The Catholic Church in Polish History

Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy

Series Editors Ted G. Jelen University of Nevada, Las Vegas Las Vegas, Nevada, USA

Mark J. Rozell George Mason University Fairfax, Virginia, USA A generation ago, many social scientists regarded religion as an anachronism, whose social, economic, and political importance would inevitably wane and disappear in the face of the inexorable forces of modernity. Of course, nothing of the sort has occurred; indeed, the public role of religion is resurgent in US domestic politics, in other nations, and in the international arena. Today, religion is widely acknowledged to be a key variable in candidate nominations, platforms, and elections; it is recognized as a major influence on domestic and foreign policies. National religious movements as diverse as the Christian Right in the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan are important factors in the internal politics of particular nations. Moreover, such transnational religious actors as Al-Qaida, Falun Gong, and the Vatican have had important effects on the politics and policies of nations around the world. Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy serves a growing niche in the discipline of political science. This subfield has proliferated rapidly during the past two decades, and has generated an enormous amount of scholarly studies and journalistic coverage. Five years ago, the journal Politics and Religion was created; in addition, works relating to religion and politics have been the subject of many articles in more general academic journals. The number of books and monographs on religion and politics has increased tremendously. In the past, many social scientists dismissed religion as a key variable in politics and government. This series casts a broad net over the subfield, providing opportunities for scholars at all levels to publish their works with Palgrave. The series publishes monographs in all subfields of political science, including American Politics, Public Policy, Public Law, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Political Theory. The principal focus of the series is the public role of religion. “Religion” is construed broadly to include public opinion, religious institutions, and the legal frameworks under which religious politics are practiced. The “dependent variable” in which we are interested is politics, defined broadly to include analyses of the public sources and consequences of religious belief and behavior. These would include matters of public policy, as well as variations in the practice of political life. We welcome a diverse range of methodological perspectives, provided that the approaches taken are intellectually rigorous. The series does not deal with works of theology, in that arguments about the validity or utility of religious beliefs are not a part of the series focus. Similarly, the authors of works about the private or personal consequences of religious belief and behavior, such as personal happiness, mental health, or family dysfunction, should seek other outlets for their writings. Although historical perspectives can often illuminate our understanding of modern political phenomena, our focus in the Religion, Politics, and Policy series is on the relationship between the sacred and the political in contemporary societies.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/14594 Sabrina P. Ramet The Catholic Church in Polish History

From 966 to the Present Sabrina P. Ramet Sociology & Political Science Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU) Trondheim, Norway

Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy ISBN 978-1-137-42622-2 ISBN 978-1-137-40281-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-40281-3

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Nature America Inc. The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY 10004, U.S.A. For Dr. Patricia Fresen and in memory of Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) PREFACE

This volume is not exactly a history of Polish Catholicism; the writing of such a history has already been accomplished in English translation by the Polish scholar Jerzy Kłoczowski. This volume is rather a history of the Catholic Church in Polish history. By that I mean that, in the following pages, I intend to embed the story of the Catholic Church within its time, and to show how the great events affecting all of Poland provided the framework within which the Church lived. To achieve this it will be necessary to explore some events and developments which did not have a direct impact on the Church but, nonetheless, helped to shape the framework within which the Church had to work. The story of Catholicism in Poland is conventionally dated to 966, the year that Duke Mieszko I converted to Christianity and began the process of imposing the Christian faith on the Poles. As in other lands, there was at ﬁrst resistance from ordinary people, whose traditional religion was polytheism. But over time, the memory of polytheism faded, and Christianity took hold. The hegemony of the Church of Rome in Poland, as elsewhere, was threatened in the 1500s by the Protestant Reformation and, at the peak of Protestant inﬂuence, a large number of Poles had converted to the new faith. But Catholicism prevailed for a number of reasons, including prominently that the peasants remained loyal to the pope and viewed Protestantism, which had taken hold in the cities, as foreign to their way of life. Thus, peasant distrust of city-folk played its part in the ultimate success of the Catholic Counter-Reformation in Poland, alongside the institutional strength of the Church of Rome, the high caliber of its intellectuals, and the emergent Marian devotions.

vii viii PREFACE

But it was the three partitions of Poland – in 1772, 1793, and 1795 – in the course of which Poland was divided between Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire, which wed the Poles more deeply to Catholicism. Where Prussia championed Lutheranism and Russia championed Orthodox Christianity, the Catholic Church prioritized protecting its own institutional interests and presence; accordingly, the Holy See and most of the Polish bishops urged Poles, during the years of foreign occupation, to accept German, Russian, and Austrian rule as anointed by God. With pressures from state-sponsored Protestantism in Germany and state-sponsored Orthodoxy in Russia, the Catholic Church was on the defensive in those two empires. Then, with the restoration of statehood in 1918, something remarkable happened. The Catholic Church, no longer on the defensive, took on the role of ecclesiastical hegemon, laying claim to Orthodox Church facilities which had been seized by the Russian Orthodox Church in the nineteenth century; local Ukrainians did not view this as a restoration of the Catholic Church’s original title to the properties, but as the seizure of properties legitimately belonging to the Orthodox Church. A particularly painful episode involved the burial of Marshal Józef Piłsudski in Wawel Cathedral in Kraków. The Archbishop of Kraków, Adam Stefan Sapieha, did not want to see Piłsudski’s last remains interred in the cathedral and, ignoring both the President of the Republic and the papal nuncio, arranged to have Piłsudski’s sarcophagus transferred from the cathedral to the Silver Bells tower. This transfer provoked public outcry. These were ripples but more important than the diverse experiences in the nineteenth century as a factor affecting Poles’ attachment to the Church was that Poles had achieved independence and, whether they had looked to the Church as their protector during the years of partition or viewed the Holy See as betraying them because of encyclicals advising them to obey the occupation authorities, independence created a new context, in which the Church had both new opportunities and new challenges. In the years 1918–1939, the Church’s hold weakened somewhat, especially in the cities. Again, there was a sharp break, with the outbreak of World War Two and the fourth partition between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. With the Nazis enslaving Poles and the Soviets preaching an atheist ideology, the Catholic Church once more cast itself as the defender of the Polish nation – including in retrospect. This revival of the Church’s role as defender of Poles continued into the communist era, when it found itself, from the second half of the 1940s until the summer of 1980, to be PREFACE ix the only independent organization of any note. The imprisonment of Bishop Kaczmarek and detention of Archbishop Wyszyński, both in 1953 which had been intended to weaken the Church, only gave the institution a martyr’s crown, strengthening its hold on Polish hearts. The charismatic Wyszyński emerged from prison in 1956 politically stronger and assumed the role of outspoken advocate for the human, cultural, and of course religious rights of Poles, even entering into the debate about a draft constitution for Poland. From then until summer 1980, the Church was widely understood to be the Poles’ sole defender. However, with the appearance of the independent trade union Solidarity in summer 1980 and the death of Wyszyński the following year, the Church lost its monopoly on this role. Even after its suppression in December 1981, Solidarity continued to operate in underground, only to reemerge into legality in 1989. As for the Church, Wyszyński’s successor as Primate of Poland was the uncharismatic Archbishop Józef Glemp, who tried to make gains through compromise with the communists, in the process coming to be called “the red archbishop”. However, the election of Karol Cardinal Wojtyła, archbishop of Kraków, as Pope John Paul II in 1978 gave Poles a new religious leader, one who proved to be hugely charismatic and, if anything, even more outspoken than Wyszyński. In the era of the partitions, the enemy was clear: the foreign occupation powers, especially Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia. In the communist era, whenever anything went wrong, it was clear whom to blame: the communists. Since 1989, however, the entire picture has been more complicated and there is no obvious “enemy”, no obvious party to blame for problems. The more conservative Catholics, gathered around the radio priest Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk, have viewed the European Union as a threat to Poland’s culture and identity, but theirs is a minority viewpoint. And for those who might blame capitalism or foreign investment for difficulties, the Church is not an obvious resource. Moreover, no sooner was communism eclipsed than the Church advanced its agenda, including a ban on abortion, penalties for insulting Catholicism in the broadcast media, and introducing Catholic religious instruction in the state schools, all the while treating sexual minorities as sinners. Overnight, the Church was claiming what it considered its rightful role as moral hegemon but, as the account which follows will show, this has been accompanied by an attenuation of faith and a loosening of people’s bonds with the Church. The notion, thus, that the Catholic Church has been deeply embedded in Polish society is only half-right, because it focuses only on the Church’s x PREFACE role during times of foreign occupation or communist domination. Taking the long view, what emerges is that, at least since 1772, the strength of Catholicism in Poland has risen when times have been difficult, but has declined when oppression has faded and times have been better. This correlation between religiosity and difficult times may be found also in other societies. I have adopted several conventions for this book. The first is that, following well-established usage in ecclesiastical circles, I shall capitalize Church when I am referring to the institution and lower-case church when I refer to a building. While lower-casing generally does not produce confusion, it has happened that there can be ambiguity when all references to the institution are lower-cased. I have adopted this convention, thus, for reasons of complete clarity. Second, whenever I write “the Church”, without specifying that it is some denomination other than the Catholic Church, then it should be assumed that I mean the Catholic Church. Similarly, when I write simply “the clergy”, I mean the Catholic clergy. If I wish to refer to the Protestant clergy, for example, that will be stated explicitly. Third, in some chapters (especially Chapter 3), some of the actors have rather long names. I have therefore adopted the convention of usually providing only the shortened version of each such name in the text while, in the first reference, providing the full name in an endnote. For example, I write Lord Castlereagh in the text, but in the attached endnote the reader can find that his full name was Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh and 2nd Marquess of Londonderry. Similarly, in the text I write Johann von Hohenzollern, but in the attached endnote the reader can find that his full name was Johann Karl Reichsgf. von Hohenzollern. Fourth, the Catholic Church embraces eight rites, of which the Roman is only one. Only two other rites have been present in Poland: the Armenian rite and the Eastern-Rite, also known variously as the Byzantine rite, the Greek-Catholic rite, and the Uniates. I have preferred, in most instances, to refer to this rite as “Eastern-Rite”, although I have employed the term “Uniates” in a few instances. And fifth, there is the question of whether to give the names of people, cities, and regions in the language used at the time – which would be German, in the case of cities included during the years 1772–1918 in Austria or Prussia/Germany, or Russian during the same years – or Polish, or English. Most scholars write Warsaw (English) but Kraków (Polish) and Peter the Great but Ivan the Terrible (rather than John the Terrible, as it would be in English). Where there are well understood conventions, I have followed them. At the same time, I have PREFACE xi preferred to refer to Austrian and Prussian/German figures in German, rather than translating their names into English. Thus, I write Friedrich the Great of Prussia (rather than Frederick the Great) and Maria Theresa of Austria (rather than Mary Teresa). I have also preferred to write the names of Polish figures in Polish, rather than translate their names in English. Thus, I write King Stanisław Augustus, rather than King Stanley August, Wincenty Witos, rather than Vincent Witos, and Karol Wojtyła, rather than Charles Wojtyła. I have followed the universal convention of referring to the emperors of Russia as tsars, though I have chosen to refer to Catherine the Great as Empress; following the same rule, I refer to the emperors of Austria and Germany as Kaisers, but to the Holy Roman emperors as emperors. I have followed the same conventions for non-English names from other languages. Where Polish cities incorporated into Austria or Prussia/Germany during the years of the partitions are concerned, I have adopted the convention of using the Polish names throughout, except in the case of Warsaw, but, for cities incorporated into either the Habsburg Empire or Prussia/Germany, providing the German name in parentheses in the first mention of the city in that chapter. Thus, I write Gniezno (Gnesen), Poznań (Posen), Wrocław (Breslau), and so forth. In the case of the Duchy of Posen, I stick to the German, since this administrative unit existed only in Prussian times and was never an administrative unit in any independent Polish state. Although I read all of the German- and English-language materials cited in this work, I struggled to learn Polish for a while and managed to translate the materials cited in Chapter 5; even then, however, I asked a native speaker of Polish, Aleksander Zdravkovski, to check my translations. Generous funding from the Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim, Norway, permitted me to hire translators for other Polish-language material cited in this volume. The Polish materials cited in Chapter 3 were translated for me by Maciej Potz, the Polish materials cited in Chapter 4 were translated for me by Ela Walters and Maciej Potz, except for one extract translated by Zdravkovski; the Polish materials cited in Chapter 6 were translated for me by Krzysztof Koseła (who kindly translated the materials cited there without compensation); and the Polish materials cited in Chapter 7 were translated for me by Sindre Finnanger and Zdravkovski. Thanks again to funding from NTNU, I was able also to undertake two trips to Poland for the purpose of conducting research interviews related to this book; these trips took me to Warsaw, Łódź, and Lublin, for two-and-a-half weeks, xii PREFACE during June–July 2004, and to Warsaw, Kraków, and Łódź, for another two-and-a-half weeks in April–May 2011. I also wish to thank Beata Eggan for her assistance in identifying and making preliminary contact with potential interviewees in Warsaw for the 2011 trip, Berit Berggård and the NTNU Faculty Administration for granting her leave to devote time to this project, and Irena Borowik for her assistance in identifying and making preliminary contact with potential interviewees in Kraków. I am also grateful to Neal Pease for checking Chapter 4 and to Magnus Rom Jensen, the social science librarian at the NTNU library, for his assistance in collecting materials needed for this project. I wish to thank the Department of Sociology and Political Science of NTNU for granting me a sabbatical during 2015–2016, during which I was able to finish the writing of this book. In addition, I would like to thank Indiana University Press, Duke University Press, and Cambridge University Press for permission to reprint certain material. In Chapter 5, the lengthy extract, appearing in the section “The Gierek Era, 1970-1980”, is taken from pages 134–135 of my book, Cross and Commissar: The politics of religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1987). It is reprinted here courtesy of Indiana University Press. All rights reserved. Portions of Chapter 5 (in the section, “Cascade to collapse”) are from “Church and Dissent in Praetorian Poland”,inSocial Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation, 2nd ed.. © 1995, Duke University Press. Republished by permission. Chapter 6 is a modified version of my chapter, “Thy Will be Done: The Catholic Church and Politics in Poland since 1989”, in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pages 117–147. I am grateful to Cambridge University Press for granting permission for me to reprint this chapter here. Chapter 7 is an updated version of my chapter, “The Catholic Church in Post-Communist Poland: Polarization, Privatization, and Decline in Influence”, which originally appeared in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Religion and Politics in Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), pages 117–147. I am grateful to Radmil Popovic of the Geography Department at my university for preparing the maps used in this book and to Kristen Ringdal, head of the Department of Sociology and Political Science, for allocating funding to pay for the cost of the maps. For this volume, I adopted the convention of using the English names for the best-known cities in all PREFACE xiii instances (hence, Warsaw, Moscow, and Vienna) as well as for all rivers, but using the name of each city as it stood at the time represented in each map. For the final map, showing borders both pre-1945 and post-1945, I have chosen to use the post-1945 names of the cities. Finally, I would like to thank Ted Jelen and Mark Rozell, the editors of this series, for their interest in and enthusiasm for this book, and my life partner, Christine Marie Hassenstab, for her interest in my work and patience during my sabbatical year, as she watched me finish the work on this book.

Saksvik, Norway Sabrina P. Ramet PERSONAGES

Adamski, Bishop Stanisław of Katowice (1875–1967), circulated a petition in 1952 asking the government to restore religious instruction to those schools where it had been abolished. Alexander I (1777–1825), reigned as Tsar of Russia 1801–1825. Alexander II (1818–1881), reigned as Tsar of Russia 1855–1881, eman- cipated the serfs in 1861, sold Alaska to the United States in 1867. Alexander III (1845–1894), reigned as Tsar of Russia 1881–1894. Bach, Baron Alexander von (1813–1893), served as Austrian minister of the interior from 1849 until 1859. Beck, Colonel Józef (1894–1944), served as Polish foreign minister from 1932 until 1939. Benedict XV (1854–1922), reigned as Pope 1914–1922. Benedict XVI (b. 1927), reigned as Pope 2005–2013, served previously as Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1981– 2005, and was the ﬁrst pope to resign since Pope Gregory XII in 1415. Bierut, Bolesław (1892–1956), general secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party 1948–1956, president of Poland 1947–1952, prime minister of Poland 1952–1954. Bismarck, Otto von (1815–1898), served as Chancellor of the North German Confederation 1867–1871, Chancellor of Germany 1871–1890, and Minister-President of Prussia 1873–1890, launched the Kulturkampf in Polish-inhabited regions of Germany. Brezhnev, Leonid Iyich (1906–1982), general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1964–1982.

xv xvi PERSONAGES

Caprivi, Leo von (1831–1899), served as Chancellor of Germany 1890–1894. Catherine II (1729–1796), reigned as Empress of Russia 1762–1796, participated in the three partitions of Poland 1772–1795. Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz (b. 1950), prime minister of Poland 1996– 1997, foreign minister 2001–2005 Clement, XIV (1705–1774), reigned as Pope 1769–1774, welcomed Austria’s annexation of a portion of Poland in the First Partition (1772). Curzon, Lord (1859–1925), served as British foreign minister from 1919 to 1924, drew the famous “Curzon Line” as a proposal for the eastern border of Poland. Cyrankiewicz, Józef (1911–1989), served as Polish prime minister 1947–1952 and again 1954–1970. Czartoryski, Prince Adam (1770–1861), served as foreign minister to Tsar Alexander I of Russia, 1804–1806. Dalbor, Archbishop Edmund (1869–1926), supported Roman Dmowski’s National Democrats. Dmowski, Roman (1864–1939), founder and leader of the right-wing National Democratic Party. Duda, Andrzej (b. 1972), president of Poland since August 2015. Dziwicz, Archbishop Stanisław (b. 1939), archbishop of Kraków since 2005, elevated to the College of Cardinals in 2006. Ferdinand I (1793–1875), reigned as Kaiser of Austria, King of Hungary and Croatia, and King of Bohemia 1835–1848. Ferdinand II (1578–1637), reigned as Holy Roman Emperor 1619–1637, was ﬁrmly committed to roll back Protestantism during the Counter- Reformation. Francis (b. 1936), elected Pope in March 2013, generally regarded as somewhat liberal. Frank, Hans (1900–1946), governor general of the Nazi-occupied Polish rump state during World War Two. Franz II (1768–1835), reigned as Holy Roman Emperor 1792–1806 and, as Franz I, as Kaiser of Austria 1804–1835. Franz Joseph (1830–1916), reigned as Kaiser of Austria, King of Hungary and Croatia, and King of Bohemia 1848–1916, negotiated the Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867, under which the Hungarian portion of his empire obtained wide-ranging autonomy. Friedrich II “the Great” (1712–1786), reigned as King of Prussia 1740–1786, participated in the three partitions of Poland 1772–1795. PERSONAGES xvii

Friedrich Augustus (1750–1827), reigned as King of Saxony 1806–1827, served a figurehead Duke of Warsaw 1807–1815 Friedrich Wilhelm II (1744–1797), reigned as King of Prussia 1786–1797. Friedrich Wilhelm III (1770–1840), reigned as King of Prussia 1797–1840. Friedrich Wilhelm IV (1795–1861), reigned as King of Prussia 1840–1861. Garampi, Giuseppe (1725–1792), appointed apostolic nuncio to Warsaw in spring 1772. Gierek, Edward (1913–2001), served as first secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party from 1970 until 1980, pledged to work for better relations with the Catholic Church. Glemp, Archbishop Józef (1929–2013), served as archbishop of Gniezno and Warsaw 1981–2006 and primate of Poland 1981–2009, elected to the College of Cardinals in 1983. Gołuchowski, Agenor (1849–1921), served as joint foreign minister of Austria-Hungary 1895–1906. Gomułka, Władysław (1905–1982), first secretary of the Polish Workers’ Party (the communist party) 1943–1948 and first secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party 1956–1970, ordered the release of Cardinal Wyszyński from prison in 1956. Grabski, Władysław (1874–1938), served as Polish prime minister June– July 1920 and December 1923–November 1925, negotiated the Concordat with the Holy See on behalf of Poland. Gregory XVI (1765–1846), reigned as Pope 1831–1846, instructed the rebellious Poles to accept the Tsar of Russia as their divinely anointed secular ruler in his encyclical Cum Primum, issued on 9 June 1832. Gromyko, Andrei (1909–1989), Soviet foreign minister 1957–1985. Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Hanna (b. 1952), chief of the Polish National Bank 1992–2001, ran for president in 1995 with the backing of several Christian organizations. Hlond, Archbishop Hlond of Gniezno and Warsaw (1881–1948), served as Archbishop of Poznań and Gniezno from 1926 until 1946, when he was appointed to head the archdiocese of Gniezno and Warsaw, Primate of Poland from 1926 until his death, elevated to the College of Cardinals in 1927. Isakowicz-Zaleski, Fr. Tadeusz (b. 1956), investigated the extent of collaboration with security police in the communist era on the part of Catholic clergy in the Archdiocese of Kraków. xviii PERSONAGES

Jaroszewicz, Piotr (1909–1992), prime minister of Poland from December 1970 until February 1980. Jaruzelski, Wojciech (1923–2014), minister of defense 1968–1983, prime minister of Poland 1981–1985, first secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party from October 1981 until July 1989, chairman of the Council of State 1985–1989, president of Poland 1989–1990. John Paul II (1920–2005), reigned as Pope 1978–2005, previously served as Archbishop of Kraków 1964–1978, elevated to the College of Cardinals in 1967, beatified in 2011, canonized in 2014. Joseph II (1741–1790), reigned as Holy Roman Emperor 1765–1790, abolished the death penalty and brutal punishments, freed the serfs, introduced religious toleration, mandated a minimum age for young men to enter the monastery, among other reforms. Kaczmarek, Bishop Czesław of Kielce (1895–1963), collaborated with Nazi occupation authorities during World War Two, put on trial by the communists after the war on charges of spying for Western intelligence agencies and imprisoned from 1951 to 1955. Kaczyński, Jarosław (b. 1949), prime minister of Poland 2006–2007, chairman of the right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS), which he co- founded in 2001. Kakowski, Archbishop Aleksander of Warsaw (1862–1938), elevated to the College of Cardinals in 1919, a friend and ally of Piłsudski. Kania, Stanisław (b. 1927), first secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party from September 1980 until October 1981. Kauntiz, Prince Wenzel Anton (1711–1794), served as state chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire 1753–1792. Kazimierz III the Great (1310–1370), reigned as King of Poland 1333– 1370, founder of the University of Kraków. Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich (1894–1971), first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1953–1964 and chairman of the Council of Ministers 1958–1964, delivered a famous speech in February 1956 denouncing Stalin’s rule, sanctioned the return of Władysław Gomułka to the leadership in Poland. Kolbe, Maximilian (1894–1941), a Franciscan friar who volunteered to be executed in place of a stranger in the Auschwitz concentration camp in 1941, canonized in 1982. Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, Count Franz Anton von (1778–1861), member of a secret executive committee functioning on behalf of Ferdinand I from 1836 to 1848, Minister-President of Austria briefly in 1848. PERSONAGES xix

Komorowski, Bronisław (b. 1952), marshal of the Sejm 2007–2010, president of Poland 2010–2015. Kuroń, Jacek (1934–2004), initially a member of the PZPR, but sentenced in 1965, together with Karol Modzelewski, to three years in prison for having written a critical Open Letter to the Party, released in 1967 but incarcerated for a second time in 1968 and for a third time, briefly, in 1980, founding member of the Independent Trade Union Solidarity, minister of labor and social policy 1989–1990 and 1992– 1993, member of the Polish parliament 1989–2001. Ledóchowski, Archbishop Mieczysław (1822–1902), served as Archbishop of Gniezno and Poznań from 1866 to 1876. Leo XIII (1810–1903), reigned as Pope 1878–1903, issued the encyclical Rerum novarum in 1891, advocating social equality and social justice. Leopold I (1640–1705), reigned as Holy Roman Emperor 1658–1705. Leopold II (1747–1792), reigned as Holy Roman Emperor 1790–1792. Lepper, Andrzej (1954–2011), leader of the Self-Defense Party. Lorek, Bishop Jan of Sandomierz (1886–1967), served as bishop from 1946 to 1967. Maria Theresa (1717–1780), reigned as Empress-Consort of the Holy Roman Empire 1745–1765 and as Queen of Hungary and Croatia 1740–1780, participated in the first and third partitions of Poland. Marwitz, Bishop Johannes von der (1795–1886), served as Bishop of Chełmno from 1856 until 1886. Mazowiecki, Tadeusz (1928–2013), the first non-communist prime minister in Poland since 1946, serving in office from August 1989 until January 1991, previously editor of the Catholic weekly Więź and later of the Solidarity weekly, Tygodnik Solidarność. Metternich, Prince Klemens Wenzel von (1773–1859), served as foreign minister of the Austrian Empire 1809–1848 and as state chancellor of the Austrian Empire 1821–1848. Mieszko I, Duke (c. 930–992; reigned 960–992), converted to Christianity in 966. Michalik, Archbishop Józef (b. 1941), chairman of the Polish Synodal Council 2004–2014 and Archbishop of Przemyśl 1993–2016. Michnik, Adam (b. 1946), Polish historian, essayist, public intellectual, and editor-in-chief since 1989 of the independent newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, joined the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) in 1977, served as adviser to the Independent Trade Union Solidarity 1980–1989, in and out of prison in the 1980s because of his opposition to communism. xx PERSONAGES

Mikołajczyk, Stanisław (1900–1966), leader of the revived Polish Peasant Party after World War Two and deputy prime minister in post-war Poland until 1947, when he emigrated to the United States. Miller, Leszek (b. 1946), prime minister of Poland 2001–2004. Moczar, Mieczysław (1913–1986), deputy minister of internal affairs in Poland 1956–1964 and minister of internal affairs 1964–1968, made a bid for power in 1968 by stoking up anti-Semitism. Mościcki, Ignacy (1867–1946), served as president of Poland from 1926 until 1939. Muszyński, Archbishop Henryk of Gniezno (b. 1933), known for his Biblical studies, especially the Qumran manuscripts. Napoleon I (Bonaparte, 1769–1821), reigned as Emperor of the French 1804–1814, set up the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807. Narutowicz, Gabriel (1865–1922), elected president of Poland in 1922 and assassinated ﬁve days after his election. Nicholas I (1796–1855), reigned as Tsar of Russia 1825–1855, closed Polish schools, hospitals, seminaries, religious houses, and printing presses. Nicholas II (1868–1918), reigned as Tsar of Russia 1894–1917. Nycz, Archbishop Kazimierz (b. 1950), archbishop of Warsaw since 2007, previously served as bishop of Koszalin-Kołobrzeg 2004–2007, elevated to the College of Cardinals in 2010. Ochab, Edward (1906–1989), served as ﬁrst secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party from March 1956 until October 1956. Paderewski, Ignacy Jan (1860–1941), world famous pianist who served as prime minister of Poland January-November 1919 and as foreign minister of Poland January-December 1919. Paetz, Archbishop Juliusz of Poznań (b. 1935), forced to retire in 2002 because of allegations that he had sexually molested seminarians. Paskievich, Field Marshal Ivan (1782–1856), suppressed the Poles’ November Uprising in spring 1831, subsequently served as Prince of Warsaw (appointed by Tsar Nicholas I). Paul I (1750–1801), reigned as Tsar of Russia 1796–1801. Paul VI (1897–1978), reigned as Pope 1963–1978, famed for his policy of Ostpolitik vis-à-vis communist regimes. Piasecki, Bolesław (1915–1979), established an association of “patriotic priests” called PAX to collaborate with the communist regime. Pieronek, Bishop Tadeusz (b. 1934), secretary general of the Polish Episcopal Conference 1993–1998. PERSONAGES xxi

Piłsudski, Marshal Józef (1867–1935), chief of state 1918–1922, minister of military affairs and de facto leader of Poland 1926–1935. Pius VI (1717–1799), reigned as Pope 1775–1799, was upset about Joseph II’s Edict of Toleration. Pius IX (1792–1878), reigned as Pope 1846–1878, instructed the rebellious Poles to accept the Tsar of Russia as their divinely anointed monarch, issued the anti-liberal Syllabus of Errors in 1864. Pius X (1835–1914), reigned as Pope 1903–1914. Pius XI (1857–1939), reigned as Pope 1922–1939, served previously as apostolic visitor/papal nuncio to Poland 1918–1921, elevated to the College of Cardinals in 1921, issued the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge in 1937, criticizing the Nazis. Pius XII (1876–1958), reigned as Pope 1939–1958, issued the scathing condemnation of Nazism with his encyclical Summi Pontiﬁcatus in October 1939. Poniatowski, Stanisław. See Stanisław. Popiełuszko, Fr. Jerzy (1947–1984), outspoken advocate of independent trade unionism, murdered in 1984. Radziviłł, Prince Antoni Henryk (1775–1833), served as Duke-Governor of the Grand Duchy of Posen 1815–1830. Ratti, Achille. See Pius XI. Rydz-Śmigły, General Edward (1886–1941), commanded Polish armies against the Bolsheviks during the Russo-Polish War of 1919–1921, promoted himself to Marshal in 1936. Rydzyk, Fr. Tadeusz (b. 1945), Redemptorist priest and founder/director of Radio Maryja. Sapieha, Archbishop Adam Stefan of Kraków (1867–1951), elevated to the College of Cardinals in 1946, supported Roman Dmowski’s National Democrats. Schwarzenberg, Prince Felix von (1800–1852), Minister-President of the Austrian Empire 1848–1852, persuaded Kaiser Ferdinand I to abdicate so that his nephew, Franz Joseph, could take the throne as Kaiser. Sikorski, General Władysław (1881–1943), prime minister of Poland from December 1922 until May 1923, inspector general of the Polish armed forces November 1939–July 1943. Sobieski, Jan III (1629–1696), reigned as King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania 1674–1696, commanded a Christian army which rescued Vienna in 1683 from an Ottoman siege. xxii PERSONAGES

Stalin, Losif Vissarionovich (1879–1953), general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1922–1953, prime minister of the Soviet Union 1941–1953, used show trials to convict his political rivals on trumped-up charges and have them executed, carried out forced agricultural collectivization and accelerated industrialization. Stanisław, Augustus (1732–1798), reigned as King of Poland 1764–1795, tried in vain to abolish the liberum veto. Suchocka, Hanna (b. 1946), prime minister of Poland from July 1992 until October 1993, signed the Concordat with the Holy See in 1993. Szydło, Beata (b. 1963), prime minister of Poland since November 2015, a ﬁrm believer that abortion should not be allowed under any circumstances. Teodorowicz, Archbishop Józef Teoﬁl (1864–1926), supported Roman Dmowski’s National Democrats. Turowicz, Jerzy (1912–1999), editor of Tygodnik Powszechny after 1956. Urban, Jerzy (b. 1933), government spokesman and press secretary for General Jaruzelski’s government 1981 to 1989, since 1989 chief editor of the satirical weekly newspaper Nie. Wałęsa, Lech (b. 1943), co-founder in 1980 and head of the Solidarity Independent Trade Union, recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983, president of Poland 1990–1995. Wielgus, Archbishop Stanisław of Płock (b. 1939), accused of having collaborated with the communist security service for about two decades. Wielopolski, Alexander (1803–1877), appointed head of the Department of Religious and Educational Affairs in Warsaw, hoped to restore the Congress Kingdom’s lost autonomy, resigned in 1861. Wilhelm I (1797–1888), King of Prussia January 1861–March 1888 and Kaiser of Germany January 1871–March 1888. Wilhelm II (1859–1941), King of Prussia and Kaiser of Germany June 1888–November 1918. Witos, Wincenty (1874–1945), head of the Polish Peasant Party, served as prime minister of Poland July 1920–September 1921, May-December 1923, and May 1926. Wojtyła, Archbishop Karol. See John Paul II. Wyszyński, Archbishop Stefan of Gniezno and Warsaw (1901–1981), Primate of Poland from 1948 until his death, appointed to the College of Cardinals in 1953. Życiński, Archbishop Józef of Lublin (1948–2011), a Polish philosopher and intellectual. CONTENTS

1 Introduction 1

2 From the Origins to 1772 13

3 The Polish Church in the Era of the Partitions, 1772–1918 39

4 The Interwar Republic, 1918–1939 111

5 War Years and Communism, 1939–1989 145

6 Transition to Pluralism, 1989–2004 191

7 Controversies in the Life of the Church 227

8 Conclusion 261

Appendix – Timeline, 966–2016 271

Select Bibliography 279

Index 291

xxiii LIST OF ACRONYMS

AK the Home Army, the chief anti-Nazi resistance force in occupied Poland during World War Two AWS Solidarity Election Action BBWR Non-Partisan Bloc for the Support of the Government, a pro-Piłsudski organization CBOS Center for Public Opinion Research (Warsaw) EU European Union FWFP Federation for Women and Family Planning GDR German Democratic Republic GG General Gouvernement, the Nazi-occupied rump Polish state during World War Two IPN Institute of National Remembrance IVF In Vitro Fertilization KEP Episcopal Conference of Poland KOK Committee for the Defense of the Country, established by General Jaruzelski in 1981 KSM Catholic Youth Organization KUL Catholic University of Lublin LGBT Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender (also sometimes written LGBTQ, with “Q” standing for Queer) LPR League of Polish Families, a right-wing organization opposed to abortion ND National Democrats, the nationalistic party led by Roman Dmowski from 1897 to 1939 NSDAP the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, or – for short – the Nazi Party OZN Camp of National Unity, a pro-regime organization set up in 1937

xxv xxvi LIST OF ACRONYMS

PAP Polish Press Agency PO the Civic Platform, a liberal party which dominated Polish politics from 2007 until 2015 PiS the Law and Justice, a right-wing party which won the Polish parliamentary elections in October 2015, which has sought to eliminate the independence of the judiciary and to institute a total ban on abortion, without exception PKWN the Polish Committee of National Liberation, established with Soviet backing in 1944 PPR the Polish Workers’ Party, i.e., the Polish communist party PPS the Polish Socialist Party, forced to merge with the PPR in December 1948 PZPR the Polish United Workers’ Party, formed in December 1948 from the merger of the PPR and the PPS, ruling Poland until the party was dissolved in January 1990 SB the Security Service, i.e., the communist-era secret police SLD the Democratic Left Alliance, formed in 1991 as an electoral alliance of center-left parties, participating in ruling coalitions 1993–1997 and again 2001–2005 WAK Catholic Election Action ZLN the Populist-National Union, from which Catholics were excluded ZMP the Union of Polish Youth, a communist-sponsored organization, established in 1948 LIST OF MAPS

Map 2.1 Medieval Poland 17 Map 2.2 The Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth 22 Map 3.1 The partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) 48 Map 3.2 The Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815) 52 Map 3.3 International borders, 1815–1914, showing the Congress Kingdom 54 Map 5.1 The partition of Poland during World War Two 148 Map 5.2 Poland’s borders, 1939–1951 154

xxvii LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Population by ethnicity (1921) 118 Table 4.2 Population by religion (1921) 119 Table 4.3 Population by ethnicity (1931) 120 Table 4.4 Population by religion (1931) 120

xxix CHAPTER 1

Introduction

I In communist times, it was common for politicians – whether in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland, or elsewhere – to assert that “religion is the private affair of the individual.” On the face of it, it suggested that each person was and is free to believe (or not believe) whatever he or she likes, and that neither the state nor any religious body should compel people to participate in religious activities against their will. But that was only half of what was suggested by this formula. The more important half was that religious organizations should restrict themselves to satisfying the spiritual or other needs of individuals qua individuals and stay out of the political arena. And staying out of politics meant that religious organizations should not attempt to inﬂu- ence legislation, engage in debates about the constitution or laws or policies of the regime in question, and advocate such things as religious instruction in the schools or bans on abortion because such advocacy is inherently political. Yet, what kind of religious organization would abstain from urging that the ethics and values it holds dear be reﬂected in legislation, let alone have no opinion at all about values? Such an organization would not normally be understood to be religious; it could at most involve a “pop religious” association, say in the way that some people dress up as bishops, priests, or nuns for Halloween parties. Stripping politics out of religion means stripping values out of religion, and that leaves at best only the formal

© The Author(s) 2017 1 S.P. Ramet, The Catholic Church in Polish History, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-40281-3_1 2 1 INTRODUCTION trappings of religion, not its essence and certainly not its meaning or function in history and society. Religion, then, is intrinsically political,1 as the history of the Catholic Church – both the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern-Rite or Byzantine-Rite Catholic Church – in Poland makes clear. Cardinal Wyszyński, who served as Primate of Poland from 1948 until his death in 1981, was aware of the intrinsically political character of religion. In a sermon he delivered in 1976, Wyszyński posed the rhetorical question,

is it possible to entirely separate the Church and the State? For as in many nations, so in Poland a program like this involves a person who is a Catholic, a Pole, and a citizen of his state. So this principle breaks up the unity of the person. In that single person there must be some sort of single conscience and behavior. If a person is to be normally educated he must preserve a unity of views, he must be open in both civic work and religious life. He cannot behave one way in the four walls of his own home, and differently at work, in the factory, or in the ofﬁce. If such a divergence [were to appear], it would be necessary to speak about the psychological alienation of the person, and therefore about the worst situation possible in civic education, particularly of the younger generation. ... Such a divide is artiﬁcial. It is an attempt to separate the unity of the social organism. And everything which goes in this direction creates a variety of amputations and psychological wounds, both in the sphere of personal and family life, and in the sphere of national and political life.2

In the history of Poland, religion has always been political. The introduction of Christianity into Poland was politically motivated, at least in part. As the Encyclopedia of World History relates, in 966, “Mieszko was converted to Christianity by Bohemian missionaries, probably for political reasons, to deprive the Germans of any further excuse for aggression.”3 When the Reformation spread from Germany across much of Europe, “it became a major historical movement, because religions became the hand- maiden for the attempted resolution of social problems – not in the sense that authentic religious ideas transformed society, but, rather, that religion was used by social groups and classes to further their respective social agendas.”4 When the Reformation reached Poland, this was viewed as something to be discussed in the Polish parliament, the Sejm, which became the scene of bitter debates, culminating in the 1550s.5 Later, in 1616, Adryan Zarembiusz, a Catholic writer, claimed that denial of the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation (by which is meant that, in the I 3 course of the Holy Mass, the holy Eucharist becomes the body of Christ) amounted to treason; since Protestant nobles rejected this doctrine, Zarembiusz’s instrumentalization of the doctrine provided a logic for the eventual abrogation of “the Protestant nobles’ rights and privileges guaranteed under the 1573 constitution.”6 Still later, when, in the last decades of the eighteenth century, Prussia and Russia incorporated portions of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth into their states, they soon became aware that religious difference reinforced Polish identity, and that the surest way to end Polish dreams of a restoration of their state and Poles’ repeated uprisings was to assimilate them into the German and Russian nations, respectively. There were, of course, “a large number of Poles who willingly served the interests of the partitioning powers,”7 but such opportunism is no guarantee of future stability. Over time, the Prussian/German and Russian regimes reached the conclusion that if Poles could be converted to Protestantism/ Orthodoxy, be linguistically assimilated to speak German/Russian as their first language, and forget their Polish culture and history, the problem of Polish separatism would be solved. Once again, religion was political – both a political obstacle and a political tool for the regimes. In the Austrian partition zone, which the Austrians astutely Christened Galicia, there was no religious difference. But Catholicism could be put to political use not just in Galicia but in the entire Habsburg Empire. Specifically, under both Joseph II (reigned from 1765 to 1790) and Franz I (reigned as an Austrian emperor from 1804 to 1835), the Church was “treated as a branch of the Civil Service, the function of which was the promotion of the useful virtues.”8 The same pattern continued into the twentieth century, with the Catholic Church endeavoring to use the resurrected Polish state, in the years 1918–1939, to advance its own interests – including to enforce mandatory Catholic religious instruction in the state schools, obtain subsidies for the Church, and retrieve properties confiscated by the Russian Orthodox Church in the nineteenth century.9 In negotiations for the Concordat of 1925, the state conceded the foregoing points, but sought to have diocesan boundaries redrawn to coincide with national boundaries, in order to avoid giving encouragement to German irredentism. The state also obtained a say in the appointment of bishops – much to the horror of certain clerics.10 Under communism, established in Poland incrementally between 1944 and 1947, the Church was initially treated as a hostile political force. Its 4 1 INTRODUCTION charity organization was confiscated, its press was suppressed, and two of its leading hierarchs were imprisoned. It was not just that the regime wanted to confiscate some Church properties; much more important was the fact that the Church asserted that there were some values, confirmed by God, which could not be qualified or disrespected by the regime. The regime, in turn, wanted to be the ultimate arbiter not just in the political and economic spheres but also in the moral sphere. Along the way, the communists tore up the 1925 Concordat with the Holy See. The entire political context in Poland began to change in summer 1980, with the establishment of the Independent Trade Union “Solidarity”, and during much of the 1980s, the Catholic Church presented itself as a mediator between Solidarity together with other opposition currents and the regime – in essence taking on a new political role. After the implosion of the communist regime in the course of 1988– 1989, the Catholic Church quickly presented its list of political demands, including the restoration of Catholic religious instruction in the schools, the protection of “Christian values” in the public media, a ban on abortion, and the signing of a fresh Concordat – which was achieved, after long discussion, with the signing of the document in 1993 and its ratification five years later.11 Although the Church won a significant number of concessions, including as regards the preamble to the new Polish constitution, the Church remained discontent with the fact that abortions remained legal in cases of incest, rape, or the discovery of irreparable damage to the fetus, and risk to the woman’s life, and hoped that the new government, installed in Warsaw after the October 2015 elections, could impose a total ban on all abortions, without exception. However, the outcry that this provoked put a stop to that effort by spring 2016 – at least for a while.

II The history of any nation involves a number of existential challenges, which figure as turning points in the life of that nation. In the case of Poland, we may plausibly enumerate (at least) five such existential challenges. The first came in the ninth and early tenth centuries, when the spread of Christianity increasingly resulted in still polytheist Poland being encircled by Christian states, especially Germany, which rejected the right of polytheist Poland to exist. Duke Mieszko adopted a pragmatic approach, viz., to accept baptism and convert his nation to Christianity, thereby ending its pariah status. The story of his conversion is not usually II 5 remembered in such a pragmatic way, but the calculation of what was necessary for Poland to survive must surely have been made. The second challenge was one for the Christian Church, rather than for Poland as such; this was the Reformation of the sixteenth century. But it brought such dissension into Poland that it may be considered also a challenge for Poland. That challenge was met with the Counter-Reformation, which reversed most of the gains of Protestantism and put the Catholic Church, as it is now called, on a firmer foundation. The third challenge for Poland came in the following century, when the Ottoman Turks were pushing into Europe, driven by a religious mission to bring Islam to Europeans. It is true that the Ottomans respected Christians and Jews –“people of the book”, as they called them – but only Muslims had full rights, their testimony in court was given greater weight than the testimony of Christians or Jews, and they paid a lesser amount in taxes, among other differences. When Vienna was under an Ottoman siege for the second time and in dire peril, the Polish King, Jan III Sobieski, rushed from Poland to Vienna with 25,000 men and, having the highest rank of any of the commanders of the Christian forces, took command of the entire allied coalition of 80,000 troops. On 12 September 1683, he led that force to victory over the Ottoman soldiers at the Battle of Kahlenberg, remembered as one of Europe’s most decisive battles. The era of the partitions, through which Poland lost its independence between 1795 and 1918, may be counted as the fourth existential challenge faced by Poland. There were, to be sure, brief periods during the era of the partitions when Poland was resurrected in truncated, autonomous form – as the Duchy of Warsaw as a French satellite, as the Congress Kingdom of Poland with the Russian tsar ruling also as King of Poland, and as the Duchy of Posen as an autonomous unit with Prussia – but independence as such was lost for the 123 years of the partitions. Moreover, these years also involved pressure and, at times, also persecution of the Church in the Prussian and Russian partition zones, and even in the Habsburg Empire, a Catholic country, there were pressures brought to bear by Emperor Joseph II, whose commitment to Enlightenment thinking resulted in various restrictions being imposed on the Church (detailed in Chapter 3). The fifth existential challenge began with the genocidal occupation of Poland by the Nazis during the years 1939–1945, in which Poles were used as slave labor and Jews were either turned into slaves or exterminated. But no sooner did World War Two end than the 6 1 INTRODUCTION

Polish nation found itself sliding into a communist dictatorship, which was fully established by 1947. The communists restricted what might be said or written, imposing a censorship, which only finally eased somewhat in the 1980s, repressed political pluralism, and, in the early years, put away thousands of Polish citizens for “crimes against the state.” The communists also confiscated much Church property, arrested and imprisoned some of its leading bishops, including Archbishop Stefan Wyszyński, the Primate of Poland, who remained incarcerated from 1953 to 1956, and took over the Church’schief news organ. During the years 1939–1956, the Church had to fight just to survive, and conditions remained difficult even after that. It was only with the emergence of the independent trade union “Solidarity” in summer 1980 that, as already mentioned, the Church’srolewas considerably transformed. These challenges will be explored in greater depth and with more subtlety in the following pages, but what is already apparent from these thumbnail sketches is that every one of these challenges had a religious dimension and in each of them the dominant religion of the time – polytheism in the first instance, the Christian/Catholic Church in the subsequent four instances – itself faced challenges to its survival. Moreover, national narratives have been developed around how the Church confronted these challenges – narratives that typically are not entirely accurate. For example, in the era of the partitions, there were clergy who were either quiescent or collaborating with the occupation authorities, as well as clergy who joined the uprisings against Russian rule in 1830–1831 and 1863; during the Nazi occupation, there were clergy who urged Poles not to resist as well as clergy who risked their lives to save Jews from extermination; and in the communist era, there were clergy who collaborated with the secret police (as detailed in Chapter 7), as well as outspoken defenders of human rights, such as Cardinal Wyszyński, Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko, and Pope John Paul II. Yet Poles have largely forgotten about the collaborative pattern in the two earlier eras, while some Poles have shrugged off the collaboration in the communist era. But the narrative, for example, of the heroism of the Church during the partition era – in which the Holy See’s counsel to the Poles to desist from rebellion was conveniently forgotten – was important in the past for establishing the Church’s claim to be the nation’s champion, although, as will be shown in Chapter 3,only some clergy were heroic. At this writing, Poles are taking to the streets week after week to protest actions taken by the government elected in October 2015 and headed by III 7 the right-wing Law and Justice Party. In this instance, however, the Church is not confronted by an existential threat; on the contrary, the government dominated by party chairman Jarosław Kaczyński presents itself as a champion of Christian values, having demanded, among other things, a ban on abortion in all instances without exception – meaning also in cases of rape, incest, extreme damage to the embryo, or serious risk to the mother’s life. As of today, about 90% of Poles declare themselves as Catholics. But not all of these self-declared “Catholics” believe in God, and increasing numbers of them, especially among the younger generation, take exception to various Church doctrines. Indeed, as of 2014, three-quarters of Poles felt that religion was not always the source of morality – an open repudiation of the Church’s teaching – and claimed further that people should take private conscience as their principal guide. Even more striking is the assertion by 41% of Poles that there is “no direct link between religion and morality.”12 Indeed, that same year only 39% of Poles were found to be “religious according to Church directives,” while 52% said that they were “religious in their own way.”13 Moreover, the number of Polish Catholics who accept the Church’s teachings concerning abortion, contraception, divorce, and other matters related to sex and sexuality has been declining. Also telling is the fact that, in 2014, the proportion of Poles attending Sunday Mass dropped below 40% for the first time since 1980. None of this amounts, as yet, to an existential crisis for the Church but the steady attrition of belief and erosion of obedience to the Church’s precepts most certainly presents the Church with yet another challenge.

III Religion, Georg Simmel noted, is a “norm-defining agency,”14 typically defining what is the appropriate behavior for each gender, what is the appropriate attire for the members of each gender, and what are the rules to be observed where marriage, sex, and reproduction are concerned. But religion is much more than that. It is, in the first place, about spirituality and about satisfying the spiritual needs of the community. This includes allowing people to experience a sense of wonder at what they may variously identify as the divine or the supernatural or what some might call a sense of the “magic” of the universe. Spiritual needs also include providing opportunities to worship, to celebrate being part of a community of like- minded people, to take part in sacred rituals, and to gain forgiveness for 8 1 INTRODUCTION past sins. Some religions, such as Catholicism, place a strong emphasis on doctrine and ritual; others, such as Shinto, place no emphasis on doctrine but direct their attention to cherishing and safeguarding nature, while also placing rituals at the center of their faith. Religions are also the vehicles for creating, shaping, preserving, and transforming culture broadly understood. And to return to the theme stressed at the outset of this chapter, religion is intrinsically political because it seeks to promote and defend certain moral values, typically seen as sanctioned by a divine being (or group of deities). Values can be promoted and defended by socializing members, proselytizing among nonmembers/potential recruits with the aim of converting them, and seeking to obtain the passage of laws, which will protect the values of the given religious organization. The persistent effort of the Catholic Church in Poland to obtain a total ban on abortion without exceptions, not just for Catholics but for the entire society, including Protestants, Jews, Muslims, agnostics, and atheists, is a classic example of the intrinsically political character of religion as well as of the dogmatic conviction that one’s own beliefs are truer than the beliefs of members of other religions and should take absolute priority over the beliefs of others. This is also why the phrase, “the politicization of religion,” is potentially misleading; one might as well speak of the politicization of politics. It would be more accurate to speak of the mobilization of human and financial resources, by a religious organization, to achieve certain political goals – if that is the point. The Catholic Church in Poland, thus, has to be political. There is no other way for it to carry out its inherited mission. In the succeeding pages, then, three central themes will be stressed. First, the Holy See (the Vatican) and, in most instances, also the archbishops, bishops, priests, and nuns have prioritized the interests of “Mother Church.” It could not be otherwise. Thus, when the Poles rebelled against Russian rule in 1830–1831 and again in 1863, the first priority of the Holy See was not how to help the Poles to regain their self-rule, but rather how to protect Mother Church or, as Catholics sometimes call the Church, “the Mystical Body of Christ.” It was from this calculation that the popes urged the Poles to lay down their weapons and accept the Russian tsar as their divinely anointed sovereign. But, as will be shown in Chapter 3, some priests and even a few bishops felt so great love for their nation that they were prepared to defy the pope and support one or the other insurrection. The second theme emerges out of the first, but inversely. The Catholic Church has scarcely wanted to trumpet the rather obvious fact that it gives NOTES 9 highest priority to its own institutional interests, with the corollary that it has not always been able to champion the interests of Poles. Thus, the narrative of the past, which the Church’sapologistshavewoven,isnotfalseassuch,but partial. As will be seen in the following chapters, it tells only part of the story. Finally, the third theme running through this study is the close connection between the Catholic religion and the Polish nation. But this connection, manifested in the 1980s by the Church’s sponsoring of alternative cultural events, criticizing controversial amendments to the constitution, and so on,15 was forged in the era of the partitions, when the Polish nation lost its independence. The religio-national nexus slackened in the interwar era, in spite of Roman Dmowski’s assertions of the equation of Pole and Catholic, but became intense in the years 1939–1989. Cardinal Wyszyński and later Pope John Paul II stepped forward as advocates of the Polish nation and, in the process, asserted “the claim that the Catholic Church [was] the moral and existential guardian of Polish society.”16 But, as Chapters 6 and 7 show, the end of communism has attenuated the nexus between the Polish nation and the Catholic Church. As Geneviève Zubrzycki has noted, “With the creation of a legitimate national state ...the fusion between nation and religion ...is called into question.”17 Now, since October 2015, with the clerical Law and Justice party in control of the parliament and the presidency and seeking to advance as much of the Church’s moral-political agenda as it can, even while undermining the independence of the media and seeking to corrupt the independence of the judiciary,18 the prospect opens up of an eventual divorce of Polish national identity from Catholicism.

NOTES 1. See chapters “Sacred Values and the Tapestry of Power: An Introduction”, “What is Religion? What is Politics?”, and “Spheres of Religio-Political Interaction: Social Order, Nationalism, and Gender Relations”, in Sabrina P. Ramet and Donald W. Treadgold (eds.), Render Unto Caesar: The Religious Sphere in World Politics (Washington, DC: American University Press, 1995); also William Reace Garrett (ed.), Social Consequences of Religious Belief (New York: Paragon House, 1989). See also Luke Ebersole, “Religion and Politics”,inThe Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 332 (November 1960), p. 102. 2. Stefan Wyszyński, ”Excerpts from a Sermon Given by Primate Stefan Wyszyński in 1976”, Making the History of 1989, Item #9, https://chnm. gmu.edu/1989/items/show/9 [accessed on 9 October 2016, 6:20 a.m. 10 1 INTRODUCTION

US time, 12:20 p.m. Norwegian time]. I have corrected an instance of nonparallel construction silently. 3. William L. Langer (ed.), An Encyclopedia of World History (1948), p. 241, as quoted in Charles J. Przywara, “The Coming of Christianity to Poland as Described in English-Language Encyclopedias”,inPolish-American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January-June 1966), p. 14. 4. Hans J. Hillerbrand, Review of R. W. Scribner, The German Reformation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1986), in The American Historical Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (October 1987), p. 977. 5. Jerzy Kloczowski [Kłoczowski], A History of Polish Christianity, trans. from Polish by Małgorzata Sady with the help of Piotr Pienkowski, Teresa Baruk- Ulewiczowa, and Magdalena Kloczowska (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 93. 6. Debra Kaplan and Magda Teter, “Out of the (Historiographic) Ghetto: European Jews and Reformation Narratives”,inThe Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Summer 2009), p. 385. 7. Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland – Vol. 1, The Origins to 1795, Revised ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 396. 8. C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918 (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 163. 9. Neal Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter: The Catholic Church and Independent Poland, 1914–1939 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), pp. 59, 69; and Edward D. Wynot, Jr., “Prisoner of History: The Eastern Orthodox Church in Poland in the Twentieth Century”,inJournal of Church and State, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 321–323. 10. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, pp. 69–70. 11. For further discussion, see Sabrina P. Ramet, “Controversies in the Social & Political Engagement of the Catholic Church in Poland since 1988”,in Sabrina P. Ramet and Irena Borowik (eds.), Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland: Continuity and Change since 1989 (Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); and Mirella W. Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland”,inEurope-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 5 (July 1998), pp. 817–842. 12. Josef Pazderka, “Poland sees Marked Decline in Public Trust of Church”,in The Tablet (19 February 2014), at http://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/ 447/0/poland-sees-marked-decline-in-public-trust-of-church [accessed on 14 July 2015], as quoted in Ramet, “Controversies in the Social & Political Engagement of the Catholic Church” [previous note]. 13. “Changing Religiosity”, CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center), Polish Public Opinion, at http://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/reports/2015/ 026_15.pdf [accessed on 26 December 2015]. NOTES 11

14. Georg Simmel, Essays on Religion, ed. and trans. by Horst Jürgen Helle in Collaboration with Ludwig Nieder (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), as quoted in A. Javier Treviño, “On Durkheim’s Religion and Simmel’s ‘Religiosity’: A Review Essay”,inJournal for the Scientiﬁc Study of Religion, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1998), p. 195. 15. For details, see Sabrina Petra Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 181–184. 16. Natalie Smolenski, “National-European Theology: The Polish Catholic Hierarchy’s Narrative of a Christian Europe”,inEast European Politics and Societies and Cultures, Vol. 30, No. 3 (August 2016), p. 523. 17. Geneviève Zubrzycki, The Crosses at Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-communist Poland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 22–23, as quoted in Smolenski, “National-European Theology”, p. 523. 18. See Sabrina P. Ramet, “Past and Present in the Struggle for Polish Democracy: A Postscript”, in Sabrina P. Ramet, Kristen Ringdal, and Katarzyna Dośpiał (eds.), Civic and Uncivic Values in Poland: Value Transformation, Education, and Culture (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, in production). CHAPTER 2

From the Origins to 1772

Religion is about many things. It is, most obviously, about worship of a God or gods and, if of a single God, then either the Triune God of Christianity or a unitary God, such as venerated in Judaism and Islam. It is also about rituals, hymns, and prayers, which, in combination with consistent and persistent traditions in church/synagogue/ mosque/temple architecture, give believers a sense of home and a sense of security in an uncertain world. It is also about shared norms, which in turn can give adherents a real feeling of belonging to a community of like-minded believers and also mobilize those believers for political action. And it is also about memories of the past and myths (whether true or false, as myths are not necessarily false and, on the contrary, can be true or partly true). When Christians talk about the virgin birth or the Sermon on the Mount or the raising of Lazarus from the dead or that mega-event – the cruciﬁxion and resurrection of Christ – these memories/myths anchor the present in the past and give meaning to the present. Some of these things can change. Catholic hymns today are no longer what was sung by early Christians in, let us say, the fourth century, and churches have been built in a large variety of styles, including the Romanesque, Gothic, Baroque, Rococo (a variant of the Baroque), neo-Gothic, and so on. But, usually, these things do not change so rapidly as to cause believers any discomfort: an exception was the abrupt switch after the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) from a Latin Mass to a Mass in the vernacular, which

© The Author(s) 2017 13 S.P. Ramet, The Catholic Church in Polish History, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-40281-3_2 14 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772 drove some Catholics to stop going to Mass and others to seek out parishes where the old Latin Mass was still being read. Which memories matter can also change. The story of Lazarus being raised from the dead is probably less meaningful today for most people than it was, let us say, 600 or 700 years ago. That may suggest that, for most Catholics, their religious belief is less dependent on belief in miracles than it was for earlier generations of Catholics. Perhaps more pointedly, perceptions of enemies and understandings of moral vs. immoral action may also change. For example, in the tenth and eleventh centuries, pagans (polytheists) were the great “enemy” of Christians (monotheists), and it was widely considered morally acceptable, even praiseworthy, to kill or enslave pagans; today, pagans (or neo-pagans) are no longer an obvious enemy, and few Christians consider it morally acceptable to kill or enslave non-Christians. Some Christians have been known, in recent decades, to murder physicians who carry out abortions, but such Christians are in a clear minority. But Catholicism has always had its foes, its perceived threats, whether pagans, in the earliest period, or Tatars in the Middle Ages, or the Orthodox Church after the Eastern Christian Churches made it clear that they refused to accept the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome, or Muslims, in the Ottoman era, which ended in 1918, or the Nazis and Soviet communists, or more recently, advocates of a secular morality. In this sense, where the Catholic Church in Poland is concerned, there have been partially overlapping rivalries with all of the foregoing as well as with the Jews. In some of these cases, the Catholic Church’s orientation was partly defensive/partly offensive, as in the cases of the Tatars, the Ottomans, and the Orthodox, and purely defensive in the case of the German Protestants during the era of the partitions (1772–1918), when Polish territories were divided up between Prussia/Germany, Austria, and Russia, and again in Nazi-occupied Poland during World War Two, when the very survival of the Polish nation and the Polish Catholic Church was at stake; on the other hand, in the case of the Jews, the Catholic Church’s orientation was largely, if not exclusively, offensive.

