Elites, Democracy and Development in Post-Socialist Transition

Frane Adam / Matevž Tomšič (Ljubljana) Elites, Democracy and Development in Post-Socialist Transition

Auf der Grundlage umfangreicher empirischer Daten aus Forschungen über die Elitenbildungs- prozesse in den post-sozialistischen Ländern und mit Hilfe anderer Indikatoren der politisch-ökono- mischen Entwicklung untersuchen die Autoren, wie sich Muster der Elitenreproduktion bzw. -zirkulation auf Prozesse der Demokratisierung und der sozioökonomischen Entwicklung auswirken. Sie behan- deln dabei ein bisher eher vernachlässigtes Thema: die Frage, wie sich zwischen den beiden Segmen- ten der politischen Elite, die Pareto als die regierende und die nicht-regierende Elite bezeichnet hat, ein Gleichgewicht herstellen lässt.

1. Introduction ent sectors and factions. In this sense, the question concerning elite circulation is at the centre There is no doubt that (political) elites are a of the theoretical and empirical research inter- significant – sometimes even a decisive – fac- ests of social scientists dealing with issues con- tor for democratization and social change. This cerning social change (this is also the point made was confirmed also in the case of post-commu- in the recent contribution of Higley and Lengyel nist Eastern Europe, which actually represents 2000). a very interesting laboratory for surveying the Extensive empirical research on political, cul- emergence of the new elite structure as well as tural and economic elites – usually defined as for the transformation and accommodation of positional or functional elites – has been con- the old one. Strictly speaking, we should speak ducted in practically all post-socialist states dur- instead of a proto-elite, meaning the rudimen- ing the first half of the 1990s. These studies were tary structure of an elite configuration which is of a more descriptive nature, yet even so they only now evolving into a more consolidated and have offered a point departure for profound, articulate form. ongoing discussions that deal with a complex Classic sociological and political science lit- phenomenon, which is hard to analyse in depth erature (see Etzioni-Halevy 1997) has already with insufficiently effective methodological developed the thesis that elites, even though they tools. These studies that rely mostly on stratifi- often aspire towards self-preservation and the cation and mobility approaches have focused protection of their own interests, are not a static on the demographic and class characteristics of and homogeneous category but are in constant, new or renovated old elites, as well as on their albeit slow transformation. Or, as already value and ideological orientations. To some ex- phrased somewhat metaphorically by Pareto tent, they offer a picture of the relation between (1997/1935, 49): “It flows on like a river, never reproduction and circulation. However, it is in- being today what it was yesterday”. It is there- teresting that relatively little effort has been di- fore very significant to ascertain what is going rected towards the study of the relation between on inside elite groups, how open they are to new the elite configuration and the attained degree members and new ideas, and what kind of rela- of democratisation (or “quality” of democracy), tions are being established among their differ- or developmental performance.

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 99 22.12.2007, 17:37 As the authors of this paper, we are mostly however, be stressed that it is often difficult to interested in how the relation between the re- make a clear-cut division between old and new production and circulation of (political) elites elites. Even the former nomenclature has in fact is reflected in the characteristics of the experienced various transformations, and part democratisation processes and in the socio-eco- of it has embraced (at least formally) democratic nomic modernisation of transitional societies principles and norms. Thus the thought and ac- (especially Slovenia). It is evident that this is a tion patterns which are essentially a relic of the demanding and multi-layered topic. In this text, former undemocratic system are often present we have, so we hope, succeeded to examine to varying degrees in recently-founded politi- some aspects of it and to open some new ques- cal parties. tions. Perhaps it would be more precise to say Nevertheless, one of the key questions of post- that our undertaking is a reactualisation of old socialist transformations concerns the position issues in a new context. and role of former holders of monopolistic social power, i.e., members of former communist elites: in other words, whether and to what ex- 2. Elite configuration in post-socialist tent were they able to retain key social resources societies and thereby continue to influence the development of these societies. In view of this, there One of the characteristics of post-socialist are two interpretations of post-socialist condi- political elites is their heterogeneity. Namely, tions. The theory of elite reproduction holds that they are made up of individuals as well as groups changes in Eastern and Central Europe did not of various social and historical origins and ideo- have an impact on the composition of elites, logical orientations: former dissidents of diverse since the nomenclature was able to stay at the provenance, more or less reformist members of top of the social structure and become the new the ex-communist nomenclature, members of grand bourgeoisie. According to the theory of professional groups (so-called technocrats), elite circulation however, these transformations people from the sphere of the Church and even are brought about by structural changes at the some members of pre-war political elites.1 Ac- top of the social hierarchy, i.e., key positions cording to Agh (1996, 45) the transitional po- occupied by new people on the basis of new litical elite possesses a number of common char- principles (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995, 616). When acteristics, including its distance toward the non- considering the position of the former commu- elite and a lack of professionalism. For this rea- nist elite in the new conditions, it is necessary, son society perceives this social group as a union the one hand, to analyze its present political fied actor which “monopolises politics and ex- role, namely to what extent was it able to stay erts control over all social life”. However, there on the political scene and to retain at least a part are numerous antagonisms and conflicts exist- of its power through new mechanisms of politi- ing among various elite segments including es- cal recruitment. On the other hand, one should pecially competition for control over key re- ascertain how much political power it was able sources which actors try to obtain through dif- to retain in other ways, particularly by trans- ferent social linkages (search for allies, various forming political and social capital into eco- “coalitions”). All this implies that we are not nomic capital or other resources. dealing with a uniform group. It has to be stressed that the political position Social conditions in the countries of the of successor parties of the nomenclature differs former communist block are, to a large extent, considerably from country to country. In coun- characterized by the relationship between so- tries where the communist party reformed gradu- called old and new elites, i.e., between elites ally, embraced systemic changes, and was also derived from the ranks of the former regime and actively involved in this process, it became an the relatively heterogeneous elites formed dur- equal partner on the political scene. This holds ing the process of systemic transition. It must, true for the situation in Hungary, in Slovenia

