-vis the rest of Europe. The Baltic states respective alliances. Instead, leaders of both paring their societies for a total decisive and Russia were seen as having human se- blocs used to meet in Helsinki and war. curity concerns that needed to be resolved, Reikjavik to discuss disarmament, arms The end of the Cold War brought sig- while the Nordic states were seen as hav- control and confidence building issues. nificant changes to this configuration. The ing the necessary resources to help resolve Northern Europe was a buffer zone with delicate balance of power was broken. The these concerns. As long as the Baltic states a delicate balance of power: NATO mem- Baltic states shortly after regaining inde- and Russia were insecure and hostages to bers Iceland, Norway and Denmark in the pendence chose integration with the West- the security dilemma, the Nordic states West, the Soviet Union in the East, and ern structures, NATO and the EU, as their could never be secure also. neutral Finland and Sweden in between. strategic goal. Finland and Sweden became The role of the Nordic countries was One should not be mistaken however that EU members in 1995. In 2004, the Baltic instrumental in bringing the Baltic states the region was free of conventional or states became members of both NATO and back to European structures. Contrary to nuclear threats. Substantial Soviet forces, the EU. Meanwhile Russia has clearly lost the prevalent scepticism among the major including strategic units equipped with its standing of a world superpower and Western European countries about the pos-
107 sibility of integration of the former So- for NATO membership in the Baltic states, viet Republics, political and economic trans- military security aspects were, to a large Inadequacies of threat formation of the Baltic states was rapid extent absent from all other narratives of assessment, inadequacies and successful. It is rather symbolic, that Northern European security: ND and NEI of security policies Iceland was first to recognize the indepen- focused on soft security matters, quality dence of the Baltic states back in 1991. of life, economic prosperity, cross-border There is more certainty and less politi- Denmark and Sweden put a lot of effort transactions. The Council of the Baltic Sea cal diversity in Northern Europe after the into economic recovery of Latvia and States (CBSS) explicitly excluded defence double enlargement, but does it mean Lithuania and assisted the build-up of their matters from its agenda. There were a lot more security? On the one hand, there armed forces from scratch. Finland was the of efforts on behalf of the US and the EU are no major military threats in the re- main advocate of Estonia. Meanwhile ini- put into desecuritisation of the regional gion. Moreover, this region did not see a tial optimism towards Russia soon turned cooperation agenda, to use terminology single violent spark involving any kind into disillusionment about the true inten- of the Copenhagen school of thought. The of use or threat to use force from any tions and policies of Russia that underlie logic of desecuritisation was rather experi- country for at least the past decade. Re- democratic and reconciliatory rhetoric. mental. To solve the traditional security cently resolved transit issue to Kaliningrad Northern European Initiative and dilemma in Northern Europe, the US and is a recent example of how even the most Northern Dimension Initiative were fo- the EU chose a post-modern approach: difficult disputes can be settled peacefully cused on the agenda before the double building ties of economic interdependence, in this region. From a traditional mili- enlargement. Both initiatives were related developing cross-border cooperation, tary viewpoint the region is as predict- to the two objectives stated above: integra- strengthening NGOs had to create a win/ able as it can be in this turbulent era. tion of the Baltic states and alleviating win situation in which military defence Good neighbourly relations and the suc- Russian concerns about Western goals in issues no longer mattered. Despite clear cess of the initiatives towards regio- this region and preventing Kaliningrad merits of these efforts, there were certain nalisation will remain the key to regional from turning into a black hole right in counter-productive effects that resulted in security after enlargement. The fact that the heart of Europe. Except for NATO and the current inadequacy of threat assessment the eastern borders of the Baltic states the BALTSEA forum specifically designed characteristic to most countries in the re- became the eastern borders of NATO and to assist defence reforms and preparation gion, including Russia. the EU should only add a new quality of
108 credibility and reassurance to the national guard organisations, territorial that do not have their own aircraft) is neighbouring states. On the other hand, defence and ultimately guerrilla warfare. ensured collectively. Finally, the public of other modern threats that cannot be fore- Meanwhile the likelihood of such a war is the Baltic states perceived the deployment seen or predicted proliferate throughout very low. Moreover, both NATO and the as a symbol of hard security guarantee the globe. In this sense, Northeast Europe EU are focusing on the creation of rapid acquired with NATO membership. is no less and no more secure than any reaction forces, capable of intervention One can draw an interesting conclu- other region. The double enlargement is wherever needed to counter rogue regimes, sion from this narrative. Russia still seems not the end of history the world did terrorist organisations, or to prevent eth- to perceive the relations with NATO as not become a safer place neither for the nic and religious conflicts. a zero sum game. Protection of the air- Baltic states nor for the Nordic countries. Inadequacy of threat assessment is also space above the Baltic states is consid- Various security challenges, mostly of non- evident in the case of Russia. Reaction of ered to be a major political and military military nature will persist indefinitely. Russian officials and analysts to the re- blow to national security of the Russian Curiously enough, the actual security cent NATO enlargement and especially the Federation and countermeasures are policies pursued by most countries in the deployment of 4 NATO fighters in sought now. Russian rhetoric, in turn, region seem to be contrary to the logic Lithuania was loaded heavily with old-fash- revitalised the suspicions in the capitals of the threat assessment outlined above. ioned Cold War-type rhetoric. Although of the Baltic states about the dormant Security policies seem to fit more the the Kaliningrad oblast remains the most revisionism of Russia. Realist school of challenges of the past rather than the con- militarised zone in Europe today, Mos- thought would be happy to conclude temporary security environment. Both cow blamed NATO and the Baltic states that security dilemma was not removed Nordic and Baltic states still hold on to for heightening the tension in the region. from Northern Europe by NATO en- the total defence concept, which is to a Russia considered the action to be coun- largement to the Baltic states and one large extent the legacy of the Cold War. terproductive in the context of rapproche- can now observe a classic chicken game Total defence concept in terms of defence ment between NATO and Russia. In its between NATO and Russia. planning implies preparation for a full- own right, NATO justified the move as a However, from a constructivist perspec- scale all-out war, encompassing total routine implementation of NATO air tive one can see an entirely different pic- mobilisation of national resources, large defence policy: the security of the airspace ture. The NATO enlargement (and even armies of conscripts, large reserves, large of all NATO members (including those the deployment of aircraft in Lithuania)
109 has been driven not by military goals, but fact, all sides benefited from this enlarge- tisation of other threats traditionally at- by common Euroatlantic values, ideas of ment of NATO but not in a traditional tributed to the realm of soft security in cooperative security and moral restitution hard security sense. Russia will now have the new international environment now of injustice committed after the Second a safe and predictive Western border that seems to be counterproductive. Such an World War. Harsh reaction of Russia was does not pose any real threat to its secu- approach to security produced inside the not a rationally calculated play in the spirit rity and at the same time does not raise box way of thinking about international of Realpolitik. It was rather highly emo- any empty temptations to review the re- affairs among the Northern European tional rejection of reality stemming from sults of the end of the Cold War en- countries, while the contemporary secu- psychological stereotypes engrained deavour that Russia had devoted too rity environment calls for thinking out- among the Russian elite and the public much energy to during the past decade. side the box. In other words, the regio- towards the Baltic states as former Soviet NATO aircraft capable of stopping any nality feature of the Northern European republics that broke apart the Soviet potential terrorist activity similar to 9/ identity turns into an impediment to Union for no apparent reason. Recent 11 will now constantly police the airspace developing a truly trans-regional approach polls in Russia indicated that up to 60 % of the Baltic states. It lowers the likeli- to security challenges. of Russian citizens considers NATO an hood that terrorists could choose the On the one hand, the Nordic coun- aggressive military bloc. The Baltic states Ignalina nuclear plant or any other sensi- tries are among the most active partici- celebrated NATO enlargement as a solu- tive object in the Baltic states as a poten- pants in the UN peacekeeping operations, tion to their long-sought guarantee of tial target for a renegade air strike that which is very much in line with the peace security from the ever-aggressive neigh- could cause disastrous consequences to the culture inherent in these nations. On the bour. By the same token, NATO has reas- whole region. other hand, these countries take somewhat serted its standing of a reliable collective Such inadequacies of threat assessment ambivalent approach to the global war on defence alliance capable of providing ap- are reflected in the overall security poli- terrorism and even more cautious ap- propriate security measures to all its mem- cies of the Northern European countries. proach to further expansion of the Euro- bers. Some actors in the region and outside atlantic area of stability towards the East- Meanwhile the true importance of the region still seem to be searching for ern borderlands, the South Caucasus, and NATO enlargement to the Northern Eu- traditional security challenges, which do the Middle East. The fact that Northern ropean security was lost in translation. In not exist anymore. Meanwhile desecuri- European countries, apart from Russia,
110 did not suffer any major terrorist attack nisations, albeit very remote from a true Europe as one regional entity, as expressed should not be a reason to abstain from membership. On the other hand, there are by their respective initiatives the North- the global war on terrorism. Inaction to- a number of initiatives and formats in one ern Europe Initiative (replaced by the E- wards the Eastern borderlands, which are way or another dealing with security is- PINE) and the Northern Dimension Ini- a potential source of all kinds of new chal- sues of Northern Europe: Northern Di- tiative. E-PINE initiative shows a certain shift lenges, also does not increase the security mension, Northern European Initiative, in American approach towards the region of the entire region. This problem can be the CBSS, the BALTSEA, the Nordic-Bal- from reliance on local regional institutions partly attributed to the current institu- tic Eight, the Nordic-Baltic Six, the brand to a more assertive 8+1 cooperation frame- tional framework in the Northern Europe, new E-PINE initiative (Enhance Partner- work that would work in three directions which does not provide strong tools to ship in Northern Europe). Most of these cooperative security, economic and social developing a more cohesive Nordic-Baltic formats were designed to assist the Baltic affairs. It is interesting to note, there are no strategy on global politics in general and states to prepare for integration. What is references made to Russia in the wording trans-regional activities in particular. their value after the double enlargement? of the E-PINE. The eight countries devel- Regardless of the past merits, their future oped the Nordic-Baltic cooperation into a Current security architecture of the utility should be reviewed. rather extensive network that works in vari- Northern Europe The main regional framework that Nor- ous directions, including defence, which dic countries and the Baltic states share as makes it a particularly attractive format for The picture of the current security ar- equal partners is the CBSS, but hard secu- the US to keep engaged in the formation of chitecture of Northern Europe is some- rity and defence matters are explicitly ex- the Northern European security agenda. what blurred. On the one hand, after the cluded from its agenda. The BALTSEA as- double enlargement, there is less political sistance forum to a large extent exacerbated Nordic-Baltic security and defence diversity outside the region. 4 countries its tasks and is pending closure or transfor- cooperation: building an agenda (3Bs and Denmark) are members of both mation into a more viable framework with for the future NATO and the EU, Sweden and Finland a possible focus on other regions. Although are members of the EU, Norway and Ice- all eight countries have different relation- The membership of the Baltic coun- land are members of NATO and Russia ships with NATO and the EU, the outside tries in the Euroatlantic institutions by has a special relationship with both orga- players the US and the EU see Northern no means undermines the need for an ever-
111 closer Nordic-Baltic security cooperation. - No new frameworks use existing initiatives that would enhance security of To use the existing opportunities and tools. There are more than enough frame- the Nordic and the Baltic countries and implement the shared interests, the NB 8 works for the Nordic Baltic coopera- add value to the overall security of Euro- needs a new and active agenda, which tion. There is no need to invent any new atlantic community. Today the Nordic and should be built upon the following im- formats and duplicate the existing ones. the Baltic countries face similar challenges peratives if it is to succeed: Nordic Baltic ministerials provide ex- of military transformation downsizing - Build upon existing political will. cellent political framework to build upon. the armed forces, moving away from terri- There is a strong mutual interest to bring - Involve the U.S. All 8 countries see torial defence posture, acquiring modern forward the Nordic-Baltic security defence the US as an indispensable participant in military capabilities and developing co-operation, which has been expressed the European defence and a major ally/ deployable and sustainable forces able to on several occasions during Nordic-Bal- partner in security affairs. Since 9/11 the counter contemporary threats. Given fi- tic Ministerial meetings. US strategic focus has shifted from Eu- nancial and resource constrains, where pos- - Consolidate the transatlantic link. rope (including its north-eastern part) to sible, NB8 should pool resources in devel- The NB 8 framework is a regional bridge elsewhere in the world. NB8 shares a com- oping common capabilities. between the EU and NATO. Northern mon goal in keeping the US involved in - Stay open and flexible. In certain Europe is a test bed for the strategic part- the region. The US is willing and able to areas cooperation of all eight countries nership between NATO and the EU as it take part in security and defence-related may not be possible or desirable. NB8 consists of non-NATO EU countries, non- cooperation activities in Northern Eu- may provide the political framework for EU NATO countries and members of rope. Combining Nordic-Baltic Eight coordination of practical initiatives or ex- both; with the E-PINE initiative could prove change of information. NB8 should not - Involve the non-aligned countries. to be a promising endeavour. Common in any way undermine the cooperation Sweden and Finland can take part in the agenda of cooperative security includes in any other format (bi-lateral or multi- defence-related endeavours with 6 Nor- counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of lateral, including non-NB8 states). It could dic and Baltic NATO members on a regu- the WMD, border security, regional chal- accommodate transparency, dialogue and lar basis. NB8 would also be of use, once lenges and new threats. coherence of various regional activities. Sweden and Finland decide to apply for - Get pragmatic and pool resources. - Outreach to other regions. Together NATO membership; NB8 should focus and work on practical with the US NB8 could develop and imple-
112 ment a common Nordic-Baltic strategy projects, well-developed network of mili- of an attractive identity of Northern Eu- towards the regions beyond Northeast- tary-to-military contacts. As a result, Nor- rope as an open, developed, democratic ern Europe. NB8 countries could explore dics and Baltics share essentially the same and safe region, willing and able to sup- opportunities to contribute with re- military culture. These advantages should port the spread of the same values world- sources and advice to the expansion of be exploited to the full in the future in- wide. security and stability area to the Ukraine, ternational involvements of the Nordic Caucasus and Central Asia. This area of and Baltic states. NB8 framework provides Predicting the Future cooperation may prove to be all the more excellent ground to prepare for common viable due to the US persistent interest in participation in either NATO, EU or UN- The era after the double enlargement anchoring these regions to the led operations. coincides with a period of global tur- Euroatlantic community. - Talk to Russia. The role of Russia in moil. Although countries in Northern - Share burden and responsibility. the region should not be neglected and Europe may feel more secure than ever There could be certain arrangements set positive agenda must be worked out. NB8 before, in fact they face a whole new era up to divide labour, tasks and burden, countries share a common interest to of unforeseen challenges and unexpected depending on priorities and resources. bring Russia closer to the Euroatlantic crises. For example, Nordic countries focus their community and involve into an open The countries of Northern Europe as attention to the Balkans while the Baltic dialogue on security and defence affairs. well as many other European countries states have more experience in working Experience of the NEI and ND would be face a huge challenge, which is not a mili- with the South Caucasus, yet the two pro- of great value in this process. tary, political or economic but first and cesses could and should be coordinated - Speak in one voice on the world foremost a mental challenge. The scope within the NB8 framework with benefits arena. A cohesive regional group of coun- and nature of the contemporary threats to both. tries has more chances to succeed in ad- requires from the decision-makers to erase - Go out of area, go out together. Nor- vancing their interests inside and outside the notion of national borders and na- dic and Baltic countries already have ex- the EU. Active NB 8 agenda would tional security from their thinking. Secu- tensive experience acquired in common strengthen visibility and weight of North- rity is not a national endeavour anymore. international exercises, international opera- ern Europe in international politics. All In todays world homeland security starts tions, implementation of BATLDREAM 8 countries are interested in development way beyond the national borders. If the
113 Balkans, the South Caucasus, the Middle borders. The most likely scenario as usu- East are not stable and at peace, any re- ally is somewhere in between. gion, even as remote and calm as North- To sum up, political integration in ern Europe, will feel the ripple effects of Northern Europe does not mean the end insecurity via illegal migration, organized of history Northern Europe faces a chal- crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. The lenging agenda of the future, which is main question is whether the countries global in scope and therefore requires a in Northern Europe that currently enjoy global approach. a period of relative peace and security are ready to change their cautious approach towards global security matters and start to think and act globally. In a best-case scenario, in the next 10 years there will be no non-aligned coun- tries left while Russia will be closely en- gaged into the activities of both NATO and the EU. The Nordic-Baltic Eight will become a club of like-minded states co- operating as equal partners, coordinating their policies inside NATO and the EU, coordinating participation in the inter- national operations and drafting common strategies and activities towards other re- gions. The worst-case scenario is an escala- tion of the global instability, breakdown of international order and another Af- ghanistan close to the Northern European
114 Section IV
Perceptions and Policies of Non-Member States After Enlargement of NATO
115 116 Russia, NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States
By Dr. Konstantin Khudoley and Dr. Dmitri Lanko*
ATO has been an important course in 1999, when the Alliance attacked EU enlargement, NATO enlargement, and part of the domestic and for- Yugoslavia, through 2002, when the the human rights of the Russian-speaking eign political context of Rus- NATO-Russia Council was founded. Men- population in Estonia and Latvia which sia during the past ten years, and in this tioning the spatial dimension, which is is tightly interrelated with the status of NATO context various discourses have apart from the mainstream discourse, two the Russian Orthodox Church in Esto- been created. other discourses are worth noting as the nia. Here again one may distinguish the It is important to stress that Russia does Alliance has both a political and a mili- mainstream and the secondary discourses. not have a common or single discourse tary dimension and as different agents in The mainstream discourse used to, and on the Alliance, but a variety of discourses Russia perceive NATO as either strength- still does securitise the Baltic states, which of both temporal and spatial dimension ening its political or its military dimen- intend to place NATO bases on their (mainstream discourses and secondary sion. This paper will focus on these three territories after the enlargement, and in- discourses). When mentioning the tem- discourses. tend to tell the EU about Russian threat poral dimension of discourse being a di- The three Baltic states1 have been an- when they join the Union, and wish to mension not transforming but only main- other important part of the contexts for banish the Russian-speaking population. taining, one cannot help mentioning the Russia. Three key issues should be men- At the same time, one must distinguish change in the Russian mainstream dis- tioned in relation to the Baltic states: the several secondary discourses as well, which * Dr. Konstantin Khudoley is the Dean of the School of International Relations of the St.-Petersburg State University, Dr. Dmitri Lanko is a Researcher, School of International Relations of St. Petersburg State University.
