Kennedy to Answer Khr Nshch Evappeal
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1 1 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 2 3 4 5 DEBT COLLECTION DIALOGUE 6 A conversation between government and business 7 8 9 Monday, June 15, 2015 10 1:30 p.m. 11 12 13 Burchfield Penney Art Center 14 1300 Elmwood Avenue 15 Buffalo, New York 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Reported by: Richard B. Whalen, CM 25 2 1 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 2 I N D E X 3 Welcome: PAGE: 4 By Eric Schneiderman 6 5 Attorney General, New York State 6 7 Opening Remarks: 11 8 By Jessica Rich 9 Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection 10 Federal Trade Commission 11 12 Introduction: 19 13 By Thomas Kane, Senior Attorney 14 Division of Financial Practices 15 Bureau of Consumer Protection 16 Federal Trade Commission 17 18 Presentations: 20 19 By James Morrissey, Assistant Attorney 20 General Office of the New York 21 Attorney General 22 23 By Christopher Koegel, Assistant Director 24 Division of Financial Practices 25 Federal Trade Commission 3 1 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 3 I N D E X (Cont.) 4 5 Presentations (Cont.): 6 By Greg Nodler, Senior Counsel 7 Enforcement Policy and Strategy 8 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 9 10 By Joy Feigenbaum, Executive Deputy 11 Superintendent Financial Frauds and 12 Consumer Protection New York State 13 Department of Financial Services 14 15 Question-and-Answer Session: 74 16 17 Closing Remarks: 119 18 By Thomas Kane, Senior Attorney 19 Division of Financial Practices 20 Bureau of Consumer Protection 21 Federal Trade Commission 22 23 24 25 4 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 DR. -
Forex Medium-Term Outlook(Jan, 2019)
Forex Medium-Term Outlook 26 December 2018 Mizuho Bank, Ltd. Forex Department 【Contents】 Overview of Outlook ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・P. 2 USD/JPY Outlook –Time for a Change in the Premise 2019 – Vital Points for Global Economy; The Year in Which the True Price of Rate Hikes Emerges ・・・・ ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ ・ P. 3 2019 – Vital Points for Forex Rates; Time for a Change in the Premise・・・・・・・・・・・P. 5 U.S. Monetary Policies Now and Going Forward – The First Step into a New Phase・・・・・P. 6 Overview of Tail Risks – Potentials for the Unexpected in Japan, the United States, and Europe・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ P. 1 0 EUR Outlook – ‒ “Increasing Caution” and “Continuing Confidence” ECB Monetary Policies Now and Going Forward – APP Termination and Outlook Regarding Reinvestment・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・P. 1 4 Uncertain future Reflected in French “Yellow Vests” Riots – Issues the EU Should Worry About・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・P. 1 5 Ongoing Shift to a “Post-Merkel” Germany and EU – The EUR 3.0 Era・・・・・・・・・・P. 1 7 Medium-Term Forex Outlook 1 Mizuho Bank Ltd. Overview of Outlook USD/JPY clearly fell in December. In line with the concerns I have consistently expressed in this report, the prices of risky assets have been forced to undergo a correction in response to the increase in U.S. interest rates. The Fed had until recently remained indifferent to this asset price volatility, but it may finally no longer be able to ignore the fluctuations. This is evidenced by the fact that Committee members were forced in December to downgrade their dot plot projections for the entire forecasting period. Market predictions, however, are even more pessimistic than those suggested by the revised dot plot, with some even predicting the end of rate hikes altogether. -
The Loan Shark Problem in the Southeastern States
THE LOAN SHARK PROBLEM IN THE SOUTHEASTERN STATES WILLIAM HAYS SIMPSON* Because of the increase in problems associated with the business of money lending in the United States many of the states passed regulatory acts. The movement ex- tended to the Southeastern area where all states, including Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vir- ginia, and West Virginia, enacted legislation which established legal interest rates. " These rates varied slightly, with all states now limiting the annual rate to 6 per cent except Georgia and Florida where interest rates were set at 7 and 8 per cent re- spectively. While 6 per cent per annum is the maximum contract rate in Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, the rate in writing is 7 per cent in South Carolina, 8 in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, and io per cent in Florida. The civil penalties imposed in actions on usurious contracts of course vary in the -different states. Louisiana law contains no provision for civil penalties but in West Virginia, Virginia, Tennessee, and Maryland forfeiture of excess over legal rate may be had through legal action while forfeiture of all interest is provided for in the laws of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and North Carolina. The laws of the latter state also provide for the forfeiture of double interest paid on loans made on household and kitchen furniture. No criminal penalties are provided for violation of the usury laws in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Maryland, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, but in Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina it is, under various circumstances, a mis- demeanor to make usurious charges. -
