DOCSLIB.ORG

Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death As a Punishment

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Florida State University Law Review Volume 22 Issue 3 Article 1 1995 Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment Michael Mello [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 591 (1995) . https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol22/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ADHERING TO OUR VIEWS: BRENNAN AND MARSHALL AND THE RELENTLESS DISSENT TO DEATH AS A PUNISHMENT Michael Mello VOLUME 22 WINTER 1995 NUMBER 3 Recommended citation: Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 591 (1995). ADHERING TO OUR VIEWS: JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL AND THE RELENTLESS DISSENT TO DEATH AS A PUNISHMENT MICHAEL MELLO* I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 592 A. Capital Punishmentand the Modern Court: An Overview ..................................................... 593 B. The Evolving Law of Death: "The Supreme Court's Obstacle Course" .............................. 598 II. LEGITIMACY IN HISTORY ......................................... 606 A. The Supreme Court: "Nine Scorpions in a Bottle" .................... .................................. 606 B. Early History of Dissent ................................. 607 1. Seriatim Opinions..................................... 607 2. Early "Opinions of the Court"--andEarly Dissents ................................................. 610 C. Taking Dissents Seriously: Some Great Dissenters 615 1. The Nineteenth Century ............................. 615 (a) William Johnson ............................... 615 (b) Peter Daniel ..................................... 619 (c) John Marshall Harlan......................... 622 2. The Twentieth Century .............................. 626 (a) Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis .......................................... 627 (b) Hugo L. Black and William 0. Douglas.. 635 (c) John MarshallHarlan ......................... 644 * Professor, Vermont Law School; B.A., 1979, Mary Washington College; J.D., 1982, University of Virginia. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that between 1983 and 1986 1 was an assistant public defender in Florida (first at the Office of the Public Defender in West Palm Beach, and later as a charter attorney with the office of the Capital Collateral Representative in Tallahassee, where all of my clients were death row inmates). An expanded version of this Arti- cle will be published in March 1996 by Northeastern University Press as a book entitled "Last Stand Against the Lions." I am grateful to Laura Gillen, for help that transcended the secretarial; a quintet of extraor- dinarily gifted law students, Diane Bech, Nancy Gray, Greg Beber, Ian Ridlon, and Joseph Te- trault, who put thought as well as research work into the product; and to Nancy Levit, Sheldon Novick, Dick Brooks, Michael Radelet, Kim Cook and Jeffrey Robinson, who commented help- fully on the manuscript. This Article is dedicated to Deanna Peterson, and to one of our casualties, Mark Evans. The Talmud: "All the darkness in the world cannot extinguish the light of one candle." 592 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:591 D. Modern Times .............................................. 648 Ill. LEGITIMACY IN THEORY: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VALUE OF THE BRENNAN-MARSHALL RELENTLESS DISSENT ........ 649 A . Overview ..................................................... 649 1. Morality and the Law? .............................. 651 2. What Role Stare Decisis? ........................... 654 3. The ProperRole of the Judiciary?................ 656 B. NaturalLaw ................................................ 660 C. Positivism ................................................... 665 D. SociologicalJurisprudence .............................. 669 E. Legal Realism ............................................... 673 F. Wechsler, Ely, Choper ................................... 676 G. CriticalLegal Studies ..................................... 680 H. A Note on Civil Disobedience .......................... 684 IV. LEGITIMACY IN STRATEGY: JUDICIAL POLITICS AND THE BRENNAN-MARSHALL POSITION ................................ 685 A. Dissentsfrom Cases GrantedPlenary Review ...... 686 B. Dissentsfrom Denial of Certiorari.................... 692 V. CONCLUSION ........................................................ 694 I. INTRODUCTION [He] had me read to him from the Times the whole of Justice Blackmun's [Bowers v. Hardwick] dissent. He talked about it for days whenever one of his lawyer friends would call. [He] was the one who made me understand that a great dissent could over the course of time acquire the moral force to alter bigoted laws that seemed impregnable. Paul Monette' [The dissenter is] the gladiator making a last stand against the lions. 2 Benjamin Cardozo Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. 3 Robert Cover Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite 1. PAUL MONETTE, WEST OF YESTERDAY, EAST OF SUMMER: COLLECTED POEMS xvii (1994). 2. BENJAMIN CAROzo, LAW & LrrERATURE 34(1931) (quoted in Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2493 (1994)). 1 am grateful to Henry Schwartzschild for bringing the reference to my attention. 3. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). 1995l RELENTLESS DISSENT minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it violates childhood's training and life's experiences, and is not compatible with the philosophical convictions I have been able to develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life." Justice Harry Blackmun, dissenting from the majority holding that capital punishment violated the Constitution 4 A. Capital Punishment and the Modern Court: An Overview At a press conference the day after announcing his retirement from the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall said when interviewing prospective law clerks he always asked if they liked working on dis- sents. "If they said 'no,' they didn't get a job," Marshall said. "I only picked those that liked to write dissenting opinions." 5 The retirements of William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun mark the end of an era-several eras, actually-and provide a fitting time to reexamine what made their judicial careers unique. This Article explores one aspect of their uniqueness: relentless dissents in capital cases. Until 1991, capital cases in the U.S. Reports invariably included dis- sents by Justice Brennan, Marshall, or both. Brennan and Marshall doggedly voted against the death penalty in virtually every case since 1976, when the Court first upheld the constitutionality of capital pun- ishment.6 Sometimes their dissents were in detail and sometimes in boilerplate. The Justices dissented not only to the imposition of capi- tal punishment in cases granted certiorari review, but also in almost every capital case where certiorari was denied. In more than 2100 cases, Brennan and Marshall reiterated their opinion that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 7 Amendment. According to Alan Bigel, in forty-two capital cases decided during the Burger era (1969-1986), excluding petitions for certiorari and stays 4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405-06 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 5. Anthony Lewis, Marshall Urges Bush to Pick "the Best, " N.Y. TiMEs, June 29, 1991, at A8. 6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 7. Search of WESTLAW, Supreme Court database ("Brennan Marshall /s dissent! & (death /2 penal!) & DA(aft 1955) & DA(bef 1991)") March 1, 1995; see also Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MicH. L. REV. 1741, 1768 (1987) (quoting E. Villarreal, Dissents to the Denial of Certiorari in Death Penalty Cases of Justices Brennan and Marshall (July 11, 1985) (unpublished Yale Law School seminar paper, listing result of LEXIS search) (noting that Brennan and Marshall had dissented from the denial of certiorari in more than 400 cases between 1976 and 1985)). 594 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22:591 of execution decided without opinion, Brennan wrote ten full opinionsg and a brief concurring statement in fifteen others. 9 Mar- shall wrote sixteen full opinions 0 and added ten brief statements re- iterating his categorical opposition to the death penalty. I"During his tenure on the Rehnquist Court (1986-1990), Brennan wrote ten full opinions for death penalty cases' and a brief statement in five 8. See Alan I. Bigel, Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall on Capital Punishment, 8 Nomns DAME J.L. ETmcs & Pua. POL'Y 11 (1994); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Wainwright v. Witt,
Recommended publications
  • The Political Effects of the Addition of Judgeships to the United States Supreme Court Following Electoral Realignments