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 100 22.12.2007, 17:37 and partly in the case of Poland. While the in social development, which meant a slowdown former communist party elite may have lost its and a lack of thoroughness in systemic changes. political monopoly, its reformed faction suc- Of course in this context as well conditions dif- ceeded in establishing itself relatively firmly in fer from case to case. In Bulgaria, and later also the political arena. A definite confirmation of in Romania, new political elites gained so much their successful political survival was both the strength that they assumed power, thus paving 1993 parliamentary elections in Poland and the the way for more radical social reforms, the suc- 1994 elections in Hungary, where the successor cessful implementation of which is questionable parties of the communist party won and assumed because of a relative feebleness of the new elite power. In both countries, however, the situation and a severe socio-economic situation. (In Ro- changed with the following parliamentary elec- mania, the new political forces were defeated at tions (in 1997 in Poland and in 1998 in Hun- the most recent parliamentary elections and the gary), when the political parties of centre-right government again returned into the hands of the orientation, which had no ties with the former reformed communists.) The most extreme cases communist party, were voted back into power. of continuity in terms of the communist origin Consequently, it can be affirmed that in these of political elites and the mode of government two countries, at least at the level of legitimate are Belarus and, until recently (October 2000), political power, a kind of balance was achieved, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These are i.e., there was circulation among the competing two cases of single-party rule (even though for- political elites, and the fundamental principles mally other parties also exist) to a large extent of parliamentary democracy are accepted by all. tied to a personality cult of the head of state. In the Czech Republic, however, the situation The ruling neo-communist elite controls most is quite different: The communist party elite – of the key positions in society, while the eco- owing to its obstinate opposition to change – nomic system is somewhere between state in- lost almost all legitimacy, was practically thrown terventionism and chaotic “ jungle law”. out of power, and the regime quickly crumbled. According to some interpretations, the find- Here the key roles are played by the parties of ings of empirical research (in the framework of the centre-right (Citizens’ Democratic Party) the project “Social Stratification in Eastern Eu- and of the centre-left (Social Democratic Party), rope after 1989”) do not categorically corrobo- which are not of communist origin (this is in rate either the theory of reproduction or the fact a new political elite). However, the situa- theory of circulation (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995, tion was quite different in Slovakia, where the 636). It is evident that in the process of post- political forces which stem mainly from the socialist transition no revolutionary changes former communist structures (such as the Move- have occurred in this region. Thus a part of the ment for Democratic Slovakia headed by old elite – mainly its bureaucratic faction – left Vladimir Mečiar), have ruled the country for the elite, but a large part of the elite of the late the major part of the 90s. Only with the 1998 1980s retained its key position. In addition, those elections did the ruling power shift to a coali- who dropped out of the elite as a rule did not tion of democratic parties. ‘drop’ very far but took up positions that still In the countries of south-eastern Europe (Bul- wielded some power. In some countries (par- garia, Romania, Albania and the former Yugo- ticularly in Hungary and Poland), a large por- slavia, excluding Slovenia and Croatia) and in tion of the nomenclature retired, which did not the countries of the former Soviet Union (ex- necessarily mean that they had regressed on the cluding the Baltic states), communist party elites social scale (many of them continued to be ac- managed to retain their power even after the first tive as consultants, etc.). On the other hand, a democratic multi-party elections and to reform large portion of post-socialist elites is made up to a much lesser extent (even though in this case of people who did not belong to the nomencla- as well it accepted the system of parliamentary ture. However, in the case of these new mem- democracy). In this way they retained key roles bers, usually no great ‘structural shifts occurred

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 101 22.12.2007, 17:37 since most of them came from the ranks of pro- as in terms of social order in general). Gener- fessionals and mid-level bureaucracy, i.e., those ally speaking, one could maintain that the stron- who at the end of the 1980s wielded at least ger the civil tradition and the greater the self- some power (Szelenyi/Szelenyi 1995, 622ff.). organizational potential of a society, the stron- The reproduction of elites in Russia is under- ger a counter-elite is capable of forming, and standable since the social changes in that coun- the greater chance it has of maintaining demo- try occurred more slowly, were less fundamen- cratic stability. tal, and no strong counter-elite existed that could Types of elites in post-socialist societies dif- have pushed out the communist party person- fer from one another in a similar way as do the nel. Thus, under conditions of relative social configurations of elites. The character of a po- instability where democratic institutions do not litical system in fact depends to a large extent function properly, communist party personnel on the type of relations among the various po- has the advantage over the new players. In the litical elites (Field et al. 1990; Higley/Burton case of Hungary and Poland, the principle of 1998). This is particularly true in the case of circulation of elites has greater weight.2 This system transformation in which elites play the can be accounted for by a relatively well devel- role of institution-builders (Kaminski/ oped civil society (in comparison to Russia) and Kurczewska 1994). In their classification, a strong political counter-elite, which defeated Higley et al. (1998) specify four types of politi- the former communists in the first free elections. cal elites on the basis of two factors: level of A research study on the profile of the national integration and differentiation of elites: consen- elite was conducted also in the Czech Republic. sual, fragmented, divided and ideocratic elites.5 Results indicate that in the case of the economic We may thus contend that in all the countries elite, the level of reproduction is quite high, of the former socialist block, there are changes while in the case of political, administrative and in the character of political elites; in conclusion, cultural elites we can speak of circulation.3 we are no longer dealing with the ideocratic type However, most of the Czech elite gravitates to- of communist elite characterized by ideologi- ward centre-right parties in its political prefer- cal and organizational uniformity. The configu- ences (this particularly applies to the economic ration of political elites primarily in terms of elite) (Srubar 1998). levels of value consensus and structural inte- One should also mention here a comparative gration on the one hand and levels of social, study on national elites which has been carried ideological and interest differentiation on the out in the Baltic countries. It concludes that in other varies from country to country. Higley et the case of Baltic elites, there is a combination al. (1998) in their analysis of post-socialist elites of continuity and change (A. Steen uses the term observe that a consensual type of elite was ‘elite recirculation’). ¨While the nomenclature formed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and was largely removed from power, the younger, Poland, that a fragmented type of elite was es- well educated, mid-level leaders from the former tablished in Slovakia and Bulgaria, while a di- regime are continuing and are now occupying vided elite emerged in Romania and Ukraine most of the top positions.¨ (Steen 1997, 166).4 (the situation in Russia is rather unclear in this It is thus evident that the configuration of na- respect). tional elites differs considerably from one post- In countries with a consensual elite, where all socialist country to another, and the same is true the key political players abide by the rules and for the balance between the reproduction and where a relative balance of power between dif- circulation of elites. It is precisely the balance ferent factions of political elite exists, an en- and relations among recently emerged factions trenchment of long-term political stability is of post-socialist elite that decisively determines most likely. However, a specific part and pro- the character of political regimes (primarily in file of the political elite is explicitly dominant terms of the division of power in a society, i.e., in countries where there is practically no con- the level of its dispersal or concentration, as well sensus on the fundamental norms of political