Yellow Vests, Carbon Tax Aversion, and Biased Beliefs
YELLOW VESTS,CARBON TAX AVERSION, AND BIASED BELIEFS* Thomas Douenne and Adrien Fabre† Abstract This paper seeks to understand how beliefs endogenously form and determine attitudes towards policies. Using a new survey and National households’ survey data, we investigate the case of car- bon taxation in France in the context of the Yellow Vests movement that started against it. We find that French people would largely reject a Tax & Dividend policy, i.e. a carbon tax whose revenues are redistributed uniformly to all households. However, they also overestimate the negative impact of the scheme on their purchasing power, wrongly think it is regressive, and do not perceive it as environmentally effective. Using information about the scheme as instrument to identify robust causal effects, our econometric analysis shows that correcting these three biases would suffice to generate majority approval. Yet, we find that people’s beliefs are persistent and their revisions biased towards pessimism so that only a small minority can be convinced. Indeed, if overly pes- simistic beliefs cause tax rejection, they also result from it through motivated reasoning, which manifests what we define as “tax aversion”. JEL classification: D72; D91; H23; H31; Q58 Keywords: Climate Policy; Carbon tax; Bias; Beliefs; Preferences; Tax aversion *Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Mouez Fodha, Fanny Henriet and Katheline Schubert for their comments and their help to get funding. We also thank Béatrice Boulu-Reshef, Stefano Carattini, Nicolas Jacquemet, Mathias Lé, Linus Mattauch, Joseph Stiglitz, Thierry Verdier, seminar participants at the Paris School of Economics and an anonymous referee of the FAERE Working Paper series. -
Macron, the Yellow Vests and the National Debate. Playing for Time, Not Solving the Political Legitimacy Crisis
NO. 17 MARCH 2019 Introduction Macron, the Yellow Vests and the National Debate Playing for Time, Not Solving the Political Legitimacy Crisis Ronja Kempin and Paweł Tokarski France’s yellow vests (gilets jaunes) are heterogeneous, make contradictory demands, and refuse to give up. Since November 2018 they have been demonstrating for more purchasing power and greater democracy. Having made financial concessions, Presi- dent Emmanuel Macron is now playing for time. He has initiated a “grand national debate”, in which all citizens were called on to voice their opinions concerning future political issues. This debate is likely to help him win the European Parliament (EP) elections in May and facilitate splintering the yellow vests. To avert further protests that could paralyse the country, delegitimise his government and ensure that his presidency fails, Macron needs to improve the way he communicates his reform agenda. Merely playing for time will not make France reformable and governable for this president, any more than it did for his predecessors. The protests never end. Since 17 November are held by the rural lower-middle class, 2018, people wearing high-visibility yel- including craftsmen and women and shop- low vests have been taking to the streets keepers. They can barely earn a living from of France on Saturdays. The protests by their work and are afraid of sliding into the yellow vests, organised nationwide, were poverty. Politically, according the yellow initially directed against the higher tax on vests, they have no voice. They reject the fossil fuels planned by President Macron. support of the trade unions and parties of They quickly evolved into a list of 42 the political left, which previously chan- demands. -
Yellow Vests, Pessimistic Beliefs, and Carbon Tax Aversion
YELLOW VESTS,PESSIMISTIC BELIEFS, AND CARBON TAX AVERSION* Thomas Douenne and Adrien Fabre† Link to most recent version Abstract Using a representative survey, we find that after the Yellow Vests movement, French people would largely reject a Tax & Dividend policy, i.e. a carbon tax whose revenues are redistributed uni- formly to each adult. However, they overestimate their net monetary loss, wrongly think the policy is regressive, and do not perceive it as environmentally effective. We show that changing people’s beliefs about the tax incidence and effectiveness can largely increase support. Yet, beliefs change little following our informational treatments. Indeed, if overly pessimistic beliefs cause tax rejec- tion, they also result from it through motivated reasoning, which manifests what we define as “tax aversion”. JEL classification: D72; D91; H23; H31; Q58 Keywords: Climate Policy; Carbon tax; Beliefs; Preferences; Tax aversion *Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Mouez Fodha, Fanny Henriet and Katheline Schubert for their comments and their help to get funding. We also thank Stefano Carattini, Linus Mattauch, Joseph Stiglitz, Thierry Verdier, as well as seminar participants at the Paris School of Economics, Columbia University, University of Pennsylvenia, University of Amsterdam, University of Quebec at Montréal, KU Leuven, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Environmental Defense Fund, EIEE-CMCC (Milan), OECD, OFCE, and conference participants at FSR Climate Annual Conference (Florence), ADRES (Lyon), FAERE (Rennes). We are thankful to Christina Hobbs for the proof- reading. We are grateful to anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions. We acknowledge financial support from the Cepremap, EUR PGSE (ANR-17-EURE-0001) ANR (ANR16-CE03-0011), and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne economics doctoral school (ED 465). -
