Book 3: Foreign Aid, Business, and State Enterprise – Counting the Cost
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INDONESIAN BANKS REVIVED Indonesia
February 24, 2000 Asian Banks INDONESIAN BANKS REVIVED Indonesia Robert Zielinski IBRA REBOOTS THE SYSTEM Tokyo 813 5571 7463 [email protected] q System Crash: Indonesia’s financial system crashed during Asia’s financial Paul Sheehan crisis. The banking system was practically wiped out as non-performing loans Hong Kong (NPLs) for the industry soared above 75% of total loans and the credit extension 852 2869 3001 process ground to a halt. This was not an isolated event, but rather the result of [email protected] years of excessive and haphazard borrowing. Graham Parry Tokyo—Economics q System Reboot: Under the direction of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA), the Indonesian banking system is being given a fresh start. 813 5571 7481 IBRA has closed, taken over or recapitalized most of the major banks, resulting [email protected] in the number of banks falling from 239 prior to the crisis to 164 at present. Priscilla Yow Hong Kong q Banks Recapitalized: IBRA has assumed Rp234 trillion of mainly impaired 852 2869 3138 loans formerly on the books of the recapitalized banks, injecting government [email protected] bonds in exchange. This transfer has given the banks assets that generate interest income and reduced problem loans to around 50% of their remaining credits. IBRA is now in the process of restructuring these loans and selling them off to help defray the recapitalization costs. A q The Worst is Over: As a result of this credible effort, we believe that Indonesia is now through the worst of its crisis. A new democratic government is in power, interest rates have come down sharply and the exchange rate has stabilized. -
1708-06Detik-Detik-Indonesia
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie Detik-Detik yang Menentukan Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi THC Mandiri Detik-Detik yang Menentukan Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi Penulis: Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie Desain Kulit: Anom Hamzah Layout: M. Ilyas Thaha Foto kulit: Harian Umum Republika/Sekneg Cetakan Pertama September 2006 Cetakan Kedua September 2006 Diterbitkan oleh: THC Mandiri Jl Kemang Selatan No. 98 Jakarta 12560 - Indonesia Tel: 6221 7817211, Fax: 6221 7817212 www.habibiecenter.or.id, E-mail: [email protected] Perpustakaan Nasional: Katalog Dalam Terbitan (KDT) Detik-Detik yang Menentukan: Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi / Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie. -- Jakarta, THC Mandiri, 2006. 549 hlm. ; 15 x 21 cm ISBN: 979-99386-6-X 1. Demokrasi. 321.8 Hak Cipta dilindungi Undang-undang. Dilarang memperbanyak sebagian atau seluruh isi buku ini dalam bentuk apa pun, baik secara elektronik maupun mekanik, termasuk memfotokopi, merekam, atau dengan sistem penyimpanan lainnya, tanpa izin tertulis dari Penerbit. Daftar Isi Pengantar i Prolog 1 Menjelang bab 1 Pengunduran Diri Pak Harto 31 bab 2 100 Hari Pertama Menghadapi Masalah Multikompleks dan Multidimensi 69 bab 3 Antara 100 Hari Pertama dan 100 Hari Terakhir, Sebelum Pemilihan Presiden ke-4 RI 159 bab 4 Seratus Hari Sebelum Pemilihan Presiden ke-4 RI 301 Epilog 447 Lampiran 510 Akronim 523 Glosari 529 Indeks 536 Biodata 546 Pengantar Sejumlah buku sudah terbit dan mengungkapkan sejarah politik kontemporer Indonesia, khusus masa lahirnya reformasi yang ditandai dengan mundurnya Presiden Soeharto dari gelanggang politik di Indonesia. Buku-buku tersebut —beberapa di antaranya ditulis oleh pelaku sejarah— telah membantu kita menelaah sejarah perpolitikan di Indonesia, dalam sebuah kurun waktu tertentu. -
A Abdullah Ali, 227, 288, 350, 359, 390 Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur)