FROM THE BAPTISM OF POLAND TO THE DOUBLE CRISIS Just as shared religion gives its members a sense of home, identifying who is a member of the community, it also draws a boundary, identifying who is not a member of that community and not included in the confessional family. This was the problem which the Poles confronted in the first half of FROM THE BAPTISM OF POLAND TO THE DOUBLE CRISIS 15 the tenth century. By that point, almost all of Europe had adopted Christianity; the hold-outs were the Nordic nations, the Baltic nations, and Poland. These pagan nations were, thus, viewed by the Christian nations as not part of civilized Europe, and their peoples were subjected to raids, pillage and plunder, enslavement, and killing. In the eighth century, the threat had been mutual; at that time, the pagan Avars had brought a large number of Slavs under their rule. In 795, Charlemagne, at that time King of the Franks and King of Italy, but later to be crowned Holy Roman Emperor (in 800), drew up a plan in coordination with Pope Leo III (reigned from 795 to 816) to defend Christian territories from the Avars and to expand the domain in which Christianity was hegemonic. By 796, the Avars had been conquered.1 This was a turning point and, by the 960s, non-Christian states were at risk of attack or subjugation by Christian states while Christian states were by and large no longer in any danger from pagans; the only escape for a non-Christian state was to accept Christianity. Duke Mieszko I (c. 930–992; reigned from 960 to 992), a member of the Piast dynasty, had been ruling as a pagan prince but, around 964, he decided that the time had come to accept Christianity. He rejected the option of turning to the Germans for conversion, since he feared that that would entail his becoming a German vassal.2 The alternative that he embraced was to enter into negotiations with Duke Boleslav I the Cruel of Bohemia. The following year he married Boleslav’s daughter Doubravka (Dobrawa in Polish) and in 966 was baptized a Christian. There are some variations in how the story of Mieszko’s and Poland’s conversion is told, especially concerning three points. First, while most authors3 believe that the Poles received Christianity from Bohemian evan- gelists invited by Duke Mieszko, there have also been speculations that German missionaries or even Irish missionaries may have brought the new religion to Poland – accounts dismissed by A.P. Vlasto as “eccentric” and lacking evidence.4 Second, while most authors5 stress the political realism that underlay the conversion, agreeing thus with what Oscar Halecki wrote in 1952, viz., that Mieszko embraced Christianity “in order to avoid German pressure”–and, as already stated, to end predatory attacks on his country – Halecki modified his account in 1963, writing that “the purely religious motives of [Mieszko’s]’s conversion ...should not be underestimated.”6 There is, finally, another interpretation, which suggests that “Mieszko had accepted Christianity at the request of his Czech wife.”7 And third, while R. Nisbet Bain has suggested that the Polish 16 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772

Church was originally associated with the Eastern Church “but was reconverted by the Roman Church at the instigation of Bolisław I (992– 1025)”,8 Pierre David has dismissed this theory, arguing, on the contrary, that “there is no liturgical or disciplinarian indication, no evidence of any kind to show that Polish Christendom, from the very beginning, did not belong to the Church of Rome”9 (see Map 2.1). Suppressing the old religion. The establishment of a Christian infrastructure got underway quickly, with a bishopric soon erected in Poznań. Gniezno was selected as the site for the residence of the Archbishop- Primate of Poland; about the same time, bishoprics were also set up in Kraków, Wrocław, and Kołobrzeg for Pomerania. At first, there was no noteworthy opposition to the spread of Christianity. But not all the pagans were ready to give up polytheism for the worship of a single, albeit triune, God, and, in the eighth and ninth centuries, the top hill of Łysa Góra (Bald Mountain) was an important place for pagan worship.10 In 994, Bishop Adalbert of Prague (956–997) – known in Polish as Wojciech – came to Poland at the invitation of Duke (later King) Bolesław I Chrobry (the Brave), the son of Mieszko I, in order to work as a missionary among the country’s pagans. He converted some pagans in the area of Gdańsk but then came under pressure to leave the area. When he refused to give up his mission, he was beheaded in 997. He was canonized in 999 as Poland’s first saint.11 Two monks who had been friends of Adalbert/Wojciech came to Poland from Italy in 1001 and founded a monastery, which a dozen Poles soon joined. Although five of these monks were murdered in November 1003, the monastic movement slowly spread. There had been a revolt, with pagan participation, against the ruling Piast dynasty in 1022. Then, in 1034, King Mieszko II Lambert, the second son of Bolesław I, died, and a period of anarchy ensued. According to some accounts, a certain Duke Bolesław the Forgotten now took the throne, but his existence is disputed. What is clear is that no one had a firm grip on power between 1034 and 1039, when Duke Kazimierz I the Restorer, the son of Mieszko II, took power and restored order, reigning until 1058. In the interim, a large-scale revolt broke out in summer 1034, involving both pagan and “nonpagan” aspects.12 With the help of German forces, Duke Kazimierz brought order to the land, but the task of forced Christianization was by no means complete. There was another pagan upsurge in 1066 and, for a while, the then-reigning King, Bolesław II Śmiały (the Bold) (1039/1042–1081), lost control of Eastern Pomerania.13 Well into the 1120s, pagan shrines were being demolished RMTEBPIMO OADT H OBECRISIS DOUBLE THE TO POLAND OF BAPTISM THE FROM 17 Map 2.1 Medieval Poland 18 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772 and pagan statues smashed; open worship of pagan gods and goddesses was suppressed. But acceptance of Christianity was a slow and often painful process. By the end of the twelfth century, paganism in Poland had been largely extinguished, though the old religion survived for a while on the Baltic coast, and on the island of Rügen.14 But that may not be the end of the pagan story. As late as 1790, Stanisław Staszic, a Polish priest, diplomat, author, and scientist, reported that “The pagans are the [Polish-Lithuanian] Commonwealth’s most faithful friends and defenders. It is the Christians who have mutilated her and wish to destroy her.”15 This suggests that there were still pagans in Poland in the late eighteenth century. For that matter, some pagan festivals (such as the springtime festival of Marzanna) have survived down to the present and, in addition, there are also pockets of neo-pagans active in Poland today, some of them best classified as Wiccans and others practicing “a mixture of Catholicism with the old, Pagan customs and practices.”16 Paganism in Poland consists of a diversity of forms, but what all of them have in common is a belief in “native Slavic gods, the offerings of meat and food (traditionally groats, white cheese, and bread), a code based on principles of honor, responsibility, and courage,” and a sense of commitment to family in the first place but also to the wider community.17 Rebuilding the Church’s infrastructure. The five years of anarchy following the death of Mieszko II had seen many churches burned to the ground and their treasures stolen. The church in Gniezno lay in ruins. Bishops and monks had been slaughtered, and Mieszko’s son, Kazimierz, had fled the country. The Bohemians had taken advantage of Poland’s “time of troubles”18 to intervene in Poland and help themselves to various relics (including the last remains of St. Adalbert) and other objects of devotion, carrying them back to their own country.19 After his return to Poland and consolidation of his rule in the course of 1041–1042, Kazimierz the Restorer set to work to put Poland and the Polish Church on the level with West European states and their ecclesiastical structures. He believed that Poland stood in need of missionaries and brought in large numbers of Benedictines, establishing new monasteries and reopening old ones. He has been credited specifically with founding the abbeys of Tyniec near Kraków and Leubus in Silesia. He also restored central control in Poland’s sundry provinces, in some instances relying on local vassals. Where Christianization was concerned, he placed stress on the evangeliza- tion of Mazovia, where the pagan revolts had been particularly strong. However, he left it to his successor to restore the archbishopric of FROM THE BAPTISM OF POLAND TO THE DOUBLE CRISIS 19

Gniezno.20 His son and successor, Bolesław II, built up the sees in Poland and completed the restoration of the cathedrals in Gniezno and Poznań. He revived the archbishopric of Gniezno, established a new bishopric at Płock, and reconstituted the ecclesiastical hierarchy.21 He also ceded several castles and estates to the bishops. But Bolesław is also remembered for having ordered the dismemberment of Bishop Stanisław Szczepanowski of Kraków on the charge of treason. There was a strong reaction to the martyrdom of the later-canonized Stanisław, and Bolesław was forced to leave Poland, ending his days in Hungary.22 Bolesław II’s immediate successor, Władysław Herman, supported bishops who were opposed to the reforms of the Church associated especially with Popes Leo IX (1049–1054), Nicholas II (1058–1061), and Gregory VII (1073–1085) and continued by Pope Urban II (1088– 1099). This put Duke Władysław at odds with the papacy. But upon the duke’s death, his son Bolesław III was determined to restore good relations with the Holy See and break with the anti-Gregorian bishops, who had been allowed to be active in Władysław’s Poland. In 1103, Pope Pascal II (reigned from 1099 to 1118) sent Bishop Galon of Beauvais (d. 1116), the future Bishop of Paris, to Poland as his nuncio. Having studied under Yves of Chartres, Galon’s formula for Poland was “to relax the rigour of the law and of ideal morality in favour of spiritual well-being.”23 He understood the importance of recruiting good bishops and maintaining basic discipline among the clergy. Presiding over a synod at Gniezno, Galon deposed two bishops because they had been put in office without the consent of the clergy whom they were to supervise. Two decades later, by which time Gilon of Toucy was serving as the papal nuncio, the diocese of Włocławek was set up. Two other bishoprics were also established in Poland while Gilon served as nuncio. In 1140, the Cistercian Order came to Poland, introducing new methods of agriculture. Around the same time, the Premonstratensians, also known as Norbertines because they had been founded by St. Norbert, the Archbishop of Magdeburg,24 arrived in Poland, settling initially in the region around Kraków. Polish clergy went to Western Europe to study. Some studied at Laon, others at Chartres, and still others in Bologna. With the turn of the thirteenth century, there was a struggle between Church and state over various prerogatives claimed by the Church. Henryk Kietlicz (1150–1219), serving as Archbishop of Gniezno from 1199, pressed for the recognition of the temporal authority of the bishop over Catholics in his diocese and that of ecclesiastical tribunals as solely 20 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772 competent to try the clergy in all civil and criminal cases. In this, Kietlicz was successful, and the Church came to enjoy juridical immunity from prosecution in lay courts as well as exemption from taxes and service obligations (as previously granted to the Cistercians).25 In defiance of Galon’s call for greater discipline, lower clergy and hierarchy alike regularly violated the rule of celibacy, which had been promulgated in 1197. In spite of the problem with enforcing celibacy, overall the twelfth century saw the Church growing in strength and prestige. In 1207, Pope Innocent III (1160/1161–1216; reigned 1198–1216) sent two letters to Polish clerics, admonishing them “to strengthen the internal organization” of the Church in Poland “and to ensure the obedience of all clerics to their superiors and to the archbishop of Gniezno.”26 Innocent called for the establishment of a regular practice of supervision and visits to all dioceses by archdeacons. He also upbraided the chaplains of local dukes and other nobles for giving a higher priority to loyalty to those secular superiors than to bishops and abbots. Both for the Catholic Church in general and for the Church in Poland, the Fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215, had enormous significance. Kietlicz and six other Polish bishops took part in this council, which approved 70 canons relating to matters of doctrine and discipline. Among other things,

[t]he council afﬁrmed [the doctrine of] transubstantiation and made mandatory for all Christians annual confession and Communion. Bishops were to add theology masters to the grammarians in their cathedrals stipulated by Lateran III for the enhancement of clerical education. They were also obliged to hold annual provincial councils in order to implement the council’s decrees. The council also dealt with the place of nonbelievers in Christian society and ordered identiﬁable clothing for Muslims and Jews.27

Pope Innocent III, whose reign has been described as marking “the summit of the medieval papacy,”28 presided over the Fourth Lateran Council, which was an early milestone in the Catholic Reformation. The Catholic Reformation, which in its later phase embraced also the Counter- Reformation, is treated below, following the discussion of the Protestant Reformation. The double crisis. The Piast dynasty, which had ruled Poland since Mieszko I, died out in 1370 with Kazimierz III the Great (1310–1370; reigned 1333–1370), who died without having produced any legitimate sons. Although he left two legitimate daughters and three sons born out of FROM THE BAPTISM OF POLAND TO THE DOUBLE CRISIS 21 wedlock, it was decided to pass the crown to Kazmierz’s nephew, King Lajos I of Hungary and Croatia. When Lajos died in September 1382, Lajos’s elder daughter Maria succeeded as Queen of Hungary and Croatia, with his younger daughter, Jadwiga (Hedwig, in Hungarian), being crowned “King” of Poland in October 1384. During the two-year inter- regnum between the death of Lajos in 1382 and the coronation of Jadwiga in 1384, the country was racked by civil war. Jadwiga was only 11 years old at the time of her coronation, but, in order to assure a regular succession, Grand Duke Jogaila of Lithuania (d. 1434) was contracted to marry her. Their marriage was sealed with the Union of Krewo (14 August 1385), which set forth various conditions to which the parties agreed. Jogaila converted to Christianity, took a Christian name, Władysław, and was crowned King Władysław II Jagiełło in 1386, thereby founding the Jagiellonian dynasty. Lithuania accounted for more than two-thirds of the territory of this union, and, with this, the ﬁrst step had been taken toward establishing the Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Nearly two centuries later, on 1 July 1569, the Union of Lublin was ﬁnalized, merging Poland and Lithuania into a single though federated state. After Jadwiga died prematurely in 1399, Władysław II Jagiełło married one of the granddaughters of Kazmierz the Great (Map 2.2). Research in Polish sources has sometimes led scholars to believe that the introduction of Catholicism to Lithuania came strictly as a consequence of the marriage of Jogaila and Jadwiga and the associated union of Poland and Lithuania. Based on Lithuanian sources, Joné Deveiké disputes this understanding, arguing on the contrary that

[t]he statement that the Catholic faith was introduced by the Poles in 1387 among complete pagans is quite erroneous. Firstly for more than a century Lithuanians had built Catholic or Orthodox churches and had invited missionaries ...Secondly, the Poles had taken no part in this, in spite of all their efforts, in spite, even, of the solemn arrival of their prelates at Lutsk, and – more signiﬁcant still – of the Pope’s legate as well.29

In fact, the ﬁrst effort at the conversion of Lithuania’s pagans to Catholicism can be dated to 1251, while, on the other side, a pagan upper class remained entrenched in western Lithuania into the seventeenth century, giving refuge to pagans from eastern Lithuania, when Catholicism became the dominant religion there.30 22 RMTEOIIST 1772 TO ORIGINS THE FROM 2

Map 2.2 The Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth ANTEMURALE CHRISTIANITATIS 23

The years of civil war in Poland, 1382–1384, were, however, only half of the “double crisis.” The other half, with which the Polish civil war overlapped, was the much longer crisis in the Catholic Church – the Great Schism (sometimes called the Great Western Schism or, more simply, the Western Schism31),whichlastedfrom1378to1417,during which time there were rival popes sitting in Avignon and Rome and, beginning in 1409, also a third pope in Pisa. Poland was among those states that recognized the authority of Rome. To remedy the division of the Church, an ecumenical council was convened in the lakeside town of Konstanz (Constance), which was in session from 1414 to 1418. The council was called by “Anti-Pope” John XXIII of Pisa (not to be confused with Angelo Roncalli, who served as pope under the same name from 1958 to 1963), but decided to depose or accept the resignations of all three contenders for the papacy. Poland’s Archbishop Mikołaj Trąba (1358–1422; Archbishop of Gniezno 1412– 1422) made such a striking impression at the council that many of those present talked of electing him pope once the schism had been overcome.32 Ultimately, Trąba was not elected, and in 1417, those present at the Council elected Oddone Colonna (1369–1431), the Cardinal-Deacon of San Giorgio al Velabro to reign as pope in Rome; the new pontiff took the name Martinus V.

ANTEMURALE CHRISTIANITATIS In 1241, a Tatar army, consisting of Mongol ofﬁcers and mainly Turkish– Muslim soldiers,33 invadedEasternEurope.Infact,threeTatararmy groups rode westward, with the main contingent, under the command of Chingis Khan’s grandson, Batu Khan, overrunning Hungary, a second group, commanded by Kadan, the son of the Great Khan Ögödei, heading into Transylvania, and the third group, commanded by Baidar, the second son of Chagatai Khan, sweeping into Poland and taking control of Kraków and Wrocław, massacring many of the locals and burning and plundering churches. On 9 April 1241, a Christian force consisting of Poles, Czechs, and Teutonic Knights was crushed by the Tatars at the Battle of Legnica (Liegnitz). In spite of their victory, the Tatars halted their advance into Poland and, instead, headed southward.34 It is said that, as Duke Henryk the Pious, the commander of the Christian forces, lay dying on the battleﬁeld, he uttered the words, “Misery has befallen us.”35 Although the Mongols/Tatars withdrew from Poland and Eastern 24 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772

Europe soon after their arrival, the ravaging of Poland sowed the seeds of a sense of national martyrdom, which would only intensify in succeeding centuries and – it should be emphasized – that sense of martyrdom had, from the beginning, an unmistakably religious character as it involved Catholic Poles defending their country and, as they came to think somewhat later, all of Western Europe, from Muslims, whether Tatar Muslims or, later, Ottoman Muslims. This religious dimension was well understood by Poland’s national bard, Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855), who called Poland the “Christ of nations,”“suffering ...to bring salvation to all the [Christian] nations.”36 The Tatars returned to Poland in 1337, toward the end of the reign of Khan Uzbek (d. 1341), laying siege to Lublin. Fearing further depreda- tions by the Tatars, King Kazimierz III assembled an army and, in 1340, captured Lwów from the Tatars and placed the Catholics living in that region under his protection. Kazimierz kept the Tatars from crossing the Vistula and, in January 1341, inflicted a decisive defeat on the invaders in a battle near Lublin.37 By the end of his reign, ruling circles in Poland began to talk of their country as having a mission to protect Christendom. Max Goldschneider has even suggested that the Polish King “wished to erect a defensive wall for the west against the east, thus forming an eastern march on the border of Christendom.”38 Thus was born, in embryo, the idea of Poland as the antemurale Christianitatis, the defensive wall of Christianity. However, it seems that it was only in 1462 that this term, antemurale Christianitatis, was applied to Poland and, ironically, not during an engagement with a Muslim invader, but rather at the height of the Thirteen Years’ War (1454–1466), when the Kingdom of Poland, with the Prussian Confederation as a fief, faced off the (Christian) Teutonic Order,39 which had been operating as a religious-military order since 1198.40 When the Polish King’s revenues ran low, he turned to the Church to borrow the funds he needed to continue the war. But the peace which followed that war was short-lived, as Ottoman Turkish forces, in collaboration with the Tatars, invaded Poland in 1498. They attacked Podolia and Red Ruthenia and plundered villages near Lwów.41 Then, the Ottomans shifted their attention to another front and, under the command of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1494/1495–1566), laid siege to Vienna for the first time. The pope put together an anti- Ottoman coalition, but, at this point in time, Poland, having suffered previously at the hands of Muslim forces, declined to take part. The ANTEMURALE CHRISTIANITATIS 25 successful defense of Vienna in 1529 has been credited in the first place to the “brave garrison under the command of Count Niklas Salm.”42 A little over a century later – in 1633 – Jerzy Ossoliński, Emissary of King Władysław IV Vasa, paid a visit to the Holy See, where he boasted

...that for centuries Poland had protected Europe against ‘wild and terrible enemies of the name of Christ’. Poles ‘with their bare breasts are holding back ...the Ottoman Crescent[,] ...Muscovites, who are Christians by name only but in reality and with their customs are worse than the rest of the barbarians,’ and ﬁnally the Tatars who only thanks to the Commonwealth of the Gentry till now had not subdued all of Europe.43

Exactly 50 years after Ossoliński made this claim, Ottoman forces once again laid siege to Vienna, this time under the command of Grand Vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa (1634–1683). The siege lasted from 17 July to 12 September 1683. The royal courts of Christian Europe fully appreciated the geostrategic and symbolic importance of Vienna and agreed to pool their resources to relieve the siege. Poland’s King Jan III Sobieski (1629–1696; reigned from 1674 to 1696) was determined to help and, in preparation for rendering assistance to the besieged city, visited the Jasna Góra monastery at Częstchowa on 25 July, to receive Holy Communion and pray before the allegedly miraculous Black Madonna picture housed there.44 After that, he rushed to Vienna at the head of a 25,000-strong Polish army. When he arrived at Vienna, as the highest ranking military leader, he was made commander of the entire 80,000-strong Christian army, which included Saxon and Bavarian con- tingents. Sobieski led this army to a decisive victory over the Ottomans on 12 September 1683, in a battle lasting for 15 hours. Thousands of members of the Ottoman army were slaughtered or imprisoned.45 The Grand Vizier escaped, but his defeat was considered inexcusable and he was beheaded in Belgrade on 25 December 1683, on the orders of the sultan. As for Sobieski, he attributed the Christian triumph at Vienna to the assistance of the Blessed Virgin Mary.46 The Christian victory immor- talized the name of Sobieski, whose successful defense of Vienna was celebrated on its 300th anniversary in the pages of Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas.47 Equestrian statues of Sobieski were erected in Lwów (later moved to Gdańsk) and Warsaw, as well as inside Wilanów Palace, while a statue of him standing was erected in Przemyśl. In Chicago, Illinois, a street is named after Sobieski. The victory seemed to 26 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772 many to conﬁrm a judgment offered by Professor Jan Cynerski Rachtamowicz of Kraków in 1637, that Poland was the

...gem of Catholic kingdoms ...a temple of freedom, a bastion of the true faith, the most faithful pupil of the Roman Church, the strongest defender, the most devoted propagator, the rampart of the Christian states (antemurale Christianorum imperiorum), the seat of justice, power, prudence, immortality, fame of its citizens.48

THE REFORMATION The Protestant Reformation, conventionally dated as beginning in 1517 with Martin Luther’s posting of 95 theses on indulgences49 on the door of Wittenberg Cathedral, spread quickly across Europe, affecting to a greater or lesser extent almost every country where the Roman Catholic Church was the dominant religion.50 Luther’s teachings reached Poland as early as 1518 when Jakub Knade proclaimed the new faith in the churches of Gdańsk (Danzig). Other Polish disciples of Luther included Stanisław Lutomirski, who prepared the Polish evangelical confession, and Eustachy Trepka of Poznań, who claimed that the only Christianity known in Poland before Luther was a corrupt form of the faith.51 The first publication of Luther’s writings followed in 1519, with an edition coming out in Wrocław. In 1520, his writings were also published in Kraków, where Luther’s ideas won converts among members of the wealthy bourgeoisie and in university circles.52 By 1525, Luther’s doctrines were being preached also in Poznań. The Reformation in Poland spread rapidly but affected mainly the gentry class and the nobility; although Luther’s writings were read with interest by intellectuals, they were irrelevant to the illiterate peasantry, for whom the Catholic Church remained “home.” In towns and cities, Luther’s Reformation attracted in the first place people of German origin, though of course there were also Polish converts.53 One of the reasons for the rapid dissemination of Protestantism in Poland was the fact that relations between the country’s elites and the papacy had become difficult due to the papacy’s support for the Teutonic Knights, whose Baltic state was a bitter enemy of Poland’s (in spite of their collaboration against the Tatars in 1241).54 In 1540, Calvinism arrived in Poland, winning ever more frequent converts from the upper classes, including relatives of Cardinal THE REFORMATION 27

Oleśnicki. With both Lutheranism and Calvinism making inroads, the deficiencies of the Catholic Church became a frequent topic of conversation in cafés in Poland’s cities.55 As early as 1534, the nobility had demanded that the Bible and other religious books be translated into Polish, but it was only in the course of 1551–1553 that the New Testament was first published in Polish. The first translation of the entire Bible into Polish came out in 1563. In the course of the following eight decades, there were four more Polish translations of the Bible, bringing the total to three Polish editions from the Protestant camp and two from the Catholic camp.56 Both Catholic and Protestant prelates looked to political authorities for protection. Indeed, as early as 24 July 1520, the Polish King had issued the Edict of Thorn (in Polish, Toruń), banning the importation of Luther’s writings into the country “under penalty of confiscation of all property and exile.” When this penalty failed to dam the flow of Luther’s works into the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania, a new edict was issued on 7 March 1523, this time in Kraków, imposing a harsher penalty – burning at the stake.57 The Catholic hierarchy appealed to the King for a strict enforcement of the ban on heresy. But after 1544, the King and the Catholic Church gave up relying on repression, ushering in an era of relative calm and toleration.58 This outcome was probably inevitable – in the short run – as the senior lines of prominent families, such as the Radziwiłł, Chodkiewicz, Czartoryski, and Ogiński families, embraced Protestantism. After an unsuccessful uprising in Gdańsk in 1525–152659 and a successful one in 1577–1578, local Lutherans were granted freedom of worship. Along the way, in 1552, influential members of the bourgeoisie in Gdańsk, Toruń, and Elbląg petitioned King Sigismund II Augustus (1520–1572; reigned from 1548 to 1572) to legalize Lutheranism. Meanwhile, Calvinism continued to win converts among middle nobles as well as some of the wealthiest magnates and, in 1555, the notion was broached that a national (Calvinist) Church be set up, with Sigismund Augustus as head of the Church. Over time, roughly 20% of the nobles converted to Calvinism, and, in the Senate at the height of the Reformation, they commanded an absolute majority of lay members. This prompted the Calvinists in the Sejm, in 1558, to call into question the right of Catholic bishops to sit in the Senate. Having early been content to enjoy the fruits of religious toleration, the Calvinists now dreamt, for a while, of establishing their supremacy in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.60 The King hesitated to grant the petition of 1552, 28 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772 since he was concerned about the reaction this would elicit from Bishop Stanisław Hozjusz (1504–1579) and the papal nuncio since 1556, Luigi Lippomano (1500–1559). Indeed, so fierce was Lippomano’s opposition to Protestant demands that his life was repeatedly threatened. Lippomano’s resistance notwithstanding, the King granted permission in 1557 for the dissemination of Luther’s teachings, thereby legalizing the Lutheran Church. But Lutherans and Calvinists were not the only Protestants establishing a presence in Poland. There were, in addition, Bohemian Brethren (who arrived in 1548), Anabaptists (who advocated a literal adherence to the strictures of the Sermon on the Mount), Ditheists (who denied the existence of the Holy Spirit), and Anti-Trinitarians, now known as Unitarians (who denied the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth as well as the existence of the Holy Spirit).61 The strength of Protestantism in Poland, ephemeral though it proved to be, may be measured in the religious composition of the Diet of 1569, in which Catholics held 70 senatorial seats (15 of those seats being held by bishops), Protestants occupied 58 seats, and Orthodox had two seats, with three seats vacant.62 By the late sixteenth century, there were 600–700 Protestant parishes in the Commonwealth, representing roughly a sixth of the total number of Catholic parishes.63 Protestants were aware that their divisions represented a weakness and there was an initiative undertaken by Jan Łaski (1499– 1560) in the last three years of his life to effect the unification of the diverse Protestant communities into a single Protestant Church. He got as far as organizing a joint synod of the Calvinists and Bohemian Brethren at Włodzisław on 15 June 1557 but died on 8 January 1560, without having realized the goal he had set himself. By 1573, religious toleration and confessional equality had been established in law. But by then Protestantism in Poland was already in decline. There are five reasons why Protestantism largely withered away, allowing the Catholic Church to reclaim its near-monopoly in Poland.64 First, as already noted, the peasants were not caught up in the Reformation. In the short term, they did what their lords told them to do, albeit without commitment; in the long term, they remained faithful to Catholicism. Second, where Calvinism was concerned, the nobles had no interest either in Calvin’s doctrine of predestination or in the Calvinist-Reformed Church’s moral rigor.65 Moreover, as theological arguments escalated between Lutherans, Calvinists, and others, Protestants ceased to be attrac- tive for the noble class. Indeed, for the nobles, conversion to Protestantism THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION 29 was never about theological truth or the controversy about indulgences or any such doctrinal refinements. Rather, for the noble class, Protestantism was useful as a weapon against the powerful Catholic bishops. Later, after they had accomplished what they had set out to do, these shallow converts to Protestantism returned to the Catholic faith.66 Third, there was the problem of disunity among the Protestants, which neither Łaski nor anyone else was able to overcome. Fourth, increasing recourse, after the end of the sixteenth century, to discrimination in the political sphere against Protestants induced many to return to Catholicism. And fifth, the Roman Catholic counter to the Protestant Reformation was effective not only as a result of the Council of Trent, which undertook to codify Catholic doctrines in opposition to the “heresies” of the Protestants and to mount an effective cultural and liturgical response,67 but also through the energetic engagement of the Jesuits in the field of education and the renewed prestige of the hierarchy. The Reformation had an enormous impact on Poland. First, it ushered in a period of religious toleration, which was unmatched elsewhere in the sixteenth-century Europe.68 Second, the convergence of Renaissance humanism and Protestant Reformation in Poland in the first half of the sixteenth century enriched both humanism and Protestantism. Third, under the impact of the Reformation, Catholic Poles petitioned the pope to have the Holy Mass said in Polish, to have holy communion administered “in both kinds” (bread and wine), and to allow priests to marry69 – in this way anticipating demands which would be pressed more vigorously and, in part, more successfully at the Second Vatican Council of 1962–1965. Fourth, “in Poland, as elsewhere, the Reformation spread the use of the national language and contributed to the development of literature.”70 And fifth, the Protestant Reformation impacted Catholicism itself and also powerfully energized the Counter- Reformation, or – as it is sometimes called – the last phase of the broader Catholic Reformation, which had begun three centuries earlier.71

THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION The Counter-Reformation – understood, thus, as the last phase of an older undertaking to reform the Catholic Church from within – was an organized and purposeful response to the Protestant Reformation. The Catholic Reformation had begun during the papacy of Pope Innocent III (1160 or 1161–1216; reigned from 1198 to 1216), and had been 30 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772 steered in Poland by Archbishop Henryk Kietlicz of Gniezno (1150– 1219; archbishop 1199–1219).72 The main purposes of this broader Catholic Reformation were to improve the educational preparation of the clergy and bring the Polish Church up to date with changes in the West. Already before the end of the thirteenth century, clerical ranks gave birth to the accomplished historian Martinus Polonus of Opava (d. 1278), elected Archbishop of Gniezno shortly before his death, and Fr. Vitelo, physician and mathematician. In the following century, on 12 May 1364, King Kazimierz III the Great (1310–1370; reigned from 1333 to 1370) founded the University of Kraków, which developed into a major center for the study of theology.73 By the end of the fourteenth century, Piotr Wysz Radoliński, Bishop of Kraków from 1392 to 1412, was working with distinguished foreign bishops on issues of reform. There were other reformers in the fifteenth-century Polish Church – among them, Archbishop Jakub Strepa of Halicz (d. 1409), Professor Jan Cantius of the University of Kraków (d. 1473), and the first members of the Observant or Bernadine branch of the Franciscan Order, Simon of Lipnica (d. 1482), Jan of Dukla (d. 1484), and Władysław of Gielniów (d. 1505). All of these would later be either canonized or beatified.74 It was, thus, widely understood among Catholic clergy, even before the advent of Martin Luther, that the Church stood in need of reform. But among those issues which the Church had not confronted head-on was the sale of indulgences, as promises of relief in purgatory, in the afterlife, from some of the punishment for sins committed on earth. The sale of indulgences had a long history, going at least as far back as the thirteenth century, when the practice had been sanctioned by none other than Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), who was later canonized.75 Luther, a trained theologian, had other grievances, but it was the issue of indulgences which, more than anything else, drove Luther to protest and demand reform. The way the system worked was that the revenue generated through the sale of indulgences was shared between the Church and the state or local authorities.76 Luther originally posted his 95 theses in Latin, but soon brought out a German translation, in order to reach a wider public. This provoked an immediate reaction and, with that, the Catholic Reformation merged into the Counter-Reformation, which had both defensive and offensive aspects. Following the issuance of the papal bull “Exsurge Domine” (15 June 1520)77 by Pope Leo X, condemning Luther’s writings, King Sigismund I the Old (1467–1548; reigned 1506– 1548), acting under the influence of the Polish Primate, began to issue THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION 31 decrees against Luther’s teachings. For its part, the Church rounded up persons it suspected of heresy, bringing them before ecclesiastical tribunals; one of those convicted of heresy, Katarzyna Weiglowa, was burned at the stake in 1539. Others were deported from Poland.78 Throughout the Catholic world, the Church also undertook positive measures, for example, by improving pastoral care and endeavoring to raise the spiritual standards for clergy and laity alike. This included improving the training of secular and regular clergy, working to improve sermons, and – where the laity is concerned – energetically promoting the cult of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Speaking at a Church Synod in Piotrków, Bishop Piotr Gamrat identified “the faults and negligences of the clergy” as one of the reasons for the spread of Protestant ideas.79 Later appointed Primate, he addressed this deficiency directly in synods held in 1542 and 1544. As a result of decisions taken at the Council of Constance, the Catholic counter-offensive against Protestantism was stepped up in the 1560s. One of the key figures in the Polish Counter-Reformation was the aforementioned Bishop Hozjusz, installed as Prince-Bishop of Warmia in 1551. Among his other achievements, Bishop Hozjusz wrote a lengthy work entitled Confessio fidei catholicae christiana (1557), which explained the basics of the Christian faith. This work was hugely influential in Poland as well as, through translations into most West European languages, abroad.80 Hozjusz presided as chairman of the Council of Constance in its later sessions. It was also Hozjusz who brought the Jesuits to Poland in 1564; the Jesuits played a central role in building up the College of Wilno. By the 1560s, Protestant nobles were returning to the Catholic Church. The reversion to Catholicism was largely peaceful, though not without some violent incidents, such as rampages in the 1560s, when mobs, often involving students of Jesuits schools, demolished Protestant churches. In Ruthenian areas of the Grand Duchy, a large number of erstwhile Orthodox boyars converted to Catholicism about the same time.81 The Polish Counter-Reformation grew even stronger during the reign of King Stefan Báthory (1576–1586) and more particularly during the reign of his successor, King Sigismund III (1587–1632), who had been trained by the Jesuits.82 It was during the latter’s reign that the famous Union of Brest (Brześć in Polish) was concluded in 1596, under which a large number of Orthodox parishes returned to the Catholic fold. They were allowed to retain their traditional vestments, iconostases, liturgies, and hymns but agreed to accept Catholic doctrines and recognize the authority of the pope. In this way, the Eastern-Rite Catholic Church came into being. 32 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772

The Catholic Church temporarily lost hundreds of parishes where Protestants took over,83 but, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Catholic Church’s religious hegemony had been restored. The Lutherans, Calvinists, and Arians had been reduced to trivial numbers, and the Orthodox marginalized. By 1620, the Protestants had lost almost all of their places of worship.84 The Swedish-Polish War of 1655–1660 only reinforced the trend to Catholic revival, with Protestants ﬁnding themselves accused of sympathizing with Protestant Sweden. This war, also known as the Second Northern War, is remembered today, above all, for the successful defense by perhaps 250 untrained or poorly trained men, including 70 monks, of the Jasna Góra monastery in Częstochowa against a battle-tested Swedish armed force of about 3,000 soldiers. Given these staggering odds, a legend soon grew up that the defense was successful due to the miraculous intervention by the Blessed Virgin Mary.85 During the reigns of the Saxon kings, Augustus II the Strong (1697–1733) and Augustus III (1733–1763), the Polish Counter-Reformation reached its highpoint. In 1716, it was forbidden to build Protestant churches any- where in the country and there were limits placed on the public celebration of the Protestant liturgy. Nonetheless, as of 1768, there were still 48 Lutheran communities in Wielkopolska.86 Ironically, just as the Polish Counter-Reformation triumphed, both Poland and the Polish Church went into decline. As J. Umiński has written,

Religion was limited to fidelity to dogmas and the observance of external religious manifestations and forms deprived of any deeper meaning, with which in a strangely inconsistent way people managed to combine hypocrisy and falsity of conduct, litigiousness, private and class egotisms, injustice towards, and lack of human respect for, the lower classes, lack of readiness for sacrifices on behalf of the country, service to the enemies of the nation, and easy breaches of family ties. The decline of religious convictions and of that true religion which comprises also the principles of an honest life, increased still more during the reign of the last King before the partition of Poland, Stanislas [Stanisław] Augustus Poniatowski (1764–95). This King was a great lover and patron of learning, the fine arts and literature, but in religion, in conformity with the spirit of the time, [he was] a man ‘free from prejudices’, and moreover of weak character and wanton morals. Therefore it is not at all strange that, as far as the upper classes were concerned, the former looseness of the Saxon period degenerated into license.87 NOTES 33

NOTES 1. A. P. Vlasto, The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom: An Introduction to the Medieval History of the Slavs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 18. 2. Ibid., p. 115. 3. Such as Fr. Newman C. Eberhardt, C. M., A Summary of Catholic History (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1961), p. 879, and Carlton J. H. Hayes, Marshall Whithed Baldwin, and Charles Woolsey Cole, History of Europe (New York: Macmillan, 1949), p. 96 – as cited respectively in John Fleszar, “The Coming of Christianity to Poland as Described in English-Language Church Histories”,inPolish American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January–June 1966), p. 20, and Frederick W. Jackiewicz, “The Coming of Christianity to Poland as Described in English-Language College Textbooks”,inPolish American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January–June 1966), p. 34. 4. Vlasto, The Entry of the Slavs, p. 114. 5. See, for example, Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; ﬁfth printing, 2005), p. 5. 6. Oscar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1952), p. 42, and O. Halecki, The Millennium of Europe (Notre Dame, ND: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), p. 105 – both as cited in Donald Voytish, “The Introduction of Christianity Into Poland as Described in General Histories of Europe and the Slavs”,inPolish American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January–June 1966), p. 25. 7. Peter P. Yurchak, The Slovaks: Their History and Traditions (Whiting, IND: John J. Lach, 1947), p. 52, as quoted in Thaddeus J. Kaczmarek, “The Coming of Christianity to Poland as Described in the Histories of Poland’s Neighbors”,inPolish American Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January–June 1966), p. 27. 8. R. Nisbet Bain, Slavonic Europe: A Political History of Poland and Russia from 1447 to 1796 (Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1908; reissued in 2013), pp. 3–4, as quoted in Voytish, “The Introduction of Christianity Into Poland”, p. 24. 9. Pierre David, “The Church in Poland, from its Origin to 1250”,inW.F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson, O. Halecki, and R. Dyboski (eds.), The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (to 1696) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 63. 10. George J. Lerski, Historical Dictionary of Poland, 966–1945, with Special Editing & Emendations by Piotr Wróbel and Richard J. Kozicki (Westport, CT and London: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 327. 34 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772

11. Ibid., p. 5. See also Anthony F. Czajkowski, “The Congress of Gniezno in the Year 1000”,inSpeculum, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 1949), pp. 340–344. 12. Vlasto, The Entry of the Slavs, p. 131. 13. Lerski, Historical Dictionary of Poland, p. 44. 14. Vlasto, The Entry of the Slavs, pp. 133–134, 153. 15. As quoted in Janusz Tazbir, Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe: Myths and Historical Reality (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, N.D. [1984?]), p. 110. 16. Terence P. Ward, “Paganism in Poland”, The Wild Hunt: Modern Pagan News & Commentary (6 July 2016), at http://wildhunt.org/2016/07/ paganism-in-poland.html [accessed on 10 July 2016]. 17. Ibid. 18. I have borrowed this phrase from Russian history, where it is used to refer to the years 1598–1613. 19. S. Kętrzyński, “The Introduction of Christianity and the Early Kings of Poland”, in Reddaway et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Poland, [note 9] p. 38. 20. David, “The Church in Poland”, pp. 68–69. 21. Vlasto, The Entry of the Slavs, p. 133; and David, “The Church in Poland”, p. 70. 22. F. W. Carter, “Cracow’s Early Development”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (April 1983), p. 207. 23. David, “The Church in Poland”, p. 72. 24. “Norbert, St.”,inThe HarperCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, Richard P. McBrien, General Editor (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, a Division of HarperCollins, 1995), pp. 919–920. 25. Jerzy Kloczowski [Kłoczowski], A History of Polish Christianity, trans. from Polish by Małgorzata Sady with the Help of Piotr Pienkowski, Teresa Baruk- Ulewiczowa, and Magdalena Kloczowska (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 36; and David, “The Church in Poland”, pp. 78–79, 81. 26. Piotr Górecki, Parishes, Tithes and Society in Earlier Medieval Poland c. 1100–c. 1250 (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 83, No. 2, 1993), p. 49. 27. “Lateran councils”,inThe HarperCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, p. 753. 28. “Innocent III”,inThe HarperCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, p. 667. 29. Joné Deveiké, “The Legal Aspect of the Last Religious Conversion in Europe”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 32, No. 78 (December 1953), p. 126. 30. Ibid., pp. 120, 128. NOTES 35

31. In preferring the term the Great Schism, I am following the usage in The HarperCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism, p. 585, which nonetheless offers “the Great Western Schism” as an alternative. However, the encyclopedia also notes that “[t]he term ‘Great Schism’ is also sometimes used to refer to the division between Eastern and Western Christendom after 1054, when the papal legates and the patriarch of Constantinople mutually excommunicated each other.” This usage, to describe the Schism of 1378 as the ‘Great Schism’, is also favored by John Holland Smith, The Great Schism 1378 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970). 32. J. Umiński, “The Counter-Reformation in Poland”, in Reddaway et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (to 1696) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 394. 33. L. Bohdanowicz, “The Polish Tatars”,inMan, Vol. 44, Nos. 95–96 (September–October 1944), p. 116. 34. Helmut Holzapfel, Tausend Jahre Kirche Polens (Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1966), p. 54; and Greg S. Rogers, “An Examination of Historians’ Explanations for the Mongol Withdrawal from East Central Europe”,in East European Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 4–5. 35. As quoted in Anna Czarnowus, “The Mongols, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe: The Mirabilia Tradition in Benedict of Poland’s Historia Tartarorum and John of Plano Carpini’s Historia Mongalorum”, in Literature Compass, Vol. 11, No. 7 (2014), p. 489. 36. M. G., “Adam Mickiewicz: ‘Prophecies’”, in Balázs Trencsényi and Michal Kopeček (eds.), National Romanticism: The Formation of National Movements (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007), p. 409. 37. Paul W. Knoll, “Poland as ‘Antemurale Christianitatis’ in the Late Middle Ages”,inThe Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (October 1974), pp. 389–390. 38. Max Goldschneider, Glanz und Verderb der polnischen Republik (Vienna: Carl Hermann Verlag, 1919), I, p. 249f, as quoted in Knoll, “Poland as ‘Antemurale Christianitatis’”, p. 394. 39. Order der Brüder vom Deutschen Haus der Heiligen Maria in Jerusalem. 40. Wiktor Weintraub, “Renaissance Poland and Antemurale Christianitatis”, in Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. III/IV (1979–1980), Part 2, pp. 920– 921. 41. Tazbir, Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe, p. 25. 42. Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974; second printing with corrections), p. 38. 43. As quoted in Tazbir, Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe, p. 59. 36 2 FROM THE ORIGINS TO 1772

44. Oscar Halecki, “The Place of Czestochowa in Poland’s Millennium”,inThe Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (January 1967), p. 503. 45. For a detailed account of the 1683 Ottoman siege of Vienna, see John Stoye, Die Türken vor Wien. Schicksalsjahr 1683 (Graz: Ares Verlag, 2010). 46. Brian Porter, “Hetmanka and Mother: Representing the Virgin Mary in Modern Poland”,inContemporary European History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 2005), p. 154. 47. Walter Leitsch and Max Demeter Peyfuss, “Dreihundert Jahre seit dem Entsatz von Wien 1683: Tagungen, Publikationen und Ausstellungen”,in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1984), pp. 392–408. 48. As quoted in Tazbir, Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe, p. 60. 49. See the complete list at http://www.luther.de/en/95thesen.html [accessed on 11 July 2016]. 50. See Diamond MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided 1490– 1700 (London: Penguin Books, 2004); Alister E. McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999); and Bernard Lohse, Martin Luther: An Introduction to His Life and Work, trans. from German by Robert C. Schultz (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986). 51. Janusz Narzyński, “Zur Geschichte des Luthertums in Polen vom 16. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert”, in Gerhard Bassarak (ed.), Ökumene in Polen (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1982), p. 59. 52. Ibid., pp. 60–61. 53. Bohdan Cywiński, Ogniem Próbowane: Z dziejów najnowych Kościoła Katolickiego w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, Vol. 1 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1993), p. 46. 54. R. R. Betts, “Poland, Hungary and Bohemia”, in G. R. Elton (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. II: The Reformation 1520–1559 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 186; and Holzapfel, Tausend Jahre Kirche Polens, p. 75. 55. P. Fox, “The Reformation in Poland”, in Reddaway et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of Poland: From the Origins to Sobieski (to 1696) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 329. 56. Narzyński, “Zur Geschichte des Luthertums in Polen”, pp. 70–71. 57. Fox, “The Reformation”, pp. 324, 326. 58. Ibid., pp. 330–331. 59. Betts, “Poland, Hungary and Bohemia”, p. 195. 60. Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland – Vol. 1, The Origins to 1795, Revised ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 138– 143; and Narzyński, “Zur Geschichte des Luthertums in Polen”, p. 63. 61. Fox, “The Reformation”, pp. 333, 340. NOTES 37

62. Ibid., pp. 344–345. 63. 600 according to Ibid., p. 345; 700 according to Narzyński, “Zur Geschichte des Luthertums in Polen”, p. 69, who adds that 191 of these were located in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 64. This list is derived from Fox, “The Reformation”, pp. 345–347. 65. Narzyński, “Zur Geschichte des Luthertums in Polen”, p. 64. 66. Fox, “The Reformation”, p. 346. 67. See Erwin Iserloh, “Luther and the Council of Trent”,inThe Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 69, No. 4 (October 1983), pp. 563–576; Kevin V. Mulcahy, “The Cultural Policy of the Counter-Reformation; The Era of St. Peter’s”,inInternational Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (March 2011), pp. 131–152; Craig A. Monson, “The Council of Trent Revisited”, in Journal of the American Musicological Society, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 1–37; and K. G. Fellerer [Karl Gustav Fellerer] and Moses Hadas, “Church Music and the Council of Trent”,inThe Musical Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (October 1953), pp. 576–594. 68. See Janusz Tazbir, Geschichte der polnischen Toleranz, trans. from Polish by Ruth Brümmer (Warsaw: Verlag Interpress, 1977). 69. Fox, “The Reformation”, p. 337. 70. Oscar Halecki, A History of Poland (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1955), p. 125. 71. On this point, see Kloczowski, A History of Polish Christianity, pp. 126–129. 72. Umiński, “The Counter-Reformation in Poland”, p. 393. 73. “History of the Jagiellonian University”, Jagiellonian University in Kraków, www.en.uj.edu.pl/en_GB/about-university/history [accessed on 4 July 2016]. 74. Umiński, “The Counter-Reformation in Poland”, p. 395. 75. Reinhold Kiermayr, “How Much Money was Actually in the Indulgences Chest?”,inThe Sixteenth Century, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Autumn 1986), p. 304. 76. Ibid., p. 305. 77. English translation posted at https://www.ewtn.com/library/ PAPALDOC/L10EXDOM.HTM [accessed on 16 July 2016]. 78. Umiński, “The Counter-Reformation in Poland”, p. 397. 79. Ibid., p. 398. 80. Ibid., p. 400. 81. Kloczowski, A History of Polish Christianity, pp. 112–113. 82. Narzyński, “Zur Geschichte des Luthertums in Polen”, p. 75. 83. Kloczowski, A History of Polish Christianity, p. 109. 84. Narzyński, “Zur Geschichte des Luthertums in Polen”, p. 75. 85. Halecki, “The Place of Czestochowa”, pp. 500–501. 86. Narzyński, “Zur Geschichte des Luthertums in Polen”, p. 76. 87. Umiński, “The Counter-Reformation in Poland”, p. 415. CHAPTER 3

The Polish Church in the Era of the Partitions, 1772–1918

The narrative which came out of the era of the Partitions and which made a great contribution to wedding not just the Polish people, but the Polish nation, to the Catholic Church was that, during the years 1795–1918, Poland disappeared from the map of Europe, with Poles enduring cultural and religious repression at the hands of Prussian/ German and Russian authorities (though not at the hands of Austrian authorities in Galicia), that the Catholic Church stood by the Polish nation and played a central role in preserving Polish culture and the Polish language, and that the Church stood by the Polish people when they rose up against Russian rule in the great rebellions launched in 1830 and 1863. One might call this an oversimpliﬁcation or even a misleading narrative, but it was the narrative which embedded itself in the minds of many Poles as they entered the twentieth century. A more correct narrative would point out that the state which was partitioned in the eighteenth century was not Poland as such, but rather the Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It would also note that there were three reincarnations of Poland during the years 1795–1918: the Duchy of Warsaw, created by Napoleon as a partially autonomous French satellite, and existing during the years 1807–1813, the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań), set up in 1815 as part of Prussian-ruled Poland and enjoying autonomy, with Polish as the main language of administration; and the Congress Kingdom,

© The Author(s) 2017 39 S.P. Ramet, The Catholic Church in Polish History, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-40281-3_3 40 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 comprising a partially autonomous region within the Russian Empire, with the Tsar of Russia also functioning as the King of Poland, and existing from 1815 to 1867 (although downgraded after the 1830–1831 uprising). This does not count a transient rump Kingdom of Poland proclaimed byGermanandAustrianauthoritieson5November1916inpartof German-occupied Russia on 5 November 1916.1 It is also misleading to believe that the entire era, from 1772 to 1918, was an era of cultural and religious repression. To begin with, Austria was Catholic and in the Austrian-ruled province of Galicia Poles enjoyed a Polish-language university, Polish theater, and various Polish-language scientific journals, among other things. But even in Prussia and Russia, policies were initially lenient. For example, after the first partition, the Russian court guaranteed religious liberty. Of particular importance is the fact that the University of Warsaw was founded as a result of a royal decree issued by Russian Tsar Alexander I (1777–1828; reigned 1801–1825) in 1816 and continued to exist until 1831 when, in reprisal for the November Uprising, it was closed for three decades.2 Indeed, in Russia, it was only after the first rebellion that there was a partial tightening of controls and only after the second rebellion that there was a more complete retraction of concessions to the Poles, combined with a systematic effort to make Russian the dominant language among Poles. Finally, where the Church is concerned, the Holy See looked out for its own interests, prioritizing the preservation of Catholic faith and practice among Poles; preserving or restoring the Polish nation was not a Vatican priority. Indeed, Popes Gregory XVI and Pius IX, who reigned in Rome during the two great anti-Russian rebellions, respectively, told the Poles to lay down their arms and obey the secular authorities, meaning the tsar’s government, which God – they claimed – hadappointedoverthem.Thereweresomepriestswhotookthe side of the rebels and even participated in the rebellion, but they were in the minority, though highly visible and celebrated. The more accurate and nuanced version of the era of the Partitions is, of course, less inspiring but it gives credit where credit is due.

PROLOGUE The Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – also known less formally as the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth – was a huge country, covering approximately 450,000 sq. miles or 1,200,000 sq. km. in the early seventeenth century, and PROLOGUE 41 stretching from the Baltic Sea in the north almost as far as the Black Sea in the south. At that time, the Commonwealth included about 4.5 million Poles, 3.5 million Ukrainians, 1.5 million Belorussians (or Belarusians), ¾ million Lithuanians, ¾ million Old Prussians (a now extinct group that spoke a Baltic language), ½ million Jews, and ½ million Livonians (a people living today in parts of Latvia and Estonia who spoke a language closely related to Estonian and Finnish). After some territorial losses, the Commonwealth’s population sank to about 9 million inhabitants, counting 4.5 million Poles, 1.5 million Ukrainians, 1.2 million Belorussians, 0.8 million Lithuanians, ½ million Jews, and ½ million members of other nationality groups.3 Given the numerical preponderance of Poles, it is not surprising that both at that time and in recent times the Commonwealth was and has been often referred to as the Kingdom of Poland. As of the late 1760s, the Commonwealth’s population of, by then, 14 million was in the main Roman Catholic, but included also 4.7 million Eastern-Rite Catholics, 400,000 Orthodox Christians, and 587,236 Jews (of whom 429,587 lived in Poland proper, with the remaining Jews living in Lithuania).4 There were also Protestants and others living in the Commonwealth. Calvinists (members of the Reformed Church), Lutherans, and Orthodox living in the Commonwealth had been deprived of their political rights in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, among other things losing the rights to elect deputies to the Sejm (or Diet) or to hold high ofﬁce.5 In the religious sphere, the Catholic Church had established a practice of not recognizing Protestant clergymen as clergy, the right to inspect Protestant Church life, and a requirement to be paid for sacraments administered by Protestant clergymen.6 Catherine II (1729–1796; reigned from 1762 to 1796), Empress of Russia, whom Simon Dixon has described as a “secularised Protestant,”7 but whom Isabela de Madariaga has characterized as having been “probably an agnostic,”8 stepped forward in 1766 to demand that the Commonwealth’s Sejm grant freedom of worship to Protestants and Orthodox and that discrimination on the basis of religion be abolished in the Commonwealth. She even managed to persuade King George III of England to support her effort. Having installed her former lover, Stanisław Poniatowski (1732–1798; reigned from 1764 to 1795) on the throne as King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, Catherine hoped to use her advocacy on behalf of the religious “dissenters,” as they were called by the Catholics, as an opening gambit in a bid to block the new King’s efforts to abolish the liberum veto (see the previous chapter) and to justify a Russian 42 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 military incursion to “rescue” the Protestants and Orthodox. By a combination of force and the deportation of recalcitrant deputies deep into Russia, Catherine succeeded in bending the Sejm to her will: as of 1768, dissenters would be granted representation in the Sejm and the Senate; the Orthodox Bishop of Mohylew was given a seat in the Senate; and the liberum veto was kept in place for all nontrivial legislative acts.9 In addition, the agreement reached in 1768 granted Protestants the right to construct churches and permitted confessionally mixed marriages “with children taking the religion of the parent of the same sex.”10 Outraged by these concessions to St. Petersburg, a group of nobles met in the town of Bar in February 1768 and organized themselves under the name the Bar Confederation, swearing to overthrow King Stanisław Augustus, as he styled himself, and bring a Saxon prince once more to the royal throne of Poland–Lithuania. Russian troops made short shrift of the Confederation’s insurgency.

FROM THE FIRST PARTITION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 3MAY 1791 At that time, there were frictions between Austria’s Maria Theresa (1717– 1780; reigned as Empress-Consort of the Holy Roman Empire, 1745– 1765 and Queen of Hungary and Croatia, and Archduchess of Austria, 1740–1780, among other titles), Prussia’s Friedrich II (1712–1786; reigned as King of Prussia, 1740–1786, and conventionally known as Friedrich or Frederick the Great), and Russia’s Catherine II, who has come down in history as Catherine the Great. These frictions gathered strength in the 1760s and continued into the dawn of the 1770s. Both Friedrich and Catherine nurtured ambitions, where Poland was concerned. Indeed, as early as 1752, Friedrich had described Poland, in his Political Testament, as “an artichoke, ready to be consumed leaf by leaf.”11 The ﬁrst “leaf” was obviously, in Friedrich’s mind, the Polish region of Royal or West Prussia, which separated Brandenburg (with Berlin) from East Prussia (with the city of Königsberg). Given the Russian Empress’s interest in Poland, Friedrich knew that he would have to coordinate any Prussian move against Poland with her. He bided his time but, in September 1768, he presented a plan to the Russian Empress for a partition of Poland, only to ﬁnd that she was not yet ready for such a move.12 But after Austrian troops captured Spisz in 1769 and the towns of Nowy FROM THE FIRST PARTITION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 3 MAY 1791 43

Targ and Nowy Sącz the following year, annexing them to the Habsburg Crown Lands, Friedrich sensed that his Russian counterpart might well be ready to strike a deal. Quite apart from the territorial gains, which might be had at Poland’s expense, by including Austria in a tripartite treaty of partition, the project might ease tensions between the three states while, of course, also limiting Austrian and Russian expansion. At first, the Holy See hoped that Vienna could be persuaded to block the planned partition of Poland. And indeed, Maria Theresa did hope, at first, to keep Russia and Prussia out of Poland. But with the pressure of events, as well as persuasion by her son Joseph II (1741–1790; Holy Roman Emperor, 1765–1790 and co-regent with his mother of the Habsburg crown lands, 1765–1790 and, after the death of his mother also King of Hungary, Croatia, and Bohemia) and the eventual conversion to the idea of partition on the part of Prince Wenzel Anton Kaunitz (1711– 1794), who shaped Vienna’s foreign policy, she finally relented and agreed to be a party to the carving up of Poland.13 Prussia and Russia agreed in principle already in June 1771 to partition Poland, with Austria acceding to the agreement the following February. Once the treaty of partition was signed (on 5 August 1772; 25 July according to the Russian Orthodox calendar), the Holy See wanted Austria, as the only Catholic power among the three partners to the partition, to annex as large a portion of Poland as possible.14 Following on the treaty of partition, the three powers sent their troops across the Polish–Lithuanian border, depriving the Commonwealth of 30% of its land mass and 35% of its population. As a result of this first partition, Russia gained 12.7% of Polish land with 1.3 million inhabitants, Prussia took 5% of Poland’s territory with 580,000 inhabitants, renaming the area it had annexed West Prussia, and Austria acquired 11.8% of Poland’s territory, Galicia and Lodomeria, with 2,130,000 inhabitants.15 After the first partition, Pope Clement XIV (1705–1774; reigned 1769–1774) welcomed Austria’s annexation. Already on the eve of this first partition, philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) had penned a tract under the title Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Projected Reformation, in which he pointed to the paradox that “a State so bizarrely constituted could have continued to exist for such a long time” and underlined “the anarchy that reigns in the Polish state.”16 Anticipating the impending partition of what he considered a cumbersome state, Rousseau commented that, while it “would be a great evil for the dismembered parts ...this would be a great good for the body of the Nation.”17 He proposed various reforms, 44 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 including the elimination of the liberum veto and the establishment of a hereditary monarchy or, alternatively, a monarchy with succession by lottery – either of which would have eliminated foreign intrigues in the succession.18 Finally, he urged Poles to stimulate and strengthen national feeling so as to make their country “indigestible” by Russia and other foreign states.19 King Stanisław Augustus withheld his acquiescence to the partition for the time being but Giuseppe Garampi, who had been appointed apostolic nuncio to Warsaw in spring 1772 but who had arrived at his post only in September 1772, urged the King to accept the fait accompli. Garampi warned the King that continued resistance – obstinacy, in Garampi’s view – risked provoking Russia and Prussia to annihilate Poland altogether. Pressed by the nuncio and lacking effective means to reverse the partition, the King finally decided in spring 1773 to accept the partition. Later, the Russian ambassador told the nuncio that, had the King not conceded on this point, Russian troops would have sacked Warsaw and Poland would have been subjected to a complete partition.20 Although the partitioning powers had curtailed most of the King’s prerogatives, empowering a newly formed Parliamentary (or Permanent) Council whose members were selected by Russia, the King nonetheless took up a program of reform, which overlapped in part with Rousseau’srecom- mendations. King Stanisław Augustus looked to overhauling the state’s financial system, bringing reform to the educational sector and getting rid of ancient laws, which kept the noble class out of manufacturing.21 Stanisław Augustus also declared a hereditary monarchy in his line. Where the Church was concerned, Gabriel Podoski, who was close to the Russian ambassador, Nikolai Repnin, held the office of Primate of Poland during the years 1767–1777. He had become Primate against the will of either the pope or the King and connived with Repnin to make the Polish Church independent of Rome; it was to be headed, of course, by Podoski. The plan died when Repnin abandoned it, in order to obtain the aforementioned agreement of 1768 to admit dissenters, that is, Orthodox and Protestants, into the Sejm.22 Nor was this the only challenge which the Church faced at this time. This was, after all, the height of the Enlightenment and Friedrich II, Maria Theresa, Catherine II, and Stanisław Augustus were all influenced by the Enlightenment. Concretely, Enlightenment thinking held, among other things, that religious orders which ran hospitals and schools were useful, but that contemplative orders were not useful and should be shut down. Stanisław FROM THE FIRST PARTITION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF 3 MAY 1791 45

Augustus was of this opinion. Indeed, attacks on religious orders had been frequent in the 1760s and became worse after the suppression of the Jesuits in 1773. Nonetheless, in the years leading up to the final partition of Poland in 1795, no other religious orders were banned. Meanwhile, in 1773, the King’s brother, Michał Poniatowski, had been consecrated Bishop of Płock and, in 1784, he was elevated to Archbishop of Gniezno and Primate of Poland. In July 1788, war broke out between Russia and Turkey. Shortly thereafter, Empress Catherine consented to the Polish King’s request to be allowed to call the Sejm into session. The Sejm convened in October 1788 and remained in session until after Russo-Turkish hostilities ended in January 1792, coming to be known therefore as the Four Years’ Sejm. This Sejm established new administrative agencies, approved new taxes, and took other initiatives, including in diplomacy.23 The Sejm’s ambitious agenda even extended to the aspiration to wrest back control of the eastern provinces from Russia, taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with its Turkish war. In an act of open defiance of Russia, the Sejm abolished the Parliamentary Council (in January 1789), the body imposed on the Poles by Russia after the first partition. Almost as soon as the Sejm was convened, there were demands that the army should be expanded. Under the terms of the partition treaty, to which Poland had subscribed in 1773, the Commonwealth’s army was limited to 20,000 men. In October 1788, in one of its first moves, the Sejm voted to increase the strength of the military to 100,000 men. There was widespread support for this initiative, and the bishops even offered to pay a tax rate twice that levied on the gentry in order to contribute to the costs of the expansion of the army.24 But the taxes were not sufficient to raise a 100,000-strong army. In the meantime, the insane bishop of Kraków had died and, on 17 July 1789, the Sejm voted to confiscate the properties of the bishopric of Kraków in order to defray the costs of the expansion of the army. The following year a compromise entirely satisfactory to the Church was reached, whereby the new bishop of Kraków would retrieve sufficient property to be able to support himself but the subvention which had hitherto been provided to the incumbent of the bishopric would be canceled, applying the funds thereby released to the military budget; it was agreed that these funds would be allocated to support military hospitals.25 Up until then, it had not been considered necessary to codify the ecclesiastical predominance of the Catholic Church. But on 2 September 1790, a “Cardinal Law” was presented to the Sejm, declaring the Roman 46 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

Catholic faith to be the “dominant” (panująca) faith of Poland. A subsequent legislative bill was read the following day to the nobles assembled in the Sejm, declaring apostasy a criminal offense. The texts of these two bills provoked extended debates but finally, in October 1790, the eleventh draft of the Cardinal Law was approved.26 The Four Years’ Sejm also undertook to change the boundaries of the bishoprics, to make them roughly equal in size and income. The Sejm’s reform was directed toward increasing the number of dioceses and parishes, assuring adequate funding for seminaries, and eliminating “glaring disproportions in various areas, including differences between the Catholics of both [Roman and Eastern] rites.”27 The high point of the Four Years’ Sejm was the passage of a new constitution on 3 May 1791. When the Sejm broke for Easter holiday, deputies hostile to the constitutional draft were allowed to believe that the Sejm would reconvene later than was the case and, in their absence, the Sejm hastily approved the constitution. The Constitution of 1791 established a hereditary monarchy, abolished the liberum veto (thereby securing the constitution even after its opponents were to return from Easter holidays), confirmed a bill stripping landless gentry of noble rank and the right to take part in elections, and simplified the working relationship between the King and the legislature.28 Accompanying passage of the constitution was a declaration, which repealed all laws incompatible with the new constitution and declared that anyone opposing the constitution would be considered a traitor. The constitution established a Custodial Council (Straż Praw) as the highest executive body: its eight members included the King, the Primate of the Church, and the Marshal of the Sejm.29 The constitution also included an article on religion, which read as follows:

The dominant religion of the nation is and shall be the holy Roman Catholic faith with all its rights. Conversion from the dominant faith to any [other] confession whatsoever is forbidden under the penalties for apostasy. Given, however, that the same holy faith commands us to love our neighbors, therefore we owe peace in faith, and the protection of the government to all people, of whatever confession, and so we guarantee the freedom of all rites and religions in the Polish territories, according to the law of the country.30

Note here that only Polish territories are mentioned; with this document, the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania was effectively laid to rest. THE SECOND AND THIRD PARTITIONS 47

However, from the Vatican’s standpoint, the extension of freedom of worship and guarantee of religious freedom to “all rites and religions” was most unwelcome (Map 3.1).31

THE SECOND AND THIRD PARTITIONS Empress Catherine was displeased, to say the least, with this display of independence on the part of the Polish Sejm but was not prepared to address the issue as long as Russia was locked in war with Turkey. Finally, on 29 December 1791, a treaty was signed between St. Petersburg and Constantinople, ending the four-year-long war and resulting in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, as well as the coast between the Bug and Dniester estuaries; Russia also expanded its holdings on the north shore of the Black Sea. A second development favorable for Russian action vis-à-vis Poland was the death, in March 1792, of Leopold II (1747–1792; reigned as Holy Roman Emperor, King of Hungary, and Archduke of Austria following the death of Joseph II in 1790), who had kept Prussia – a potential partition partner for Russia – away from further expansion at Poland’s expense.32 Finally, within Poland, there were nobles who objected to Stanisław Augustus’s introduction of a hereditary monarchy. Already in 1767, there had been anti-Stanisław confederations of Protestant nobles in Toruń, of Orthodox nobles at Słuck, and of Catholic nobles at Radom, all of them hoping to remove the sitting monarch – but Catherine would have none of it.33 Now, in the wake of the passage of the 3 May Constitution, Polish discontents, led by Felix Potocki, Seweryn Rzewuski, Ksawery Branicki, and Szymon Kossakowski, organized themselves as the Targowica Confederation and, at the end of April 1792, appealed to Russia for assistance. Refusing to accept the constitution, they hoped naively that Catherine would restore the status quo ante. On 18 May 1792, 97,000 Russian troops crossed the Polish border, facing 65,000 Polish troops. Prince Józef Poniatowski and Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746–1817) scored some victories for the Polish side, but the more experienced and larger Russian army ultimately triumphed.34 Catherine pressed the Polish King to join the Targowica Confederation – in effect, to give up both the hereditary monarchy and the 3 May Constitution. The King acquiesced together with most of his cabinet on 24 July and urged the army to end its resistance. Kościuszko and Józef Poniatowski emigrated.35 On 23 January 1793, having renounced its treaty with Poland, Prussia joined Russia in signing a treaty of partition. As a result of this 48 H OIHCUC NTEEAO H ATTOS 1772 PARTITIONS, THE OF ERA THE IN CHURCH POLISH THE 3 – 1918

Map 3.1 The partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) THE SECOND AND THIRD PARTITIONS 49

Second Partition of Poland, Prussia annexed 58,000 sq. km. of territory, including Gdańsk (in German, Danzig), with 1.1 million inhabitants, and Russia gaining 250,200 sq. km. of land in Ukrainian- and Belorussian- inhabited regions of the Polish Kingdom, with 3 million inhabitants.36 Rather than restoring Poland to its pre-May status, as the Targowica confederates had hoped, the Russian ambassador was authorized to vet all political decisions to be taken by the Sejm and Russian troops were stationed in what was left of Poland in order to enforce this arrangement.37 Having no influenceinSt.Petersburg,theHolySeesimplyaccommo- dated itself to the territorial and political provisions of the second partition. Besides, from the Vatican’s point of view, the suppression of the Sejm was not unwelcome. As for the leaders of the Targowica Confederation, Potocki, Rzewuski, and Branicki resigned in humiliation. The Sejm convened in Grodno, Lithuania, in June 1793, annulled the 3 May Constitution, and, under duress, ratified the Second Partition. The Permanent Council was reestablished. In Dresden, Polish émigrés planned an uprising and called on Tadeusz Kościuszko, who had earned the rank of Brigadier General in his service in the American Revolutionary War, to serve as commander. The insurrection began in March 1794, “when General Antoni Madaliński refused orders [from Russian authorities] to disband his cavalry unit.” On 24 March, Kościuszko, dressed in folk attire and flanked by infantry and artillery troops, proclaimed a revolutionary government, subsequently inflicting a defeat on a Russian column at Racławice on 4 April “thanks to an heroic last minute charge by peasants armed with scythes.”38 Driven by enthusiasm for the cause of Polish liberty, Kościuszko’s troops liberated Warsaw and Wilno before the end of April. Fearing for his life, the Russian ambassador took flight, and the revolutionary government ruled in Warsaw from 28 May to 4 November 1794. Bishop Józef Kossakowski of Livonia, who had openly supported Russia and declared his opposition to the Constitution of 3 May, was imprisoned by the insurgents and hanged on 9 May 1794. Bishop Ignacy Massalski of Wilno, an erstwhile supporter of the Targowica Confederation, who had declared his opposition to the national uprising of 1794, was hanged by an angry mob on 28 June 1794. Primate-Archbishop Poniatowski, who had warned against an insurrection, took note of the fate of his fellow hierarchs. When that insurrection seemed to some to be assured of success, the Primate was publicly vilified; rather than waiting for the radicals to decide his fate, the Primate took poison on 12 August 1794.39 But the tide of war began to 50 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 turn as early as June 1794, when the Russians recaptured first Kraków and then Wilno. The Russian siege of Warsaw, which was abandoned in early September, was renewed by the end of the same month. In hopes of breaking through the Russian encirclement of the city, Kościuszko led an assault on Maciejowice, a town 40 miles southeast of Warsaw. However, his forces were outnumbered four-to-one and were crushed. Kościuszko, wounded in three places, was captured, Cossacks charged the city, killing Polish General Jakub Jasiński, and slaughtering as many Poles as they could find.40 The insurrection of 1794 was over. On 3 January 1795, the three parties to the first partition of Poland signed a final treaty of partition in St. Petersburg, dividing up what remained of Poland, with Austria gaining western Galicia and southern Masovia, with about 1.2 million inhabitants, Prussia annexing Podlachia and the rest of Masovia, together with Warsaw, with about 1 million inhabitants, and Russia taking the largest slice of land, including the city of Vilnius; the Russian share brought about 1.2 million persons into the Russian empire. On 12 January 1796, the three partitioning powers signed a convention erasing the name “Poland” from maps and other official usage.41 There were further attempts to revive armed struggle between 1796 and 1798, but these were easily suppressed.