Tax Evasion, Income Inequality and Opportunity Costs of Compliance
Tax Evasion, Income Inequality and Opportunity Costs of Compliance Kim M. Bloomquist Senior Economist Internal Revenue Service Office of Research Washington, D.C. Paper presented at the 96th Annual Conference of the National Tax Association Drake Hotel Chicago, IL November, 2003 Abstract – This paper argues that widening income inequality contributes to the propensity to evade by both reducing the probability of detection and increasing compliance opportunity costs. Lower detection probability occurs as rising inequality gradually alters the composition of income from being employment-based (i.e., matchable) to investment-based (i.e., non-matchable). Greater economic polarization also increases the financial strain on many former middle-class taxpayers, thus raising their opportunity cost of compliance. In addition, the compliance opportunity costs for wealthy taxpayers also could increase if they perceive a growing exchange inequity between their tax burdens and public sector benefits. This paper tests the hypothesis that rising income inequality contributes to tax evasion in the United States. Empirical analysis for the period 1947-2000 finds a positive correlation between the underreporting rate for wage and salary income and the top decile wage share. This finding suggests that enforcement policies aimed at reducing income tax evasion may lose some effectiveness in an environment of increasing inequality. Tax Evasion, Income Inequality and Opportunity Costs of Compliance INTRODUCTION If asked to identify a single indicator that best described the overall condition of the U.S. economy in recent decades, a measure of income inequality would likely be among the top candidates. A recent study by Piketty and Saez (2001) finds that between 1970 and 2000 the share of income (not including capital gains) reported by the top decile of U.S. -
Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death As a Punishment
Florida State University Law Review Volume 22 Issue 3 Article 1 1995 Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment Michael Mello [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 591 (1995) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol22/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ADHERING TO OUR VIEWS: BRENNAN AND MARSHALL AND THE RELENTLESS DISSENT TO DEATH AS A PUNISHMENT Michael Mello VOLUME 22 WINTER 1995 NUMBER 3 Recommended citation: Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (1995). ADHERING TO OUR VIEWS: JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL AND THE RELENTLESS DISSENT TO DEATH AS A PUNISHMENT MICHAEL MELLO* I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 592 A. Capital Punishmentand the Modern Court: An Overview ..................................................... 593 B. The Evolving Law of Death: "The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course" .............................. 598 II. LEGITIMACY IN HISTORY ......................................... 606 A. The Supreme Court: "Nine Scorpions in a Bottle" .................... .................................. 606 B. Early History of Dissent ................................. 607 1. Seriatim Opinions..................................... 607 2. Early "Opinions of the Court"--andEarly Dissents ................................................ -
Recent Cases
Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 23 Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 1970 Article 7 5-1970 Recent Cases Law Review Staff Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Law Review Staff, Recent Cases, 23 Vanderbilt Law Review 809 (1970) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/7 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RECENT CASES Accountants-Auditors-Compliance with General Accounting Principles Not a Complete Defense To Criminal Fraud Defendants' are members of a certified public accounting firm which was retained annually by Continental Vending Corporation (Continental) to audit its financial statements. While conducting a yearly audit, defendants learned that an affiliated company, Valley Commercial Corporation (Valley),2 was not in a position to repay its debt 3 to Continental. .The president of Valley, however, offered to secure the debt personally. Defendants determined that if adequate collateral' was posted, Continental's statements could be certified without reviewing Valley's books.5 The collateral was obtained,, its value was confirmed,7 and the receivable was entered on the balance sheet8 subject to an explanation in a footnote.' The statements were 1. Defendants are a senior partner, a junior partner, and a senior associate in the national accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross Bros. -