    The Political Effects of the Addition of Judgeships to the United States Supreme Court Following Electoral Realignments

    A Compliant Court: The Political Effects of the Addition of Judgeships to the United States Supreme Court Following Electoral Realignments Lauren Paige Joyce Judson Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of: Master of Arts In Political Science Jason P. Kelly, Chair Wayne D. Moore Karen M. Hult August 7, 2014 Blacksburg, Virginia Keywords: Judicial Politics, Electoral Realignment, Alteration to the Supreme Court Copyright 2014, Lauren J. Judson A Compliant Court: The Political Effects of the Addition of Judgeships to the United States Supreme Court Following Electoral Realignments Lauren J. Judson ABSTRACT During periods of turmoil when ideological preferences between the federal branches of government fail to align, the relationship between the three quickly turns tumultuous. Electoral realignments especially have the potential to increase tension between the branches. When a new party replaces the “old order” in both the legislature and the executive branches, the possibility for conflict emerges with the Court. Justices who make decisions based on old regime preferences of the party that had appointed them to the bench will likely clash with the new ideological preferences of the incoming party. In these circumstances, the president or Congress may seek to weaken the influence of the Court through court-curbing methods. One example Congress may utilize is changing the actual size of the Supreme The size of the Supreme Court has increased four times in United States history, and three out of the four alterations happened after an electoral realignment. Through analysis of Supreme Court cases, this thesis seeks to determine if, after an electoral realignment, holdings of the Court on issues of policy were more congruent with the new party in power after the change in composition as well to examine any change in individual vote tallies of the justices driven by the voting behavior of the newly appointed justice(s).
  • Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex Parte

    Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex Parte

    Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship 2000 Just Because John Marshall Said it, Doesn't Make it So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789 Eric M. Freedman Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship Recommended Citation Eric M. Freedman, Just Because John Marshall Said it, Doesn't Make it So: Ex Parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 531 (2000) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/53 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MILESTONES IN HABEAS CORPUS: PART I JUST BECAUSE JOHN MARSHALL SAID IT, DOESN'T MAKE IT So: Ex PARTE BoLLMAN AND THE ILLUSORY PROHIBITION ON THE FEDERAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS IN THE JUDIcIARY ACT OF 1789 Eric M. Freedman* * Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law ([email protected]). BA 1975, Yale University;, MA 1977, Victoria University of Wellington (New Zea- land); J.D. 1979, Yale University. This work is copyrighted by the author, who retains all rights thereto.
  • Not the King's Bench Edward A

    Not the King's Bench Edward A

    University of Minnesota Law School Scholarship Repository Constitutional Commentary 2003 Not the King's Bench Edward A. Hartnett Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Hartnett, Edward A., "Not the King's Bench" (2003). Constitutional Commentary. 303. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/303 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOT THE KING'S BENCH Edward A. Hartnett* Speaking at a public birthday party for an icon, even if the honoree is one or two hundred years old, can be a surprisingly tricky business. Short of turning the party into a roast, it seems rude to criticize the birthday boy too harshly. On the other hand, it is at least as important to avoid unwarranted and exaggerated praise.1 The difficult task, then, is to try to say something re­ motely new or interesting while navigating that strait. The conference organizers did make it easier for me in one respect: My assignment does not involve those ideas for which Marbury is invoked as an icon. It is for others to wrestle in well­ worn trenches with exalted arguments about judicial review and its overgrown descendent judicial supremacy, while trying to avoid unseemly criticism or fawning praise. I, on the other hand, am to address more technical issues involving section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its provision granting the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus.
  • Recent Cases

    Recent Cases

    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 23 Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 1970 Article 7 5-1970 Recent Cases Law Review Staff Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Law Review Staff, Recent Cases, 23 Vanderbilt Law Review 809 (1970) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/7 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RECENT CASES Accountants-Auditors-Compliance with General Accounting Principles Not a Complete Defense To Criminal Fraud Defendants' are members of a certified public accounting firm which was retained annually by Continental Vending Corporation (Continental) to audit its financial statements. While conducting a yearly audit, defendants learned that an affiliated company, Valley Commercial Corporation (Valley),2 was not in a position to repay its debt 3 to Continental. .The president of Valley, however, offered to secure the debt personally. Defendants determined that if adequate collateral' was posted, Continental's statements could be certified without reviewing Valley's books.5 The collateral was obtained,, its value was confirmed,7 and the receivable was entered on the balance sheet8 subject to an explanation in a footnote.' The statements were 1. Defendants are a senior partner, a junior partner, and a senior associate in the national accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross Bros.
  • The Marshall Court As Institution