117 are not that pessimistic. The outline of Foreign and Defence Policy. Neither will states in the enlargement, meaning that these discourses and their correlations this paper draw a line between proponents the enlargement took place mostly due to with the Russian discourses on NATO is of various international relations theories, promises made by the West in the early another objective of this paper. A special for example, between power realists and 1990s when the character of international focus will be made on the third discourse constructivists. The words power, geo- relations was completely different. Today due to the fact that it is least heard and politics, ordering systems, interna- NATO has new tasks and new challenges, least studied abroad.2 tional structure, securitisation3 and and enlargement does not have any cru- It is important to stress that this paper many others which are crucial to differ- cial importance in fulfilling or meeting will not draw a line between the political ent international relations theories are to these. On the contrary, the term accepta- elite and the academic community, in be found in the context of NATO. tion, which will be used hereafter in this other words, between practitioners and Another important thing to be stressed paper, stresses the role of the West while theorists, as officials of the Russian For- in this introductory part of the paper the Baltic states are still in search for their eign Ministry tend sometimes to put it. concerns the terms used in Russia for role and niche in the Alliance. It is worth Both practitioners and theorists con- NATO enlargement. Enlargement is a mentioning that the use of the term join- tribute to the Russian discussion on rather neutral term, it does not have any ing refers to NATO more as an interna- NATO with almost similar arguments. To negative context in the country, since it tional regime in transition, than those clarify the above mentioned spatial divi- is used for both NATO and the EU en- preferring acceptation viewing the Alli- sion of Russian discourse on NATO, one largement. It is worth mentioning that ance as a solid, though not unitary, inter- should mention that discoursive space in Arkadiy Moshes uses the term enlarge- national actor. Russia, especially concerning foreign po- ment, when describing Russian President litical argumentation, does not to any Vladimir Putins pragmatic perception Discourse 1: extent correlate to institutional space. of this phenomenon.4 At the same time, Baltic States are Accepted into Moreover, writings of some of the theo- two other terms are commonly used as NATO to Maintain the Alliance rists may be considered both as data for well, being that of Baltic states joining the analysis and as indicators for discourse NATO and that of acceptation of the Such an opinion is to be found in the changes among the practitioners. A Baltic states into NATO. The first term first discussion paper out of many, on good example is the Russian Council for underlines the role of the three Baltic Russian relations with the Baltic states,
118 prepared by the Russian Council for For- to counteract challenges rapidly. The ington Treaty, NATO would hardly start eign and Defence Policy.5 During the last NATO war on Yugoslavia in 1999 was an a war on Russia, even if Russia swal- ten years some Russian foreign policy- unpleasant surprise for them,7 however lows Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, or all makers have frequently expressed their controversies within the NATO member of them. Consequently, they proposed concerns about the American military states on the issues of Afghanistan and that instead of joining NATO the Baltic power, including the presence of U.S. Iraq made them optimistic again. states should become neutral, accept the troops in Europe and Eurasia, as posing On the contrary, for Western Europe, Russian security guarantees, contribute a real threat to Russia. For this discourse they claim, NATO has become a too mili- to forming a new security regime in Eu- (it may be classified as mainstream of the tary organisation. The armies of Western rope within the OSCE, or pay more at- 1990s) it became a common sense to European countries are not capable to tention to the Common Foreign and Se- equate NATO with the U.S.6 Simulta- counteract the new security challenges, curity Policy of the EU. Within this dis- neously, same authorities have frequently such as terrorism. Therefore, Western course, the only reason for NATO to claimed Russia not posing any threat to Europeans, in the view of this part of the accept the Baltic states has been to main- either America or Western Europe or to Russian elite, perceive NATO as a mean- tain itself. NATO enlargement was per- Central and Eastern Europe or to the ingful forum for shaping political con- ceived as NATO becoming politically Baltic states, and therefore NATO is be- sensus, especially on delicate issues such meaningless to its members and as a search coming an international organisation, as the acceptation of Turkey into the Eu- for a new political meaning which could which is irrelevant to the security poli- ropean Union and the re-unification of have saved the old Alliance. This discourse cies of its members, as the membership Cyprus. Though the two arguments con- was especially popular among Russian for- becomes politically meaningless and the tradict, they do, in combination, create a eign policy-makers prior to and during Alliance militarily ineffective. Conse- discourse of NATO as an out-of-time in- the first wave of the enlargement, when quently, these Russian authorities have ternational institution. the Czech Republic, Poland and Hun- invented separate explanations for why And concerning the Baltic states, the gary joined NATO. This is the reason NATO is no longer relevant for the U.S., Russian elite has frequently noted that why the first wave of the enlargement Western Europe and the Baltic states. NATO would not be able to guarantee did not provoke any serious response For the U.S., they claim, NATO has the independence and security of the Bal- from the Russian side. Russian authori- become too political and no longer able tic states. Despite Article 5 of the Wash- ties were graciously watching NATO on
119 its way towards military ineffectiveness; cies is the Russian policy on the UN, es- and the adaptation of this extended in- they did not consider NATO becoming pecially the efforts to preserve the role of ter-operability to the new, mobile and more effective militarily after the three its Security Council as it was during the flexible military forces prepared to ac- Central European States joined. It is im- Cold War. And further, within the same complish new military missions. How- portant for the understanding of this discourse, Russian attempts to maintain ever, this part of the Russian elite did discourse to take into account that the the OSCE as an important part of the not have certainty about the nature of military capability of neither Central European security architecture, are to be those new missions. And as NATO was European nor the Baltic states was per- placed. This was especially important in preparing to act outside Europe, the ceived as important in Russia. the context of the Baltic states, as the OSCE discourse of NATO as a world sheriff The Russian foreign policy strategy was Human Rights Commissioner most ac- was created in Russia. It became especially created on the basis of this discourse and tively worked in the field of the human popular among this part of the Russian focused on strengthening alternative se- rights of the Russians-speaking minority elite after the attack on Yugoslavia; some curity institutions in Europe and Eurasia, in Estonia and Latvia in mid-1990s. of the Russian authorities and scholars and globally to replace NATO after its even expressed concerns like Yugoslavia expected complete loss of relevance to the Discourse 2: today, Byelorussia tomorrow? In 1999 security policies of its members. Russian Baltic States are Accepted into the Russian Council for Foreign and attempts to create an effective defence NATO to Counter-Balance Misun- Defence Policy wrote that after Yugosla- organisation on the post-Soviet period derstandings between America via NATO enlargement should be con- are among the examples of such policies. and the Old Europe sidered not just as an unfriendly step, As a result, the Tashkent Collective Secu- but they should be considered as prepa- rity Treaty, an organisation created in the Another part of Russian foreign rations to aggression (SVOP, 1999). The early 1990s to preserve limited influence policy-makers could not help noticing same people in Russia even wished to of Moscow over military sphere and de- the strengthening of the military dimen- warn the Baltic states from participating fence policies of the CIS countries sion of NATO in the past ten years. They in wars far away from their national (Tkachenko & Petermann, 2002: 15), has watched very carefully the extending of spheres of interest, which nevertheless become a counter-terrorist organisation NATO military staff inter-operability to would hurt the Baltic states. by today. Another example of such poli- new members and candidate countries At the same time, they could not help
120 noticing a gap appearing between America started discussing whether the country suggested Estonia to choose the Nordic and the old Europe, thus admitting the should build strategic cooperation with way of development, which did not mean transformation of the Alliance from what America or old Europe. necessarily rejection of NATO member- it used to be during the Cold War. In This gap became especially evident to ship (Denmark and Norway are members Russia, this may be considered the first this group of the Russian elite after the of NATO), but opt-outs and social de- step towards de-securitisation of NATO. U.S. failed to implement Article 5 of the mocracy. For the part of the Russian elite being Washington Treaty after 9/11, and after This part of the Russian elite was most analysed, the Northern Dimension of the France and Germany refused to partici- active in opposing NATO enlargement. EU policies and the Northern European pate in the war on Iraq in 2003. Conse- For some time it was a popular opinion Initiative of the U.S. Department of State quently, the enlargement was seen as an among them that no country should en- were two competing strategies to gain attempt to counter-balance this gap. Cen- ter the Alliance, if the country did have power in the Baltic Sea Region (Tkachev tral European and especially the Baltic border disputes with other countries. To & Churov, 2000). Again, they were try- states seemed loyal to the U.S. Another imitate border disputes between Russia ing to underline the U.S. efforts to important feature of the Baltic states was and the Baltic states, this part of the elite strengthen NAFTA, which became espe- their mainstream discourse not to per- lobbied the delay in demarcation and cially evident after George W. Bush was ceive NATO and the European Union as delimitation of borders, and later did its elected the U.S. President: he made his organisations in mutual competition in best to prevent border treaties with the first visit to Mexico. As a result, like in the field of providing security to Europe, Baltic states getting signed. As a result, the first discourse, this part of Russian unlike the discourse of this part of the the border treaty with Lithuania was rati- political elite perceived the emerging Russian elite. Of course, some people in fied only in 2003, as the status of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Baltic states, too, perceived NATO and Kaliningrad became one of the top pri- the EU as an alternative to NATO. the EU as competitors, for example, Jaan orities of Russian foreign policy. Border Throughout the 1990s there was a myth Kaplinski in Estonia, but this was defi- treaties with Estonia and Latvia have not within the mainstream foreign political nitely not the mainstream (see, for ex- been even signed yet. Another instrument discourse, which claimed that the EU is ample, Soosaar, 2003). Another example used by Russia to prevent the NATO en- good, while NATO is bad (Yagya, 2001: here is former Estonian Foreign Minis- largement was its attempt to link enlarge- 175). As a result, Russian society and elite ter Toomas Hendrik Ilves (Ilves, 1999), who ment with the ratification of the CFE
121 Treaty, which is a treaty still not open to membership; they also stress the NATOs Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the new members. ability to conduct peacekeeping and hu- Yeltsin has always been principally against manitarian missions, and to share knowl- the acceptation of the Baltic states into Discourse 3: edge and experience in the military field. NATO (Albright, 2003: 255). He fre- Baltic States are Accepted to As a result, they rejected the first dis- quently discussed this issue with then the NATO to bring Russia Closer course, which spoke of NATO coming U.S. President Bill Clinton, including to the Alliance closer to Russian borders, and intro- after the results of the U.S. presidential duced a new discourse of Russia coming elections in 1996 were announced. Last, but not least, there is a group closer to the Alliance in terms of demo- A vast part of the ruling elite in Russia inside the Russian political and academic cratic values and techniques of civilian in the late 1990s believed that the whole elite, who view the acceptation of the Baltic control over the military. territory, which used to be the Soviet states into NATO positively, despite small It is worth noting that the Russian Union, would remain within the sphere internal disagreements. They perceive the President Boris Yeltsin opposed to the of political, economic and military influ- development of NATO as mostly a devel- acceptation of Poland, Hungary and the ence of Russia, one of the poles of the opment along its political dimension. Czech Republic into NATO, as he con- multi-polar world. This hope created the This group contributed most of all to de- sidered the first wave of the enlargement myth about the so-called red line which securitisation of the Alliance, or, in Rus- as a part of Russian bargain with the West lies along the borders of the Soviet Union, sian mainstream terms, to a pragmatic (Yeltsin, 2000: 151). For example, Yeltsin as outlined in 1975, when the Final Act approach towards NATO and to the en- hoped to achieve full membership in G8 of the Helsinki Conference on Security largement. For them NATO represents, this way. During the Kosovo crisis of and Cooperation in Europe was signed. first of all, a group of countries with high 1999, his opposition against NATO A part of the Russian elite expected the standards of democracy, liberal values and strikes on Yugoslavia had a clear domes- country to oppose principally, if NATO civil control of the armed forces. Thus, tic political background: the State Duma intended to cross it. Thus, they were hop- they perceive the Alliance itself as a mean- was at the same time discussing the pos- ing that the Yalta Potsdam system of ingful forum for shaping political con- sibilities to impeach Yeltsin. The situa- international relations in Europe would sensus and as an anchor for the new de- tion of the Baltic states was completely be restored, though not in full. Conse- mocracies in Europe as they prepare for different. According to a former U.S. quently, it was the time, when the deci-
122 sions of the Yalta and Potsdam confer- give a shift to the transformation of cess, namely, to the beginning of inte- ences started being viewed positively in NATO in such a direction which they gration of Russia into Western security numerous statements by researchers, close would consider favourable for Russia (SIR, space. to the Russian Foreign Ministry. 2002). This was the first step, but other steps For this part of the Russian elite the 9/11 produced a sensitive shift not only followed. Russia and NATO signed the acceptation of the Baltic states into NATO for various international political pro- 2002 Rome Agreements, and Russia and and into the European Union (related cesses, it did not only led to regrouping Germany signed the agreement on tran- statements appeared in 1999) has become of powers on the international arena in- sit of German military goods across Rus- an issue of prestige; it occupied a larger fluencing the whole international system; sian territory. The number of joint mili- part of the Russian domestic discourse it also gave impetus to the transforma- tary exercises, involving Russia and NATO than it was worth. This discourse was not tion of domestic contexts in Russia. As a member states grew from less than ten in solid; its different implications have been result of the terrorist attacks on the U.S., 2003 to over fifty planned for 2005. The evaluated in the previous parts of this Russia joined the U.S.-led anti-terrorist agreement on the status of NATO forces essay. However, this part of the Russian coalition and agreed on the deployment on Russian territory, and visa versa, will elite (though mostly heard both in Rus- of coalition military bases in Central be signed soon. It is remarkable that nei- sia and abroad) was not the only one. Asia, i.e. in the post-communist space. ther the controversies over the U.S. war There was another (though smaller) Thus, NATO member states have crossed on Iraq, nor the YUKOS case etc. have group which was not sharing such views. the red line, but in different places than become important obstacles to the devel- Their point of departure was that NATO the Baltic states, and in a different situa- opment of the relations between Russia in the 1990s had transformed into the tion: Russia welcomed it and did not and NATO. Despite the fact that vast part most important security organisation in oppose to it. Russias President Vladimir of this group in the Russian elite con- Europe, and furthermore, that the po- Putin called leaders of the Central Asian demned the arrest of YUKOS President litical dimension of NATO had become states personally, urging them to accept Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, they could not more important for the Alliance than its NATO member states military bases on help but mention that it did not affect military dimension. Consequently, they their territories. For this third group Russian-NATO relations to any great ex- believed that the enlargement of the Al- within the Russian elite, this meant a sig- tent. Thus, though integration of Russia liance, including the Baltic states, would nificant shift to a very important pro- into Western security sphere has not be-
123 come an irreversible process yet, it has Moreover, they think that Russia will the treaties does not affect the quality of gone far ahead during past several years. benefit from the acceptation of the Baltic cross-border cooperation between Russia It is evident to them that the longer states into NATO and the European Union and the two countries, but it contributes border between Russia and NATO, which even in the short run. Once the double to a sense of watchfulness evident on both will appear after the Baltic states join the enlargement has happened, this will give sides of the border. In the past, such a Alliance, will create some problems in the all parts of the Russian political and aca- situation seemed reasonable to at least a short run. The adjustment of two ordering demic elite a sense of stability on its north- part of Russian political elite; they hoped systems along this new longer border will western borders. This becomes especially that absence of border treaties would be- be more complicated than in case of the important today, when stability in the come obstacles for the Baltic states in join- short borders of Murmansk/Norway and south of Russia is in question. For the ing NATO and the European Union. Kaliningrad/Poland. The Cold War-type way Russian elite, one of the possible scenarios Today, as the enlargement has already hap- of thinking as part of domestic discourses is the balkanisation of Afghanistan and pened, it will be very difficult even for on both sides of the border should also be Central Asia, and a merge of the conflicts this part of the Russian elite to explain taken into consideration, when speaking in Iraq and Israel/Palestine; terrorism, in- why the treaties with Estonia and Latvia about the relations between Russia and fectious diseases and illegal drugs will spread are delayed again. Moreover, the border NATO member states in general and about over both the Central Asia and Middle East. treaty with Lithuania, which is already international relations in the Baltic Sea Re- So far, the Russian elite has not worked signed and ratified due to the fears within gion in particular. However, in the long out a clear solution to these challenges; in the Russian elite considering how Kalinin- run, many problems will be solved and many such a situation of an exaggeration of the grad otherwise could flow away after will disappear themselves, as new models of threat of Baltic membership in NATO enlargement, which has proved to be an cooperation are introduced. Despite the fact there is a possibility for the part of the important tool to make the relations be- that even this part of the Russian elite pre- Russian elite to hide away from the ne- tween the two countries better. dicts numerous problems to appear in the cessity to recognise these new threats. However, this may be considered as short run, they consider it as a mistake to To our mind, Russia should sign bor- only the first step; other steps are also to delay the development of the existing posi- der treaties with Estonia and Latvia as first be undertaken. In the early 1990s, Russia tive tendencies in the relations between steps of action in order to benefit more signed treaties with Poland, Hungary and Russia and the Alliance. from NATO enlargement. The absence of several other Central European states.