Stopping the Payday Loan Trap Alternatives That Work, Ones That Don’T
Stopping the payday Loan trap AlternAtives thAt Work, ones thAt Don’t NCLC® NATIONAL CONSUMER June 2010 L AW C E N T E R® © Copyright 2010, National Consumer Law Center, Inc. All rights reserved. About the Authors Lauren K. Saunders is the Managing Attorney of NCLC’s Washington, DC office, where she handles legislative, administrative and other advocacy efforts on behalf of low income consumers. She contributes to several NCLC publications, including Fair Credit Reporting, Fair Debt Collection and Consumer Banking and Payments Law. She graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School where she was an Executive Editor of the Harvard Law Review, and holds a Masters in Public Policy from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and a B.A., Phi Beta Kappa, from Stanford University. Leah A. Plunkett is a staff attorney at NCLC, where she focuses on predatory small dollar loans, auto policy, protection of exempt funds, and the consumer needs of domestic violence survivors. Before coming to NCLC, Leah clerked in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and established the Youth Law Project at New Hampshire Legal Assistance. Leah is a cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, where she was on the board of both the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau and HLS for Choice. Carolyn Carter is NCLC’s Deputy Director for Advocacy. She is a contributing author to Cost of Credit, Truth in Lending, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices and several other NCLC treatises. Prior to joining NCLC, she worked for legal services programs in Ohio and Pennsylvania. -
Fairness and Redistribution
Fairness and Redistribution By ALBERTO ALESINA AND GEORGE-MARIOS ANGELETOS* Different beliefs about the fairness of social competition and what determines income inequality influence the redistributive policy chosen in a society. But the composition of income in equilibrium depends on tax policies. We show how the interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equi- libria or multiple steady states. If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, effort will be high and the role of luck will be limited, in which case market outcomes will be relatively fair and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If, instead, a society believes that luck, birth, connec- tions, and/or corruption determine wealth, it will levy high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. These insights may help explain the cross-country variation in perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies. (JEL D31, E62, H2, P16) Pre-tax inequality is higher in the United support the poor; an important dimension of States than in continental West European coun- redistribution is legislation, and in particular the tries (“Europe” hereafter). For example, the regulation of labor and product markets, which Gini coefficient in the pre-tax income distribu- are much more intrusive in Europe than in the tion in the United States is 38.5, while in Europe United States.1 it is 29.1. Nevertheless, redistributive policies The coexistence of high pre-tax inequality are more extensive in Europe, where the income and low redistribution is prima facia inconsis- tax structure is more progressive and the overall tent with both the Meltzer-Richard paradigm of size of government is about 50 percent larger redistribution and the Mirrlees paradigm of so- (that is, about 30 versus 45 percent of GDP). -
11GUEREE CO, Cent Efficiency Would.Be Secured If They Do Not Think I Am Best on October 14 William Kaempffer,-Mrs^-M
;:.:::!.-.:.-. __,V. -./ -v . o PAGE TEN fSEfTEMBER 2_, 3,944 08k 1 will determine"^; peace terms, and if the other nation' tones, nearly obscured what little English he could com- A free land is one where a about his Job" waiter or clerk can properly Next Salvar* Drive The Rahway Record don't like it therWs nothing they can do about it. mand in his relation to Lieutenant Paul Mancusbt of the answer people who unjustly bawl Established July 13, 1833 tale of how he and another, Louis Shockley, 84 East Hazel him out—provided he doesn't core 'This Record will wrap a torrid -1170 Broad 8tn*t Tel. Rah. 7-0600 New Furthermore," the "indispensable", man should know pack f or Tojo. ""HMo SUNDAY, OCT. 8 Published Thursday arteroons by The Rahway Publishing Corporation. that whatever is agreed upon at the Dumbarton Confer wood avenue, at separate times Wednesday night, had been II Xntered at the post office at Rahway, New Jersey, as Hcond class mall matter Waste Paper In Bundles under the act of March 3, 1879. ence, will not last two minutes when the general confer badly beaten by two hold-up men. The reason for the ma- Tin Cans, cleaned and flattened CASUALTIES 1NCEEASE With 4 Allied fronts. Walter • P. Marpre-iT. ...—P-blUber ence of all nations is called, for the other-countries,-dis licious, attack,- according to Albert, was-that he had.been Help to Win the War r O. C. Stearns.. Editor SURGICAL DRESSINGS gusted at the procrastination and appeasement methods able to produce only 20 cents when his assailants, whom he EXCLUSIVE AT'RrjrCOERKE CO.