    The Marshall Court As Institution

    Herbert A. Johnson. The Chief Justiceship of John Marshall: 1801-1835. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997. xii + 317 pp. $39.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-57003-121-2. Reviewed by Sanford Levinson Published on H-Law (December, 1997) Herbert A. Johnson, who with the late George perhaps the general political atmosphere that L. Haskins co-authored the Holmes Devise volume helped to explain the particular appointments to Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 the Court that made the achievement of Mar‐ (1981), here turns his attention to Marshall's over‐ shall's political and jurisprudential goals easier or all tenure of office. Indeed, the book under review harder. is part of a series, of which Johnson is the general This is a book written for a scholarly audi‐ editor, on "Chief Justiceships of the United States ence, and I dare say that most of its readers will Supreme Court," of which four books have ap‐ already have their own views about such classic peared so far. (The others are William B. Casto on Marshall chestnuts as Marbury v. Madison, Mc‐ Marshall's predecessors Jay and Ellsworth; James Culloch v. Maryland, Gibbons v. Ogden, and the W. Ely, Jr. on Melville W. Fuller; and Melvin I. like. Although Johnson discusses these cases, as he Urofksy on Harlan Fiske Stone and Fred M. Vin‐ must, he does not spend an inordinate amount of son.) One could easily question the value of peri‐ space on them, and the great value of this book odizing the Supreme Court history through its lies in his emphasis on facets of the Court, includ‐ chief justices; but it probably makes more sense ing cases, of which many scholars (or at least I to do so in regard to the formidable Marshall than myself) may not be so aware.
  • Abington School District V. Schempp 1 Ableman V. Booth 1 Abortion 2

    Abington School District V. Schempp 1 Ableman V. Booth 1 Abortion 2

    TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME 1 Bill of Rights 66 Birth Control and Contraception 71 Abington School District v. Schempp 1 Hugo L. Black 73 Ableman v. Booth 1 Harry A. Blackmun 75 Abortion 2 John Blair, Jr. 77 Adamson v. California 8 Samuel Blatchford 78 Adarand Constructors v. Peña 8 Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell 79 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital 10 Bob Jones University v. United States 80 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 13 Boerne v. Flores 81 Advisory Opinions 15 Bolling v. Sharpe 81 Affirmative Action 15 Bond v. United States 82 Afroyim v. Rusk 21 Boumediene v. Bush 83 Age Discrimination 22 Bowers v. Hardwick 84 Samuel A. Alito, Jr. 24 Boyd v. United States 86 Allgeyer v. Louisiana 26 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 86 Americans with Disabilities Act 27 Joseph P. Bradley 87 Antitrust Law 29 Bradwell v. Illinois 89 Appellate Jurisdiction 33 Louis D. Brandeis 90 Argersinger v. Hamlin 36 Brandenburg v. Ohio 92 Arizona v. United States 36 William J. Brennan, Jr. 92 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing David J. Brewer 96 Development Corporation 37 Stephen G. Breyer 97 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 38 Briefs 99 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 38 Bronson v. Kinzie 101 Assembly and Association, Freedom of 39 Henry B. Brown 101 Arizona v. Gant 42 Brown v. Board of Education 102 Atkins v. Virginia 43 Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association 104 Automobile Searches 45 Brown v. Maryland 106 Brown v. Mississippi 106 Bad Tendency Test 46 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company 107 Bail 47 Buchanan v.
  • Chapter 2 the Marshall Court and the Early Republic

    Chapter 2 the Marshall Court and the Early Republic

    Chapter 2 The Marshall Court and the Early Republic I. The Supreme Court in Its Initial Years: 1 78918O11 The Supreme Court of the United States was a relatively insignificant institution during the first decade of the new Republic. Presidents Washington and Adams had some difficulty attracting people to serve, and the rate of turnover was high. Three men were appointed chiefjustice during the first 12 years.JohnJay resigned after six years to serve as New York’s governor, which he presumably deemed the more important office (and during his tenure he sailed to England to serve as the princi pal negotiator of what became known as the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, which, together with his co-authorship of the Federalist Papers, remains his primary claim to fame for most historians) . His successor, John Rutledge, had been appointed as an Associate in 1 789 but had resigned in 1 791 , without ever sitting, to go to the more prestigious South Carolina Supreme Court. He was nominated to become Chief Justice ofthe U.S. Supreme Court in 1795 but failed to receive Senate confirmation. Thereafter, Oliver Ellsworth was nominated and confirmed in 1796; he served until 1800, when he resigned while overseas on a diplomatic mission to France. One source of discontent was the onerous duty of “riding circuit,” which required eachJustice to travel twice a year to sit in the federal circuit court districts. (There were no “circuit courts” in the modern sense; instead, they consisted of districtjudges sitting together with a Supreme Courtjustice as a “circuit court.”) The trips were strenuous and time-consuming.
  • Supreme Court Justices