INDEX A anti-Chinese riots, 74, 222–23, 381–84, Abdullah Ali, 227, 288, 350, 359, 390 393 Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), 245, see also Malari riots; May 1998 riots 269, 416, 417, 429–32, 434–35, Anthony (Anthoni) Salim, see Salim, 438–39, 444, 498, 515 Anthony Aburizal Bakrie, 393, 399, 402 Apkindo (Indonesian Wood Panel Achmad Thahir, 200 Association), 4 Achmad Tirtosudiro, 72, 166–67 Aquino, Cory, 460–61 Adam Malik, 57, 139, 164–66 Arbamass Multi Invesco, 341 Adi Andoyo, 380 Ari H. Wibowo Hardojudanto, 340 Adi Sasono, 400, 408 Arief Husni, 71, 91 Adrianus Mooy, 246 Arifin Siregar, 327 Agus Lasmono, 113 Army Strategic Reserve Command Agus Nursalim, 91 (Kostrad), 56, 59, 64, 72–73, 108, Ahmad Habir, 299 111, 116, 166, 171, 176, 209 Akbar Tanjung, 257, 393, 395 Argha Karya Prima, 120–21 Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara, 65–66, Argo Manunggal Group, 34 68, 69, 72 A.R. Soehoed, 328 “Ali Baba” relationship, 50 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Ali Murtopo, 57, 60, 65–66, 69–70, Asian Nations), 155, 362, 498 73–75, 117, 153, 222–23, 326 AsiaMedic, 474 Ali Sadikin, 224, 238–39 Asian financial crisis, 33, 85, 87, 113, Ali Wardhana, 329, 393 121–23, 130, 147, 193, 228, 248, American Express Bank, 192, 262, 276, 284, 286, 290–91, 311, 329, 271 336, 349, 352, 354–67, 369, 392, Amex Bancom, 262–64 405, 466, 468, 473, 480 Amien Rais, 381, 387–88 Aspinall, Edward, 496 Ando, Koki, 410–11 Association of Indonesian Muslim Ando, Momofuku, 292, 410 Intellectuals (ICMI), 379 Andreas Harsono, 351 Association of Southeast Asian Andrew Riady, 225 Nations, see ASEAN -
Papa Minta Saham” in Online Media Merdeka.Com and Suarakary.Id
ISSN 2549-5607 The 1st International Conference on Language, Literature and Teaching ANALYSIS OF PAN AND KOSICKI NEWS MODEL IN CASE “PAPA MINTA SAHAM” IN ONLINE MEDIA MERDEKA.COM AND SUARAKARY.ID Siswanta Slamet Riyadi University Surakarta [email protected] Abstract This paper aims to understand the news framing Setya Novanto (SN) in the case of “Papa Minta Saham” in the online media Suarakarya.id and Merdeka.com. By using the model of Pan and Kosicki framing analysis, some aspects highlighted by both editors was analyzed according to four structural analyses of syntax, script, thematic and rhetoric that have a better understanding about bias of reporting of both online media. Results of research conducted during November to December 2015 showed that Merdeka.com and Suarakarya.id built reality constructed that SN as ethics and authority incumbency offender, SN as a broker of high profile, as Chairman of the House of Representatives had embarrassed the nation of Indonesia, and SN do not deserve as role models by other officials. Because of news, framing process conducted both online media bias raises the mass media, especially bias by selection of sources and bias by placement. Merdeka. com less wise in implementing the principle of presumption of innocence against SN, on the other hand Suarakarya.id dismissed reports facts that lead to evidence of involvement of SN the legislative and ethics incumbency offender. Keywords: Framing, online media, construction, reality, bias. 1. INTRODUCTION “Papa minta saham” was an issue that became trending news topic mainstream conventional and online media for approximately one month, mid-November until mid-December 2015. -
The Asian Financial Crisis: Crisis, Reform and Recovery
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Sharma, Shalendra D. Book — Published Version The Asian financial crisis: Crisis, reform and recovery Provided in Cooperation with: Manchester University Press Suggested Citation: Sharma, Shalendra D. (2003) : The Asian financial crisis: Crisis, reform and recovery, ISBN 0-7190-6603-4, Manchester University Press, Manchester, http://dx.doi.org/10.7765/9781526137685 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181916 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ www.econstor.eu The Asian financial crisis i ii The Asian financial crisis Crisis, reform and recovery Shalendra D. Sharma Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave iii Copyright © Shalendra D. -