124 Those treaties put an end to reflections on Friendly Relations and Cooperation without any ratification. This concerns, on the history of the relations between in July 2003, when Romanian member- first of all, Russia. Russia should not in- Russia and those countries in their offi- ship in NATO was pending. In our crease its military capabilities in the cial rhetoric and established the basis for mind, it would be logical for Russia to Northwest Russia, including Kaliningrad, cooperation for the future. However, no sign similar treaties with the Baltic states neither in Belarus. It would hurt the in- other similar treaties have been signed in as well. Of course, it will take more time vestment rating of the Northwest Russia the following ten years. The main reason to work out such a treaty with Estonia and produce a threat of getting involved was Russias opposition against NATO than with Romania. At the same time, in a conflict with or inside Belarus, where enlargement. Political relations between the very negotiations on such a treaty, its President Alexander Lukashenko re- Russia and Central European countries once started, will contribute greatly to mains unpredictable and the possibility were almost frozen. Doing so, the Rus- the creation of a sense of trust and part- of an internal conflict remains far from sian diplomacy of the 1990s did the same nership between our countries. Today negligible. mistake as the Soviet diplomacy of the such a sense is lacking, which is the main A segment within this part of the Rus- 1930s, when Soviet diplomats used to dis- obstacle for developments in the relations sian elite perceives cooperation between cuss issues of Polish security in London, between Russia and the Baltic states not Russia and NATO as a factor influencing Paris and Berlin, but not in Warsaw. In only on a political, but also on an eco- military reform in the country. Such a the 1990s, again, Russian diplomats raised nomic level. reform is becoming more and more ur- the issue of NATO enlargement in Wash- A further step should introduce a gent, since Russian military forces were ington D.C., Brussels and Berlin, but not milder position regarding the CFE Treaty. only reduced, however not reformed in Prague, Warsaw or Budapest. Unfortunately, the adapted treaty, signed throughout the 1990s. At the same time, As a result, anti-Russian attitudes came at the Istanbul summit in 1999, will hardly the unreformed military used to create to dominate foreign politicy discourses be ratified by a majority of the parties. and is now creating obstacles to moder- not only in the Baltic states, but also in In particular, the Baltic states are not ready nisation of the country as a whole. An- Central Europe. Russias participation in to sign the treaty, neither politically, nor other segment within this group, includ- the anti-terrorist coalition has changed technically. For the part of the Russian ing the writers of this paper, question the policy of Russia. It is indicative that elite analysed here, it seems valid, if all whether cooperation with NATO and Russia and Romania signed the Treaty parties follow the guidelines of the treaty even NATO membership is an impor-
125 tant factor for a democratic transition could justify high military expenditures better relations with Central European and in the army. For example, in 19491974 for public opinion. Cooperation between Baltic states, and, last but not least, stabil- the Portuguese army used to be one of Russian and NATO forces in the frame- ity in Europe in the situation of instabil- the pillars of the authoritarian regime, work of SFOR and KFOR has not made ity in the South. despite NATO membership. In the 1970s a shift in either the public opinion, or it was not the cooperation with the U.S. discourses among the elite. The Cold War Conclusion army which made the army step out type of discourses still exists. Though ter- against the regime; ratherit was the fail- rorism as a threat is perceived among all Russian mainstream discourse on ure in the colonial wars. And moreover, part of the Russian elite, other types of NATO keeps viewing the Alliance as un- in 19741976 a vast part of the Portu- threats are perceived as more important. able to transform and therefore as a threat. guese officers were not planning transi- The anti-terrorist coalition resembles the At the same time the NATO enlargement tion to democracy; instead, there was a anti-Hitler coalition of WWII, when all in 2004 is to become one of many im- plan to replace the existing right-wing states were trying to reduce their role in portant steps towards de-securitisation of regime with a left-wing one. NATO and military actions, though planning to oc- NATO and the Baltic states for Russia and Western European countries, especially cupy leading positions in the post-war visa-versa. Today the Alliance is mentioned the Social Democratic Government of world order. To conclude, even this part in none of the contexts concerning the Germany, got involved in domestic is- of the Russian elite is sceptical regarding top priorities of Russian foreign policy sues in Portugal only at that stage. military reform in Russia. At the same in any of the above-described groups of This part of the Russian elite perceives time, they agree that cooperation with the Russian elite. Furthermore the de- resistance of its other parts as insuperable NATO may create a friendly background securitisation on the Russian side of the at the current stage of defence policies. for the reform. Successful military reform border is depending on how the devel- Their opponents, especially those wearing can only take place in peaceful times, not opments of the NATO-Baltic states rela- military uniform, would like to limit this in the times of tensions and confronta- tionship will be perceived in Russia. cooperation down to only exchange of tion. Thus, the important constructs for Above we did only outline three pos- visits. Another part of the elite would the discourse on NATO, common for this sible scenarios stemming from the trans- prefer to see tensions between Russia and part of the Russian elite are: a friendly formation of NATO (conservative, mili- NATO (but not confrontation), which environment for Russias military reform, tary and political), but there are more sce-
126 narios undergoing current discussion Europe without Brussels? // Challenges burg State University. Presentation at the within the Alliance. Again, the military to International Relations in Post-Cold conference Russia and NATO: New Areas transformation of the Baltic states has not War Europe / Ed. by K.K. Khudoley & for Partnership. St. Petersburg: St. Peters- been completed yet. And optaining U.S. S.L. Tkachenko. St. Petersburg: St. Peters- burg State University, February 6, 2004 weapons does not necessarily mean a cre- burg University Press, 2002. P. 4561 Lanko, 2002: Lanko D.A. NATO En- ation of an army in compliance with Khudoley, 2002a: Khudoley K.K. Rus- largement: Reflections on the Russian NATO standards. Finally, the de-securiti- sia and NATO in the New International Domestic Politics // Challenges to Inter- sation will depend on to what extent the Environment // Russia-NATO Strategic national Relations in Post-Cold War Eu- NATO-Russian Council, which was cre- Partnership: Not Whether, but When? / rope / Ed. by K.K. Khudoley & S.L. ated only two years ago and which is per- Ed. by K.K. Khudoley. St. Petersburg: St. Tkachenko. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg ceived as a very effective tool by all parts Petersburg University Press, 2002. P. 14 University Press, 2002. P. 3144 of the Russian elite, will remain effective. 24 Moshes, 2003: Moshes A. Russia and The effectiveness of the Council still has Khudoley, 2002b: Khudoley K.K. Rus- NATO: Analysis of Russian Perceptions / to be tested; and one of the tests will be sia and NATO: What Expects Us in the / Challenges and Capabilities: NATO in the Baltic states. Future? // Challenges to International the 21st Century / Ed. by B. Heurlin & Relations in Post-Cold War Europe / Ed. M.B. Rasmussen. Copenhagen: Danish References by K.K. Khudoley & S.L. Tkachenko. St. Institute of International Studies, 2003 Petersburg: St. Petersburg University SIR, 2002: School of International Re- Albright, 2003: Albright M. Madam Press, 2002. P. 630 lations, St. Petersburg State University. Secretary: a Memoir. New York: Miramax, Khudoley, 2003: Khudoley K.K. Rus- Russia and NATO in the Modern World: 2003 sia and NATO: First Steps after the Rome Issues and Prospects for Cooperation / Ilves, 1999: Ilves T.H. Estonia as a Nor- Agreements // Russia and NATO after Discussion paper prepared by the Schools dic Country. Speech to the Swedish In- Rome: Prospects of Cooperation / Ed. section for foreign policy analysis and stitute for International Affairs, Decem- by K.K. Khudoley et al. St. Petersburg: working group of researchers. Published ber 14, 1999 St. Petersburg University Press, 2003 in April 2002 Katsy, 2002: Katsy D.V. NATO/EU & Khudoley, 2004: Konstantin Khudoley, Soosaar, 2003: Soosaar E. Lihtne lahendus CIS: IS it Enough Security in Eastern School of International Relations, St. Peters- ei lahenda (Easy Resolution Does Not Re-
127 solve) // Postimees, March 3, 2003 eng/programs/ndim_doc1_3.htm 2 We advise to look through Khudoley 2002a, SVOP, 1997: Russian Council for For- Voronov, 2003: Voronov K. Severnoe 2002b, 2003, 2004; Lanko, 2002, and Katsy, 2002 for a more detailed evaluation on this discourse. eign and Defense Policy (SVOP). Rossiya i izmerenie: zatyanuvshiysya debyut (North- 3 politization, if translated directly from Rus- Pribaltika II (Russia and Baltic States II): ern Dimension: Protracted Debut) // sian Voronov, 2003: 79 Discussion Paper. Published in Nefavismaya Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye 4 Moshes, 2003: 37 Gazeta on October 28,1997. Full text in otnosheniya, # 2, 2003. P. 7686 5 SVOP, 1997 6 Zaslavskaia, 2002: 62 Russian may be found at URL: http:// Yagya, 2001: Yagya V.S. Mify i realnosti 7 probably, this was the main factor, why some www.svop.ru/live/materials.asp?m_id=6882 v ontosheniyah ES Rossiya (Myths and Russian authorities became so mad with NATO SVOP, 1999: Russian Council for For- Reality in Russian-EU Relations) // Rossiya in March 1999 eign and Defense Policy (SVOP). Rossiya i i Evropa: na puti k edinoy formule (Russia Pribaltika II (Russia and Baltic States II): and Europe: Towards a Common For- Discussion Paper. Published in Nezavismaya mula) / Ed. by V.P. Goryunov & S.N. Gazeta on October 13,1999. Full text in Pogodin. St. Petersburg: Nestor, 2001. P. Russian may be found at URL: http:// 173178 www.svop.ru/live/materials.asp?m_id=6883 Yeltsin, 2000: Yeltsin B. Prezidentskiy Tkachenko & Petermann, 2002: marafon (Presidents Marathon Race). Tkachenko S.L., Petermann S. Sotrud- Moscow, 2000 nichetsvo stran SNG v voennoy sfere i faktor Zaslavskaia, 2002: Zaslavskaia N.G. NATO (CIS Military Cooperation and the Stanovlenie sotrudnichestva Severoatlanticheskogo Factor of NATO). St. Petersburg: St. Pe- alyansa i Rossii (The Formation of Russian- tersburg University Press, 2002 NATO Cooperation) // Russia-NATO Stra- Tkachev & Churov, 2000: Tkachev G.I., tegic Partnership: Not Whether, but When? Churov V.E. Severnoe izmerenie v kontekste / Ed. by K.K. Khudoley. St. Petersburg: obshchego razvitiya Evropy: vzglyad iz Peterburga St. Petersburg University Press, 2002. P. (Northern Dimension in the Context of 5863 European Development: View from St. 1 often referred to as Pribaltika in Russia even Petersburg) // http://www.leontief.ru/rnsc/ today
128 Finlands Defence Policy: Sui Generis?
By Dr. Pauli Järvenpää*
t this particular juncture of his- still holding on to the concepts of mili- peace-keeping and humanitarian opera- tory, most of the armed forces in tary non-alignment, general conscription tions. Clearly and demonstrably Finland Europe are undergoing a process and territorial defence, all the while these shares international responsibility and of profound, long-term transformation. concepts are to become abandoned rem- solidarity and is willing to use its resources Most countries are abandoning the concept nants of yesterday for practically all other to promote and defend common values. of territorial defence and emphasizing ca- countries in Europe? The second circle brings us closer to pabilities to conduct international crisis home, to Europe and its security envi- management operations at distances far away Three circles of national security ronment. By actively participating, as a from their own borders. Not Finland. Most interest member of the European Union and as a countries in Europe are also discarding the Partner to NATO, in the efforts to make great Napoleonic idea of raising mass armies In order to understand Finnish de- Europe and its immediate neighbourhood by conscription and, instead, they are cre- fence thinking it might be helpful to think stable and safe, Finland is also looking ating small all-professional armed forces. Not of Finnish national security interests as after its own self-interest. The more stable Finland. Furthermore, for most Western three concentric circles. The outer circle our continent remains, the safer Finland and Central European countries NATO is can be thought of as comprising of com- will be. As a consequence, Finnish forces the answer to their defence prayers. Once mon values. Finland is of course inter- are heavily involved in the NATO-led op- again, not for Finland. ested in defending such values, which is erations in the Balkans. How can all of this be explained? Why demonstrated by its steadfast support of, And finally, in the third circle national is Finland a sui generis case? Why is it and participation in, the United Nations interest is at its highest by such core is-
* Dr. Pauli Järvenpää is the Director General, Department of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of Finland
129 sues as national independence, security and military defence organized? Are the three high figures of support for actually de- well-being of the nation and its citizens, concentric circles, briefly outlined above, fending the country. The Advisory Board and ultimately, in the gravest possible situ- visible in Finnish defence and security for Defence Information, located in the ation, where the very survival of the na- planning? Ministry of Defence, has conducted opin- tion is at stake. To defend Finland the The image of three concentric circles ion polls for many decades, and answers Finns need a credible national defence, and is obviously a metaphor explaining the have been very much the same from one since the country has chosen, at least for different dimensions of Finnish national year to another: The answers have, year the time being, to stay outside of NATO, defence. Yet, the basic notion holds that after year, indicated the fact that more the national defence will have to be built we have to have a national defence and a than three-quarters of the people answer independently to cover all possible circum- force planning system in place which will affirmative when asked if they would take stances. These circumstances are now in a produce troops all readily available, sol- up arms in defence if Finland was attacked, flux. The future challenge will be to shape idly trained, and well enough equipped even in circumstances of an uncertain Finlands military capabilities to respond for the three tasks depicted by the meta- outcome. For example, in 2003 the fig- to the new security environment. phor. There is a strong conviction within ure was 78%. Furthermore an even larger In sum, the Finnish forces are actively participating in the peace-keeping and cri- Finland that the only way is to produce percent of the Finns would be willing to sis response operations abroad, at the same good soldiers first. Only good soldiers participate in national defence, bringing time Finland is making sure that its terri- are to be trained to become good peace- their specific skills and abilities to bear, tory will be successfully defended, should keepers. if the country was attacked. an adversary threaten the territorial integ- One dimension of Finnish defence Finnish national defence has, since the rity of the country or threaten the very policy bears a first highlighting. And that mid-1990s, been developed in accordance existence of the nation. And this Finland is the exceptionally high popular support with the recommendations authorized in continues to do as a non-allied country. of and for the military throughout the a series of Defence White Papers. In 1995, country. According to national opinion the Government produced the first issue, The Defence White Paper of 2001 polls conducted over the last few years and hereafter it has become customary for the most trusted institutions in the coun- each Government to produce a Paper in What is Finlands defence planning try are the Ministry of Defence and the the early phase of its term in office. The based on today? How is the countrys Defence Forces. The polls also show very Defence White Paper published in 2001,
130 entitled The Finnish Security and De- which may include threat or limited use strategic strike meant significant changes fence Policy 2001, forms the basis of of military force, 3. a strategic strike in- in the Finnish military structures. The Finlands current defence policy and de- tended to force the state leadership into major change was to reduce the wartime velopment plans. taking desired decisions by paralyzing cen- strength of the mobilised Defence Forces The Paper recognizes the significant tral institutions and functions of society from 540 000 to 350 000 soldiers by the change of Finlands international position and the defence system, and 4. a large-scale year 2008. The forces would be divided which has past in the post-Cold War pe- attack, with the aim of capturing strategi- into operational and territorial forces. riod: Finlands membership in the Eu- cally important areas or using Finnish ter- Roughly about 100 000 soldiers would ropean Union raises the threshold to ex- ritory against a third party. form the backbone of the operational ert pressure against Finland. Also, the For the first time ever the strategic forces, while 250 000 reservists would be active participation in the NATOs Part- strike as a surprise attack severing the so- assigned local defence tasks. nership for Peace (PfP) programme did ciety from its leadership and vital assets, The striking power of the land forces improve Finlands interoperability with civilian as well as military, became the main was to be concentrated in three readiness the Alliance. Furthermore, preparations yardstick with which to measure and de- brigades, the Pori, Karjala and Kainuu for host nation support (HNS) were al- velop the Finnish military capabilities. Brigades, which were modernised to high ready started on the basis of the 1997 The White Paper concludes, resources are military standards. The number of bri- Defence White Paper. The same point was primarily allocated to achieving a capa- gades was reduced from 27 to 22, while reiterated in the 2001 White Paper: Cre- bility to prevent and repel a strategic 11 of them were to be armoured, readi- ation of capabilities for receiving assis- strike. As a result, improvements in war- ness or jaeger brigades. The Pori Brigade tance in a crisis situation is taken into time equipment in the planning period was also assigned the task of training con- consideration when developing Finlands 2001-2008 focus particularly on command, scripts, who volunteered to be trained for national defence. control and surveillance capability, elec- international crisis response operations. According to the 2001 White Paper, the tronic warfare, land force mobility and The firepower and mobility of the land following threat scenarios constitute the the capacity to deliver and protect against forces were enhanced by the acquisition basis for defence planning: 1. a regional long-range weapons effects. of 124 Leopard 2A4 tanks, armoured fight- crisis with repercussions for Finland, 2. The waning of a large-scale attack as a ing vehicles (CV 90), more armoured per- political, economic and military pressure, likely military threat by the waxing of the sonnel carriers, and transport helicopters.