    Supreme Court Justices

    The Supreme Court Justices Supreme Court Justices *asterick denotes chief justice John Jay* (1789-95) Robert C. Grier (1846-70) John Rutledge* (1790-91; 1795) Benjamin R. Curtis (1851-57) William Cushing (1790-1810) John A. Campbell (1853-61) James Wilson (1789-98) Nathan Clifford (1858-81) John Blair, Jr. (1790-96) Noah Haynes Swayne (1862-81) James Iredell (1790-99) Samuel F. Miller (1862-90) Thomas Johnson (1792-93) David Davis (1862-77) William Paterson (1793-1806) Stephen J. Field (1863-97) Samuel Chase (1796-1811) Salmon P. Chase* (1864-73) Olliver Ellsworth* (1796-1800) William Strong (1870-80) ___________________ ___________________ Bushrod Washington (1799-1829) Joseph P. Bradley (1870-92) Alfred Moore (1800-1804) Ward Hunt (1873-82) John Marshall* (1801-35) Morrison R. Waite* (1874-88) William Johnson (1804-34) John M. Harlan (1877-1911) Henry B. Livingston (1807-23) William B. Woods (1881-87) Thomas Todd (1807-26) Stanley Matthews (1881-89) Gabriel Duvall (1811-35) Horace Gray (1882-1902) Joseph Story (1812-45) Samuel Blatchford (1882-93) Smith Thompson (1823-43) Lucius Q.C. Lamar (1883-93) Robert Trimble (1826-28) Melville W. Fuller* (1888-1910) ___________________ ___________________ John McLean (1830-61) David J. Brewer (1890-1910) Henry Baldwin (1830-44) Henry B. Brown (1891-1906) James Moore Wayne (1835-67) George Shiras, Jr. (1892-1903) Roger B. Taney* (1836-64) Howell E. Jackson (1893-95) Philip P. Barbour (1836-41) Edward D. White* (1894-1921) John Catron (1837-65) Rufus W. Peckham (1896-1909) John McKinley (1838-52) Joseph McKenna (1898-1925) Peter Vivian Daniel (1842-60) Oliver W.
  • The Marshall Court and Property Rights: a Reappraisal, 33 J

    The Marshall Court and Property Rights: a Reappraisal, 33 J

    UIC Law Review Volume 33 Issue 4 Article 14 Summer 2000 The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1023 (2000) James W. Ely Jr. Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Recommended Citation James W. Ely Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1023 (2000) https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss4/14 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE MARSHALL COURT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: A REAPPRAISAL JAMES W. ELY, JR.* INTRODUCTION Historians have long stressed the affinity between the jurisprudence of John Marshall and the protection of property rights. "Two fixed conceptions which dominated Marshall during his long career on the bench," Vernon L. Parrington observed, "were the sovereignty of the federal state and the sanctity of private property."1 Famous cases involving property rights and contractual stability figured prominently in the work of the Marshall Court. The property-conscious tenets of Marshall's constitutionalism helped lay the legal foundation for a market economy and had a lasting impact on the American polity. Beginning with the Progressive movement, and continuing through the New Deal Era, the rights of property owners were often disparaged as impediments to economic regulation and the welfare state.
  • Fairness and Redistribution