Michael Malley
T he 7th D evelopment Cabinet: Loyal to a Fault? Michael Malley Five years ago, amid speculation that B. J. Habibie and his allies in the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) would gain a large number of seats in the cabinet, State Secretary Moerdiono announced that "expertise" would be Soeharto's chief criterion for choosing ministers. This year, despite the economic crisis that enveloped the country, few people even thought to suggest that Soeharto sought the most technically qualified assistants. As the outgoing cabinet's term wore to a close, the jockeying for influence among ministers and their would-be successors emphasized the most important qualification of any who would join the new cabinet: loyalty. As if to diminish any surprise at the lengths he would go to create a cabinet of loyalists, Soeharto fired his central bank chief, Soedradjad Djiwandono, in mid- February, just two weeks before the 6 ^ Development Cabinet's term expired. Together with the finance minister, Mar'ie Muhammad, Soedradjad had worked closely with the International Monetary Fund to reach the reform-for-aid agreements Soeharto signed in October 1997 and January this year. Their support for reforms that would strike directly at palace-linked business interests seems to have upset the president, and neither were expected to retain their posts in the 7 ^ Cabinet. But Soedradjad made the further mistake of opposing the introduction of a currency board system to fix the rupiah's value to that of the US dollar. The scheme's main Indonesian proponents were Fuad Bawazier, one of Mar'ie's subordinates, and Peter Gontha, the principal business adviser to Soeharto's son Bambang Trihatmodjo. -
Corruption and Central Banks Dissertation
Corruption and Central Banks Dissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Wirtschaftwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Passau Eingereicht von Michael Schinke Dezember 2005 Table of Content FIGURES IV TABLES V LIST OF VARIABLES AND ABBREVIATIONS VI LATIN ALPHABET VI GREEK ALPHABET VIII ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (GERMAN SUMMARY) IX I. INTRODUCTION: WHY STUDY CORRUPTION IN CENTRAL BANKS? 1 II. A CORRUPTION CASE IN THE CENTRAL BANK OF INDONESIA 5 II.1. INTRODUCTION 5 II.2. THE INDONESIAN SITUATION: THE CRISIS UNFOLDS 5 II.3. THE BANK BALI MATTER 11 II.3.1. HOW THE SCANDAL BROKE AND ITS POLITICAL REVERBERATIONS 11 II.3.2. THE PROBLEMS OF BANK BALI 15 II.3.3. THE BANK BALI DEAL 18 II.4. BANK BALI SCANDAL—A CASE OF CENTRAL BANK CORRUPTION? 25 II.5. CIRCUMSTANCES FAVORING CORRUPTION 27 I III. CENTRAL BANKS IN A CORRUPT ENVIRONMENT: HOW CORRUPTION DRIVES INFLATION 31 III.1. INTRODUCTION 31 III.2. THE BASIC MACROECONOMIC MODEL 34 III.3. CORRUPTION AND SEIGNIORAGE 41 III.4. MONETARY POLICY OF AN INCORRUPTIBLE CENTRAL BANK 46 III.5. CORRUPT MONETARY POLICY 53 III.6. AN EXTENSION OF THE MODEL: THE CORRUPT CENTRAL BANKER REVISITED 59 III.7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 61 IV. INSIDER TRADING AMONG CENTRAL BANKERS: SHOULD ONE CONDONE CORRUPTION AMONG CENTRAL BANKERS? 65 IV.1. INTRODUCTION 65 IV.2. A BASIC MODEL OF STOCHASTIC SUPPLY SHOCKS IN A NATURAL RATE MODEL 65 IV.3. SHOCK TREATMENT BY AN INCORRUPTIBLE CENTRAL BANK 68 IV.4. CORRUPT CENTRAL BANKS—SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE MEDIA 75 IV.5. CORRUPT CENTRAL BANKERS IN A STOCHASTIC WORLD 82 IV.6. -
Monopoli Bulog Pada Masa Orde Baru