131 One particularly interesting aspect of Finnish forces maintain in crisis response by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the 2001 Defence White Paper was its em- operations. From 1 May 2004 the same Defence. phasis on the preparation for international brigade is once again being commanded The group was tasked to report on its crisis response operations. Peace-keeping by a Finnish general. progress to the Governments special Cabi- has a long and honourable tradition in It is also worth noting the fact that all net Committee on Foreign and Security Finland. The Finns participated in UN expenses for peace-keeping operations are Policy, and it is expected to complete its peace-keeping operations already in 1956 shared equally between the Ministries of work in September this year. The White at Suez, a year after Finland had become Foreign Affairs and Defence. The total cost Paper will provide the necessary focus and a member of the UN. Since then, more for 2004 is in the area of 105-110 million direction for national defence development than 45 000 Finnish soldiers have served euros. Furthermore, it is equally worth and plans for the next four years and be- in such operations, and at the moment, mentioning that the part maintained and yond, all the way to the year 2012. nearly 1000 Finns are participating in paid by the Ministry of Defence for peace- It is of course too early to tell what the eight different operations around the keeping operations are money separate main focus in the Defence White Paper world, from Afghanistan and Kashmir to from the regular defence budget. will be, but certain cornerstones of policy Eritrea and Kosovo. have already been laid out by the Gov- Finland has greatly benefited from its The Defence White Paper of 2004 ernment. An interim report outlining cooperation with NATO in its effort to the main policy directions was made pub- develop already existing crisis response Finlands national defence, as the de- lic on 15 April this year. The report states capabilities. The Planning and Review fence arrangements in most nations of that the Finnish Government will con- Process (PARP) with its Partnership Goals Europe, is currently undergoing an im- tinue to base the security policy of Fin- (PG) has been particularly useful. Finland portant period of transformation. In May land on maintaining a credible national did as the first non-NATO nation take 2003, the Government appointed a four- defence, remaining militarily non-allied over the command of a brigade in a person working group of experienced civil and continuing active participation in in- NATO-led operation (brigade MNB(C) servants to prepare the Defence White ternational crisis management efforts and in Kosovo from 1 May 2003, half year Paper of 2004. All relevant ministries are in other security co-operations. Due to rotation). This earns as a clear testimony represented in the process; however the the fact that Finland is not seeking NATO of the high professional standards the main portions of the report are prepared membership, one especially important and
132 highlighted aspect of the policy will be notes full participation of Finland in the assistance of other countries, in case such to maintain and further develop the ex- development and implementation of the situations arise. cellent working relationship with NATO. EU Common Security and Defence Apart from the interim report of the A clear indication of the future defence Policy. More specifically, Finland is pre- Government outlining the main direc- policy of Finland was given on 15 April, pared for participation in the EUs rapid tions of the Finnish security policy, sev- as the President of the Republic and the reaction force which is being developed eral discussions in Finland on various Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Se- through the concept of battle groups. aspects of national security have been curity Policy discussed the basic guide- The Cabinet Committee states that Fin- handled. Three separate studies merit at- lines for the 2004 Defence White Paper. land will maintain and develop its defence tention. Firstly in February 2004, a par- First of all, it was argued that Finland capability as a militarily non-aligned coun- liamentary working group published a continues to develop its cooperation with try. The defence planning will remain study of various changes in the Finnish NATO and continues to participate ac- firmly focused on enhancing the ability security environment. The main aim of tively in the PfP programme. At the same to defend national territory, if necessary, the study was to examine and raise ques- time, it was stated that Finland will con- and rather than enhancing the ability to tions on which the Parliament expects tinue to follow the transformation of reconstitute defence forces should mili- answers in the Defence White Paper later NATO, therefore pursuit of NATO mem- tary threats materialize (of which the cur- this year. The parliamentary group con- bership remains an option in Finlands rent Swedish policy is an example). cluded that parallel to maintaining the security and defence policy also in the Compulsory military service is main- need of a credible national defence, in- future. In other words, the door to tained and national defence will continue creased solidarity and multilateral coop- NATO will be kept ajar, however the Gov- to be based on the territorial defence con- eration are essential to counter todays ernment for the moment does not wish cept. At the same time, resources are be- threats. to enter through it. ing developed for participation in mili- Secondly, the Ministry of Defence Furthermore, as a member of the Eu- tary cooperation in various crisis situa- published a report on the military require- ropean Union, Finland underlines its tions. Specifically this means that Finland ments for NATO membership in March cohesion, solidarity and common com- has to be able to cooperate and contrib- 2004. On the 4 of February 2003, Mr. mitments with the Union enhancing the ute to operations abroad, and at the same Jan-Erik Enestam, then Minister of De- security of Finland. The Government time improve its facilities to draw on the fence, appointed an expert group to pre-
133 pare a report on the consequences for over the coming years, there are reasons land it will maintain its ability to defend Finlands defence system and defence ad- to remain confident that the budget levels national territory rather than the ability ministration of a possible membership of will remain stable. The 2001 White Paper to reconstitute defence forces. The feature such a military alliance. If one wants to provides a defence budget of about 2,1 of a system of general conscription will crystallise the key conclusions of the re- billion euros in 2004, with about 2% real remain as well, which will guarantee the port, it would be that Finland would be increase each year until 2008, which is the quality and quantity of national reserves. able to fulfil all criteria for NATO mem- end of the 2001 White Paper planning It is also important to note that neither of bership with the exception of popular period. Approximately one third, or about these concepts will be seriously contested support and that our current defence 650 million euros, of the defence budget by the citizens of Finland. On the con- budget levels, refocused, could readily continues to be spent annually on procur- trary the public mind sets these concepts sustain the membership costs. ing major defence materiel. If the same level as the cornerstones of Finnish national de- And thirdly, the Defence Staff, also in of defence spending is maintained, the fence, and as such they are fully supported March 2004, published a study concerning Finnish defence experts are confident that by the vast majority of the population. the armys strike capabilities in the future Finlands national defence capabilities can The robust commitment to interna- years. The capabilities to be developed were be steadily and prudently developed to tional operations is also there to stay. As selected from a wide repertoire of weapons answer the challenges in the early 2010s. the Governments interim report states, systems, ranging from multi-launch rocket international military cooperation is an systems to attack helicopters. One of the Conclusion essential part of Finlands defence and se- most interesting findings was the recom- curity policy, and it supports Finlands mendation to develop a stand-off air-to- For those who might wish to see radi- own defence. If future brings economic ground capability for the F-18 Hornet fleet. cal changes in Finlands defence orienta- constraints, role specialisation and coop- A big question in the course of pre- tion, the 2004 Defence White Paper will eration with like-minded nations will be paring the 2004 White Paper will be the most likely be a disappointment. As the a requirement. This will be especially im- question how many resources will be al- early indications attest, no major policy portant due to the fact that cooperation lotted to national defence in Finland. Even changes will be in the offing. grows within the European Union, and though there are no grounds to assume As perhaps the most important conti- crisis response capabilities within the that defence budgets will rise dramatically nuity in the defence orientation of Fin- Union are to be developed further.
134 Reforms of the Croatian Armed Forces toward NATO
By Neven Kranjcec1
he principal strategic objectives Since its establishment in 1991, the and 20032 opened the door for a more for the Republic of Croatia are Croatian Armed Forces have passed intensified defence reform programme. all linked to joining NATO and through numerous reform efforts, which Since joining the Partnership for Peace, the EU as two mutually supporting goals. could be outlined in the following phases: Croatia has progressively intensified its The primary activities supporting these 1991-1995, the defence reforms dur- dialogue with NATO and sought to make goals are focused on enhancing effi- ing this period were conducted under the most of Alliances expertise, structures ciency of the Croatian Armed Forces considerations of the then present war and programmes, including the PARP, to (CAF) and their interoperability with situation. assist and guide the military reform pro- the forces of NATO countries, enabling 1996-1999, the post-war defence re- cess3. and enhancing stability and security na- forms were mainly focusing on the main- This article will focus on the latest re- tionally, regionally and internationally. tenance of sufficient independent military forms (2002 and onwards) that started In support of these national objectives, capabilities ensuring national security. with the legal and constitutional changes, the Republic of Croatia entered the PfP 2000-; partly as a result of the PfP intended to clarify uncertainties in the programme in May 2000, the Intensi- Initiative, comprehensive reforms of the political relationship between the Presi- fied Dialogue in July 2001, and the military sector were launched for the first dent, the Parliament, the Ministry of Membership Action Plan (MAP) in May time. Political and legal redefinition of Defence, and the Chief of Staff. The con- 2002. the defence-related framework in 20021 stitutional changes and the Defence Law
*Lt Col Neven Kranjèec of the Croatian Armed Forces is currently a student of the Colonels Course 20032004 of the Baltic Defence College
135 and Law on Service in the Armed Forces This article will try to describe these in the Defence Ministry, General Staff and regulated issues concerning defence and reform achievements in reorganisation, Armed Forces. The size of the CAF is established responsibility over the defence planning, personnel management, defined by the Croatian Presidents De- system in a much more balanced and de- modernisation, cooperation and contri- cision on the Size, Composition and tailed manner among the highest institu- bution with the inputs from the DR as a Mobilisation of the CAF, passed in May tions of the Government. These laws corrective tool for future processes. 2002. The Armed Forces are limited to emphasise the democratic control of the the authorised wartime strength of about Armed Forces through a more viable di- Reorganisation 140,000 troops. The peacetime authorised vision of authorities and responsibilities ceilings do not exceed 29,000 personnel, with regard to key players in the defence To redirect resources for including up to 21,000 active duty mili- system management and command4 . modernisation and the advancement of tary and 8,000 serving conscripts. The Reform of the CAF is an ongoing pro- capabilities, the CAF implemented a new reserve component is to be reduced to cess seeking required capabilities, based organisational structure and downsized the 108,000 personnel. The Armed Forces on the Alliances Defence Capabilities Ini- professional and reserve components. should have up to 4,000 civilian person- tiative5 . In this process of developing af- Most of the reorganisation and nel. These numbers have been under seri- fordable, modern and capable armed downsizing was completed by the end of ous revision since 2003, as it was realised forces that are well organised, trained and 2003. Continuation of this effort in 2004 that the new armed forces structure was equipped, the Planning and Reviewing and 2005 will allow a gradual shift, not adapted to the new security situation Process (PARP) plays a significant role. emphasising the CAF modernisation and properly and was, beyond question, And Croatia has, furthermore, realised a mobility and deployment capabilities. unaffordable. It is to believe that the DR need to approach reforms from a ratio- These adjustments, especially with regard will come with adequate recommendations nal, holistic and long-term perspective. to management, development and deploy- on this issue. Therefore, already in the early beginning ment of professional forces, will also de- The land component represents the larg- of the defence reform, a requirement for mand refinements in the present laws and est part of the CAF. During 2002-2003 it a Defence Review (DR)as a comprehen- subsequent procedures. was reduced from 6 area commands to 4 sive study and a clear directivewas de- Reform concerning reorganisation corps6 . This is based on a geographic-ter- termined. began with organisational restructuring ritorial principle. Each corps consists of
136 8-14 brigades, centred around one pro- consists of command, four air bases, one of the Croatian defence policy related to fessional guardian brigade. A corps is brigade, and several supporting units. training and education, procurement and designed to be operationally independent, The main intent of the future force acquisition as well as resource manage- based on a modular system, which allows structure is to base it on operational ca- ment. Some of the key findings were im- the easier transfer of smaller units between pabilities reducing a multiplication of mediately adopted8 and some are planned the corps.7 authorities/competence and unnecessary to be. Consequently, a Defence Review At the beginning of 2004, it was con- administration. This is also to optimise will serve as a basic guidance for the Long cluded that the existing structure was too and integrate physically dispersed, but Term Development Plan (out to 2015) and reliant on mobilisation, and not efficient identical activities, and the squandering will provide revised priorities for the and effective in its focus. Recently, it has of already insufficient resources should modernisation of the Armed Forces. been found that this territorial system be avoided. Further, to foster improved planning resembles too much the previous Con- and budgeting to meet requirements, the cept of Territorial Defence and, there- Planning Minister of Defence signed into effect the fore, not applicable to the future NATO new regulation formally implementing the collective defence requirements. This kind The reform process is influenced by Planning, Programming and Budgeting of organisation cannot support develop- the PARP, the Individual Partnership System (PPBS) in February 2003. In turn, ing of deployable, modernised forces, and Programme and the Partnership Goals (the the PPBS Methodology was adopted in it was recommended to adopt a new number of which increased from 21 in July 2003, and the Methodology of Plan- organisation and composition, with a 2001 to 48 this year, followed by an in- ning in the CAF was developed. Addi- smaller number of headquarters, less creased number of activities - 69 in 2001 tionally, the Annual Military Priorities guardianfull timebrigades and less, but to more than 360 in 2004). PARP has had document was adopted in 2003. It defines better trained reserve forces. It is quite an extremely important role in the prepa- priorities for planning and budgeting for possible that the unnecessary commands ration of Croatian units for NATO-led the fiscal year 2004. Having gained expe- such as Navy and Air Forces Command operations. It also exposes Croatian de- rience in the development and implemen- will be abolished. Today the Navy is fence system, as a whole, to the tation of the PPBS through co-operation organised into the Navy Command, the interoperability requirements, having with NATO members, the MoD is pio- Fleet and two naval sectors. The Air Force great effect on the most significant aspects neering the introduction of this form of
137 planning and budgeting in Croatia. Suc- that end, personnel management is also officer, NCO and enlisted soldiers train- cess in the implementation of the PPBS evaluating and developing new proposals ing systems, as well as the training of bat- will provide an extended long-term plan- for enhancement of the officer and NCO talion and brigade staffs. Thus far, full ning horizon and ensure a more realistic professional education and development level of compatibility with NATO stan- connection between the operational needs programme, the pay and benefits system, dards has been achieved in the NCO sup- and the resources available. the officer evaluation and promotion sys- port chain, thanks to continuous efforts tem, the recruitment programme and qual- in the development of the Armed Forces, Personnel Management ity of life enhancements, to attract and re- and this system will continue to evolve tain quality personnel. The end result is even further. Currently, the programme of intended to be a more professional, capable The professional development system downsizing the number of personnel in and affordable military that is well trained for active officers and NCOs is based on the Croatian Armed Forces is the main and equipped to contribute to national a 20-30 year service career. All officers and project. This programme was initiated in security and, through the UN and NATO NCOs are given the opportunity, based October 2002, and proceeded through- operations, to international security. on performance, to retire from military out 2003. The intention of downsizing The personnel management system service as a captain, major, lieutenant colo- to the appropriate size of the military to within the CAF and the Ministry of De- nel or colonel, or as an NCO, after 20 years the national security requirements are to fence of the Republic of Croatia has fo- of service. Active duty soldiers may be pro- be based on strategic assessments and a cused in part on the role of improving moted to NCO if they meet criteria and new organisational structure, and on sav- interoperability with NATO forces, as well are younger than 25, and/or to officer if ings of personnel costs all directed to- as various other PfP goals. Criteria have they are younger than 30 given that they ward modernisation of military capabili- been established to select, train and edu- meet civilian and military education require- ties and equipment. In addition to and cate personnel to be involved in NATO/ ments. Soldiers that are not promoted to in parallel with the restructuring, the per- PfP activities, as well as staff officers asso- NCO must retire at the age of 40. This sys- sonnel management system is internally ciated with the planning and co-ordina- tem allows the maintenance of a satisfactory re-evaluating its role and function to re- tion of such activities. age structure in the armed forces. vamp the personnel management function, Significant improvements and changes In the period from December 2002 to as it adjusts to the future demands. To in this regard have been achieved in the the end of February 2003 all officers,
138 NCOs and soldiers were screened to de- Initiation of the armoured person- termine who met the standards for re- Modernisation nel carrier (APC) programme and pos- tention. In February 2003, the MoD sible continued slow-rate production of adopted the Regulation on Selection and Croatian Armed Forces desperately the M-84A4 tank; Posting of Active Military Personnel need modernisation. Obsolete and non- Continued re-equipping (interopera- during the CAF Reorganisation. Post- standardised equipment, mostly captured bility) for units destined for overseas de- ing priority was given to active military during the war, has to be replaced with ployment, primarily at tactical level.9 personnel meeting standards, then to new, modern one. During previous years, The important issue is whether all the those who had the potential and oppor- this was not possible because of high per- plans and proposals for modernising of tunity to meet standards. Some of those sonnel costs. The personnel expenses in the armed forces match the resources and who did not and could not meet the stan- 2002 amounted to almost 70% of the de- whether the resources are, subsequently, dards were retained temporarily to fulfil fence budget, which impeded effective spent for the purpose for which they were the needs of the CAF. It is planned that development and modernisation of the actually provided. Combining the intro- until 2010 approximately 2000 of active CAF. The planned programme of duction of the PPBS with the duty personnel per year will be released downsizing will hopefully reduce person- modernisation of the CAF is the main from duty and replaced by 1000 new- nel expenses to some 50% of the defence issue in the near future, after which per- comers. budget by 2010, releasing more funds for sonnel costs will also be balanced prop- The quality of personnel is essential in the desperately needed modernisation. erly. reaching the level of readiness needed by Today the key issues of modernisation the CAF in order to carry out tasks for and equipping are focussed on: Cooperation and contribute to the Alliance. Therefore, Overhaul and upgrade of Mi-8 trans- the personnel management system will port helicopters and PC-9 training air- In terms of limited resources, empha- remain in focus for the next several years, craft. sis is placed on areas where national re- until the entire career path for the mili- Integration of new FPS-117 air-sur- quirements do overlap with international tary, as well as for the civilian personnel veillance and Peregrine coastal radars, ac- commitments. Currently, the CAF units employed in defence sector, is well estab- quisition of communications and fire are deployed on a number of the UN and lished. control systems for artillery; other peace operations, including the
139 ISAF, in Afghanistan.10 Croatia has been to activities directly contributing to de- company (with the proper relief forces especially active within the framework of fined international defence co-operation for rotation), a military police platoon initiatives and processes concerning goals. Due to budget restrictions, a pro- (currently engaged in Afghanistan), an Middle and South Eastern Europe (the cess has been introduced to define areas engineering platoon for de-mining, an Stability Pact, SEDM, CENCOOP, Quad- in which certain bilateral partners (espe- NBC platoon for decontamination, as well rilateral (Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia) cially NATO partners) can serve as men- as two medical support teams. Simulta- and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative), and tors. The objective of this process is to neously, the equipping and preparations has intensified activities related to full avoid duplication of efforts, so that mul- for logistics support of the PSO-declared membership in the military element of tiple partners do not provide assistance units were completed. Maintaining the the Quadrilateral MLF brigade. in the same areas of co-operation. readiness of these units is ongoing, as well Bilateral co-operation activities are Unfortunately, the existing coopera- as the improvement of language skills for conducted with the goal of supporting: tion on the unit level cannot be consid- the selected personnel. New personnel, interoperability with NATO; developing ered satisfactory, especially in the light of mostly NCOs, are selected and are in the the defence system and CAF capabilities; cooperation agreed by the Adriatic Char- preparation process for serving at the facilitating defence transition; developing ter.11 With the exception of the partici- international military staffs. good neighbourly relations and regional pation in PfP or similar exercises and MP The adoption of NATO documents, co-operation; and enhancing international platoon deployed in Afghanistan, the rest procedures and standards in the area of security through participation in inter- of the cooperation activities are conducted NBC defence started in 2003. It will con- national activities. Considering limited on an experts level. tinue in 2004, through unit training and budget resources, bilateral activities that mission preparation instruction provided support more than one Partnership Goal Contribution by the International Military Operations receive priority. The most intensive bi- Centre (IMOC). The objective of the CAF lateral defence co-operation is conducted Croatia is currently working on the is to have all designated units engaged in with the US, the UK, Germany, France, implementation of 48 Partnership Goals. NATO-led peace operations capable of Austria, Hungary and Slovenia. The num- From 2003, the Croatian Army is able to meeting the basic standards of individual ber of activities has remained approxi- provide for participation in NATO/PfP and collective NBC defence by the end mately the same, but emphasis has shifted exercises and operations: a light infantry of 2004.