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 102 22.12.2007, 17:37 activity, including most countries of the former 899), harbour political aspirations that are closer Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Yugosla- to the reformed and modernised old elite. Some via (Serbia and Montenegro) and in Albania. 44% of the newcomers expressed a voting pref- This faction of the elite usually rose from the erence for the Liberal Democracy and the As- ranks of the former communist regime (even sociated List of Social Democrats, both of which though institutions of political democracy also have organisational roots in the old regime, exist in these countries in the form of political while 35% of them are in favour of the new parties, multi-party parliament and elections). parties forming the so-called spring block (for Thus the chances for successful political trans- figures see Kramberger 1998). At the very least, formation, meaning the establishment of stable we can say that circulation (if we can speak of polyarchical democracy (as well as reform of it at all) has not weakened the old elite, which the remaining societal spheres), are relatively we could most appropriately name the retention small, at least in the near future. (We deal in a elite because of its ability to take advantage of more detailed manner with the factors that in- its inherited positions in terms of social capital fluence the stability of democracy and with the and control of symbolic and material resources. perspectives of different post-socialist states in This leads us to surmise the existence of an the third chapter.) asymmetry between the two pillars of the po- Our review of the evidence on the formation litical elite. In other words: we start with a the- and dynamics of positional elites in post-social- sis that we shall try to elaborate further – the ist societies clearly indicates that there is nei- existence of dominant (retention) and periph- ther pure reproduction nor pure circulation but eral (new) elite. We may reinforce our conjec- that instead we may speak of a greater inclina- ture with data that indicate a high level of cohe- tion to one or other form in these countries. In siveness in the sense of common political pref- the case of Slovenia, we will try to define more erences and dominance of the retention elite both precisely these mixed forms, i.e., the relations in terms of legitimate power – referring espe- between reproduction and circulation and their cially to the retention elite’s strong victory at consequences for modernization,6 democracy the parliamentary elections 2000 and also to and economic development. some key politicians who enjoy a very long mandate – as well as in terms of informal influence. For example, 75% of the economic elite 3. The ambivalence of the Slovenian elite (i.e., those who responded to this question) configuration gravitates (regarding its voting preference) towards the political parties of the retention elite, The research conducted in 1995 on the while only 16% of this elite segment gravitates Slovene functional elites in politics, culture and towards the block of new parties. We see a simi- the business sector,7 provides some data on the lar but less pronounced picture in the culture relations between the old elite (persons who elite and in the remainder of the political elite.8 occupied high positions before 1988 and were Before we attempt an interpretation of these able to preserve them) and the new elite (those data, we should also point out the findings from assuming elite positions after 1988). In fact this the same investigation that show that Slovenia’s shows a fairly high level of reproduction. The retention elite is not characterised simply by a rate of reproduction amounts on average to 77%, high level of reproduction, but also by an inten- the highest individual level being in the busi- sive fluctuation in its informal (egocentric) net- ness sector (84%) and the lowest in politics works. From the provided data alone it would (66%), while in the culture it reaches 78% be possible to conclude that there is a high level (Kramberger 1998, 1999; Iglič/Rus 2000). of accommodation among the old elite. This elite Here we must take into account the fact that has replaced as much as 65% of its ties with the majority of newcomers, who account for more prominent contact persons (Iglič/Rus 23% of the 1995 sample of respondents (208/ 2000). These are persons from various social

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 103 22.12.2007, 17:37 fields with whom the elite has ties and contacts, of monopolies and rent-seeking behaviour. The meaning that they represent their social capital. opposing point of view stresses the benign ef- The fact that a high level of elite reproduction fect of elite reproduction, especially political coincides with extensive transformations in elite stability; at the same time it relativises the sig- contact networks tells us much about the suc- nificance of data indicating a high level of elite cessful adaptation of the old elite to new social continuity (Iglič/Rus 2000; Kramberger 1999). conditions. The old elite renounced those con- We can in fact cite points of view and argu- tacts which are not functional in these novel ments which tend to tone down the air of drama conditions and has obtained new ones. surrounding the data on high reproduction and In sum, the findings – which must be taken continuity of the old elite. The first argument is cum grano salis, because they are only partly concealed within the results of research into reliable and comparable (there are differences elites in other transition countries. Certain na- in research design and sampling, some results tional (political) elites reformed themselves in are outdated) – concerning elite configuration the 1980s and neutralised their dogmatic in certain East-Central European countries hardcore segment by replacing it with techno- (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland) as well as crats; such elites have demonstrated in the 1990s in Slovenia, we can conclude that the former a greater level of elite reproduction and less cir- are closer to a model of limited circulation or culation (Hanley et al. 1995). This would at first combination of both forms (recirculation or seem to be the case in Hungary and Slovenia, reprocirculation), while the later is closer to a and to a lesser extent in Poland. Yet the data do model of “extended reproduction” or to a pat- not entirely confirm this hypothesis; they show tern named “reproduction circulation” (Higley/ no major differences (except in the sense of Lengyel 2000, 7). To put differently: in the case ‘class reproduction’) in reproduction/circulation of Slovenian elite we cannot speak of simple between the Hungarian, Polish and Czech elites, self-reproduction in the sense that no change or while Slovenia is marked by considerably higher transformation took place. But the fact remains reproduction. that there is no balance between circulation and Another argument would appear to be that reproduction and that social dynamics after the Slovenia is a small social system, which is exchange of the regime brought about an elite con- periencing difficulties attaining a ‘critical mass’ stellation, the nature of which should be matter from which a more numerous elite might be re- for multifaceted investigation. cruited. Some believe that such systems are then Now we can return to the question of how to condemned to reproduce one and the same elite interpret the data indicating a relatively high (Kramberger 1999). The question is whether level of reproduction among Slovene elites. We such views arise from a deterministic concep- have yet to witness any truly in-depth discus- tion of the elite dynamics or whether they are sion within the discipline of social sciences on just an attempt to legitimise the status quo. this delicate and controversial subject (see in- The third argument for the predominance of formation about the similar situation in the Slo- the retention elite is supposed to lie in the fact vak Republic in Kusa 1997). Nevertheless, we that Slovene society has not only just gone could summarise two points of view from the through a process of systemic change, but has debates that have erupted in recent times. Ac- also acquired a new nation/state framework. A cording to the first, represented and revealed to part of the old elite was active in the process of the public by one of the authors of this article gaining independence, and in this way it ac- (Adam 1999), the high level of elite reproduc- quired further legitimacy necessary to continue tion produces a long-term malignant effect (al- in power.9 though this possibly may not be apparent in the The fourth argument, which puts into perspec- short term), including a possible shift towards tive the data on high reproduction, is derived oligarchic democracy or delegate democracy from the work of an external observer, an Ameri- (O’Donnell 1994), as well as the establishment can sociologist who is also an authority on the