THE RUSSIAN SECTOR,1795–1914 As a result of the partitions, Russian inherited 62% of the land which had belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Within this vast region, 40% of the population consisted of Belurussians; 26% were Poles. The rest of the population consisted of Ukrainians, Ruthenes, Lithuanians, Russians, Tatars, and Jews. While most of the Poles were Roman Catholics, the Ruthenes and Belorussians tended to be members of the Eastern-Rite Catholic Church. Russian Poland, 1795–1830. In consequence of the partitions, the Church lost 2,585,000 hectares of land, of which 1,700,000 hectares were lost in the Russian partition. The tsarist authorities seized both Roman Catholic and Eastern-Rite Catholic properties, turning them over to the Orthodox Church.42 But although Catholic clergy were placed under state supervision, the “monasteries were not liquidated and Tsar Paul I (1750–1801; reigned from 1796 to 1801), the successor to Catherine II, stopped the persecution of Uniates [Eastern-Rite Catholics], i.e., the practice of forcing them to convert to the Orthodox THE RUSSIAN SECTOR, 1795–1914 51

Church.”43 Catherine had viewed the Eastern-Rite Catholics as “rene- gades” and had brought armed force to bear to induce conversions to Orthodoxy – a policy that would be taken up once again in the 1830s, following the November Uprising and yet again in the 1860s, following the January Uprising.44 During these years, authorities burned books belonging to Eastern-Rite Catholics, destroyed their churches, and murdered Eastern-Rite Catholic priests. In 1839, St. Petersburg forbade the Eastern-Rite Catholics to have any further contact with the Vatican. But the years 1796–1830 were a time of relative liberality. Tsar Alexander I (1777–1825), in particular, who ascended the throne in 1801, brought in the Polish patriot, Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770– 1861) as his foreign minister and, early in his reign, liberated those Poles who had been exiled to Siberia, while allowing Poles living abroad to return to their neighborhoods.45 Alexander I created a Clerical Commission and brought in Eastern-Rite Catholics as members; in 1805, he divided the Commission into two sections – one for each rite of the Catholic Church present in Russia. The new tsar also appointed Czartoryski as curator of the Wilno (Vilnius) school district in 1803; in this post, Czartoryski guided a reform of the University of Wilno. Poles were appointed to head the universities at Kharkov and Wilno, and also at the Krzemieniec Lyceum. Education continued in Polish at these institutions of higher learning as well as throughout the extensive network of secondary schools in Polish-inhabited areas (Map 3.2).46 This was, however, the era of the Napoleonic Wars and, in July 1807, after defeating Prussia on the ﬁeld of battle and capturing Berlin on 25 October 1806, Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821; reigned as Emperor of the French from 1804 to 1814) signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Tsar Alexander on 7 July 1807. Two days later, Napoleon signed a second treaty with Prussia. As a result of these treaties, a Duchy of Warsaw was established as a resurrected Polish state but de facto French satellite. The Duchy was constructed on Polish territories which had been ceded to Prussia earlier47 (see the next section for the discussion of the Duchy’s system). The tsar had been sympathetic all along to the idea of reestablishing the Kingdom of Poland, albeit obviously under his own scepter,48 and, after the defeat of Napoleon, Czartoryski raised the issue of uniting all Polish lands in one kingdom, with the Tsar of Russia sitting as King of Poland. But England, Austria, Prussia, and France, now under the restored Bourbon dynasty, resisted this plan and saw to it that Prussia regained the Poznań and Toruń districts; Kraków and its environs were set up as a semi-autonomous 52 H OIHCUC NTEEAO H ATTOS 1772 PARTITIONS, THE OF ERA THE IN CHURCH POLISH THE 3 – 1918

Map 3.2 The Duchy of Warsaw (1807–1815) THE RUSSIAN SECTOR, 1795–1914 53

Republic of Kraków. Even so, Russia expanded its Polish holdings, setting up an autonomous Kingdom of Poland, often called “the Congress Kingdom,” with Alexander as king. Although Alexander wielded executive authority in this Congress Kingdom, legislative powers were assigned to a revived Sejm, with representatives from the Polish nobility sitting in it. Polish institutions and laws were retained, Polish remained the official language in the kingdom, and there was even a Polish army. During the decade following the 1815 Congress of Vienna, Polish trade was reoriented to (the rest of) the Russian Empire. According to Zawadzki, “[f]orPolishlandedand educated classes, ...in the first years of Alexander’s reign Russia was the most tolerant of the partitioning powers and the one least likely to deny them their national traditions and social privileges.”49 But the Congress Kingdom was autonomous, not independent, and in any case was a truncated Poland – as Waliszewski put it, a “Lilliputian Kingdom of Poland.”50 Toward the end of 1825, Tsar Alexander died and was succeeded by his younger brother, Nicholas I (1796–1855), who set about closing Polish schools, starting in Wilno (Map 3.3). Under Nicholas I, some of the remaining properties of the Roman Catholic Church were secular- ized. Catholic priests were put on the government payroll, receiving salaries which were just a fraction of what Orthodox clergy received.51 While Alexander I is remembered for his liberality and, within limits, sympathy for the Poles, Nicholas I has come down in history – for at least one historian – as “the most reactionary tsar the Russian Empire ever had.”52 During his reign, “the disorder, the brutality, the arbi- trariness, and the corruption of justice and police” were legendary.53 Repression was so severe that, in Aksakov’s words, “everywhere in Russia only silence could be heard.”54 As if that was not bad enough, Russian officials were paid so poorly that it was completely routine for officials, including judges, to expect to be bribed.55 The combination of repression and widespread corruption was mephitic and Poles, at least, needed only to find the right moment to rise up in rebellion. From the insurrection of 1830–1831 to the death of Tsar Nicholas I in 1855. That moment came in 1830 when revolutionary tremors swept through France (in July) and Belgium (in August), reaching Switzerland in November. On 29 November 1830, a week after revolution had broken out in Switzerland, a group of junior officers in Warsaw launched an insurrection against Russian rule and seized the local arsenal, capturing 54 H OIHCUC NTEEAO H ATTOS 1772 PARTITIONS, THE OF ERA THE IN CHURCH POLISH THE 3 – 1918

Map 3.3 International borders, 1815–1914, showing the Congress Kingdom THE RUSSIAN SECTOR, 1795–1914 55

30,000 riﬂes, which were quickly distributed among the people of Warsaw. Eventually, about 200,000 Poles joined the insurrection – a small proportion of the Polish population.56 Polish military units were divided, with some joining the uprising and others, possibly out of confusion, joining the Russian troops. Four bishops expressed their support for the insurrection by signing a manifesto issued by the Sejm which declared the dethronement of Nicholas I, while about 50 monks took direct part in the uprising.57 This was of course not enough to make a difference in the outcome of this poorly planned and ill-prepared insurgency. On 5 February 1831, Russian troops launched an offensive and, by May, had reversed a series of Polish victories. The Polish effort was weakened, among other things, by insufﬁcient funds and the resistance of Polish peasants to conscription. As Prażmowska recounts,

On 6 September Russian units led by Field Marshal Ivan Paskievich approached Warsaw from the west. The Poles were not prepared, as they had anticipated an attack from the east. When the military collapse became inevitable, the government resigned and the army withdrew, without conceding defeat or signing an armistice. Thousands of men streamed into exile rather than accept humiliating conditions of capitulation.58

After the suppression of the November Uprising, the Sejm and the Polish army were disbanded, and an organic statute, adopted on 22 February 1832, reduced the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland. Martial law was introduced – to be lifted only a quarter of a century later, and 100,000 Russian troops were stationed in the Kingdom, with beefed up police and surveillance. “Existing Polish institutions were abolished, gradually subordinated to St. Petersburg, or reorganized Russian-style, with Russians or loyal Poles in the top positions.”59 Given the willingness of certain bishops to endorse the insurrection, there were concerns that the Catholic Church might be forced to break with Rome or, worse yet, be forced to merge into the Orthodox Church.60 At the direct instruction of Austrian and Russian authorities,61 Pope Gregory XVI (1765–1846; reigned 1831–1846) issued an encyclical on civil obedience, Cum Primum, on 9 June 1832. Given its issuance after the insurrection had been suppressed, it most certainly was not directed at the insurgents; it was patently intended for the Russian authorities, even though it was addressed, as it could only be, “to all Archbishops and Bishops dwelling in the Kingdom of Poland.” In a key passage, the pontiff explicitly declared that the tsar had been 56 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

“appointed by God” to rule over the Poles. “[T]he obedience which men are obliged to render to the authorities established by God,” the pope declared,

is an absolute precept which no one can violate, except if by chance something is commanded which runs counter to the laws of God or of the Church. “Let everyone” says the Apostle, “be subject to higher authorities, for there exists no authority except from God. Therefore, he who resists the [secular] authority resists the ordination of God” ...Similarly St. Peter (1 Pt 2.13) teaches all the faithful: “Be subject to every human creature for God’s sake, whether to the king as supreme, or to the governors sent through him.”. ...Your emperor will act kindly toward you; at no time will he deny his patronage for the good of the Catholic religion and he will always listen patiently to your requests ...Meanwhile raising our hands to heaven, We pray God for you that he may enrich and ﬁll each one of you more and more every day with an abundance of heavenly virtues.62

The regime’s real intent, however, was neither to force the Catholic Church in occupied Poland into schism nor to compel it to merge with the Orthodox Church. While Tsar Nicholas I did contemplate abolishing the Archdiocese of Warsaw or placing Catholic dioceses under the authority of the Orthodox Bishop of Mohylew, the governor he had appointed to serve as Prince of Warsaw and as his viceroy in Poland, none other than General Ivan Paskievich, commander of the Russian forces which had subdued the recent insurrection, had a different idea. What Paskievich wanted was to use the authority of the Catholic Church to bind Polish Catholics to obedience to the tsar.63 In this regard, the recent papal encyclical was most welcome. While Nicholas I accepted Paskievich’s argument that it was the wiser course to try to harness the authority of the Catholic Church to tsarist purposes, he nonetheless proceeded with a series of harsh measures against Poles – measures certainly ill-suited to winning Polish loyalty and obedience. Among other things, laws discriminating against Poles were introduced, conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism would no longer be permitted, and, beginning in 1836, confessionally mixed couples (Catholic-Orthodox) were placed under the legal requirement to raise their children as Orthodox Christians. But the harshest blow was the forced dissolution of about 200 of the 322 Catholic monasteries in Russian-occupied Poland. Although this move against the monasteries THE RUSSIAN SECTOR, 1795–1914 57 had been planned already from the beginning of Tsar Nicholas’ reign, it was presented as if it came as a reprisal for the events of 1830–1831.64 Hundreds of Polish schools, orphanages, hospitals, and philanthropic institutions were forced to shut down, along with monastic novitiates, seminaries, and printing houses. Most of what was left of the Roman Catholic Church’s once extensive land-holdings was confiscated in 1842, but the Holy See was rewarded for its encyclical on civil obedience and its quiescent attitude with the signing of a Concordat on 3 August (22 July) 1847, which recognized the right of Catholics to practise their faith, required that the Holy See consult with tsarist officials before appointing bishops and suffragans, and restored the archepiscopal seat at Mohylew. Two decades later, on 25 November 1866, the tsar would cancel the Concordat in reprisal for the involvement of Catholic clergy in the 1863 uprising. Nor was the Eastern-Rite Catholic (or Uniate) Church forgotten. On the contrary, Nicholas revived his grandmother Catherine II’s plan to clear Russia of the Uniates.65 Disaster came in 1839, when 1.5 million Uniates in Lithuania and Belorussia were forced to accept the authority of the Orthodox Church. Two-thirds of the approximately 2,000 Eastern-Rite priests refused to recognize the Orthodox Church; they were therefore arrested and either imprisoned or sent into internal exile in the Russian East. All church facilities which had hitherto belonged to the Uniates were turned over to the Orthodox Church and the Basilian Order was disbanded. Because Cum Primum had enjoined Catholics in the Russian Empire to obey the tsar’s government, most Poles suspected that the encyclical had been inspired by Russia.66 Catholic clergy of both rites became involved in secret conspiracies and were instrumental in the activity of the Stowarzyszenie Ludu Polskiego (the Association of Polish People), a conspiratorial organization set up in Kraków in 1835. One of the more radical conspiracies was the work of Rev. Piotr Ściegienny, a Piarist who invoked religious arguments to stir up peasants against the tsar. Ściegienny’s anti-regime activity was uncovered in 1844. He was arrested and sentenced to 27 years to be served in prison, followed by internal exile in Siberia. The Holy See endorsed his arrest by defrocking the independent-minded cleric. In 1871, Ściegienny was pardoned and allowed to return to Poland. Nonetheless, there continued to be career opportunities for loyal Poles – meaning, in practice, Poles who had not joined the insurgents 58 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 in 1830–1831. Polish officers and ordinary recruits could be incorporated into the Russian army, and Polish administrators could find positions in the bureaucracy, the Polish Bank, or the Treasury. The official language in the Kingdom was still Polish. On the other hand, the University of Wilno was shut down and intellectual societies were banned. Russian authorities took over museums and libraries, in many cases transferring their collections to Russia. There were also cuts to elementary and secondary schools. In these conditions, about 10,000 persons left Russian Poland after the failed uprising of 1830–1831 and fled abroad.67 The pressure on Russia’sPoleswould ease only with the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853–1856) and the death of Tsar Nicholas I in 1855. Polish emigration. Already in mid-century, economic pressure induced Poles to seek a better life abroad. Prussia was the main destination for seasonal migration on the part of Poles living in Austrian Galicia and Russia; but many Poles, whether economic migrants or political refugees, sought permanent emigration, and typically moved to the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. As increasing numbers of Poles left, seeking a better life abroad, the Catholic hierarchy in Poland became concerned at the impact on their domestic flock.68 They need not have worried: between 1857 and 1900, the Polish population across the three partition zones rose from 11.9 million to 24.8 million, an increase of 105%. The increase was highest in the Russian partition (179.4%), but lower in Galicia (77.7%) and Prussian Poland (52%).69 Of the 1.2 million Poles who left Prussian Poland between 1871 and 1914, 750,000 settled elsewhere in Germany (chiefly in Westphalia), with the rest moving to the Americas. The number of Poles leaving Russian Poland during the same years was almost identical – 1.25 million – but, in this case, 800,000 settled in the United States, with about 200,000 moving to other parts of North America and South America (chiefly in Brazil and Canada), and 200,000 moving to other parts of Russia (chiefly east of the Ural Mountains). About 50,000 Russian Poles emigrated to Germany or other European countries. Polish emigration from Austrian Galicia during the same period amounted to 1.051 million, with most emigrants moving to the United States, Canada, and, in certain periods, Brazil.70 By the eve of the First World War, there were more than 3 million Poles living in the United States, concentrated in larger cities, especially Chicago.71 Polish émigrés coming to North America settled in Polish neighborhoods, typically ministered by Polish priests, and preserved their folk culture and traditional customs intact. THE RUSSIAN SECTOR, 1795–1914 59

However, the American Catholic episcopate wanted to promote the Americanization of all immigrants, including Poles. This eventually provoked the erection in 1907 of a Polish National Catholic Church in the United States. This Church, led by Bishop Franciszek Hodur (1866– 1953), consecrated as bishop by Old Catholics in Holland in 1907, sought to preserve national traditions in Polish religiosity. In 1919, this Church began to build a following also in Poland. From the accession of Alexander II in 1855 to the January Uprising in 1863. Nicholas I’s eldest son Alexander II (1818–1881) was crowned Emperor of Russia, King of Poland, and Grand Duke of Finland on 2 March 1855. He is best known for his emancipation of the serfs in 1861 – two years before Abraham Lincoln’s emancipation proclamation. He also pushed through reorganization of the judicial system, abolished capital punishment, introduced universal military service, and promoted higher education. In 1867, he sold Alaska to the United States. Where Poles are concerned, the new tsar tried a combination of repression and concessions, such as removing the tariff barrier between the Kingdom of Poland and the rest of the Russian Empire, and promoting investment and economic development in the Kingdom. In 1861, there were antiregime demonstrations in Warsaw, which the tsarist police suppressed with brutal force. The era of Alexander II’s reign was, however, also an era of religious revival among Poles, due in the first place to the vigorous work of Capuchins and missionaries.72 This revival developed in spite of severe religious persecution. Under these circumstances, the Polish Church protested against regulations, which hampered its pastoral work or injured the rights of Polish believers. Some Poles brooded over Pope Gregory XVI’s condemnation of the 1830–1831 uprising, but excused him by telling themselves that the pope had lacked accurate information about the situation in Poland. Religious fervor continued to be linked with nationalist fervor. One of a number of manifestations of this linkage occurred in May 1861, when émigré university students who had arrived mainly from France organized the singing of the Polish national hymn, “Bożecoś Polskę,” in Wilno. In the wake of this public demonstration of Polish patriotism, “Bożecoś Polskę” was sung in churches across the Kingdom, in spite of pressure from the regime.73 By now, a fresh nationalist storm was brewing. Alexander Wielopolski (1803–1877), a pious Catholic serving as head of the newly reconstituted Department of Religious and Educational Affairs in Warsaw, told representatives of the Warsaw clergy in April 1861 that 60 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 he “would not tolerate ‘a government within a government’.”74 Wielopolski hoped to restore some of the Polish Kingdom’s lost autonomy and, in association with that, shut down the Agricultural Society. Two days later, on 8 April, a large crowd came to Castle Square in protest, many of them praying on their knees. Russian troops were called in and shot at the protesters, killing more than 100 persons. Martial law was declared in Warsaw and public gatherings were banned. When, on 11 November 1861, large crowds jammed into Warsaw’s churches to mark the anniversary of Kościuszko’s death, Russian troops entered the churches, arresting thousands of the faithful.75 In protest, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders ordered the closure of the city’s churches and synagogues. Wielopolski resigned; the tsar appointed his liberal brother, Konstantin, as the new viceroy. By mid-1862, a clandestine independence movement had emerged and was intensifying preparations for a second uprising. A number of priests were involved in the underground activity, in spite of the Vatican’s repeated bans on any such involvement on their part. The conspirators, led by 22-year-old Stefan Bobrowski and 28-year-old Zygmunt Padlewski, set up a Central National Committee, which, on 22 January 1863, proclaimed itself the Provisional National Government, declaring war on Russia. The insurgents’ stated objective was to liberate all Polish lands held by Russia since 1772. The rebels could field no more than 6,000 armed men at first, though this number would later grow to 30,000. Facing this poorly armed force was a highly trained and well-armed Russian force of 100,000 troops in the Kingdom, with an equivalent number close at hand in the western gubernii.76Altogether, nearly 300 priests, representing 15% of Catholic clergy in the Kingdom, recognized the Central National Committee and thus also the legitimate authority of the Provisional National Government.77 Their open support increased the credibility of the Provisional Government, especially among the peasants. When the uprising started, Poles were divided; some even wondered whether the self-declared Provisional Government was entitled to speak for the Polish nation and take it into a war against formidable odds. But the Provisional Government won support among peasants by promising them land, and new tactics were adopted for this second uprising. The November Uprising of 1830–1831 had been fought with pitched battles, with the result that Russian superiority was decisive. This time, the uprising would be conducted as a guerrilla war. The role played by Catholic priests in the uprising – in defiance of the Holy See – made a tangible THE RUSSIAN SECTOR, 1795–1914 61 contribution to the insurrection. As Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek note, the fact that the insurrection lasted 15 months

...despite unfavorable conditions, can be partly attributed to the involvement of the clergy, both secular and monastic. Many priests played a signiﬁcant part in the uprising, either as organizers or as commanders, as well as serving as chaplains ...Moreover, their presence often made the whole movement seem to be almost a religious event.78

In all, Catholic priests took part in more than 1,200 battles, typically by distributing the holy eucharist, caring for the sick and wounded, perform- ing the last rites, delivering food to guerrilla units, and providing shelter when needed. Monasteries often served as storehouses for food and weap- onry.79 It was not usual to see priests actually taking up rifles and engaging in warfare – that was contrary to canon law. However, two priests gained fame as military commanders: Stanisław Mackiewicz, who was executed by Russian troops in Kowna, and Stanisław Brzóska, who, together with the men under his command, continued to engage in guerrilla warfare until he was apprehended in Podlasie in 1865 and executed. Archbishop Zygmunt Szczęsny Feliński of Warsaw (1822–1895) was torn between his loyalty to the Holy See, which had expressly forbidden clergy to revolt against secular authorities “appointed by God” and his devotion to the Polish people. Feliński balanced right against prudence and, while conceding that Poles were entitled under natural law to take up arms to win back their state, he nonetheless added that “our historians and publicists have not only the right, but the obligation to enlighten the national consciousness, so as to warn patriots against adventures that would be ruinous for the national soul.”80 But, sympathetic to the aspirations of the insurgents, the archbishop wrote a letter to the tsar appealing to him to “take personal responsibility for the Polish issue and make Poland an independent state, connected with Russia only by dynastic ties.”81 Feliński’s “reward” for this initiative was to be sent for two decades into internal exile in Yaroslav, a town with virtually no Catholics. Following the advice of N. N. Miliutin, Tsar Alexander issued a decree on land reform on 2 March 1864, offering to grant the peasants identical property rights to those promised by the Provisional Government.82 This took the wind out of the sails of the insurrection, as the peasants put down their weapons and returned to their homes. By August of that year, the 62 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 insurrection was largely over, except for a few recalcitrants, such as Fr. Brzóska, who held out for a few more months. After the suppression of this second uprising, more than 50,000 people were exiled to Silberia; between 1864 and 1914, more than 1,000 Polish priests were likewise sent to Siberia.83 At this juncture, the Russian government forbade the use of Polish in any public place, including in the churches and schools, stepping up pressures for linguistic Russification. Priests were informed that they were not permitted to leave their parishes, almost all monasteries were dissolved, and the University of Warsaw, which had been shut down in 1833 but reopened in 1862 (now called the Main School), was closed once again in 1869. A new University of Warsaw, with Russian as the language of instruction, took its place.84 Beginning in 1864, Polish teachers in Warsaw were required to use Russian as the language of instruction to teach Polish to Polish children.85 Accordingly, Russian became the mandatory language of instruction in all secondary schools throughout the Empire. Russian authorities’ distrust of Poles was now so deep that Poles were all but barred from teaching in any state school; Russians were brought in to Polish regions to teach in the schools. Worse yet, from the Polish point of view, after 1863, religious instruction in the Catholic catechism was usually entrusted to Orthodox and Lutheran priests! Poles responded by teaching their children about the Catholic faith at home. Moreover, after 1863, it was illegal to speak Polish in government offices or at public places, such as train stations or restaurants. In addition, many Polish landowners, who had played roles in the uprising, were packed off to Siberia; the authorities confiscated their estates for subsequent sale to Russians.86 Finally, and inevitably, the Kingdom of Poland was now erased altogether and the lands which had once comprised this autonomous region were integrated fully into the Russian legal and administrative system. The last half-century of tsardom. After the failure of the January Uprising, tsarist repression increased and control was tightened. Poles tried to make the most of the situation, postponing their hopes for a national state until some undetermined point in the future. Polish clergy were variously banished, executed, or sent to penal servitude. As of 1870, only one bishopric in Russian Poland was filled; the Archbishop of Warsaw had been sentenced to a term of 20 years’ internal exile.87 The Church was now placed under the supervision of the state’s Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical College in St. Petersburg. As already noted, monastic orders were dissolved, lands remaining to the Catholic Church were confiscated, and the freedom of movement THE RUSSIAN SECTOR, 1795–1914 63 of Catholic clergy was restricted.88 Specifically, Catholic priests were forbidden (in June 1863) “to leave their places of residence without the consent of military and diocesan authorities.”89 In 1875, the Union of Brest was declared null and void and the Russian Empire’s 270 Eastern- Rite Catholic parish churches, 75 branch churches, and 57 chapels were turned over to the Orthodox Church. Of a total of 209 Uniate priests, only 69 were prepared to cross over to Orthodoxy; those who refused to embrace Orthodoxy were removed from their parishes. Catholics, but also Lutherans, were subjected to Russification.90 Particular outrage was provoked by a decision in the late 1860s “to introduce the Russian (or Belarusian) language into Catholic churches in the northwest provinces.”91 Both clergy and laity recoiled at this new effort to Russify them. This harsh climate continued until 1894, when the accession of a new tsar, Nicholas II (1868–1918), was accompanied by a thaw in religious policy. In April 1905, in the wake of “Bloody Sunday” (22 January 1905), when tsarist troops and Cossacks fired on a procession of unarmed workers walking peacefully to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, the regime introduced a new policy of religious toleration and lifted some restrictions on the use of non-Russian languages.92 In fact, the dominant tendency among Polish hierarchy and ordinary clergy was to avoid making trouble for the authorities and themselves and, in that sense at least, to remain loyal to the Russian tsar. Many consoled themselves with the thought that divine justice – meaning Poland’s resurrection as an independent state – would prevail in the long run.93Przegład Katolicki, the most important Catholic periodical in Warsaw, stressed the loyalty of the clergy in an 1894 article:

Today’s entire clergy is supposed to answer for the fact that years ago a few priests took part in an uprising, even though [the clergy as a whole] does not share any solidarity with that movement; indeed, it decisively condemns it. ... In a word, even though our clergy carries out its duties peacefully, even though it is the best force for peace and social order ...we are held in complete mistrust by the authorities.94

By 1905, the authorities had come to the conclusion that their various policies of repression, rescinded in part only a decade earlier, had failed of their objective. Moreover, as a report issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that year conceded, the result of tsarist policies after 1863 had been to promote “an identiﬁcation of the two terms ‘Polish descent’ and 64 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

‘Roman Catholic belief’, which is in complete opposition to the fundamental [goal of] Russian policy in regard to the western territories”– which was the disjunction of Polish and Catholic, in the interest of at least partial assimilation.95 Polish Catholicism in the second half of the nineteenth century assumed characteristics of intense collective sentiment, expressed in processions, pilgrimages, retreats, and celebrations of feast days. There were also sanctuaries with miraculous icons, most notably at Jasna Góra in Częstochowa. There were repeated reports among rural Poles of appearances of the Virgin Mary and various saints. Between 1865 and 1899, the number of Poles making the annual pilgrimage to Jasna Góra quadrupled – rising from 46,101 to 200,411 in the latter year, but peaking at half a million pilgrims in 1882, the jubilee year of the holy icon.96 But, for all their enthusiasm for religious manifestations, most of the faithful did not know the fundamental doctrines about God, Christ, or the Church, could not explain the meaning of the sacraments and other rituals of the Church, and related to religious ceremonies as forms of supernatural magic. But side by side with this mystical folk religiosity there were also tendencies in the opposite direction, with the spread of socialism among the working class, accompanied by some degree of de- Christianization.97 At the same time, there were also political activists who, being conscious of the popes’ and bishops’ repeated admonitions to obey the Russian tsar (and for that matter also the monarchs in Berlin and Vienna), ceased to view the Church as an ally. Skepticism and anti- clericalism gained converts. In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War, there were Catholic intellectuals such as Stanisław Brzozowski and Marian Zdziechowski, who criticized the passivity into which traditional Catholicism had led Polish Catholics. These and other critics, active mainly in Russian Poland, produced a program of Polish modernism, calling attention to the “anachronistic and fossilized” state of Polish Catholicism. In response, Pope Pius X (1835–1914; reigned from 1903 to 1914) issued the encyclical Pascendi Domenici Gregis in 1907,98 condemning modernism as a most vile heresy. In the wake of this encyclical, integralist (i.e., conservative) ﬁgures founded the weekly periodical Myśl Katolicka [Catholic Thought], in which they propounded “a static and hierarchic vision of the Church, understood in a strictly legalistic spirit, where the ultimate source of order in the Church was the pope.”99 PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 65

PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 Prussia emerged from the first partition with a stronger economy and an improved military and diplomatic position. Although the territorial and demographic gains from that first partition were generally welcomed within the Prussian bureaucracy, state administrators were skeptical about the supposed benefits to be gained from the second and third partitions.100 With war raging across Europe in the wake of the French Revolution, Prussia withdrew from the First Coalition (against Napoleon) in 1795 and adopted a stance of neutrality because of a fear on the part of Prussian ministers that, at such point as Prussia would rejoin the fight against France, the newly annexed Poles would rise up against the Prussian occupation: this is, in fact, what happened in 1806, with the South Prussian Uprising. Another matter was that the lands added in 1793 and 1795 were economically underdeveloped and required serious investments on the part of the Prussian state. At this point in time, the Prussian authorities adopted a policy of cooptation and leading up to the battles at Jena and Auerstadt in October 1806, sought to put members of the Polish nobility who spoke German to work in the civil service and courts.101 Prussian authorities took an entirely different approach where the Church was concerned, cutting off its direct ties with the Holy See in Rome, establishing strict state control of the Church’s finances, and confiscating many of the Church’s monasteries.102 The state now imposed a minimum age of 24 for a novice to take monastic vows (following an example set in Austria in 1770) and, having seized the Church’s material assets, put the Catholic clergy on the state payroll. In West Prussia and Warmia (Ermland), the regions annexed in September 1772, roughly two-thirds of the population was Catholic; in ethnic terms, the population in these newly annexed areas was three- quarters Polish and one-quarter German. There were about 100 urban parishes in these two regions at the time, alongside more than 300 rural parishes of the Catholic Church; they were served by more than 500 secular clergy.103 There were also 19 religious orders in West Prussia and Warmia at the time, including Benedictines, Dominicans, Carmelites, and Carthusians. Moreover, in spite of a ban imposed in 1773, the Jesuits continued to operate in Prussia; initially, the ban was scarcely enforced and, even later, it was enforced only very mildly and the Jesuits continued to operate a monastery and a school.104 66 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

Confiscations of facilities. In September 1794, in a policy reversal, King Friedrich Wilhelm II (1744–1797; reigned from 1786 to 1797) decided to confiscate the property of the Church hierarchy. But Karl George (sic) Heinrich von Hoym, the erstwhile provincial minister for Silesia and now provincial minister for South Prussia, thought that confiscating Church property was the height of folly. Accordingly, the King quickly changed his mind.105 But by February 1796, swayed by the arguments of Friedrich Leopold Freiherr von Schrötter, the provincial minister for East-, West, and “new East” Prussia (Neuostpreußen), the King reversed himself once again and gave his approval for the seizure of Church lands. Both Hoym and Schrötter wanted to limit this confiscation to the estates and other property of the hierarchy. Preparations for the confiscation of the properties of the Catholic hierarchy in West Prussia and Warmia got underway in early 1796. Although there were no attacks on monasteries or convents in those two regions between 1772 and 1793 (for fear of provoking internal unrest), measures were taken to reduce the number of monks and nuns. In addition to the aforementioned minimal age for men to take their vows, women seeking to enter the convent and take their vows were now required to have reached their 21st birthday.106 But the war with France was taking its toll and there was a desperate need for barracks, poor houses, prisons, and, for that matter, also schools. To meet this need, the authorities began confiscating the facilities belonging to religious orders. For example, in 1796, a Dominican monastery in Łęczyca was confiscated and converted into a barracks; the five monks in residence there did not resist and were transferred to Łowicz. In 1800–1801, six mendicant monasteries met the same fate, while a Carmelite monastery was seized in 1800 and converted to a poor house. There were further seizures of religious houses the following year in Grudziądz (Graudenz), Warsaw, Sieradz (Schieratz), Kalisz (Kalisch), and Poznań (Posen). In the case of Grudziąz, the Bishop of Chełmno (Kulm) joined the provincial in resisting the conversion of the local convent into a poor house. In Poznań, there were two Carmelite monasteries in operation at the start of 1801. General Friedrich von Zastrow,107 commander of the 39th Infantry Regiment stationed in Poznań, needed a building the size of the Josephine Carmelite monastery. With 36 rooms and three halls, the monastery suited von Zastrow’s needs perfectly. Orders were sent to the monastery on 5 July 1801, calling on the monks to evacuate their facility. The monks responded by sending a note of protest to the King. PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 67

On 18 July, the cabinet replied, confirming von Zastrow’s order to surrender the facility. The Carmelites now claimed that the statue of Mary in their church was crying real tears and that the dead, buried in the monastery cemetery, were moving about in their graves and crying out.108 The authorities were losing patience and finally, on 12 August 1801 at 4 a.m., while the monks were asleep in their cells, the monastery was occupied by military force. The military cleared the monastery and took the monks to join their fellow monks on the edge of town. Two monastery buildings in Poznań were needed for use as prisons, as was a monastery in Bielsk. Mendicant monasteries in Poznań and Łowicz were seized for use as teacher-training schools. The rooms of a monastery in Gniezno (Gnesen) were put to use as a small school. And two mendicant monasteries were converted to poor houses. These and other seizures of Church property reflected not merely the needs of the authorities at a time of war, but also Enlightenment thinking, when tendencies of secularization were coming to the fore. Bishops and episcopal succession. The initial ban forbidding Polish bishops with dioceses in Prussia to have a direct correspondence with the Curia in Rome was handed down in 1793. Subsequently, after the third partition brought additional Polish lands into Prussia, the ban on direct contact with the Curia was renewed in 1798. Meanwhile, episcopal vacancies were inevitably a matter of interest for Prussian authorities, who were intent on seeing vacancies filled by bishops who would be more or less friendly to Berlin. Thus, for example, after the death on 15 June 1793, of Bishop Antoni Okęcki,109 who had been Bishop of Poznań since 1780, Otto von Voss,110 the provincial minister for South Prussia, thought that Franciszek Rydzyński,111 the canon of Gniezno-Poznań, would be a good choice to succeed Okęcki.112 There was another candidate likewise sympathetic to Prussian authorities, viz., Johann von Hohenzollern,113 co- adjutor in Chełmno. But on 25 June 1793, Voss proposed, as an alternative, Ignacy Raczyński, the brother of Marshal Kazimierz Raczyński. He was finally consecrated as Bishop of Poznań only on 12 September 1794, nearly 15 months after the episcopal see had become vacant. In the meantime, Michał Jerzy Poniatowski, the Archbishop of Gniezno, had died (on 12 August 1794). After some discussion, the choice for his successor fell (on 16 February 1795) on Ignacy Krasicki, the Bishop of Warmia. The idea was that Johann von Hohenzollern would then take his place as Bishop of Warmia: insofar as he was trusted at the court, this was rushed through and he was installed in this post on the 68 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 same day that Krasicki became Bishop of Warmia. Subsequently, Rydzyński, who had failed to become Bishop of Poznań, was installed as Bishop of Chełmno. Throughout all of these and other episcopal transi- tions, Berlin remained keenly interested in keeping clergymen hostile to Prussia from assuming episcopal rank. The Duchy of Warsaw. By 1806, Napoleon was clearly ascendant. The defeat of Friedrich Wilhelm II’s army at Jena and Auerstadt in October 1806 reopened the question of restoring an independent Poland in the minds of some Poles. On 3 November 1806, Jan Henryk Dąbrowski (1755–1818), who had commanded a Polish legion in support of Napoleon’s Grande Armée, met with Napoleon in Berlin. On the same day, General Dąbrowski called for a national uprising among Poles; French troops entered Poznań. Catholic clergy gave their enthusiastic support to the uprising and their influence was “unmistakable”.114 In the meantime, Prussia had affiliated with the Fourth Coalition, but was defeated by the Grande Armée at Friedland on 14 June 1807. On 7–8 July 1807, France and Russia came to an agreement at Tilsit. The following day, Prussia signed a peace treaty with France. As a result of these treaties, Prussia essentially lost its territorial gains from the second and third partitions, with these alienated lands now being turned over to form the Duchy of Warsaw, a semi-autonomous Polish state functioning as a French satellite. In October 1809, with Polish troops supporting the Grande Armée, Austria was compelled to give up about half of what it had taken in the partitions, to the benefit of the Duchy. Included in this territorial transfer were the city of Kraków and the regions of Lublin and Zamość. King Friedrich Augustus of Saxony, an ally of Napoleon, was named Duke of Warsaw, and the Duchy received a constitution dictated by Napoleon. Although this truncated state included only 20% of pre-1772 Poland and a mere 30% of its population, it nonetheless embraced Poznania (including Gniezno), Warsaw, and Kraków. French authorities introduced the Napoleonic Code in the Duchy, thereby abolishing serfdom, establishing the principle of the legal equality of citizens, and introducing civil marriage and divorce – much to the dismay of the Polish episcopate. The principle of legal equality did not, however, extend to Jews, who were not allowed to purchase land. The Duchy also suspended their political and civil rights for 10 years; in the Russian-ruled “Kingdom,” which was created after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, this decision was confirmed on a permanent basis.115 PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 69

Some bishops resisted tendencies toward secularization in the Duchy but, at the same time, the establishment of the Duchy aroused hopes that the Church might regain some of its earlier privileges. The constitution did establish Catholicism as the official religion of the state, but the Church remained subordinated to the state, provoking protests from Archbishop Raczyński of Gniezno and other bishops.116 As part of Napoleon’s empire, the Duchy was required to supply troops for the French Emperor’s various military campaigns. Some 20,000 Polish troops were brought to bear to conquer Spain, almost 100,000 Poles accompanied the Grande Armée in its invasion of Russia in 1812, and there was even a Polish unit dispatched to the French colony of Haiti, to assist a French contingent in putting down an uprising by local slaves. The Congress of Vienna. The task which confronted the diplomats who assembled in Vienna for the famous Congress of Vienna (September 1814-June 1815) was to craft a peace, which would endure, and to discourage fresh revolutionary upheavals. Given the diverse interests at play, there was no formula which could have succeeded in meeting this dual challenge, as the continent-wide revolutionary upheavals of 1830 and 1848–1849 would later demonstrate. One of the central issues debated at the Congress was, in fact, the fate of Poland. Russia’s Tsar Alexander I wanted to restore the Kingdom of Poland under his suzerainty and with limited autonomy. Austria and the Western powers favored restoring a Polish state, but only if it would be completely independent of Russia.117 Metternich’s deputy, Johann von Wessenberg, was among those who considered the restoration of an independent Poland “a matter of justice ...that would atone for the original ‘sin’ of partition.”118 While the Congress of Vienna was still in session, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh (1769–1822; in office, 1812–1822),119 circulated a note cautioning that “experience has proved, that it is not in counteracting all their habits and usages as a people, that the happiness of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion of Europe can be preserved.” Earlier attempts, he noted, “to make them forget their existence and even language as a people, ha[ve] been sufficiently tried and failed.” The only sensible approach, Castlereagh concluded, was to accept Polish culture and let Poles be Poles “under whatever form of political institution” might be established.120 But the final settlement, which established the Russian-ruled “Kingdom of Poland” described in the previous section, offered only the stipulation – which in practice amounted to little more than a suggestion – that “the Poles, subjects respectively of Russia, 70 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

Austria, and Prussia, will obtain a representative body and national institutions.”121 The only sop to Polish aspirations for an independent state was the recognition of Kraków as a free city under the protection of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Some influential Prussian officials expressed their opposition to Germanization as early as December 1815,122 but, as the Prussian government got underway promoting the establishment of elementary schools in what was left of Prussian Poland, it viewed the schools largely as an instrument for cultural and linguistic Germanization.123 The Grand Duchy of Posen. Following the Congress of Vienna, Prussian authorities established the Grand Duchy of Posen in 1815, granting it a tangible degree of administrative autonomy. Perhaps ironically, there was no parallel grant of autonomy to West Prussia, in spite of the presence of large numbers of Poles there too. The Grand Duchy of Posen covered an area of almost 29,000 sq. km. and embraced 776,000 inhabitants; Polish and German were both official languages in the Grand Duchy, which was headed by a Duke-Governor (Polish: książę-namiestnik; German: Statthalter)), Prince Antoni Henryk Radziviłł (1775–1833), a liberal Prussian, and a Governor (German: Oberpräsident), Joseph von Zerboni di Sposetti (1766–1831).124 In spite of the assurance of autonomy, there were tendencies toward Germanization in the Grand Duchy and pressures on the Church, such as the launch in 1816 of a wave of dissolution of monasteries.125 The Church did enjoy a considerable degree of independence; nonetheless, the government continued to play a role in the nomination of bishops, which sometimes gave rise to conflict. There was also a conflict between Church and state over mixed marriages in 1839–1840, in which the Church insisted that all children should be brought up in the Catholic faith. As Piotr Wandycz reports, this conflict “made Archbishop Marcin Dunin (1774–1842) a national martyr and enhanced the influence of the clergy as defenders of the ‘Polish faith’.”126 The 1830 uprising and its aftermath. In the meantime, the November 1830 uprising in the Russian partition quickly had repercussions in Prussia, where about 3,000 local Poles volunteered to join the uprising, with others providing supplies to the insurgents.127 Publicly, Prussia declared its neutrality, although its sympathies did not lie with the insurgents.128 After the November Uprising had been suppressed, the volun- teers who had crossed over the border to join the insurgents were subjected to heavy fines by the Prussian government, the office of PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 71

Duke-Governor was abolished, Polish language largely disappeared from official use, and state supervision of the courts in the Grand Duchy was tightened.129 The inception of a new phase was signaled by the installation of a new Governor for the province, Eduard Flottwell (1786–1865), at the end of 1830. Flottwell pursued a policy of favoring Germans, while suppressing the privileges of the Polish nobility. In 1831, a campaign of systematic Germanization was set in motion, focused especially in the Grand Duchy of Posen.130 The campaign extended to the schools, the administrative apparatus, and the judicial system. Policy toward the Church also har- dened, with further confiscations of monastery property, limitations on what priests were allowed to do, and restrictions on Church societies. Archbishop Dunin of Gniezno-Poznań,exofficio Primate of Poland, was accused of encouraging the conversion of German Protestant settlers to Catholicism and arrested.131 These actions contributed to a growing antagonism between Polish Catholics and German Protestants. Tensions were eased only with the death of King Friedrich Wilhelm III in 1840 and the accession of his liberal-minded son, Friedrich Wilhelm IV (1795– 1861), to the throne of Prussia. The new King expanded the use of Polish in the administrative apparatus, reduced censorship, and introduced freedom of association. A compromise was reached with the Church on the issue of mixed marriages.132 The King also authorized the formation in 1841 of a special Catholic department in the Prussian Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kultusministerium). At this time, the Polish elite in the Grand Duchy was divided into two camps:

The conservative upper nobility and a portion of the citizenry and the clergy were striving to come to an arrangement with the Prussian state and hoped for a further loosening of the Prussian regime to the advantage of Polish self- administration. Most of the politically incapacitated and also, in part, socially degraded nobility continued to be receptive to the idea of a revolutionary uprising.133

In the meantime, Polish émigrés had set up the Polish Democratic Society in Paris in 1832. Twelve years later, this Society began to coordinate plans for a national insurrection across all three partitions of Poland. When the revolt broke out, the Germanized and loyalist Bishop of Chełmno, Anastazy Sedlag (in office 1838–1856), spoke out against the 72 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 independence movement, even though almost all the priests in the Grand Duchy supported it, ordering that the rebels be turned over to the authorities. Sedlag’s stance brought words of caution from the pope.134 In fact, the 32-year-old émigré Ludwik Mierosławski, who was command- ing the peasant army, was betrayed to Prussian authorities before any military action could get underway in Prussia. Poznania was placed under a state of siege, which ended only in March 1848. Moreover, in spite of Bishop Sedlag’s loyalism, Catholic clergy in Poznania were to play a prominent role in the Polish national movement in the nineteenth century.135 The abortive insurrection of 1846 notwithstanding, there were tendencies toward a rapprochement between German and Polish subjects of Prussia at that time, with countless ethnically mixed marriages.136 Poles were joining German scientific, cultural, and art societies, and “Hegel’s philosophy exerted a huge influence on many Polish scholars.”137 Prussian authorities welcomed these developments, but continued to prioritize the spread of German as the lingua franca for the kingdom, even applying pressure on the priests to use German in the liturgy (!) and in their sermons.138 Polish and even German priests serving Polish congregations defied the government and continued to use Polish to preach and in religious instruction. Meanwhile, the clergy became involved “in printing Polish-language literature that ranged from religious books to popular stories and farmer’s companions ...[Polish-language] song- and prayer-books were instrumental in awakening national feeling.”139 Among these was a prayer book prepared by Fr. Jan Ficek, a parish priest in Piekary, who constructed a pilgrimage site in Upper Silesia, declaring that it was dedicated to the preservation of the Polish language. Ficek also set up sodalities of sobriety, which involved some 200,000 persons in the Opole region.140 In fact, the Polish temperance movement spread throughout the three partition zones in the 1840s. The Jesuits were involved in dozens of missions, initially in Austrian Galicia, later in the Prussian partition zone, teaching religion, instructing people in Polish culture, and engaging in other educational work. In Galicia, the energetic Fr. Wojciech Blaszyński turned his parish into a revival center. Indeed, there was a religious revival in all three partition zones after 1832. The failed insurrection of 1830– 1831 had something to do with this, as it reinforced Romantic tendencies to venerate and glorify folk traditions and to associate Polish patriotism with religious fervor. At least in part for this reason, as Jerzy Kłoczowski PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 73 has pointed out, there was no mass abandonment of Christianity in Poland along the lines of what had been happening elsewhere in Europe.141 While Prussian authorities tried to weaken the national consciousness of Poles, Catholic priests were engaged in a contrary effort – to strengthen the national consciousness among Polish peasants. Fr. Antoni Prusinowski, a Resurrectionist preacher working in Wielkopolska, was instrumental in launching a campaign to promote reading. Libraries were established, mostly maintained by parish priests.142 Pilgrimage sites were also important in strengthening the religio-national nexus. The cult of the Virgin Mary, especially of Our Lady of Częstochowa, took on national symbolism. Jasna Góra may have been the most visited pilgrimage site, but a cult of Our Lady the Intercessor developed also in the Silesian town of Piekary. From the Revolution of 1848 to German Unification. The year 1848 was one of revolutionary upheaval. Paris, Vienna, Budapest, Frankfurt, Prague, and Naples were among the cities shaken by revolutionary turmoil. But among Poles, whose aspirations in 1830–1831 and 1846 had been beaten down, the mood was initially cautious. This caution did not stop Prussian Poles from organizing a National Committee in 1848 and appealing to the King to reorganize the entire province of Poznania “on a Polish-national basis” and introduce Polish administration.143 But local Germans thwarted this initiative. The Poles mobilized and in Berlin there were people prepared to take up arms against the revolutionary National Committee. On 11 April 1848, an agreement was signed between the moderate Prussian General Karl Wilhelm von Willisen (1790–1879)144 and representatives of the Poles. Meanwhile, General Columb led Prussian forces against Polish units around Gniezno and forced them to surrender. In West Prussia, arrests of members of the National Committee quickly put a stop to its activity. As Marian Biskup has recorded,

[t]he violent and sanguinary suppression of the Polish action in the province of Posen [Poznania] would have great signiﬁcance for the future. A new constitution, which was adopted by the conservative Prussian Landtag in 1850, lifted the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Posen, in spite of the ﬁerce opposition of the Polish deputies, who constituted a ‘Polish circle’ in the Landtag. Already in July 1848 the National Assembly in Frankfurt-am-Main had recognized the Grand Duchy of Posen as an integral component of Germany.145

With the end of the revolutionary tremors, Poles in the Prussian partition zone became quiescent and things calmed down.146 Meanwhile, the 74 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 campaign to Germanize the Poles was intensified in the years following 1848, with greater support for this policy among German liberals than among German conservatives. The years of interethnic and thus also inter- confessional rapprochement were over, as Poles and Germans drifted apart once more, setting up ethnically exclusive associations and increasingly engaging in economic competition with each other.147 Beginning in 1858, under the influence of Prince-Regent Wilhelm (the future King Wilhelm I), a “new era” began in Poznania, with an easing of press censorship and an increase in the number of Polish deputies elected to the Landtag.148 Subsequently, with the outbreak of the January Uprising in the Russian partition zone in 1863, some left-wing radical Germans felt a deep sympathy for the Poles – at least for the Poles living in Russia. Thus, for example, at its convention in London in October of that year, the German Educational Society for Workers issued a striking proclamation: “The Polish question is the German question. Without an independent Poland there can be no independent and unified Germany ...[T]he German working class must inscribe the restoration of Poland on their banner in flaming characters ...”149 Not surprisingly, when the opportunity arose (in August 1866), Polish deputies in the Prussian Landtag addressed an appeal to the Prussian King, asking for full recognition of Polish rights. The Kaiserreich, 1871–1873. Until 1866, there were two competing visions of what a united Germany would look like: the Großdeutsch vision, involving the merger of the Habsburg Empire with all of the German states, with its capital in Vienna; and the Kleindeutsch vision, involving the union of the German states under Prussian leadership, with the Habsburg Empire excluded and with its capital in Berlin. As a result of the Austro- Prussian War of 1866, which Austria lost, the Habsburg Empire reconstituted itself as the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy in 1867 and Prussia led 21 other independent states of northern Germany into the North German Confederation, likewise in 1867. Three years later, Prussia led an alliance of German states into war with France. On 1 September 1870, a Prussian force numbering 150,000 troops crushed the 120,000- strong French Army in the Battle of Sedan. Following the French capitulation, the German heads of state met on 18 January 1871 at the Palace of Versailles outside Paris and, in the palace’s Hall of Mirrors, proclaimed the Prussian King, Wilhelm, Emperor (Kaiser) of a united Germany. There had been resistance to German unification both from the minor kingdoms and principalities jealous of their independence and from those PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 75

Prussians who, while valuing the Hohenzollern dynasty, feared that uni- ﬁcation would change their way of life in unpredictable ways. In addition, Poles living in Prussia had (with some misgivings) accepted Prussia as a binational commonwealth, but feared that the framework of a united Germany, driven by German nationalism, would afford less space for the preservation of Polish culture. Moreover, as Theodore Hamerow has pointed out, “[t]he more likely a united Germany became, the less likely a restored Poland appeared [to be].”150 Even the formation of the North German Confederation had already been anathema to the Poles. It was in this spirit that, on the eve of the constitution of that confederation, Polish members of the Prussian Landtag had issued a formal declaration, noting that

the prospective incorporation ...of the Grand Duchy of Posen and of West Prussia into the North German Confederation which is about to be constituted would take place against [our] wish and will, and [we] herewith most solemnly enter a protest against ...any political act which is to stamp the Poles in the former Polish territories of the Prussian state as Germans, and to destroy by constitutional law the national existence which has been guaranteed to them.151

There have been differences of opinion about when the Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) was launched, what triggered it, and what its main target or purpose was. There is, however, no dispute about the nature of the policies that were adopted. Most historians date the origin of the Kulturkampf to 1871, but a few historians – among them, Günter Dettmer152 – have argued for a slightly earlier date, viz., in 1870, when a conflict flared between the Catholic hierarchy and secular authorities concerning Old Catholics (who rejected the doctrine of papal infallibility, which had been proclaimed at the First Vatican Council that year). Georg Franz,153 on the other hand, traces the Kulturkampf to the issuance in December 1871 of the “pulpit paragraph,” which prescribed imprisonment for up to two years for the dissemination of views injurious to public peace at places of worship. Leonhard Müller154 likewise dates the Kulturkampf to December 1871 but believes that the trigger was the resignation of Heinrich von Mühler as Minister of Religion and Education. Ernst Engelberg155 opts for a later date, arguing that the laws passed in May 1873 strengthening the state’sinfluence on clerical appointments marked the inception of the Kulturkampf.156 76 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

As for the chief targets, there is no dispute but that the Catholic Church and the Polish nation were the chief targets, but which of the two was the primary target? It is a matter of record that Otto von Bismarck157 (1815– 1898: served as Minister-President of Prussia 1862–1890 and as Chancellor of Germany 1871–1890) was opposed to ultramontane tendencies in the Church and wanted to establish the state’s dominance over the Church, starting with effective control of episcopal appointments. It is also true that Bismarck kept the recurrence of Polish uprisings, whether in Prussia or most noisily in Russia, in mind and feared that, as long as Poles preserved a strong national identity, embedded in the Polish language, their dream of establishing an independent Polish state would not go away. Moreover, at least as early as 1870, Bismarck was becoming concerned that the Catholic clergy were stirring up Polish separatism.158 Thus, Germanization of Prussia’s/Germany’s Polish subjects made emi- nently good sense. These two impulses came together in Bismarck’s original plan to orchestrate the appointment of German bishops to head all of the eastern dioceses. According to Trzeciakowski, there were two phases in the German Empire’s policy vis-à-vis the Catholic Church: in the years 1871–1878, the state tried to subordinate the Church to its bureaucratic apparatus, leading to resistance on the part of both German and Polish Catholics; and in the years 1878–1914, the state tried to engage the Catholic Church as a partner in its program of Germanization and/or neutralize the influence of Polish clergy.159 There is yet another way of looking at the Kulturkampf, however. That is to trace Bismarck’s decision to set it in motion to foreign policy considerations. Among those taking this approach is Adalbert Wahl, who has argued that “one will always do well in Bismarck’s case to think first of foreign policy motives.”160 Against this viewpoint, Richard Blanke coun- tered that “Bismarck’s anti-Polish policies put such strains upon his alliance with the Habsburg Empire that one might almost describe them as something undertaken despite the dictates of foreign policy.”161 Finally, Otto Pflanze and Georg Franz agree that, in launching the Kulturkampf, Bismarck may have been responding to a mix of perceived threats, both domestic and foreign.162 The inception of the Kulturkampf. In 1867, there were 2,436,800 Poles in Prussia, amounting to 10.1% of the country’s population; by 1871, the number of Prussian Poles had inched upwards to 2,600,000, but that number now accounted for only 6.3% of the population of Prussia.163 One of the first actions undertaken by the government was to ban the PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 77

Society of Jesus (Jesuits) in summer 1872,164 99 years after Pope Clement XIV had declared the dissolution of the order. This was followed by a decision to mandate German as the language of instruction in all schools, beginning in 1873; up to then, Polish-language schools had operated in areas where the local population was mainly Polish-speaking. After the passage of this legislation, only (Catholic) religion and (Polish) history would still be taught in Polish and even those subjects in Polish only in the elementary schools.165 Since the Church resisted Berlin’s program of linguistic Germanization and cultural “Prussianization” of Poles, Bismarck came to view the Church as an antagonist. Over time, Polish priests were dismissed from posts as teachers and school inspectors: Prussian government officials took their places. Further laws were passed in May 1873, including legislation granting state authorities the final say in clerical appointments, requiring that priests and bishops be German citizens and be able to show that they had had regular attendance at a German high school and subsequently completed studies at a German university, and allowing state authorities to veto clerical and episcopal appointments. Persons seeking ecclesiastical appointments were henceforth expected also to pass an exam covering philosophy, German history, and German literature.166 It was in the middle of a raucous debate in the House of Deputies over this law that Rudolf Virchow, a member of the Progressive Party, first applied the term Kulturkampf to the political strategy he saw unfolding, telling his fellow deputies, “I am convinced that a great cultural struggle [Kulturkampf] is implied here.”167 Bringing the Church under control. Some bishops ignored the regulations introduced in May 1873, allowing priests who had not met the government’s educational expectations to exercise their sacerdotal duties and appointing them to parishes without clearing the appointments with the government. This provoked repressive actions on the part of the state, affecting all the Catholic bishops in the Prussian sector of Poland.168 One of the first victims of Prussian reprisals was Archbishop Mieczysław Ledóchowski (1822–1902; appointed Archbishop of Gniezno and Poznań in 1866). When the Prussian government forbade the use of Polish as a language of instruction in 1873, Ledóchowski first protested to the authorities and then sent around a circular to religion teachers, indicating that they would have to use German in the upper classes but calling on them to continue to use Polish as the language of instruction in the lower grades. He also rejected state control of the seminaries and appointed priests without consulting the secular authorities. When the 78 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 state tried to fine him, he refused to pay the fines. Eventually, the authorities gave up trying to bring Ledóchowski into line and, on 3 February 1874, he was taken into custody and put in prison in Ostrów, where he served a two-year sentence.169 Upon leaving prison, he emigrated to Rome, where Pope Leo XIII (1810–1903; reigned from 1878 to 1903) named him Prefect of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. Then, there was the case of Johannes von der Marwitz (1795– 1886),170 Bishop of Chełmno. Born into a Polonized German family, he was consecrated as Bishop in 1856, with the government’s approval. But as the Kulturkampf got underway, Marwitz ignored the laws and then refused to pay the fines imposed on him, to which the authorities responded by seizing his possessions and confiscating his funds. Eventually, growing tired of the fight, Marwitz agreed to consult with the government in filling open clerical posts, and the government relented of its harassment of him.171 The state authorities were not prepared to stand either for priests serving without their approval or for clergy using the pulpit for political purposes (presumably meaning, in the first place, to encourage Poles to love Poland and Polish culture). In reprisal, the authorities imprisoned hundreds of priests and banished additional numbers from the country. As a result, by 1879, as many as 324 parishes in the dioceses of Warmia, Chełmno, and Wrocław (Breslau), as well as in the archdiocese of Gniezno-Poznań lacked priests. In 1881, there were 766 villages in the archdiocese of Gniezno-Poznań without a parish priest.172 In some cases, the government installed parish priests of whom it approved without the consent of the Church hierarchy; but only 12 priests were willing to officiate in the province of Poznań without the approval of the hierarchy. In reply, the Church excommunicated some of these priests.173 Most Catholics, especially Polish Catholics, sided with the Church hierarchy; indeed, the Kulturkampf so inflamed religious tempers that an attempt was made on the Chancellor’s life when he visited the Bavarian town of Kissingen on 13 July 1874.174 Moreover, during the years 1871–1878, German and Polish Catholics worked together in the eastern provinces to resist the government. The Center Party, a confessional party, which had been established to defend Catholic interests, also engaged itself in the fight. Interestingly, some Polish Protestant pastors also spoke out against the anti-Catholic measures.175 The death of Pope Pius IX on 7 February 1878 proved to be a turning point in Church-state relations in the Kaiserreich. Pius IX had issued the ultramontane, PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 79 antiliberal, antisecular Syllabus of Errors in 1864,176 but his successor Pope Leo XIII sounded a new conciliatory note. With concessions by the Church, the Prussian authorities began withdrawing anticlerical laws in 1882. Later, in a gesture of good will, Bismarck asked the pope to arbitrate a dispute between the Kaiserreich and Spain over the Caroline Islands in the Pacific. Flattered by this assignment, which he executed with great success, Pope Leo decorated the “Iron Chancellor” with the Order of Christ.177 But this by no means signified an end to the state’s interest in seeing “friendly” bishops in place. Thus, when Bishop Heinrich Förster of Wrocław died in 1881, Bismarck blocked the appointment of Prince Edmund Radziwiłł as his successor, installing Robert Herzog instead. The chancellor also managed to bring Andreas Thiel to serve as Bishop of Warmia (in 1885) and Leo Redner to serve as Bishop of Chełmno after the death of the incumbent (in 1886). When the see of Gniezno- Poznań became vacant in 1884, Church and state initially promoted rival candidates, but finally settled on Julius Dinder (1830–1890), a German from Königsberg with a full command of Polish. He was promptly installed as Archbishop of Gniezno-Poznań and Primate of Poland.178 But, although German bishops now sat in the four sees in the eastern provinces, Bishop Thiel did not publicly support the policy of linguistic Germanization. Colonizing the eastern territories. By 1885, Bismarck had concluded that his plan to turn Poles into Germanophone Prussians was not succeeding and, indeed, had no prospect of success. Worse yet, his efforts to control episcopal appointments together with his other policies vis-à-vis the Church, including the imprisonment or banishment of well-loved Polish parish priests, had only strengthened the bond between the Catholic faith and Polish national identity, while sowing deep resentment among all Poles. Moreover, as F. Schinkel has noted, “[t]he Kulturkampf resulted not in a weakening, but in an extraordin- ary strengthening of the Polish national movement.”179 Despairing of his original strategy, Bismarck now came up with a two-pronged policy. On the one hand, he would now expel all Poles lacking Prussian citizenship (or, more precisely, as many as Russia would accept); on the other hand, he would organize a mass colonization of the annexed territories by German settlers. In this way, the desired result – of having citizens in Poznania and Warmia not dreaming of an independent Polish state – could still be achieved. 80 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