140 ture, command and management struc- End of crisis management practice Defence Review tures of the MoD and the Joint Staff. A Affordability, transparency and reli- key factor is the ability of the proposed ability12 A key approach for Croatia is to con- CAF structure to fulfil responsibilities Hopefully, similar process will become tribute to NATO and benefit from derived from membership in the Alliance. a regular practice in the future as a tool NATO membership. NATO The Review will also address issues such as intended for a more realistic linkage be- interoperability is viewed as the basic the size, training, equipping and infra- tween tasks and resources. principle to lead development of the CAF structure related to reserve forces, and the and capabilities for both national defence type of forces (contracted, conscripted, Conclusion and international contributions. Thus, or some combination of both). advancements in national defence capabili- The Defence Review is to be conducted A continued defence reform is a neces- ties and NATO membership requirements by the MoD, with expert assistance and sity for Croatia to meet the demand for are mutually reinforcing goals. Simulta- co-operation from the international com- modern armed forces without the cre- neously, these advancements contribute to munity, and, domestically, by academic ation of any overwhelming burden onto regional and international security and experts and other ministries, and they will the state economy. Furthermore, there is stability. complete the final recommendations in an urgent need to invest in Taking into consideration the balance 2004. The expected outcomes of the DR, modernisation and acquisition of new of national requirements and requirements as an excellent vehicle to overcome diag- military equipment, facilitating execution ensuing from future membership in nosed shortfalls of the Croatian Defence of the armed forces mission. Downsizing NATO and the EU, the DR will deter- System, are: the personnel will provide for smaller mine options for achieving defence capa- Clear definition of missions, capa- personnel costs, and release more resources bilities and the affordability of each op- bilities and priorities needed for modernisation. These reforms tion. It will redefine the present strategic Easier and faster adjustment to the are necessitated by the future NATO mem- defence concept, redirect its focus from new strategic circumstances bership. With the progress of implemen- individual to collective defence, and pro- Better rationale behind decision mak- tation of the Partnership Goals and sup- vide the basis for further changes in the ing in terms of missions, priorities and ported by the results of ongoing defence system, including the CAF struc- resources reorganisation, increasing cooperation on
141 unit level is expected. The development The Republic of Croatia has reached a reached, it must be maintained as a pro- of a modern approach to the planned tasks point where it has to thoroughly review cess in which the whole society will be of the unit, and to equipping and man- its defence system in order to define the informed about and integrated in. A com- ning will have direct impacts on capabili- role and capabilities the armed forces shall prehensive reform like this, interacting ties of the CAF to contribute to the in- maintain and can afford. Until now, no actively with society, is a vital interest of ternational operations. such review of the CAF has been con- the defence forces, and without the sup- The process of reforms itself is to be ducted. In order to get the maximum port from society it will not succeed its emphasised; comprehensive reforms en- benefit from the reforms the DR must mission. compassing a rational, holistic and long- consider the structure and type of forces, term perspective are a must. The reform their capability and the reserve compo- 1 The adoption of a package of strategic docu- ments and laws in the area of national security is a process of permanent analysis of the nent usage. This is also required when and defence should be regarded a major develop- shortfalls of the previous reforms, with defining the size and force capability to ment in 2002. These are: National Security Strat- the purpose of improvement in the light deploy for a full spectrum of NATO mis- egy, Defence Strategy, Defence Law, Law on the of the development of more efficient sions. Service in the Armed Forces, Law on the Produc- tion, Repairement and Trafficking of Weapons armed forces, and should be considered The latest reform is not the last one and Military Equipment and the Law on the Par- as consistently driven by long-term plans the CAF will pass through. It is positive ticipation of Members of Croatian Armed Forces and visions. The dynamics of changes in to see development of the forces as a per- in Peace Support Operations Abroad. the environment and an accession to manent process of reform to ensure the 2 The President of the Republic of Croatia signed Military Strategy in 2003 (based on the Chief of NATO require that part of the existing adequate legal base, efficient planning sys- the Joint Staff recommendation and Minister of strategic documents and legal regulations tem, appropriate management of person- Defence approval). Based on it, the MoD devel- are taken into consideration and revised, nel and budget, technical modernisation oped Defence Policy 2003/04 and CAF Vision as well as new supporting documents are and proper assessment of possible short- 2014 as leading short and long term planning documents. produced. The ongoing reforms of to- falls as a tool for future improvements, 3 Mahecic, Zvonimir; Aspiring to NATO mem- day within the CAF are very much in all in order to contribute to collective bership, NATO Review, Winter 2003, at http:// line with this comprehensive perspective, security within the EU and NATO. And www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/ however are to be followed up by appro- once such cycle planning - funding - imple- special.html 4 The President, as the supreme commander, priate reviewing tools. mentation - assessment improvement is
142 signs principal decisions regulating the Armed (Burundi, Haiti, and Cyprus) and some are un- Forces. Under the Defence Law of 2002, the Prime der consideration (Sudan, Ivory Coast). Minister, through the Defence Minister in peace- 11 On May 2, 2003 in Tirana was signed time, is responsible for the day-to-day manage- Adriatic Charter among foreign ministers of ment of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Albania, Croatia, Macedonia and USA, a docu- Defence. In peacetime, the Chief of the Joint Staff ment in spirit of 1998 signed Baltic Charter reports through the Defence Minister to the among Baltic states and USA, with similar pur- President. In wartime or crisis, the President can pose. Charter emphasised what has been told exercise command of the Armed Forces directly briefly to this states during the Prague summit - through the Chief of the Joint Staff, keeping the that cooperation among them same as with Defence Minister and government informed. neighbouring countries Bosnia and Herzegovina 5 http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211- as well as Serbia and Montenegro will be one of prague/in_focus/capabilities/index.htm the crucial measurement of contribution. 6 1st around Zagreb, 3rd around Osijek to the 12 Source: Briefing to the members of NATO East, 4th around Split to the south and 5th north Parliamentary Assembly during their visit to of Zadar - around Rijeka on the coast Croatia on March 2004, given by Dr Jelena Grèiæ 7 See: Novi list, Rijeka, 14 January 2003. (http:// Poliæ, Head of MoD Defence Policy Division www.novilist.hr/) 8 Alike in the area of modernisation of MiG-21 and M-84A4 tank production it was found that could not be considered as priority because they are rapidly becoming outdated in the sense of the modern battle-space and its operational require- ments. 9 Watkins, Dr Amadeo, PfP Integration: Croatia, Serbia & Montenegro, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United King- dom, April 2004, p 9 10 Currently Croatia has just over 60 troops deployed abroad on 7 peace operations, includ- ing some 35 military police and NSE personnel with ISAF IV in Afghanistan. See: Jutarnji list, 2 January 2004. Some new missions are recently offered for military observers participation
143 144 Section V
EU Enlargement and New Members
145 146 EU25 > 15+10
By Kristiina Ojuland*
want to discuss the imminent en- mits, Mr Jacques Chirac, President of pean Union, the overriding common largement, as well as the future, of France, represented Germany. It is less well national interest of all of us old and the European Union from the known, however, that during one of the new, big and small countries alike is the Estonian perspective. I would like to stress sessions of the Intergovernmental Con- same: we want ourselves and others to in advance, however, that although ference last year, the foreign minister of enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity. We Estonias and Britains place in the en- Estonia represented the United Kingdom. believe that the best way to achieve this is larged European Union differs signifi- Similarly I had the honour of represent- through the enlarged European Union. cantly, our vision about the future of the ing my Latvian colleague at the EU meet- We want European integration to succeed. Union coincides in many important re- ing with US Secretary of State Colin The political and economic implica- spects. An eloquent proof of this was the Powell. Representing each other at meet- tions of the enlargement are obvious article on taxation in the European ings is symbolic of the reality of todays twenty-five European countries acting as Union, co-authored by the British and Europe. European integration is not con- one, in the international arena, is a force Estonian prime ministers, Tony Blair and fined to institutions, it also includes with considerably more weight than the Juhan Parts, which was published last shared visions. Although, there have re- sum total of twenty-five individual coun- November in The Financial Times. cently been concerns about the possibil- tries. Europe must be strong, in order to I also have a personal example of our ity, that different interests of Member achieve its goals in many areas. common perceptions. It is well known, States might have a negative effect on the An enlarged Europe will also benefit that at one of the European Council sum- future and unity of the enlarged Euro- European culture as a whole. Pluralism * Kristiina Ojuland is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia. This article is a manuscript of the speech delivered at St. Anthonys College, University of Oxford. Editors of the Baltic Defence Review are grateful to the St. Anthonys College and Estonian MFA for the possibility to publish it.
147 and cultural diversity has made Europe shifted priorities significantly, and led to collapse of Communist regimes in Europe. so successful in the past, and will provide the development of a cohesion policy, but It can be said, that for at least eight coun- a great potential also for the future. also to the increased budgetary tensions tries, the Cold War will truly come to an It goes without saying, however, that between richer and poorer members of end on 1 May 2004, when they rejoin the the upcoming enlargement also poses sev- the European Union. The accession of rest of Europe after more than six de- eral obvious challenges for both current relatively wealthier Austria, Finland, and cades of forced and artificial separation. members and Acceding Countries, as well Sweden, a decade ago, added the north- What could be the most immediate as the European Union as a whole. The ern dimension to the Union, and brought challenges that the enlarged Union might founding members have half a century of along a greater focus on social and envi- have to face? An obvious one is a change experience in European integration, and ronmental issues. in the borders of the Union. This means have seen how the three previous enlarge- The enlargement, which takes place in new neighbours, and hence, a need for ments in the history of the European May, however, is particularly dramatic. new policies, for dealing with them. This Union have changed the Union, in more And not only because of its big bang is where the experience and the know-how or less, dramatic ways. The first enlarge- nature. Above all, it has a powerful sym- of new members can be particularly use- ment, three decades ago, added three coun- bolic meaning. The membership of ten ful. It is also clear, that the ongoing en- tries Britain, Denmark, and Ireland. new countries, to the east and the south, largement will be accompanied with While the founding members intended touches the collective psyche of Europe. changes in the decision-making process to create a political community, of which This enlargement erases the dividing line of the European Union, as well as, within the economic communities were the first that was drawn during the Cold War be- its institutional structure, a matter cur- step, the three new members placed a tween Eastern and Western Europe. rently debated at the Intergovernmental greater emphasis on the economic aspect The continuation of the Cold War Conference. of the community. The tension between division, into the 21st century, is unthink- The functioning of the Union after these two visions has been present ever able and morally unjustifiable. For the enlargement means, that the priorities of, since, and is still important to the debates countries that are involved in enlarge- not fifteen, but twenty-five Member States, concerning the future of the European ment, it concludes the process of Euro- have to be reconciled. It also entails the Union today. The accession of Greece, pean reunification, which was launched, coordinating of the external priorities of Spain, and Portugal, two decades ago, also with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the an increased number of countries. This
148 has posed a challenge already for the fif- European integration worked for West- Security in Europe is indivisible and the teen current members, as was evident last ern Europe both in terms of economic enlargement of the European Union ex- year in the case of Iraq. Obviously, the reconstruction as well as the creation of tends the model of stability and prosper- Union must make its institutions more post-war peace and stability after various ity that has worked so well in the West. efficient, so as to be able to cope with the decades dominated by nationalism, totali- The economic dimension of the en- arising situations. The balance between tarian ideologies, and tensions between largement is most evident and discernible. small and big states, as well as, between countries. It led to prosperity, completely European integration is a long-term pro- the net contributors and net recipients different political agenda and changed cess where we must, mutually, discuss all from the EU budget, will also change con- system of inter-state relations. possible options, and ultimately imple- siderably. The genius of Jean Monnet and the ment everything that all members have These challenges, however, are not es- Schuman plan will work for the new mem- agreed upon. The agreement to pursue sentially new in the history of the Euro- bers as well. The preparation for acces- economic integration has worked very pean Union, and are clearly outweighed sion has been a motor of transformation well; the reunification of Europe ex- by the long-term benefits of the reunifi- and has undoubtedly contributed to sta- tends the single market. This contributes cation of Europe, the word that I would bility and prosperity in Europe as a whole. to the goal of transforming the European particularly want to emphasise. The en- In Estonia, we started our transformation Union into the most competitive largement in May makes Europe or at in the early 1990s at a time when we did economy in the world. Enlargement adds least most of it a whole again, after so not expect to join the European Economic almost eighty million new citizens to the many decades of artificial division. Eu- Community in the near future. In retro- European Union, which is a significant rope would not be the same without spect, we did many things right but it contribution to the Unions labour force. Budapest and Prague, which have been was only in the accession negotiations that This is particularly important, consider- the heart of Europe for centuries, or with- we realized how much work we still had ing that the population of Europe, as a out the Hanseatic towns of Tallinn and ahead of us. Without the prospect of whole, has been decreasing and aging con- Riga. The Baltic Sea was Europes true mare European integration, we would not have stantly, which has an adverse effect upon nostrum during the times of the Hanseatic achieved as much as we have today. And the regions competitiveness. League a unifying, not dividing sea without integration, todays Europe And now, a few words about the fu- and is becoming one again. would be a worse place than it is today. ture of the European Union from the Es-
149 tonian perspective. Membership in the Eu- 1998, in Brussels, and was concluded in justification for the existence of the state. ropean Union, as well as in the North Copenhagen, in December 2002. The Ac- The concept of a social contract entails Atlantic Treaty Organisation, has been the cession Treaty was signed, last year, in the giving away of some of our freedoms, main priority of Estonian foreign policy Athens, on April 16. A correspondingly so that, everybody can equally benefit from since the country regained its indepen- successful referendum on EU accession was the rewards of cooperation. It might be dence in 1991. Pan-European ideas in Es- held in Estonia on September 14, 2003. said, that the European Union is the so- tonia are, however, much older than that. It must be emphasised, however, that - cial contract, which binds the peoples of Noor Eesti (Young Estonia), a significant like in Britains case - Estonian support Europe. We pool some of our sovereignty, literary movement, which influenced 20th for European integration has not been and that is precisely, what makes coexist- century Estonian thinking, called for be- unconditional. The average Estonian has ence, not just possible, but also benefi- coming European, but remaining Esto- been cautious, as was indicated by the cial. This is, yet, one more argument for nian, already a hundred years ago. One accession referendum. The referendum the advantages that the European Union, of the major proponents of the Pan-Eu- ultimately resulted in a yes vote, with of twenty-five members, has, over twenty- ropean movement in Estonia, during the 67 percent of the voters being for the five individual countries. 1920s, Kaarel Robert Pusta, the one time accession. But this support was relatively It is rarely mentioned, that the Euro- Estonian foreign minister and ambassa- low, compared with most other Acceding pean Union can also delegate some of its dor to France, argued in 1929, echoing Countries. sovereignty to international organizations. the ideas of count Richard Coudenhove- Due to our recent history, the ques- One of the initial reasons for drafting Kalergi, that everything that strengthens tion of true Estonian sovereignty has the Constitutional Agreement was, to en- the unity of Europe, also provides secu- played a central role in the debates con- able the Union to accede to the Council rity for our [ ] independence. cerning our European integration. This, of the Europe Human Rights Conven- In November 1995, Estonia submitted I think, is a core question for Europe as a tion. It is the essence of modern interna- its European Union membership appli- whole. Does European integration mean tional relations to work together to solve cation, and in 1997 received invitation, a transfer, or delegation, or pooling of common problems. along with several other states with the sovereignty? Some of the answers, to these The European Union, which Estonia same aspirations, to start accession nego- questions, may lie in the familiar social is about to join, is a constantly develop- tiations. This process began, in March contract theory, the main philosophical ing organisation. After signing the Acces-
150 sion Treaty, Estonia was granted observer more comprehensible for the citizens of does not contribute to the dynamic de- status. This gave us the right to partici- Europe. velopment of Europe. Quite the contrary pate in the work of the Council of the Estonia supports the development of - it even threatens to slow it down. Steady European Union at all decision-making the European Union, as a union of states, progress of reforms is, however, of vital levels. Estonia has made definite use of in which the equal treatment of all mem- importance in the situation where the these opportunities. Within the frame- bers is assured. This has always been one of population of Europe is aging and thereby, work of the consultation process, we have the European Unions basic principles, and the competitiveness of Europe is decreas- participated in the ongoing general pro- must also be maintained in the future. ing. The concept of an enlarged Europe, cedures, so that, our interests would be After the European Council held on which entails unity, rather than division, taken into consideration, as the new Eu- 1213 December and the failure to con- is, to unite us, rather than to create new ropean Union legislation is being drafted. clude the Intergovernmental Conference, divisions. Possibilities for closer co-op- Especially, when it comes to taxation, en- some founding members of the European eration already exist in the current trea- vironmental, domestic, judicial, and en- Union, have resuscitated the old idea of ties. There are successful examples, such as ergy matters Estonia has also actively par- two-speed Europe, distinguishing be- the Economic and Monetary Union and ticipated in formulating the European tween the core Europe characterised by Schengen. But closer co-operation has to Unions Common Foreign and Security increased integration, and the rest. There be flexible and adjustable to the needs of Policy. have even been suggestions that the Con- Member States in different policy areas. The enlargement of the European stitutional Treaty of the European Union In spite of the considerable progress Union, and the more thorough integra- could be adopted only by a selected num- achieved during the Italian Presidency at tion, which accompanies this process, ber of Member States. Other terms like the Intergovernmental Conference, there makes it essential, that institutional and pioneer and avant-garde group have are a few big issues the matter of quali- procedural changes are made. A notewor- also been used. fied majority voting in particular and thy achievement is, no doubt, the fact that Such distinctions are, to my mind, several smaller ones, that still need to be both the Member States as well as the Ac- counter-productive and politically danger- agreed upon. Recent developments give ceding Countries are unanimous concern- ous. Core Europe can, in essence, be hope that reaching consensus is possible, ing the need to make the European Union interpreted as protectionist, encapsulating, and that the IGC probably can be com- legislative process, as a whole, public and and exclusivist. A distinction of this kind pleted during the Irish Presidency.