    Fairness and Redistribution

    Fairness and Redistribution By ALBERTO ALESINA AND GEORGE-MARIOS ANGELETOS* Different beliefs about the fairness of social competition and what determines income inequality influence the redistributive policy chosen in a society. But the composition of income in equilibrium depends on tax policies. We show how the interaction between social beliefs and welfare policies may lead to multiple equi- libria or multiple steady states. If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes. In equilibrium, effort will be high and the role of luck will be limited, in which case market outcomes will be relatively fair and social beliefs will be self-fulfilled. If, instead, a society believes that luck, birth, connec- tions, and/or corruption determine wealth, it will levy high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained as well. These insights may help explain the cross-country variation in perceptions about income inequality and choices of redistributive policies. (JEL D31, E62, H2, P16) Pre-tax inequality is higher in the United support the poor; an important dimension of States than in continental West European coun- redistribution is legislation, and in particular the tries (“Europe” hereafter). For example, the regulation of labor and product markets, which Gini coefficient in the pre-tax income distribu- are much more intrusive in Europe than in the tion in the United States is 38.5, while in Europe United States.1 it is 29.1. Nevertheless, redistributive policies The coexistence of high pre-tax inequality are more extensive in Europe, where the income and low redistribution is prima facia inconsis- tax structure is more progressive and the overall tent with both the Meltzer-Richard paradigm of size of government is about 50 percent larger redistribution and the Mirrlees paradigm of so- (that is, about 30 versus 45 percent of GDP).

  • Secession In, 192–193

    Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-53713-1 - Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000 Charles Tilly Index More information Index Aargau: anti-Catholic actions in, 193; Albiez, Hans, 57–58, 59 high taxation in, 190;incorporation Alemannic dialects, 178 of, 171;revolution in, 175;secession Alexander, of Yugoslavia: assassination in, 192–193 of, 230;dictatorship of, 230 abolition, Chartists and, 163 Alexander II, concessions of, 218 Academy of Metz, 129 Alfonso XIII: elections of, 233;escape Academy of Moral and Political of, 233;restoration of, 233 Sciences, 196 Algeria: anti-Semitism in, 130;civil war Act of Succession, 144 in, 122, 132;revolutionary situations Act of Union, 141 in, 99 actors: constituted political, 20; alliances, 68;tactical, 9 detached identities of, 63;external, Allies: as external party, 237;liberation 11;intentions of, 9;political, 15; of France by, 121;victory of, 131 political entrepreneurs as, 76;public Alsace-Lorraine: German annexation political, 21 of, 129;Jews of, 129 administration, Dutch model of, 28 Alteraciones urbanas andaluzas of Afghanistan: contention in, 34; 1647–52, 88 Freedom House analysis of, 209; American Revolution, 75, 148;Catholic Soviet assistance to, 222;U.S. Emancipation and, 149;influence of, support of rebels in, 222 80;as revolutionary model, 105 Africa: anticolonial rebellion in, 244; Americas: European settlement in, 243; enslavement of, 244;European Spanish colonization of, 82 settlement in, 243;indirect rule in, Amerindians, massacre of, 25 49;Spanish colonization of, 82 anarchist movements, in Iberia, 233 Age of the Democratic Revolution Andalucıa,´ 90 (Palmer), 75 Andorra: democratization of, 216; Agitators, 140 Freedom House analysis of, 209;vs.
  • Et-2020-The-Atlantean-Order-Of-Lucifer-Hardcover

    Et-2020-The-Atlantean-Order-Of-Lucifer-Hardcover

    1 2 The Atlantean Order of Lucifer. The eternal religion of the sun. Last edit: 07.07.2020 ¨Why should Christians, and Jews believe Jews are the chosen people? Isn`t that racist? If you want to avoid racism: All should have the right to believe their native groups are chosen.¨ That is a philosophical absolute. Go watch ¨Europa the last battle 1-10 video documentary¨ PS! This is not a Satanic book, but a national-conservative Nordic Luciferian book with elements from Christianity, humanism and white-centrism. This is not a ¨racist book¨ short for ¨white racial supremacist¨ which Wikipedia states is: A white who sees it as his right to rule or enslave other races. Muslims believe in subjugating others, and The Jewish Talmud believe Jews will have 2800 slaves each… Yet I have never met at white supremacist or a ¨racist¨ who ¨wants to enslave others¨. We simply want what we want for all other nation-groups. A place to call our own. This book is no cause for violence. What we`re fighting is a peaceful info-war and ¨might is not right¨ anyway you see it. I like writing controversial books, because it is the job of a philosopher to question religion, society, authority, and address the factual dangers of this current zeitgeist, like the current gullible apathy to mass-media, cultural- Marxism, global Jewry, masonry, globalism and Agenda 21. This involves all the human race, but the first battles will be fought in Europe. Nationalism is an important tool to awaken others to conspiracy reality and the greater war.