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Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States

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Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States Paul K. Davis, J. Michael Gilmore, David R. Frelinger, Edward Geist, Christopher K. Gilmore, Jenny Oberholtzer, Danielle C. Tarraf C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2781 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0215-8 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: pavlofox/stock.adobe.com. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report assesses nonstrategic nuclear options for bolstering deter- rence capabilities in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Interest in such options has been stimulated by concerns about poten- tial Russian aggression against these nations, which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and by Russia’s vigorous efforts to modernize and diversify its nuclear capabilities for limited war. The most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review described several U.S. nuclear initiatives that are either underway or proposed. The report should be of interest to senior decisionmakers across the U.S. Depart- ment of Defense, as well as to members of Congress. RAND Ventures The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solu- tions to public policy challenges to help make communities through- out the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND Ventures is a vehicle for investing in policy solutions. Philanthropic contributions support our ability to take the long view, tackle tough and often controversial topics, and share our findings in innovative and compelling ways. RAND’s research findings and recommendations are based on data and evidence and therefore do not necessarily reflect the policy preferences or interests of its clients, donors, or supporters. iii iv Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States Funding for this venture was made possible by the independent research and development provisions of RAND’s contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers. The project was overseen by RAND’s Inter- national Security and Defense Policy Center, which analyzes changes in the international political, strategic, economic, and technological environment and helps DoD develop policies to shape the environ- ment and advance U.S. interests. For more information about RAND and ISDP, see www.rand.org (contact information is provided on the webpage). Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ...............................................................xv Abbreviations ................................................................... xvii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO Selective Review of Deterrence Theory ....................................... 3 Definitions .......................................................................... 3 The Goal of Deterrence: Affecting Human Behavior ......................... 7 Selected Cold War History ....................................................... 9 Lessons Learned, Valid and Invalid .............................................19 CHAPTER THREE Developments Since the Cold War ...........................................25 Developments in Russian Strategy and Nuclear Weapons Within It ...... 26 NATO Developments Since the Cold War ....................................35 Realities of Geography and Conventional Force Balances ...................41 Weakness of NATO’s Infrastructure for War in the Baltic States .......... 46 CHAPTER FOUR Limited Nuclear Options for NATO Consideration ......................49 Features of Credible Limited Nuclear Options ...............................49 v vi Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States Current and Planned NATO Discriminate Nuclear Capabilities ..........51 Scenario Development Considerations ........................................57 CHAPTER FIVE Selected Methods for Evaluating Deterrence Options ....................59 Wargaming and Game-Structured Modeling .................................59 Qualitative and Semiquantitative Cognitive Modeling ..................... 60 Using Human Wargames to Test and Supplement Cognitive Models .....62 Recommendation on Methods ..................................................65 CHAPTER SIX Wargaming the Use of Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons During an Invasion of the Baltic States ..............................................67 The Initiating Scenario .......................................................... 68 How the Wargame Exercise Unfolded ..........................................72 Synopsis of Insights from the Wargame Exercise and Related Analysis ....81 CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusions .......................................................................83 Two Views of Deterrence .........................................................83 Overall Conclusions ............................................................. 86 Possible Topics for Future Analysis .............................................89 APPENDIXES A. A Deterrence Model for Exploring Issues Speculatively ..............91 B. Format for Wargaming a Conflict in the Baltic States .............. 101 C. Conventional Force Cost Estimates .................................... 105 D. Tactical Nuclear Force Cost Estimates ................................. 111 References ....................................................................... 119 Figures and Tables Figures 2.1. An Adversary’s Decisionmaking Process (Side A Attempts to Influence Side B) ....................................... 5 3.1. NATO’s Cold War Central Front and 2018 Baltic Front Lines ........................................................... 42 3.2. The Suwalki Gap Land Border Between Lithuania and Poland .................................................................47 5.1. A Merged Construct for Using Both Human Wargames and Cognitive Modeling ............................................63 6.1. NATO and Russian Forces in and Around the Baltic States ..................................................................69 6.2. Russian Integrated Air Defense Systems Around the Baltic States ...........................................................71 6.3. Potential Airfield Targets in Western Russia .....................75 A.1. Model Inputs, with Illustrative Values ........................... 92 A.2. Utilities of Possible Wars, as Perceived by Red .................. 94 A.3. Probability That Red Will Invade Versus the Probability That War, If It Occurs, Will Become Nuclear ...................95 B.1. Illustrative R-FLEX Map and Counters ........................ 101 B.2. Illustrative R-FLEX–Baltics(N) Player Aids .................... 103 vii viii Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltic States Tables 2.1. Stereotypical Contrasts: How Hawks and Doves View Nuclear Issues ........................................................13 3.1. Russia-to-NATO Force Ratios in and Around the Baltic States, 2018 .................................................. 43 3.2. Current and Notional Enhanced NATO Force Postures .......45 4.1. Versions of the B61 Nuclear Bomb ................................52 A.1. Red’s Decision as a Function of Blue’s Model of Red .......... 96 A.2. Value of Upgrades to NATO’s Nuclear Options for Reestablishing Deterrence During Wartime .................... 97 A.3. Value of Upgrades to NATO’s Nuclear Options for Reestablishing Deterrence During Peacetime ................... 99 C.1. Current and Notional Enhanced NATO Force Postures ..... 105 C.2. Armored Brigade Combat Team Annual Operations and Support Costs, Derived from Multiple Sources ................ 108 C.3. Estimated Cost Increases for Enhanced Force Postures, With and Without Procurement Costs.......................... 110 D.1. Estimated Cruise Missile Costs .................................. 112 D.2. Estimated Ballistic Missile Costs ...............................
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