151 I would also like to add a few words ter contribute to the international efforts developments in Russia closely. Like all about the Estonian perspective on the to help these states. This is significant for the Member States and Acceding Coun- European Unions common foreign and all of Europe. Just as stability in Ukraine, tries Estonia underlines the importance security policy. As far as the Unions ex- Belarus, Georgia, and Moldova augments of the extension by Russia of the EU-Rus- ternal relations are concerned, Estonia security in the whole Europe. Various sia Partnership and Cooperation agree- totally shares the majority of the other policies aimed at both the South Caucasus ment from May 1. Member States conviction, that the Eu- states and the New Neighbours are still In our view the European Union ropean Unions international role needs being formulated in the European Union, should be careful, however, in extending to be increased. There exists a significant thus giving Estonia and other new mem- cooperation in the area of defence policy, potential for this, considering that the bers a chance to contribute with their as this could unnecessarily duplicate the collective opinion, and the joint actions particular historical experience and know- cooperation in the NATO framework and of twenty-five states, carry much more how to this effort. have negative implications for the exist- weight than the simple sum of the actions Estonia is also committed to the devel- ing transatlantic security structure. In this of individual states. opment of the Barcelona process and close respect our position is very similar to that We support the new European Neigh- partnership of the EU with its Mediterra- of the United Kingdom. Regarding the bourhood Policy and in particular the nean neighbours. It is important to look European Security and Defence Policy New Neighbours initiative, and are for ways to establish in foreseeable future (ESDP), Estonia supports in principle the ready to actively develop relations with a free trade area of the countries of the strengthening of the Unions capabilities. the European Unions Eastern next-door Southern Mediterranean. We appreciate the EU and NATO agree- neighbours, as well as to participate both The European Unions partnership ment Berlin Plus that enables the Eu- financially and with intellectual capital with Russia is of great importance. We ropean Union, within the framework of in the cooperation projects aimed at the will contribute to the development of this the so-called Petersberg tasks, to also carry Western Balkan states. We already have partnership and also continue bilateral out military operations. The further de- experience with carrying out bilateral cross-border cooperation with neighbou- velopment of the ESDP, however, should development cooperation with several of ring regions of Russia. In less than a not cause a weakening of the transatlantic the Western Balkan states. After accession months time presidential elections will link or duplicate NATO. Strong transat- to the European Union we can even bet- be held in Russia. We are following the lantic cooperation between Europe and
152 the United States is of utmost importance strategy and Estonian priorities coincide The basis for the success of the Euro- for global security. We see NATO as the to a large extent with the measures that pean Union has been the capability of only credible guarantee of collective secu- the Irish Presidency is undertaking to uniting very different states into a func- rity in Europe, and the ESDP thus as an implement the strategy. Among these are tioning mechanism, and thereby generat- addition to NATO. creating more employment in Europe, in- ing development and growth. It has been Among the most important endeavours vestment in human resources, life-long characterized as the most successful union of European integration are the increased learning, and the promotion of environ- of countries in the history of mankind efficiency and competitiveness of the Eu- mentally safe technologies. that has set an example for other commu- ropean economy with a strong internal In addition, to secure economic nities in different parts of the world. market. In order to revitalize the Euro- growth in Europe and increase its com- The enlargement on 1 May will add pean economy, it is important that all petitiveness, research and development ten new members to the European Union. Member States follow the conditions im- and scientific innovations should be This is not integration for the sake of posed on their fiscal policy by the Stabil- prioritised even more. Increased atten- integration but a process that will bring ity and Growth Pact. Even further liberal- tion has to be paid to the development very real benefits for everyone. It creates ization of markets and maximization of of information and communication as the surplus value of prosperity and secu- the potential of all Member States rather well the so-called frontier technologies, rity that the divided Europe would not than suffocating it with red tape is also of biotechnology in particular. Estonia is be able to provide. particular importance. Estonia has been in among the most successful Acceding the forefront among Acceding Countries Countries also in this respect. The in- in this respect. According to the World formation technology report by Harvard Economic Forum Global Competitiveness University from 2002, for example, gave Report, in 2003 Estonia ranked 22nd with the ICT development in Estonia the 23rd its growth competitiveness index, ahead of ranking among 75 countries surveyed. seven EU Member States. Of the Acceding Estonia was the only CEE country among Countries, only Malta did better. the top 25 and will take this innovative Efficiency and increased competitive- and cutting-edge approach along to the ness are the core of the so-called Lisbon European Union.
153 Estonian Security Perceptions in the Context of EU Enlargement: A Critical Discussion
By Steffen B. Rasmussen*
ince the end of the atrocities of unthinkable. Contrary to what might around security concerns. This makes Es- World War II the process of Eu- seem logical, the EC has influenced the tonia an interesting case since in previ- ropean integration has been mo- security in Europe by dealing with more ous enlargements the acceding countries tivated primarily by security concerns. or less everything but security and mili- tended to focus on the economic gains The means dictated by the bipolar struc- tary issues. In other words, the relations of EU membership. Estonia is set to re- ture of the International system were eco- between the Member States of the EU were ceive net roughly 700 million euro in nomic integration, but the ends were to de-securitised by the creation of economic the period of 20042006. This makes the avoid another war in Western Europe. interdependence and effectively excluding overwhelming focus on security even Viewed in this perspective, the European security concerns from the discourse of more interesting. Considering the his- integration project has been an enormous the cooperation. tory of Estonia as a very small country success, since it has not only prevented In the same way, the 2004 EU enlarge- being ruled for most of its history by war in Europe, but lead to the emergence ment to the east is primarily about secu- foreign powers, it cannot surprise that a of a security community where the threat rity. In Estonia both the EU and NATO feeling of vulnerability in Estonia leads or use of armed force has become utterly membership debates have evolved largely to an intense focus on how to maintain * Steffen B. Rasmussen as a Masters student at the University of Aalborg (Denmark) and a former Research Assistant at the Baltic Defence College.
154 the security and independence of the tion to Estonian membership of the EU, country. But considering the status of but also in the context of EU enlargement The concept of security the concept of security in the academic in general. debate as an essentially contested concept, Since security is an ambiguous term, I This outline of the concept of security meaning that there is little agreement shall, in the next section, attempt to reach serves to clarify, what is meant by the Es- about what security is, it seems odd that a definition of security, which will then tonian security concept, which is the ob- using the concept in arguments about form the basis of the ensuing discussion. ject of the study. As the topic of this es- EU membership is regarded as straight- The discussion is structured into three say suggests, what is studied is not Esto- forward and unproblematic in Estonia. sections. The first investigates the link nian security in the sense of objectively Furthermore, when considering the very between state sovereignty, national iden- identifiable threats and corresponding different historical and political contexts tity and the Estonian security concept. security policies, but rather the meaning of Estonia and Western Europe one This section also includes considerations the concept itself is given. The starting might question whether the security con- about the role of the Russian-speaking point of this study is a subjectivist un- cept of Estonia and the security logics minority in Estonia. The second section derstanding of security, meaning that of European integration are compatible considers the role of Russia and how what security is cannot be decided objec- to an extent that enlargement of the EU Russia is constructed as being both tively by the analyst. Instead, what consti- to include, among others, Estonia is also Estonias other and fundamentally dif- tutes security is decided by an inter-sub- straightforward and unproblematic in ferent from Europe, and how enlarge- jective understanding among humans. The terms of security. ment challenges this construction. In the subjectivist approach to security is widely In this essay I will seek to discuss the third section the discussion turns to the associated with the Copenhagen School Estonian security concept in the context expansion of the concept of security and of security studies, which is epitomised of EU enlargement. Because of the mas- the notion of hard and soft security. by the works of Ole Wæver. His approach sive scale of the enlargement, it influences The argument is that the reliance on the to security will be briefly outlined in the not only the new member states, but fun- hard/soft dichotomy has repercussions following1 since it constitutes a coherent damentally changes relationships across for the understanding of the EU secu- subjectivist approach to security that will Europe. I will therefore discuss the Esto- rity logic. The essay will end with some serve as the theoretical foundation of this nian security concept not only in rela- concluding remarks. essay.
155 Starting from the premise that security, tifies a referent object that is existentially to securitised with the securitised issues like other social phenomena, is socially con- threatened by a specific threat. That one then constituting security. structed, Wæver argues that what should be actor frames an issue as a security issue does, To structure the discussion, the heuris- studied is the ideational phenomenon of however powerful the actor concerned, not tic categorisation of issues into different security. In other words, it is the construc- alone make it a security issue. It must be sectors, established on the basis of discoursive tion of security that should be studied rather accepted as such by the audience to which commonalities, will be applied.3 This means than its contents, since universal attributes the speech-act of securitisation is directed. viewing military, political, economic, soci- of the form of security will be constant re- This makes security a shared understand- etal and environmental security issues not gardless of the contextual substance, which ing. This said, not all actors are equally as different kinds of security, but as sectors may vary. This makes a debate over which powerful in this respect. Those speaking of security into which securitisations can parts material reality should be taken into or behalf of a large group, or those who be grouped for reasons of clarity. account of superfluous, i.e. the debate over are in a position of authority, will find it Drawing on the above conceptualisation whether security is only about military and easier to get acceptance from the audience, of security, I now move on to analyse the defence or if security is also about economy, thus successfully securitising the given is- social construction of Estonian security. the environment etc. When security is not sue. This power-holder bias, which is in- From an investigation of which threats to objectively identifiable, it also entails a shift herent in the theorising, means that the which referent objects are successfully in epistemology from rationalist positivism study should focus mainly on the speech- securitised in the Estonian security dis- to interpretative analysis, which will be acts of the elite.2 Here, it is beneficial to course as it is played out in the media and employed in this essay. imagine a continuum on which an issue academia, I shall arrive at an overall pic- To decide what security is in a particu- might be positioned, ranging from non- ture, the Estonian security perception and lar context, Wæver argues that the mean- politicised (the issue is not on the politi- discuss this in the EU context. ing of a concept is decided by the way cal agenda), through politicised (the issue people use it, regardless of what their in- is being dealt with through normal politi- State sovereignty and national tentions are with the usage. Security, thus, cal procedures) to securitised (the issue as- identity is a discoursive practise; a specific way of sumes primacy over other issues). Secu- framing an issue. This specific way is ritisation, seen this way, means moving the This section contains three sub-sec- termed securitisation, where an actor iden- issue from non-politicised or politicised tions. I shall analyse, first, fundamental
156 aspects of the Estonian security percep- foreign policy objective being the inde- tonia made demands on territory de facto tion and how these are expressed in the pendence and sovereignty of Estonia. This part of Russia. EU membership debate. Next, I will out- geo-political and essentially realist think- Even though the security definition line the EU context, and thereafter move ing led to border disputes with Russia, has been expanded since the mid 1990s on to discuss the Estonian security con- since the territory of the Estonian Soviet from only being about military security, cept in the context of the EU enlarge- Republic was not identical to that of in- a central concept in contemporary Esto- ment. ter-war Estonia.5 In terms of citizenship, nian security discourse remains that of The history of the Estonian people as this was awarded to citizens of the inter- sovereignty. In contemporary Estonia, a coherent group inhabiting the territory war republic and their descendants only, state sovereignty is also constructed to of present day Estonia stretches back to turning the Russian-speaking residents of mean security of the Estonian nation.9 the 12th century.4 Nevertheless, the terri- Estonia (35% of the total population6) This is evident in the preamble of the tory of present day Estonia has been ruled into aliens, since these had largely come Estonian constitution. It mentions as the by foreigners throughout history. Esto- to Estonia during the Soviet era. The his- primary responsibility of the state to nian independence followed after a torical experience of two Russian occupa- guarantee the preservation of the Esto- bloody war in the wake of the October tions and the small size of the state left a nian nation and culture through the Revolution and the (temporary) collapse feeling of vulnerability and insecurity ages.10 This means that the central mis- of imperial Russia. The period of inde- permeating Estonian society.7 The main sion of the state is to secure the Esto- pendence lasted only until 1940 when Es- threat securitised was an outright Russian nian nation and that the absolute sover- tonia was incorporated into the Soviet invasion, evident from the security policy eignty of the state becomes essential for Union. Still, the period of independence guidelines of 1996: The main sources of the survival of the nation.11 From a study has had a profound impact on the Esto- danger threatening state security are ag- of the minority legislation and integra- nia that regained its independence in 1991 gressive imperial aspirations and politi- tion policy of Estonia, it is possible to from the Soviet Union. Estonia merely cal and/or military instability.8 This conclude that the state through legisla- restored its statehood after 51 years of should be seen in the light of the contin- tion has effectively assured that citizen- Soviet occupation. This meant focusing ued presence of Russian troops on Esto- ship and socio-economic integration can on re-establishing the legal and territorial nian territory until 1994 and the outstand- only happen through linguistic and cul- features of inter-war Estonia, with the only ing border dispute which meant that Es- tural assimilation.12 To be a subject of the
157 state thus requires membership of the of the theoretical category of a primal securitised, because by questioning the nation. nation-state, where the nation precedes the direct link between state and nation, it But in the Estonian discourse, nation state, and where the purpose of the state threatens both, since the two depend on is not an exclusively cultural term, as it is is to protect and express the nation.15 each other. In this line of argument, the expressed in the constitution, but also re- These close linkages between state sover- fusion of state sovereignty and national fers to the biology of the ethnic eignty, territory and national identity are identity into one single referent object Estonians.13 The link between state sover- of decisive impact on the concept of se- for security is evident. The extensive eignty and survival of the nation is fur- curity and do not leave much room for securitisation stems also from the feeling ther strengthened by a close link between Russian-speakers, who are considered alien of vulnerability and being permanently the nation and Estonian territory, to which both to the national identity, the terri- threatened by extinction. This gives rise ethnic Estonians have a special right due tory and the state. to issues of Estonian identity being to their long-term settlement here. viewed in terms of either/or: Either the The Estonian nation in terms of cul- The Estonian EU membership state preserves the biological and cultural tural identity as well as the state, geopo- debate continuity of the Estonian nation, or the litically, is in the security discourse con- nation will dissolve in larger flows. structed as being permanently in danger In the Estonian EU debate euro- But in the anti-EU discourse it is not of assimilation and extinction.14 Here, the skeptics securitised membership of the primarily integration in general that is historical and geographical context of EU as a threat. The strict conditions of constructed as a threat to the nation, but being a small people inhabiting a small accessions to the EU involved a relaxation Russia and the Russian-speakers.16 This is territory comes into the picture. The sheer of citizenship laws and guaranteeing the due to three factors. First, their presence size of the Russian-speaking minority in rights of the Russian-speaking minority. on Estonian soil weakens the link between Estonia means that Russian-speakers can- The loss of the right of the state to decide state territoriality and nation, which is not be easily assimilated into the nation. over issues concerning the Estonian na- the foundation of the primal nation-state. Thus, no permanent solutions to the Rus- tion essentially questions the whole con- Second, their integration is framed as an sian threat are articulated. struction of both the Estonian state and existential threat to Estonian culture, if The Estonian close linkage of state, ter- the Estonian nation as a primal nation- integration means anything short of lin- ritory and nation is thus a good example state. Therefore, EU membership is heavily guistic, cultural and eventually biological
158 assimilation. Third, they are seen as an bership, the required citizenship and pean integration, to an extent that inte- embodiment of the Soviet regime with minority rights legislation must be gration into the EU has also become an its russification policies.17 Some even go adopted, because membership enhances element in the state-building itself. In 1997 as far as arguing that the EU accession Estonian security more than it threatens Estonian president Meri expressed the demands are part of a Russian plot: Rus- it. The further argument is that the inter- phenomenon: Estonia integrates with sia is waiting to ambush not from nal stability of the state is increased by Europe and therefore Estonia is a state.21 Ivangorod, like in the Middle Ages, but having the EU as a guarantor of the rights This same view of EU enlargement as a from Brussels.18 Consequently, in the of the minority instead of the Estonian means for Estonia to consolidate rather debate about the loss of sovereignty as a state, which should reassure the Russian- than lose its sovereignty is put forth in result of EU membership, by some ob- speaking minority. Increased stability of the National Security Concept.22 servers the EU is seen to run Russias er- the state then again means increased abil- The debate about membership of the rands and the EU is equated to Russia, ity to protect the Estonian nation in the EU has brought out in the open various working together against Estonia.19 The long term. Another version of the argu- aspects of the Estonian security concept, EU is seen not as a direct threat to the ment is that EU membership increases the not least due to the fact that the debate has Estonian nation. It is framed as a threat security of the national identity through largely evolved around security concerns, to state sovereignty, which then leads to a guaranteeing the survival of the Estonian with extensive and contradictory securiti- growing Russian threat to the nation. language and culture. It thereby also sation taking place. The general picture is The official, pro-EU rhetoric also frames strengthens Estonian independence, mean- that the discourse has been dominated by the EU membership in terms of sover- ing sovereignty of the state.20 In terms of the pro-EU arguments, because the Esto- eignty and security. While the euroskeptics sovereignty, EU membership is seen as a nian elite are almost exclusively for EU see a loss of sovereignty as a direct threat bulwark against wider processes of globali- membership, arguing partly from a geo- to the security of both the Estonian state sation, and EU membership thus becomes political standpoint.23 However, the secu- and nation, in this perspective a loss of a prerequisite for the existence of the Es- rity arguments against EU membership are sovereignty is seen as a necessary evil to tonian state. not only the views of a few radicals, but achieve enhanced security trough modi- The state-building taking place from are put forth both in mainstream media24 fying the power asymmetry vis-à-vis Rus- the 1990s onwards was from the very and in the parliament, mainly by the na- sia. Because it is a condition for EU mem- beginning taking place alongside Euro- tionalist Pro Patria Union.