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 104 22.12.2007, 17:37 study of elites, Professor Higley. In his opinion state that it is not analytically supported by spe- – expressed in an interview he gave for a cific examples or empirical evidence. Merely Slovene weekly in September 1999 during an short-term or token exchange of the old elite international conference on transition elites in with a new one cannot guarantee democratic Ljubljana – there is indeed a high level of re- development. production of elites in Slovenia, however since After weighing the arguments and counter- there has been a change of elites in power, this arguments concerning the significance of the fact has no major problematic significance high level of reproduction of elites, we arrive at (Higley 1999). Despite the fact that this new elite two tentative, but more or less cardinal, conclu- had been in power for only two years (1990– sions. 1) The debate on this issue has to be un- 1992), this period is seen as sufficient for the derstood as an analysis of the foundations for a self-transformation of the old elite, which is rational strategy that might lead to a competent supposed to have become flexible and adapt- and educated national elite. 2) Slovenia cannot able. possibly do away with a part of the old elite, or Nevertheless, it is also possible to reassess rather this would make no sense; instead, it can those interpretations that relativise the signifi- achieve an optimal (and realistic) quality of cance of data on the high reproduction of elites functional elite through a greater level of circu- in Slovenia and to demonstrate their weakness. lation from the potential elite (the highly edu- In regard to the first argument on the cated stratum) to the elite positions. As for the modernisation of the old elite, which some in- political elite, it should be emphasised that the terpret as recognition of its competence, we assertion that “determining some kind of nor- could say that this is true only in part. Although mal levels of elite reproduction is impossible” it should be considered with some reservation, (Higley 1999, 28) can be challenged. Instead, one can find in the recent World Competitive- reproduction must be low enough and circula- ness Yearbook published by the Institute Man- tion high enough (or vice versa) as to allow for agement Development in Loussane that Slovene the formation of a counter-elite which in re- managers lag behind their Hungarian counter- sources and legitimacy should be comparable parts in terms of quality and skills (although they to the (old) elite recently in power (and vice are better off than their counterparts in the Czech versa). Republic and Poland). The situation is signifi- We cannot yet provide a final assessment of cantly more problematic concerning Slovenia’s the malign or benign nature of elite configura- administrative elite (including the judiciary), tion in Slovenia. Further analysis is needed con- which in terms of efficiency ranks 44th place out cerning the influence of this configuration on of 47 countries (while Slovenia occupies 39th the political system and on socio-economic per- place in the general index of competitiveness). formance. Yet we can already state – and dis- The second argument, which refers to a small cussion thus far confirms this – that this is a critical mass, may also be interpreted as an ar- complex task. Despite its small size and trans- gument in favour of greater circulation: small parency, Slovenia is in many ways a multifac- social systems such as Slovenia must be very eted and contradictory example of a transition attentive to the mechanisms and criteria of se- society. lection for elite positions (if they lose only a few competent people this can have quite negative consequences). The third argument for the 4. Processes of democratization in the light legitimacy of the retention elite does hold wa- of elite reproduction/circulation ter, but it cannot be an argument that in some people’s understanding justifies the irreplace- From what has been discussed previously we ability of key politicians from this elite echelon. might derive a thesis – or hypothesis – stating In connection with Higley’s assertion about the that the existence of an elite and counter-elite, exchange of elites (fourth argument), we may or rather the differentiation between elites, is

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 105 22.12.2007, 17:37 one of the key structural foundations of a demo- is problematic in situations of divergence and cratic regime. This implies that (excessively) confrontation (when there is no longer con- high levels of elite reproduction are not com- sensus), but excessive consensus which un- patible with democracy. Yet we must be more dermines mutual control and existence of precise here, for here we are referring to a quasi-solidarity (“esprit de corps”) also hinder polyarchic type of democracy with several cen- the operation of democratic institutions. tres of power and influence, marked primarily 5) The institutional framework (environment), by “horizontal accountability” (O’Donnell which either hinders or stimulates oligarchic 1998). Oligarchic or delegate democracy refers tendencies (e.g., parliamentary or presiden- to something else, and is characterised by a con- tial system). centration of power and weak mechanisms of control and responsibility (the media, courts, an Countries exposed to all the above risk fac- autonomous central bank, court of auditors), as tors face the largest problems regarding the de- well as the weak participation of citizens. In their velopment of democratic institutions. In first latest work, Higley/Lengyel (2000) argue that place are Belarus and Serbia (or rather the Fed- circulation is conductive to the creation and eral Republic of Yugoslavia).10 Other examples persistence of a consensual type of elite which include Slovakia and Croatia. The former had, is most compatible with democratic stability. what was untypical for a transitional country, a In order to arrive at more solid findings, we long period of rule by one (Mečiar’s) party (from must take into account other factors influenc- 1992–1998). The turnover occurred (i.e., the ing the constitution of a democracy resembling communist party went into opposition) when either the polyarchic or the oligarchic model. Slovakia was still a part of Czechoslovakia (in Of these factors – we might call them risk fac- 1990–1992). In Croatia there was a change tors – the following are the most important: (since 1990 the former elite, which transformed itself into the social democratic party, has been 1) Excessively high elite reproduction (insuf- in opposition), but Tudjman’s HDZ had been in ficient circulation) prevents the emergence of power for nearly ten years (1990–1999). Apart a dynamic equilibrium between the (old) in- from this, Croatia has a presidential system herited elite echelon and the (new) counter- which exacerbates the effects of a long period elite. of one-party government; and these effects are 2) Exchange (transfer) of power. Since a similar to those brought about by high repro- change of regime involving the old elite be- duction. ing in opposition for a given period has not If, on the other hand we look at those transi- occurred, this further enhances the effect of tion countries ranked as having achieved sig- elite reproduction. nificant results in democratisation, we see that 3) Longer periods of government by one po- Hungary and Poland have quite a favourable litical party elite. Even if in transitional coun- balance between elite reproduction and circula- tries this period is not so long as it is in the tion: a regular change of government, no overly case of established polyarchic democracies long periods of rule by one political party elite, (where there are cases of three or four suc- competitive relations among factions of the po- cessive terms in power; the scandal with the litical elite (although at the same time there is a illicit financing of German CDU indicates that basic consensus), and a political institutional this factor is really risky), it still contributes framework closer to a parliamentary democracy to the petrifaction and disproportion in power than to a presidential system. As for the Czech and influence between the governing or domi- Republic – which is not exposed to the factors nant elite and the counter-elite. of risk, except for factor 4 – we may have ob- 4) Relationship of co-operation and competi- served recently quite an intensive, yet non-trans- tion between individual pillars (factions) of parent, co-operation in the form of a tacit agree- the political elite. Of course this relationship ment between Zeman’s Social Democratic party,