A settlement law passed in 1886 allocated funds for the government to purchase Polish estates and turn them over to German settlers. The regime’s confessional preference was clear from the fact that, between 1887 and 1909, 15,916 German Protestant families benefitted from this largesse, as opposed to just 613 German Catholic families.180 Poles did not remain passive, however, and set up their own rival settlement organizations, which raised funds to purchase land put up for sale by Polish landowners. By 1894, these Polish organizations had succeeded in settling nearly as many Poles on purchased estate lands, as the government’s Settlement Commission had managed to do for Germans.181 In addition, the law of 1886 allocated funds for the construction of new Protestant churches, the rebuilding of existing Protestant churches, and extra subsidies for Protestant pastors. Indeed, in 1902, the Prussian government budgeted about 600,000 Reichsmarks per year for the period ending in 1914 to construct Protestant churches in Posen province and West Prussia.182 By 1901, some 73 new Protestant parishes had been established just in Poznania. This policy had its origins in December 1871, when Bismarck had instructed Interior Minister Count Botho von Eulenburg (1831–1912) “to deport all politically active persons from Posen [Poznań] immediately, if they were not Prussian citizens.”183 Subsequently, on 31 August 1872, Berlin and St. Petersburg had signed a convention regulating the deportation of Poles lacking citizenship in the country in which they were living: this related, in fact, to Poles holding Russian citizenship who had crossed over to Prussia. As of 1 October 1884, there were 30,165 Polish immigrants from Russia living in Germany, with more than two-thirds of them living in East and West Prussia and Poznania.184 On 15 December 1884, Bismarck instructed his Interior Minister to refuse to extend Prussian citizenship to any applicants with Russian citizenship and, 2 months later, then-Interior Minister Robert von Puttkamer received instructions from the chancellor to proceed with the expulsion of Russian subjects. Not only Poles but also Jews were deported to Russia, and a fresh effort was made to use the schools to promote cultural-linguistic Germanization.185 By January 1888, when the expulsions were brought to a close, about 32,000 aliens, out of an estimated 44,000, had been deported; more than two-thirds of these were Poles, while the rest were Jews.186 The Caprivi era. On 20 March 1890, Bismarck was forced to step down as chancellor and Leo von Caprivi (1831–1899) came in as head of the Prussian government and Chancellor of Germany. During the four years PRUSSIAN POLAND, 1795–1907 81 that Caprivi served as Chancellor, the government adopted a more positive attitude toward its Polish subjects, which was reciprocated by a new “loyalism” on the part of Polish leaders. These years have come down as the “era of reconciliation” (Versöhnungsära).187 Holdovers from Bismarck’s chancellorship, who shared Bismarck’s deep distrust of Poles, were gradually weeded out of office. A key change came in March 1891, when Gustav von Gossler was replaced as Minister of Religious Affairs and Education by Robert von Zedlitz-Trützschler, who welcomed the influence of religion in public life. Already in his first year in office, Zedlitz allowed Poles to use public school facilities to teach Polish after regular school hours.188 Almost at the same time as the changeover in the chancellor’soffice, the incumbent archbishop of Gniezno-Poznań, Julius Dinder, died – on 30 May 1890. As long as Gossler remained in office, however, it proved to be impossible to agree on Dinder’s successor. The Poles favored Edward Likowski for the post, or alternatively the return of Ledóchowski, while the minister insisted that a German be appointed and promoted the candidacy of Bishop Leo Redner of Chełmno. The Polish canons presented a list of six possible successors, including Likowski together with five other Polish clerics. But on 5 August 1890, the government rejected all six as “ultramontane and intransigent Polish” prelates.189 Eventually, after initially championing Redner for the post, Caprivi took what was, in its time, a bold decision and decided to support the appointment of Fr. Florian Stablewski (1841–1906), a cleric known for his loyalty to Prussia. In doing so, he broke with the policy adopted by Prussia heretofore of placing only Germans to head the archdiocese of Gniezno-Poznań. Although there were some protests by Germans in Poznania, Stablewski soon confirmed the confidence which Prussian and German authorities had placed in him.190 Needless to say, his appointment was welcomed by Poles and contributed to the mood of reconciliation. By March 1892, Caprivi had stepped down as Minister-President of Prussia, though he continued to serve as German Chancellor until October 1894. The former Interior Minister, Eulenburg, now took the reins as Minister-President. Although this transition, combined with Zedlitz’s resignation as Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, complicated the situation for Poles, it was agreed, under pressure from Archbishop Stablewski, to restore Polish instruction in elementary schools in February 1894.191 Among Poles, the chief advocate of loyalism was Józef Kościelski, a noble estate owner who was elected to the German Reichstag in 1884. But 82 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 neither he nor Caprivi proved able to stem the reemerging tide of Polonophobia among some Germans. Between 1882 and 1907, the Polish presence in Poznania rose from 58.5% to 61.5%, while Poles, who had accounted for only 28% of merchants in Poznania in 1882, now accounted for 49% of merchants by the later year.192 For German Protestants, the Poles were alien both linguistically and confessionally. Moreover, there were German Protestants both within the Protestant League and outside it who sought “a more radical and permanent solution to the nationality problem: the conversion of all Catholics, German and Polish, to Protestantism.”193 The Society for the Eastern Marches, a xenophobic organization founded in 1894, which included both Protestant and Catholic members, had a different idea: for the Society, intergroup harmony might best be promoted – as Die Ostmark put it in its April 1898 issue – by settling large numbers of German Catholics in Polish-dominated areas, so that “finally the absurd idea that posits the equivalence of Protestant and German as well as Polish and Catholic can be destroyed.”194 But language and religion were intertwined, and language was the key marker of nationality. Continuing into the twentieth century, there continued to be rows about whether priests would be allowed to hear confession in Polish, present their Sunday sermons in Polish, and so forth. Polish Catholics asked for concessions, but German bishops offered as few as possible. In April 1904, following on a statement from the aforementioned bishops, Catholic priests met in secret and offered their thoughts. “The Poles,” they agreed,

must be granted what religious requirements make necessary: confession, Polish devotion with sermons on afternoons. The Poles must be denied everything that serves political-Polish agitation: communion and confession class, [Polish-language] baptism, wedding ceremonies, funerals in the Polish language, Sunday mass with Polish hymns ...195

AUSTRIAN GALICIA, 1780–1914 The experience of Poles in Austrian-occupied Galicia differed from the experiences of Poles in the Prussian/German and Russian partitions in three key respects. First and most obviously, unlike Prussia and Russia, Austria was a Catholic power; so any effort to convert Polish Catholics to AUSTRIAN GALICIA, 1780–1914 83 some other faith was completely out of the question. Second, whereas Poles in Prussia and Russia started out with autonomy and the right to use their language locally, Poles in Austria were initially denied any autonomy or support for Polish language and culture. But by the latter part of the nineteenth century, these relationships had been reversed. The Poles in Prussia and Russia had lost their autonomy and were being subjected to programs of Germanization and Russification, while the Poles of Galicia obtained wide-ranging autonomy after 1867, and enjoyed Polish instruction in the schools and universities and opportunities to develop a lively Polish cultural life. And third, Prussians thought in terms of whether locals would consider themselves Polish in the first place or rather Prussian first and foremost; similarly, Russians were concerned as to whether locals would feel Polish or Russian. By contrast, in Austria, Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich (1773–1859), who served as State Chancellor of the Austrian Empire from 1821 to 1848, promoted a Galician identity for the Poles of the Empire, as a more promising strategy for securing the integration of Galicia’s Poles into the Empire’s multinational community.196 The Church under Joseph II and Franz I. Joseph II (1741–1790) served as Holy Roman Emperor 1765–1790, co-regent with his mother, Maria Theresa, in the Habsburg lands until 1780, and – among other titles – King of Hungary, Croatia, and Bohemia from 1780 to 1790. Already in the 1770s, with the encouragement of her son, Maria Theresa made ecclesiastical purchase of land conditional upon government approval, reduced the number of religious holidays, and forbade anyone to take monastic monastic vows before reaching age 24.197 After the death of his mother, Joseph was effectively sole ruler in the Habsburg lands. Like his mother, Joseph II had imbibed the ideas of the Enlightenment and wanted to bring the Enlightenment to his empire.198 As early as October 1781, he issued his Edict of Toleration (Toleranzpatent), abolishing most features of discrimination against Protestants, as well as some aspects of discrimination against Orthodox believers. His motivation was not sympathy for non-Catholic creeds, let alone indifference to Catholicism.199 Following other Enlightenment thinkers, such as Jean Bodin (1530–1596) and John Locke (1632–1704), Joseph was motivated by rationalist and pragmatic calculations. Specifically, he wanted to promote the equality of his subjects in order to strengthen royal absolutism.200 It was in this spirit that Joseph would ease conditions for the serfs, relax the censorship, retract some privileges hitherto enjoyed by the nobles, 84 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 promote German as the language of administration (in place of Latin), promote a reform of the army, abolish torture, build great hospitals, and open up the Prater fairground, hitherto reserved for aristocrats, to the public. Where the Church is concerned, Georgine Holzknecht201 sees the roots of Josephinism in Gallicanism202 and Jansenism.203 But Josephinism went beyond mere Gallicanism (or Jansenism, for that matter) and involved the idea that the state should regulate the Church in the interest of the state. There had been tendencies in this direction under Holy Roman Emperors Ferdinand II (reigned from 1619 to 1637), Leopold I (reigned from 1658 to 1705), and Karl VI (reigned from 1711 to 1740).204 But Joseph went further than his predecessors, dissol- ving 700 monasteries and convents, comprising about a third of the pre- dissolution total. Among the religious orders he dissolved were the Carthusians, the Camaldensians, the Carmelites, and the Capuchins. In short, contemplative orders did not win his favor. Those religious orders allowed to remain were those involved in caring for the sick, educational activities, farming, and sundry trades – all activities which appealed to Joseph’s rationalist-pragmatic mindset.205 All the same, those religious orders allowed to continue their work were cut off from their main offices abroad, and papal encyclicals could not be promulgated or distributed within his realm without His Majesty’s consent.206 Joseph II also regulated religious processions, the way in which the altar was illuminated and the way in which pictures of saints were decorated, and claimed the right to overrule papal bulls.207 He also placed the seminaries under state control and redrew diocesan boundaries. Pope Pius VI (1717–1799; reigned 1775–1799) was duly upset by Joseph’s various moves to circumscribe the Church. He was especially upset about the 1781 Patent of Toleration, the prohibition against Austrian bishops making direct contact with Rome, and the suppression of contemplative religious orders.208 The pontiff therefore resolved to meet with the Kaiser face to face, arriving in Vienna on 22 March and remaining there for a full month. The pope hoped for meaningful concessions but had to be satisfied with the mere pledge, offered by Joseph, “that his ecclesiastical reforms would not contain any violation of Catholic dogmas, or compromise the dignity of the pope.”209 What the pope did not accomplish was to slow down the pace of Josephinist reform; on the contrary, Joseph lent his support to the Congress of Ems, organized by elector-bishops of the Holy Roman Empire in August 1786 for the AUSTRIAN GALICIA, 1780–1914 85 purpose of protesting papal efforts to control or limit the bishops’ prerogatives and powers. Joseph’s reforms in both the social and the ecclesiastical spheres were nothing short of revolutionary, affecting Church- state relations and social relations in Galicia as much as elsewhere in his realm, although, as Larry Wolff has pointed out, “the recent acquisition of Galicia, and the convenient argument for its ‘revindication’ [on the argument that the region had once been part of Hungary, now ruled by the Habsburgs], meant that historic prerogatives had less weight there than in the other Habsburg lands.”210 Joseph II died at the age of 49, heartbroken that his enlightened reforms had met as much resistance as they had. His younger brother Leopold II (1747–1792) now took the throne as Holy Roman Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and Archduke of Austria. In the two short years he reigned, he rescinded changes in the liturgy, which his brother had brought about and made some small concessions to the Church, restoring Catholic privileges, but otherwise left the Josephinist model of Church-state relations in place. He reversed other Josephinist policies, including restoring serfdom to its pre-Josephine condition and trying to appease national minorities.211 He is also remembered for having been the first head of state to effect the permanent abolition of capital punishment. He died suddenly at the age of 45, amid rumors that he had been poisoned. Leopold’s successor was his son Franz (1768–1835), who was to be the last Holy Roman Emperor, ruling as Franz II from 1792 to 1806, and the first Kaiser (Emperor) of Austria, ruling in that capacity as Franz I from 1804 until his death. He has been described as “dry, bureaucratic, and reactionary” as well as “devoted ...to the Germanization of [the empire’s] subject peoples, and to patriarchal autocracy.”212 Kaiser Franz was generally satisfied with Joseph’s formula for state control of the Church. However, Franz was clearly more conservative than Joseph had been, now prohibiting divorce in cases of Catholic marriages – and by “Catholic” the law specified anyone born into the faith.213 Under Kaiser Franz I, the Church’sinfluence on the school system increased considerably: a decisive step in this direction came on 14 August 1805 with the issuance of a “political constitution” for German schools.214 Under Franz, bishops obtained the right to approve or disapprove schoolbooks and priests were now usually entrusted with the task of inspecting the schools. There was also an increase in the number of theological institutes and efforts were undertaken to attract more young 86 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 men to the priesthood. But the basic principles of the Josephinist reform of relations with the Church were retained under Franz I.215 Where Galicia was concerned, of the 12 diocesan bishops serving in the years 1821–1848, six were Poles and the remaining six were Germans or Germanized Czechs or Hungarians.216 Habsburg Galicia to 1849. As noted above, the Habsburgs took part in the first and third partitions of Poland-Lithuania, but not in the second partition. The land annexed in 1772 – Galicia-Lodomeria, as the Habsburgs called it – would remain part of the Habsburg Empire until the breakup of Austria-Hungary in 1918. But most of the land annexed in 1795 – West Galicia – was assigned to the Duchy of Warsaw in 1809 and would be transferred to the Russian Congress Kingdom in 1815. The Habsburgs justified their participation in these two partitions in different ways. Maria Theresa, the Empress-Consort of the Holy Roman Empire at the time of the first partition, told her Chancellor, Prince Wenzel Kaunitz (1711–1794), that she felt nothing but “repugnance” for the word “partition”. Kaunitz offered the justi- fication for the 1772 annexation by arguing that the lands being taken had been parts of the medieval Kingdom of Rus’, under the names Galich (in the Old Rus’ language)217 and Vladimir. Since Hungary had taken possession of those lands in the twelfth century, only to lose them to Poland two centuries later, it could be plausibly argued, Kaunitz thought, that these lands were being reunited with their true homeland.218 The trick was to get locals to think of themselves as Galicians, rather than as Poles. Although most Galicians, now, were Catholics, the Habsburgs also made a play for the loyalty of local Jews, with Joseph claiming to have “liberate[d] the Jews from the Egyptian despotism of Poland and [to have] establish[ed] a promised land on the same terrain where they had lived for centuries, now socially and politically transformed: Habsburg Galicia.”219 In 1790, after the death of Joseph II, Galicians prepared a charter addressed to Kaiser Leopold in which, among other things, they called for Latin and the “national language” (code for Polish) to be used as the language of administration in Galicia, rather than German.220 In spite of this, it would take almost a century before Poles/Galicians were to begin to enjoy the fruit of Habsburg rule. A key turning point was the issuance by Kaiser Franz Joseph (1830–1916; reigned from 1848 to 1916) of the February Patent in 1861, which provided for separate legal institutions and a separate administrative apparatus for Galicia. AUSTRIAN GALICIA, 1780–1914 87

The Republic of Kraków. Initially, after the partition of 1772, Kraków lay within Habsburg Galicia, as its most important cultural center. But the 1815 Congress of Vienna, as already noted, established Kraków as an independent city-state, with an area of 1,164 sq. km and a population of 88,000 inhabitants, increasing to more than 120,000 by 1827. The Republic of Kraków embraced not only the city itself but also three towns and more than 200 villages.221 Class inequality was deeply resented by those at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale and, in 1846, peasants of Galicia – both Polish and Ruthenian – rose up against their Polish landlords, killing or wounding 1,458 of them,222 in a revolt centered in, but not conﬁned to, central and western Galicia. Priests connected with the gentry residences were among the victims. Ewa Jabłońska- Deptuła and Jan Skarbek recall that the priests

were unable, often despite heroic efforts, to stop the bloodshed. Neither persuasion nor even standing in front of the mobs in liturgical attire, holding up the Holy Eucharist, was of any avail. A few priests died, often in unusual circumstances. Several others were beaten, robbed, or turned over to the police. Churches, on the other hand, unlike nobles’ residences, were unaffected. Very few priests sided with the peasants ...The rebellion took an especially cruel and ruthless turn in eastern Galicia (Przemyśl diocese). Blinded by Austrian propaganda, the peasants attacked the clergy ...even though the latter had publicly opposed serfdom and taxes ...223

Austrian authorities used the revolt as a pretext to annex Kraków, thus bringing an end to the city’s three-decade-long independence. What is worth emphasizing is that the 1846 revolt involved Polish and Ruthenian peasants rising up against their Polish landlords. This uprising, therefore, bears little, if any, comparison to the 1830 and 1863 uprisings in Russian-occupied Poland. Metternich and Galicia. Metternich, who served as Chancellor from 1821 to 1848, may be considered a “modern” in the sense that he believed that there were some inherent laws of politics, discoverable by reason, which, if applied, could promote social stability.224 He summarized his politics at one point as calling for

respect for all that is; liberty for every government to watch over the well-being of its own people; a league between all governments against factions in all states; contempt for the meaningless words which have become the rallying cry of the factions; respect for the progressive development of institutions in lawful ways; refusal on the part of every monarch to aid or succour partisans under 88 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

any mask whatsoever – such are happily the ideas of great monarchs; the world will be saved if they bring them into action – it is lost if they do not.225

It followed, for Metternich, that there neither should be nor could be any concessions on the part of legitimate authority to rebellious groups. Where Galicia was concerned, Metternich favored provincial autonomy as a means of building commitment to the empire. As early as 1817, Metternich began pushing for the introduction of administrative unifor- mity throughout the empire and urged that provincial boundaries be aligned with the boundaries of ethnic groups to the extent possible.226 On the other hand, the University of Lemberg (Lwów), which had been downgraded to a lyceum in 1805, was reestablished as a university in 1817, on Metternich’s watch, though with German still as the language of instruction.227 The population of the Habsburg Empire increased by 40% between 1800 and 1848, with the result that, a robust rate of industrialization (especially in Bohemia and Lower Austria) notwithstanding, there were increasing numbers of landless peasants or people with holdings that were either too small or too infertile to provide an adequate basis for subsistence.228 In addition, there were food shortages across Europe in the years 1845–1847, with many countries reaching the breaking point in March 1848. When Vienna was shaken by tremors, Metternich resigned as Chancellor on 13 March, under pressure from the Vienna Diet. Two days later, the upheaval spread to Pest (the eastern part of Budapest), followed by the creation of the ﬁrst Hungarian Diet on 17 March. In September, Hungary declared itself a “parliamentary dictatorship,”229 effectively sundering its bond with the Habsburg dynasty and launching a War for Hungarian Independence, which ended on 13 August 1849, with the Hungarian surrender at Világos. In Galicia, there were also protests, with Poles demanding political rights equal to those enjoyed by German-Austrians, Hungarians, and Czechs, as well as language equality. They also hoped that the Europe-wide revolution would result in the reemergence of a uniﬁed and independent Poland.230 Barricades went up in Lwów. But on 2 November 1848, army units under the command of General Wilhelm Hammerstein restored Austrian control of the city, after having unleashed a devastat- ing bombardment of the city, which left 50 civilians dead and the town hall in ashes.231 AUSTRIAN GALICIA, 1780–1914 89

The Catholic Church in the era of Franz Joseph. Franz I died in 1835; his immediate successor was his son, Ferdinand I, then age 42. Given Ferdinand’s mental deficiency, Metternich, together with Count Franz Anton von Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky (1778–1861), formed a secret committee, which functioned as the de facto executive in Austria from 1836 to 1848. After Metternich’s resignation as Chancellor, Kolowrat assumed the newly created post of Minister-President (as the office of Chancellor was renamed), only to step down a month later, officially for reasons of health. Between 4 April and 21 November, four other Austrian statesmen held the office of Minister-President, each serving in office thus for an average of 57 days. Finally, in November 1848, Prince Felix zu Schwarzenberg was installed as Minister-President, holding that post until his death three- and-a-half years later. One of Schwarzenberg’s first acts was to engineer the abdication of Kaiser Ferdinand, opening the way for Ferdinand’s nephew, the hard-working Franz Joseph (1830–1916), to assume the throne as Kaiser on 2 December 1848. During 1848, as the revolutionary tide crested, questions about Church-state relations were reopened. Entering the debate were both supporters of Josephinism, for example, among Reichstag deputies from Vienna, Bohemia, Moravia, Upper Austria, and Salzburg, and – in the other camp – opponents of Josephinism, who wanted to see the Church more independent of the state. Among the latter were Reichstag deputies from the South Tirol and Galicia.232 Some bishops were demanding the complete independence of the Church from the state. There were also currents seeking the political independence of Galicia. During that tumultuous year, many Latin clergy of Galicia lent their support to the independence movement; but the bishops, like the local gentry, held back, stressing that political activists should restrict themselves to legal activities – which meant, in practice, forswearing any recourse to rebellion to achieve independence.233 Put simply, the bishops of Galicia were unwilling to break with Austria,234 as restrictive as they found the Josephinist formula. It was obvious to the royal court in Vienna that the Josephinist system needed to be reevaluated and at least reformed, if not abandoned altogether. Thus, under Franz Joseph, restrictions on the Church’s activities were gradually relaxed. Already in April 1850, legislation was passed expanding the powers of the country’s bishops and restoring the administration of the seminaries to episcopal control. Under the Rescripts of 18 and 23 April 1850, the bishops also regained the right to unobstructed 90 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 contact with the Curia in Rome, the right to prescribe the liturgy as they saw fit, and a restoration of their pre-Josephinist authority over the lower clergy, as well as full competence to make clerical appointments and to elevate priests to episcopal rank. Negotiations for a Concordat with Vienna had been initiated in 1833, when Franz was still the Kaiser, but broke down because Franz was not prepared to give up any of the authority the secular authorities exercised in the ecclesiastical sphere.235 After the death of Franz II/I, negotiations with the Holy See resumed, but ran aground when Josephinians in Vienna, among them Kolowrat, dug in their heels.236 With the ascent of Franz Joseph to the throne in December 1848, the Church question once again came to the fore. As early as 7 February 1849, the newly installed Kaiser had his new ambassador in Rome, Count Moritz Esterházy, inform the pope “that the Austrian government was determined to recognize the principle of the complete freedom of the Church and to get rid of any abuses in this sphere.”237 The following year, the Kaiser issued the so-called April Ordinances (18 and 23 April 1850), which established a new foundation for the Church-state relationship, in particular by guaranteeing “the unhindered access of the bishops to the pope.”238 Eventually, in summer 1855, after a period of intense negotiations, the Concordat was finally signed. The Concordat guaranteed the Church unobstructed contact with the Holy See, guaranteed that Catholic youngsters would receive education compatible with the teachings of the Catholic Church, guaranteed that the bishops would supervise religious instruction and that nothing in the schools would contradict Catholic teaching.239 Article 19 guaranteed that the Kaiser would consult the bishops before filling any vacant episcopal post. Article 28 guaranteed that the establishment of religious orders and congregations would be regulated by the Church’s rules. Article 21 recognized Church ownership of the religion fund and guaranteed that henceforth proceeds from that fund would be used only for the Church’s needs.240 Galicia’s bishops, like bishops elsewhere in the Empire, greeted the signing of the Concordat and could take satisfaction in the concessions from the Kaiser and his government. But there was opposition to the Concordat from the start. Non- Catholics opposed it because of its provision regarding confessionally mixed marriages, and in the years 1856–1867 there were many articles published, both supporting the Concordat and expressing opposition to it. Before the end of 1867, the city council of Vienna adopted a resolution calling for the abrogation of the 1855 Concordat, which the council AUSTRIAN GALICIA, 1780–1914 91 characterized as “that baleful agreement by which the inhabitants of Austria, as regards their most sacred rights and possessions, are exposed to the arbitrary pleasure of a foreign power.”241 In addition, in September 1867, 1,500 schoolmasters publicly called for the separation of the schools from ecclesiastical control. The Liberals would have liked to scotch the Concordat altogether but, given Franz Joseph’s loyalty and devotion to the Church, contented themselves with chipping away at its provisions one by one, among other things legalizing civil marriage, moving divorce proceedings to secular courts, and ending the Church’s role in supervising the schools. When the last of these legislative acts was adopted, Galicia’s bishops and clergy were among its foremost critics.242 Earlier, in November 1849, Kaiser Franz Joseph had “lifted some restrictions on Protestants and a few months later granted full religious freedom to all citizens.”243 Later, on 8 April 1861, the Kaiser approved the further expansion of the rights of Lutherans and Reformed (Calvinists), whereby they obtained the right to regulate their own ecclesiastical affairs. Another bill granted all Christian faiths equal status and provided that a “free- thinker” (meaning someone not affiliated with any religious body) could no longer be imprisoned for expressing his or her views. Bishops and clergy protested vigorously against all this legislation, while Pope Pius IX, whose 1864 Syllabus of Errors had condemned liberalism, secularism, and equal treatment of religious faiths, among other “errors,” denounced these laws as “truly unholy,”“destructive, abominable, and damnable,” and “absolutely null and void.”244 But on 18 July 1870, the First Vatican Council, over which Pope Pius IX presided, proclaimed the doctrine that the pope was empowered by God to offer “infallible” pronouncements in matters of faith and morals – meaning that, when the pope addressed these issues ex cathedra (literally, “from the chair” of St. Peter, but in practice meaning solemnly), he could not err. The claim of infallibility outraged many bishops and cardinals and, among the delegates from the Habsburg Empire, the mood could be described as a combination of stunned dis- belief and sullen compliance. In Vienna, the parliament considered that the proclamation of papal infallibility “changed the character of the party with which the Concordat had been signed and that Austria was therefore justified in canceling the treaty.”245 Vienna proceeded to annul the Concordat in 1871 and ordained that the government, not the Church, would appoint and dis- miss priests from their parishes, that the government would prescribe the educational requirements for the ordination of priests, that Church 92 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 property would henceforth be subject to taxation, and that members of monastic orders could renounce their vows and return to lay status, simply by informing the appropriate government official.246 These measures did not go as far as similar measures enacted in Prussia, but aroused clerical tempers all the same. To the Roman Catholic hierarchy of the Habsburg Empire, it seemed that the Josephinist system had been reintroduced in their country, albeit partially transfigured. As for the Kaiser, he scarcely approved of these legislative changes, but respected the Reichstag as entitled to adopt them and therefore did not attempt to overturn them. In the years 1850–1910, the number of Catholic parishes in Galicia increased by 10.8%, as compared with a 3.7% increase in the Congress Kingdom in the same period.247 Roman Catholics predominated in western Galicia, but in eastern Galicia, where many Ruthenes lived, Eastern- Rite Catholics were more numerous than Roman Catholics. Their relations were anything but friendly, with Ruthenes accusing Roman Catholics of wanting to Latinize their Eastern-Rite Church, while Poles suspected the Eastern-Rite priests of gravitating dangerously close to Orthodoxy.248 There were also fears that the two rites were poaching in each other’s congregations. Finally, in 1863, Roman and Eastern-Rite Catholics of Galicia signed an agreement, called the Concordia, to end their disagreements; under its terms, approved by Pope Pius IX, people were not allowed to change from one rite to the other without the permission of the Holy See.249 Galicia, 1846–1914. As Piotr Wandycz has noted, the jacquerie in Galicia in 1846 was a turning point in relations between Poles and Vienna, though how one understands the nature of that turning point depends on how one interprets the contending forces in that fateful year.250 I find myself in agreement with those historians who have underlined the class antagonisms, which underlay and rose to the surface in the uprising of 1846. What is undisputed is that local peasants refused to support radicals calling for a national revolution and instead opposed the radicals and turned to massacring local Polish gentry. The immediate consequences of 1846, apart from the aforementioned annexation of Kraków by Austria, were: first, that the Polish nobility realized how great a political gulf existed between them and the peasants, whether Polish or Ruthenian; second, that the Polish elite of Galicia adopted a strategy of caution and circumspection; and third, that Vienna succeeded in keeping the peasants high and dry from any revolutionary streams.251 AUSTRIAN GALICIA, 1780–1914 93

After the smothering of revolution in 1849, the Constitution of March 1849 was revoked and Austria entered a period lasting until 1860 and known alternatively as “neo-abolutism” or “the Bach regime,” named after the Minister of the Interior, Alexander Bach252 (1813–1893), a key player in the overhaul of the state, in which the powers of the police and the extent of domestic surveillance were dramatically increased.253 The governor of Galicia in this period was Agenor Gołuchowski, who strove to parlay ultra-loyalism on his part into concessions from Vienna. “During the post-revolutionary decade,” Wandycz has written,

Bach’s absolutist, clerical, and police regime weighed heavily on Galicia. The response of the Polish leading classes – held in check by the threat of the division of the province [into a Polish province in the west and a Ruthenian province in the east] and the enmity of the peasantry – was one of meek submission and hope that loyalist policies might eventually improve things.254

But after Austria’s defeat in its war against France and Sardinia in 1859, Polish leaders presented an appeal to Vienna in December 1860, declaring that they considered Galicia indivisible and calling on Vienna to permit the establishment of a representative diet (sejm). Vienna saw no reason to grant the Poles their wish and, in the short run, actually circumscribed the Poles’ prerogatives. The crushing by tsarist forces of the 1863 uprising in the Russian partition had a sobering effect on Polish elites in Galicia, with local conservatives now insisting that only a posture of complete loyalty to the Habsburg monarchy made any sense. National survival was the highest priority; Polish independence, while it remained a hope for the future, could be put on the back burner. But after Austria’s defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866, the Poles addressed the throne once again, asking for provincial self-government. Vienna put off the Poles for the time being and turned first to negotiating an agreement with the Hungarians – the famous Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867, in which the Hungarians obtained a large measure of autonomy, which they succeeded in expanding incrementally in renegotiations held every ten years. Some Poles called for Galicia to be granted the same degree of autonomy as had been granted to Hungary. Franz Joseph would not hear of it. But there were concessions nonetheless: Polish was introduced as the language of public administration in 1869, and was extended to secondary schools; Polish or Ruthenian had already been in use as the language of instruction in 94 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 elementary schools.255 The universities in Kraków and Lwów were polonized in the early 1870s, and it was agreed that only Polish professors would teach at those two universities256; in 1872, the Learned Society in Kraków was reorganized as the Kraków Academy of Sciences; a second Galician learned society – the Association for the Promotion of Polish Science – was set up in Lwów in 1901; and, beginning in 1871, it became routine practice to appoint a Pole to the Austrian cabinet to take responsibility for Galician affairs. In 1880, there were 3,238,534 Poles living in Cisleithania, as the Austrian half of the Empire was officially called after the 1867 Ausgleich; this represented 14.9% of the population of the Austrian half. By 1910, this figure had risen to 4,967,984, comprising 17.7% of the population of Cisleithania. Of this total, 4,672,500 were living in Galicia, with an additional 235,224 Poles in Silesia, together with smaller numbers elsewhere in Cisleithania.257 But class division continued to be central to the Galician experience. The province’s economy continued to the end of the nineteenth century to be predominantly agricultural, with antiquated methods of farming, and rural overpopulation.258 But for the Polish elites, the era following 1867 was a “golden age.” When it came to imperial service, there was no glass ceiling for Poles. Indeed, two Poles served as Minister-President (Prime Minister): Count Alfred Potocki (1870–1871) and Count Kazimierz Badeni (1895–1897). Count Agenor Gołuchowski served as Foreign Minister from 1895 to 1906, and four Poles served as Finance Minister: Julian von Dunajewski (1880–1891), Leon von Biliński (1895–1897 and again 1909–1911), Witold von Korytowski (1906– 1908), and Wenzel von Zaleski (1911–1913). In addition, three Poles served as Minister of Education in Vienna: Stanisław von Madeyski (1893– 1895), Ludwik Ćwikliński (1917–1918), and Stanisław von Madejski’s son Jerzy (1918). The class division could also be seen in a comparison between the culturally poor and economically hard-pressed countryside and the culturally rich and economically vibrant cities of Kraków and Lwów. The universities, scientific institutes, theaters, bookshops, and newspapers all functioned in the Polish language, as did the historical journal, Kwartalnik Historyczny, founded in 1884. As the ever-insightful Oscar Jászi noted in 1929,

The Austrian Poles, or to speak more correctly, the Polish nobility (because there was an enormous gulf between the Polish landlords and the wretched peasantry) began to feel themselves comfortable and became the most loyal subjects of AUSTRIAN GALICIA, 1780–1914 95

His Majesty and the most important ofﬁces and diplomatic positions of the monarchy were [e]ntrusted to them. Since they had their own national autonomy and the possibilities of a free cultural development, not the slightest revolutionary ripple or irredentist agitation was to be observed among them.259

But the aristocrat-conservatives were about to be confronted by new rivals, with less quiescent strategies than theirs: the Polish Social Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia founded in 1890, renamed in 1892, and merged with the Polish Socialist Party in 1919; the Polish Socialist Party, founded in Paris in 1892 under the leadership of Bogusław Gorski (though later to be led by Józef Piłsudski); the Polish Peasant Party, founded in Galicia in 1895, with Wincenty Witos as a prominent member; and the National Democratic Party, founded in Russia in 1897, under the leadership of Roman Dmowski. The Social Democrats, Socialists, and Peasants focused on the social and economic gulf between the conservative elites who had dominated Galicia up to then and the working classes in the countryside and cities; the National Democrats, by contrast, stressed Polish national culture and engaged in anti-Ukrainian (anti-Ruthenian) and anti-Semitic posturing.260 All of these parties wanted to reach Poles in all three partition zones. In 1907, Vienna introduced universal male suffrage. Shortly thereafter, the number of Kaisertreu261 nobles holding office declined and the representation of socialists and peasants in the Reichsrat (the parliament) increased.262 Subsequently, in 1914, a revised constitution was adopted as well as a new electoral law, but the outbreak of World War One prevented this from being put into effect. The Galician exception. In tracing Galicia’s trajectory from 1772 to 1914, it is immediately apparent how great was the difference between Austrian Galicia and the other two partition zones. In the first place, although the Josephinist system imposed state control over the Church, the system was implemented throughout the Empire and did not have an anti-Polish character and, since the dynasty and the majority of the Empire’s population were Catholic, there was no effort to smother Catholicism; the contrast with the Prussian and Russian zones is striking. This, of course, had the consequence that the Catholic hierarchy and clergy had no vested interest in pressing for the independence of Galicia, let alone all of Poland. Second, while the major conflicts in the Prussian and Russian partition zones by the latter half of the nineteenth century were focused on regime efforts to Germanize or Russianize the Poles both 96 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 culturally and linguistically and, ideally from the perspective of those regimes, to wean them from the Catholic Church, in Habsburg Galicia, the main lines of cleavage, as we have seen, were defined by class, not religion: thus, nobility vs. peasantry, city vs. countryside. To the extent that competition between rival nationality groups was a factor, it was between Poles and Ruthenes, rather than between Poles and Austro- Germans. Third, while the Prussians/Germans and Russians became more repressive over time, the Austrians became more generous over time, thereby winning a degree of loyalty from Galician Poles without parallel in either Prussia or Russia. And finally, to return once more to the Church, from the standpoint of the Holy See, the last thing the Vatican wanted to do was to repudiate the government of the devout Kaiser and take its chances with Polish revolutionaries, among whom divergent view- points were becoming ever more apparent.

WORLD WAR ONE AND THE END OF THE PARTITIONS For Poles, the outbreak of the First World War offered the opportunity to reestablish an independent Polish state. Patriotic Poles looked for a Great Power to help them, but differed as to which Great Power would best fulfill this function. Roman Dmowski, the Germanophobic leader of the National Democrats initially favored working with Russia. On 14 August 1914, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Romanov gave encouragement to Dmowski’s de facto Russophilia by promising that, upon the conclusion of the war, Poles living in Russia would be granted significant autonomy. However, in May-June 1915, a Russian military offensive was rebuffed with massive casualties. After that, Dmowski looked to Britain and France for backing.263 Other Poles supported the German war effort; among these “conciliationists” was Bishop Edward Likowski, whom German authorities had, after a long delay, approved for installation as Archbishop of Gniezno-Poznań on 13 August 1914, 12 days after Berlin had declared war on Russia. (Likowski died in office 6 months later, on 20 February 1915.) Wiktor Kulerski and Adam Napieralski, editors of the newspapers Gazeta Grudziądzka and Katolik, respectively, entered into a formal agreement with German authorities.264 This confidence in Berlin seemed to be vindicated when, on 5 November 1916, a manifesto was issued in the name of the German and Austrian Kaisers, proclaiming the creation of a self-governing Polish state on Russian Polish territory occupied by German and Austrian forces. Galician Poles, by contrast, looked to WORLD WAR ONE AND THE END OF THE PARTITIONS 97

Austria for a sponsor. Józef Piłsudski, by then leader of the Polish Socialist Party and having at this command a small force of riflemen organized into three companies, favored collaboration with Austria. There is some disagreement as to whether Piłsudski’s decision to take his small force into combat against Russia enjoyed the official sanction of the Habsburg Ministry of War. Henryk Batkowski, for example, asserts that the K.u.K. Ministry of War approved the formation of the Polish Legion under Piłsudski’s command.265 By contrast, Grace Humphrey believes that “[n]o one had invited him to organize the Polish Legions and take command of them. His relations with the Austrians were not definite and clear. They had no agreement.”266 Be that as it may, Piłsudski would later recall (in 1922):

[When the war broke out,] I asked myself what Partition offered this possibility of creating an armed force, which would count when all, both conquerors and conquered, were weakened under the destiny of war. I saw immediately that the only country where it was possible to begin and carry through such work was Austria. I reckoned that Germany with her iron state organization and her machine would at once put in every one capable of ﬁghting. Russia was [of] no use – she was too conﬁdent in her own strength and her policy of force in dealing with her subjects. Austria remained the weakest state, maintaining herself alive as [a] type of political tight-rope walker, dependent on her subjects. [Austria was] the easiest to talk to ...267

Whatever understanding there may, or may not, have been between Austrian authorities and Piłsudski, when he led his riﬂemen into Kielce on 13 August,268 Austrian authorities were taken aback at the thought of having a maverick unit, not under their command, ﬁghting the Russians. They demanded that Piłsudski’s legion be integrated into the Austrian army and that he take an oath of loyalty to the Kaiser, subordinating himself and his legion to Austrian military command.269 On 15 November, the Austrian High Command promoted Piłsudski to Brigadier General. Piłsudski resigned his commission on 28 July 1916 and was formally relieved of his command and released from military service on 28 September. But after agreeing to join the Provisional Council of State set up by Germany and Austria at the head of the provisional Polish state, Piłsudski soon declared that his and the Polish people’s interests were at fundamental variance with German interests. On 22 July 1917, he was taken into custody by the Germans and interned in 98 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

Gdańsk (Danzig). After the war was concluded, with victory by Great Britain, France, and the United States, Piłsudski was hailed as a hero by his countrymen, for having always kept the interests of Poland uppermost in his heart. Finally, the Holy See inevitably took a keen interest in the Polish question. On the one hand, the Vatican could, in theory, welcome the independence of an overwhelmingly Catholic nation; on the other hand, Polish independence was likely to come at the expense of the survival of Austria- Hungary which, for all of its see-sawing over Josephinist reform, continued to be cherished by the Vatican. Thus, when, in 1916, Dmowski approached the Holy See, hoping to obtain the Vatican’s backing for Polish independence, he met a skeptical reception. Pietro Cardinal Gasparri, Pope Benedict XV’s Secretary of State, told Dmowski that Polish independence was “a dream, an impossible goal! ...Your future is with Austria.”270 Later, as the Habsburg Empire began heading to defeat, Benedict XV issued a statement (in 1917), calling for the reestablishment of an autonomous Poland. But events moved quickly and, on 11 November 1918, the Regency Council set up under Austro-German auspices, transferred authority to Piłsudski. Poland quickly gained recognition of its independence from key European states and the Holy See extended diplomatic recognition in March 1919. Already in 1918, Benedict XV had appointed the Vatican librarian, Monsignor Achille Ratti, to serve as apostolic visitor, later nuncio, in Warsaw; Ratti would serve in Warsaw for three years. In 1832, sitting in exile in Paris, the great Polish Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) had set to work on Part III of his epic poem, Forefathers’ Eve. In lines written apparently “in a fitof‘frenzied inspiration’ following some kind of personal and mystical vision,”271 Mickiewicz compared the final partition of his homeland to Christ’s crucifixion. But just like Christ, Poland –“the Christ-nation”–would rise again from the dead in triumph.272 In 1918, Mickiewicz’spro- phecy was fulfilled.

NOTES 1. On this rump Kingdom of Poland, see Marian Biskup, “Preußen und Polen: Grundlinien und Reﬂexionen”,inJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1983), p. 24. 2. Ofﬁcial website of the University of Warsaw – History, at http://en.uw.edu. pl/about-university/history/ [accessed on 24 March 2016]. NOTES 99

3. Cyprian Pogonowski, Poland: A Historical Atlas (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1987), p. 141. 4. Gershon David Hundert, Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004), p. 22. 5. Isabel de Madariaga, Catherine the Great: A Short History (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1990; paperback edition printed in 2001), p. 43. 6. Kazimierz Bem, “Protestant Solidarity in the Eighteenth Century: Relief efforts of the Walloons for the Polish Reformed Churches”,inChurch History, Vol. 73, No. 1 (March 2004), p. 93. 7. Simon Dixon, Catherine the Great (Harlow and London: Pearson Education, 2001), p. 117. 8. Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 503. 9. Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; ﬁfth printing 2005), p. 92. 10. Larry Wolff, The Vatican and Poland in the Age of the Partitions: Diplomatic and Cultural Encounters at the Warsaw Nunciature (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1988), p. 116. 11. As quoted in Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland – Vol. 1, The Origins to 1795, Revised ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 389. 12. Ibid., pp. 392–393. See also Biskup, “Preußen und Polen”, pp. 8–9. 13. Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974; second printing, with corrections, 1977), pp. 163–164. See also S. K. Padover, “Prince Kaunitz and the First Partition of Poland”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 13, No. 38 (January 1935), p. 384. 14. Wolff, The Vatican and Poland, p. 15. 15. Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland – Vol. 2, 1795 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 393. Johannes Kunisch offers a lower estimate of the number of inhabitants in the Prussian partition, setting the number at 356,000. See Kunisch, Friedrich der Grosse. Der König und seine Zeit (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2004), p. 487. By contrast, Jürgen-Peter Ravens offers an estimate of 585,000 inhabitants in the Prussian partition of 1772, which is to say a ﬁgure very close to the estimate offered by Davies. See Jürgen-Peter Ravens, Staat und katholische Kirche in Preußens polnischen Teilungsgebieten (1772–1807) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), p. 13. 16. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Considerations on the Government of Poland and on Its Planned Reformation, in Rousseau, The Plan for Perpetual Peace, On the Government of Poland, and other Writings on History and Politics, trans. 100 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

from French by Christopher Kelly (Lebanon, NJ: Darmouth College Press / University Press of New England, 2005), pp. 169, 187. 17. Ibid., p. 183. 18. Ibid., pp. 230, 232. 19. Ibid., p. 174. 20. Wolff, The Vatican and Poland, pp. 30–32. 21. Anita Prażmowska, A History of Poland (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 125–126. 22. Jerzy Kloczowski [Kłoczowski], A History of Polish Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 185. 23. Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, pp. 99–100. 24. Wolff, The Vatican and Poland, p. 189. 25. Ibid., p. 195. 26. Richard Butterwick, ThePolishRevolutionandtheCatholicChurch,1788–1792: APoliticalHistory(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 212–216. 27. Kloczowski, History of Polish Christianity, p. 186. 28. Prażmowska, History of Poland, p. 127. 29. Butterwick, The Polish Revolution and the Catholic Church, p. 251. 30. As quoted in Ibid., p. 251. 31. Wolff, The Vatican and Poland, p. 211. 32. de Madariaga, Catherine the Great, p. 169. See also Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 70, 192. 33. Daniel Stone, The Polish-Lithuanian State, 1386–1795 (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 270–271. 34. Ibid., p. 284. 35. Ibid., p. 285. 36. Russia’s gain, Dixon, Catherine the Great, p. 171; Prussia’s gain, Biskup, “Preußen und Polen”, p. 10; both conﬁrmed in Stone, The Polish- Lithuanian State, p. 285. 37. Prażmowska, History of Poland, p. 128. 38. Stone, The Polish-Lithuanian State, p. 286. 39. Wolff, The Vatican and Poland, p. 187; and Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland – Vol. 1, pp. 397, 407. 40. Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland – Vol. 1, p. 407. 41. Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 105. 42. Andrej Chojnowski, “The Controversy over Former Uniate Property in Interwar Poland”,inNationalities Papers, Vol. 16, No. 2 (September 1988), p 177. 43. Halina Dylągowa, “Na przełome Oświecenia i Romantyzmu (1795– 1831)”, in Jerzy Kłoczowski, (ed.), Chrześcijaństwo w Polsce: Zarys przemian, 966–1979 (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1992), p. 374. NOTES 101

44. Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland – Vol. 2, p. 86. 45. Charles Morley, “Alexander I and Czartoryski: The Polish Question from 1801 to 1813”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 25, No. 65 (April 1947), p. 406. 46. Dylągowa, “Na przełome Oświecenia”, p. 390; Morley, “Alexander I and Czartoryski”, p. 407; and Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 114. 47. “Treaty between France and Russia, Tilsit, 7 July, 1807”, Napoleon.org, at http://www.napoleon.org/en/reading_room/articles/ﬁles/tilsit_treaty_ 777.asp [accessed on 24 April 2016]. 48. Morley, “Alexander I and Czartoryski”, p. 411. 49. W. H. Zawadzki, “Russia and the Reopening of the Polish Question, 1801– 1814”,inThe International History Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (February 1985), p. 20. 50. Kazimierz Waliszewski, La Russie, as quoted in Zawadzki, “Russia and the Re-Opening”, p. 44. 51. Kloczowski, History of Polish Christianity, p. 194. 52. Samuel Kutscheroff, “Administration of Justice Under Nicholas I of Russia”,inThe American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 1948), p. 125. 53. Ibid., p. 136. 54. As quoted in Ibid., p. 134. 55. Ibid., p. 131. 56. Kloczowski, History of Polish Christianity, p. 218. 57. Ewa Jabłońska-Deptuła and Jan Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami (1832–1864)”,inKłoczowski (ed.), Chreścijaństwo w Polsce: Zarys przemian, 966–1979 (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1992), pp. 404, 405. 58. Prażmowska, History of Poland, p. 140. 59. Jabłońska-DeptułaandSkarbek,“Wdobiemiędzy powstaniami”, pp. 403–404. 60. Ibid., p. 404. 61. Ibid., p. 405. 62. “Cum Primum” (On Civil Disobedience), Encyclical of Pope Gregory XVI, 9 June 1832, Papal Encyclicals Online, at http://www.papalencyclicals. net/Greg16/g16cumpr.htm [accessed on 26 March 2016]. 63. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 404. 64. Ibid., pp. 404–405. 65. So-called because the Eastern-Rite Catholic Church came into being through the 1596 Union of Brest, when a number of hitherto Orthodox dioceses agreed to accept the authority of the pope and subscribe to Catholic doctrines, while preserving their traditional hymns and rituals. 66. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 406. 102 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

67. Prażmowska, History of Poland, p. 141. 68. Daniel Olszewski, “Okres Wzrastającego ucisku i głębokich premian społecznych (1864–1914)”,inKłoczowski (ed.), Chrześcijaństwo w Polsce, p. 467. 69. J. Zubrzycki, “Emigration from Poland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries”,inPopulation Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (March 1953), p. 250. 70. Ibid., pp. 252–255, 257. See also Jerzy Zubrzycki, “Polish Emigration to British Commonwealth Countries: A demographic survey”,inThe International Migration Review, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter 1979), pp. 649–672. 71. See Joseph John Parat, Polish Catholics in Chicago, 1850–1920: A Religious History (Deskalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981). 72. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 417. 73. Ibid., p. 438. 74. Ibid., p. 439. 75. Closely paraphrased from Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 148. 76. Ibid., p. 151. 77. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 441. 78. Ibid., p. 443. 79. Ibid. 80. As quoted in Brian Porter, “Thy Kingdom Come: Patriotism, Prophecy, and the Catholic Hierarchy in Nineteenth-Century Poland”,inThe Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 (April 2003), p. 227. 81. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 444. 82. See Edward C. Thaden, Russia’s Western Borderlands, 1710–1870 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 162, 83. Prażmowska, History of Poland, p. 147; and Ronald Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism: Poland, 1933–1939 (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 19. 84. Oskar Halicki, A History of Poland (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1955), p. 255; Kloczowski, History of Polish Christianity, pp. 194–195, 231; and Ofﬁcial Website of the University of Warsaw [note 2]. 85. Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. 2, pp. 99–100. 86. Theodore R. Weeks, “Deﬁning Us and Them: Poles and Russians in the ‘Western Provinces’ 1863–1914”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 31–32. 87. Neal Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter: The Catholic Church and Independent Poland, 1914–1939 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), p. 7. 88. Olszewski, “Okres Wzrastającego ucisku”, p. 471. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid., p. 472. NOTES 103

91. Ibid. 92. Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, pp. 175–176. 93. Porter, “Thy Kingdom Come”, pp. 228–229. 94. As quoted in Ibid., p. 223. 95. As quoted in Weeks, “Deﬁning Us and Them”, p. 36. 96. Olszewski, “Okres Wzrastającego ucisku”, pp. 488–489. 97. Ibid., pp. 491–492. 98. Pascendi Dominici Gregis, Encyclical Pope Pius X on the Doctrines of the Modernists (8 September 1907), at http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-x/ en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-x_enc_19070908_pascendi-dominici-gre gis.html [accessed on 25 April 2016]. 99. Olszewski, “Okres Wzrastającego ucisku”, p. 501. 100. William W. Hagen, “The Partitions of Poland and the Crisis of the Old Regime in Prussia 1772–1806”,inCentral European Hiistory, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 1976), pp. 121–122. 101. Ibid., p. 125. 102. Dylągowa, “Na przełome Oświecenia”, pp. 373–374. 103. Ravens, Staat und katholische Kirche in Preußens polnischen Teilungsgebieten, p. 14. 104. Ibid., pp. 16–17. 105. Ibid., pp. 92, 94. 106. Ibid., pp. 99–100. 107. General Friedrich Wilhelm Christian von Zastrow. 108. Ravens, Staat und katholische Kirche in Preußens polnischen Teilungsgebieten, p. 102. 109. Bishop Antoni Onufry Okęcki. 110. Otto Karl Friedrich von Voss. 111. Franciszek Ksawery Rydzyński. 112. Ravens, Staat und katholische Kirche in Preußens polnischen Teilungsgebieten, p. 115. 113. Johann Karl Reichsgf. von Hohenzollern. 114. Ravens, Staat und katholische Kirche in Preußens polnischen Teilungsgebieten, p. 161. 115. Dylągowa, “Na przełome Oświecenia”, p. 387. 116. Ibid., pp. 377–378. 117. Brian E. Vick, The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics After Napoleon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 281. 118. Ibid., p. 283. 119. His full, formal name was Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh and 2nd Marquess of Londonderry. 120. Extracts as quoted in Vick, Congress of Vienna, p. 286. 121. Ibid., p. 281. 104 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

122. Ibid., p. 287. 123. Dylągowa, “Na przełome Oświecenia”, p. 390. 124. Joseph Johann Baptist Andreas von Zerboni di Sposetti. 125. Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland – Vol. 2, p. 209. 126. Piotr S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 130. 127. Biskup, “Preußen und Polen”, p. 12. 128. Be that as it may, Russian authorities did not want Prussia to get involved in suppressing the uprising. – Ibid., p. 13. 129. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, p. 129. 130. Biskup, “Preußen und Polen”, p. 13. 131. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 406. 132. Ibid., p. 407. 133. Martin Broszat, Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik (Frankfurt-am- Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972), p. 107. 134. Jabłońska-DeptułaandSkarbek,“Wdobiemiędzy powstaniami”, pp. 411–412. 135. Kloczowski, History of Polish Christianity, pp. 234–235. 136. Biskup, “Preußen und Polen”, p. 14. 137. Ibid. 138. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 413. 139. Ibid. 140. Kloczowski, History of Polish Christianity, pp. 222–223. 141. Ibid., p. 235. 142. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 414. 143. Biskup, “Preußen und Polen”, p. 15. 144. General Karl Wilhelm Freiherr von Willisen. 145. Biskup, “Preußen und Polen”, p. 15. 146. Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 146. 147. Broszat, Zweihundert Jahre, p. 115. 148. Ibid., p. 120. 149. As quoted in Ibid., p. 125. 150. Theodore S. Hamerow, Social Foundations of German Uniﬁcation, 1858– 1871, Vol. 2: Struggles and Accomplishments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 308. 151. As quoted in Ibid., p. 309, from Verhandlungen des Landtages: Haus der Abgeordneten (1866–67), I, pp. 340–341. 152. Günter Dettmer, Die ost- und westpreussischen Verwaltungsbehörden in Kulturkampf (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1958), especially pp. 25–26. 153. Georg Franz, Kulturkampf. Staat und Katholische Kirche in Mitteleuropa von der Säkularisation bis zum Abschluss des Preussiscchen Kulturkampfes (Munich: Verlag Georg D. W. Callwey, 1954). NOTES 105

154. Leonhard Müller, Der Kampf zwischen politischen Katholizismus und Bismarcks Politik im Spiegel der Schlesischen Volkszeitung (Breslau: Müller & Seiffert, 1929), especially p. 3. 155. Ernst Engelberg, “Deutschland von 1871 bis 1897”,inDeutsche Geschichte, Vol. II (von 1789 bis 1917) (Berlin Deutscher Verlag d, Wiss. VEB 1965). 156. The foreoing summaries of differences of interpretation regarding the inception of the Kulturkampf are derived from Lech Trzeciakowski, The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland, trans. from Polish by Katarzyna Kretkowska (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1990), pp. 1–2. See also Hans-Erich Volkmann, Die Polenpolitik des Kaiserreichs. Prolog zum Zeitalter der Weltkriege (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), pp. 46–56. 157. Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince of Bismarck, Duke of Lauenberg. 158. Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Vol. 2: The Period of Consolidation, 1871–1880 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 179. 159. Lech Trzeciakowski, “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church in Prussian Poland 1871–1914”, trans. from Polish by Stanislaus A. Blejwas, in Slavic Review, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1967), p. 619. 160. Adalbert Wahl, Deutsche Geschichte, 1871–1914 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer 1926–1930), as quoted in Richard Blanke, “Bismarck and the Prussian Polish Policies of 1886”,inThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 1973), p. 212. 161. Blanke, “Bismarck and the Prussian Polish Policies”, p. 214 (my emphasis). 162. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Vol. 2, p. 196; and Franz, Kulturkampf, p. 214. 163. Trzeciakowski, The Kulturkampf, p. 11. 164. Erich Schmidt-Volkmar, Der Kulturkampf in Deutschland 1871–1890 (Göttingen, Berlin, and Frankfurt: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1962), pp. 106–112. 165. Biskup, “Preußen und Polen”, p. 17; Davies, God’s Playground, Vol. 2, p. 124; and Schmidt-Volkmar, Der Kulturkampf in Deutschland, p. 126.. 166. Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany 1840–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969; first paperback printing, 1982), p. 263; and Dettmer, Die Ost- und Westpreussischen Verwaltungsbehörden, pp. 43– 45. See also Georg Frank-Willing, Kulturkampf gestern und heute. Eine Säkularbetrachtung 1871–1971 (Munich: Verlag Georg D. W. Callwey, 1971), pp. 43–46. 167. As quoted in Trzeciakowski, The Kulturkampf, p. 57. I have altered the word “battle”, offered in the text as a translation of “Kampf”,to“struggle”, which is the correct translation. The German word for battle is Schlacht. 168. Trzeciakowski, “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church”, p. 621. 169. Ibid., p. 623. 106 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

170. Johannes Nepomuk von der Marwitz. 171. Trzeciakowski, “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church”, p. 622; and Dettmer, Die Ost- und Westpreussischen Verwaltungsbehörden, pp. 78–82. 172. Trzeciakowski, “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church”, p. 624; and Olszewski, “Okres Wzrastającego ucisku”, p. 470. 173. Trzeciakowski, “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church”, p. 624. 174. Schmidt-Volkmar, Der Kulturkampf in Deutschland, p. 137. 175. Olszewski, “Okres Wzrastającego ucisku”, p. 471. 176. The complete text of the Syllabus is posted at http://www.papalencyclicals. net/Pius09/p9syll.htm [last accessed on 14 May 2016]. 177. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Vol. 3, p. 192. See also Kloczowski, History of Polish Christianity, p. 232. 178. Trzeciakowski, “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church”,pp.627– 628. 179. Friedrich Schinkel, Polen, Preussen und Deutschland (Breslau: Korn, 1931), p. 151, as quoted in Trzeciakowski, The Kulturkampf, p. 6. 180. Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 177. 181. Richard Blanke, “An ‘Era of Reconciliation’ in German-Polish Relations (1890–1894)”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 1977), p. 50. 182. Report dated 1902, as quoted in Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, p. 176. 183. Joachim Mai, Die preußisch-deutsche Polenpolitik 1885/87. Eine Studie zur Herausbilding des Imperialismus in Deutschland (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1962), p. 38. 184. Ibid., p. 39. 185. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Vol. 3, p. 198. 186. Ibid., p. 203. For further discussion, see Volkmann, Die Polenpolitik des Kaiserreichs, pp. 83–90. 187. See Richard Blanke, “The Development of Loyalism in Prussian Poland, 1886–1890”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 52, No. 129 (October 1974), pp. 548–565, especially p. 548. 188. Blanke, “An ‘Era of Reconciliation’”, p. 42. 189. As quoted in Harry Kenneth Rosenthal, “The Election of Archbishop Stablewski”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1969), p. 267. 190. Ibid., p. 274. 191. Blanke, “An ‘Era of Reconciliation’”, p. 49. 192. Blanke, “The Development of Loyalism”, p. 561. 193. Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict, p. 179. 194. As quoted in Ibid., p. 183. 195. As quoted in Ibid., p. 189. NOTES 107

196. Larry Wolff, “‘Kennst du das Land?’ The Uncertainty of Galicia in the Age of Metternich and Fredro”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Summer 2008), p. 287. 197. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, p. 189. 198. This interpretation is contested. For example, Ignaz Cornova (1801), François Fejtö (1953), and Jean Bérenger (1973) are among those biogra- phers who have championed the notion that Joseph II embodied Enlightenment ideas, while Pavel Pavlovovich Mitrofanov (1907) argued that it was not Enlightenment idealism that inspired Joseph, but considerations of raison d’état. The view taken in this chapter is that Joseph was guided both by Enlightenment ideas and by considerations of raison d’état. But Bérenger is surely right in thinking that Joseph “simply wanted to do too much, too fast.” See Franz A. J. Szabo’s comprehensive and brilliantly executed overview of competing biographies of Joseph II in his article, “Changing Perspectives on the ‘Revolutionary Emperor’: Joseph II biographies since 1790”,inThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 2011), pp. 111–138. 199. François Fejtö, Joseph II. Porträt eines aufgeklärten Despoten, trans. from French by Ursala Rohden (Munich: Matthes & Seitz Verlag GmbH, 1987), p. 272. 200. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 186–187. 201. As cited in Peter Leisching, “Die Römisch-Katholische Kirche in Cisleithanien”, in Adam Wandruszka (ed.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, Vol. 4: Die Konfessionen (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995), p. 3. 202. The French doctrine clearly distinguishable by the end of the sixteenth century, emphasizing the “independence of the French king in the temporal order ...and [the] union of clergy and king to limit the intervention of the pope within the kingdom.”–Encyclopaedia Britannica, at http://global. britannica.com/topic/Gallicanism [accessed on 27 May 2016]. 203. A religious movement appearing in France, the Low Countries, and Italy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries “teaching that humanity is essentially good and can attain salvation without divine aid.”–Encyclopaedia Britannica, at http://global.britannica.com/topic/Jansenism [accessed on 27 May 2016]. 204. Leisching, “Die Römisch-Katholische Kirche”,p.5. 205. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, p. 191; and Fejtö, Joseph II, p. 278. 206. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, p. 188. 207. Fejtö, Joseph II, pp. 275n2 and 278. 208. “Pope Pius VI”, Catholic Encyclopedia – New Advent, at http://www.new advent.org/cathen/12131a.htm [accessed on 27 May 2016]. 209. Ibid. 108 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

210. Larry Wolff, “Inventing Galicia: Messianic Josephinism and the Recasting of Partitioned Poland”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Winter 2004), p. 822. 211. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, p. 192; and Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867–1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951; fourth printing, 1968), p. 19. 212. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 22. C. A. Macartney has defended Franz II/I’s good name, saying that he “does not altogether deserve the very harsh judgments which have been passed on him by many later Austrian historians, and adopted by their superﬁcial foreign copyists. He was neither a bad man, nor a stupid one ...He was an upright and conscientious ruler, strongly conscious of his duty towards his peoples and tireless in his endea- vour to fulﬁll it; few of his servants spent such long hours as he did over the business of government. He took endless pains to establish a system of laws which ensured that justice should prevail among [his subjects] and himself observed it towards them according to his lights, not squandering their substance on a luxurious Court – on the contrary, the modesty of his Court was proverbial, and the cause of much grumbling among the pleasure-loving aristocrats of the time.”–C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918 (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 147. 213. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 239–240. 214. Leisching, “Die Römisch-Katholische Kirche”, p. 12. 215. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, p. 163. 216. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 424. 217. John-Paul Himka, “The Greek Catholic Church in Nineteenth-Century Galicia”, in Geoffrey A. Hosking (ed.), Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991) – abstract, at http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-1-349-21566-9_4 [accessed on 27 May 2016]. 218. Wolff, “Inventing Galicia”, p. 820. 219. Ibid., p. 825. 220. Larry Wolff, The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 39. 221. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, p. 72. 222. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, p. 308. 223. Jabłońska-Deptuła and Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami”, p. 411. 224. Andrew Milne, Metternich (London: University of London Press, 1975), p. 26. 225. As quoted in Ibid., p. 29. 226. Ibid., p. 115. 227. Wolff, “‘Kennst du das Land’”, p. 287. 228. Milne, Metternich, pp. 106–107. NOTES 109

229. István Deák, The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 158. 230. Henryk Batkowski, “Die Polen”, in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, Vol. 3: Die Völker des Reiches, I. Teilband (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980), p. 529. 231. Markian Prokopovych, Habsburg Lemberg: Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772–1914 (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009), p. 32. 232. Leisching, “Die Römisch-Katholische Kirche”, p. 19. 233. Jabłońska-DeptułaandSkarbek,“Wdobiemiędzy powstaniami”, pp. 412–413. 234. Ibid., p. 413. 235. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, p. 234. 236. Ibid., p. 263; and Josef Wodka, Kirche in Österreich. Wegweiser durch ihre Geschichte (Vienna: Verlag Herder, 1959), p. 325. 237. Wodka, Kirche in Österreich, p. 326. 238. Ibid., p. 327. 239. Leisching, “Die Römisch-Katholische Kirche”, pp. 27–31. 240. Ibid., pp. 31.32, 241. As quoted in May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 47. 242. Ibid., pp. 47–48. 243. Olszewski, “Okres Wzrastającego ucisku”, p. 473. 244. As quoted in May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 48. 245. Ibid., p. 49. See also Laurence Cole, “The Counter-Reformation’s Last Stand: Austria”, in Christopher Clark and Wolfram Kaiser (eds.), Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 290. 246. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 63. 247. Olszewski, “Okres Wzrastającego ucisku”, p. 481. 248. Jabłońska-DeptułaandSkarbek,“Wdobiemiędzy powstaniami”, pp. 426–427. 249. Ibid., p. 427. 250. Piotr S. Wandycz, “The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy”,inAustrian History Yearbook, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1967), pp. 268–269. 251. Ibid., pp. 270–272. 252. Baron Alexander von Bach or, in German, Alexander Freiherr von Bach. 253. Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1929; first Phoenix edition, 1961; fifth impression, 1971), p. 100. 254. Wandycz, “The Poles”, p. 274. 255. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 53; and Batkowski, “Die Polen”, p. 537. 110 3 THE POLISH CHURCH IN THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918

256. Jean Bérenger, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1700–1918, trans. from French by C. A. Simpson (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 237. 257. Batkowski, “Die Polen”, p. 526. 258. Closely paraphrased from Wandycz, “The Poles”, p. 280. 259. Jászi, Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, p. 390. 260. Ibid., p. 281. 261. Loyal to the emperor. 262. Batkowski, “Die Polen”, p. 534. 263. Prażmowska, History of Poland, p. 161. 264. James Bjork, “A Polish Mitteleuropa? Upper Silesia’s Conciliationists and the Prospect of German Victory”,inNationalities Papers, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2001), pp. 479–480. 265. Batkowski, “Die Polen”, p. 550. 266. Grace Humphrey, Pilsudski: Builder of Poland (New York: Scott and More, 1936), p. 127. 267. As quoted in Ibid., p. 126. 268. Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Piłsudski: A Life for Poland (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982), p. 55. 269. Ibid., pp. 56–57. 270. As quoted in Neal Pease, “Poland and the Holy See, 1918–1939”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Autumn 1991), pp. 521–522. 271. Alan Davies, The Cruciﬁed Nation: A Motif in Modern Nationalism (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), p. 11. 272. Ibid., p. 11. CHAPTER 4

The Interwar Republic, 1918–1939

Poland rose from the dead on 13 November 1918, when the Regency Council set up by Berlin the previous year as a government for the satellite Polish kingdom, transferred its authority to Marshal Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935). This transfer was made at the suggestion of Archbishop Aleksander Kakowski (1862–1938). Piłsudski exercised dictatorial powers until 20 February 1919, at which time he abdicated, surrendering his authority to the Sejm.1 There were, at the time, three competing visions for the resurrected state. The ﬁrst was that of Roman Dmowski (1864–1939), the founder and leader of the National Democrats, known in Polish as the Endecja (a play on the acronym ND). Dmowski and his followers wanted ideally to construct an ethnically homogeneous Poland. To accomplish this, the Endecja proposed to assimilate non-Polish Slavs (Ukrainians/Ruthenians and Belorussians) and encourage Germans and Jews to emigrate.2 Anti- Semitism was rife at the time and, in what socialists called a pogrom, Poles killed 1000–2000 Jews in the years 1918–1921. In Lwów, a mob consisting of civilians and uniformed soldiers attacked the Jewish quarter, destroying three synagogues.3 There is no evidence that Dmowski was behind the violence, but he embraced anti-Semitism as part of his program, promoting the equation of Pole and Catholic. From the beginning, he enjoyed the strong support of rural clergy as well as part of the hierarchy, who endorsed Dmowski’s idea that the nation was, in some important ways, superior to the state.4

Dmowski’s old rival, Piłsudski, offered a very different vision for Poland’s future, hoping to see the new Poland constructed as a commonwealth of its diverse nationalities, on the model of the Polish– Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1386–1772 and, accordingly, was convinced that the state, not the nation, had to be the highest locus of loyalty for all citizens of Poland. Against Dmowski’s xenophobic and assimilationist program, Piłsudski advocated civic equality and tolerance.5 His socialist background notwithstanding, Piłsudski had been raised Catholic, but converted to Protestantism in 1899 in order to marry a divorcee; after his first wife died, he returned to the Catholic faithinFebruary1916.Kakowski(elevatedtotheCollegeofCardinals in 1919) once said of him, “Piłsudski is a typical Pole. He has considerable doubts about the existence of God, while simultaneously directing fervent prayers to the Mother of God.”6 In spite of Piłsudski’s Catholicism, Adam Sapieha7 (1867–1951), who served as Bishop of Kraków from 1911 to 1925, Archbishop of Krakówfrom 1925 to 1946, and eventually Cardinal until his death, expressed concern, even before Poland had regained its independence, that the marshal’splanwastosetupa“socialist and Jewish” Poland.8 Archbishops Józef Bilczewski (1860–1923; canonized in 2005), Józef Teofil Teodorowicz (1864–1926), and Edmund Cardinal Dalbor (1869– 1926), as well as Bishops Pelczar, Łosiński, and Łukomski were also hostile to the marshal. They preferred the party headed by atheist Dmowski to the “soft” Catholic Piłsudski, no doubt at least in part because they embraced Dmowski’s anti-Semitism. The National Democrats had initially promoted secular values – which brought them into conflict with the Church. But beginning gradually already during World War One, the Endecja and the Catholic Church had moved slowly toward a rapprochement. An early sign of this was the Endecja’s founding, after the war, of the Populist-National Union or ZLN, a political party from which non-Catholics were excluded. Endecja’s 1925 program offered a clear olive branch to Catholic hierarchs by declaring that “the Roman Catholic religion occupies a leading position in the state, and ...the Roman Catholic religion is governed by its own laws.”9 The following year, Dmowski brought out his book, Kościoł, Naród, i Państwo [The Church, the Nation, and the State], in which he asserted: “To attempt to separate Catholicism from Polishness, to tear the nation from religion and from the Church, is to destroy the very essence of THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939 113 the nation.”10 This message found its mark and, over time, most Catholic clergy came to support Dmowski’s National Democratic Party (later, just known as the National Party). The third vision in contention was the vision of the Catholic hierarchy. In early 1920, even before the constitution was drafted, Archbishop Kakowski gave an interview to an Italian newspaper, in which he vented his anxieties about what the future could hold in store. “You must not,” he told the journalist,

suppose that we have not also our difﬁculties. Inﬁdelity and Freemasonry have spread their contagion amongst us, as elsewhere. Judaism constitutes with us a danger more serious than elsewhere ...In a word, even in Poland, the Church is in a situation of combat, not in that of peaceful and undisturbed possession.11

That was, at least, how one of Poland’s leading hierarchs viewed the situation when independent Poland was only a little more than a year old. And he and other like-minded hierarchs were determined to change this and to shape Poland in accordance with their vision. That vision included seeing Catholicism declared the state religion, introducing mandatory religious instruction in the state schools, obtaining state subsidies for Catholic schools, and setting aside Sunday as a day of rest, with no businesses allowed to be open – not even Jewish-owned businesses.12 And, of course, the Church wanted to negotiate a Concordat and, in any event, with provisions more favorable than its defunct Concordats with Imperial Russia and Imperial Austria. The number of clergy increased steadily, reaching 10,400 diocesan priests, 7,000 monks, and almost 22,000 nuns by 1939. The Church built almost 1,200 churches and at least 1,000 presbyteries in the interwar period. In 1919, the Polish Youth Associations United came into being, only to be absorbed later into Catholic Action which, in 1936, numbered about 500,000 adherents, with the figure rising to approximately 700,000 by 1939.13 In 1927, there were at least 131 Catholic periodicals circulat- ing in Poland. Ten years later, this number had risen to 228, mostly weeklies and monthlies, averaging a circulation of between 5,000 and 10,000 per issue.14 The persistent shortage of priests and nuns notwithstanding,15 the Church made important gains in the interwar era, securing many of the concessions it sought, signing a Concordat with the state in 1925 (the provisions of which will be described below), and reaching a 114 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939 modus vivendi with Marshal Piłsudski’s post-May 1926 regime, in large part due to the personal friendship between the Marshal and Pope Pius XI. But, as Paweł Leszczyński has pointed out, the “Roman Catholic Church did not manage to impose its vision” on the state. The Church was not satisfied with the provisions of the 1921 constitution but little changed after Piłsudski’s May 1926 coup. By twenty-first century standards, the Catholic Church did very well for itself in interwar Poland. But “Roman Catholic representatives viewed Piłsudski’s movement as masonry, always ready to fight with the Church, and whose aim was to undermine the Church’s social position.”16 Nonetheless, the April 1935 constitution was an improvement, from the Church’s perspective, as shall be noted below.