159 As seen above, the notion of sover- eignty and national identity and the link tity formation process. Here, common eignty has been central in the arguments between them.25 European values and norms are referred for the security implications of EU mem- to. But more interesting, the other used bership with extensive securitisation tak- The EU context to define the us is not other actors, be it ing place. The securitisation of both state Russians, Asians, Muslims etc. Instead, the sovereignty and national identity has been That EU enlargement has revealed, or even other in the European identity forma- the basis of both pro-EU and contra-EU reinforced, a close link between state sover- tion process, and the very raison dêtre arguments. In spite of the different views eignty and national identity that has subse- of the EU, is Europes own past of war- on EU membership, virtually all actors quently been securitised is a bit of a para- fare among sovereign states. This view is frame the issue as a security issue drawing dox, when considering the security logic apparent not only in the core countries on the concept of sovereignty. Sover- underlying and legitimising the EU. The of Germany and France, but also domi- eignty is universally seen as an ideal, with analysis by the founding fathers of the EU nates the discourse in the United King- arguments ranging from the securitisation concluded that the cause of the Second dom28 as well as in other member states. of sovereignty itself to arguments that World war was not the evil nature of Ger- The implications of the historical con- sovereignty can only be compromised if many or the breakdown of the system of a text of European integration for the present it increases security (and thereby again balance of power. Instead, the anarchic in- security discourse is that what is securitised independence and thus sovereignty). An- ter-state system of sovereign nation-states was as a threat to Europe is the return to the other central feature of the security dis- seen as the cause itself. The idea of Euro- inter-state security logics of the past. The course is the universal acceptance of the pean integration as a large-scale peace project main threat to the EU is thus constructed close link between state sovereignty, na- to address the problem is dominating the as fragmentation of the EU to which con- tional identity and territory. This means European security discourse also today.26 tinued integration is the proper response. that threats to state sovereignty in the Enlargement in this perspective then be- political or military sector are also seen as comes an enlargement of the zone where a The Estonian security conception cultural threats to national identity in the Kantian rather than a Lockean logic domi- in the EU context societal sector. International cooperation nates inter-state relations.27 is seen as means to an end, which prima- The notion of the EU as a peace project Epitomising the difference between the rily remains the defence of state sover- is the foundation in the European iden- Estonian security concept and the EU se-
160 curity concept is the view on the histori- political unification. National identities as it is supposed to with EU membership cal period between the two World Wars. thus remain what they are, while a politi- in the arguments of the pro-EU elite, the In the Estonian concept, this is the cal identity is forged at the European nationalist securitisation of state and na- Golden Age, where the cultural identity level.30 The logic of the EU is thus to tion might gradually decline. In general, of the Estonian nation for the first time decouple culture and national identity periods of transition tends to increase the found its natural political expression in from territoriality and sovereignty and perception of security risks.32 On the an independent and ethnically relatively desecuritise the links. The difference is also other hand, the continued Russian fram- homogenous sovereign nation-state.29 In apparent in the nature of the anti-EU dis- ing of security in Westphalian terms might the EU security discourse, the inter-war course. In Estonia the EU is constructed reinforce the similar traits of the Esto- period is constructed as the Dark Age, as a threat to a great extent because its nian security conception. where the clash of Westphalian states in impingement on state sovereignty means an international system characterised by that the nation becomes threatened by Russia and the European Union the logic of sovereignty led to the atroci- Russia and the Russian-speaking minor- ties of World War II. ity. Thus, Russia is securitised as a threat In the previous section I focused on In the Estonian security concept, the to the nation, not primarily the EU it- the Estonian securitisation of state sover- construction of the state as a natural ex- self. Anti-EU discourse in the EU-15 also eignty and national identity. The aim was pression of the nation means that the sov- frames the EU as threat to national iden- to show how the basic notions of state ereignty of the state is closely linked to tity, but without coupling this to the and nation are constructed as prerequi- the security of the national identity. State sovereignty of the state.31 sites of one another and how they, via sovereignty and national identity are thus On the contrary, in the EU discourse the notion of sovereignty, were closely fused into a single referent object of secu- the Westphalian order system that the linked referent objects in the security de- rity whose intrinsic right to survival must Estonian ideal of unqualified national bate about EU membership. The debate be protected, even by extraordinary mea- sovereignty would give rise to, is precisely was here whether EU membership would sures. The EU discourse constructs national what is securitised as a threat to Europe impinge on the sovereignty of Estonia and political identities as separate through as such. However, as Estonia is consoli- and whether it would thereby constitute stressing the diversity of the members of dated as a state and the feeling of vulner- a threat or a solution to the Russian threat. the EU while at the same time pursuing ability of the Estonian nation subsides, I argued that the historical context of
161 Russian occupation played a vital role for security are as striking as the contrast once as something natural beyond debate, the security conception. In this section I was between West and East Berlin.33 This given the civilisational similarities of Es- will discuss how Russia is also constructed civilisational construction effectively makes tonia and the EU. as an other to Europe, rather than only the Russian threat to Estonia a threat to In terms of an inherent civilisational Estonia in the Estonian security discourse. Europe. The inspiration from Samuel difference, the other is not only to be After considering the security logic of the Huntingtons thesis of the inherent dif- found on the other side of Estonias East- EU, I discuss how this contradicts with ferences between civilisations that makes ern border. Also the Russian-speaking the Estonian construction. conflicts unavoidable could not be clearer, minority is constructed as belonging to Russia is not only constructed as a and it is noteworthy that his 1996 book this alien civilisation, both in terms of political threat to Estonia, but also as an The Clash of Civilizations and the Re- culture and biology. This means that the alien culture. The historical context of making of World Order is among the Russian-speaking minority is constructed Russian invasions means that the Estonian most revered and cited scholarly works by some as a potentially disloyal segment security perception tends to equate the in Estonia.34 The cultural dimension means of the population that could act as a fifth cultural difference with threat. This is why that the Russian threat is not constructed column in a struggle with Russia. This is Russia threatens not only the state but as one that will fade as Russia undergoes by no means a consensus view; some ar- also the national identity directly. Inter- political development, but is a permanent gue for granting citizenship to the Rus- estingly, the construction is not only phenomenon. The binary construction of sian-speaking part of the population and Russian culture in opposition to Estonian Russia versus Europe then makes integra- integrate, not assimilate them, into being culture, but also Russian/Orthodox tion into Europe the only possible policy subjects of the state without belonging to civilisation in opposition to the Euro- option for Estonia if it is not to fall into the Estonian nation. But even though pean civilisation, to which Estonia be- the sphere of influence of Russia and the these arguments do not frame the issue longs. Estonian vulnerability thus partly Orthodox civilisation, and because of the in terms of an existential threat, there stems from the fact that Estonia has imminent threat this should happen as seems to be a consensus in so far as the emerged as the frontier of Western values soon as possible. But in terms of civili- inherent civilisational difference is con- and principles in Europe. We are a fron- sation, the Estonian membership is not cerned. The notion of two separate soci- tier where the contrasts between two dif- exclusively constructed as a security mea- eties on the Estonian territory is thus ferent views of development, history and sure against the Russian threat, but also constructed by near consensus.35 This is
162 important for the security concept. It is This seems like a contradiction within the terms to make Estonia part of the EU undoubtedly easier for an actor to Estonian security concept. community of values, and, on the other, securitise the Russian-speaking minority But one should be careful not to see Russia is securitised as a threat, primarily as a threat, when the notion of two dis- the cooperative framing of security as as a reflection of the underlying concept tinct communities is already generally ac- shared as a fundamental change in the basic of security, but also in order to mobilise cepted by the Estonian audience. concept of security in Estonia. Primarily, support for integration into the EU and In a current official articulation of the the official statements are directed at the delegitimise domestic political opposi- security concept, the National Security international audience, mainly NATO and tion. But, drawing on the constructivist Concept of 2001, security is framed in the EU to which Estonia has acceded. Thus, definition of security, I argue that the cooperative terms: Estonias security it should be viewed more as engaging in official statements are shaping the secu- policy is guided by the principle that se- Euro-Atlantic rhetoric and should be in- rity concept towards a more cooperative curity is indivisible and international co- terpreted in the Estonian context. A mem- understanding, no matter the intentions operation is necessary, and is based on a ber of the working group authoring the behind them. This is confirmed by the belief in the collective defence of com- National Security Concept thus jokes that policy impact; Estonian-Russian relations mon values.36 This is a reflection of a when Estonians refer to Russia as teddy have become more cooperative.38 Potential general shift in official statements towards they really mean bear.37 This then means membership has meant for Estonia that a configuration of security as shared. These that most Estonians consider Russia a the need to be with Europe is greater than official statements also try to frame the threat, and the softening of the official the need to be against Russia, and this is Estonian-Russian relationship in coopera- statements were merely meant to persuade reflected in the security discourse. tive terms. It is a logical consequence of the EU (and NATO) into accepting Esto- But keeping in mind the construction globalisation and the corresponding in- nia as a member. This then gives rise to of Russia as civilisatory different in the creased interdependence to define secu- the two contradictory security discourses security discourse, one should not exag- rity in cooperative terms. But the official of the virtue of cooperation and engage- gerate the change in the Estonian secu- rhetoric of shared and cooperative secu- ment with Russia, and Russia as being in- rity concept caused by the cooperative rity does not correspond with the draw- herently different and the main threat. rhetoric. It still talks about the defence ing of civilisational borders and perva- On the one hand, security is framed for of common values. One could argue that sive construction of Russia as the other. the international audience in cooperative the shared security rhetoric is taken by
163 the majority of the Estonian audience to neighbours to the east. Enlargement not designed to impose the will of the mean shared primarily in terms of the means that the EU is faced with security EU by force. The ambitious goal of the Euro-Atlantic area whose common values dynamics on its borders which it can- EU is thus to diffuse its own norms in should be defended, and that Russia is not afford to ignore in the long the international system, so that the glo- not included. This would then mean that term.39 While for Estonia, integration bal system comes to be based on the same the EU and NATO members together can into the EU is seen as increased indepen- ideas of the EU itself; pacifism, principles, increase their security on behalf of Russias dence from Russia, for the EU, enlarge- consensual decision-making, network security. The framing of the Estonian- ment forces it to formulate a new policy governance and the pooling of sove- Russian relationship in cooperative terms towards Eastern neighbours. reignty.42 Towards Eastern neighbours and the improvement of bilateral relations The primary reason for this is that the the normative diffusion has manifested is thus not an expression of a perception effective de-securitisation of the EU in itself in a multi-level governance approach of their securities being shared or a policy an increasingly interconnected world de- based on networking, most evident in goal in itself, but merely an expression of pends on a de-securitisation of the in- the Northern Dimension Initiative the fact that cooperation with Russia is a ternational system as such.40 This makes (NDI) of the EU,43 incorporating both necessary component of EU and NATO the primary security objective of the EU EU members, acceding states (including membership. This way, it is not the threat to promote a ring of well governed Estonia) and non-members. A striking that has been redefined but merely the countries to the East of the European feature of the NDI is the attempt to de- perception of how it is necessary to deal Union and on the borders of the Medi- fine security in positive rather than in with it. terranean with whom we can enjoy close negative terms. Essentially, there is no and cooperative relations.41 The security other in the security discourse, there is The security logic of the EU strategy also identifies as vital for Euro- only a we.44 The further argument is that pean security to avoid letting enlarge- the cooperative method of the NDI has The enlargement of the European ment create new dividing lines. In line a socialising effect that will affect the per- Union not only has implications for the with the security policy of making ceptions that the parties involved have 25 states concerned, but requires a re- friends through de-securitisation and of each other. Another aspect, which I constitution of relationships across the creating networks of interdependence, shall return to below, is that a new prin- continent, not least with the new the instruments employed by the EU are ciple of subsidiarity is evident, in that
164 the formulation and execution of policy more, a central component in the EU the Estonian security concept is also on behalf of the EU is largely left to the policy designed to expand the security shifting towards acknowledging the need member states most concerned, seen in community (the acceding states already to engage Russia through cooperative the Finnish ownership of the NDI.45 being part of it) is the construction of means, in the Estonian concept the threat interdependencies and networks. This is remains Russia itself, while in the EU The Estonian security conception at odds with the Estonian construction concept the threat is the independence in the EU context of independence from Russia as a secu- and isolation of the EU and Russia from rity issue. An illustrative case here is the each other. The case of the NDI exemplifies the Estonian electricity grid. It is integrated Whether the EU is successful in creat- security logic of the EU. Through net- with the Russian grid, and runs on dif- ing new networks with its new Eastern working it seeks to draw in the neigh- ferent standards than the grids in West- neighbours is another and questionable bouring states and avoid creating a hard ern Europe. In Estonia, the debate has issue. Indeed, it has been argued that the dichotomy of insiders and outsiders. The been about the cost of refurbishing it NDI exemplifies how the EU cannot imple- cooperative threat reduction activities in to fit the Western European standards,47 ment the post-sovereign rhetoric in prac- Russia have a similar aim of diffusing thus increasing independence from Rus- tise but remains confined to pursuing con- norms while also addressing substan- sia by severing the links to the Russian ventional sovereignty-based foreign ce.46 The official Estonian statements grid and thereby enhancing Estonian policy.48 This would then suggest that the framing security in cooperative terms are security. In this way, the link to the Rus- difference between Estonia and the EU is very much in line with the networking sian grid is constructed as a security more at a conceptual than practical policy approach to security policy. But the problem. Following the EU logic of se- level. other branch of the security discourse curity, the link should be seen not as a The general reconstitution of relation- that relies extensively on the construc- problem but as an opportunity to ships means that the EU is in the process tion of Russia as the other contradicts strengthen interdependence and thereby of boosting the networking strategy. A the logic of the EU security policy, be- security. This is just one example of how window of opportunity for Estonian or cause this relies on influence through different security concepts of Estonia and Baltic leadership and influence through norm diffusion and does not involve the EU would give rise to different secu- the subsidiarity principle when the EU defining other actors as others. Further- rity policies. This is so, because although reformulates policy towards Eastern