MONOPOLI BULOG PADA MASA ORDE BARU Oleh: Dr. A. Muhammad Asrun, S.H., M.H. 2 Monopoli BULOG Pada Masa Orde Baru Perhimpunan Pusat Studi Hukum Publik Jakarta 2015 Monopoli Bulog Pada Masa Orde Baru Penulis: Dr. A. Muhammad Asrun, S.H., M.H. Penerbit : Perhimpunan Pusat Studi Hukum Publik Alamat: Jl. Pedati Raya No. 6 Jakarta Timur. Email: [email protected] Dr. A. Muhammad Asrun, S.H., M.H 3 Cetakan Pertama, Juli 2015 ISBN: 9786027237339 Hak Cipta dilindungi undang-undang Dilarang memperbanyak karya tulis ini dalam bentuk dan dengan cara apapun tanpa ijin tertulis dari penerbit. 4 Monopoli BULOG Pada Masa Orde Baru KATA PENGANTAR Naskah buku ini berasal dari Tesis yang diajukan penulis sebagai Mahasiswa Pascasarjana Ilmu Hukum Universitas Indonesia dan dipertahankan dalam sidang pengujian tesis. Oleh karena itu, untuk kepentingan penerbitan buku ini diadakan beberapa penyesuaian konteks persoalan. Bahan tulisan ini dipersiapkan ketika bangsa Indonesia sedang menghadapi masalah melonjaknya harga sembilan bahan pokok sebagai akibat dari krisis moneter yang terjadi sejak bulan Juli 1997. Krisis moneter ini juga telah memicu kerusuhan sosial di beberapa kota di Jawa, Sulawesi, Sumatera, dan Kalimantan pada tanggal 13-14 Mei 1998. Kerusuhan-kerusuhan sosial tersebut dan tekanan mahasiswa telah memaksa Soeharto berhenti sebagai Presiden Republik Indonesia kedua pada tanggal 21 Mei 1998. Perundingan antara mantan Presiden Soeharto dan Managing Director IMF (International Monetary Fund) Michael Camdessus pada tanggal 15 Januari 1998, antara lain, telah menyepakati penghapusan monopoli Bulog terhadap bahan-bahan kebutuhan pokok, kecuali untuk beras. Namun, dalam perundingan antara tanggal 19 Maret hingga 8 April 1998, IMF melunakkan sikapnya dengan memperbolehkan Bulog tetap memegang monopoli bahan-bahan pokok sampai waktu membaiknya ekonomi Indonesia. -
Asia Report, Nr. 15: Bad Debt
BAD DEBT: THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL REFORM IN INDONESIA 13 March 2001 ICG Asia Report N° 15 Jakarta/Brussels Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................. i I. THE PUBLIC DEBT DEFINED....................................................................... 1 II. EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT............................................................................ 3 A. The International Monetary Fund....................................................... 4 B. The Development Banks ..................................................................... 6 C. The Consultative Group for Indonesia................................................ 7 D. External Debt as a Political Tool......................................................... 8 E. Indonesian Attitudes to External Debt............................................... 9 III. REDUCING EXTERNAL DEBT .................................................................... 10 A. Cutting Subsidies.............................................................................. 10 B. Increasing Tax Income..................................................................... 10 C. Privatisation ..................................................................................... 11 IV. DOMESTIC DEBT ...................................................................................... 12 A. Bank Restructuring........................................................................... 12 B. The Outlook for Banks ..................................................................... -
"Corruption Ruins Everything": Gridlock Over Suharto's Legacy in Indonesia (Part II)
Volume 6 | Issue 3 | Article ID 2680 | Mar 03, 2008 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus "Corruption Ruins Everything": Gridlock over Suharto's Legacy in Indonesia (Part II) Peter King “Corruption Ruins Everything”: Gridlock Tanjung Priok, was moved out and replaced by over Suharto’s Legacy in Indonesia (Part 840 newcomers; salaries were doubled, and II) goods throughput and customs revenue have reportedly soared. The reforms are slated to be Peter King extended by this “islands of integrity” method to the courts and the most KKN-prone government agencies, but both internal and Part I can be read here. external resistance have surfaced already, especially in parliament. The Speaker of the Gridlock over KKN DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat--People's Representative Council), Agung Laksono, The examples above suggest governmental argues that spectacular targeted salary increases are unfair and may lead to… paralysis in the face of a pervasive corruption “jealousy” (!).