ESTABLISHING THE NATION’S BORDERS During the Russo-Polish war of 1919–1920, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon,17 suggested where the eventual border between Poland and Russia could plausibly be drawn. The Curzon Line, as it came to be called, would have corresponded closely with the distribution of Poles vs. East Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians), resulting in a Polish state with a largely Polish population. The Bolsheviks were favorably inclined to Curzon’s idea, but the Poles were not satisﬁed and, led by Marshal Piłsudski, entered into an agreement with Symon Petliura (1879–1926), commander of the Army of the Ukrainian National Republic. The latter offered some territorial concessions in Poland’s favor and, on 25 April 1920, the Polish army marched into Ukraine, entering Kiev on 7 May. The Bolsheviks now rallied Russians to defend “Mother Russia” and even before the end of May, General Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky (1893–1937) launched a counteroffensive on the northern ﬂank, while cavalry forces under the command of General Semeon M. Budenny (1883–1973) attacked Polish forces in Kiev. The Poles retreated all the way back to Warsaw, with the Russian forces in hot pursuit. The Russians now laid siege to Warsaw and the situation looked desperate for the Poles. Then, on 14 August, Polish forces commanded by Piłsudski launched a brilliant counteroffensive and not only pushed the Russians out of Polish-inhabited territories, but even brought a large swathe of territory inhabited by Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians under Polish control. With the Bolsheviks still engaged in a civil war with various monarchist forces, they agreed to an armistice on 12 October 1920, signing the Treaty of ESTABLISHING THE NATION’S BORDERS 115

Riga on 18 March 1921, thereby recognizing Polish conquests.18 Piłsudski returned to Warsaw, a national hero, cocky, and convinced that he and only he should become the first president of independent Poland. He already thought of himself, as he would put it in 1928, as “the greatest man in Poland.”19 His opponents were equally determined that Piłsudski should not become the country’s president. Their initial strategy was to deny Piłsudski credit for the great victory in the Battle for Warsaw in August 1920. Piotr Wandycz, the distinguished Yale historian, was quite clear in an article published in 1960 that Piłsudski and Piłsudski alone deserved full credit for effecting the brilliant counter-attack that saved Warsaw and with it Poland from the Bolsheviks.20 However, Ignacy Jan Paderewski (1860– 1941) – who is remembered today chiefly for his career as a concert pianist and for the extant recordings of his inspired performances of Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata, Chopin’s Revolutionary Etude, Chopin’s waltzes, and other classical masterpieces – served as prime minister during 1919, at a time when Piłsudski was kept on as interim chief of state. He and Piłsudski fell out, but Paderewski was entrusted by his successor, Władysław Grabski, with the task of representing Poland to Britain and France, in hope of securing their assistance against the Bolsheviks. Paderewski asked that they dispatch a military mission to Poland to evaluate the situation, and a mission, which included French General Maxime Weygand, was dispatched and presented a military plan for Piłsudski’s approval. After the Poles had repelled the Red Army, Paderewski credited Weygand’s alleged genius, praising him for having “saved the integrity and independence of our country.” In fact, Piłsudski had “rejected Weygand’s plan” and executed his own plan.21 It should be added that, at that time, Paderewski was contemplating running for the office of President of the Republic. Another aspirant for the presidency was General Władysław Sikorski (1881–1943), who had taken part in the defense of Warsaw and who would later show himself to be a critic of Piłsudski. In Sikorski’s account, it was not Piłsudski’s genius that made the decisive difference in the Battle for Warsaw, but rather “the non-execution of [an] order by Budenny ... [which] was one of the principal causes of the Russian defeat on the Vistula in 1920.”22 Interestingly enough, Weygand, to whom Paderewski had given credit for the Polish victory, agreed with Sikorski and wrote that it was “the indiscipline of General Budenny,” who “decided not to obey the orders of the High Command,” which determined the outcome of the battle.23 116 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

Finally, the Church, which had its own reasons to want to deny Piłsudski credit for his victory at Warsaw, promoted the idea that the Blessed Virgin Mary had appeared in the sky above the River Vistula, effecting a miracle, which not only saved Warsaw and Poland from the Bolsheviks but also, as a Catholic website puts it, amounted to nothing less than “a breakthrough in the history of the world.”24 On 20 March 1921, 2 days after the signing of the Treaty of Riga, a plebiscite was held in Upper Silesia, in order to demarcate a section of Poland’s western border. Both the Germans and the Poles undertook energetic propaganda campaigns in order to inﬂuence local residents. The Polish side made ample appeals to religious motifs. Sanford Grifﬁth, who visited Upper Silesia before and during the plebiscite, reported that he had seen a Polish poster which depicted

the Polish White Virgin protecting Upper Silesian children in the folds of her cloak from a mad ape wearing a Prussian helmet. Another show[ed] a friendly old bishop welcoming his children to Polish soil “made holy by the blood of a thousand martyrs” as one effective pamphlet [put it].25

Achille Ratti, serving at the time as papal nuncio to Poland, maintained a strict neutrality in the dispute between Germany and Poland over Upper Silesia; it has been said that his decision to remain at his post in Warsaw in August 1920 enhanced his prestige, thereby contributing to his subsequent election to the papacy in 1922. When the results of the plebiscite turned out to favor Germany, rather than Poland, Polish nationalists scapegoated Ratti (as if his engagement on Poland’s behalf might have swung the vote the other way). Poland’s bishops asked the Vatican to remove him – which the pope did, compensating the unfortunate Ratti with elevation to the College of Cardinals and the See of Milan.26 Having failed to undercut Piłsudski’s status as the military genius who had saved Poland and expanded its borders, his enemies were to have a second chance to contain him, when the February 1919 election to the Constituent Assembly handed Dmowski’s National Democrats, who were supported by the Church hierarchy,27 a plurality of 42.3% of the vote, giving the Endecja 141 seats in the 432-seat Assembly. The Socialists, by contrast, attracted a mere 9.2% of the vote, gaining 36 seats. The various political parties hostile to Piłsudski fully expected that the marshal, if he chose to run for the presidency, would win handily. So they wrote the constitution in such a way that the president would not enjoy either DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONFESSIONAL MAKE-UP 117 legislative initiative or a veto over legislation passed in the Sejm, the lower house of the bicameral legislature being created (alongside the Senate), and could dissolve the Sejm only if 60% of the Senators and at least 50% of the members of the Sejm concurred. In addition, Article 46 of the constitution, while making the president the titular head of the armed forces in peacetime, deprived him of command in wartime.28 Piłsudski had no interest in serving as a weak head of state. Instead, Gabriel Narutowicz (1865–1922), an erstwhile professor of hydroelec- tric engineering in Zürich and friend of the Marshal, ignored Piłsudski’s advice and accepted the nomination of the Polish People’s Party “Wyzwolenie.” He was elected but served as president for only 5 days, as he was assassinated on 12 December 1922 by a fanatic associated with the National Democrats; the assassin was angered that Narutowicz had won the office with the help of non-Polish voters.29 From the Church, responses were mixed, even contradictory. Narutowicz was given a state funeral in Warsaw’s cathedral, with Cardinal Kakowski presiding; Kakowski behaved in a dignified way. But it was generally known that Narutowicz had been a nonbeliever and a number of curés openly expressed their pleasure that the country’s first president had been slain. Some clergy said Masses for Narutowicz’s assassin upon his execution, but, although Cardinal Dalbor censured them, he did not condemn the assassination of Narutowicz as such. “As a whole, the response of the Polish Church to the assassination struck many as scandalous, and many blamed the full-throated politicking of the rightist clergy for helping to create an atmosphere conducive to mayhem.”30 In spite of this tragedy, it was only after Wincenty Witos (1874–1945), who at one time had been a prominent deputy in the Austrian parliament, put together his second cabinet on 28 May 192331 that Piłsudski resigned as Chief of the General Staff and President of the Supreme War Council, withdrawing to his estate at Sulejowek 17 kilometers east of Warsaw.32

DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONFESSIONAL MAKE-UP As a result of Piłsudski’s victory in the Russo-Polish war, large numbers of Ukrainians and Belurussians were incorporated into Poland. According to the ofﬁcial census results from 1921, Poles accounted for nearly 70% of the total population of the country, while Ukrainians/Ruthenes and Belorussians, concentrated in the eastern regions of the country, accounted for 14.3% and 3.9%, respectively (as shown in Table 4.1). 118 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

Table 4.1 Population by ethnicity (1921)

Nationality %

Polish 18,814,239 69.2 Ukrainian/Ruthenian 3,898,431 14.3 “Local” 49,441 0.2 Belorussian 1,060,237 3.9 Jewish 2,110,448 7.8 German 1,059,194 3.9 Lithuanian 68,667 0.3 Russian 56,239 0.2 Czech 30,628 0.1 Other 29,193 0.1 Total 27,176,717 100.0

Source: Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974; fourth printing, 1983), p. 36.

Jews made up 7.8% of the population and Germans, concentrated mainly in Upper Silesia and in the so-called “Polish corridor” (formerly West Prussia), which separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany, 3.9%. No other nationality group was recorded at more than 0.3%. Two points should be made about the data from 1921: first, the designation “local” seems to have been an artificial construct designed to siphen off some of those who might otherwise have reported themselves as Belorussians; and second, since the borders were not finally settled until 1922, the officials responsible for the census decided to interpolate statistics from 1919 for Silesia and the Wilno region into the 1921 census report.33 In confessional terms, it is clear that there was a close, but not exact, correlation between nationality and religion. First, and most obviously (as is clear from a comparison of Tables 4.1 and 4.2), there were Poles who were not Roman Catholics; it is known that some of these were Protestants. Second, there were 735,916 members of the Jewish religious community who declared some nationality other than Jewish. And finally, adding the three East Slavic groups together (Ukrainians/Ruthenes, Belorussians, and Russians), they accounted for 18.4% of the population, while only 10.5% of the population were members of the Orthodox Church (see Table 4.2). There is no mystery here, since there were Eastern-Rite Catholics among the Ukrainians, while some Belorussians were Roman Catholics; in addition, some East Slavs were members of the DEMOGRAPHIC AND CONFESSIONAL MAKE-UP 119

Table 4.2 Population by religion (1921)

Religious afﬁliation %

Roman Catholic 17,365,350 63.8 Eastern-Rite Catholic 3,031,059 11.2 Eastern Orthodox 2,846,855 10.5 Lutheran and Reformed 1,002,216 0.1 Other Protestant 12,416 0.1 Other Christian 65,586 0.2 Mosaic (Jewish) 2,845,364 10.5 Other and unknown 7,871 0.0 Total 27,176,717 100.0

Source: Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974; fourth printing, 1983), p. 36.

Jewish faith. Not listed separately in the census results shown here was the small Armenian-Rite Catholic Church, which operated autonomously, under the leadership of the Archbishop of Lwów, Józef Teodorowicz. A second census was conducted in 1931. But on this occasion, ethnicity was measured not by the self-declaration of citizens, but rather by their native language, carefully defined as the language “in which [the respondent] conventionally thinks and communicates with his family.”34 Concerning absolute numbers (shown in Table 4.3, below), we find increases for all groups except Belorussians and Germans, although the huge increase of persons recorded as “locals,” from 49,441 in 1921 to 707,088 in 1931 transparently betrays the authorities’ desire to whittle down the number of Belorussians being reported. But if one combines the figures for Belorussians and “locals” in each census, one arrives at a figure of 1,109,678 in 1921, rising to 1,696,940 in 1931. The Germans were, in general, discontent in their new “homeland” and most, if not all, of the reduction in their numbers can be traced to emigration.35 The only change in the categories for religious affiliation in the 1931 census (see Table 4.4) was that, whereas, following a line for “Lutheran and Calvinist”–which I have given here, more accurately, as “Lutheran and Reformed”–the 1921 census had a line for “Other Protestant,” followed by a line for “Other Christian,” in the 1931 census, by contrast, “Other Protestant” disappeared, being folded into “Other Christian.” Not surprisingly, the 1931 census reported increases in absolute numbers in all categories, although the differential rates of increase meant that 120 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

Table 4.3 Population by ethnicity (1931)

Native language %

Polish 21,993,444 68.9 Ukrainian 3,221,975 10.1 Ruthenian 1,291,647 3.8 “Local” 707,088 2.2 Belorussian 989,084 3.1 Jewish (Yiddish) 2,489,084 7.8 Jewish (Hebrew) 243,500 0.8 German 740,992 2.3 Lithuanian 83,116 0.3 Russian 138,713 0.4 Czech 38,097 0.1 Other 50,271 0.2 Total 31,915,779 100.0

Source: Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974; fourth printing, 1983), p. 36

Table 4.4 Population by religion (1931)

Religious afﬁliation %

Roman Catholic 20,670,100 64.8 Eastern-Rite Catholic 3,336,200 10.4 Eastern Orthodox 3,762,500 11.8 Lutheran and Reformed 835,200 2.6 Other Christian 145,400 0.5 Mosaic (Jewish) 3,113,900 9.8 Other and unknown 52,500 0.1 Total 31,915,779 100.0

Source: Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974; fourth printing, 1983), p. 36. certain groups, speciﬁcally Eastern-Rite Catholics and Jews, declined in proportional terms. The two largest increases in numbers involved “Other Christians,” who rose from a combined total (combined with “Other Protestants”) of 78,002 in 1921 to 145,400 in 1931, and those in the “Other and unknown” category, rising from 7,871 in 1921 to 52,500 in 1931. Among those included in the “Other” category were a certain number of Buddhists. Buddhism ﬁrst appeared in Poland soon after the PHASE 1: THE BIRTH OF A NATION, MARCH 1921–MAY 1926 121 conclusion of World War One.36 Where the Protestants are concerned, there were seven Protestant denominations present in Poland as of 1938:

• the Lutheran Church, headquartered in Warsaw, with 470,000 members, just over half being Germans; • the Union Church of Poznania and Pomerania, headquartered in Poznań, with 290,000 members, of whom most were non-Poles; • the Union Church of Upper Silesia, headquartered in Katowice, with more than 30,000 members, notably Poles, with some of them Germanized; • the Evangelical Church of Southern Poland, headquartered in Stanisławów, with 31,000 members, including Poles and Ukrainians; • the Old Lutheran Church of Western Poland, headquartered in Toruń, with 3,700 members, mostly Germans; • the Reformed Church (Calvinist), headquartered in Warsaw, with 10,000 members, including Czechs and Ukrainians; and • the Reformed Church in Wilno, with 3,000 members, almost all of them Poles.37

Finally,someofthevariancebetweenthetwocensusesmaybeduetothefact that many Eastern Orthodox and Eastern-Rite Catholics among the Ukrainian and Belorussian communities were placed under pressure to declare their native language as Polish – thus, being counted as Polish by ethnicity.38 The heterogeneous mix conformed, broadly speaking, to Piłsudski’sideato fashion a multiethnic, if not also multi-confessional, commonwealth which would be reminiscent of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of past centuries. The major difference is that, in both of the interwar censuses, the Lithuanians accounted for just 0.3% of the total population.

PHASE 1: THE BIRTH OF A NATION,MARCH 1921–MAY 1926 The years 1921–1926 were marked by economic problems, unresolved issues with Germany, unresolved issues with the Catholic Church and, last but not least, political instability – due in part to the large number of parties able to secure seats in the bicameral legislature (11 as a result of the 1922 elections). Indeed, between November 1918 and May 1926, Poland had 14 governments, although Wincenty Witos served three nonconsecu- tive terms as prime minister while Władysław Grabski served two non- consecutive terms in that ofﬁce. 122 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

The constitution. The framework for the conduct of Church-state relations and likewise for the practice of the Catholic faith, as well as of other faiths, was set forth in Articles 111–121 of the March 1921 constitution. The most important Articles are the following:

Article 111. The freedom of conscience and of religion shall be guaranteed to every subject. No one may be denied the rights granted to other citizens on account of his religion or his religious convictions. All inhabitants of the Polish Republic shall have the right to confess freely their creed in public or in private and to follow the canons of their religion or ritual, so long as such practices are not contrary to public order. Article 112: It shall be forbidden to have freedom of creed which is not in agreement withthelaw.Noonemay[stay]awayfromtheperformanceofhispublicdutieson account of his religious convictions. No one may be compelled to take part in a religious act or ritual, unless he be subject to paternal or tutelary authority. Article 113. Every religious association recognized by the State shall have the right to organize its religious services in public or at private meetings; it may freely conduct its internal affairs, own and acquire, administer and dispose of, its movable or immovable property, have the possession and benefit of its funds and endowments, equally with institutions of a religious, charitable, or scientific character. No religious association may be formed in disagreement with the laws of the state. Article 114. The Roman Catholic faith, being the religion of the great majority of the nation, occupies a leading position in the State among other religions, which, however, also enjoy equal rights. The Roman Catholic Church is governed by its own laws. The relation of the State to the Church shall be determined on the basis of an agreement with the Holy See, which shall be subject to ratification by the Sejm. Article 115. The Churches of religious minorities and other legally recognized religious associations shall be governed by their own laws, which the State shall not refuse to recognize, provided that they do not contain provisions contrary to law. The relation of the State to these Churches and religious denominations shall be determined by legislation after an understanding has been attained with their authorized agencies. Article 116. Recognition of a new religious denomination or one not hitherto legally recognized shall not be refused to religious associations whose organization, teaching, and structure are not contrary to public order or public morals.39 PHASE 1: THE BIRTH OF A NATION, MARCH 1921–MAY 1926 123

Among other provisions, Article 121 provided for religious instruction to be mandatory in the state schools and supervised by the respective Churches. Article 111 was, of course, in contradiction with the 1864 Syllabus of Errors, but the Church was not going to fight to suppress freedom of religion – not in the twentieth century! However, Church hierarchs let it be known that they found the phraseology of Article 114 far from fully satisfying. What the Church wanted was to see Catholicism declared to be the official state religion and for it to be clear that the Catholic Church enjoyed a position of legal superiority over all other religious associations, exercising, thus, rights not shared equally with others. Declaring Sunday a mandatory day of rest for the entire population, with the result that practicing Jews had 2 days of mandatory rest per week (Saturday being a day of rest for Judaism), was in the spirit of what the Church had in mind. Instead of seeing their institution declared the official state Church, however, the Catholic hierarchy were told to be content with the vague formulation that the Roman Catholic faith “occupie[d] a leading position in the State” and, lest anyone think that this granted the Roman Catholic Church some special rights, it was immediately added that “other religions, ...however, also enjoy equal rights.” But the same Article also held out the promise of the eventual conclusion of a Concordat between the Holy See and the Polish state, and this would become the focus of intense negotiations. The constitution guaranteed that all citizens would enjoy their rights, with no discrimination on grounds of religion, nationality, or language. Minorities would also be allowed to establish schools and social organizations. But there were differences of opinion about this from the very beginning. Piłsudski, as already emphasized, was committed to the principle of equality, and the Polish Socialist Party likewise supported this principle. On the other hand, the Endecja repudiated the whole concept of equality of peoples. “Poles alone should be masters in their own house,” the Endecja believed, calling, thus, “for excluding all ethnic minorities from political power.”40 A new pope. Monsignor Achille Ratti (1857–1939) had started his career as the Vatican librarian,41 but in April 1918, he was selected to serve as apostolic visitor to Poland and Lithuania, based in Warsaw. He was installed in that post in summer 1918 and, after the Holy See recognized Polish independence in 1919, Ratti was elevated to papal nuncio. As 124 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939 he familiarized himself with the local hierarchy, he was shocked to find that most of the local bishops, inclulding the two most influential hierarchs – Bishop Sapieha of Kraków (elevated to archbishop in 1925) and Archbishop Teodorowicz of Lwów of the Armenian Rite – supported the nationalist Endecja.42 Teodorowicz was uninhibited in his rhetoric and, when the parliamentary elections of 1919 got underway, blasted his political opponents for planning to construct the Second Republic as a “pagan state.” Archbishop Teodorowicz, then-Bishop Sapieha, and Edmund Cardinal Dalbor (1869–1926) led their all-too-willing fellow bishops – except for Cardinal Kakowski – into support for Dmowski’s Endecja.43 The Endecja dangled a carrot of candidacy for a seat in the Sejm in front of Kakowski, but he declined the invitation. Isolated within the Polish Episcopate, Kakowski nonetheless enjoyed the Vatican’s favor. Piłsudski was, at the time, the interim acting head of state. Teodorowicz, as an admirer of Dmowski’s ideas, had no use for Piłsudski, who reciprocated the sentiment. Ratti, who considered Dmowski’s brand of nationalism dangerous, gravitated toward Piłsudski, who wanted good relations with the Vatican. Piłsudski and Ratti became good friends; indeed, they were “kindred spirits,” as Neal Pease writes.44 Cardinal Kakowski usually could be counted on to side with them against the pro-Endecja bishops. Then came the 1919 parliamentary elections for the country’s Constituent Assembly. The hierarchy urged people to vote for candidates who were favorably disposed to the Church and, in fact, 32 clerics, including Archbishop Teodorowicz, served in that body. Most of the Church’s hierarchs at that time, including Teodorowicz, were deeply worried about the potential for the secularization of Poland and adopted an embattled, defensive posture. Among other things, the bishops objected to laws initially still operative in the areas, which had been ruled by Germany, which allowed for civil marriage and divorce. The Peasant Party wanted to be allowed to confiscate some Church lands for distribution to the peasants, but Teodorowicz would not hear of it. On the contrary, the Church hierarchy wanted to recover properties lost during the era of the partitions and certainly did not want to give up any land to the Peasant Party. This conflict between these contrary ambitions had the result that the whole issue of redistributing land was put off until a future comprehensive settlement could be agreed.45 In the meantime, Achille Ratti, having been appointed Archbishop of Milan in 1921 and elevated to the College of Cardinals the same year, was PHASE 1: THE BIRTH OF A NATION, MARCH 1921–MAY 1926 125 elected pope on 6 February 1922, as the successor to Pope Benedict XV (1854–1922; reigned 1914–1922).46 Taking the throne as Pius XI, the new pontiff did not forget the political battles in Poland and specifically disapproved of the Polish hierarchy’s association with the National Democrats and the bishops’ heavy involvement in politics. In the first elections to the Senate (the upper house in the bicameral Polish parliament), Bishop Sapieha and Archbishop Teodorowicz stood for election. The new pope wanted to see the bishops stay out of politics, but let his two old enemies run for office. Upon their election to the Senate, Pius XI compelled them to resign their senatorial seats. He now embarked on a policy of replacing retiring or deceased hiearchs with clerics who were disposed to stay out of politics. This reflected the pope’s more general approach of wanting clergy to stay out of politics, regardless of the country in which they lived and worked. When, in May 1923, Witos returned to the prime ministership, this time heading a Peasant-Right coalition,47 his new government began work on a land reform bill in July and, in autumn of that year, called “for an extended land reform including redistribution of mortmain [inalienable] holdings of the Church.”48 Pius XI joined the Polish Episcopate in protest; Cardinals Dalbor and Kakowski hurried to Rome, where they issued a joint protest with the Holy See against the proposed law. This contributed to the abandonment of the land reform and the fall of the Witos government by the end of the year.49 The Concordat. Although the Holy See had made known its desire, early in the life of the Polish Second Republic to conclude a Concordat with the Polish government, it was only in October 1924, during Władysław Grabski’s second term as prime minister, that serious bilateral negotiations got underway. These negotiations yielded fruit in early February 1925 when the Concordat was finally signed. Among other things, the Concordat guaranteed that the Catholic hierarchy, ordinary clergy, and laity in Poland would enjoy unimpeded access to the Holy See, declared religious instruction under Church supervision to be mandatory in all elementary and secondary state schools, and recognized the Church’s right to all its property, including investments. Article XI recognized the Holy See’s right to appoint all archbishops, diocesan bishops, and co- adjutors (subject to consultation with the government), while Article XII required that all hierarchs take an oath of loyalty to the Republic. The government also undertook to put the clergy on the government payroll and to subsidize Church administration costs and church construction. 126 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

Under the terms of the Concordat, there was no obligation to teach religion in the universities, although religion was obviously part of the curriculum at the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), which had been founded in 1918. Finally, the Concordat provided that minority children (Ukrainians, Belorussians, and others) would receive religious instruction in their native languages.50 The Concordat further stipulated (in Article XXIV) which Church lands should be made available for redistribution. Most of the Polish bishops gave their assent to the Concordat, including Cardinals Dalbor and Kakowski. However, Sapieha and Teodorowicz argued that the Church was conceding too much, while “the clergy from former Austrian and German Poland, where ecclesiastical landhold- ings were most extensive, worried that the economic clauses of the pact might impoverish their dioceses.”51 However, although the Concordat allowed that the state might confiscate up to 100,000 hectares of Church properties, in practice no Church lands were confiscated in the years of the Second Republic.52 Implementation of some of the clauses of the Concordat proved to be difficult, however, both because Church and state had differing interpretations of certain clauses of the Concordat and because the Church looked to the state to provide recompense for ecclesiastical properties seized during the era of the partitions, when those properties could not be returned.53

PHASE 2: THE SANACJA,MAY 1926–MAY 1935 As already noted, 14 governments attempted to govern Poland between the end of 1918 and May 1926. During these years, political polarization escalated. Many Poles blamed the endless crisis on the March 1921 constitution, which had made it virtually certain that no political party could govern alone. On 10 May, Witos returned once more, for the third time, as prime minister. The following day spontaneous demonstrations as well as some orchestrated demonstrations swept Warsaw, with many participants shouting “Down with Witos!” and “Long live Piłsudski!” On 12 May, Piłsudski set out from Sulejowek with about 2,000 armed men and marched to Warsaw. Piłsudski imagined that there would be so huge an eruption of support for him that the government would immediately resign and hand over power peacefully. Instead, the government mar- shalled its forces, leading to a 3-day civil war, which would leave nearly 400 people dead and about 1,000 injured.54 At that point, in the night of 14/15 May 1926, the president resigned, as did Prime Minister Witos and PHASE 2: THE SANACJA, MAY 1926–MAY 1935 127 his government. Now Piłsudski assumed the post of Minister of Military Affairs (effective 15 May) and Inspector General of the Polish Armed Forces (effective 28 August). Kazimierz Bartel (1882–1941), a member of the Sejm since 1922 and Piłsudski’s choice for the prime ministership, assumed that office on 15 May. Shortly thereafter, the Sejm and the Senate elected Piłsudski president of the Republic; Piłsudski declined the honor, satisfied that the vote had served its purpose of legitimating his coup after the fact. Piłsudski now proposed Ignacy Mościcki (1867–1946) for the office of president; he was duly elected in June 1926 and served in that office until 1939. But Piłsudski would hold the real power in Poland from then until his death nine years later. As he assumed power, he let it be known that, in his view, Poland had undergone a “moral breakdown” and claimed that he was responding to that crisis and wanted to restore health to the Republic (an idea conveyed by the term Sanacja, by which his regime would come to be known) and to bring about a spiritual rebirth of the nation.55 Less than 2 weeks after the coup, Piłsudski gave an interview to Warsaw’s Morning Courier (published on 27 May 1926). In this interview, he promised that his coup would prove to be “a revolution without revolutionary consequences.”56 Poland’s bishops were divided about how to respond to the new regime established in May 1926. Cardinal Kakowski, who had happened to be in Rome at the time of the coup, returned to Poland with a letter from the pope, giving his blessing to the new regime and advising the bishops to cooperate with the new government or at least adopt a posture of neutrality. In reply, Piłsudski sent a message to the pontiff promising that “so long as Piłsudski rules Poland, no harm will come to the Church.”57 The message was symbolically important and, in practical terms, by and large correct. But in spite of the pope’s endorsement of the new regime and likewise of Piłsudski’s reassurance of his good will vis-à-vis the Church, Polish bishops tended to be skeptical at best, if not outright hostile to the Marshal’s regime. Initially, the bishops kept silent and refrained from any public criticism of the coup. But later, “some bishops condemned the coup in official pronouncements,” declaring that it was contrary to Catholic rules.58 The Church press in Wilno and Kielce took a line, which can only be considered brazen defiance of Pope Pius XI, condemning the coup and characterizing it as “trampling on law and order.” The newly appointed Polish Primate, Archbishop August Hlond (1881– 1948), issued a pastoral letter on 28 May, which expressed regret that the coup had taken place, but, significantly, he did not condemn the 128 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939 perpetrators, appealing rather for calm and popular acceptance of the results of the coup. In October 1926, Piłsudski appointed a new government, which included two ministers, A. Meysztowicz and K. Niezabytowski, who were regarded as far to the right. A week later, Primate Hlond paid a courtesy call on Piłsudski – a gesture reciprocated by the Marshal the following day.59 But a subsequent meeting at Nieświeź saw the Episcopate complaining that the Concordat was not being respected. Hlond presented his first public speech concerning the political situation at the Seventh Catholic Convention in Poznań on 6 November 1926. In this speech, “ ...the Primate severely criticized the entire eight years of Poland’s independence. He saw the roots of the crisis in secularization, political in-fighting, shallowness and mindlessness in dealing with public matters and lack of responsibility for the fate of the nation.”60 Strikingly, Hlond’s speech included “veiled criticisms of parliamentary democracy, based on lay and liberal-democratic principles seen as alien to the traditions of the Catholic nation.”61 According to Hlond, the Western Allies, especially France, had forced the Poles to accept a parliamentary system for the young nation; Hlond accordingly saw in the May coup “a ground- breaking turn ‘in a new healthy direction’.”62 Yet Hlond did not trust or like Piłsudski and thus did not offer unequivocal support for the new regime. Piłsudski’s past socialism was clearly a factor. In his speech, the Primate set forth some conditions which he expected the government to meet; in return, he declared that he would order all clergy to withdraw from politics. He also pledged that the Church would not back any political party. Hlond wanted the Church to serve simultaneously as a neutral partner cooperating with the government and as a mediator between the government and the opposition. Piłsudski’s balancing act. After taking power, Piłsudski reached out to conservative groups; the appointment of Meysztowicz and Niezabytowski to his cabinet was one token of this overture. Their appointment shocked persons on the left, including people in his own movement. On the other hand, the frequent charge made by some bishops that the Piłsudski regime was dominated by Freemasons and atheists was not entirely wrong. Piłsudski’s circle did include a disproportionate number of atheists and Freemasons, as well as, for that matter, also Protestants; of the eight persons to serve as prime minister in the Sanacja regime, aside from Piłsudski, six were Freemasons, as were many cabinet ministers and persons working in the Sanacja-era diplomatic service.63 Needless to say, the PHASE 2: THE SANACJA, MAY 1926–MAY 1935 129

Polish Episcopate was not pleased with this large representation of Freemasons in the government.64 Nor was the Episcopate pleased with the new regime’s decision to make it easier for married persons to obtain a divorce, and, at the end of August 1926, a Catholic Congress held in Warsaw, provided the stage for delegates to criticize the regime for having facilitated divorce. A religious procession in Warsaw at the time of the Congress served as not only an expression of devotion to the Catholic faith but also “the first public demonstration against [the] sanacja” regime.65 Piłsudski, as already noted, was not an atheist but – contrary to what the bishops liked to think – held that “one’s religion, or lack of it, should make no difference in the realm of civic affairs.”66 The Endecja governments prior to May 1926 had tried to force the Ukrainian and Belorussian Orthodox Christians to convert to Catholicism; Piłsudski considered this approach wrong-headed and lent his support to the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which had defied the Moscow Patriarchate in 1922 by declaring autocephaly.67 Piłsudski’s support of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church did not earn him any points with the Catholic Episcopate. Indeed, in the years following the establishment of the Second Republic, the Catholic hierarchy hoped to convert Orthodox believers to Catholicism and in Chełm, for example, stepped up pressure on Orthodox believers entering into mixed marriages with Catholics, mobilized Rosary Circles to work among Ukrainians, and increased Catholic propaganda generally.68 In 1929, Antoni Remiszewski, head of the Province of Lublin, put together a list of 97 Orthodox churches which he thought should be “dismantled”; he succeeded in closing 23 of them, until the Orthodox hierarchy began to protest loudly, bringing Remiszewski’s campaign to an end.69 This case is important in that it confirms and illustrates the commitment of the Catholic Church – and here, both of the Holy See and of its various archbishops and bishops – to believe that the “universal truth” of Catholicism justified the Church in seeking to convert as many non- Catholics as possible, to use the legal instruments of the state to advance ecclesiastical interests, and indeed to place its own interests above the interests of the state. Although the Polish Episcopate had embraced Dmowski’s Endecja as its advocate, or potential advocate, the National Democrats’ priorities were not identical to those of the Episcopate. Founded in Warsaw in 1893 by Roman Dmowski and Zygmunt Balicki, the National Democrats have often, but misleadingly, been described as “realists”.70 130 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

In fact, this description is too simple, as there was a large dose of romanticism in the thinking of the National Democrats.71 For the National Democrats, the nation was the supreme value (not the Church, as Dmowski was a nonbeliever until late in life) and a loyal Pole “had to embrace everything Polish, including the nation’s past and its historical mission for the future.”72 In the short term, in the partition era, the historical mission of Poles was to restore the Polish state in as large a territorial extent as possible; in the long term, other ambitions were possible. Although we should bear in mind Brian Porter’s warning not to view Fr. Stanisław Staszic (1775–1826) and Roman Dmowski as players in a single, coherent national drama,73 it is known that Staszic “had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on Dmowski”74 and Dmowski would certainly have been aware that Staszic had argued that Poland had “a special civilizing mission” in Europe.75 But where Staszic viewed Poland as a moral nation, Dmowski and the National Democrats purged their nationalism of ethical content.76 Accordingly, rejecting both the rule of law and democratic principles, Dmowski argued for “the primacy of the nation by highlighting that a state had to subject itself unconditionally to the will and interests of the nation.”77 Given Dmowski’s fuzzy account of the nation as a political body that transcends individuals and his expressed desire to expel all Jews from Poland, it comes as no surprise that, in his later years, he gravitated toward fascism. Against Dmowski’s ideology of nation, Piłsudski’s movement advocated the reverse – the state concept – arguing that the interests of the state, in which all citizens including Jews78 should enjoy equal rights, trumped the interests of the nation and indeed any interests, which could weaken the state. As Krzysztof Krasowski explains,

the doctrine of the primacy of the state not only struck at the value system to which the majority of bishops subscribed, but in essence also meant the subordi- nation of the Church to the state. That directly concerned the sphere of its interests and inevitably infringed on the principles of Catholic teaching. From the bishops’ point of view, the concept of the state could be interpreted almost as a return to [Holy Roman Emperor] Joseph’s model of state supremacy and as a forecast of a ﬁght with the Church. [However,] those concerns were not justiﬁed.79

Church-state relations under Piłsudski. By the end of 1926, the initial shock produced by the May coup had worn off and Primate Hlond PHASE 2: THE SANACJA, MAY 1926–MAY 1935 131 realized that cooperation with the regime was likely to pay greater divi- dends than confrontation. Accordingly, at the end of the year, Hlond wrote a letter to the Marshal in which he stated:

The Primate of Poland declares the sincere loyalty of the Episcopate to the state and the government, and announces that the Episcopate wishes for harmonious cooperation with the state authorities and in agreement with its mission work for the Country’s good at all times, without entering any party politics, as has been groundlessly suggested by the press of various orientations. The Episcopate wants the government to care for the Catholic Church sincerely and the state authorities to avoid in their dispositions everything that could annoy the Catholics and dispose the people unfavourably towards them.80

Nonetheless, as suggested above, the hierarchy was not satisﬁed with the implementation of the Concordat and, beginning on 24 November 1926, the two sides met to discuss certain points in contention. Under the terms of the Concordat, which had been concluded more than a year before Piłsudski took power in Poland, the state enjoyed a veto over the appointment of bishops, but had no say, no veto, over the appointment of suffragan bishops, rectors, teachers in the seminaries, or abbots, and the lower clergy were not required to take a loyalty oath to the government.81 While the state could be discontent with its lack of control over appointments at most levels in the Church, a further grievance was that the consent of the government was not required for the establishment of new monastic orders. And then there was the fact that “the clause giving the Government the right to demand the removal of a priest could not actually be implemented.”82 But the Church also had its grievances, including the Holy See’s demand that some formerly Catholic churches, which had been seized in the nineteenth century and turned over to the Orthodox Church be returned: the government was opposed to this. Then, there was the fact that the Piłsudski regime introduced state supervision of all schools operated by the Church, including those run by religious orders – in spite of protests on the part of the hierarchy.83 There were also disagreements about the amount that the government was paying the priests as salary, as well as concerning the aforementioned bill making civil marriage and civil divorce available. That bill even empowered civil courts to dissolve marriages contracted in church. The Episcopate was doggedly opposed to losing its control in the sphere of matrimony and, with persistence, was 132 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939 able to obtain the retraction of this measure.84 In 1932, the government suggested that abortion should be allowed in some circumstances; once again, howls of protest from the Catholic hierarchy had their effect, preventing this proposal from becoming law. In fact, on most issues in contention between Church and state, whether in connection with the provisions of the Concordat or having to do with other issues, the government usually ended up granting the Church what it wanted. Among these concessions were government agreement that Catholic schoolchildren would be required by law to go to confession (at least) three times a year and the government’s consent to grant the Catholic clergy immunity from civil prosecution.85 Catholicism under siege? The Catholic Church was not under siege in interwar Poland. But this was a pre-ecumenical age, with the Second Vatican Council not to be convened until 1962, and the Catholic hierarchy saw threats on all sides: not just from Freemasons and Jews but also from Protestants, Orthodox Christians, and liberals touting secular values – some of the liberals being atheists, at least in the eyes of the Church – all of whom were perceived by the hierarchy as threatening, at least some of the time. Secularism was seen as especially dangerous, and Primate Hlond asserted that the advocates of Church-state separation worshipped in “the synagogue of Satan”86 – the employment of the word “synagogue” revealing the Primate’s deep-seated anti-Semitism. In 1933, on the 250th anniversary of the Battle for Vienna, when allied European forces commanded by Polish King Jan III Sobieski had defeated the Ottoman Turks, Hlond compared the Church’s struggle against secular values in the twentieth century with Catholic states’ armed confrontation with the Muslim Turks in the seventeenth century. He added, in a misleading slur, which was nonetheless an effective polemical touch, that the Church now found itself confronted with the threat of “modern paganism”.87 The Jews were, as ever, also seen as threatening and when, by 1928, six elementary schools attended only by Jews had been established in Warsaw, Archbishop Sapieha expressed satisfaction that these would ensure “that the evil inﬂuence of the Jews might be removed from the Catholic children.”88 Theodore Weeks traces the inception of modern Polish anti- Semitism to the years 1883–1892,89 but it was in the early decades of the twentieth century that anti-Semitism gained a prominent place in Polish-Catholic writings and speeches.90 In 1936, a year after Piłsudski had passed away, Primate Hlond issued a pastoral letter under the title PHASE 2: THE SANACJA, MAY 1926–MAY 1935 133

“On Christian Moral Principles”. In this letter, Hlond wrote that “a Jewish problem exists and will exist so long as Jews remain Jews.”91 For any Catholic cleric of that age, it seemed “self-evident” that any non- Catholic faith was inferior to Catholicism and that any non-Christian faith – especially a faith highly visible in one’s own society – was a “problem”. But Hlond’s letter continued with the ambivalent admonition, “One may not hate anyone. Not even Jews.”92 The phrase “not even Jews” betrayed the fact that, for Hlond, the Jewish presence in Poland was indeed problematic. And then there were the Freemasons, frequently construed by Church leaders as forming an anti-Catholic alliance with the Jews.93 Thus, as the Polish bishops looked at the Piłsudski regime, they saw a league of secularists and Freemasons, who had seized power extra-constitutionally and who were positively disposed toward the Jews. It always came back to the Jews, for in the 1930s, Polish Catholic circles were becoming ever more concerned that the country’s 3.5 million Jews were having an allegedly large influence on Polish culture.94 Crisis and transition. It was emblematic of Piłsudski’s style of governing that, instead of fashioning a political party embodying the principles and programs for which he stood, he preferred to set up what was called the Non-Partisan Bloc for the Support of the Government, generally known by its Polish acronym BBWR.95 This bloc had no program except service to the state and support for Piłsudski. In the parliamentary elections of March 1928, the BBWR won 24% of the total vote for the Senate, giving Piłsudski’s electoral machine 122 of the 444 seats in the Sejm and 46 of the 111 seats in the Senate. The discouraged National Democrats had to be satisfied with 37 seats in the Sejm and nine in the Senate.96 Piłsudski was, needless to say, not completely satisfied with these results and did his best to intimidate the Sejm and turn it into a pliant tool. A Center-Left alliance was established in September 1929 in a move to challenge Piłsudski. But when this alliance started holding mass demonstrations, beginning in Kraków on 29 June 1930, Marshal Piłsudski decided on a forceful response. On 25 August 1930, Piłsudski took over the post of prime minister, announced new elections for November, and had Witos and other opposition leaders imprisoned in the Brześć fortress. Thanks also to an intimidating police presence at the next elections, held in November 1930, he achieved his goal: this time around, although the National Democrats increased their representation in the Sejm to 63 deputies out of 444 and in the Senate to 12 out of 111, Piłsudski’s BBWR now claimed 47.4% of the vote for the Sejm, collecting 247 seats 134 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939 there, and 54.8% of the vote for the Senate, placing 76 deputies in the upper house.97 Satisfied with this result, Piłsudski stepped down as prime minister and Walery Sławek, who had already served as prime minister between March and August 1930, returned to that post. This would prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for Piłsudski, however, because the brutality to which he had had recourse to achieve these electoral results alienated not only many of his erstwhile conservative allies, but also the intelligentsia, the youth, and even some of his closest collaborators. Although Piłsudski would later be celebrated as Poland’s great hero and champion, in the last years of his life, following the elections of 1930, his regime was politically isolated and viewed with disfavor. His regime’s last act was to pass a new constitution, which took effect on 23 April 1935 and dramatically extended the powers of the presidency, granting the incumbent of that office, inter alia, the power to dissolve the legislature and call new elections and the power to issue decrees with the force of law.98 Cardinal-Primate Hlond was largely satisfied with the new constitution, noting that it acknowledged that citizens had equal rights and did not grant the state preeminent powers. Hlond also endorsed the constitution’s creation of a strong presidency.99 Bishops S. Łukomski and H. Przeździecki, who were antagonistic to the Sanacja regime, wanted the Episcopate to make a public statement expressing dissatisfaction with the new constitution; they also wanted the Episcopate “to refuse to celebrate a thanksgiving Mass for the new constitution.”100 They put pressure on Cardinal-Primate Hlond, but Hlond rejected their arguments and pointed out that the new constitution granted the Church all the rights and prerogatives that it had enjoyed under the 1921 constitution. Piłsudski had been in declining health and passed away on 12 May 1935, without being able to take advantage of the provisions for a strong presidency, which had been tailor-made with him in mind. Even now, during the period of national mourning, some of the hierarchs did not forget their grievances against the Marshal. Teodorowicz’s hostility could be taken for granted. In addition, Bishop A. Łosiński of Kielce forbade a priest in his diocese to celebrate a memorial Mass for the Marshal. Along similar lines, Bishop Łukomski refused to hang the national flag in front of his residence or to allow bells to be rung in Piłsudski’s honor. But not all bishops took this line:

Bishop S. Okoniewski compared Piłsudski’s death to Christ’s Ascension. He said that the late Marshal had been a blessing for Poland and a Great Leader of the nation. Bishop K[azimierz] Bukraba adopted a similar posture, calling the PHASE 3: RULE BY THE COLONELS, MAY 1935–SEPTEMBER 1939 135

Marshal the man who had resuscitated Poland and its greatest citizen [and] Bishops J[ózef] Gawlina and T[eodoro] Kubina delivered laudatory sermons to celebrate the memory of the deceased.101

For two years, Piłsudski was allowed to rest in peace in the St. Leonard crypt below Kraków’s Wawel Cathedral, next to the sarcophagi of sundry Polish kings. This location was supposed to be temporary, while a special sepulchre was prepared for the Marshal’s last remains in the Silver Bells tower. But as Piłsudski’s many admirers streamed to Wawel Cathedral to pay their respects to the man many credited with having pulled Poland out of chaos, Archbishop Sapieha became impatient to move the Marshal out of the Cathedral. Thus, defying objections from the President of the Republic as well as from the papal nuncio, Sapieha acted on 23 June 1937, ordering the precipitous transfer of Piłsudski’s sarcophagus to the St. Wacław crypt below the Silver Bells tower.102 The peremptory and ostensibly hurried way in which Piłsudski’s last remains were moved, not to mention also the protests from the president and the nuncio, allowed many Poles to conclude, as Neal Pease has put it, “that Sapieha was pursuing a vendetta against a dead man by banishing his bones from the cathedral.”103 There were public demonstrations and rallies to protest Sapieha’s decision and the windows of the archbishop’s palace were smashed on 26 June. Other bishops reacted in a circumspect way, with Cardinal-Primate Hlond trying to mediate. Finally, with the involvement of the Holy See and the papal nuncio, Sapieha was compelled to send a contrite letter of explanation to President Mościcki, in which he promised not to rearrange any more tombs at Wawel Cathedral without the prior permission of the president. But the transfer of the sarcophagus was allowed to stand. What has come to be called the Wawel Incident of 1937 may be regarded as the ﬁnal, albeit posthumous, act of the Piłsudski era.

PHASE 3: RULE BY THE COLONELS, MAY 1935–SEPTEMBER 1939 After the death of Marshal Piłsudski, a struggle for power ensued. At first, Walery Sławek (1879–1939) looked like the heir apparent; he wanted to continue Piłsudski’s policy line, with only a few modifications. By late 1935, however, General Edward Rydz-Śmigły (1886–1941) edged out Sławek for the leadership. With the rise of the Rydz-Śmigły faction, the 136 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939 sanacja gravitated toward fascism, but not without challenges from rival factions, especially the faction around Ignacy Mościcki, the sitting president.104 Parliamentary elections were scheduled for 8 September 1935. In previous elections, the episcopate had been actively involved, urging people to vote and advising them for which party to vote. This time, however, the episcopate decided to sit on the sidelines, neither encouraging people to vote nor urging a boycott. When the numbers came in, it turned out that only 46.57% of the eligible electorate had voted. That was already disappointing for the sanacja regime; worse yet were the results, showing that 70 of the regime’s preferred candidates failed to be elected to the Sejm.105 The regime concluded that the Church’s neutrality had worked against its interests and decided to seek a rapprochement with the bishops. As Krasowski has noted, “the Church remained the only real power capable of neutralizing anti-government feelings and boosting the legitimacy of the regime.”106 An early gesture of good will toward the Catholic Church was the replacement, in October 1935, of Wacław Jędrzejewicz (1895–1993), who was unpopular among the bishops, as Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Education, with Wojciech Świętosławski (1881–1968), a professor of chemistry at Warsaw’s University of Technology. The episcopate welcomed the change. Świętosławski lived up to expectations, signing an executive order on 23 March 1936, adjusting school curricula in line with the Church’s preferences and extending certain privileges to the Church. After the BBWR had been disbanded in October 1935, a new organization was set up in its place – the Camp of National Unity (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego, or OZN). In February 1937, OZN published its program, underlining, among other things, the leading role of the Catholic Church in Poland and the need to treat the Church with “proper care”. The leaders of OZN also declared their commitment “to build a new Poland on the foundation of Catholic ethics [and] in accord with papal encyclicals.”107 With this, Piłsudski’s successors broke with their mentor’s concept of balance between the religious and the secular; one might even use the term neo-sanacja in reference to the post-Piłsudski regime. By this point, the Endecja was increasingly assimilating fascist ideas.108 But the regime was likewise given to fascist tendencies, with close associates of Rydz-Śmigły dreaming “of constructing a Polish model of a total state – a blend of military dictatorship with a local brand of totalitarianism.”109 Rydz- Śmigły himself was nothing if not ambitious and, in November 1936, had himself promoted to the rank of Marshal, in this way laying claim to be PHASE 3: RULE BY THE COLONELS, MAY 1935–SEPTEMBER 1939 137 somehow Piłsudski’s equal.110 Cardinal Kakowski and Bishops Franciszek Lisowski and Czesław Kaczmarek let it be known that they supported the idea of a strong state that could take matters in hand. Their statements should be understood in the context of the deterioration of Poland’s external security during 1938–1939. Fearing a progressive weakening of the government, Primate Hlond now encouraged Poles to participate in the autumn 1938 elections, regardless of their views about the system or the regime. Turnout this time was 67% for elections to the Sejm and 70% for elections to the Senate.111 The foreign minister, Colonel Józef Beck (1894–1944), was struggling to maintain a balance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Primate Hlond fully supported Beck’s policy of balance, urging in an interview he gave to the Austrian Catholic newspaper Reichspost in February 1938, “Poland should steer clear of any blocs. We have alliances with particular countries for particular purposes, but Poland should avoid anything that could draw it into a world conflict.”112 Two years earlier, on 29 February 1936, Primate Hlond had distributed his pastoral letter, “For Catholic moral principles”, condemning bolshevism, radical nationalism, and racism alike, condemning racists as people who neglected their soul, their religion, and spiritual life. Echoing Hlond’s viewpoint, Bishop H. Przeździecki declared, “We, the followers of Christ, will never accept racism. Spreading nowadays in Germany, it perpetrates the errors of exaggerated nationalism, opposes the doctrine of Christ, oppresses his true believers, and joins forces with neo-paganism. May racism stop in Germany and never cross its borders!”113 Then, in September 1938, addressing the Fourth Catholic Synod in Katowice, Primate Hlond warned that Poland was “surrounded by countries ruled by non- Christian ideologies,” and demanded that “Catholicism ...should perme- ate the whole of Polish life. The Synod is, thus, a call to build a Christian Poland.”114 Synodal resolutions called for “religious totalism, Catholic totalism” and postulated the creation of a “total Catholic”.115 In this way, the Catholic Church in Poland ended up reflecting precisely the kind of totalist thinking which it abhorred in Nazism and Soviet communism. There were calls to declare Catholicism the official state religion, assure that all legislation was in conformity with divine law as interpreted by Catholic prelates, make the public schools confessional, and change the social order to bring it into full accord with papal encyclicals.116 As the Polish Second Republic entered the final year of its existence, Poland’s bishops exuded optimism. “We have pushed godless communism 138 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939 away from the borders of Poland,” they declared in a joint statement in April 1939,

and prevented it from taking refuge in Polish society under the pretense of non-Christian culture. We are casting away godlessness, freethinking, and positivism. We are recovering from laicism, materialism, and religious indifference. We are successfully defending ourselves from our neighbors’ neo-paganism.117

CONCLUSION What is clear from the foregoing is that the Catholic Church over-stretched itself (while also underestimating the danger from the Third Reich and Stalin’s Russia). The Church was not content “merely” with reclaiming some churches handed over to the Orthodox in the previous century or with celebrating the army’s destruction of several dozen Orthodox churches in autumn 1938,118 or with relying on military force to coerce large numbers of Orthodox to accept Catholic baptism,119 or with obtaining a ban on the Freemasons in 1938,120 or with stoking bigotry and animosity toward the Jews.121 In fact, as shown in the previous section, the Catholic Church wanted nothing less than to create a “total Catholic”–more or less the Catholic equivalent of the “new Soviet man”–and to reshape Polish society in such a way as to eliminate – if possible – all deviations in law and practice from Catholic teachings. This is what the bishops had in mind when they referred to the need to build a “new Poland”. The Catholic Church claimed to be the moral voice of the nation but, in the interwar years, this was far from the case. It would earn this accolade only later in the course of the 43 years of communist rule, 1946–1989.122

NOTES 1. Neal Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter: The Catholic Church and Independent Poland, 1914–1939 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), p. 18; and Holger Michael, Marschall Józef Piłsudski 1867 bis 1935. Schöpfer des modernen Polens (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag Nf. GmbH, 2010), pp. 83–84. 2. Ronald Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism in Poland, 1933– 1939 (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 27. NOTES 139

3. Ibid., p. 25. 4. Krzysztof Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki w II Rzeczypospolitej. Myśl o ustroju państwa – postulaty.—realizacja (Warsaw and Poznań: Radakcja Naukowa, 1992), p. 90. 5. Hans Roos, A History of Modern Poland, trans. from German by J. R. Foster (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966), pp. 47–48. 6. As quoted in Michael, Marschall Józef Piłsudski, p. 136. 7. Prince Adam Stefan Stanisław Bonifacy Józef Sapieha. 8. Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism, p. 30. 9. As quoted in Brian Porter-Szűcs, Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, modernity, and Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 181. 10. As quoted in Ibid., p. 182. 11. As quoted in Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 111. 12. Ibid., pp. 54–55; and Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism, pp. 28 and 260. 13. Jerzy Kloczowski [Kłoczowski], A History of Polish Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 280–281, 285; and Ryszard Bender, “I Wojna Światowa i Polska Niepodległa (1914–1939)”,inJerzyKłoczowski (ed.), Chrześciajaństwo w Polsce. Zarys Przemian 966–1979 (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1992), p. 538. 14. Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism, p. 39. 15. Kloczowski, A History of Polish Christianity, p. 292. 16. Paweł A. Leszyński, Stosunki Państwo-Kościoł w Koncepcjach Oraz Praktyce Rządów Obozu Piłsudczykowskiego (Gorzów Wielkopolski: Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim, 2008), p. 37. 17. George Nathaniel Curzon, Marquess Curzon, also known as Baron Curzon of Kedleston and as Earl Curzon of Kedleston. 18. See Michael, Marshall Józef Piłsudski, pp. 95–104. 19. As quoted in Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Piłsudski: A life for Poland (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982), pp. 276–277. 20. Piotr S. Wandycz, “General Weygand and the Battle of Warsaw of 1920”,in Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1960), p. 357. 21. M. B. Biskupski, “Paderewski, Polish politics, and the Battle for Warsaw, 1920”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 46, No. 3–4 (Autumn-Winter 1987), pp. 503–506; the quoted extracts appear on p. 506. 22. L. Sikorski, La campagne polono-russe de 1920 (Paris: Edité par Payot, 1928), as quoted in Thomas Fiddick, “The ‘Miracle of the Vistula’: Soviet Policy versus Red Army strategy”,inThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 1973), p. 627. 23. Maxime Weygand, Mémoires. Mirages et realité (Paris: Edité par Flammarion, 1957), Vol. 2, p. 157, as quoted in Fiddick, “The ‘Miracle of the Vistula’”, p. 627. 140 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

24. “Miracle of the Vistula – Polska – Official Promotional Website”,athttp:// dw-pl.elcodo.io/en/experience-poland/traditions-and-holidays/assump tion-virgin-mary-and-day-polish-armed-forces/ [accessed on 7 June 2016], pp. 2–3of3. 25. Sanford Griffith, “An Onlooker in Upper Silesia”,inThe North American Review, Vol. 214, No. 788 (July 1921), p. 3. 26. Neal Pease, “Poland and the Holy See, 1918–1939”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Autumn 1991), pp. 522–523. 27. Michael, Marschall Józef Piłsudski, p. 110. 28. Joseph Rothschild, “The Ideological, Political, and Economic Background of Piłsudski’s Coup D’État of 1926”,inPolitical Science Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (June 1963), pp. 228, 230. 29. Ibid., p. 229; Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974; fourth printing, 1983), pp. 46–48; and Anita J. Prażmowska, A History of Poland (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 169. 30. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 65. 31. He had served previously as prime minister from July 1920 to September 1921. 32. Roman Dyboski, “The Peasant in Modern Poland”,inThe Slavonic Review, Vol. 2, No. 4 (June 1923), p. 111; and Roos, A History of Modern Poland, p. 104. 33. Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 35. 34. As quoted in Ibid., p. 35. 35. See Winson Chu, The German Minority in Interwar Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), especially Chapter 1 (“Phantom Germans: Weimar Revisionism and Poland (1918–1933)”). 36. As I wrote in 1998, “Buddhism can trace its first appearance in Poland to the early years after World War I, but Polish Buddhism did not survive the combined effects of the destruction of World War II and the onslaught of Stalinism. Buddhism returned to Poland in 1972, however, and gained converts, particularly after the proclamation of martial law in 1981.”– Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 329. 37. Jan Szeruda, “The Protestant Churches of Poland”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 16, No. 48 (April 1938), pp. 616–617, 38. Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 37. 39. Articles 111, 112, and 113 as quoted in Leonid I. Strakhovsky, “The Church in Contemporary Poland (1919–1930)”,inThe Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (October 1932), p. 333; Articles 114, 115, and 116 as quoted in Stefan Rosada and Józef Gwóźdž, NOTES 141

“Church and State in Poland”, in Vladimir Gsovski (ed.), Church and State Behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), pp. 170–171, 40. Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism, p. 27. 41. See Eugène Cardinal Tisserant, “Pius XI as Librarian”,inThe Library Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (October 1939), pp. 389–403. 42. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 33. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid., p. 36. 45. Ibid., pp. 58–59. 46. “Pius XI”, The Columbia Encyclopedia (2016), at http://search.credorefer ence.com/content/topic/pius_xi [accessed on 18 June 2016]. 47. Details in Antony Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland 1921–1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1972), pp. 115–116. 48. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 66. See also Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, p. 118. 49. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 66. See also Zygmunt Zieliński and Stanisław Wilk, Kościół w Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej (Lublin: Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, 1980), p. 69. 50. Rosada and Gwóźdž, “Church and State in Poland”, pp. 171–172; Strakhovsky, “The Church in Contemporary Poland”, pp. 336–338; and Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, pp. 120–121. 51. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 70. 52. Ibid., p. 69. See also Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 210. 53. Zieliński and Wilk, Kościół w Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej, p. 32. 54. Eva Plach, The Clash of Moral Nations: Cultural Politics in Piłsudski’s Poland, 1926–1935 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), p. 4. 55. Ibid., p. 5. 56. As quoted in Ibid., p. 15. 57. As quoted in Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 79. 58. Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki, p. 88. 59. Ibid., p. 91. 60. Ibid., p. 92. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 80. 64. Peter Hetherington, Unvanquished: Joseph Pilsudski, Resurrected Poland and the Struggle for Eastern Europe, 2nd ed. (Houston, TX: Pingora Press, 2012), p. 612. 65. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 83. 142 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

66. As quoted in Neal Pease, “The Marshal and the Almighty: Piłsudski and Religion”,inThe Polish Review, Vol. 56, Nos. 1–2 (2011), p. 51. 67. Suzanne Gwen Hruby, Leslie Laszlo, and Stephan K. Pavlowitch, “Minor Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe”, in Pedro Ramet (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 321. 68. Konrad Sadkowski, “From Ethnic Borderland to Catholic Fatherland: The Church, Christian Orthodox, and State Administration in the Chełm Region, 1918–1939”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Winter 1998), p. 821. 69. Ibid., p. 826. 70. For a characterization of Dmowski’s program as a “realist” one, see, for example, Stanisław Kozicki, “Roman Dmowski 1864–1939”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 18, No. 52 (July 1939), p. 120. 71. Brian A. Porter, “Who is a Pole and Where is Poland? Territory and Nation in the Rhetoric of Polish National Democracy before 1905”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Winter 1992), pp. 639–653, especially pp. 639 and 649. 72. Ibid., p. 646. 73. Brian Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 13. 74. Joanna B. Michlic, “The Jews and the Formation of Modern National Identity in Poland”, in Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby (eds.), Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 132. 75. Pedro Ramet, “The Interplay of Religious Policy and Nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”, in P. Ramet (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, Revised & Expanded ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 8. 76. Porter, “Who is a Pole”, pp. 644, 649. 77. Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki, p. 90. 78. Michael, Marschall Józef Piłsudski, p. 119. 79. Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki, p. 90. 80. As quoted in Kloczowski, A History of Polish Christianity, pp. 295–296. See also Zieliński and Wilk, Kościół w Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej, pp. 80–81. 81. Closely paraphrased from Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, p. 211. 82. Ibid. 83. Leszyński, Stosunki Państwo-Kościoł, p. 36. 84. Ibid., p. 35; and Strakhovsky, “The Church in Contemporary Poland”, p. 339. NOTES 143

85. Both of these concessions were made in 1927. See Polonsky, Politics in Independent Poland, pp. 211–212. 86. As quoted in Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism, p. 345. 87. Ibid. 88. As quoted in Ibid., p. 348. 89. Theodore R. Weeks, From Assimilation to Antisemitism: The “Jewish Question” in Poland, 1850–1914 (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), Chapter 5 (“Beginnings of Modern Polish Antisemitism, 1883–1892”). 90. Closely paraphrased from Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 118. 91. As quoted in Ibid., p. 120. 92. As quoted in Modras, The Catholic Church and Antisemitism, p. 357. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid., pp. 245–248. 95. From the Polish, Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem. 96. Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 63. 97. Ibid., pp. 64–65. 98. Ibid., p. 69. 99. Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki, p. 131. 100. Ibid., p. 132. 101. Ibid., p. 133. 102. Neal Pease, “The ‘Unpardonable Insult’: The Wawel Incident of 1937 and Church-State Relations in Poland”,inThe Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 1991), p. 427; Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki, p. 133; and Porter-Szűcs, Faith and Fatherland, p. 179. 103. Pease, “The ‘Unpardonable Insult’”, p. 429. 104. Jerzy Holzer, “The Political Right in Poland, 1918–1939”,inJournal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July 1977), p. 409. 105. Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki, pp. 134–135. 106. Ibid., p. 136. 107. Ibid. 108. Rothschild, East Central Europe, p. 71. 109. Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki, p. 140. 110. Lukowski and Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland, pp. 219–220. 111. Krasowski, Episkopat katolicki, p. 139. 112. As quoted in Ibid. 113. As quoted in Ibid., p. 142. 114. As quoted in Ibid., p. 144. 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid. 117. As quoted in Ibid., p. 145. 118. Kloczowski, A History of Polish Christianity, p. 273. 144 4 THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC, 1918–1939

119. Werner Benecke, “Zur Lage der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche in der Zweiten Polnischen Republik 1918–1939”, in Hans-Christian Maner and Martin Schulze Wessel (eds.), Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918–1939 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002), p. 141. 120. Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter, p. 117. 121. Ibid., p. 119. 122. See Ibid., pp. 216–217. CHAPTER 5

War Years and Communism, 1939–1989

The half-century running from 1939 to 1989 was a time of hardship and challenges, but also opportunities, for the Catholic Church in Poland. In all of Nazi-occupied Poland – meaning both the territories in the west incorporated directly into the Third Reich and the Nazi-ccupied rump Polish state known as the General- gouvernement (hereafter, GG) – 1,996 clergy lost their lives in the course of the war, alongside 238 nuns and 113 clerics.1 The Nazis also shut down hundreds of churches, chapels, and charitable organizations; many Church facilities were simply destroyed. After the war, there was some state funding for the reconstruction and repair of Church facilities destroyed or damaged by the Nazis and, in the years up to 1952, 799 churches were rebuilt, with state assistance.2 But once the communists were ﬁrmly in control, they set about to weaken the Church by tarnishing the reputation of the clergy as a whole, by conﬁscating Church property, and by gradually narrowing the space for religious instruction, while using the educational system to promote the Marxist materialist (i.e., atheist) worldview. The bishops and ordinary clergy were confronted with a choice – whether to collaborate with the Nazi occupation authorities, or later with the communist regime, and thereby enjoy favorable treatment, or to defy the power-holders, even at the risk of imprisonment. Not surprisingly, there were both those who chose to collaborate during the Nazi

© The Author(s) 2017 145 S.P. Ramet, The Catholic Church in Polish History, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-40281-3_5 146 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 occupation, such as Catholic bishops Jan Lorek of Sandomierz, Czesław Kaczmarek of Kielce, and Teodoro Kubina of Częstochowa, and those who remained defiant, such as Bishop Fulmann and Suffragan Bishop Göral in Lublin, and Apostolic Administrators Kolowski in Siedlce – all three of whom paid for their defiance of the Nazis by being hauled off to prison.3 Archbishop Adam Sapieha (1867–1951), who, in the absence of Cardinal Hlond, was serving as the de facto Primate of the Catholic Church in Poland, was courted by the Germans but refused any form of collaboration. Given his rank and prestige, however, he remained at liberty. The same pattern was played out in communist Poland, albeit with a different cast of characters. Among collaborators, there were those who did so openly, such as Bolesław Piasecki (1915–1979), who established an association of “patriotic priests” called Pax and aspired to enjoy the status and influence of a junior partner to the regime in the sphere of religious policy.4 There were also covert collaborators, such as Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus of Plock (b. 1939), whose primary role was to pass along information of interest to the authorities, while dampening tendencies toward defiance among the clergy in his archdiocese. But there were also defiant clergy such as Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński (1901–1981), who spent three years in detention for his courage, and Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko (1947–1984), who paid with his life for his regular Masses for Solidarity (the independent trade union, suppressed by the regime in December 1981). But the hardship and challenges also presented the Church with an opportunity to redefine itself, both in the wake of World War Two and in the course of the four decades of communist rule. By the dawn of World War Two, the Catholic Church had acquired a reputation “as a reactionary organization” and was widely seen as supportive of the interests of large landowners.5 The Church had become alienated from the bulk of the Polish nation. It was the Golgotha which it shared with the Polish nation which provided the Church with an opportunity to revive itself. The role of clerical collaborators was quietly “forgotten” and the Church promoted a myth, largely successfully, which exaggerated the opposition of its bishops and clergy to the Nazi occupation. Until the era of Cardinal Wyszyński, who served as Primate of Poland from 1948 until his death in 1981, the Church in Poland had not been regarded as an advocate of human rights. Certainly, it had earned – again THE NAZI OCCUPATION 147 with a mix of quiescent cooperative clergy and those who took part in the Poles’ uprisings against Russian rule in the nineteenth century – a reputation as a defender of Poles’ national rights. But, in the course of the 1970s, Cardinal Wyszyński would take up the cause of human rights and, after the founding of Solidarity in summer 1980, of the rights of labor. Karol Cardinal Wojtyła (1920–2005), elected Pope John Paul II in 1978, would continue this struggle.