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 106 22.12.2007, 17:37 which is in power (in a coalition government) of media pluralism, where the consequences of and Klaus’s centre-right opposition party (ODS) monopolies are apparent, deriving from the pre- (Cabada 1999). This configuration of political vious regime (Rupel 1999), and have endured elites, which results in insufficient mutual con- with the help of “wild privatisation” and, lately, trol, in all likelihood gives rise to difficulties in with the help of “deregulation” and com- the political sphere, as well as a slowing down mercialisation (Hrvatin/Kerševan 1999). in the implementing of economic reforms. There There is clear evidence of other oligarchic are also increased aspirations of the ruling par- tendencies, or rather tendencies that testify to ties to ‘colonize’ the society in accordance to the inadequate structure of “horizontal account- their particular interests. (The last example of ability” (this relates chiefly to the judiciary, such aspirations was the attempt to assume con- which has already been mentioned several times trol over the Czech public television, which had as a weak point in reports from the European failed because of strong public revolt.) The con- Commission in Brussels). Moreover, certain sequence of such conduct is a decline of satis- reforms that may jeopardise the advantages held faction with the new elites and a rise of support by the old elite are being slowly implemented for the communist party. (privatisation, property restitution). As far as the In the case of Slovenia, we have arrived at political culture is concerned, we may also ob- the following conclusions: A relatively high serve phenomena which we might ascribe to the level of reproduction has been mentioned. There great influence of the old elite and to the persis- have been two turnovers of the elites in power: tence of certain political figures (the phenom- in the period from 1990 to 1992, during the gov- enon of irreplaceability); this involves a latent ernment of the non-communist coalition Demos cult of the powerful leader, and is indicated also and in 2000 when for less than half a year the in international value surveys (e.g., Rose et al. so-called spring parties assumed power. These 1999, 111). In general, we can say that Slovenia changes were short-lived, however, and the Lib- is already demonstrating the negative conse- eral Democratic Party, the leading force of the quences of a relatively high level of reproduc- (modernised) retention elite, has been in power tion of elites and other risk factors; however, for the last nine years. In regard to the fourth counter-tendencies also exist, and special em- factor, the situation is somewhat atypical. Rela- phasis should be given to the relatively success- tions between the factions of the political elite ful socio-economic development of recent years. are hard to identify, for they are a mixture of conflicting, fragmented and consensual elements. Institutional solutions (Slovenia has a 5. Elite configuration and economic pure parliamentary system, proportional repre- performance and reforms sentation and coalition governments) in fact tend more to hinder than support developments to- In analysing the political characteristics of a wards oligarchic tendencies. system it is significant to determine if and to According to the Nations in Transit 2001 re- what extent they influence or are related to other port conducted by Freedom House, Slovenia developmental performances of society, particu- belongs to the group of “consolidated democ- larly the economic one. Concerning the classic racies” in regard to the quality of its democracy, issue concerning whether or not democracy has thus sharing third place with Hungary, Litva and a positive influence on economic development, Latvia, and is lagging behind Poland and the researchers’ opinions differ. In this regard, there Czech Republic. We can see therefore that are some assertions that no clear linkage is ap- Slovenia is among the most successful post- parent between democracy and economic socialistic countries; all the same, some coun- growth (Przeworski/Limongi 1993; Siermann tries are ahead of it. In our opinion, conditions 1998). In our opinion this is not the case (see in the last few years have even worsened in some also Huber et al. 1997). Countries with a devel- aspects. This holds true especially in the field oped democracy belong, almost without excep-

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 107 22.12.2007, 17:37 tion, to the group of economically most devel- (too) slowly. This is true mostly in the case of oped and richest countries. If the chosen crite- the transformation of the ownership structure, rion is the Human Development Index (HDI), that is, the privatisation of the former common which measures the state of the human resources (social) property (critiques concerning overly or the quality of life in an individual country, or slow privatisation are also a standard issue in the World Competitiveness Index (WCI), which the reports of the Commission of the European measures complete systemic competitiveness, Union concerning the advancement of the can- we can find that the first twenty positions are didate states). It is interesting to note that the all occupied by democratic countries. Further- proportion of state property is much larger in more, the majority of them suit the criteria for a the case of Slovenia than it is in other candidate polyarchic democracy. The so-called Asian ti- states. Under such conditions, which make pos- gers – Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong – are sible an extensive intervention of politics in the to some extent exceptional, which may be due functioning of the economy, there is a potential to their specific cultural context. In the major- danger of the proliferation of clientelistic and ity of the remaining developed countries, there corruptive practices. The next problematic ele- is a relative balance between a ruling elite and ment of ownership transformation is a delayed an opposing counter-elite. This enables their process of property restitution, i.e., the process (more or less frequent) alteration of power po- of returning property confiscated during the sitions. communist era to its rightful owners or to their In the context of the post-socialist transition legal descendants (such a delay gives rise to we can also notice relatively close connections serious doubts concerning the functioning of the between the development of democracy and rule of law). The mentioned reforms are ex- economic performance. Therefore, according to pected to be implemented for European Union the Nations in Transit 2001 report, the coun- membership – which is Slovenia’s strategic goal tries that have executed economic reforms most – and are, together with other changes (reform successfully are for the most part the same coun- of the retirement system, reform of state admin- tries that have advanced furthest in the process istration, greater openness to foreign investment, of democratisation. Slovenia also belong to this etc.), crucial for the attainment of a long-term group, although it occupies only fifth place – socio-economic development. Parallel to this, behind Poland, Hungary, Estonia and the Czech individual economists have recently called at- Republic. It should be stated, however, that tention to certain alarming trends such as the Slovenia ranks first regarding certain key macro- growing public debt, external debt and external economic indicators such as GDP per capita, trade deficit (Jazbec/Damjan 2001). purchasing power and level of living standard The type of socio-economic order emerging (Slovenia is, according to the Human Develop- in Slovenia could be defined as an unusual com- ment Report for the year 2001, positioned in bination of “managerial capitalism” with a 29th place, while the Czech Republic, as sec- strong state or public sector in the sense of “state ond best, holds 34th place).11 This is due in large or bureaucratic capitalism”. Concerning this we part to the better starting position and relatively can state, on the basis of past experience, that well-developed “civilisational competence”, the such a combination may have certain positive result of specific historical and geo-political cir- as well as negative effects on economic devel- cumstances (see more about this in Adam et al. opment. It is not just in the sense of procrasti- 2001). nation of reforms, which is a consequence of One may argue that a high level of elite re- holding on to advantages and acquired positions production, accompanied by the domination of as well as to inertia, but also of restricting ac- the modernized old or retention elite, also in- cess to potential competitors, particularly to fluences the functioning of the economic sys- those actors who might occupy elite positions tem. Some reforms which could consequently if entry were based more on meritocratic crite- weaken the position of the elite, are carried out ria and on the functional autonomy of sub-