[51] It remains to be seen which impacts severely upon every important whether the islands of integrity will be washed policy and institution in the republic. The away by the storms of self-seeking. President takes initiatives but hesitates fatally to follow through, and compromises his own Perhaps the greatest irony of the KKN saga reputation and effectiveness in the process. surrounding the Presidency is that the post- Most government ministries, for whom tactical Suharto President with the most imposing funds and off-budget budgets are the stuff of credentials for reform (including even KKN life,[50] do not even have a reform plan in front reform), reconciliation and democratic of them which would permit them to parlay dealing—Gus Dur-- was impeached and sacked their own essential income-boosting black by the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat funds (civil service pay being universally –People’s Consultative Assembly) in 2001 for a inadequate) against budgetary reform and a big comparative bagatelle of corruption. -
Studi Kasus Pengadaan Beras Dan Tepung Terigu A. Muhammad Asrun
20 Hukum dan Pembangunan DISTORSI PELAKSANAAN MONOPOLI BULOG: Studi Kasus Pengadaan Beras dan Tepung Terigu A. Muhammad Asrun Lengsernya Suharto dilatarbelaleangi dengan kri sis ekonami yang ditandai dengan melanjalenya harga sembilan bahan pakak. Krisis tersebut, telah memicu kerusuhan sasial secara luas di beberapa kata di Jawa dan Sumatera pada tang gal 13-14 Mei 1998. Riset ini membuktikan ada distarsi terhadap implementasi monopoli BU LOG untuk pengadaan beras dan tepung terigu, yaitu berupa pemberian hale ekslusif impar beras dan tepung terigu bagi perusahaan yang memi lilei hubungan dekat dengan mantan presiden Soeharta. Pengadaan beras dan tepung terigu se harusnya dilakukan melalui mekanisme tender yang terbuka, sehingga akan tercapai harga yang kampetitif· I. Pendahuluan A. Perdebatan Soal Manapali Perdebatan masalah monopoli sebagai bagian dari pembahasan ekonomi dan hukum telah berlangsung sejakawal kemerdekaan Indo nesia. Para pendiri republik ini menegaskan bahwa sistem ekonomi kita tidak boleh berlandaskan pada paham free fight liberalism ataupun etatism. Esensi perdebatan monopoli terletak pada dua kelompok pendapat, yaitu perlindungan praktek monopoli demi kepentingan rakyat banyak sebagai pengecualian dan pengaturan pelarangan praktek monopoli yang dilakukan sekelompok orang. Pembahasan masalah monopoli juga dikaitkan dengan pema haman terhadap konsep demokrasi ekonomi di Indonesia. Sebagai salah satu penggagas konsep demokrasi ekonomi Ikatan Sarjana Eko nomi Indonesia (lSED mengaitkan pemikiran demokrasi ekonomi de- Januari - Pebruari 1999 Distorsi Pelaksanaan Monopoli BULoe Z1 ngan pengaturan rnonopoli.1 Menurut ISEl, "hanya perusahaan yang tidak rnenguasai hajak hidup orang banyak boIeh ada di tang an orang-seorang." ISEI hanya rnernbenarkan rnonopoli oleh negara, yaitu daIarn hal " ... cabang produksi yang penting bagi negara dan menguasai hajat hidup orang banyak dikuasai oIeh negara."2 Karena itu, rnenurut organisasi para ekonorn ini, pelaksanaan rnonopoli negara harus dilaksanakan dengan pengawasan oleh lembaga perwakilan rakyat. -
The Politics of Protest Events
INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy subm itted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Bell & Howell Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Artror, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0000 UMI’ DEMOCRATIZATION FROM BELOW PROTEST EVENTS AND REGIME CHANGE DSr INDONESIA 1997-1998 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in The Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Denny J. Ali The Ohio State University 2001 Dissertation Committee Approved by Professor R.