165 neighbours seems to open. However, this EU security policy contains a contra- is likely not to be perceived as such be- diction between two objectives. This is The expansion of the concept cause of the remaining centrality of inde- between the security need for hard ex- of security pendence in the Estonian security con- ternal borders due to the removal of in- cept, and the centrality of interdependence ternal borders (essentially the Schengen Above I have focused on sovereignty in the EU security logic. acquis), and the need to break down bor- as a central concept and Russia as a cen- At another level of abstraction the dif- ders to create networks of interdepen- tral factor in the Estonian security per- ference between the Estonian and the EU dence to expand the security community. ception. I will now take in consideration view towards Russia can be seen in the This border issue has thrown the EU into the broadening of the security concept debate on the extent of Europe, a debate what amounts to an organizational di- that has taken place since the mid to late that has been intensified and put to the lemma, questioning the very identity of 1990s. In the first years after re-indepen- forefront with enlargement. While the the Union.49 The dilemma is brought to dence, the concept of security referred to EU is undecided and ambivalent as to the forefront by the Kaliningrad prob- military security alone. Gradually, the whether Russia belongs in Europe, the lem, where the EU hitherto has favoured concept was expanded to include non- civilisational construction in the Esto- border-drawing to networking.50 The Es- military security issues. As argued above, nian security discourse leaves no doubt tonian need for the construction of a result of this has been influence from that Russia does not belong in Europe. Russia as the other in terms of identity Western European discourse, but another With Estonian membership of the EU and for political reasons, while also need- factor is the perception of a decrease in the Estonian influence on the EU dis- ing to engage Russia cooperatively, is this the immediacy of the Russian military course and debate whether the new way paralleled by an EU need to harden threat, allowing other issues to become neighbours are us or them could pull its external border, while at the same time securitised. the EU in the direction of perceiving reducing its significance. Here, the Esto- In the Estonian National Security Con- them as them. But since defining other nian security concept would most likely cept from 2001,51 all the five sectors of countries as the other runs contrary to impact the EU further in the direction military, political, economic, societal and the fundamental logic of European inte- of transferring the traditional state secu- environmental issues are framed as secu- gration such a shift is not likely to be- rity thinking about borders to the new rity issues, whereas the Guidelines of the come dominant. EU borders. National Defence Policy of Estonia from
166 1996 focus exclusively on military secu- spread usage of the concepts, it is hard to rity threats are seen as something demand- rity. Those environmental and economic reach a consensus definition, although ing, respectively, hard security guarantees issues that are framed as security could hard security usually refers to military and soft security guarantees. This results also be seen as part of the explanation for security (the original object of security in the construction of EU and NATO the softening of the approach towards Rus- studies) whereas soft security refers to membership as complementary, in that sia, in that these threats to a larger extent economic, societal and environmental se- NATO provides a hard guarantee, while than military defence demand coopera- curity. The question of whether the po- the EU provides a soft guarantee. This tion with Russia instead of exclusively litical sector falls into the category of hard construction of security as something to with the EU and NATO member states. or soft security is not straightforward be guaranteed leads to a very widespread While a very wide range of issues are to decipher, it seems to hover somewhere concept of a division of labour between defined as potential security issues in the in the middle. The Estonian Ministry of NATO and the EU, where NATO does National Security Concept, this has simul- Foreign affairs uses the term semi-soft se- hard security and the EU does soft taneously led to a hierarchy among them. curity, to denote security from outside security.53 This simplistic thinking, how- In the Estonian case, the close link be- political pressure,52 i.e. political security. ever, fails to capture the security impact of tween nation and state means that societal The distinction is not a heuristic distinc- the EU to which Estonia has acceded. security is closely linked to political and tion as that of the five sectors of security, This is so, because the primary secu- military security. As such, a societal threat but an analytic distinction, based on an rity function of the EU is not to deal to the national identity automatically also objectivist understanding of security. Thus, with threats, illustrated by the fact that becomes a political threat to state sover- hard and soft security is seen as two dif- countering threats is only mentioned as eignty, and vice versa. So in the Estonian ferent things, rather than two aspects of the third strategic EU security objective.54 security concept it is clear that the mili- the same thing. This is problematic because Applying the Monnet method in its secu- tary, political and societal sectors have of the close linkages and spill-over effects rity policy, the approach of the EU is primacy over the economic and environ- among the five sectors of security. For not to deal with the threats, but instead mental sectors. The hierarchy of issues instance, a hard security issue such as a seek to prevent them from arising. This finds its linguistic expression in the reli- military threat might also have repercus- is the essence of the normative power pro- ance on the concepts of hard and soft sions for the economy and the environ- jection, which is the main external im- security concerns. Because of the wide- ment. Furthermore, hard and soft secu- pact of the EU.55 By conceiving security
167 in terms of threats to which guarantees through normative power projection is, threats. There is thus a certain immediate must be obtained, the Estonian security is open for discussion, the point is just impact. But at the same time, developing concept cannot incorporate an under- that the Estonian security concept does the military dimension, in essence increas- standing of the main security impact of not allow for understanding that the EU ingly acquiring state-like characteristics, the the EU. Further, because the hard and does both hard and soft security be- EU would probably lose capacity for nor- soft security categories are constructed cause the hard/soft dichotomy does not mative power projection, in that it would in terms of threats and guarantees they allow for an understanding of links be- no longer be an example of a normatively are also inappropriate for understanding tween the sectors of security in terms of better inter-state dynamics to be followed, the EU security policy. Thus, the negli- policies of one sector influencing other but a strategic actor with its own geo- gible hard security that the EU is per- sectors.56 This is the reason for the fact political agendas.58 Thereby, the mecha- ceived to be doing is the military dimen- that the potential for economic coopera- nisms of norm diffusion would lose their sion of the Common Foreign and Secu- tion as an opportunity to alleviate mili- effect.59 The result would be a decreased rity Policy. The problem is that the Esto- tary and geopolitical concerns has not been long term impact on hard security. nian security concept implicitly, through explored to a great extent, as seen in the Whether an increased military capability the reliance on the hard/soft dichotomy, example of the electricity grid. Still, it was would increase the impact on military fuses the nature of threats with the na- this logic that was the foundation of the security would then be doubtful. ture of possible measures to be taken Northern Dimension Initiative of which On the other hand, there is a tendency against these threats. But, since the nor- Estonia was part.57 to blur the security issues and blend the mative power projection is intended to A further illustration is that, follow- sectors. For instance, NATO membership change the logic of the international sys- ing the Estonian security concept a is also constructed as a guarantee against tem into one where relations among states strengthening of the evolving military di- the cultural threat that Russia represents. are de-securitised, this is also very much mension of the CFSP would mean a lin- In a conventional definition of soft and doing hard security, only the tool is early increased EU impact on hard secu- hard security this would amount to seek- not hard. The key argument here is that rity. Possessing military capabilities, and ing a hard guarantee against a soft the EU does both hard and soft secu- the decision-making capacity to utilise threat, and thus be an indicator of a per- rity. How successful the EU is, and how them, would undoubtedly increase the ception of security incorporating the large its impact is on hard security ability of the EU to respond military to links between the sectors in terms of
168 policy initiatives and the threat these are revealed that EU enlargement brings out relationships, with a securitisation of the to deal with. Another interpretation is in the open contradictions within the logic of sovereign nation-states as the main that the sovereignty that NATO guaran- Estonian security concept, as well as be- threat. There is also an internal contra- tees is so closely linked to the societal tween this and the security logic under- diction in the Estonian security concept security of the nation, that in this in- pinning the process of European integra- between the stressing of independence and stance, a referent object spanning the tion. While the overall picture is one of the stressing of shared and cooperative military, political and societal sectors is complexity, three characteristic features of security. constructed. the Estonian security concept were never- Secondly, Russia plays a dominating theless singled out in the context of EU role in the Estonian security discourse Conclusion enlargement. stemming from the frequent construction Firstly, a prominent characteristic of of Russia as the other in the construc- The widespread and uncontested usage the Estonian security concept is the close tion of the Estonian national identity. of security arguments in relation to Esto- coupling of state sovereignty with national Estonia instead belongs to the European nian EU membership coupled with a ques- identity. In relation to EU membership civilisation, which is why EU member- tioning of whether the Estonian security the debate has been characterised by per- ship is entirely natural. The historical perceptions and the security logic under- vasive securitisation of these two concepts context of Russian invasions has led to pinning European integration are com- by both the proponents of EU member- an equation of difference with threat in patible to an extent that makes Estonian ship and those who opposed it. This has the Estonian discourse. This contradicts accession to the EU straightforward and led to a traditional Westphalian security the EU security ambitions of enlarging unproblematic in security terms, inspired concept with the territorial state as the the security community, which rests on the discussion of Estonian security per- central referent object being the natural forging a shared identity through mecha- ceptions in the context of EU enlargement. expression of the nation. The construc- nism of norm diffusion and creation of The overall picture of the Estonian se- tion of sovereignty to mean indepen- interdependence. curity perceptions in the context of EU dence and to be the central referent ob- Thirdly, a tendency to rely on the dis- enlargement is a complex and at times ject of security fundamentally contradicts tinction of hard and soft security is- contradictory one. Utilising the speech- the EU security logic of pooled sover- sues is evident in the Estonian security act approach to security, the discussion eignty and creation of interdependent concept, stemming from the widened
169 notion of security that has evolved in the views can exist, there must be a limit to /www.copri.dk/publications/WP/ recent years. Because the distinction be- their size. WP%202001/6-2001.doc on the 03/03/ tween hard and soft security is made Only time will tell whether the incon- 2004. by the nature of the threat and the poli- sistencies identified within the Estonian Browning, C. S. (2002), The Internal/ cies to counter these, the Estonian secu- security concept and the contradictions External Security Paradox And The Re- rity concept does not allow for an under- when compared to the EU will remain, with construction Of Boundaries In The Bal- standing of the logic of the main EU se- destabilising consequences, or whether the tic: The Case Of Kaliningrad, COPRI curity policies which are not aimed at contradictions will even out as a result of Working Paper at www.copri.dk/publica- countering threats, but seek to prevent the general change in political practices tions/Wp/WP%202002/21-2002.doc on them from arising, involving an indirect that EU enlargement entails. the 03/03/2004. and essentially de-securitising approach. Buzan, B. (1991), People, States And Fear: While the discussion in this essay has Bibliography An Agenda For International Security Studies been focused on the understanding of the In The Post-Cold War Era, (2nd Ed.)Harlow: concept of security as constructed in Es- Alto, P. and Berg, E. (2002), Spatial Pearson Education. tonia, this does not mean that the find- Practices And Time In Estonia: From Post- Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003), Re- ings are relevant for conceptual disputes Soviet Geopolitics To European Gover- gions And Powers: The Structure Of Interna- only. The definition of the meanings of nance, in Space and Polity, vol. 6, no. 3, tional Security, Cambridge: Cambridge words and concepts is essentially an exer- pp. 253270. University Press. cise of power, since meanings have a di- Archer, C. (2000), Security Aspects Of Buzan, B. et al. (1998), Security: A New rect impact on political practise substance. The EUs Northern Dimension, in The Framework For Analysis, London: Lynne The difference between the Estonian se- NEBI59 Yearbook 2000, pp. 316327, Ber- Rienner Publishers. curity perceptions and the logic of Euro- lin: Springer. Constitution of the Republic of Es- pean integration thus gives rise to differ- Browning, C. S. (2001), The Region- tonia, at http://www.president.ee/eng/ ent political practises, and it is doubtful Building Approach Revisited: The Con- ametitegevus on the 03/03/2004. they can be reconciled without the un- tinued Othering Of Russia In Discourses Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs derstandings of security approaching each Of Region-Bulding In The European (2004), Security, at http://www.vm.ee/eng/ other. Although inconsistencies in world- North, COPRI Working Paper at http:/ kat_206/2080.html on the 03/03/2004.
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171 Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science. 16 Kuus, M. (2002), p. 403. 34 Feldman, M. (2000), p. 15. Wæver, O. (1998), Insecurity, Secu- 17 Lind, M. (2003), p. 68) 35 Lind, M. (2003), pp. 84-85. 18 Estonian Member of Parliament quoted in 36 National Security Concept of the Republic of rity And Asecurity In The West European Feldman, M. (2000), p. 21. Estonia (2001), p. 5. Non-War Community, in Adler, E. and 19 Kuus, M. (2003), p. 578. 37 Aap Neljas, in Kuus, M. (2003), p. 581. Barnett, M. (eds.) (1998), Security Com- 20 In the Estonian security discourse, the terms 38 Kuus, M. (2003), p. 581. munities, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sovereignty and independence are often used syn- 39 Richmond, O.P. (2000), p. 51. onymously. Kuus, M. (2002), p. 399. 40 Manners, I. (2002a), p. 28. sity Press. 21 Quoted in Kuus, M. (2002), p. 398. 41 Solana, J. (2003), p. 7. 22 National Security Concept of the Republic of 42 Manners, I. (2002b), pp. 242-244. 1 Drawing primarily on Wæver, O. (1997) and Estonia (2001) 43 Archer, C. (2000) Buzan, B. et al (1998). 23 Stefanova, B. (2002), p. 158. 44 Filtenborg, M. S. et al. (2002). 2 Mortensen, J. (1998), p. 24 I have been forced to rely mostly on second- 45 Filtenborg, M. S. et al. (2002). 3 For detailed explanations of the categories ary material. The authors I refer to have focus on 46 Höhl, K. et al. (2003). and how precisely issues are grouped into them, the discourse of the elite and the mainstream 47 Kuus, M. (2002), pp. 405-406. see Buzan, B. et al. (1998), where the sectoral frame- media, with the quotes taken mainly from the 48 Browning, C. (2001) work is developed and explained in great detail. largest newspapers in Estonia, Posttimees and Eesti 49 Richmond, O. P. (2000), p. 45. 4 Lind, M. (2003), p. 66. Päehvaleht. 50 Browning, C. (2002) 5 Alto, P. and Berg, E. (2002) I shall below discuss the widened security 51 National Security Concept of the Republic of 25 6 Feldman, M. (2000), p. 11. agenda, also securitising economic and environ- Estonia (2001) 7 Alto, P. and Berg, E. (2002), p. 260. mental issues. 52 Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). Guidelines of the National Defence Policy of 26 Wæver, O. (1998) 53 Evident in e.g. Männik, E. (2003), Moroff, H. 8 Estonia (1996), quoted in Minotaite, G. (2001), p. 27 Terminology taken from Wendt. A. (1999). (2002) 18. Wendt opposes the Kantian logic of friendship 54 Solana, J. (2003). 9 Defined by Buzan, B. (1991), p. 70 as A large to the Hobbesian logic of enmity and the Lockean 55 Manners, I. (2002b) group of people sharing the same cultural, and logic of rivalry. 56 A more fitting dichotomy, if one is indeed possible the same ethnic or racial, heritage. 28 Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003), p. 361-363. needed for reasons of simplicity, would be one of 10 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, Pre- 29 Ethnic Estonians constituted more than 88% immediate v. long term impact on security. In amble. of the population. Feldman, G. (2003), p. 558. this dichotomy Estonian membership of both 11 Kuus, M. (2002), p. 401. 30 Wæver, O. (1998) the EU and NATO would then be constructed as 12 Lind, M. (2003), p. 47. 31 Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003), p. 356. necessary on a basis that NATO deals directly 13 Kuus, M. (2002), p. 403. 32 Richmond, O. P. (2000), p. 53. with military security through a guarantee against 14 Feldman, M. (2000), p. 26. 33 Minister of Foreign Affairs Siim Kallas in the enemy, and thus has an immediate impact. 15 Buzan, B. (1991), p. 73. 1996, quoted in Feldman, M. (2000), p. 17. The EU has an immediate impact on environ-
172 mental security through strict legislation and eco- nomic security through fostering growth and a long term impact on military security through its efforts to change the nature of the enemy turning it into a friend. 57 Archer, C. (2000) 58 Manners, I. (2002b) 59 Höhl, K. et al. (2003) argue that the legitimacy of the EU, in the eyes of Russia, in engaging in the cooperative threat reduction activities is depen- dent on the perceived absence of geo-strategic in- terests on part of the EU.
173 The A.P. Møller and Wife, Chastine McKiney Møllers Fund has generously granted financial support of USD 50 000 to the A.P. Møller Research Library at the Baltic Defence College. The grant is for purchasing literature towards preparation of the Master of War Studies and the Higher Command Studies Course library.
The Baltic Defence College would like here to express our warmest gratitude and appreciation to the A.P. Møller and Wife, Chastine McKiney Møllers Fund.
Elizabeth Tromer
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