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 108 22.12.2007, 17:37 systems. In the case of the economic elite, the of power in the sense of the circulation of po- fact that there are very few new entrepreneurs litical elites in positions of power and also on (mittelstand) is a manifestation of this; entre- the openness on the part of national elites (in preneurs that do exist are faced with a whole various fields, such as economy, culture, etc.) range of obstacles and with very few incentives. towards entry of new members exclusively on Restitution is also a mechanism for generating the basis of meritocratic criteria as mechanisms a potential business elite, and in both cases – for social promotion. the same is true for the inflow of foreign capital It is not our intention to argue that the politi- and foreign competitors – the retention elite is cal elite represents the only factor of demo- trying to slow down those reforms and legisla- cratisation. The situation in post-socialist soci- tion that could endanger its positions and mo- eties as well as the types of political order are nopolies. On the other hand, the economic part influenced also by other factors such as (inher- of the retention elite – thanks to the privatisation ited) dynamics of economic development, the model favouring dispersed insider ownership – level of cultural capital (mainly the level of edu- was able to introduce some restructuring mea- cation of the population), the level of civil soci- sures such as “down-sizing” and other ratio- ety development, political culture (rootedness nalisations at the enterprise level (Stanovnik/ of democratic values) as well as other elements Kovačič 1999). This in general increased pro- of tradition (work and vocational ethics, ability ductivity (and of course unemployment) in and motivation for collective action and self- Slovenia, which, along with Poland, is the only organisation, internalisation of formal-legal and transition country that succeeded after ten years bureaucratic disciplines as well as fundamental to reach its 1988 GDP level. But the limits of functional knowledge) (Adam et al. 2001, 28f.). this approach are evident; “managerial capital- However, the successful constitution of the ists” (see more about this phenomenon in Eyal democratic system is not simply the predeter- et al. 1998) – with the exception of some im- mined product of certain cultural, historical and portant cases – have failed to bring their com- material conditions but is also the result of po- panies to a higher technological level and to litical actors with their specific interests, pas- facilitate new developmental cycles (Stanovnik/ sions, memories and virtues (Schmitter 1992, Kovačič 1999). Not only is an acceleration of 425). Under the specific conditions of a transi- reforms an agenda; without technological tion from an authoritarian (or totalitarian) type modernisation and productive foreign capital of social order in a democratic one, the role of (FDI) it will not be possible to attain a long- the political subsystem is all the more impor- term competitive position within the EU. What tant, such is also the role of the political elite as is required is a new kind of co-operation be- the subsystem’s main carrier, given that it is re- tween the state (political-administrative elite) sponsible for establishing the structural condi- and strategic business groups that will be based tions (systemic infrastructures, mainly the leg- on the functional autonomy of both sides and islative framework) for the “normal” function- free from clientelistic bonds.12 ing of other social areas and their autonomous development. A sufficient degree of differentiation among 6. Discussion political elites and their circulation, in the form of at least two comparably powerful political It is evident that the successful formation of a parties or blocks, undoubtedly represents a cru- stable democracy and long-term sustained socio- cial condition for the dynamics and consequent economic development depend greatly upon the viability of a political system. What is at stake structure of the political sphere, the relations is not the persistence of the old (retention) elite between various factions of the political elite as in itself, nor the dilemma as to, whether old or well as on the nature of the whole elite constel- new, leftist or rightist parties are more suitable lation. Here focus is on the relative dispersion to assume power; instead, what is at stake is the