THE NAZI OCCUPATION On 1 September 1939, the Wehrmacht invaded Poland. In spite of their inferiority in terms of firepower, equipment, and the number of men under arms, the Poles fought bravely, inflicting 50,000 casualties on the German forces, shooting down 500 German aircraft, and destroying more than 1,000 of the Wehrmacht’s armored vehicles. On the Polish side, there were more than 200,000 military casualties during September 1939, as well as civilian casualties due to German bombing.6 Warsaw held out for four weeks, hoping that the French would honor their pledge to attack Germany in the west, in the event of a German attack on Poland; the French, however, sat on their hands and Warsaw surrendered on 27 September. After a delay, the Soviets moved in to annex much of eastern Poland, where the majority of the population consisted of Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians. Pomerania, Upper Silesia, and Wartheland in the west were incorpo- rateddirectlyintotheThirdReich;thisregion(theOstgebiete, or eastern districts) included Poznań (Posen) and Łódź (which the Germans renamed Litzmannstadt). Hitler wanted to remove all Poles and Jews from the Ostgebiete, andtoaccomplishthiswithin10years. Already by the end of February 1940, about a million Jews and Poles had been deported from these areas and, when it comes to just the Poles, roughly 325,000 were deported eastward by the end of that year.7 Some Poles were deported westward, to Germany, and between 1939 and 1944, approximately 2.8 million Poles were taken to Germany for slave labor (Map 5.1). In theory, the Nazis were going to Germanize the Polish lands by bringing in German settlers, who would displace the Poles who were to be deported. The Nazis even talked of the eventual disappearance of the Polish nation and, in the context of that idea, executed, in the course of the five-year-long occupation, 15% of Poland’s teachers, 148 A ER N OMNS,1939 COMMUNISM, AND YEARS WAR 5 – 1989

Map 5.1 The partition of Poland during World War Two THE NAZI OCCUPATION 149

18% of Catholic clergy, 45% of Polish physicians, 50% of the country’s engineers, and 57% of its lawyers.8 In practice, occupation authorities were ready to register, as Germans, any Poles who had German ancestors and were ready to be “re-Germanized”. Already in 1939, 70,000 Poles presented themselves for re-Germanization; by the end of 1941, this figure had risen to 111,000 and, by the end of 1943, to 264,000.9 In addition to being exempt from slave labor, these “new Germans” enjoyed increased food rations, access to special restaurants and sports facilities, and other benefits. As the price for these privileges, they were expected to terminate all social contact with Poles. These “new Germans” were also expected to behave like Germans – meaning that they were to speak German, to relate to the Nazi version of German culture (for example, by not speaking ill of composers Richard Wagner and Anton Bruckner), and of course to support the ThirdReich.Inadditiontosheersurvivalandbettertreatment,there was a third motivation behind many Poles’ declarations that they were German, namely, the prospect of being able to acquire Jewish-owned property through the program of ‘aryanization’.10 In addition to the adults who volunteered to be inducted into the German nation, “[a] bout 200,000 Polish children with ‘racially appropriate features’ were removed from orphanages and from their parents in order to be brought up as ‘Aryans’ in Nazi homes.”11 Nazi treatment of Jews and Gypsies was even worse and, by the end of 1944, only roughly 10% of Poland’s pre-war Jewish population of 3 million were still alive.12 All told, an estimated 6.3 million citizens of Poland were killed by the Nazis in the course of the war. The chief resistance force was the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or AK), which was loyal to the legitimate government of Poland, sitting in exile in London. At its peak in mid–1944, the AK numbered about 400,000 fighters.13 But ordinary citizens engaged in small acts of resistance, as for example parish priests who assisted Jews. But, where priests are concerned, some assisted the Nazis, for example by telling people to turn over their produce to the occupation authorities. Most Poles, however, just wanted to survive and, among Catholic priests, overt collaboration with the Nazis “was as rare as close collaboration with the resistance movement.”14 Estimates of the number of collaborators among the general Polish population vary widely, with estimates as low as roughly 7,000 and as high as one million.15 150 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

NAZI POLICY VIS-À-VIS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH TheNaziswerewellawarethat,duringtheageofthepartitions,those Catholic clergy who had joined in the two insurrections against the Russians had endeared themselves tothePolishpeopleandthatthe Church had thereby come to be seen (albeit not without oversimplifi- cation) as possibly the greatest champion of the Polish nation. As already noted, the long-term continuance of the Polish nation was incompatible with Nazi war aims – at least in terms of the lands they had been occupying. In addition, at least some high-ranking Nazis were hostile to Christianity per se.16 For example, in a secret decree issued in the night of 6/7 June 1941, Martin Bormann, chief of the NSDAP17 Chancellery, wrote that national socialism was incompatible with Christianity. Fearing, thus, that the Catholic priests would stir up Polish patriotism, the Nazis arrested a number of clergy in the GG, closed the seminaries, shut down the religious press, and even banned Polish songs and hymns, fearing that, whether explicitly or implicitly, they had a religio-patriotic tone.18 National monuments and plaques commemorating events in Polish history were removed from the churches. In the Ostgebiete, the hearing of confession in Polish was strictly forbidden already beginning in the first months of the occupation. Starting in summer 1940, Polish clergy were evacuated from Wartheland to the GG; the Germans planned to remove 80% of Polish clergy from Wartheland, but never reached this target.19 Indeed, a decree issued on 13 September 1941 specified that in Wartheland henceforth, among religious associations, “only Evangelical and Catholic Churches of ‘German nationality’” were to be recognized as juridical persons.20 The Catholic University in Lublin (KUL) was shut down in November 1939, after the Gestapo entered KUL’s premises, arresting all those professors who were on hand, as well as the clergy at the seminary and Bishops Ulman and Göral, who werelatershippedtotheconcentrationcampinOranienburg. After the defeat of France in 1940, it was decided that the GG should be renamed and that it would, at some point in the future, be incorporated directly into the Third Reich.21 Meanwhile, the arrests of priests continued. By 1 October 1940, the Germans had arrested 826 Catholic priests; of this number, 263 were still in custody on that date, while another 40 had either been shot or died in concentration camps.22 SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL 151

Among the first clergymen to be arrested was General-Vicar Walenty Dymek, acting head of the Poznań archdiocese, who was taken into custody on 1 October 1939. Bishop Włodimierz Bronisław Jasinski of Łódź, and his five canons together Suffragan Bishop Kazimierz Tomczak, were interned about the same time, as was Suffragan Bishop Michał Kozal of Włocławek (arrested together with other priests on 7 November 1939). Before the end of 1939, the Nazis also arrested all clergy who had been active in Catholic youth organizations such as Catholic Action. By the end of 1939, approximately a thousand clergy were incarcerated in prisons or concentration camps in Poland. The Nazis also shut down Jesuit colleges in Gdynia, Poznań, and elsewhere. At first, within the Ostgebiete, Nazi policy was less severe in West Prussia and Upper Silesia than in Wartheland; but in January 1941, the roughly 60 monasteries and convents which had been in operation in Upper Silesia were confiscated by the occupation authorities.23 Intent on choking the Church to death, the Nazis began killing seminarians. In response, Archbishop Sapieha opened a Polish seminary that would operate in secret.

SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL Right-wing Polish nationalists who had been active before the war were deeply anti-Semitic. Indeed, even as the Nazis rounded up Jews for isola- tion and liquidation, the nationalist right continued to view Jews as enemies and even welcomed the Nazi murder of millions of Jews.24 Anti-Semitic views could also be found within the Catholic Church; indeed, a report sent by Polish Church authorities to the Polish government-in-exile in summer 1941 asserted:

As far as the Jewish question is concerned, it must be viewed as a special sign of Divine Providence that the Germans, regardless of the many injustices they have inﬂicted and continue to inﬂict upon our country, did well to demonstrate that it is possible to liberate Polish society from the Jewish plague and to show us the path that we should follow unrelentingly, albeit in a less cruel and brutal fashion. It is clearly God’s will that the occupiers themselves have contributed to the solution of this burning question, because the Polish nation itself, weak and unsystematic, would never have taken the energetic steps that this matter demands.25 152 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

Among those hostile to the Jews was Bishop Kaczmarek of Kielce who, in spring 1941, had published a “pastoral” in which he warned of the corrup- tive influence Jewish children were allegedly having on Catholic children.26 This same Bishop Kaczmarek had circulated a pastoral letter in the first month of the German occupation, appealing to Catholics to obey the German authorities in all things. “Order must rule in society,” he advised. “That is why one has to loyally cooperate with the authorities; because those who act otherwise would do their society an injustice [and] make more difficult a return to normal life and to better days.”27 Consistently, Kaczmarek not only refused to join in any conspiratorial actions against the Germans, but also urged his flock likewise to desist from such activity. Kaczmarek’s colleague, Bishop Jan Lorek of Sandomierz, took a similar stance and, further, in spring 1940, advised the clergy of his diocese to urge Poles taken to work in Germany “to uphold their faith and good morals in the foreign lands,” and to do the work they were told to do.28 There were, however, also Catholic priests and nuns who risked their lives to save Jews. Among these were three Polish priests and two nuns later honored by Yad Vashem, Israel’s Holocaust Memorial, as “Righteous among Nations”. They included Fr. Jan Raczkowski, chaplain of the Home Army, who “created an unofficial help group that involved priests, nuns, and families from Otwock and the surrounding areas” in order to save Jews.29 All told, it has been estimated that non-Jews saved between 30,000 and 35,000 Jews in Poland during the Nazi occupation.30

AFINAL TALLY The Nazis were given not only to extreme measures but also to wild fantasies and dauntingly radical plans. Moreover, these plans were sometimes accelerated as time passed. Initially, thus, the Nazis referred to the GG as a homeland for Poles but, in March 1941, German Führer Adolf Hitler met Hans Frank (1900–1946), the Governor General of the GG, and told him that a decision had been reached to Germanize that region as well and, in that connection, to remove Poles and Jews from the territory of the GG. According to Nazi plans, 15 million of the 45 million people then inhabiting the GG would be screened to select those who seemed, to the Nazis, to be racially “worthy”, with the remaining 30 million to be deported from the territory.31 Nazi plans for the Catholic Church were equally radical and called for nothing less than the expulsion, incarceration, or execution of Polish clergy – over time – the choking off of seminary life, and the eventual THE COMMUNIST ERA 153 disappearance of Polish Church life altogether. At the outset of this chapter, an enumeration was provided of the number of priests, nuns, and clerics who lost their lives during the occupation. But many more spent time in one or another concentration camp. According to a tally prepared after the war had ended, a total of 3,643 priests, 389 novices, 341 monks, and 1,117 nuns were taken by the Nazis to concentration camps; 2,517 of this number died as a result.32 In spite of these losses (and, in a sense, because of them), in spite of the record of collaboration on the part of a few bishops, and in spite of the legacy of anti-Semitism in the ranks of the hierarchy and clergy, the Catholic Church in Poland emerged from the war morally strengthened, as if “cleansed” of the stain of its past sins by the purgatory it had experienced during the war. With this, the stage was set for the Church to renew its bonds with the Polish nation.

THE COMMUNIST ERA As a result of the war, Poland lost territories in the east, to the Soviet Union, but gained territories in thewest,attheexpanseofGermany (see Map 5.2). At the end of World War Two, the Soviet Union successfully sponsored communist parties in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and what would, in 1949, become the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany). In addition, local communists succeeded in bringing themselves to power in Yugoslavia and Albania. The communists were not in clear control in Poland until 1947, or in control in Czechoslovakia until 1948. The Soviets had their own idea of what socialism (which they deﬁned as the preliminary stage before communism is reached) should look like. According to the Soviet model, this entailed the establishment of a single-party system (although, in the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, a few additional parties continued to exist, functioning purely as conveyer belts for communist policy). The Soviet model also involved: strict central party control of the media, promoting the ‘propaganda of success’; state ownership of industry, combined with economic planning; agricultural collectivization, with the replacement of private farms with collective farms; private travel largely limited to ‘fraternal’ socialist states; and regime control of religious associations. Although there were early efforts to implement this model throughout socialist Eastern Europe, one or another part of the model would prove unworkable in one or another country, 154 A ER N OMNS,1939 COMMUNISM, AND YEARS WAR 5 – 1989

Map 5.2 Poland’s borders, 1939–1951 THE COMMUNIST ERA 155 with the result that, already by the mid–1950s, there were signs of creeping heterogeneity, and this heterogeneity would only grow over time. Where Poland is concerned, agricultural collectivization, which brought up to 10% of agricultural land into collective farms by 1955, was abandoned in the wake of the “Polish October” of 1956, and by 1960 only about 1% of the country’s total arable land was included in collective farms.33 Regime efforts to control the Catholic Church were essentially abandoned at the same time, giving rise to an era of mutual pressure, consultations, and growing confidence on the part of the Church. Later, after the imposition of martial law in December 1981, the strategy in the media shifted from the ‘propaganda of success’ to the ‘propaganda of failure’, with the communists openly admitting their errors and past fail- ures, while suggesting that their experience with past failure meant that they were best qualified to find policies that would work in the future.34 As already noted, however, it was not until 1947 that the Polish Workers’ Party (or PPR, i.e., the communist party) was able to assert its clear dominance in the country. In London, the Polish government-in- exile claimed to be the legitimate government of the country; but on 22 July 1944, in Chełm, the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), a left-wing front backed by the Soviets, presented its own claim to govern Poland. Four days later, the PKWN installed itself in Lublin and began to assert effective authority across lands occupied by the Soviet Red Army. On 31 December 1944, the Lublin regime took another step, declaring itself the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland. The following June, in a show of national unity, the Provisional Government invited Stanisław Mikołajczyk (1900–1966), who had served earlier as prime minister in the government-in-exile, to join the Provisional Government as minister of agriculture, together with five other non- communists. However, the 20-man cabinet was dominated by the communists. Mikołajczyk headed the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), one of two genuinely popular political parties in the country, the other being the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), headed by Józef Cyrankiewicz (1911– 1989). However, genuine popularity counted for nothing in the rigged elections held in January 1947, and official results gave the PPR-led bloc, which included the PPS, 80% of the vote, with the PSL allegedly garnering a mere 10%.35 Before the end of that year, workers’ councils and trade unions were also brought under regime control.36 In October 1947, Mikołajczyk fled from Poland, and in December 1948 the socialist party 156 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 was forced to merge with the PPR, forming what would be called the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR). In the meantime, Władysław Gomułka (1905–1982), who had headed the PPR since 1943, was dismissed and replaced by Bolesław Bierut (1892–1956), who had become President of the Republic in February 1947. Cyrankiewicz was rewarded for his cooperation by being named prime minister. With this, the era of Stalinism commenced – an era of harsh policies designed to implement the Soviet model. On 12 March 1956, Bierut died, while on an official visit to Moscow – apparently due to a heart attack brought on by the shock of hearing Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) criticizing Stalin. A week later, Edward Ochab (1906–1989) was elected to succeed Bierut as First Secretary of the PZPR. But the internal factions, which had been kept barely below the surface, now flared into the open. Ochab, like Bierut before him, enjoyed Soviet backing. But Gomułka, who had been under house arrest from August 1951 until December 1954, was known for his recognition of Polish particularities, and hence his call for a “Polish road to socialism”. The rivalry came to a head at the VIIIth plenary session of the PZPR Central Committee in October 1956, when Gomułka was brought out of the shadows and restored to the leadership post.37 Gomułka would remain at the helm until December 1970.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 1945–1956 The immediate post-war years were years of reconstruction both for Poland generally and for the Church specifically. In March 1945, even before the war had ended, the Kraków Curia launched the weekly newspaper, Tygodnik Powszechny, which quickly gained an audience. On 29 July 1945, Cardinal-Primate August Hlond (1881–1948) returned to Poland. Pope Pius XII (1876–1958; reigned 1939–1958) bestowed on him the title of papal legate, with special powers. Hlond had to consider what to do about the fact that some dioceses which had been Polish before September 1939 now lay in the Soviet Union. In addition, some dioceses which had been German before the war now lay in Poland (the so-called recovered territories). As early as 15 August 1945, Hlond issued a decree, dividing the recovered territories into five jurisdictions and appointing five Polish prelates to serve as apostolic administrators in these dioceses, exercising the same authority as bishops. Furthermore, because of the high number of casualties among the clergy during the war, Hlond THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 1945–1956 157 recalled Polish priests and orders serving abroad back to Poland. The seminaries resumed their work already in 1946 and on 12 May 1946, Hlond consecrated 10 bishops – among them, Stefan Wyszyński (1901– 1981), his eventual successor as Primate of Poland.38 On 12 September 1945, the communist regime declared the 1925 concordat null and void, on the ground that there were still German bishops in charge of dioceses in the recovered territories. Nonetheless, the communists needed the Church’s collaboration in the reconstruction of the country. One sign of this was that Bolesław Bierut, as state president, was present at public Church ceremonies and celebrations. In token of regime circumspection at the time, Bierut declared, “Respect for religious feelings and religious practices is the Polish people’s immutable, steadfast principle, to which they will most firmly adhere.”39 But Church-state relations were not good and, as early as 1945, Bolesław Piasecki (1915–1979), an erstwhile fascist who had headedamilitiaforceduringWorldWarTwotofight both the Nazis and the Soviets, was encouraged by the communists to create an organization of “patriotic priests” to be called Pax, in order “to build a Catholic-Marxist alliance and to mobilize the nationalist Right” in support of the socialist regime.40 Piasecki’s group included members of the pre-war ‘Falanga’ fascist movement, which Piasecki had headed.41 Piasecki’s group was quickly able to launch a weekly newspaper, Džiś i Jutro, and in March 1947 was cleared to launch a daily newspaper, Słowo Powszechne. Meanwhile, a referendum had been scheduled for June 1946 on whether to retain the bicameral legislature inherited from interwar Poland or to convert it, as the communists favored, to a unicameral parliament. The Catholic press advocated for retention of the bicameral legislature.42 However, the communists were in control of the electoral commissions which counted the ballots, and announced that 68% of the voters had endorsed conversion to a unicameral parliament (as well as two other proposals backed by the communists). Later, when the archives were opened, it was revealed that only 27% had voted for the communist proposals; most people had voted against the proposals and wanted to retain the bicameral model.43 During 1946–1947, the regime nationalized the Church printing presses and suppressed various Catholic periodicals; Catholic books and newspapers were removed from public libraries; and Catholic lay organizations were dissolved. The regime also seized about 375,000 hectares of 158 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 land belonging to the Church.44 The regime also introduced civil marriage and civil divorce – a move considered controversial at the time – and required that persons wanting a church wedding contract a civil marriage first. Subsequently, in September 1948, the time allocated for religious instruction in the schools was shortened; at the same time, “the hitherto obligatory prayers at the beginning of instruction were abolished.”45 About the same time, the Union of Polish Youth (ZMP), which had been established a few months before, began to agitate for the removal of crucifixes from classrooms and for the replacement of religious holidays with holidays linked to communist history. In response to these moves, Polish bishops assembled for a conference in Wrocław on 23 September 1948, at which they issued a strongly worded protest. But the nationalization of Church-run schools continued, as did the contraction of religious instruction from state-run schools. Then, on 22 October 1948, Cardinal Hlond died unexpectedly at the age of 67. On his deathbed, he dictated a letter to be delivered to the Holy See, expressing his wish that Bishop Wyszyński be named to succeed him as Primate. His wish was granted and, on 12 November 1948, Pope Pius XII elevated Wyszyński, then Bishop of Lublin, to Archbishop- Metropolitan of Gniezno and Warsaw, and thereby also Primate of Poland. In February 1949, the new Primate proposed the creation of a joint commission of representatives of the Church and the state, in order to resolve problems in the Church-state relationship. The regime replied only a month later, with a declaration attacking the Church; the declaration was published in Życie Warszawy on 18 March 1949.46 That declaration notwithstanding, Władysław Wolski, Minister of Public Administration, received Msgr. Sigismund Choromański, secretary of the Episcopate, for a conversation on 20 March 1949. Immediately after this meeting, Wolski issued a statement affirming that the government would not interfere in the Church’s internal affairs, provided that the Church kept out of (anti-regime) politics, and Wolski specifically guaranteed the continuance of religious instruction in the state schools.47 The promises were not kept and on 1 July 1949 the Vatican issued a decree against the communists, under the title Acta Apostolicae Sedis, threatening with excommunication those Catholics who defended or advocated communist ideas. On 21 September 1949, the regime nationalized the Church’s hospitals. Shortly thereafter, the regime press published allegations of “embezzlement, false bookkeeping, and assistance to sub- versive elements” on the part of the management of the Catholic charity THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 1945–1956 159

‘Caritas’.48 Finally, on 23 January 1950, the regime seized control of Caritas and installed a new management team there, headed by Rev. Antoni Lamparty, one of the ‘patriotic priests’. The hierarchy protested – but to no avail. The Polish Episcopate now felt that it needed to reach an agreement with the regime and, on 14 April 1950, signed a historic agreement with the Polish government. The Church agreed to teach its faithful to respect the law and to call upon them “to intensify their work for [the] reconstruction of the country and the advancement of the nation’s welfare.”49 The agreement also included the provision that the Church would “combat criminal activities of underground bands and denounce and punish under Canon Law clergymen guilty of participation in any underground activities against the Polish State.”50 The hierarchy also agreed to press the Holy See to appoint permanent (Polish) bishops in the recovered territories. For its part, the government guaranteed the continuance of mandatory religious instruction in the elementary and secondary state schools (Article X), guaranteed that schools operated by the Catholic Church would enjoy the same prerogatives and rights as schools operated by the state (also Article X), guaranteed that the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) could continue its work (Article XI), guaranteed that the Catholic press and periodicals would be treated on an equal basis with other press and periodicals (Article XIV), and guaranteed freedom of worship – among other guarantees.51 In fact, the regime quickly violated Article X of the 1950 agreement, by forcing a large number of Catholic schools to close. The regime also forced the closure of several of KUL’s faculties. The regime’s violations of the 1950 agreement. The ink was barely dry on the 1950 agreement when the regime began violating both the spirit and the letter of the agreement. The regime had, for example, guaranteed that religious instruction would be allowed to continue in the state schools, but, as the regime shut down religious classes in one school after another, Bishop Stanisław Adamski of Katowice (1875–1967) and his two auxiliary bishops, Herbert Bednorz and Juliusz Bieniek, circulated a petition in October 1952, seeking signatures to request that the government restore religious instruction in those schools where it had been abolished. Their petition was branded “political sabotage” and the regime organized a number of protests against the bishops.52 The regime also shut down a number of minor seminaries in the course of 1952. Subsequently, in a decree issued on 9 February 1953, the authorities demanded that the Church surrender the control of ecclesiastical appointments at all ranks 160 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 to state authorities and set forth conditions for the academic preparation of clergy. The decree was in open violation of the regime’s pledge, just three years earlier, not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Church – not to mention Minister Wolski’s promise in 1949; it was also in violation of the constitution. Wyszyński, by then a cardinal, rejected the decree and, in a protest letter to Bierut on 8 May 1953, the Polish bishops declared that they would rather leave ecclesiastical posts vacant than see them filled by regime appointees!53 The regime also violated the spirit of the 1950 Agreement when it came to the Church press, which was gradually being strangled. The campaign against the Church press came to a head on 5 March 1953, when the death of Soviet leader Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin (1879–1953) was announced. The editors of Tygodnik Powszechny, the Polish Church’s most respected newspaper, refused to publish an obituary for Stalin; this provided the pretext for the regime to suppress the paper – albeit later allowing Piasecki’s organization (which had been condemned by the Vatican) to restart the newspaper.54 Finally, the regime ignored its pledge, given in 1949 by Minister Wolski, as well as in the 1950 Agreement, by recruiting both bishops and priests as informers. When the archives of the security service were eventually opened (after 1989), it came to light that between 10% and 15% of Catholic clergy had collaborated with the security service in this way, including two archbishops and two bishops. The details of this collaboration are presented in Chapter 7, in the context of the controversy which flared over the revelations about the clergy serving as security service informers. The Case of Czesław Kaczmarek. The refusal of the Vatican to recognize Poland’s new Western borders and to adjust its ecclesiastical jurisdictions accordingly was a major sticking point in Church-state relations in Poland. It was in order to apply pressure toward this end that the regime had the Bishop of Kielce, Czesław Kaczmarek, arrested on 20 January 1951.55 Six days later, the regime expelled the apostolic administrators in the new western regions; in their place, local diocesan councils were allowed to elect vicars capitular. The bishops were not consulted and first learned about this development from reports in the press. Meanwhile, Bishop Kaczmarek was subjected to psychological terror for a period of approximately two years.56 By the time he went to trial, together with three priests and one nun, on charges of “anti-state activities and espionage,” he was a broken man. Among other things, Kaczmarek was accused of having THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 1945–1956 161 been an active supporter of Adolf Hitler (rather than merely a passive supporter of the German occupation of Poland), of having collaborated with the Gestapo and with Governor-General Hans Frank, and of having passed along information about life in Poland to the U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, during the years 1945–1947. According to reports in the regime press, he confessed himself guilty of all the charges against him.57 Kaczmarek’s real “crime”, however, was his well-known hostility to the communists and his influence on the clergy in his diocese.58 His trial last just eight days, ending on 22 September with his conviction and sentence to 12 years of penal servitude. The regime demanded that Wyszyński condemn Kaczmarek and impose ecclesiastical sanctions on the unfortunate prelate. But the Cardinal-Primate refused to do so and, instead, registered a sharp protest. In response, the regime had Cardinal Wyszyński arrested on 25 September 1953. In this situation, the remaining bishops elected Michał Klepacz (1893–1967), the Bishop of Łódź, to serve as chair of the Episcopal Conference and, on 28 September, cowed into submission, pledged their “loyalty to the regime, condemned Kaczmarek, and vowed to work together with the government for a church-state dialogue. The declaration made no reference to Wyszyński’s arrest.”59 Church-state relations in the early 1950s. The trial of Bishop Kaczmarek was perhaps the best known trial of a Catholic bishop in Poland at that time, but there were other arrests and trials involving bishops and priests. In November 1952, as already mentioned, Bishop Adamski was taken into custody; the following month, Archbishop Eugeniusz Baziak (1890– 1962), who had been named co-adjutor of Kraków with Archbishop Adam Stefan Sapieha the previous year, was arrested, together with Suffragan Bishop Stanisław Rozpond. Baziak and Rozpond “were accused of illicit sales of art and foreign currency, as well as of espionage.”60 By the end of 1953, nine bishops and several hundred priests were behind bars in Poland.61 Not surprisingly, the regime’s venom was directed against the Cardinal- Primate above all. An article written by General Edward Ochab and published in the regime’s newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, included the following passage:

First of all, it is Primate Wyszyński who bears the responsibility for sabotaging and breaking the principles of the understanding [of 1950], and for actually 162 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

helping the West German Teutonic Knights and the Anglo-American enemies of our nation to defame People’s Poland and make it appear odious. The repeated warnings of the government and of society did not mitigate the rash adventurousness of this Vatican alumnus.62

From September 1953 to 6 October 1954, Wyszyński was held in a “cold, damp house at Stoczek”. After that, he was transferred to detention in Prudnik Śląski in the Opole region in the south, where he was placed in a former convent of the Franciscan Sisters. It was during the time he spent at the converted convent that the Primate read Henryk Sienkiewicz’s The Deluge, which described the successful defense of Jasna Góra against the Swedes in 1655 – a victory traditionally attributed to the direct intervention of the Blessed Virgin Mary.63 Conditions at Prudnik Śląski were not good, however, and, at the request of Bishop Klepacz, acting in the name of the bishops collectively, the Primate was moved once again – on 29 October 1955 – this time to Komańcza. Here, ﬁnally, he had a room of his own, without guards, rather than a cell. He was also allowed, now, to receive visitors, letters, and newspapers.64 About a year prior to Wyszyński’s incarceration, the regime closed the theological faculties at the universities of Kraków and Warsaw on 2 August 1952. In their place, the regime set up a Catholic Theological Academy in Warsaw, appointing Rev. Professor Jan Czuj as its director. Whereas the theological faculties at Kraków and Warsaw had had a combined capacity of 800 students, only 300 students were enrolled in the new Academy. This development was followed quickly by an announcement that there would be no further religious instruction in the state schools.65

GOMUŁKA BACK IN THE SADDLE AGAIN,PART ONE: 1956–1966 There were three events in 1956 which served as triggers for change. The first of these was Khrushchev’s “secret” speech on 25 February 1956, in which the Soviet leader denounced some of the excesses and crimes of the Stalin era. This speech, presented at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, quickly ceased to be secret and, in Poland, it seriously undermined the legitimacy of Bolesław Bierut and the rest of the Stalinist old guard. The speech also contributed to legitimating Gomułka’sideaofa specifically Polish path to socialism.66 The second event was the death of Bierut on 12 March, while in Moscow, thus depriving Poland’sStalinistsof their leading figure. In the wake of these two events, the incoming First GOMUŁKA BACK IN THE SADDLE AGAIN, PART ONE: 1956–1966 163

Secretary, Edward Ochab, declared an amnesty for thousands of political prisoners. This, however, reduced levels of fear of the party among ordinary people and, in the context of low standards of living, paved the way for demonstrations in the city of Poznań on 28 June. Crowds sang religious hymns, demanded “bread and freedom”, and attack communist party headquarters. The party replied by sending in tanks to quell the protests. The third event was the commemoration of the anniversary of Polish victory over the Swedes at Jasna Góra, which brought more than a million pilgrims to the shrine of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa. Back in Warsaw, the PZPR understood that there was deep discontent in society and feared the prospect of destabilization. Eventually, the two factions within the party agreed that a change of leadership was needed and settled on Gomułka as the only communist with sufficient credibility among the Polish people to be able to restore confidence in the party. Gomułka was recalled to Warsaw, and film footage of his arrival at Biała Podl, an outlying station, by train shows him being greeted by genuinely enthusiastic crowds.67 Poles had high hopes at the time, and there were new freedoms – some temporary, such as the formation of active workers’ councils, but some with long-lasting effects, including the taming of the security police, the removal of party bosses at every level, the arrest and trial of some of those who had tortured political prisoners, and the decision to allow the dissolution of the collective farms. The speed with which the collective farms were abandoned and divided may be gauged from the fact that there were 10,510 such farms in operation on 30 September 1956, but only 1,534 still in operation three months later.68 Cardinal Wyszyński was freed from incarceration on 28 October 1956 – by coincidence, the same day that Hungary’s Cardinal Mindszenty was liberated from his cell in Budapest. Gomułka sounded the clarion call for Church-state rapprochement that same month by declaring that it was an illusion to believe “that socialism can be constructed by communists alone, [or] only by people with materialistic social views.”69 A new chapter in Church-state relations. Gomułka was convinced that, in order to stabilize Poland and reverse the growing alienation of people from the party, a rapprochement with the Church was essential. As early as 26 October 1956, Gomułka sent two emissaries – Zenon Kliszko, Deputy First Secretary of the PZPR, and Władysław Bieńkowski, the newly appointed Minister of Education – to Komańcza, to ask Wyszyński to come to Warsaw as quickly as possible. Wyszyński replied that he would do so as soon as the decree of 9 February 1953, declaring regime control of ecclesiastical appointments, would be withdrawn.70 This request was 164 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 granted immediately, allowing Wyszyński to return to Warsaw two days later. The Cardinal-Primate had also demanded the release of all those bishops who were still incarcerated and the restoration of legitimate diocesan administrators in the western dioceses. These requests were likewise granted, and, soon after the Primate’s return to Warsaw, various bishops as well as priests were released from prison. Bishop Kaczmarek had been released from prison previously, in early 1955.71 In November, the two sides established a Church-state joint commission and, on 8 December 1956, the commission issued a communique confirming: the withdrawal of the decree of 9 February 1953; the availability of religious instruction in all state schools, when requested by the parents; access for chaplains to the country’s hospitals; and the return of nuns and priests who had been driven from the voivodeships of Katowice, Opole, and the recovered territories, including Wrocław. Before the end of the year, the editorship of Tygodnik Powszechny, which had been controlled by Pax since 1953, was restored to Jerzy Turowicz (1912–1999). The monthly Catholic periodical, Znak, was also granted permission in 1956 to resume work. In addition, it was now possible to revive mainstream Catholic lay organizations, including the Clubs of Catholic Intellectuals (Kluby Inteligencji Katolickiej, or KIK), which spread initially to 30 cities. In spring 1957, however, the regime ordered KIK to limit its operations to just five cities: Warsaw, Kraków, Toruń,Poznań, and Wrocław. Finally, a Catholic ‘Znak’ group was set up just before the first session of the newly elected parliament would take place in February 1957. The PZPR reserved a few seats for Znak in the Sejm; the inclusion of Znak in the parliament was symbolically useful to the regime, insofar as it suggested inclusiveness.72 The honeymoon period in the Church’s relations with the Gomułka regime proved to be relatively short. The amount of time allocated for religious instruction in the schools was trimmed already in the 1958–1959 school year; the Church responded by arranging for religious instruction to take place outside school premises. A fresh controversy developed when new towns and settlements were constructed (in the early 1960s) in which there were no plans to build churches. Believers in these towns replied by building their own churches, chapels, and rectories, without regard to regulations. But the process could be slow: Nowa Huta, for example, had no church until 1970. Yet another controversy flared when, on 18 November 1965, the Polish bishops sent an open letter to the German Episcopate, calling for reconciliation and mutual forgiveness for the sufferings of Poles during World War Two and of German expellees GOMUŁKA BACK IN THE SADDLE AGAIN, PART ONE: 1956–1966 165 from Poland in the immediate aftermath of the war. In response, Życie Warszawy (10 December 1965) posed the rhetorical question, who had authorized the bishops to repent on behalf of the Polish nation, vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Germany? It was also noted that the Polish bishops’ letter contained no reference to the GDR.73 The Great Novena. As he read Sienkiewicz’s Deluge while still in detention, Wyszyński focused on the vows which King Jan II Kazimierz (1609– 1672; reigned, 1648–1668) had taken on the eve of the battle to save Polish independence. Wyszyński understood that Soviet hegemony lay heavy on the Polish nation, and started to conceive of renewing the king’s vows, three centuries later.74 Gradually, in the course of 15–29 August 1956, the idea of organizing a Great Novena of the Millennium took shape in his mind – to celebrate 1,000 years of Christianity in Poland. On 29 August 1956, he outlined his idea to organize a decade-long cycle of prayer in a letter to Bishops Klepacz and Choromański. In his plan, the vows taken by Jan Kazimierz at Jasna Góra in 1655 would be recited anew at Jasna Góra each year until 1966, the year of the millennium. His objective was nothing less than to renew Poland spiritually.75 The ‘Great Novena of the Millennium’ would be launched in 1957; the central event each year was to be a mass pilgrimage to the shrine of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa, credited – as already noted – with having saved Poland in 1655. During the Great Novena, a copy of the Black Madonna painting would be carried from parish to parish: this was to make a huge impact on the faithful and would be disconcerting for the communists. So intense was the excitement and nationalism associated with the Novena that, in some towns, according to a secret PZPR report, “local Communist authorities participated directly in the festivities.”76 But when the communists took the opposite approach and interfered in religious ceremonies – as happened in many towns and villages across Poland – the result was resistance and a clarification of the Church’s role as one of opposition to the regime. With the Great Novena, thus, the Church had redefined itself and taken a decisive step toward strengthening its hold on the loyalty and affection of Polish Catholics. In a confidential report to the Ministry of Church Affairs in 1962, party officials warned that the Novena was threatening the party’s efforts to promote atheism and secularization.77 This report led directly to the adoption by the PZPR of a more restrictive and obstructive policy vis-à- vis the Novena. When the Great Novena reached its culmination in 1966, tension between Church and state became intense. In May of that year, for 166 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 example, militia units were dispatched to intercept and “detain” the picture of the Black Madonna before it could reach Katowice.78 The authorities followed this up with a prohibition on the public display of religious pictures. The faithful responded with an interesting act of defiance: processions in June 1966, which originally had been intended to include the copy of the Black Madonna painting, now included instead an empty frame, signaling both that the faithful continued to honor the Blessed Virgin Mary and that their most basic freedoms were being blocked by the regime. The authorities showed just how nervous they were about the Great Novena by scheduling competing events, including

sports matches, excursions, and ﬁlm festivals (showing American movies such as “The Magniﬁcent Seven” and “High Noon!”). They tried to prevent attendance of the millennial celebrations by requiring overtime at the factories and erecting blockades to stop motorists on their way to religious events. In short, the authorities’ clumsy attempts ranged from petty harassments to overt interfer- ence and intimidation. All of this culminated in June, when the Black Madonna icon was scheduled to arrive in Warsaw.79

On 20 June 1966, around 9 p.m., the authorities blocked streets in an effort to prevent the authentic painting of the Black Madonna from reaching the cathedral in Warsaw’s old town. Protesters the next day shouted, “Down with the Communists!” and “Long live Cardinal Wyszyński!”80 In the meantime, the cardinal arranged to have the Black Madonna displayed, not in the open air as originally planned, but behind a window so that, to the faithful gathered outside, it seemed that the Blessed Virgin Mary was “behind bars”.81

GOMUŁKA BACK IN THE SADDLE AGAIN,PART TWO: 1966–1970 The Great Novena and the Church’s celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Poland contributed to bringing Church-state relations to a new low by 1966. In token thereof, authorities refused to issue a passport to Cardinal Wyszyński in 1967, thereby denying him the opportunity to attend a Synod of Bishops which opened in Rome on 29 September 1967. Życie Warszawy explained that the Primate had been “denied a passport because of his unfriendly and disloyal attitude toward the Polish state.”82 The regime was also disgruntled because none of those associated with Pax or the Christian Social Association (another pro-regime Catholic GOMUŁKA BACK IN THE SADDLE AGAIN, PART TWO: 1966–1970 167 organization) had been invited to attend the Synod, even though members of the Znak group received such invitations. Tensions continued, with Wyszyński publicly criticizing the PZPR on 3 December 1967, charging that the communists were trying to convert Poles to atheism. A visit by Władysław Rubin, secretary-general of the Synod of Bishops in Rome, to Warsaw toward the end of 1968 brought about a partial thaw in Church-state relations. After his visit, the regime lifted its three-year ban on the Primate’s travel outside Poland, and Wyszyński was allowed to travel to Rome for consultations with the pope and other officials at the Vatican. The mere fact that the regime had refused, for three years, to allow the Cardinal-Primate to travel outside Poland suggests that it viewed him as a serious threat to its power – and this, more than a decade before Karol Wojtyła would be elected pope. But travel or not, there continued to be problems for the Church and, in June 1969, Wyszyński raised the topic of the regime’sconfisca- tion of Church properties in the recovered territories. He also com- plained about difficulties in obtaining permission to construct new church facilities, discrimination at the workplace against Catholics whoattendedMassortookpartinother religious ceremonies, and limits on the Church press. The regime replied to the first point, indicating that properties would be returned to the Church once Poland signed a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, in which the latter relinquished any claim to those lands.83 Church-state relations were alsoaffectedtoanextentbyathree- cornered struggle for power within the PZPR, which dragged on for much of the 1960s. Gomułka, the head of the party, had his power base in the central party apparatus, but, having returned to power in 1956 with the aura of a reformer, he had turned out to be more conservative than some of his early supporters had hoped. Edward Gierek (1913–2001), with a power base in the Upper Silesian party apparatus and some support in other voivodeships, had earned a reputation as an efficient manager of Silesian industry and contended that he could do a better job managing the Polish economy than Gomułka had done. Finally, there was a group around General Mieczysław Moczar (1913–1986), whose power base was in the security apparatus, which he had supervised since 1956, initially as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and, beginning in 1964, as Minister.84 In 1968, Moczar made his bid to unseat Gomułka and secure the leadership post for himself. Fanning the flames of Polish nationalism associated 168 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 with memories of the partisan struggle during World War Two, Moczar, whose adherents came to be known as the ‘partisans’,also stoked anti-Semitic prejudices. Moczar’s goal was nothing less than to unseat Gomułka and to claim the leadership of the party for himself.85 Anti-Semitism served, as it had in the past, to underline a commitment to Polish nationalism and, in this instance, to make the case that Moczar, if elevated to the First Secretaryship of the PZPR, could fashion policies more independent of Soviet influence than had been the case under Gomułka.86 Many Jews lost their jobs and, between 1968 and 1971, between 13,000 and 15,000 Jews are thought to have emigrated, many of them with academic qualifications, among them roughly 500 scientists, 200 journalists, and a number of artists, musicians, actors, film directors, and students.87 During the so-called anti-Zionist campaign of 1968, the Church understood that it figured as an instrument in intra-party struggles.88 The bishops spoke out against Moczar’s campaign, de facto putting themselves on Gomułka’s side. In any event, Gomułka had the backing also of the Soviet Union,89 and Moczar lost his top leadership posts in the wake of his failed campaign; by November 1978, Moczar found himself occupying the important-sounding but largely meaningless post of chair of the Supreme Chamber of Control.90 Gomułka rewarded the Church for its support during his battle with Moczar and government propaganda that year had no anti-Church or anti-hierarchy content.91 But Gomułka’s victory over Moczar left the growing economic difficulties unresolved. Curiously, in a system nominally committed to full employment, the party First Secretary began talking about putting half a million Poles out of work by 1975 in order to encourage “high productivity, respect for work, and discipline”. This, he suggested, would promote better work habits and, thus, “improve economic results.”92 But what ultimately brought an end to Gomułka’ssecond term as head of the regime was an ill-conceived decision, announced on 12 December 1970 (i.e., shortly before Christmas), to increase the prices of food and fuel by 15 to 30%. Protesters took to the streets in anger, forcing the regime to withdraw the price increases by February 1971. In the meantime, GomułkawasforcedtoresignandEdward Gierek was elected First Secretary of the PZPR on 20 December 1970. On the same day, the new First Secretary pledged to work for better relations with the Church. THE GIEREK ERA, 1970–1980 169

THE GIEREK ERA, 1970–1980 Gierek’s decade at the helm began with strong signals of a desire to turn a new page in relations with the Catholic hierarchy. Within the first few days of Gierek’s ascent to power, his incoming prime minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, announced: “We will work for full normalization in church-state relations, with the expectation that government efforts will [meet with] true understanding on the part of the Catholic clergy and the lay Catholic circles.”93 Wyszyński responded to this overture by canceling the reading of a sharply worded pastoral letter on the evils of abortion – which the communists had legalized. The letter had been prepared in September 1970, with the intention of having it read in the country’s churches on 27 December.94 In fact, at this juncture, the regime needed the Church’s support. With the industrial working class discontent, Gierek made a number of concessions to the Church, in the hope that the hierarchy would adopt a friendly posture toward his regime’s economic policies. These concessions had their limits, however, as would become clear in 1972, when Gierek’s team reacted negatively to the Cardinal-Primate’s request for permission to establish a faculty of theology in Kraków.95 But there were nonetheless some real concessions. For example, the Sejm passed legislation on 23 June 1971, to transfer German ecclesiastical properties in the Oder-Neiße region to Polish Churches (meaning to both the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church). Or again, the regime granted permission for the construction of new churches and, most notably, on the occasion of the beatification of Maximilian Kolbe on 17 October 1971, granted permission for thousands of pilgrims to travel to Rome; the head of the state Office for Church Affairs even attended the celebration in St. Peter’s.96 Indeed, during 1973–1974, there were high-level contacts between the Vatican and the Polish government, starting with Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski’s audience with Pope Paul VI (1897–1978; reigned 1963–1978) on 12 November 1973. But, by 1974, tensions re-emerged in the Church-state relationship. For one thing, the number of new churches which the regime permitted to be constructed did not meet the needs of the Church, as far as the hierarchy was concerned.97 Then there was the fact that the regime was reviving the earlier tactic of periodically attacking certain hierarchs in the press, especially Primate Wyszyński and Bishop Ignacy Tokarczuk, for their political stance.98 Nor had the Church forgotten about the Sejm’s 170 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 earlier proposal to draft a law to fight social parasitism – a proposal which the Church had firmly opposed. Thus, by the start of 1975, the ostensibly “friendly” relations between Church and state – if one might describe them in this way – characteristic of the initial period of Gierek’s term in office, had given way to much cooler relations. Now, in the course of 1975, the Church would confront the regime on a matter of high priority for both Church and state. At issue were amendments to the constitution, announced in late 1975, which included an anchoring in law of the leading role of the PZPR and a guarantee of Poland’s “unbreakable fraternal bond with the Soviet Union.”99 When the draft amendments were made public, various intellectuals protested. The hierarchy also protested vigorously, sending a memorandum to the constitutional commission on 31 January 1976. The regime made a few cosmetic changes, but left the essence of the amendments intact, and the modified amendments were adopted by the Sejm on 10 February 1976, with no contrary votes and only one abstention (Stanisław Stomma, chair of the Znak group). By that point, however, the Polish government had more urgent concerns than those associated with the constitutional amendments. Specifically, Gierek had decided, early in his term, to build support for his regime by a combination of keeping prices of food, fuel, and other staples fixed, while allowing for exceedingly generous increases in wages. Between 1971 and 1975, Poles enjoyed a 40% increase in real wages.100 This was combined with heavy borrowing abroad, in order to build up Polish industry at a rapid pace; the theory was that the products of the expanded industrial sector could be exported at a volume sufficient to cover the loans and pay for the increases in wages. By 1975/76, this house of cards was wobbling and, at the PZPR’s Seventh Congress (held 8–12 December 1975), Gierek announced that the freeze on prices would be terminated in 1976. The regime tried to keep that promise by announ- cing, on 24 June 1976, “a drastic food price increase – ranging from a 69% average for meat products to 50% for butter and 100% for sugar.”101 Protests centered in Poznań forced the regime to withdraw the price increases. But the authorities also brought police and special units to Poznań to suppress the demonstrations and numerous protesters were detained. In response, Cardinal Wyszyński sent a personal letter to PZPR chief Gierek in July 1976, defending the right of the workers to express their views and criticizing the use of police and special units. He used the THE GIEREK ERA, 1970–1980 171 occasion to criticize the economic policies of the regime as well.102 Two months later, the Episcopate convened for a plenary session, adopting a resolution harshly critical of the regime. In this resolution, the hierarchy demanded that the regime end repressive action against the erstwhile protesters; the bishops also asked the regime to grant amnesty to those protesters who had been taken into custody and to provide financial compensation for those workers who had been injured in June. The Episcopate reiterated its demand, in November 1976, for amnesty and for the release of all imprisoned protesters. Those workers who had been imprisoned would be released in 1977, and Stanisław Kania would credit the Church’s pressure with having been decisive in achieving this outcome.103 Difficulties continued for the Church during the years Gierek was at the helm. But in spite of this, the Church was growing in confidence, and experienced a new resilience. This was marked, for example, by the “Weeks of Christian Culture” organized by Catholic clergy and lay persons in various parts of Poland in the 1970s (and continuing into the 1980s). In the Nowa Huta district of Kraków, to take one example, this included theatrical productions, cabarets, and jazz concerts, as well as art exhibits in the basement of the Church of the Blessed Maximilian Kolbe.104 (Kolbe would be canonized in 1982.) The PZPR was opposed to this new development but, insofar as these events were all held on church premises, dared not interfere. The entire Polish deck of cards was reshuffled when, on 16 October 1978, on the eighth ballot, Karol Cardinal WojtyłaofKrakówwas elected pope, taking the name John Paul II (1920–2005; reigned 1978–2005). The effect that this had on the Polish public can scarcely be overestimated: the entire country pulsed with excitement or, where the communists were concerned, with consternation. The Polish authorities immediately changed their behavior toward the Primate; for example, on the 30th anniversary of his elevation to the office of Primate (on 12 November), Minister of Church Affairs Kazimierz Kąkol sent him congratulations, in the name of the government. More particularly, it suddenly became possible to begin construction of more than 10 new churches. But other demands registered by the Church over the years remained unfulfilled and, on the occasion of a plenary conference of the Episcopate on 28–29 November 1978, the bishops once more requested an increase in the print run of Catholic newspapers and a scaling back of censorship.105 172 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

When Wojtyła was elected to St. Peter’s chair, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) wanted Gierek to minimize the importance of this development and to refuse to grant the new pope a reentry visa. But Gierek realized that this was impossible.106 The question was not whether the pope would be allowed to visit, but when. Cardinal Wyszyński met with First Secretary Gierek on 24 January 1979 to discuss a papal visit. The pope wanted to be on hand to celebrate the 900th anniversary of St. Stanisław’s martyrdom on 8 May. But Stanisław had been beheaded for having stood up against oppressive rule by King Bolesław II and ﬁgured thus as a symbol of resistance to secular authority. Wyszyński and Gierek ﬁnally reached a compromise: the visit would be postponed until June, but the pope would be allowed to visit six cities, instead of two, as he had originally requested.107 In addition, the papal visit would now last nine days – longer than originally proposed. Gierek and his team had hoped to present the papal visit as somehow representing support for his regime, but things did not unfold in line with this plan. On the contrary, the pope’s charisma, sense of timing, and appeal to patriotic/Catholic themes had a powerful impact, and the massive crowds that turned out to hear him speak gave Poles a sense of their potential power. As I wrote not long after the event,

When the new pope returned to Poland in June 1979, the triumphal visit took on the character and dimensions of a national celebration. In the nine days of the visit, tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of Polish and East European Catholics crowded to see him at various stops along the way. At the shrine to the Madonna at Częstochowa, he was interrupted by ebullient applause sixty-one times, and on three occasions the applause turned into song, with the pope joining in. Earlier, in his ﬁrst Christmas message to his home diocese of Kraków since becoming pope, the pontiff had seemed to invite the workers to stand up to the Polish government. “St. Stanislaus [Stanisław],” he had told members of the diocese, “defended the contemporary society against the evil that threatened that society, and he did not hesitate to stand face to face with the ruler when the defense of the moral order required it.” Now, during his visit, he talked in Warsaw about the Soviet Union’s refusal to come to the Poles’ aid during the ill-fated Warsaw uprising of August-October 1944, when the Red Army halted across the river from Warsaw and watched the Nazis suppress the rebellious Poles. In Częstochowa, the pope even appeared to call into question the legitimacy of the communist party’s power monopoly and demanded that the Church enjoy complete freedom as a social actor. Nervous Polish authorities instructed Polish television to avoid any panning shots that THE GIEREK ERA, 1970–1980 173

would show the size of the crowds attending the pope’s talks; and, according to certain West German sources, television broadcasts of the visit were notably “poor and scanty in the eastern and northern parts of Poland, where broadcasts can be picked up in Western Belorussia and Western Lithuania; and the Białystock station was temporarily “out of order”, allegedly as a result of Soviet pressure.108

The empowering effect of the visit was obvious to most observers. Franz Cardinal Koenig of Vienna, for example, foresaw that the visit would produce a “psychological earthquake” in Poland,109 while Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko (1909–1989) expressed his concern that the visit would have “the same effect on the [Polish] masses as the Ayatollah Khomeini had in Iran.”110 Gromyko would be proven right in his assessment. Poland was already shouldering a massive $20 billion debt, which its economy could not sustain. In addition, discontent among the workers was persistent, and the industrial working class was running out of patience with the imploding economy. Thus, it is likely that the wave of industrial unrest which struck Poland in July–August 1980 would have happened anyway – with or without the Polish pope. What the pope added was, however, crucial: he provided the workers going on strike with a powerful point of reference – the Church – and had already told the industrial workers, during his first papal visit, that he was on their side; and second, the mere presence of a charismatic Polish hierarch on the throne of St. Peter inspired Poles with hope for a better tomorrow. The strikes of summer 1980 were triggered by the latest attempt on the part of the government – announced on 1 July – to increase the prices of foodstuffs and fuel. The strikes which followed affected about 140 enterprises by the end of the month, including the Gdańsk shipyard. As the strikes continued, the party realized that it would have to negotiate with the workers and make real concessions. Negotiations began on 23 August 1980, simultaneously in Gdańsk and Szczecin. So difficult were these talks that Cardinal Wyszyński decided to offer his assistance and, thus, during the night of 27/28 August 1980, he sent his personal emissary, Dr. Romuald Kukułowicz, to meet with the Politburo and present his offer to form a mediation commission under his authority. The Politburo accepted Wyszyński’s offer. With written authorization from Wyszyński, Kukułowicz flew to Gdańsk, accompanied by Catholic lawyers Andrzej Wielowiejski and Andrzej Święcicki; Wyszyński’smediatorsexerteda 174 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 constructive influence, leading directly to the agreements of 30 and 31 August, in Gdańsk and Szczecin respectively, which laid the groundwork for the legal registration of the Independent Trade Union Solidarity, which Lech Wałęsa (b. 1943) and his fellow shipyard workers had organized. That the PZPR viewed this result as a major defeat was clear from the fact that, on 6 September 1980 – barely a week after the agreements were signed – Edward Gierek was stripped of his post as party leader and expelled from the Politburo. On the same day, Stanisław Kania (b. 1927), a Politburo member since 1975, was elected to take over as PZPR First Secretary.111 By mid-October, Kania would be replaced in that post by Wojciech Jaruzelski (1923–2014), the erstwhile Minister of Defense. The Gierek era had come to an end, and Poland was about to embark on a new course, initially characterized by pluralization, then clampdown, retreats, and compromises, and finally the collapse of the communist system altogether.