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 109 22.12.2007, 17:37 establishment of an appropriate balance between the new Lithuanian elites may lie in a more pro- governing and non-governing elite, between nounced left-right political cleavage (which stimu- lated a more critical focus on the past); in the case of competition and cooperation, between conflict the other two countries, ethnic cleavages between and consensus.13 the indigenous and Russophone populations were As far as the quite ambiguous situation in the prevalent. In Estonia and Latvia, an intensive de- Slovenian case study is concerned, we identi- russification of elites occured, meaning that the ethnicity of candidates for elite positions was more fied certain less promising side-effects of the important than their political background. existing elite formation and of its emerging 5 For detailed information on their conceptualisation structure of (latent) power. In this sense our see Higley et al. (1998). analysis can be considered as an “early warn- 6 Here we understand modernisation as a complex process of social changes in various fields (politics, ing” and as a contribution to the rational intel- economy, science,…) in the function of catching up lectual discourse about the future of democracy with the so-called developmental core, the states at the national and international levels. percieved to be the most developed. From the view- point of postsocialist states, such a referential frame comprises mainly the most developed member states of the European Union. 7 It should be stated that, regarding the research carried out in 1995 on elites in Slovenia, a positional REFERENCES determination of the elites was performed. In this context, individuals are part of an elite if they oc- 1 Attila Agh (1996) defines five characteristic transi- cupy key positions in three main social areas: in poli- tional types of politicians: politicians of morality, politics (e.g., ministers, representatives in parliament, ticians of historical vision, politicians of coincidence, high state administrators, party leaders), in economy old nomenclature and the emerging professional po- (managers in leading companies), and in the cultural litical elite. For more details see Agh (1996). sphere (leading staff in cultural and scientific insti- 2 Wasilewski’s (1999) study of the current Polish elite tutions, media houses and professional associations). (573 interviews were conducted with representatives 8 Like in some other post-socialist countries, the po- of political, administrative and economic elites), gives litical space in Slovenia is still divided into two main somewhat different results in terms of the reproduc- camps or ‘familles spirituales’ consisting (condition- tion of the Polish elite: among the new elite, there ally speaking) of old and new parties. The United are supposedly over a quarter (27.4%) of those who List of Social Democrats (ZSLD) and the Liberal belonged to the elite during the communist rule. Ac- Democratic Party (LDS) together with two marginal cording to the author, this share represents a “sig- parties, the National Party (SNS) and the Democratic nificant reproduction of the old elite” (Wasilewski Party of Pensioners (Desus), are considered to be- 1999, 4). long to the camp of old parties (the later two are ac- 3 40% of the Czech transitional economic elite occu- tually new parties but they have ideological leanings pied elite positions before 1989, of which 85% were toward the old parties). Both leading parties have ex-communist party members, while 57% of the new organisational roots in the old (socialist) regime; how- economic elite were former communist party mem- ever, LDS acquired some special features. It is a quite bers (the percentage of ‘party members’ in the eco- heterogeneous party if one considers its origins. Its nomic elite is considerably greater than the percent- dominant core originates from the former Socialist ages in the political and cultural elites). In the cur- Youth Organisation which, in the second half of the rent managerial structure, only 23% of the managers 80s, became more and more critical towards the re- in fact held general manager positions before 1989, gime; it can be said that it was an opposition within however, 50% of them were at that time deputy gen- the (communist) party and its members had contacts eral managers or members of the board of directors with dissident circles (opposition outside the com- (i.e., they belonged to a kind of second-rank mana- munist party). gerial staff). 30% of the cultural elite held elite posi- The other block of new parties, also known as the tions under communism. The results are similar in spring parties, consists of three parties: the (new) the case of the political elite, thus displaying a rela- Social Democrats (SDS), the Slovenian People’s tively low level of continuity. 35% of the members Party and New Slovenia (NSi). After the last elec- of the new political elite used to be communist party tions, one can observe a marginalistion of the ‘spring members (Srubar 1998). camp’ and the formation of a political sphere with 4 The proportion of elites who were members of the one strongly dominant party – LDS. Because of the Communist Party and who held high positions in the predominance of the camp of the so called old par- former regime are: 55% in Latvia, 54% in Estonia ties, more serious divisions and even a split of this and 44% in Lithuania (Steen 1997, 158). One reason camp is possible. If this process would be accompa- for the smaller proportion of ex-CP members among nied with a further marginalisation of the spring

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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 110 22.12.2007, 17:37 block, the differentiation of old parties will generate Agh, Attila (1996). From Nomenklatura to Clientura: a new political and ideological constellation. The Emergence of New Political Elites in East Cen- 9 A similar argument emerged in the case of Lithuania; tral Europe, in: Geoffrey Pridham/Paul Lewis (eds.): however unlike in the case of Slovenia, the strong Stabilizing Fragile Democracies, London, 44–68. position of the old (leftist) political elite is matched Cabada, Ladislav (1999). Razvoj strankarskega also by a strong new counter-elite (see Steen 1997). sistema na Češkem (Development of the Party Sys- 10 In Yugoslavia (or its Serbian part), important politi- tem in the Czech Republic), in: Teorija in praksa, 36 cal changes occurred after the federal presidential (2), 290–303. and republic parliamentary elections held in 2000 Etzioni-Halevy, Eva (1997). Classes & Elites in Democ- when president Milošević and his party, who were racy and Democratization, New York/London. the most serious obstacles for the democratisation of Eyal, Gil/Ivan Szelenyi/Eleanor Townsley (1998). Mak- society, had to give up (at least formal) power to the ing Capitalism without Capitalists. Ruling Class in democratic opposition. However, the heritage of Eastern Europe, Verso, London/New York. Milošević’s over decade-long rule – which caused a Field, G. Lowell/John Higley/Michael Burton (1990). bloody war in the former Yugoslav region and brought A New Elite Framework for Political Sociology, in: the country to a state of economic exhaustion, Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto, 28 (88), 149–181. interational isolation as well as the material and moral Gambetta, Diego (1988). Mafia: the Prices of Distrust, devastation of society– will be present for a long time; in: Diego Gambetta (ed.): Trust. Making and Break- this will cause severe problems for democratic con- ing Co-operative Relations, London. solidation and systemic modernisation of society. Hanley, Eric/Natasha Yershova/Richard Anderson 11 One can mention the assessment of developmental (1995). Russia – Old Wine in a New Bottle? The capacities conducted by the World Economic Forum, Circulation and Reproduction of Russian Elites 1983– in which Slovenia is positioned ahead of all other 1993, in: Theory and Society, 24 (5), 639–668. transitional countries. For more detailed information, Hellman, Joel (1998). Winners take all, in: World Poli- see their recent publication called »Readiness for the tics, 50, January, 203–234. Future Index« (European Economic Summit 2001, Higley, John (1999). Vladavina oligarhij (The Rule of Salzburg, Austria). Oligarchies). An interview (made by I. Mekina), in: 12 One of the strongest arguments in favour of elite cir- Mladina, October 4, 1999, 27–28, Ljubljana. culation (and political inclusiveness) can be found Higley, John/Jan Pakulski/Wlodimierz Wesolowski in an article written by an economist from EBRD. (1998). Introduction: Elite Change and Democratic He argues that the real problem in implementing and Regimes in Eastern Europe, in: John Higley/Jan completing reforms in transition countries are not the Pakulski/Wlodimierz Wesolowski (eds.): Postcom- losers but the winners (to some extent overlapping munist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe, with the retention elite), who have an incentive to London, 1–33. preserve their rents and control of resources at the consequence of blocking reforms which endanger Higley, John/György Lengyel (2000). Elite Configura- their rent-seeking positions. He sees the solution in tion after State Socialism, in John Higley/György frequent executive turnovers and in including the Lengyel (eds.): Elites after State Socialism, Lanham, losers in decision-making processes (Hellman 1998). 1–21. 13 In this context it is worth to mention the following Higley, John/Michael Burton (1998). Elite Settlements statement: “There is a number of places around the and Taming of Politics, in: Government and Opposi- world where three unfortunate sets of circumstances tion, 33 (1), 99–115. coexist: where people do not cooperate when it would Hrvatin, Sandra/Tanja Kerševan (1999). Where are the be mutually beneficial to do so; where they compete Borders of Media Capitalism in Slovenia?, in: The in harmful ways; and, finally, where they refrain from Public, 6 (2), 93–114. competing in those instances when they could all gain Huber, Evelyne/Dieter Rueschemeyer/John Stephens considerably from competition” (Gambetta 1988, (1997). Economic Development and Democracy, in: 159). Eva Etzioni-Halevy (ed.): Classes & Elites in De- mocracy and Democratization, New York/London, 142–149. BIBLIOGRAPHY Iglič, Hajdeja/Andrej Rus (2000). From Elite Reproduc- tion to Elite Adaptation: The Dynamics of Change Adam, Frane (1999). Ambivalentnost in neznosna lahkost in Personal Networks of Slovenian Elites, in: tranzicije (Ambiguity and Unbearable Easiness of Družboslovne razprave, 16 (32–33), 181–197. Transition), in: Niko Grafenauer et al. (eds): Jazbec, Boštjan/Jože Damjan (2001). Čas zbeganosti: Sproščena Slovenija, Nova revija, Ljubljana, 99–113. gospodarska rast in primanjkljaj v plačilni bilanci Adam, Frane/Matej Makarovič/Borut Rončević/Matevž (Time of Confusion: Economic Growth and Current Tomšič (2001). Socio-kulturni dejavniki razvojne Account Deficit), Delo (Ljubl.), 14. April. uspešnosti. Slovenija v evropski perspektivi (Socio- Kaminski, Antoni/Joana Kurczewska (1994). 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02_01_7_tomsic.p65 111 22.12.2007, 17:37 Change and Modernization. Lessons From Eastern Design Conference: A Comparative Study of Na- Europe, Berlin, 131–152. tional and Trans-national Elite Intergration in CEE Kramberger, Anton (1999). Slovenske elite in njihova and West European State, Ljubljana, 1–13. reprodukcija (Slovenian Elites and their Reproduc- tion), in: Saturday Supplement of Delo, August, 7 and 14, Ljubljana. Kramberger, Anton (1998). Positional Elites in Politics, Economy and Culture in Slovenia during 1988–1995: Summary Statistics on Elite Segments, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana. AUTHORS Kusa, Zuzana (1997). Elite Research in Slovakia, in: Helmut Best/Ulrike Becker (eds.): Elites in Transi- Frane ADAM, born in 1948, Associate Professor at tion, Opladen, 77–89. the Faculty of Social Sciences (Department of Cultural O’Donnell, Guillermo (1998). Horizontal Accuntability Studies), University of Ljubljana, and at the Faculty of in New Democracies, in: Journal of Democracy, 9 Humanities, Koper. Post-doctoral specialisation and vis- (3), 112–126. iting researcher (on the basis of a scholarship by the A. O’Donnell, Guillermo (1994). Delegative Democracy, von Humboldt-Stiftung scholarship) in Konstanz and in: Journal of Democracy, 5 (1), 55–69. Bielefeld (FRG) and guest professor at the Sussex Uni- Pareto, Vilfredo (1997). Selections from the Work of versity, Brighton, U.K., School of European Studies. Vilfredo Pareto, in: Eva Etzioni-Halevy (ed): Classes Research interests: transformation (modernisation) of & Elites in Democracy and Democratization, New post-socialist countries, theories and indicators of socio- York, 47–52. economic development, social capital. Recent publica- Przeworski, Adam/Fernando Limongi (1993). Political tions: Developmental Options and Strategies of Small Regimes and Economic Growth, in: Economic Per- Countries, in: Journal of International Relations and spectives, 7 (3), 51–70. Development, 1/1998 (3–4), 181–194; Slovenia: A Suc- Rose, Richard/William Mishler/Christian Haerpfer cess Story or Facing an Uncertain Future, in: D. A. Dyker (1999). Democracy and its Alternatives, London. and I. Vejvoda (eds.): Yugoslavia and After, London/ Rupel, Dimitrij (1999). Težave in možnosti slovenske New York, 213–231. države (Problems and Possibilities of the Slovenian State), in: Niko Grafenauer et al. (eds): Sproščena Address: Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva pl. Slovenija, Ljubljana, 294–310. 1, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: frane.adam@uni- Schmitter, Philippe (1992). The Consolidation of De- lj.si. mocracy and Representation of Social Groups, in: American Behavioral Scientist, 35 (4/5), 422–446. Siermann, Clemens (1998). Politics, Institutions and the Matevž Tomšič, born in 1969, Research Assistant at Economic Performance of Nations, Cheltenham/ the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Northampton. Ph. D. candidate. Research interests: democratic stabil- Srubar, Ilja (1998). Elitewandel in der Tschechischen ity, political elites and the role of the state and other Republik, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage political institutions as generators of socio-economic de- zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, B8/98, 21–31. velopment; culture in post-socialist countries. Recent Stanovnik, Peter/Art Kovačič (1999). Analiza publications: Socio-kulturni dejavniki razvojne mednarodne konkurenčnosti Slovenije (Analysis of uspešnosti. Slovenija v evropski perspektivi (Socio-Cul- the International Competitiveness of Slovenia), In- tural Factors of Developmental Performance: Slovenia stitute of Economic Research, Ljubljana. in European Perspective), Ljubljana, ZPS, 2001 (together Steen, Anton (1997). The Baltic Elites after the Change with F. Adam, M. Makarovič and B. Rončević); “Moč” of the Regime, in: Helmut Best/Ulricke Becker (eds.): kulture: kulturna elita in politične spremembe v družbah Elites in Transition, Opladen, 149–170. vzhodne-srednje Evrope (“Power of Culture”: Cultural Szelenyi, Ivan/Szonja Szelenyi (1995). Circulation or Elite and Political Change in East-Central Europe), in: Reproduction of Elites During the Post-Communist Družboslovne razprave, April 2001, 17 (36), 39–56. Transformation of Eastern Europe, in: Theory and Society, 24/5, 615–638. Address: Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva pl. Wasilewski, Jacek (1999). Integration of Polish Post- 1, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: matevz.tomsic Transitional Elite, Paper prepared for International @uni-lj.si.

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