CASCADE TO COLLAPSE During the period from 31 August 1980 to 13 December 1981, Poland experienced a sweeping repluralization of society and politics, amid a proliferation of religious symbols. In addition to Solidarity and a rural offshoot calling itself Rural Solidarity, there was also an independent student union, as well as independent initiatives in culture. Even the Democratic Party and the United Peasant Party, which had served for more than three decades as obedient tools of the PZPR, started to hold meetings without communist participation and to adopt resolutions without coordinating them with the communists.112 The Church also benefitted, with Catholic newspapers and magazines being allowed to increase their print runs. And there was direct cooperation between the Church and Solidarity, with Catholic advisers participating in the work of the trade union. In April 1981, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, hitherto chief editor of the Catholic periodical Więź, took over the editorship of Tygodnik Solidarność, the weekly news organ of Solidarity.113 Needless to say, the Soviets were deeply concerned about these developments; in September 1981, Soviet Defense Minister Dimitry Ustinov paid a visit to Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was serving as Prime Minister at the time, and pressed him to take action to stifle the newborn pluralist society. By then, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies were staging military maneuvers along their borders with Poland. Moreover, Solidarity’s leaders were conscious of the fact that party hardliners were CASCADE TO COLLAPSE 175 demanding a military solution.114 In spite of that, Solidarity took few precautions, mistakenly believing that, in the event of new legislation, there would be legal channels available to challenge the laws. Archbishop Józef Glemp (1929–2013), who had inherited the mantle of Primate after the death of Cardinal Wyszyński in May 1981, was aware, as the regime surely was, that Solidarity was planning to stage organized unrest on 17 December 1981; he was also aware that the regime was considering emergency measures and, on 7 December, sent a letter to the Marshal of the Sejm, urging that that body not authorize “special powers” for the regime.115 At 5:30 a.m. on 13 December, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR, Kazimierz Barcikowski, accompanied by General Ryba and then-Minister of Church Affairs Jerzy Kuberski, came to the residence of the Primate, in order to inform him, in an official capacity, of the introduction of martial law.116 Glemp at once let them know of his opposition to this move. An hour later, at 6:30 a.m., the Secretary of the Episcopate, Bronisław Dąbrowski, and the director of the press office of the Episcopal Conference, Fr. Alojzy Orszulik, came to the Office of Church Affairs, to present Minister Kuberski with the Episcopate’sofficial protest. That protest notwithstanding, the newly established Committee for the Defense of the Country (KOK), headed by General Jaruzelski, proceeded with its plan, imposing a curfew, closing all schools and universities, and suspending all trade unions, youth organizations, Catholic lay organizations, and professional associations. KOK detained thousands of persons, interning 5,500 persons.117 The Church in conditions of martial law.118 The suppression of Solidarity on 13 December 1981 and the concomitant proclamation of martial law put the Church under great stress. Glemp’s initial reaction, like that of Wyszyński to the nationwide strikes of summer 1980, was to urge moderation and the avoidance of violence. In a message auspiciously carried on Radio Warsaw on 13 December, Primate Glemp told his flock:

It does not matter if someone accuses the Church of cowardice. The Church wants to defend each human life; and therefore, in this state of martial law, it will call for peace wherever possible; it will call for an end to violence and for the prevention of fratricidal struggle. There is nothing of greater value than human life. That is why I myself will call for reason, even if it means that I become the target of insults. I shall plead, even if I have to plead on my knees: do not start a ﬁght of Pole against Pole.119 176 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

Glemp’s sermon did not refer explicitly to Solidarity and did not condemn Jaruzelski’s coup. The Vatican’s reaction was likewise restrained, and both Agostino Cardinal Casaroli and the pope evidently feared the eruption of a major conﬂict in Poland; yet within a few days, the Episcopal Main Council issued a somewhat tougher statement, condemning the curtail- ment of rights and demanding the release of all political prisoners and a revival of Solidarity’s legal activities. The Primate was not content, however, to give the regime a blank check. When the regime started to require loyalty oaths of all state employ- ees, Archbishop Glemp sent an open letter to Jaruzelski condemning the oaths as incompatible with constitutionally guaranteed rights. At the same time, Glemp seemed to want to distance himself from those in the political underground who had been radicalized by the suppression of Solidarity:

The consequences of standing up for the truth are enormous. Firstly, one must not, in the fervor of conﬂict and struggle, slander either the rulers or the ruled, utter falsehoods about them, exaggerate ﬂaws, pass over merits, [or] make them look ridiculous. Secondly, one must demand honest information from the mass media, both domestic and foreign. Thirdly, there must be demands that people deprived of freedom or dismissed from their place of work should know why they are being given such a punishment.120

Glemp went further, and declared that Solidarity shared culpability with the state for the ultimate course of events – an assessment that alienated many Poles. Subsequently, on 13 April 1982, the Primate’s Social Council, an advisory body of 28 lay Catholics, issued a report urging Solidarity to critically reexamine its own culpability in the attendant crisis. There were violent clashes in several Polish cities in the ﬁrst week of May 1982, but, perhaps surprisingly, in his sermon on the feast of St. Stanisław a few days later, Glemp seemed to endorse the regime’s line that underground Solidarity had planned the clashes in advance. Glemp later appealed for calm on the second anniversary of Solidarity; his appeals were ignored, and more than 4,000 demonstrators in dozens of towns were arrested. Glemp was increasingly criticized, often in the context of unfavorable comparisons with his predecessor. Typical of such criticisms is a letter written on 24 April 1982 by Anka Kowalska, a writer, poet, and former member of KOR. In this letter, she protested that the report issued by the Primate’s Social Council on 13 April in effect endorsed martial law and justiﬁed the state’s criminality. CASCADE TO COLLAPSE 177

We all turn our eyes and hearts towards the Church. Why does she not raise her voice against those traders peddling human souls? How can the Church suggest instead that this tortured and betrayed society admit to being naughty and behaving improperly and show understanding for its hangmen who lost their temper.121

The Episcopate had issued a communique already on 15 December 1981, sharply condemning the repressive measures taken by the authorities and demanding the release of all those taken into custody as well as the restoration of full rights to the trade unions, especially Solidarity.122 The bishops collectively returned to this theme on 27 February 1982, demanding yet again the reactivation of the independent trade unions and called on the regime to tell people “the complete truth about the situation of society.”123 Concerning the internees, Primate Glemp met with General Jaruzelski for direct talks on 9 January 1982; on that occasion, Glemp renewed his demand for the release of all those interned in connection with martial law and called for further negotiations between Church and state. In response, Jaruzelski told Glemp that he took umbrage at the Church’s communique of 15 December.124 But the bishops reiterated this demand yet again in 1983. Meanwhile, the traditional gulf between the hierarchy and the lower clergy was becoming once again evident as priests such as Jerzy Popiełuszko, Mieczysław Nowak, and Kazimierz Szklarczy began delivering fiery sermons in defense of Solidarity. Popiełuszko and Reverend Teofil Bogucki (Popiełuszko’s spiritual mentor), both assigned to the parish of St. Stanisław Kostka, began celebrating “Masses for the fatherland” in 1981; from April 1982 on, Popiełuszko recited special prayers for the victims of martial law, including Wałęsa, who was in detention. Popiełuszko’s criticisms of the government were direct and unflinching, as he hammered away at the positive contributions of Solidarity.125 Similarly, in a June 1982 sermon, Sklarczy denounced martial law as “evil”, praised Solidarity as “immortal because it represents justice,” and told his listeners that Christianity’s confrontation with communism was a war of good against evil, love against hate, truth against lies.126 Against these bold words, Glemp sought more modest concessions. Soon after the proclamation of martial law, the regime made a small concession to the Church, issuing a decree which permitted hospitalized children to obtain weekly religious instruction if requested by the parents. Later, in August 1982, the Primate registered three requests: that Wałęsa 178 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 be released from detention, that the remaining internees be released and trade union work recommenced “at least in stages,” and that a date be established for the pope’s second visit to Poland.127 On 8 October, the authorities formally banned the suspended trade union. Exactly a month later, Archbishop Glemp met with Jaruzelski and confirmed the second papal visit for June 1983, prompting some to say that Glemp had concluded that the prospects for Solidarity’s relegalization were nil and that it was pointless to continue to defend the now-banned organization. At any rate, when the coordinating committee of underground Solidarity called for anti-regime demonstrations on 10 November, Glemp sharply criticized the planned demonstrations.128 The following month, two hundred priests, angered by Glemp’s soft approach to the regime, paid a three- hour visit to the archbishop. In reply to criticism, Glemp charged that too many priests were behaving like “journalists and politicians”.129 In early 1983, Polish police reportedly gave Glemp a list of 69 “extre- mist priests” who needed to be reined in. Aside from Popiełuszko, Nowak, and Sklarczy, the list probably included Bogucki, Henryk Jankowski (an adviser to Wałęsa), Stanisław Małkowski, Rufin Abramek (a Pauline monk), Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski (well known for his pro-Solidarity sympathies, and discussed at greater length in Chapter 7), and Zenon Ziomek. All were either beaten, tortured, or harassed, some were vilified in the press, and the homes of Popiełuszko and Małkowski were ransacked on orders from above.130 Glemp tried to accommodate the authorities by transferring Nowak from his parish, provoking vociferous protests,131 and rebuked the outspoken Popiełuszko for displaying Solidarity emblems at his fatherland Masses, for his contacts with Solidarity activists, and for allegedly neglecting his official duties to devote his time and energy to his fatherland Masses.132 Later, after Popiełuszko had been murdered by Polish secret police, Glemp suspended Małkowski from preaching in Warsaw – perhaps to protect him, but perhaps to pacify the authorities, who had been assailing the priest in the press.133 Glemp sometimes appeared to be the most timid of all of Poland’s prelates. Whereas Glemp now argued that Solidarity had lost its meaning after it went underground, and that “the Solidarity now in existence has moved a great deal away from its principles,”134 Bishops Tadeusz Gocłowski of Gdańsk, Kazimierz Majdański of Szczecin, and Andrzej Śliwiński of Gdynia, together with Henryk Cardinal Gulbinowicz of Wrocław all struck more radical poses. Gocłowski, for instance, comme- morated the 15th anniversary of the riots of December 1970 by reminding CASCADE TO COLLAPSE 179 his listeners of the shooting of the defenseless citizens by security forces.135 Majdański and Śliwiński both conducted solemn masses on the fifth anniversary of the imposition of martial law, the former raising pointed questions about the Szczecin agreement of 1980 on another occasion.136 Bishop Damian Zimon of Katowice seemed even more radical, reassuring tens of thousands of Polish workers gathered at Częstochowa in September 1987 of their right to their own independent trade unions.137 And Cardinal Gulbinowicz, who in 1985 had become the third Polish archbishop to be elevated to the College of Cardinals, openly encouraged pro-Solidarity sentiment at an open-air mass at the shrine of the Black Madonna in September of that year and sent a joint telegram with Wałęsa to the pope in the name of the Polish workers.138 In addition, Jan Sikorski, a Warsaw parish priest at St. Joseph’s Church, played a highly visible role. In September 1984, he said a special mass, attended by thousands, to honor the critics of the regime, particularly Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik. In December 1985, he described the period of Solidarity’s legality as “a time of joy when we won back our freedom and dignity.” And in December 1986, on the fifth anniversary of the imposition of martial law, he led a solemn procession of thousands to St. Joseph’s Church for a special memorial Mass. On that occasion, he said of his congregation, “These are the people who did not give up the struggle for the ideals that are alive in Poland. And to defend them, to allow them to meet, is the permanent role of the Church.”139 But Cardinal Glemp (by now “Comrade Glemp” to his critics)140 was basing his strategy on his desire to obtain government approval for a Church-sponsored fund to help private farmers (achieved in 1987) and enactment of a bill guaranteeing the Church’s legal status in clear and unambiguous terms (achieved in May 1989). In addition, according to Tadeusz Kamiński, a professor at the University of Hamburg, Glemp may well have felt that, during the Jaruzelski years (1981–1989), Poland was threatened primarily by the West, which, in its desire to weaken Soviet communism, might be willing to “sacrifice” Poland by inciting a sanguinary anti-Soviet revolt.141

The Second and Third Papal Visits

The Polish pope played an ambivalent but effective role in the triangular relationship of Church, regime, and opposition. On the one hand, the pope repeatedly signaled his support of the cautious Glemp – symbolically by elevating him to the College of Cardinals in January 1983. On the 180 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 other hand, the pope’sowncommentsweredefiant and, for the opposition, often exhilarating. Pope John Paul II’s first papal visit to Poland in 1979 is now widely credited with having contributed to the social revolution in 1980. His second visit in June 1983 came at a time of widespread despondency, and the pope used his visit to lift Polish spirits. The keynote of the pope’ssecondvisitwashisemphasison Poland’s right to political sovereignty and self-determination, and his calls for dialogue were always placed within the context of the need for self-determination. He called for amnesty for all political prisoners, and endorsed Polish aspirations to (re)establish authentic, self-governing trade unions.142 There were rumors on the eve of John Paul II’s third trip to Poland in June 1987 that the tone of the visit would be more subdued and that the visit would be more purely pastoral. On the contrary, the pope, now able to travel to Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Lublin (unlike in 1983), used the visit to express Church support for the relegalization of Solidarity and Rural Solidarity, and for the principles of the ill-fated Popiełuszko. At Tarnów on 10 June, the pope quoted from the memoirs of Wincenty Witos, calling on the government to respect its 1981 agreements at Rzeszów and Ustrzyki and relegalize Rural Solidarity.143 At Kraków later that same day, he told the hundreds of thousands of Poles present to resist disillusionment and to continue their “patient fight” for freedom; and he repeatedly praised the goals and ideals of Solidarity.144 At Gdańsk on 12 June, the pope told a crowd estimated at one million persons that workers have the right to organize independent trade unions. There, and elsewhere, he frequently repeated the word “solidarity”–always with great emotional impact.145 AndinWarsawon14June,thefinal day of his trip to Poland, the pope paid a visit to the Church of St. Stanisław Kostka and prayed at the grave of Fr. Popiełuszko. Throughout the trip, he spoke of the nation’s right to determine its own fate, of the importance of religious freedom, and of the right of workers to independent trade unions.146 Understandably, underground Solidarity expressed considerable satisfaction with the papal visit.147 From time to time the Polish communist press attacked the pope.148 In so doing, the press betrayed the regime’s fear of the Polish pope and his command of the hearts of Poles. For in his sermons in Poland, the pope eloquently endorsed every major demand of the democratic opposition in Poland. CASCADE TO COLLAPSE 181

The Great Transformation

The Catholic Church was unrelenting in its support for the relegalization of Solidarity. In August 1988, for example, Dominican friars in Gdańsk organized a pro-Solidarity rally involving some 3,000 persons.149 And on 20 October 1988, representatives of Catholic intelligentsia clubs from across Poland issued a nine-point statement, calling, among other things, for the relegalization of Solidarity and the establishment of a parliamentary (multi-party) democracy.150 In the most concrete way, the Church helped Solidarity by making facilities at St. Brygida’s Church in Gdańsk available to the trade union for use as its headquarters while it remained illegal. In addition, the Vatican insisted on the relegalization of Solidarity as a precondition for the restoration of diplomatic ties – something Warsaw wanted. Finally, Poland’s bishops collectively issued a programmatic pastoral message on 26 August 1988 that spelled out their support for trade union pluralism and described the wildcat strikes that month as a symptom of a lingering disease afflicting the sociopolitical system.151 Toward the end of 1988, at the same time that preparations began for roundtable talks between Solidarity and the government, there were also signs of an impending “great transformation” in Church-state relations. Talks were continuing between the Vatican and the Polish government, and in late October Warsaw made a serious bid for the restoration of diplomatic ties, by legalizing the Catholic opposition group Dziekania, whose 100 members had been pressing for political and economic pluralism since the group’s founding in 1984. They also agreed to register Catholic student unions in Częstochowa, Lublin, Warsaw, Gdańsk, and other cities. Subsequently, on 17 May 1989, after the relegalization of Solidarity the previous month, the Sejm passed three laws which, for the first time since World War Two, guaranteed the Church’s legal status, guaranteed religious freedom, and extended state health coverage and pensions to the clergy. Under the new law, the state recognized the legal status of the Catholic University of Lublin and the various seminaries and theological academies. These bills granted the Church the right to organize radio and television programs, guaranteed freedom for the Church press, and also allowed the Church to resume control over the Caritas charity, which it had lost in 1950. The new legislation further allowed the Church to establish and administer hospitals, homes for the elderly, schools, and orphanages, and, in an especially surprising provision, the government 182 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989 agreed to return Church property seized in the 1950s or, in the event that the Church no longer wished to regain certain property, to pay appropriate compensation. In addition, the formation of new dioceses, construction of new church buildings, establishment of new convents and monasteries, and staffing of personnel posts in the Church would no longer require regime approval. The legislation abolished military obligation for seminarians and novices. It also provided for the restoration of religious instruction in the school curriculum (with registration at the discretion of the parents). And finally, it confirmed 1 January, All Souls’ Day, Christmas Day, Easter Monday, and Corpus Christi as nonworking holidays, and added an additional one: 15 August, the Feast of the Assumption of Mary into heaven.152 Exactly two months later, the Vatican announced that it had established full diplomatic relations with Poland and that it would be appointing a papal nuncio to take up residence in Warsaw. Subsequently, in October 1989, the government submitted amendments which would abolish the state Office for Church Affairs. Taken collectively, these developments signified a dramatic change in the situation of the Church in Poland, promising more security for Church personnel and for Church life generally. On the other hand, some mention should be made of the fact that three pro-Solidarity priests were brutally murdered in the course of 1989: Stefan Niedzielak of Warsaw, known for his intense devotion to his congregation, whose badly battered body was found on 21 January;153 Stanisław Suchowolec of Białystock, whose asphyxiated body was found on 30 January;154 and Sylwester Zych of Krynica Morska, who had served four years in prison (1982–1986) for having allegedly sheltered two men convicted in the murder of a policeman and whose body was found on 11 July.155 If one assumes that state security police were behind these murders – and there is no other reasonable explanation – then, one is led to the conclusion that some elements in the political establishment were militantly hostile to any normalization of relations with the Church. The relegalization of Solidarity in April 1989, the passage of the new religious legislation in May, the holding of elections in June in which Solidarity candidates were allowed to run for office, and the appointment of a Solidarity prime minister (Tadeusz Mazowiecki) in August brought an end to the communist era in Poland. Within a matter of months of Mazowiecki’s appointment, the Roman Catholic Church in Poland switched to the offensive and began pushing hard for the reintroduction NOTES 183 of (Catholic) religious instruction in the schools – in spite of voluble protests from Protestants, Old Catholics, Orthodox, agnostics, and nonbelievers. At the same time, the Catholic Church applied heavy pressure on the Polish legislature to ban abortion, even though public opinion polls showed that most Poles opposed such legislation.156

EPILOGUE Until 1980, Polish Catholics were publishing more than 13 periodicals (not counting those associated with Piasecki’s Pax publishing house). All of these were suspended after 13 December 1981. But they rebounded in force a few years later and, as of 1986, Catholic circles were publishing 33 periodicals, with a total print run of 1.2 million.157 During the same time frame, the proportion of young people who said that they were believers, and practicing the faith regularly, rose from 32.2% in 1981 to 66.2%.158 Was this because growing numbers of young people were becoming convinced of the holy trinity, the Immaculate Conception and virgin birth, the physical ascension of Jesus into heaven, and the doctrine of papal infallibility? Or was it rather because they increasingly viewed the Church as their defender against a repressive regime? Here one may recall what Witold Gombrowicz wrote in his diary in 1953: “For Poles, God has become a pistol with which to shoot Marx.”159 Or again, there were the strident words uttered by Cardinal Wyszyński in February 1974: “For us, next to God, our ﬁrst love is Poland. After God, one must above all remain faithful to the Homeland ...We will love all the peoples in the world, but only in such an order of priorities.”160 Accordingly, priesthood became a high-status profession in the 1980s, as reﬂected in the rise in the number of seminarians from 4,088 in 1971 to 7,225 in 1982 to 8,835 in 1986.161 As Bishop Tokarczuk observed in 1978, “Only a short while ago, people viewed the Church as an abode of darkness, as a reactionary force ...Today they see in the same Church ...a protector of culture and human rights.”162

NOTES 1. Christoph Kleßmann, “Nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik und Nationalitätenfrage im GG (1939–1945)”,inJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, New series, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 1970), p. 586. 184 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

2. The Roman Catholic Church in People’s Poland (Warsaw: The Central Priests’ Committee, Afﬁliated to the Organization of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, 1953), p. 17. 3. Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), p. 159. 4. See Mikołay Stanisław Kunicki, Between the Brown and the Red: Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in 20th-Century Poland – the Politics of Bolesław Piasecki (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2012). 5. Maryjane Osa, Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 78. 6. Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; ﬁfth printing, 2005), p. 225. 7. Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, pp. 85–86, 100. 8. Czesław Madajczyk, Die Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Polen (1939–1945) (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1967), p. 5; and Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 229. 9. Klaus-Peter Friedrich, “Collaboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’: Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland During World War II”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Winter 2005), p. 726. 10. Ibid., pp. 726–727. 11. Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 229. 12. Ibid., p. 232. See also Christopher R. Browning, with contributions by Jürgen Matthäus, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939–March 1942 (Lincoln and Jerusalem: University of Nebraska Press and Yad Vashem, 2004); and Frank McDonough, with John Cochrane, The Holocaust (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 13. Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 235. 14. Kleßmann, “Nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik”, p. 586. 15. Friedrich, “Collaboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’”, p. 744. 16. For discussion, see Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 17. Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiderpartei, or National Socialist German Workers’ Party. 18. Kleßmann, “Nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik”, pp. 575, 580. 19. Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, pp. 162–163. 20. Ibid., p. 171. 21. Madajczyk, Die Deutsche Besatzungspolitik, p. 18. 22. Kleßmann, “Nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik”, p. 580. NOTES 185

23. Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, pp. 159–161. 24. Friedrich, “Collaboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’”, pp. 730–731. 25. As quoted in Ibid., p. 737, quoting from Feliks Tych, “Polish Society’s Attitudes toward the Holocaust”, in Beate Kosmala and Feliks Tych (eds.), Facing the Nazi Genocide: Non-Jews and Jews in Europe (Berlin: Metropol, 2004), pp. 94–95. 26. Friedrich, “Collaboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’”, p. 737. 27. As quoted in Ibid., p. 736. 28. As quoted in Ibid., p. 735. 29. “Three Polish priests, two nuns named ‘Righteous among Nations’”, The Am-Pol Eagle [17 June 2014?, not given], at http://ampoleagle.com/ three-polish-priests-two-nuns-br-named-righteous-among-nations-p7987– 1.htm [accessed on 29 September 2016]; and “Priests and Nuns Named Righteous Among the Nations”, Zenit (17 June 2014), https://zenit.org/ articles/priests-and-nuns-named-righteous-among-the-nations/ [accessed on 8 October 2016]. 30. “The Righteous Among The Nations”, Yad Vashem (2016), at http:// www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/stories/historical_background/ poland.asp [accessed on 29 September 2016]. 31. Madajczyk, Die Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Polen, pp. 20, 25. 32. The Roman Catholic Church in People’s Poland, p. 105. 33. Paul Katona, “Collectivization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe”,inThe World Today, Vol. 16, No. 9 (September 1960), p. 402. 34. See George Kolankiewicz, “Poland and the Politics of Permissible Pluralism”,inEast European Politics and Societies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (December 1987), pp. 152–183. 35. Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 253. 36. Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945–1950 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 72. 37. For details, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conﬂict, Revised & Enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967). 38. Jan Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat im kommunistischen Polen 1945–1989 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1996), p. 47. 39. As quoted in The Roman Catholic Church in People’s Poland, p. 5. 40. Kunicki, Between the Brown and the Red, p. 3. See also Andrzej Micewski, Katholische Gruppierungen in Polen. Pax und Znak, 1945– 1976, trans. from Polish by Wolfgang Grycz (Munich/Mainz: Kaiser und Grunewald, 1978). 41. Elizabeth Valkenier, “The Catholic Church in Communist Poland, 1945– 1955”,inThe Review of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July 1956), p. 308. 42. Ibid., p. 308. 186 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

43. Lukowski and Zawadzki, Concise History, p. 253. 44. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, p. 52. 45. Ibid., p. 69. 46. Ibid., pp. 72, 73 n139. 47. Valkenier, “The Catholic Church in Communist Poland”, p. 313. 48. Vincent Chrypinski, “Church and State in Gierek’s Poland”, in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet (eds.), Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek’s Poland (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), p. 252. 49. 1950 Agreement, Article II, as quoted in Stefan Rosada and Józef Gwóźdž, “Church and State in Poland”, in Vladimir Gsovski (ed.), Church and State behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p. 201. 50. Article VIII, as quoted in Rosada and Gwóźdž, “Church and State in Poland”, p. 202. 51. Rosada and Gwóźdž, “Church and State in Poland”, pp. 202–203. 52. Ibid., p. 215. 53. Leonid Luks, Katholizismus und Politische Macht im Kommunistischen Polen 1945–1989. Die Anatomie einer Befreiung (Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1993), p. 27. 54. Ibid. 55. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, p. 82. 56. Ibid., p. 91. 57. According to a summary in Catholic Herald (18 September 1953), p. 1. 58. Adam Dziurok, “Metody walki aparatu bezpieczeństwa z Kościołem Katolickim: Przykłady działań dezintegracyjnych służby bezpieczeństwa w latach sześc dziesiątych XX wieku”, in Rafała Łatki (ed.), Stosunki Państwo- Kościoł w Polsce 1944–2010: Studia i materiały (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademika, 2013), p. 67. 59. Kunicki, Between the Brown and the Red, p. 101. 60. Zygmunt Zieliński, with the cooperation of Sabina Bober, Kościoł w Polsce 1944–2007 (Gdańsk-Zaspa: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2009), p. 83; also Józef Marecki, “Stosunki Państwo-Kościoł w Polsce w okresie Stalinowskich represji”,inŁatki (ed.), Stosunki Państwo-Kościoł, p. 34. 61. Jan B. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland: An historical outline, revised ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 75. 62. As quoted in Andrzej Micewski, Cardinal Wyszyński: A Biography, trans. from Polish by William R. Brand and Katarzyna Mroczkowska-Brand (San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984), p. 137. 63. Ibid., pp. 142, 144. 64. Ibid., p. 148. 65. Ronald C. Monticone, The Catholic Church in Communist Poland 1945– 1985: Forty Years of Church-State Relations (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1986), p. 23. NOTES 187

66. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland, p. 80. See also J. F. A. W., “Gomulka’s Road to Socialism: The May Meeting of the Polish United Workers’ Party”,inThe World Today, Vol. 13, No. 8 (August 1957), pp. 341–350. 67. See the English-language news footage at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=P3bjaJ6vy4U [accessed on 2 July 2014]. 68. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland, p. 94. 69. As quoted in Luks, Katholizismus und Politische Macht, p. 31. 70. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, p. 110. 71. Catholic Herald (4 March 1955), p. 8. 72. Luks, Katholizismus und Politische Macht, pp. 40–41. 73. Ibid., p. 131. 74. Micewski, Cardinal Wyszyński, pp. 152–156. 75. Ibid., pp. 156–157. See also A Freedom Within: The Prison Notes of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, trans. from Polish by Barbara Krzywicki-Herburt and Reverend Walter J. Ziemba (San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 345–347. 76. Osa, Solidarity and Contention, p. 70. 77. Ibid., pp. 72–73. 78. Ibid., p. 74. 79. Ibid., p. 87. 80. As quoted in Ibid., p. 90. 81. See Ibid., pp. 88–89; picture on p. 89. 82. Monticone, The Catholic Church in Communist Poland, p.47. 83. Ibid., pp. 49–50. On 3 June 1972, a treaty between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany was ratiﬁed, permitting the realignment of diocesan boundaries in accordance with Poland’s post–1945 borders. Later that month, the Vatican normalized ecclesiastical administration in the recovered territories. – Bogdan Szajkowski, Next to God ...Poland: Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), p. 35. 84. Adam Bromke, “Poland’s Political Crisis”,inThe World Today, Vol. 25, No. 3 (March 1969), pp. 121–122. 85. Hans-Christian Dahlmann, “Die antisemitische Kampagne in Polen 1968”, in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2008), p. 558. 86. Bromke, “Poland’s Political Crisis” [note 84], p. 122. 87. Dahlmann, “Die antisemitische Kampagne”, p. 566. 88. Luks, Katholizismus und Politische Macht, p. 75. 89. Bromke, “Poland’s Political Crisis”, pp. 122–123. 90. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland, pp. 176–177. 91. Hanna Diskin, The Seeds of Triumph: Church and State in Gomułka’s Poland (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2001), p. 227. 188 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

92. Polish Press Agency Reports (English ed.), 15 March 1971, as quoted in de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland, p. 142. 93. Trybuna Ludu (24 December 1970), as quoted in Diskin, Seeds of Triumph, p. 228. 94. Diskin, Seeds of Triumph, p. 228. 95. Ibid., p. 230. 96. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, p. 161. 97. Ibid., p. 163. 98. Diskin, Seeds of Triumph, p. 230; conﬁrmed in Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, p. 163. 99. As quoted in Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, p. 166. 100. Alex Pravda, “Gierek’s Poland: Five Years On”,inThe World Today, Vol. 32, No. 7 (July 1976), p. 272. 101. de Weydenthal, The Communists of Poland, p. 162. I have changed “per- cent” to “%” for the sake of consistency. 102. Antoni Dudek and Ryszard Gryz, Komuniści i Kościoł w Polsce (1945–1989) (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2003), pp. 336–337. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid., pp. 394–395. 105. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, p. 179. 106. Osa, Solidarity and Contention, p. 139. 107. Ibid., pp. 139–140. 108. Pedro Ramet [Sabrina P. Ramet], Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 134–135. 109. Frankfurter Rundschau (1 June 1979). 110. As quoted in Margaret Budy, “Nine Days That Shook E. Europe”,inSoviet Analyst, Vol. 8, No. 13 (28 June 1979), p. 7. 111. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, pp. 192–195. 112. See Pedro Ramet [Sabrina P. Ramet], “Poland’s ‘other’ Parties”,inThe World Today, Vol. 37, No. 9 (September 1981), pp. 332–338. 113. Luks, Katholizismus und Politische Macht, p. 116. 114. Sabrina Petra Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), p. 87. 115. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, pp. 259–260. 116. Ibid., p. 261. 117. Ramet, Social Currents, p. 88. 118. This and the next two subsections are reprinted, in slightly revised form, from the author’s Social Currents [note 114], pp. 185–189, 190–193. NOTES 189

119. As quoted in Jonathan Luxmoore, “The Polish Church Under Martial Law”,inReligion in Communist Lands, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1987), p. 127. 120. As quoted in Ibid., pp. 134–135. 121. As quoted in Communist Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1983), p. 106. 122. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, pp. 263–264. 123. As quoted in Ibid., p. 273. 124. Ibid., p. 269. 125. New York Times (13 September 1987), p. 3; also Grażyna Sikorska, “To Kneel Only Before God: Father Jerzy Popiełuszko”,inReligion in Communist Lands, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 1984), p. 153. 126. Los Angeles Times (28 June 1982), p. 4. 127. Słowo Powszechne (30 August 1982), p. 4, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 8 September 1982, p. G15. 128. Tadeusz Kamiński, “Poland’s Catholic Church and Solidarity: A Parting of the Ways?”,inPoland Watch, No. 6 (1984), p. 79. 129. Luxmoore, “The Polish Church”, p. 149. 130. For further discussion, see Ramet, Cross and Commissar, chapters 8 and 9. 131. The Times (London), 22 February 1984, p. 6; and Washington Post (22 February 1984), p. A15. 132. John Moody and Roger Boyes, The Priest and the Policeman: The Courageous Life and Cruel Murder of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko (New York: Summit, 1987). 133. Keston News Service, no. 213 (22 November 1984), p. 5, and no. 214 (6 December 1984), p. 8; also New York Times (2 December 1984), p. 5. 134. EFE (Madrid), 22 February 1984, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, no. EPS–84–041 (28 March 1984), p. 93. 135. Uncensored Poland News Bulletin (UPNB), London, 30 January 1986, p. 13. 136. Ibid., 23 September 1986, p. 25, and 20 February 1987, p. 18. 137. New York Times (21 September 1987), p. 4. See also Zimon’s sermon on the ecological disaster in UPNB (14 July 1986), p. 29. 138. New York Times (16 September 1985), p. 1. 139. ORF Teletext (Vienna), 17 September 1984, in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 17 September 1984, pp. G1–2; New York Times (30 December 1985), p. 5; and Washington Post (14 December 1986), p. A1. 140. The Economist (London), 25 February 1984, p. 44. 141. Kamiński, “Poland’s Catholic Church”, p. 83. 142. Tadeusz Walendowski, “The Pope in Poland”,inPoland Watch, no. 3 (Spring/Summer 1983), pp 5–8; and Karl Hartmann, “Politische Bilanz 190 5 WAR YEARS AND COMMUNISM, 1939–1989

des zweiten Papstbesuches in Polen”,inOsteuropa, Vol. 33, Nos. 11–12 (November–December 1983), pp. 897, 900. 143. Polish Situation Report, Radio Free Europe Reports (RFER), 10 July 1987, p. 5; and Glas koncila (Zagreb), 21 June 1987, p. 3. 144. Washington Post (11 June 1988), p. A33. 145. Corriere della Sera (Milano), 12 June 1987, p. 15, and 13 June 1987, p. 12. 146. Tygodnik Powszechny (28 June 1987), trans. into German as “Die dritte Papstreise nach Polen”,inOsteuropa, Vol. 37, No. 12 (December 1987), pp. A679–680. See also “Papstbesuch in Polen: Was bleibt für die Gastgeber?”,inHerder Korrespondenz, Vol. 41, No. 7 (July 1987). 147. Corriere della Sera (16 June 1987), p. 21. 148. See, for example, the reports in Frankfurter Allgemeine, 4 April 1985, p. 2, and 16 April 1985, p. 6. 149. AFP (7 August 1988), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 8 August 1988, p. 16. 150. UPNB (31 October 1988), p. 5. 151. Słowo Powszechne (29 August 1988), pp. 1, 2, trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 1 September 1988, pp. 36–37. See also Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 27–28 August 1988, p. 1. 152. Frankfurter Allgemeine, 6 May 1989, p. 12, and 18 May 1989, p. 6; Keston News Service, no. 326 (25 May 1989), p. 2; and Tygodnik Powszechny (25 June 1989), pp. 1, 3, trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 12 July 1989, pp. 39–42. See also PAP (Warsaw), 28 June 1989, in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 29 June 1989, p. 43. 153. AFP (22 January 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 23 January 1989, p. 67; New York Times (27 January 1989), p. A4; and Warsaw Domestic Service (7 March 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 8 March 1989, p. 52. 154. AFP (31 January 1989), in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 1 February 1989, p. 38. 155. Keston News Service, no. 330 (20 July 1989), p. 9; and Glas koncila (30 July 1989), p. 3. 156. New York Times (6 November 1990), p. A1. 157. Luks, Katholizismus und Politische Macht, p. 150. 158. Ibid., p. 160. 159. As quoted in Ibid., p. 161. 160. Szajkowski, Next to God ...Poland, p. v. 161. Siedlarz, Kirche und Staat, p. 399. 162. As quoted in Luks, Katholizismus und Politische Macht, p. 104. CHAPTER 6

Transition to Pluralism, 1989–2004

The May 1989 elections effectively ended communist rule in Poland, inaugurating a new era in Polish politics.1 The elections were the clearest signal that communist rule had come to an end and that some form of pluralism, in which the Church could ﬁnd new opportunities, was emerging. Traditionally, in Catholic teaching, what happens on earth should reﬂect, as much as possible, God’s will; political power, accordingly, can be viewed as a sword, whose wielder can either contribute to realizing the promise that “thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven,” or set up obstacles to that project. This is also an important reason why the Catholic Church has been wary of the secular character of the state, and, insofar as the EU is conceptualized as a secular union, its threat to Church interests is greater, not less, than the threat already posed by the secular state. In traditional Catholic teaching, there is no such thing as neutrality in politics: there is apathy, of course, just as there are uninvolvement and abne- gation and disengagement and disestablishmentarianism, which is nothing less than the effort to keep the bishops at a maximum distance from the swords they so yearn to wield. But neutrality in issues that involve God’s will or God’s plan is an absurdity – at least as understood in traditional Catholic teaching. Not all Catholics will agree with this formulation, but I dare say that all conservative Catholics will, and it is the conservative wing of the Catholic Church which reigns supreme in the Vatican and in the Catholic Church in Poland alike.2

In conditions in which a force hostile to Catholicism maintains a political monopoly, the Church is thrown on the defensive and looks in the first place to protect its own interests. Although there were differences in the Church’s strategy in Nazi Germany, fascist Italy, communist Poland, and socialist Yugoslavia, the objective was, in all of these cases, the same: survival and self-defense. Church leaders criticized violations of human rights in all of these cases as well, and the figures of Pope Pius XII (1876–1958; reigned as pope 1939–1958), Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński (1901–1981), and Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac (1898–1960) still provide inspiration to many, even if Pius and Stepinac have found detractors, as well as advocates. Wyszyński and Stepinac were both imprisoned by the communists as a result of their refusal to collaborate, while the Nazis considered kidnapping Pius at one time. And in all of these cases, the Church was prepared to come to a modus vivendi, whether that found expression in the form of a concordat or, in the case of communist-era Poland, in the form of the April 1950 agreement, or, in the Yugoslav case, in the form of a protocol between Belgrade and the Vatican signed in 1966, six years after Stepinac’sdeath. Where the Polish case is concerned, the Catholic Church was clearly on the defensive during the years of communist rule. During these years, the Church could not hope to realize the kingdom of God on earth. But the years 1988–1989 marked a transition in which the opportunity was opened for Church leaders to lay hold of the swords of power and take up the ecclesiastical agenda. While it is conceivable that other prelates might have reacted differently, Pope John Paul II, Josef Cardinal Glemp, and Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, executive secretary of the Episcopal Council of Poland from 1993 to 1998, were not disposed to let this opportunity pass; indeed, they would have considered such neglect unconscionable. It would have been no less than asignof– neutrality! As a result, led by the ‘Polish pope’, Cardinal Glemp, and Bishop Pieronek, the Church in Poland fought energetically, beginning in 1988/1989, to make the system itself conform to the Church’s programmatic preferences. Those programmatic preferences are, of course, the preferences not just of the Church in Poland but of the Catholic Church as such. The chapter which follows is divided into four parts: It begins with a brief survey of the Church’s charitable and social engagement and the various controversies in which it has been involved. This is followed by a A NEW ERA 193 discussion of the continuing battle over abortion, outlining the changes in legislation from 1989 to 2004 and the effects of such changes, and summarizing the arguments and rhetoric on both sides of the controversy. In the third part, the focus is on the debates surrounding Polish accession to the European Union (EU), explaining why John Paul II, Glemp, and Pieronek, in spite of their concerns about the draft EU constitution, chose to give EU accession their strong backing. In this context, it will be clear in what sense the Church views the integration of Poland into the EU as “a great apostolic assignment”–as José Casanova has called it.3 The role of the ultra-conservative Radio Maryja in the controversy over EU accession will also be described. And finally, in the conclusion, an account will be offered of how an important sector of the Catholic Church has continued to insist that Catholic doctrines and beliefs have a claim to exclusive truth and universality, at the expense of Protestant, Orthodox, and other Christian and non-Christian religions; but alongside such conservative Catholics one can also find more liberal voices. Throughout this chapter, it will be assumed that tendencies toward globalization, secularization, pluralization, and growth in tolerance are largely irreversible, and that the Church, which has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt to historical change over the past centuries, has the capacity to adapt to these tendencies, provided that it does not allow itself to make a fetish of some completely unnecessary trappings of the faith, which are dear to the more atavistic conservatives but which depend, among other things, on a studied de-emphasis of the Gospels.

ANEW ERA As already noted, the collapse of communism presented the Church with new opportunities, and, indeed, as the authoritarian system crumbled and new pluralist institutions were put in place, the Church moved quickly to operationalize its agenda. Those who remember Pope John XXIII may be tempted to speculate how history might have been different if he, Angelo Roncalli, had been occupying St. Peter’s throne since 1978, rather than Karol Wojtyła. Certainly, it is hard to imagine that the Italian Roncalli would have displayed so steady an interest in Poland. Moreover, judging from what he actually did, one might speculate that he would have given a higher priority to continued aggiornamento (bringing the Church up to date and in tune with the world) rather than undertaking measures which put the Church in confrontation with secular forms of globalization. One 194 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004 might also speculate that Roncalli would have given a higher priority to ecumenism and charitable work than to the various issues related to sexuality which absorbed so much of the attention of the Wojtyła papacy. The only utility of such speculation, however, is to remind us that much in history depends on specific personalities, and that the direction which the Church took under Wojtyła’s leadership is not a direction which it would necessarily have taken regardless of who was pope. Moreover, it was Wojtyła who, acting on the last wishes of Wyszyński, named Glemp primate of Poland, and it was Wojtyła who, acting entirely on his own initiative, strengthened Glemp’s position by raising him to the College of Cardinals. And yet, because Pope John Paul II was Polish, Glemp never enjoyed the kind of freedom which his predecessor had enjoyed until 1978. Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński would repeatedly tell Pope Paul VI (Giovanni Montini) that he (the pope) was not familiar with conditions in Poland and should let those who knew Poland make decisions affecting her ecclesiastical interests; Cardinal Glemp was hardly in a position to treat Pope John Paul II in the same way. The Church’s priorities. Be that as it may, the Church’s first priority as communism crumbled in Poland, becoming the subject of discussions between the episcopate and sympathetic figures in the Sejm and in the opposition as early as the winter of 1988/1989, was abortion, which the Church wanted to see banned. Later, in May 1989, after the elections in which Solidarity won 99 of the 100 seats in the newly created Senate, Glemp met with Solidarity leader and future Polish president Lech Wałęsa so that the bishop could impress upon Wałęsa the seriousness with which he regarded abortion. Pressure on both the legislature and the medical establishment built quickly, and as early as September 1990, the Senate passed a restrictive bill on abortion and forwarded it to the lower house, the Sejm, for approval. In the meantime, the Polish episcopate had issued a communiqué calling for the return of religious instruction to the schools and began to air a proposal to declare Catholicism the state religion of Poland. The latter proposal was eventually dropped, apparently because the pope quashed it, but as early as August 1990, a special sub-committee of the Joint Commission of the Government and the Episcopate peremp- torily announced the restoration of religious instruction in the public schools. Ombudsman Ewa Letowska challenged the constitutionality of this decree, but on 30 January 1991, the Constitutional Court of Poland ruled that the decree did not violate Church-state separation or any other existing statute. The following year the number of religion classes was A NEW ERA 195 increased from one period per week to two per week, though a new subject, ethics, was introduced as an alternative to religion class. Although representatives of non-Catholic denominations initially expressed concern that their children would face peer pressure, if not pressure from teachers, to submit to Catholic religious instruction, the religion classes soon became popular, with Catholics and non-Catholics alike valuing them as a unique occasion on which to discuss metaphysical questions in an open way.4 At the same time, Church leaders did their best to keep sex education out of the schools. In December 1992, under pressure from the Church, the Sejm voted 198 to 172, with 12 absten- tions, to institute a new law mandating that radio and television broadcasts respect “Christian values”; the nature of such “Christian values” would be ascertained by an eight-member council, on which the Church was well represented.5 Then, in January 1993, both houses of the Polish legislature, voting separately, approved a law criminalizing abortion (details in the next section), which was signed into law by President Wałęsa on 15 February. Throughout the period 1989–1993, the Church sought to negotiate a concordat. A joint governmental-ecclesiastical commission, meeting in Warsaw, produced a draft and forwarded it to the Holy See for approval. But the Holy See rejected the draft and, after a long delay, produced a new draft which was said to be in conflictwith16existing laws, two codices, and a number of decrees; among these laws were the law on liberty of conscience and faith, the law governing Church-state relations, and the law concerning marriage.6 In spite of this, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, who had less than two months left in office before parliamentary elections would sweep her out of power, signed the Vatican’s draft text on 28 July 1993, forwarding it to the parliament for its approval. The concordat was not ratified, in fact, until 25 March 1998, but then it was approved without revisions; the problem of its incompatibility with existing laws having largely disappeared with the enactment of Poland’s new constitution in 1997, though it was necessary to change the law on marriage, so that a church wedding would be recognized by the state.7 The Church, thus, was spending the capital it had accumulated during the years of its opposition to communism. But the speed with which it moved on these legislative fronts troubled some Poles and there were many – some 53% in fact, according to a 1999 poll – who felt that the Church’s political influence had grown too large.8 196 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

As is very well known, the pope continued throughout his papacy to speak out on issues of social justice (his Sollicitudo rei socialis of 1988 standing as a prominent example), addressing the theme of poverty, and excoriating both communism and capitalism for their excesses. One reason that the Church in Poland gave priority to issues of abortion, divorce, and the protection of Christian values on the air waves is that these issues were readily susceptible to legislation, whereas the problems of global injustice and poverty can scarcely be solved by the passage of a few laws in Warsaw. The role of Aleksander Kwaśniewski: The concordat was, itself, not finalized until a bitter dispute concerning the constitution had been resolved and not before Wałęsa had been voted out of office. In fact, prominent Church leaders did their best, during the 1995 presidential elections, to persuade Poles to vote for either Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the National Bank of Poland and a firm defender of the Church’s interests, or incumbent Lech Wałęsa, denouncing the candidate of the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) Aleksander Kwaśniewski as “anti-religious”, “anti-God”, and “neo-pagan”. In spite of the Church’s efforts, Kwaśniewski won 51.72% of the vote in the second round and assumed the presidential office.9 But Kwaśniewski was not prepared to go into battle against the Church, and, inspired more by pragmatism than by conviction, steered the unaltered concordat to approval in the legislature. It was also during Kwaśniewski’s first term as president that, on 2 April 1997, the new Polish Constitution was finally approved, after nearly eight years of discussion and negotiation. Initially, the Polish Episcopate had wanted to see an invocation of the Godhead in the preamble, an explicit guarantee in the constitution protecting human life from conception, a definition of marriage as a relationship between persons of opposite sex, and an emphasis on the Christian history and culture of Poles. The final compromise satisfied the Church’s demand for an invocation (the preamble begins with the words, “In the name of God ...”) and in the preamble, a clause was inserted referring to the Christian heritage of the Polish nation. At the same time, Article 25 of the Constitution defines the Polish state as neutral in matters of religion, while, ambiguously, referring to Church-state “cooperation for the good of mankind and for the common good.”10 The educational and charitable engagement of the Church. In spite of declines in religious practice as well as in the acceptance of central Catholic doctrines (detailed in the next chapter), roughly 90% Poles still describe themselves as Catholics. How is this paradox to be explained? I A NEW ERA 197 believe that at least five factors must be mentioned in this connection. The first in terms of chronology, but by far the weakest of the five at this point in time, is the feeling that “the Church is on our side,” inherited from the Church’s solidarity with the Polish people during World War Two. Much more vivid in the first decade after the collapse of communism, though fading in importance now, was the memory of the Church’s firm defense of human and civil rights during the communist era when, for many years, the Church was the only legal institution protecting Poles from communist repression. In the present, post-communist context, two other factors must be mentioned, namely, the Church’s educational and charitable commitment. Where education is concerned, it is worth noting that the Church operates not only the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL, founded in 1918 and reactivated in 1944) and the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw (founded in 1995, transforming the state-run Academy of Catholic Theology into a full-fledged university), but also some 277 primary and secondary schools as of 2002 – up from 10 in the communist era, and from 186 in 1997.11 But factor #4 – the sheer scope of the charitable and social engagement of the Church in Poland – must also, to my mind, be taken into account, if one is to make sense of the Polish people’s devotion to their Church. The Caritas charity and the Polish branch of the Catholic Youth Organization (known in Poland by the initials KSM) – both of them revived after May 1989 – are well known; the latter organization has some 20,000 active members and organizes charity drives. But there are other organizations, such as: the Christian voluntary center, which works with hospitals, hos- pices, and orphanages; Novo Millennio, a charitable organization set up by Fr. Mieczysław Puzewicz after the floods of 2000, in order to help affected villagers; and soup kitchens for the poor, such as the ‘Mensa’ soup kitchen operated by the Church in Lublin. To this one may add therapy organized by the Church for children of pathological families (such as families affected by alcoholism), assistance to women trafficked into forced prostitution (with the Sisters of Our Sorrowful Heart, in Silesia, being especially active in this regard), and therapy for homosexuals who have entered into heterosexual marriages, to help them make their marriages work.12 The fifth factor is the sense of home associated with the Catholic Church, the feeling of familiarity, of this is who we are and where we belong. We may add to the equation the engagement of the Church press on behalf of working Poles. While the Church press is intended to serve as the 198 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004 organ of the Church, Niedziela (with a circulation of 250,000) criticized a draft government budget at one point, warning that the factory closures called for by the government would throw large numbers of people out of work.13 In the late 1980s, the number of priestly vocations declined, leading some observers to speculate that the Church in Poland might be faced with a shortage of priests at some point in the future. But the numbers of vocations rose again in the 1990s, hitting a 50-year high in 2003.14 The continued strength of vocations is, in turn, not merely a factor for the strength of the Church but also a symptom of the continued vitality and credibility of the Church. Homosexuality and homophobia. For the Polish left, however, the Church’s strongly expressed views about various aspects of sexuality remain troubling. Indeed, the sexual concerns registered by Pope John Paul II, Cardinal Glemp, and others went far beyond the exclusion of abortion and sex education, and extended to fighting a host of perceived ‘evils’ including contraception, prenatal medical testing (such as amnio- centesis), artificial insemination,15 divorce, homosexuality, and pornography, not to mention the Church’s continued resistance to the notions advocated by some would-be reformers in the US, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere – the ordination of women, an end to priestly celibacy, and a more general celebration by the Church of human sexuality. Then, when 24-year-old Karolina Bregula, having lived in Sweden for three years, decided to launch a billboard campaign in Warsaw in May 2003, showing gay and lesbian couples holding hands and showing affection, Catholic groups protested to city officials, and the posters were variously taken down or painted over. But even so, Robert Biedroń, leader of the Campaign Against Homophobia, counted the campaign as a success. “For the first time,” he said, “homosexuals were shown as ordinary people, not as paedophiles from a railway station or freaks from a gay parade.”16 By summer 2003, moreover, Senator Maria Szyszkowska (SLD), a professor of philosophy at the University of Warsaw whose ethical development had been influenced by the writings of Immanuel Kant, was preparing legislation to expand gay rights. Among the problems which the legislation was intended to overcome were the fact that a life partner lacking a marriage certificate could not obtain information about the condition of a hospitalized partner or be consulted in connection with proposed surgical procedures, the lack of inheritance rights when one’s life partner dies, the inability to obtain a special visa when one’s partner has A NEW ERA 199 professional opportunities or obligations in certain countries requiring such visas (e.g., Japan), and a more nebulous but no less real awareness that one’s life partner was not recognized as such. Senator Szyszkowska’s bill was designed to eradicate these forms of inequality and would have granted same-sex couples all the rights and prerogatives enjoyed by heterosexual couples, except the right of adoption, which she left out reluc- tantly in the conviction that Polish society was not yet ready to accept such a provision. Immediately after the publication of the draft bill,17 she received a death threat, and the Catholic Church sent letters to people’s homes saying that it was not in accord with the social teachings of the Church to accept homosexual relationships.18 The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith also issued an instruction, claiming that love between two persons of the same sex was contrary to Natural Law and informing Catholic politicians that they had a moral duty to oppose any legislation supportive of homosexuality. Among Poles, however, one out of every five respondents in a May 2002 opinion poll felt that there was no need to have recourse to religion in order to explain morality or make moral choices (by contrast more than a third of respondents felt that only religion could serve as a foundation for moral dictates).19 Homosexuality became highly politicized, with the right-wing League of Polish Families promising to establish Maoist-style ‘reeducation’ camps for gays and lesbians and with the introduction, in the parliament, of a draft law which would have prohibited homosexuals from teaching in the schools; the bill was, however, struck down by the parliament in early 2004.20 The League’s youth organization also used violence to prevent Polish gay people from marching for tolerance and pelted marchers with bottles and stones, even throwing acid at them – all this in the name of Christian love! Yet the Catholic media and the Catholic bishops, who seem never to tire of calling homosexuality ‘unnatural’ and ‘sinful’, were eerily silent when it came to anti-gay violence in the 1990s, and after one such attack in Kraków (in May 2004), the Archbishop of that city described the marchers as having staged a “demonstration of sin,” while saying nothing about their attackers.21 But the ranks of those supporting the bill for gay partnerships have included Rev. Florian Lempa (b. 1951), a Catholic professor of canon law at the University of Białystok, and Rev. Ernest Ivanovs, pastor of Warsaw’s small Reformed Free Church, who has made gays, lesbians, and transgen- dered people feel welcome in his congregation.22 Nor are those offering a vision of a more tolerant Poland likely to give up. “I am optimistic about 200 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004 the eventual outcome of this struggle,” Senator Szyszkowska told me in 2004, “although it is going to be an uphill struggle. There have been some doors closed to me because of this. For example, I used to have my own radio program; now that’s over. But I will never give up.”23 Sexuality and the elections. By 2001, it was hard to portray President Kwaśniewski as being particularly ‘left-wing’ on matters of interest to the Church. He had backed the Church’s position on the concordat, on the Invocatio Dei, and even on abortion, had made no effort to repeal or revise the guidelines protecting ‘Christian values’ in the public media or to resecularize the schools, and, at least for the time being, his party had postponed any action to grant legal equality to same-sex couples. But, for all that, the Church viewed Kwaśniewski as, at best, a pragmatic politician, if not as a ‘bolshevik’,24 and certainly not as an ideological ally. Hence, when the 2000 presidential campaign got underway, Cardinal Glemp gave his blessing to Catholic Election Action (WAK), as an alternative to the SLD, while Wałęsa made a long-shot effort to regain the presidency, using homosexuality as a campaign issue. At a campaign rally in July 2000, for example, Wałęsa mused, “I believe those people need medical treatment. Imagine if all people were like that – we wouldn’t have any descen- dants!”25 With Catholic lawmakers pressing presidential candidates to declare their views concerning homosexuality, Marian Krzakowski, the candidate of Solidarity Election Action (AWS), spoke out against homosexual marriage and adoptions. Candidates from the center and left were more circumspect; Andrzej Potocki, a spokesman for the Liberty Union Party, for example, told PAP that “people of different sexual orientations enjoy the same rights guaranteed under the constitution.”26 The focus on homosexuality during the campaign drove some observers to distraction. Marek Sawicki, for example, the deputy vice president of the Polish Peasant Party, referring to economic challenges, muttered in exasperation, “There are so many questions to be resolved ...and now here we are [pre] occupied with homosexuality.”27 An opinion poll conducted during the 2000 presidential elections showed that some 55% of Poles had a negative view of homosexuality with 62% declaring that they were opposed to same-sex marriage (even though 88% of Poles admitted that they did not know anyone who was gay or lesbian); but in spite of the SLD’s lack of hostility toward same-sex unions, Kwaśniewski easily won reelection, while the SLD went on to win the largest bloc of parliamentary seats in September 2001 – once again in spite of ecclesiastical exhortations to voters not to cast their ballots for the former communists.28 Perhaps not A NEW ERA 201 irrelevant is the fact that, even in 2003, some 31% of Poles told pollsters that they had positive memories about communist Poland, with roughly the same number – 33% – saying that they had negative memories.29 Presumably the remaining 36% either had mixed memories or did not want to admit to remembering anything before 1989! Controversy over Auschwitz. There is a further controversy from the post-communist period which deserves at least some mention, namely, the controversy which flared during 1998–99 concerning the planting of Christian crosses near the entrance to the Auschwitz concentration camp where more than one million persons and probably between 2.5 million and 3 million persons, mostly Jews, were liquidated by the Nazis during World War Two.30 Controversy surrounding Auschwitz actually began in 1984 when Carmelite nuns took possession of a nearby building and converted it into a convent. Jewish organizations expressed outrage and eventually, in 1987, an agreement was reached requiring the nuns to vacate the premises – which they did, albeit only in 1993. Where the crosses are concerned, a large 26-foot (8-meter) high wooden cross had been erected already in 1988, in spite of Jewish protests, to commemorate a mass celebrated by the pope at a nearby site in 1979 “to commemorate the spot where 152 Polish prisoners had been shot by the Nazis in 1941.”31 Given the strength of Jewish opposition, and in particular Jewish insistence that Jews could not pray in the presence of a cross, a consensus was eventually reached in the first half of 1998 that, out of respect for Jewish sufferings and sensitivities, there should be no religious or political symbols placed at Auschwitz, and, thus, that the cross should be removed. In response, a Catholic group calling itself the Cross Defense Committee began putting up smaller crosses (ranging from 3 feet, or one meter, to 13 feet, or 4 meters, in height) in July 1998. By 10 August, the committee, egged on by the right-wing Catholic radio station ‘Radio Maryja’, which had already run afoul of the episcopate, had planted more than 90 crosses at Auschwitz; eventually, committee members and sympathizers planted some 300 crosses at the former concentration camp, thereby devaluing the site as one associated especially with Jewish suffering.32 The key figure in this drama was Kazimierz Switon, then 67 years old, a distributor of anti-Semitic pamphlets who took up residence in a “tiny caravan” parked at the edge of Auschwitz and who, decked out “in gumboots and a grubby felt hat,” used the sudden media attention he was receiving to denounce Jews, liberals, freemasons, and other supposed “enemies of Poland”.33 While Poland’s chief rabbi, Pinchas Menachem 202 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

Joskowicz, joined the Israeli government and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum in Israel, among others, in protesting the presence of the crosses, Cardinal Glemp protested the Israeli protest as an endeavor to “impose foreign will”.34 By June 1999, however, all the smaller crosses had been removed and only the tallest cross remained. The Poles were rewarded for their understanding of Jewish concerns a year later, when the European parliament issued a report praising Poland as the least xenophobic country in Central Europe, speciﬁcally highlighting Polish understanding of Jewish concerns as regards Auschwitz,35 although sociological data from the late 1990s showed that, among post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland recorded the highest score for anti- Semitism.36

THE FIGHT OVER ABORTION While one can find churchmen who differ with the Vatican over contraception, artificial insemination, and sex education, one would be hard pressed to find any churchman advocating on behalf of abortion. That said, there are at least three complications with abortion in the case of Poland: first, the ban on abortion, instituted at the behest of the Catholic Church and on the basis of Catholic values, applies to all residents of Poland, whether Catholics or not; second, according to a poll taken in 2003, some 61% of Poles believed that the law on abortion was overly strict and should be liberalized, with only 20% wanting to make the law even more restrictive and 19% having “no opinion”;37 and third, the law had consequences which no one welcomes – indeed, it could be said not to have achieved its purpose at all! Opening salvoes and effects. Abortion was illegal in Poland until 1956, but with the legislation passed that year, social reasons (including financial reasons) were sufficienttoobtainanabortion,withtheresultthat abortion was, de facto, available on demand. This situation lasted for nearly 40 years, during which time an average of 180,000 to 300,000 abortions were performed each year.38 What the Church wanted was a bill which would make abortion illegal, with no allowable exceptions – not even to save the woman’slifeorinthecaseofincestorrape.Onlya small minority of parliamentarians were prepared to go that far, but a bill drafted in 1992 by members of the Christian National Union would have permitted abortion only in cases where pregnancy endangered the women’s life. Two members of the parliament – Zbigniew Bujak of the Labor THE FIGHT OVER ABORTION 203

Union and Barbara Labuda of the Democratic Union – took the initiative to set up a Social Committee for a Referendum, to press for a national referendum on the future status of abortion. Bujak and Labuda gathered more than 1,300,000 signatures in support of a referendum. The Church’s position, then as now, was that morality could not be the subject of a referendum. As a result of the Church’s pressure, there was no referendum. In the meantime, in May 1990, the Ministry of Health had decided that contraceptives would no longer be covered by national health insurance – a decision which put contraceptives effectively out of reach of many Polish women. At the same time, the ministry issued new guidelines for abortion, already restricting its availability, even in advance of new legislation.39 Opinion polls conducted around that time found that some 80% of Poles felt that abortion should continue to be legal and available, within unspeciﬁed constraints. But the parliament continued to work on the bill, in spite of public hostility, settling on a draft bill which excluded prenatal tests. The exclusion was later dropped, and the bill passed by the Sejm on 7 January 1993 and ratiﬁed by the Senate on 30 January, was signed into law by President Wałęsa on 15 February. The new law outlawed abortions except in the following instances:

• when a panel of doctors certiﬁes that the pregnancy endangers the mother’s life or seriously threatens her health; • when a prosecutor certiﬁes [that] the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest; • when the fetus is determined by pre-natal tests to be seriously, irreparably damaged; • and when needed to save the mother’s life during an emergency.40

Since the Church had not wanted any exceptions to the prohibition, this law was not fully satisfying as far as either the Holy See or the Polish episcopate was concerned. But the application of the law proved to be tougher and more restrictive than might have been anticipated. Specifically, according to Wanda Nowicka, many women who were entitled by law to access to an abortion were denied such access in practice.41 Shana Penn cites two examples. The first concerns Barbara, a 28-year-old woman, who already had a four-year- old son afflicted with hypochondroplasia, a rare disease causing under- development of the limbs, disfigurement, and chronic pain. Although she 204 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004 was using contraceptives, Barbara became pregnant once more, but was denied a prenatal test and was even advised, by the hospital administrator that, even if tests detected deformity, she would not be granted an abortion, because “nobody wants to have any problems.” In fact, under the law, she would have been entitled both to a prenatal test and, under the circumstances, to an abortion. Barbara eventually gave birth to a daughter, suffering from the same affliction as her son, but received no state support for her two disabled children. Penn’s other case concerns Alicja, a 31-year- old mother of two, who had severe eyesight deficiency resulting from retinal damage. When she became pregnant again, she saw an opthamol- ogist, who advised her that continuing with the pregnancy would be likely to cause further damage to her eyesight. Allegedly, however, “[t]he gyne- cologist at the public hospital, to whom Alicja was referred, opposed the diagnosis and destroyed the medical report, thus blocking her ability to seek medical treatment elsewhere.” Alicja, whose finances were marginal, could not afford any alternative recourse and went through with the pregnancy, with the result that her eyesight was further damaged to the extent that she became unable to work or even to care for her newborn.42 But for many Polish women, the criminalization of abortion merely drives them to seek abortions abroad (if they are more well-to-do) or illegally (if they do not have the funds to travel). Indeed, it was estimated in 2000 that there had been between 80,000 and 200,000 illegal abortions per year since passage of the 1993 law on abortion, and that estimate did not even count the number of abortions performed abroad.43 Where illegal abortions are concerned, facilities are generally not as well equipped as public hospitals are, with the result that illegal abortions are less safe than legal abortions would be. There have also been cases of women leaving their newborn babies at the hospitals where they are delivered (as 738 mothers did in 1995), of leaving them at the doorstep of the local church, of selling them to foreigners, and even of dumping their newborn babies in the trash (as 162 women did in 1994).44 As of 1992–93, most Poles favored making abortion available in cases of financial hardship. Since the number of abortions conducted abroad for Polish women and illegally at home is roughly the same as the number of abortions conducted legally before, and given the additional problems which have ensued, as itemized above, it can reasonably be argued that passage of the law has not yielded the results which its advocates had hoped for. Indeed, these trends have continued with, for example, just 159 legal abortions in 2002.45 Moreover, according to official government statistics, THE FIGHT OVER ABORTION 205 there were on average 50 cases of infanticide in Poland annually during the years 1990–2003 and an average of 61 cases of child abandonment (involving newborn babies) annually during the same period.46 Another problem is that there have been cases of women with health problems who have been denied abortion, in spite of the risk to their health posed by childbirth, and who have died shortly after giving birth. Radio Maryja. In 1991, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk (b. 1945) of the Redemptorist Order – a kind of latter-day Fr. Coughlin – established Radio Maryja in Toruń, broadcasting a combination of religious programs, prayers, news (chiefly about the Catholic Church), and calm religious music. Pope John Paul II welcomed the new station when it began broadcasting in 1991, and by 1993, Radio Maryja was broadcasting nationwide. By 2002, the station claimed a radio audience of about 10% of adult Poles.47 But Rydzyk’sradiostationsoonprovedto be considerably to the right of the Vatican, broadcasting programs characterized by xenophobia and authoritarian attitudes, and blaming privatization, the market economy, Jews, and liberals for Poland’s problems.48 In 1997, Polish ecclesiastical leaders reprimanded Rydzyk for repeatedly ignoring a summons to appear before the court in connection with a slander allegation. Archbishop Henryk Muszyński (b. 1933) of Gniezno also had the occasion to reprimand Rydzyk after a broadcast in which Fr. Waldemar Chrostowski, director of the Catholic- Judaic Dialogue Institute, was maligned, while Archbishop Józef Życiński (1948–2011) of Lublin compared Rydzyk to French racist Le Pen and Austrian racist Jörg Haider.49 Bishop Pieronek, who, as long as he was Secretary of the Episcopal Conference, represented the center of gravity in the Church in Poland at least as much as Cardinal Glemp, accused Rydzyk of fostering “a kind of psychosis” about “some hidden external enemy wanting to destroy Catholicism in Poland.”50 But Rydzyk’s Radio Maryja has also played a part in the abortion drama, by demanding that legislators and other politicians who wanted to liberalize Poland’s strict abortion law should have their heads shaved, reviving a practice adopted in the early 1940s against Polish women who were suspected of prostituting themselves to Nazi occupation troops. Radio Maryja also claimed that those advocating liberalization of the regulations concerning abortion were trying to build “a pagan cult of power”.51 Radio Maryja also helped to organize transportation for persons wishing to join a March for Life on the eve of an important vote in the Sejm on abortion. After the march, in which about 40,000 206 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004 persons allegedly took part, organizers of the march “ ...encouraged protesters to visit parliamentary deputies in their homes and offices and convince them to vote against [a proposed] amendment” to the law.52 In 2001, Radio Maryja, which had formed links with the now-defunct right-wing League of Polish Families, which in turn had 36 seats in parliament after the 2001 parliamentary elections, succeeded in obtaining ‘social broadcaster’ status – which exempted the station from having to pay for its broadcasting license. This followed a vote in the Sejm, which ruled that the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council had unfairly discriminated against the station. But in autumn 2002, Cardinal Glemp, increasingly exasperated at Radio Maryja’s broadcasting excesses, issued a decree banning the station from operating in Warsaw and restricting the station from raising funds. Among other things, Radio Maryja had usurped some of the prerogatives of the episcopacy itself, thereby setting itself up as an independent (or, if one prefers, potentially schismatic) movement and engaging in quasi-educational activity. As Glemp pointed out in his decree, “No ecclesiastic organization, even those well-known, popular and charismatic [movements], can organize religious offices, meetings, or other forms of religious education without the approval of the bishop of the diocese.”53 And for that matter, Radio Maryja was competing with the Polish episcopate’s own official radio station – Radio Józef. In communist times, every diocese having the means to do so set up its own diocesan radio station; as of the mid-1990s, there were some 30 diocesan radio stations across Poland, but only one truly national Catholic radio station -–Radio Maryja. However, in 1998, the episcopal conference decided to promote the merger of these diocesan stations, in order to form an official national Catholic radio station – in effect, an alternative to Radio Maryja. Some 22 diocesan stations responded positively to this appeal, forming the now-defunct Radio Plus, headquartered in Lublin and directed, in its day, by Fr. Jarosław Jęczeń. Eight archbishops – among them, Archbishop Józef Michalik of Przemyśl (b. 1941, who served two five-year terms as chairman of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate beginning in April 2004) and Archbishop Henryk Gulbinowicz of Wrocław – feared that Radio Plus would be too open to alternative ways of thinking and therefore preferred to continue to manage their broadcasting on the diocesan level.54 Radio Maryja has remained controversial, however, and, on 1 October 2002, a decree signed by Cardinal Glemp, banning the station from THE FIGHT OVER ABORTION 207 broadcasting in Warsaw, came into effect, although, in practice, its broadcasts continued to be received in Warsaw. The decree also restricted the fund-raising activities of the station. Shortly after that, an investigation into the station’s financial affairs was reopened.55 Revising the abortion law. In response to the law passed in 1993, various women’s organizations were created – among them, the Women’s Rights Center (founded in Warsaw in 1994), which offers legal advice and assistance to women, and training for police, prosecutors, and judges dealing with domestic abuse, a women’s counseling center set up by the feminist organization eFKa (in Kraków), the League of Polish Women, and various feminist groups. In 1995, the National Women’s Information Center was set up with headquarters in Warsaw; directed by Barbara Limanowska, the center seeks to foster a discussion of reproductive and sexual rights. In fact, in the wake of the September 1993 elections, which strengthened parties on the left, the Polish parliament voted in June 1994 to amend the bill, in order to make some allowance for financial difficulties. President Wałęsa vetoed the measure, however, and the lower house failed to override the presidential veto. Subsequently, after the election of Kwaśniewski, the parliament reopened the question, and in late August 1996, the Sejm approved changes to the law to allow abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy where financial hardship was present, to restore a partial subsidization of contraceptives, and to introduce sex education in the schools. Although the Church continued to oppose the use of contraceptives, some 48.1% of Poles reported (in an opinion poll conducted in May 2002) that they thought that the use of contraceptives should be allowed; among young people 18–24 years of age, the proportion favoring the accessibility of contraceptives was as high as 67.7%.56 But the hierarchy deplored these measures taken by the Sejm and organized a protest by 50,000 faithful to put pressure on the Senate. On 4 October, the Senate overturned the Sejm’ s vote, rejecting the amendments by a vote of 52 to 40. But under Polish law, the Sejm enjoys the authority to override a vote in the Senate, and did just that three weeks later. President Kwaśniewski signed the bill into law on 20 November 1996. Could the introduction of sex education into the schools be justified? A relevant fact which bears on this question is that, according to a report issued by the World Health Organization in January 1997, based on 1996 data, 60% of Polish boys and 20% of Polish girls had had sexual relations by the age of 18, with teenagers accounting for some 16% of live births.57 208 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

The Polish primate compared the measure to World War Two, in an ill- conceived reference which prompted a protest from the World Jewish Federation. But the following year, the Constitutional Tribunal reviewed the amendments and struck down the provision for the termination of pregnancy on social or financial grounds. In 1999, in the Sejm, where the center-left dominated, amendments to the health law were passed which would have allowed prenatal testing in cases where family members had genetic problems, where there was reasonable suspicion that the fetus might have genetic flaws which could be treatable before birth, and when there was reasonable suspicion that the fetus might be damaged. The Senate, however, controlled by parties more conservative in political coloration, rejected the amendments in mid-June 1999. Then, in July 2001, the Federation for Women and Family Planning (the FWFP) staged a mock tribunal, to inform public opinion about the impact of the law and about violations of women’s reproductive rights guaranteed by the albeit restrictive legislation. By this point, with growing polarization between liberals and conservatives in Poland and with the FWFP undertaking legal action against hospitals it accused of having refused abortions to women who were legally entitled to them, the SLD let it be known that it wanted to try once more to liberalize the law, specifically to restore the provisions struck down in 1997. A poll conducted by Rzeczpospolita in January 2003 among a representative sample of 1,025 Polish adults found that 63.6% thought that a referendum concerning the law on abortion should be conducted in Poland.58 That same month, Polish women’s organizations renewed pressure on the government to ease up on restrictions on abortion, and the following month, in an interesting development, religious leaders, women’s rights groups, and 150 politically prominent figures from 46 countries signed a letter sent to President Kwaśniewski calling on him to liberalize the law on abortion. Encouraged by these developments, women deputies of the SLD drew up a proposal to liberalize the law. But in June of that year, President Kwaśniewski met with the papal nuncio to Poland, Archbishop Józef Kowalczyk, and assured him that he was opposed to the proposal drawn up by the women deputies. But Kwaśniewski’s party remained committed to easing the restrictions on abortion. Thus, in March 2004, the SLD announced its intention to pass a new bill which would not only ease such restrictions but also introduce universal sex education, assure access to birth control, and legalize in-vitro fertilization.59 The following month, Izabela Jaruga- Nowacka, co-founder of the Union of Labor and known for her THE CHURCH AND THE EU 209 championing of the rights of sexual minorities, by now serving as deputy prime minister, proposed further to make postcoital contraceptive medi- cation available to victims of rape.60

THE CHURCH AND THE EU The collapse of communism opened up not only the possibility of repluralization but also the prospect of Polish entry into what had hitherto been West European organizations, and in the first place the EU. Poland submitted an official application for admission to the EU on 8 April 1994, and Polish support for membership in the EU, already higher than 75% at the time, rose to an estimated 80% by May 1996.61 But for the Church in Poland, which had not fully absorbed the full impact and spirit of the Second Vatican Council, the notion of integration into European structures – into ‘Europe’, as the shorthand has it – seemed as much threatening as beckoning. Bishop Pieronek warned, in a 1998 lecture, that he was concerned that Christian values were withering away in Europe, and blamed this situation squarely on EU-promoted secularization.62 This, in the minds of Polish bishops more generally, posed a danger that spiritual values would be displaced by material values and by ever greater absorption with sexuality. The Church’s task, then, must be to restrain the lIbido and uphold divine law. In communist times, questions of ecclesiastical survival, the independence of trade union activity, and human rights dominated the Church’s agenda. But with the satisfactory resolution of these challenges and the development of a normative structure within the EU, the Church has inevitably, and for completely obvious reasons, paid attention to that normative structure. What the Church would like ideally is to play a decisive role in defining what will be understood as European values.63 But in July 2002, the European Parliament called for the legalization of abortion across both current and prospective EU member-states, emphasizing, at the same time, the importance it attached to seeing sex education in the public schools and to easy access to contraceptives. This was a shot across the bow, as far as the Holy See and Catholic prelates were concerned, signalling to the Church that it would have to fight if it wanted to see the normative structure of the EU conform to Catholic moral teaching. The EU’s additional encouragement of the legalization of same-sex partnerships in member-states and prospective members further dismayed the Church, inducing deep consternation among Catholic prelates and 210 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004 provoking expressions of concern lest EU integration completely undermine the Church’s ability to defend its Catholic mores. But in spite of these expressions of concern, support for EU membership grew among the bishops and clergy. Bishop Pieronek’s warning notwithstanding, he and Archbishops Muszyński and Tadeusz Gocłowski of Gdańsk were understood to be pro-EU as early as 1995. In recognition of his outspoken support for integration, Pieronek was later awarded the Polish European Award from the Polish Robert Schumann Foundation.64 Then, in 1997, Archbishop Muszyński led an episcopal delegation to Brussels for discussions with EU officials; Muszyński returned even more determined to support the cause of EU integration. Józef Cardinal Glemp also became an early supporter of EU membership, though he warned, in 1998, lest the EU suffocate Poland’s Christian identity and culture. Glemp has been a cautious supporter and, on another occasion, warned that accession to the EU might bring “abortion, euthanasia, pornography, gay movements and anti-family policy” to Poland. Indeed, as of October 2001 the proportion of Poles who still favored membership had slipped to about 60%,65 while, as of late 2002, an estimated 59% of Catholic priests supported EU membership, with only 20% opposed.66 But the cause of EU integration also had its foes. Leading the pack were Radio Maryja’s Fr. Rydzyk, who went so far as to urge Poles to boycott EU products, and Andrzej Lepper (1954–2011), the controversial leader of the Self-Defense Party, which gained notoriety for depositing manure outside ministry buildings. Not too surprisingly, right-wing Catholics used anti-pornography campaigns in an effort to mobilize anti-EU sentiment. But even Archbishop Życiński of Lublin, generally regarded as a moderate, warned in February 1998, “The suggestion to let Europe into Poland is a denial of the word of Christ, who commanded us to preach the Gospel to the ends of the earth.”67 In spite of these somewhat amorphous concerns about the EU fostering secularism, homosexuality, and pornography, it was only in March 2002 that the Polish Episcopate issued the first official document dealing with Poland’s bid to join the EU. In forwarding the document to the president, the prime minister, the Vatican, and the European Convention, Archbishop Muszyński underlined that “the Church regards the EU as a community of the spirit” and that “according to the Church, Europe is above all an entity of the spirit and of certain values.”68 The following month European Minister Danuta Huebner met with representatives of Poland’s Catholic media, to pass along assurances that the EU had no THE CHURCH AND THE EU 211 influence on the moral decisions of its member states and, in fact, had never interfered in questions of abortion or euthanasia specifically. Then in May, Church concerns came into focus when Cardinal Glemp and President Kwaśniewski issued a joint statement promising that Polish representatives to the European Convention would endeavor to assure that the eventual EU constitution would include a reference to Europe’s Christian tradition. A spokesperson for the episcopate offered that the invocatio Dei as featured in the Polish constitution could serve as a model for the EU constitution. In June 2002, the Polish News Bulletin reported that some deputies of the SLD and its coalition partner, the Labor Union, continued to prioritize the liberalization of the law on abortion and the restoration of sex education in the schools but that Prime Minister Leszek Miller and his cabinet colleagues wanted to avoid “an open war” with the Church until Poland had been admitted into the EU. Accordingly, the Bulletin reported, the SLD came up with the idea of appointing the more ideolo- gically committed members of these parties to the civil rights team, “where they can freely investigate and explore what have been described as ‘radical initiatives’; ...the intention is to keep the party’s anti-clerical and feminist wings busy until the EU referendum scheduled for next summer ...”69 In spite of the implicit medium-term threat to the Church’s vital interests, the Church did not react at the time. But in the course of that summer, the European Parliament issued a non-binding appeal to member states to liberalize their legislation in the sphere of reproductive rights; the Church in Poland responded by offering this as evidence that “Europeanization” could undermine “Polish values”.70 The controversy escalated in December, when Marek Dyduch, secretary general of the SLD, reportedly told a newspaper that his party would take up the question of liberalizing the law on abortion after the referendum on EU entry, scheduled for June 2003, was behind them. The publication of Dyduch’s statement provoked an immediate reaction, with Archbishop Muszyński demanding that a clause be added to the EU constitution guaranteeing that there would be no EU pressure on Poland to change its legislation in that sphere, with Cardinal Glemp demanding that the EU guarantee Poland’s right to adopt its own regulations on abortion inde- pendently. Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz protested that there was no reason to think that the EU even could impose such legislation on Poland, while Prime Minister Miller declared that the government had no plans to reopen the abortion question. In fact, Cimoszewicz 212 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004 added, the Polish government had no intention of seeking the addition of any special clause either to the EU constitution or to Poland’s accession treaty. But Glemp and Muszyński, acting in harmony with the Holy See, insisted that a recognition of Poland’s “separateness” be included in both the accession treaty and the EU constitution itself. In fact, Ireland had obtained something along these lines in the accession treaty it had signed at the time it joined the EU, and, among the other nine countries that joined the EU in 2004, Malta had already negotiated a clause safeguarding its proscription of abortion. So, whether it was unnecessary or not, at least two other countries had thought it worthwhile to obtain explicit guarantees on the subject of abortion. Former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing chaired the 13- member committee assigned to draft the constitution for the EU. The committee released the first 16 articles of the draft constitution, including the preamble, to the public on 6 February 2003; the draft began with a preamble which acknowledged the humanistic values developed in ancient Greece and Rome, the principles of the Enlightenment, and the rights articulated and defended in the course of the French Revolution. The only recognition of Christianity was the acknowledgment “ ...that the ‘values’ of Europe’s ‘religious’ heritage ‘are always present’ along with those of its cultural and humanist heritage.”71 The virtual invisibility of God and Christianity in the preamble, especially in light of the explicit mention of ancient Greece and Rome, dismayed Christians across Europe, and there were public calls from Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Poland, and later also from Lithuania and Latvia, to add an explicit allusion to the continent’s Christian heritage. In an official statement released later in the year, Pope John Paul II argued that “Christian roots are a foundation of freedom because they make Europe a melting pot of different cultures and experiences ...[and inspired demands for] the universal right to justice and peace.”72 In the pope’s mind, it was, accordingly, unthinkable that mention of God and Christianity might be omitted from the EU constitution. The Vatican continued to hammer at this theme. In February 2003, for instance, an official spokesperson at the Vatican described the proposed text as “totally unsatisfactory”,73 while, in June of the same year, Roberto Cardinal Tucci, director of Radio Vatican, described God’s absence as “an offense to reason, to good sense, and to a good part of Europe’s citizens.”74 Elmar Brok, a European deputy from Germany, added his voice to the chorus, declaring that “Europe as a whole is based on a THE CHURCH AND THE EU 213

Christian heritage.”75 Others felt that the draft constitution was not secular enough and demanded that there be “a guarantee of the separation of Church and state” in all member states.76 And still others claimed that a reference to the continent’s Christian heritage would be discriminatory because it would suggest that only the contribution of Christianity but not the contribution of Judaism and Islam to European history and civilization is worth mentioning. Thus, for example, Richard Prasquier, a member of the executive committee of France’s Representative Council of Jewish Institutions, warned that “mentioning only Christian values would fail to recognize the Jewish contribution to European culture.”77 Then there was Les Semaines Sociales de France, a French Christian policy group, which threw its support behind an amendment to insert a mention of God together with an advisory that God and religion should not be misused for political proﬁt. Back in Poland, the government caved in to Church pressure and sent a note to EU councils in Brussels in January 2003 asking for an assurance that “no EU treaties or annexes to those treaties would hamper the Polish government in regulating moral issues or those concerning the protection of human life.”78 Michal Tober, a government spokesperson, said that the note would serve to prevent opponents of EU accession (such as Radio Maryja) from misleading people about the consequences of joining the EU. A few months later, immediately after Archbishop Józef Życiński criticized the draft constitution and traced the French revolutionary ideals of freedom, equality, and fraternity to Christian virtues,79 President Kwaśniewski called for the addition of a reference to Christianity in the European constitution. But while fringe groups marched in Warsaw carrying banners that read “The Poles will not build the Europe of Sodom and Gomorrah,”80 Archbishop Życiński emphasized that the disagreements over the preamble should not discourage Poles from voting for Polish accession. Cardinal Glemp himself declared, on the eve of the Polish referendum on accession, “I am not a Euro-enthusiast. I’m a Euro-fatalist. Europe is Poland’s destiny.”81 In the event, more than 59% of Poles took part in the referendum on 7–8 June 2003, with 78% voting in favor of accession.82 Subsequently, Poland joined the EU on 1 May 2004. But the controversy over the absence of any mention of either God or Christianity in the preamble continued, and in October 2003, Poland’s bishops added another buchette to the ﬁre by noting their “great concern” that the preamble omitted “any reference to conscience as a basic criterion of moral evaluation.”83 Europe’s leaders had set 12 December as the date on which they would sit down, under the chairmanship of Italian 214 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, to hammer out details still in dispute in the draft constitution, and Berlusconi promised the pope that he would ask his fellow prime ministers to agree to add a reference to Christianity to the constitution. But Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared his unmitigated opposition to any such idea. According to Erdogan, “Freedom of conscience and a ban on all discrimination are the founding principles of modern Europe. If the concept of religion is included in the constitution, it would contradict those principles and centuries of progress on the continent.”84 But the 12 December summit ended in fiasco – not because of any differences of opinion about the alleged benefits or damage entailed in including mentions of God and/or Christianity in the preamble, but because Germany and France wanted to revise the voting system which had been agreed in Nice in 2000, under which Poland and Spain, in spite of their smaller populations, were to receive almost as many votes as Germany and France. The latter two countries also wanted to introduce a system of ‘double majority voting’ under which decisions would have to be supported by half of all member states having at least 60% of the population of the EU. When Poland and Spain refused to give up what the French and Germans characterized as an over-generous allotment of votes, the summit collapsed. But by late March 2004, Spain had a new prime minister, who was prepared to give up the system established in Nice, and, with their Spanish partner talking compromise, the Poles too softened their line. Meanwhile, by April 2004, about 10 of the projected 25 member-states of the EU were supporting the inclusion of a reference to Christian values in the eventual EU constitution. By June 2004, the EU constitution had been finalized. The preamble still reflected the original formulation (although the Greeks and the Romans had disappeared from the text, together with the French Revolution). God and Christianity had not been added to the text, but the embracive reference to religious traditions remained – a formulation which implied the inclusion not only of Christianity but also of Judaism, Islam, and perhaps of other traditions as well. Poland’s bishops were divided about whether the constitution should be accepted.

AFTER GLEMP In March 2004, Cardinal Glemp retired as chair of the Conference of the Polish Episcopate, though retaining his title as ‘Primate’; as already mentioned, the more clearly conservative Archbishop Michalik was elected to AFTER GLEMP 215 take over the duties of chair. Michalik proved to be more sympathetic to the political message of Radio Maryja, including its EU-phobia, than either John Paul II or Primate Glemp, according to one informant, who described Michalik as more of a maverick.85 As of 2002, one could divide Poland’s21 bishops into four groups: there were only two ‘Euro-enthusiasts’ (having no fear of the EU and seeing more opportunity than danger in EU membership), alongside six ‘Euro-skeptics’ (fearing that Polish membership in the EU would, on the whole prove to be negative for Catholicism in Poland), four ‘Euro-realists’, and nine ‘Euro-neutrals’ (who did not get engaged in the issue).86 Michalik, quite obviously, figured as a skeptic. What needs to be stressed is that it is religion itself, or rather the Catholic Church, which constitutes the vector along which Poland is polarized. This is also reflected in the press, with, for example, Nasz Dziennik, a daily newspaper owned by Fr. Rydzyk, staking out a position on the far right, the Church’s weekly newspaper Niedziela and the secular weekly Polityka occupying a more moderate but still conservative niche, and Gazeta Wyborcza, a daily newspaper (which, in 2004, had a circulation of 516,000 copies on weekdays and 686,000 on weekends) edited by Adam Michnik, striving for a centrist position and often publishing views from both left and right, side by side. There are also center-left and progressive publications such as Nie, edited by Jerzy Urban, Tribuna, a left-wing newspaper published in 70,000 copies, and Bez dogmatu, a weekly magazine founded and edited, 1993–2002, by Barbara Stanosz. Bez dogmatu has maintained a dignified posture, and has opened its pages to contributions by the aforementioned Robert Biedroń, among others.87 There are also several hard-left publications – Lewą nogą, Walka Trwa, and Nowa lewica – and a sophisticated center-left weekly magazine called Przegląd; these hard-left publications have had minimal influence, however, on either policy debates or public opinion. Nie, an irreverent weekly edited by Jerzy Urban, is widely respected and influential periodical (with a circulation of 300,000), and then there is the anti-clerical weekly, Fakty i mity, owned and edited by ex-priest Roman Kotliński who, in 2002, launched the Reason Anticlerical Party and who has joined in gay rights events in order to declare his support for gay and lesbian marriage.88 Yet, even though the foregoing account takes note of the presence of at least six distinct opinion groups in Poland, Poles themselves speak of ‘left’ and ‘right’, and tend to aggregate much – though not all, to be sure – into one or the other camp, friend or foe. For the Church, what is at stake is morality itself, and the Church sees itself as the protector of Natural Law, 216 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004 headed by the vicar of Christ (as the pope is called). For the Church’s critics, on the other hand, some of the Church’s positions – most especially its opposition to the declaration of legal equality of women and men89 and its hostility to same-sex unions – are morally indefensible and, instead of focusing on the primary principles of Natural Law, which, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, are immutable, the Church is concen- trating at least some of its efforts on defending certain secondary principles, which, in line with Aquinas’ predictions,90 are already in the process of change. And hence, too, as Jerzy Urban told me in June 2004, there are real concerns, among some, about “the very idea that Catholic teaching should be reflected and anchored in state structures and state law.”91 These concerns would turn out to be prophetic when the right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS)92 won the October 2015 elections and set about muzzling the press, trying to take control of the judiciary, and rewriting the Constitution in the light of Catholic values, as interpreted by the party.93

CONCLUSION In a brilliant survey of the politics of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland published in Europe-Asia Studies some years ago, Mirella Eberts noted that what the Church hoped to see realized in post-communist Poland was a state which would be “democratic in form, but Christian in content.” The problem with this ideal, however, she argues, is that it is in the nature of pluralist democracy “ ...that the content cannot be firmly predetermined in advance.”94 The result, J. Gowin suggests, has been that “antagonism toward democracy and a tendency to pit it against the natural law principle grew in Church circles.”95 Eberts even suggests that “ ...many, if not the majority, of the Church hierarchy hold an inter-war vision of a democratic Poland,”96 though it is not necessary to refer to historical examples to understand what the Church wants. Thus, when in 2000 the Vatican issued a controversial document, which seemed to backpedal on the ecumenically inspired recognition of Protestant organizations as “Churches”, which had been extended at the Second Vatican Council, by asserting that Protestant denominations are not, in fact, Churches at all, but “ecclesial communities”, Roman Catholic leaders in Poland gave their strong endorsement.97 The document – Dominus Iesus, on the Unicity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church – was aimed at those Catholic theologians who “have argued that all religions may be equally valid ways of salvation.”98 The CONCLUSION 217 episcopal conference of Poland’s 92,000-member Lutheran Church released a statement declaring, “This claim to exclusiveness on questions as fundamental as salvation evokes our deepest concern,” while Orthodox Archbishop Jeremiasz, head of Poland’s 570,000-member Orthodox Church, expressed his personal hope that Dominus Iesus would soon be “quietly forgotten,” adding that “We have to learn to live in a Christian way without doing injustices to each other.”99 Archbishop Życiński replied to these critics, however, by suggesting that they subscribed to a “post- modernist mentality in which there is no center or single reference system, and where all interpretations are equally good ...It is not that people can go to church and choose [what to believe] – there are certain fundamental truths which a Christian should know.”100 This exclusivist mentality was reflected in the establishment by then- Prime Minister Cimoszewicz of an Inter-Ministerial Team for New Religious Movements in August 1997, which, in a report issued in June 2000, called on governmental agencies to train personnel in how to deal with the “religious sects”. Complaints were registered by high-ranking figures in the Adventist Church, the Church of Evangelical Christians, and the Church of Christian Assemblies that their bodies and allegedly “all non- Catholic groups” were being “treated as sectarian and dangerous” by Catholic bishops and government officials.101 But in early 2001, Krysztof Wiktor, secretary of the aforementioned Inter-Ministerial Team, announced that his agency would shortly be replaced by a new Inter-Ministerial Team for Psycho-Manipulative Groups and would dedicate itself to combatting “therapeutic, health and crypto-political groups which have nothing in common with religious associations.”102 The very existence of this agency constitutes a demonstration of the fact that the Polish state has, at least to some extent, endeavored to accommodate the programmatic desiderata of the Catholic Church, ignoring the protests by members of minority religions and that the agencies of state consider it quite normal to engage themselves in the religious sphere. The Catholic Church also set up a network of anti- cult centers, operated by the Dominican Order.103 In view of the firm opposition of the Church globally, and hence also in Poland, to gay and lesbian equality and its disinclination to see sex education in the schools, we may conclude that the Church remains a bastion of conservatism, at least where sex is concerned. Still, it is worth reminding ourselves that the Church in Poland is not homogeneous, and that there are liberal (i.e., cosmopolitan) tendencies in its ranks, such as Fr. Adam Boniecki (b. 1934), at one time the editor-in-chief of Tygodnik Powszechy. 218 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

The late Fr. Józef Tischner, whose liberality and tolerance were legendary, urged, at one point, that “ ...the Church should do a very heroic thing and start accepting the state, even if it is not exactly as the Church would like it to be.”104 Indeed, there are other roles for the Church to play, besides that of judge or even, as during the reign of Pope John Paul II, as advocate of human rights and the rights to free labor union – roles which, since the election of Jorge Mario Bergoglio (b. 1936) as Pope Francis in March 2013, the Church has embraced with greater clarity than heretofore. It is not that the Catholic Church had neglected to address the issue of environmental deterioration and climate change,105 but Francis was the ﬁrst pope to issue an encyclical on climate change and the destruction of the earth’s ecosystem. This encyclical, released in June 2015, warned of the “unprece- dented destruction of ecosystems” which, it noted, would have “serious consequences for all of us” if the world community fails to ﬁnd an adequate response.106 For that matter, his predecessor Benedict XVI (b. 1927; reigned 2005–2013), deserves credit, among other things, for his 2009 encyclical in which he “proposed a kind of super-UN to deal with the world’s economic problems and injustices.”107 In his encyclical, Pope Benedict XVI had stressed the importance of “justice and the common good.”108 But in its refusal, up to now, to loosen its strictures on abortion and contraception, the Church has failed to address the challenges of world overpopulation and widespread poverty and, thus, indirectly, also the issue of climate change, which is affected, in part, by uncontrolled population growth. And in its dogged refusal to embrace sexual minorities and to accept same-sex unions as fully worthy, the Church makes its contribution to the persistence of homophobic hatred and violence against gays.

NOTES 1. This chapter is a modiﬁed version of Sabrina P. Ramet, “Thy Will be Done: The Catholic Church and Politics in Poland since 1989,” in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 117–147. 2. Against this view, some critics may wish to assert that the “real” question is not whether the Church can stand aside when questions such as abortion come up, but whether the Church’s engagement is “legitimate”. While the latter question is not entirely irrelevant to this chapter and will, in fact, be taken up toward the end of the chapter, to make assessments of the legitimacy of the Church’s engagement in the political sphere the center of focus NOTES 219

would shift the emphasis from a discussion of the Church’s political engagement with the EU to public opinion as such. 3. José Casanova, “Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration”, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe [note 1]. 4. Krzystof Koseła, Professor of Sociology, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, in interview with the author, Warsaw, 22 June 2004; and Robert Biedroń, president of the Campaign Against Homophobia, in interview with the author, Warsaw, 24 June 2004. 5. Law on Radio and Television Broadcasting, as published in Dziennik Usław (Warsaw), 29 January 1993, trans. in U.S. Department of Commerce, Central and Eastern European Legal Texts (29 January 1993); and Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 299– 300. 6. Polskie Radio First Program (Warsaw), 15 September 1995, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 15 September 1995; and Andrzej Korboński, “A Concordat – But No Concord”,inTransition (Prague), Vol. 1, No. 9 (9 June 1995), p. 15. 7. Fr. Piotr Mazurkiewicz, Professor of Political Science, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, in interview with the author, Warsaw, 28 June 2004. For a detailed account of the quest for a concordat, see Sabrina P. Ramet, “Controversies in the Social & Political Engagement of the Catholic Church in Poland since 1988”, in Sabrina P. Ramet and Irena Borowik (eds.), Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland: Continuity and Change since 1989 (Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 8. PAP (5 January 1999), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, accessed at Georgetown University. 9. See Ramet, Nihil Obstat, pp. 303–304; and Mirella W. Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland”,inEurope-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 5 (July 1998), p. 829. 10. As quoted in Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church”, p. 834. 11. Mazurkiewicz [note 7]. See also Fr. Piotr Mazurkiewicz, “Autonomy of the Church and Freedom of Religion in Poland”, in Gerhard Robbers (ed.), Church: Autonomy: A Comparative Survey (Frankfurt-Am-Main and New York: Peter Lang, 2001), pp. 359–380. 12. Fr. Mieczysław Puzewicz, episcopal vicar and head of KSM in Lublin, in interview with the author, Lublin, 30 June 2004; Auxiliary Bishop Mieczysław Cisło of Lublin and Rev. Dr. Tadeusz Kadżiołka, Rector of the Seminary, in interview with the author, Lublin, 1 July 2004; Magda Bień, member of the World Youth Alliance, and Ella Kryczka, member of 220 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

the board of directors of KSM, in interview with the author, Lublin, 1 July 2004. 13. Urszula Buglewicz, editor of the Lublin edition of Niedziela, in interview with the author, Lublin, 2 July 2004 (Katarzyna Surowiec, interpreter). 14. Ks. Krzysztof Pawlina, “Powołania kaplańskie i zakonne w Polsce na początku XXI wieku”, in Piotr Mazurkiewicz (ed.), Kościoł Katolicki w przededniu wejścia Polski do Unii Eurpejskiej (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2003), p. 44; and Mazurkiewicz [note 7]. 15. The Church fears that heterogenic insemination, in which sperm are selected for certain desired traits, reduces human life to a commodity. 16. As quoted in The Scotsman (28 May 2003). 17. Magazyn Trybuny (Warsaw), 29–30 November 2003, pp. 6–7. 18. Senator Maria Szyszkowska, in interview with the author, Warsaw, 6 July 2004 (Ania Konieczna, interpreter). 19. Sławomir H. Zaręba, “Postawy Polaków wobec zasad moralnych religii katolickiej”, in Witold Zdaniewicz and Sławomir H. Zaręba (eds.), Kośćioł Katolicki na początku trzeciego tysiąclecia w opinii Polaków (Warsaw: Instytut Statystyki Kośćioła Katolickiego, 2004), p. 88. 20. Biedroń [note 4]. 21. Rev. Ernest Ivanovs, pastor of the Reformed Free Church of Poland, in interview with the author, Piaseczno, 6 July 2004. 22. Ibid. 23. Szyszkowska [note 18]. 24. Kadżiołka [note 12]. 25. As quoted in Agence France Presse (21 July 2000), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 26. As quoted in Ibid. 27. As quoted in Ibid. 28. Polish News Bulletin (27 August 2001); Agence France Presse (11 September 2001); and Polish News Bulletin (28 September 2001) – all in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 29. PAP (5 May 2003), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 30. Raul Hilberg writes that 1 million Jews were killed at Auschwitz, Aharon Weiss writes that between 1.2 million and 2.5 million died at Auschwitz, and Yehuda Bauer writes that there were between 1.5 million and 3.5 million victims at Auschwitz. These estimates are reported by László Karsai, in his book, Holokauszt (Budapest: Pannonica kjiadó, 2001), p. 116. I am indebted to Prof. György Péteri for hunting down this information for me. Higher estimates are also available. For example, William Carr, in the fourth edition of his History of Germany, writes that “The camp comman- dant at Auschwitz calculated in 1945 that two-and-a-half million Jews had been gassed there and a further half-million had died of hunger and illness, a NOTES 221

total of three million Jews murdered coldly and scientiﬁcally ...” In addition, according to Guenter Levy, some 20,000 Gypsies were also killed at Auschwitz. See William Carr, A History of Germany, 1815–1990, 4th ed. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), p. 334; and Guenter Lewy, The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 166. 31. BBC News (27 August 1998), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 158626.stm [last accessed on 27 April 2013] 32. Bogdan Turek, “Poland: Tension Rises over Crosses in Auschwitz”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (10 August 1998), at http://www.rferl.org/ content/article/1089241.html [last accessed on 27 April 2013]. 33. The Independent (London), 21 November 1998, at http://www.indepen dent.co.uk/life-style/auschwitz-unholy-war-1186264.html [last accessed on 27 April 2013]. Switon was later given a six-month suspended sentence for slandering Jews and Germans and for calling Polish parliamentarians “national traitors”. 34. As quoted in Turek, “Poland: Tension Rises”,p.1. 35. Polish News Bulletin (16 March 2000), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. See also Geneviève Zubrzycki, “The Catholic Church and the ‘War of the Crosses’ at Auschwitz (1998–1999)”, in Michael Geyer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds.), Religion und Nation: Beiträge zu einer unbewältigen Geschichte (Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 2004), pp. 176–204. 36. Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, “Attitudes of Young Poles toward Jews in Post–1989 Poland”,inEast European Politics and Societies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Fall 2000), p. 576. 37. Agence France Presse (21 October 2003), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 38. Wanda Nowicka, “Poland: Case Study on Legal Instability Concerning Abortion, 1997”, Polish Federation for Women and Planning (25 October 2010), p. 1, at http://www.federa.org.pl/index.php?option=com_con tent&view=article&id=201:wanda-nowicka-poland-case-study-on-legal- instability-concerning-abortion–1997&catid=63:papers&Itemid=124 [last accessed on 27 April 2013]. 39. Ramet, Nihil Obstat, p. 297. 40. New York Times (16 February 1993), at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/ 02/16/world/walesa-signs-law-sharply-restricting-abortions.html [accessed on 27 April 2013]. 41. Nowicka, “Poland: Case Study” [note 37], p. 2. 42. Shana Penn, “‘Breaking the Silence’: How Poland’s Abortion Law Jeopardizes Women’s Health and Rights” (2001), posted at Polish Federatoin for Women and Family Planning, see the link at http://www. federa.org.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 194&Itemid=126 [accessed on 27 April 2013]. 222 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

43. Wanda Nowicka and Monika Tajak, “The Effects of the Anti-Abortion Act”, in Wanda Nowicka (ed.), The Anti-Abortion Law in Poland: The Functioning, Social Effects, Attitudes and Behaviors (Warsaw: Federation for Women and Family Planning, September 2000), p. 3. The ﬁgure of 80,000–100,000 was also reported more recently: see “Poland’s PiS in bed with Catholic Church, backs abortion ban”, Politico (5 April 2016), at http://www.politico.eu/article/polands-church-state-alliance-to-ban-abor tion/ [accessed on 24 July 2016]. 44. Ramet, Nihil Obstat, p. 298. 45. Sprawodanie Rady Ministrów z wykonywania w roku 2002 ustawy z dnia 7 stycznia 1993 roku o planowaniu rodziny, ochronie płodu ludzkiego i warun- kach dopuszczalności przerywania ciąży. (Warsaw: Prezes Rady Ministrów, 27 pażdziernika 2003). 46. Statystyka – Dzieciobójstwo i porzucenie, at www.kgp.gov.pl 47. BBC News (1 October 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 2289567.stm [last accessed on 27 April 2013]. 48. Polish Business News (1998), “The Catholic Voice in the Polish Home”,at www.masterpage.com.pl/outlook/catholic.html [last accessed in 2005]. This URL no longer works as of April 2013. However, much the same information can be found in more recent sources, including: Die Welt (Berlin), 30 July 2007, at http://www.welt.de/politik/article1066939/ Polen-soll-antisemitischen-Pater-stoppen.html; Die Presse (Vienna), 21 July 2009, at http://diepresse.com/home/kultur/medien/496873/ Polen_Chef-von-Radio-Maryja-ein-Rassist; Die Welt (12 January 2010), at http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article5175327/Pater-Rydzyk- Radio-Maryja-und-der-Antisemitismus.html; and Die Presse (10 May 2011), at http://diepresse.com/home/kultur/medien/660895/Polen_ AntisemitismusVorwuerfe-an-Radio-Maryja [all four websites last accessed on 27 April 2013]. 49. Archbishop Józef Zyciński of Lublin, in interview with the author, Lublin, 2 July 2004. 50. As quoted in Polish Business News [note 47]. 51. Urszula Turska, “Radio Maryja – Our Lady of Contention”,inThe Warsaw Voice, No. 46 (17 November 1996), at http://www.warsawvoice.pl/v421/ Media00.html [last accessed in 2004, and no longer posted online], p. 3. 52. Ibid. 53. As quoted in Agence France Presse (30 August 2002), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 54. Rev. Dr. Jarosław Jęczeń, Director of Radio Plus, in interview with the author, Lublin, 3 July 2004. 55. For a detailed discussion of Fr. Rydzyk’s radio career, see Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Radio Maryja and Fr. Rydzyk as a Creator of the National- NOTES 223

Catholic Ideology”, in Ramet and Borowik (eds.), Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland [note 7]. 56. Zaręba, “Postawy Polaków” [note 19], p. 98. 57. Jonathan Luxmoore, “Eastern Europe 1997–2000: A Review of Church Life”,inReligion, State & Society, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 2001), p. 323. 58. “Abortion – yes or not?”, Poland.pl (2002), at http://www.poland.pl/ articles/view.htm?id=30005 [last accessed in 2002, and no longer posted online]. 59. “Polish Parliament to open debate on easing abortion law”, HLI-EUROPA News (11 March 2004), at http://www.hli.org.pl [last accessed in 2004]; the same information may be found at “Polish Parliament to open debate on easing abortion law”, LifeSite News (5 March 2004), at http://www.life sitenews.com/news/polish-parliament-to-open-debate-on-easing-abor tion-law [accessed on 27 April 2013]. 60. “Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka promotes postcoital contraception”, HLI- EUROPA News (26 April 2004), at http://www.hli.org.pl [last accessed in 2004]; and “Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka – Poland”, World People’s Blog (19 September 2006), at http://word.world-citizenship.org/wp-archive/721 [accessed on 27 April 2013]. 61. Mirosława Grabowska, “Unia Europejska i studia europejskie – nowa rzeczywistość i jej badanie”, in Krzystof Koseła, Tadeusz Szawiel, Mirosława Grabowska, and Małgorzata Sikorska (eds.), Tożsamość Polaków a Unia Europejska (Warsaw: Instytut Badań nad Podstawami Demokracji, 2002), pp. 15–16. 62. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, “The Catholic Church and European Integration” (9 June 1998), at http://www.poland-embassy.org.uk/ events/pier.htm [accessed in 2004 and no longer posted online]. 63. On this point, see also Timothy A. Byrnes, “Transnational Religion and Europeanization”, in Byrnes and Katzenstein (eds.), Religion in an Expanding Europe [note 1]. 64. “Honors for Bishop Pieronek”, News from Poland (June-August 1998), at http://www.polishworld.com/polemb/news/698/bishop.htm [last accessed in 1998]. 65. Grabowska, “Unia Europejska” [note 60], pp. 19, 21. 66. Agence France Presse (7 January 2003), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. The poll was conducted on 11 October and 5 November 2002 among 600 priests. 67. As quoted in Natalia Jackowska, Kośćiol katolicki w Polsce wobec integracji europejskiej (Poznań & Gniezno: Instytut Zachodniego, 2003), p. 167. 68. Warsaw Voice (31 March 2002), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 69. Polish News Bulletin (20 June 2002), reprinting an article from Newsweek, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 224 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

70. Penn, “Breaking the Silence” [note 42]. 71. European Report (18 June 2003), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 72. “Pope: Christian roots in Future EU Constitution”, euobserver.com (17 February 2003), at http://euobserver.com/institutional/9404 [accessed on 27 April 2013]. 73. Agence France Presse (6 February 2003), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 74. Tomas Dixon, “Ignoring God in the Constitution”,inChristianity Today (1 July 2003), at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2003/july/18. 26.html [last accessed on 27 April 2013]. 75. As quoted in Christian Science Monitor (10 April 2003), p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 76. As quoted in Ibid. 77. As quoted in Ibid. 78. The Guardian (30 January 2003), p. 17, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 79. Gazeta Wyborcza (3 June 2003), trans. in BBC Monitoring International Reports (3 June 2003), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 80. As quoted in Manchester Guardian Weekly (30 April 2003), p. 33, in Lexis- Nexis Academic Universe. 81. As quoted in The Guardian (7 June 2003), p. 17, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 82. The Daily Telegraph (London), 9 June 2003, at http://www.telegraph.co. uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/1432463/Poles-vote-overwhel mingly-to-join-EU-after-Popes-plea.html [accessed on 27 April 2013]. 83. Associated Press Worldstream (21 October 2003), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 84. As quoted in Agence France Presse (1 October 2003), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 85. Adam Szostkiewicz, deputy foreign editor and staff writer for religious affairs for Polityka, in interview with the author, Warsaw, 27 June 2004. 86. Katarzyna Leszczyńska, “The Standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the Czech Republic Towards Europe, the European Union and the European Integration Process”, in Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, SinišaZrinščak, and Irena Borowik (eds.), Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation (Zagreb: Institute for Social Research, 2004), pp. 270–271. See also Katarzyna Leszczyńska, “The Roman Catholic Church in Poland vis-à-vis Europe and the Processes of European integration: Three images of Europe”, in Ramet and Borowik (eds.), Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland [note 7]. 87. Barbara Stanosz, founder of Bez dogmatu, and Andrzej Dominczak, member of the editorial board of Bez dogmatu, in interview with the author, Warsaw, 24 June 2004; and Biedroń [note 4]. 88. Roman Kotliński, editor of Fakty i mity, in interview with the author, Łódź, 28 June 2004 (Adam Cioch, interpreter). NOTES 225

89. “The Episcopate alarmed with the bill of an equal status of women and men”, HLI-EUROPA News (29 April 2004), at http://www.hli.org.pl [accessed in 2004]. 90. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, in T. Aquinas, Political Writings, ed. and trans. by R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 120–128. 91. Jerzy Urban, editor of Nie, in interview with the author, Warsaw, 25 June 2004 (Piotr Szymczak, interpreter). 92. From the Polish, Prawo i Sprawieliwość. 93. For further discussion, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Kristen Ringdal, and Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (eds.), Civic and Uncivic Values in Poland: Value Transformation, Education, and Culture (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, in production) – here, especially Chapter 14, Sabrina P. Ramet, “Past and Present in the Struggle for Polish Democracy – A postscript”. 94. Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church” [note 9], p. 836, quoting from J. Gowin, Kościoł po komunizmie (Krakow: ZNAK, 1995), p. 73. 95. Gowin, Kościoł, p. 73, as quoted in Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church” [note 8], p. 836. 96. Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church” [note 9], p. 837. 97. Jonathan Luxmoore, “Poland’s Catholic Bishops Reject Criticism of Dominus Iesus”, in Christianity Today (posted 1 September 2000), at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2000/septemberweb-only/34.0b. html [last accessed on 27 April 2013]. 98. As quoted in Ibid., p. 1. 99. Both as quoted in Ibid., p. 2. 100. As quoted in Ibid., p. 1, insertion by Luxmoore. 101. Jonathan Luxmoore, “Poland Rethinks Supervision of ‘Sects’ After Minority Church Complaints”,inChristianity Today (posted 1 March 2001), at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/marchweb-only/3–5–24.0. html [last accessed on 27 April 2013]. 102. Ibid., p. 1. 103. Agnieszka Kościanska, “Polish Government Report – the Embodiment of the Anti-cult Propaganda”, CESNUR – Center for Studies on New Religions, at http://www.cesnur.org/2001/london2001/koscianska.htm [last accessed on 27 April 2013]. 104. As quoted in Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church” [note 9], p. 837. 105. Indeed, the Roman Catholic Church, like the Evangelical Church of Germany and the Norwegian Church, and no doubt other religious bodies as well, had begun, even before the papacy of Francis, to alert people to the dangers of environmental deterioration and to the importance of environmental protection. 226 6 TRANSITION TO PLURALISM, 1989–2004

106. As quoted in The Guardian (18 June 2015), at https://www.theguardian. com/environment/blog/live/2015/jun/18/pope-encyclical-climate- change-live-reaction-analysis [last accessed on 22 July 2016]. 107. The Guardian (16 June 2015), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2015/jun/15/pope-francis-destruction-ecosystem-leaked-encyclical [last accessed on 22 July 2016]. 108. Caritas in veritate (29 June 2009), at http://w2.vatican.va/content/bene dict-xvi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in- veritate.html [accessed on 22 July 2016]. CHAPTER 7

Controversies in the Life of the Church

Since the end of communist rule in Poland in 1989, there has been a steady decline in the participation by Poles in religious rites (such as attendance at Sunday liturgy), accompanied by a decline in the number of religious vocations, a steady attenuation (beginning even before 1989) of the Catholic belief system, and persistent criticism of the Catholic Church’s political engagement.1 At the same time, slightly more than 90% of Poles continue to identify themselves as Roman Catholics, and assessments of the Church as an institution remain positive (as opposed to views of the Church’s public activities, which have been assessed more critically).2 How is this paradox to be explained, and what does it mean? In spite of this nominal identiﬁcation with Catholicism, there has been some erosion of commitment to Catholic norms among Poles, especially among members of the younger generation, alongside a decline in the prestige and inﬂuence of the Church; these changes may be traced to a combination of factors some of which were outside the Church’s control but for some of which the Church itself, or clergy of the Church, may be held responsible. Among the latter, the following may be included: (1) the Church’s blundering efforts to promote its own agenda on Poland (especially in the years 1989– 1997) (2) the controversy stirred up by revelations about the extent of collaboration with the communist-era secret police on the part of bishops and priests (3) the controversies surrounding property restitution to religious communities; and (4) the scandal surrounding sex

© The Author(s) 2017 227 S.P. Ramet, The Catholic Church in Polish History, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-40281-3_7 228 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH abuse by clergy not only in the USA and Germany but also in Poland itself, as well as in other countries, and the Holy See’s ineffective response to this scandal. In addition, Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk’sRadio Maryja (as discussed in the previous chapter), operating outside the control of the Primate’sofﬁce, serves to divide and polarize the Polish Catholic community. As a result of these factors, the Church may be seeing some of its inﬂuence in Polish society being eroded.

THE CHURCH AT THE DAWN OF THE POST-COMMUNIST ERA The Catholic Church’s role in bringing about the collapse of communism in Poland is indisputable and, although communism would have crumbled sooner or later even without the Church’s involvement, the Vatican accelerated that development.3 Not surprisingly, public opinion surveys in 1989/90 showed that more than 90% of Poles had a positive evaluation of the Church’s activity in the public arena.4 By 1996, however, only about 50% of respondents assessed the Church’s public activity positively.5 To be sure, the Church has made positive contributions in democratic Poland – among other things (as noted in the previous chapter) through its charitable work, its counseling services for troubled marriages, Church- sponsored activities for young people, and its educational work. However, several factors have worked to diminish the Church’sinﬂuence and prestige. Among factors beyond the Church’s control, the most important is the fact that, with the re-emergence of pluralism and the construction of a democratic system, the Church lost its special position as the only legal institution offering an alternative worldview to that propounded by the regime and constituting an opposition of a sort, and, with that, the special political bond between the people and the Church, as their defender, gradually withered.6 Alongside this, participants in a roundtable organized by Pawel Zalęcki also mentioned “the shock of market reforms, disap- pointment with the ‘post-Solidarity’ government and disillusionment with the ‘new’ Poland ...[which] affected the Church as well.”7 Finally, among factors beyond the Church’s control, one may also mention changes in values associated with generational change. Thus, an opinion poll conducted in 2001 revealed that only 38% of respondents indicated that God was “very important in their lives,”8 while, in 2002, only 45.2% of Poles attended Mass regularly, and still fewer – 17.3% – reported taking holy communion on a regular basis.9 Another opinion THE CHURCH’S AGENDA 229 poll, conducted in 2009, found that, among Poles aged 24 to 34, only 3% reported that they hoped to remain true to the values of the Catholic faith, while 51% said that the most important thing in life was love.10 The poll also found that, in urban areas, only 21% of young Poles attended Mass regularly. In the context of the foregoing statistics, the fact that just over 90% of respondents in opinion polls picked “Catholic” as one of their most important identity markers should not be misconstrued; that fact does not necessarily signify belief in all the Church’s doctrines or agreement with all of the Church’s social norms. Indeed, an opinion poll conducted in 2012 revealed that 42% of young Poles admit that they do not observe all of the Church’s commandments.11

THE CHURCH’S AGENDA However, there are several factors entirely within the Church’s control that have contributed to the decline in the prestige and efficacy of the Church. One of these, mentioned by key representatives of the Catholic Church in Poland (including archbishops and bishops) taking part in Zalęcki’s roundtable, was that the Church failed to pay adequate attention, in the period immediately after 1989, to such pressing social issues as unemployment and poverty.12 Again, members of the same group also felt that “numerous representatives” of the Church had behaved in an arro- gant manner and, in the process, alienated many people. And the replacement of the charismatic Cardinal Wyszyński as Primate of Poland, upon his death in May 1981, by the markedly less charismatic Archbishop (later Cardinal) Józef Glemp contributed, even in the 1980s, to a more mixed assessment of the role of the Church; Glemp himself was, at the time, occasionally criticized for having been too flexible in dealing with the communist regime. But probably the most important factor contributing to the decline in the Church’s prestige in the years up to 1997, and in spite of a change in overt strategy also thereafter, was precisely its energetic pursuit of an ambitious political and legislative agenda, much of which was carried into law in the course of the 1990s. The introduction, with little preparation of the public, of Catholic religious instruction as a mandatory subject in the state schools was rushed through amid some controversy,13 at the same time that the Church successfully prevented the introduction of sex education in the schools. Passage, two years later, of a law requiring respect for Christian (in practice, Catholic) values in radio and television 230 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH broadcasting, and in 1993 of a law imposing significant restrictions on access to abortion, at a time when most Poles favored a more liberal law on abortion were also controversial.14 Catholic (arch)bishops and ordinary clergy were also active in efforts to influence the outcome of the presidential election in late 1990 and likewise of the parliamentary election in September 1991. Polling data gathered in 1991 showed that 74% of Poles disapproved of the political activity of the Church in these elections.15 A subsequent poll taken three years later found that 69% of Poles surveyed thought that the Church should stay out of politics,16 and by 2012 fully 80% of Poles were said to object to the Church’s repeated interventions in the political business of the country.17 An opinion poll conducted by CBOS in 2013 confirmed this tendency, with 55% of respondents objecting to the Church expressing opinions about legislation and 82% objecting to clergy telling people how to vote.18 The Church hierarchs did not see it that way. Thus, for instance, in 1995 Bishop Adam Lepa, titular bishop of Regian and auxiliary bishop of Łodź, argued that “The task for believers is to introduce Christ into public life without any enclaves or exceptions, including [in] the sphere of politics. ... If the church does not deal with politics, then politicians will deal with the church.”19 The Church’s efforts to insert its preferred vocabulary into the preamble to the constitution and to design the constitution itself according to its own preferences also stirred up a lot of bad blood on both sides of the ensuing debate. Specifically, after a draft constitution had been drawn up by the government, the Permanent Council of the Episcopal Conference of Poland (KEP) issued a statement in February 1997, dismissing the draft constitution as an exercise in “moral nihilism” and asserting that the parliament “had no mandate from the nation to pass the Constitution.”20 In fact, of course, it was precisely the parliament which was empowered to pass a constitution. The center-left government made some concessions to the Church and the thus-revised draft constitution was put to a national referendum on 25 May 1997, where it was approved by a narrow margin. Nonetheless, in spite of the concessions made by the government, the Church was not satisfied with the Constitution of 1997, but preferred now to seek to amend the constitution, working through two parties promoting its interests: the Law and Justice Party (PiS)21 and the League of Polish Families (LPR)22, a party close to the aforementioned Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk.23 From May 1997 until March 2004, thus, the Church left its interests, to a large extent, in the hands of those two parties, retreating from its active THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT COLLABORATION 231 engagement in politics. As Krzystof Zuba has noted, this changed with the election of Archbishop Józef Michalik (b. 1941) as chairman of the KEP in March 2004 (he served in that post until 2014).24 Although a return to the failed strategy of the pre-1997 period was forsworn, the Episcopate mended its fences with the ultraconservative, anti-Semitic Radio Maryja, even “accepting its informal status as a ‘political arm’ of the [C]hurch.”25 Even so, the Church’s abandonment of its aggressive – in the view of its critics – posture of 1989–1997 has not been forgotten and continues to have a lingering effect on more secular (i.e., left of center) Poles. Indeed, the Church’s continued defense of its positions on in vitro fertilization, homosexuality, and other matters related to sexuality continues to polarize Polish society and in October 2010, 45-year-old Janusz Palikot, a philosopher and member of parliament abandoned Donald Tusk’s ruling party (the Civic Platform, or PO)26 and established an overtly anti-clerical party.

THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT COLLABORATION Although some awkward questions were being raised by the turn of the 21st century concerning the relations between the Catholic clergy and the Security Service (SB),27 and admissions as early as 2002 that perhaps as many as 25% (later revised to 10–15%) of Catholic priests had been “in contact” with the SB,28 the issue of clerical collaboration with the communists was largely hushed up as long as Pope John Paul II was alive. In April 2005, however, shortly after Pope John Paul II passed away, the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN)29 in Warsaw, which had been established in 1998 in order to investigate collaboration on the part of Poles with either the Nazi occupation during World War Two or the communists, published a report indicating that Fr. Konrad Hejmo, a Polish priest who had been working in the Vatican beginning in 1979, had been providing the SB with regular reports on the activities of the pope throughout the 1980s. The following year, Marek Lasota, an ofﬁcial at the IPN, brought out a book, Spying on Wojtyła, in which he detailed the methods used by the SB to compromise seminarians and priests in order to get them to collaborate.30 By that point, Fr. Tadeusz Isakowicz- Zaleski, who had been attacked and injured in 1985 presumably by agents of the security apparatus, had discovered that the SB had kept a 500-page ﬁle on his activities, with information fed to them by priest-collaborators. Zaleski decided to probe the extent of collaboration in the Archdiocese of Kraków and immersed himself in the IPN archives for 18 months. 232 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

Perhaps hoping to take some of the steam away from Zaleski and, in any event, giving in to inexorable pressures, the Episcopal Conference of Poland issued a statement in March 2006, admitting that at least 10% of Catholic priests had served as informers for the SB and apologizing to the Catholic faithful. Stanisław Cardinal Dziwisz, Archbishop of Kraków, asked the victims of such information-gathering not to abandon the Church and told his listeners that the Polish hierarchy was willing “to reveal the archive records, but under strict Church supervision.”31 This was followed, in August, by the release of a “Memorandum on the Collaboration of Some Priests with the Security Organs of Poland during the years 1944–1989”. The document was prepared by a commission appointed by Cardinal Dziwisz and issued by the Episcopal Conference. The memorandum documented the collaboration of some priests and nuns, but also presented evidence that, in some cases, the security services had planted falsified documents in their files in order to implicate blame- less religious.32 But as Zaleski continued his work, Dziwisz ordered him to terminate his research and to keep his findings to himself. Fr. Zaleski told me that Cardinal Dziwisz was opposed to any revelations from the archives “because many of his friends and acquaintances had been SB collaborators and he knew exactly what had been going on.”33 By then, however, the Catholic daily, Dziennik, had published a report that as many as 6,000 Catholic priests had been listed as informers in SB records.34 There were at least two casualties at the time: Fr. Mieczysław Maliński, who was suspended from his sacerdotal duties in May 2006 because of “recurring rumors” that he had collaborated with the SB; and Fr. Micha Czajkowski, who admitted two months later that he had spied on fellow clergy and on people in the opposition for 24 years, reporting what he observed to the Security Service.35 In late June 2006, as pressure grew, Dziwisz reversed himself and granted Zaleski permission to continue with his investigation, but imposed on the priest the requirement that he contact those he intended to mention to allow them to present their side of the story.36 In at least one case, involving a bishop, although documentation in the archives suggested that the cleric had collaborated, the bishop in question was able to present Zaleski with convincing documentation that he was innocent and, as a result, Zaleski removed any suggestion that the cleric in question had done anything wrong.37 But the dam, although cracked, had not yet broken and, as late as October of that year, Józef Cardinal Glemp accused Zaleski of “pursuing and hounding priests all over Poland” and of having “distorted the image of the THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT COLLABORATION 233 priesthood.”38 The following month, Glemp withdrew his charges and issued a public apology to Zaleski.39 By this point, Archbishop Stanisław Wielgus of Płock was set to succeed the retiring Glemp as Archbishop of Warsaw, with his installation ceremony set for early January 2007. But shortly before Christmas 2006, Gazeta Polska, a conservative weekly, published a report based on the investigative work of its journalistic staff, alleging that Wielgus, regarded as liberal, had collaborated with the SB for about two decades, providing its functionaries with information about the activities of Catholic archbishops and priests. According to Tomasz Sakiewicz, editor of Gazeta Polska, Wielgus “was one of the most important collaborators of the communist intelligence [services] in the Church.”40 Yet the article in Gazeta Polska did not appear, at first, to make any difference in Church calculations; on the contrary, the article was quickly rebuffed by a spokesperson for the Płock Diocese. But behind closed doors, Wielgus was coming under intense pressure to withdraw his name. Thus, on 7 January 2007, barely an hour before he was scheduled to be installed as Archbishop of Warsaw, Wielgus announced that he was stepping aside. By this point, it was being openly admitted, both in Church circles and in the press, that he had collaborated with the SB from 1967 to 1987 and even that he had received special espionage training (although Wielgus himself continued to deny the charges, claiming that the SB planted false material in his file).41 Although the consensus is that Wielgus did indeed collaborate, it is also known that agents did file false reports claiming to have met with bishops and priests to obtain information. Their motivation was simple: their promotion depended upon their meeting certain targets in terms of collaborative contacts.42 The pope now turned to Kazimierz Nycz (b. 1950), Bishop of Koszalin-Kołobrzeg, a man untainted by past collaboration, to take the reins in Warsaw. About the same time, the Polish Episcopal Conference set up a commission to check the past behavior of all 133 Polish bishops and archbishops.43 Curiously, Pope Benedict XVI chose to send a letter to Wielgus just a month after his cancelled installation, declaring that he (the pope) was aware of the “exceptional circumstances” in which Polish priests had operated in communist times, conveying a “special apostolic blessing,” and encouraging Wielgus to resume his sacerdotal duties.44 The Wielgus affair was the signal for the dam to burst, and it was now that Zaleski’s voluminous work was published.45 Based on documents at 234 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

IPN archives in Kraków and Katowice, the book identified one retired archbishop and two still-active bishops as having been SB collaborators in the past: Juliusz Paetz, the erstwhile Archbishop of Poznań, who had already been investigated on charges of sexual molestation of seminarians and compelled to retire in 2002 (though not without receiving “a warm message of praise” from Pope Benedict on the 50th anniversary of his ordination in 2009);46 Bishop Wiktor Skworc of Tarnow, who claimed to have been recruited without his knowledge (!) as an “unofficial collabora- tor” of the SB;47 and Bishop Kazimierz Gorny of Rzeszow.48 Zaleski’s book contained other revelations, detailing and documenting, for example, how Fr. Kazimierz Jancarz, a priest sympathetic to the Independent Trade Union Solidarity, had been placed under close surveillance for 10 years,49 how Franciszek Cardinal Macharski had been kept under surveillance by his own brother-in-law,50 and how a local parish priest named Fr. Wacław Cedro, operating under the nom de guerre “Andrzej”, had maintained surveillance on the distinguished professor, Fr. Józef Tischner. “Andrzej” submitted reports to the SB not only about Tischner, but also about priests in the parishes of Nowy Targ and Niedzicki, monks working in Podhaly and Spisz, and clerics connected with the Oasis Light-Life Movement, as well as on the activities of priests supporting Solidarity.51 But, Zaleski notes, “most of ‘Andrzej’s’ reports were a mix of true information, wrong interpretations, and rumors circu- lating among the clergy.”52 Zaleski’s book also documents the recruit- ment and collaboration of several Jesuits,53 as well as the activity of Polish priest-informers at the Vatican.54 But Zaleski also documented the refusal, on the part of the clergy, including some who would later be consecrated as bishops, to collaborate. Among those cleared by Zaleski’s research are Cardinal Macharski, Bishop (now Archbishop and Cardinal) Nycz, Andrzej Cardinal Maria Deskur, Bishop Tadeusz Rakoczy of Bielsko-Żywiec, retired Bishop Wacław Świerzawski of Sandomierz, and Bishop Jan Szkodoń of Kraków.55 But refusal to collaborate came at a price, since it was a signal for the SB to engage in operations against the recalcitrants, including surveillance and unspecified “countermeasures”.56 Zaleski’s book became an overnight sensation, eventually selling 140,000 copies, and, in spite of its careful accumulation of documentation and weighing of evidence, came under attack from the highest echelons of the Church in Poland. Thus, Archbishop Józef Życiński of Lublin, said that the book “ ...shows a worrying lack of concern for humanist THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT COLLABORATION 235 principles,” while Archbishop Damian Zimoń of Katowice, leaping to Sworc’s defense, described the book’s contents as “tendentiously selected ...with the aim not of seeking truth but of impugning the good name” of Bishop Skworc. Zimoń added that, in his view, Zaleski had “no formal or moral right” to investigate priests outside the Archdiocese of Kraków or, thus, to have written his book.57 Meanwhile, the commission appointed by the Episcopal Conference continued its work and, already in June 2007, admitted that SB documents had revealed that at least a dozen bishops still alive had had contacts with the secret service in the communist era.58 Twenty-one months later, however, the bishops announced that the Vatican had cleared them of any collaborationist activity. In an official statement issued on 11 March 2009, the Episcopal Conference declared:

The Holy See states that it ﬁnds no basis for accusing Polish bishops’ conference members of [having] committed an[y] willing collaboration. Because of this, we consider the matter closed. Wishing to concentrate on its pastoral mission, the conference does not intend in the future to take any position on such material.59

Yet, whether the bishops consider the matter closed or not, the revelations about collaboration have unmistakably damaged the prestige and standing of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. Nor was the controversy at an end. In early 2011, Roman Graczyk, an IPN researcher based in Kraków, brought out a book detailing the collaborative contacts between journalists of the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny and the SB. Graczyk devoted an entire chapter to journalist Stefan Wilkanowicz, reporting that the Tygodnik journalist had met with a number of different agents in the course of roughly three decades.60 According to Graczyk, the SB was interested even in small details, such as how much sugar a person of interest might use in his coffee, as such information could later be used to convince the person in question that the SB already knew a lot about him.61 While the SB hoped, among other things, to tame Tygodnik Powszechny, the editors and journalists of that publication hoped, for their part, that, by entering into collaborative contacts with that agency, they could tame the SB. The decision to collaborate was not taken by the journalists of that publication individually. On the contrary, when the SB made its first overtures to the staff, the managerial section of the editorial council 236 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH discussed the matter and decided that allowing the meetings to take place could serve the interests of the paper, provided of course that the journalists/ informers used good judgment in what they discussed. The information to be revealed to the SB would be discussed by the staff of the paper before being passed along to any SB agent.62 The staff were certain that their offices were bugged – as indeed they were. Thus, although some things were discussed in the office, more sensitive matters were taken up on the stairs, while, for discussions of the most sensitive matters, the staff would hold their meetings in a nearby forest.63 From the standpoint of the newspaper, the contacts had some benefits: first, the journalists proved capable of influen- cing the thinking of SB agents, with the result that they became more reasonable over time; and second, by analyzing the questions posed by the SB agents, the staff of Tygodnik Powszechny could assess what was important for the SB and, presumably, for the regime.

THE CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING PROPERTY RESTITUTION There were four pivotal controversies concerning the restitution of properties to religious communities: first, should only properties confiscated by the communists be restored to the religious communities affected, or could the restoration process be applied also to properties confiscated, for example, by Russian occupation authorities during the years 1795– 1918;64 second, should the roughly 25,000 Polish Jews who remained in Poland (as of 2013)65 be entitled to obtain the return of some 6,000 properties and facilities lost after 1933;66 third, was the restitution process marred by corruption;67 and finally, has the Catholic Church, in particular, received properties worth more than what it had lost and has such restitution been damaging to local communities and businesses?68 The first of these was short-lived, and, where the Catholic Church was concerned, it was decided to focus attention on restoring properties confiscated by the communists. The second controversy was largely stirred up by representatives of the roughly one million Polish Jews living outside Poland, who argued that the provisions being offered by the government were unjust and that only full restitution could be considered just.69 Not surprisingly, the Polish government was not prepared to return one facility or property for every four Polish citizens of the Jewish faith still living in Poland, and, while the aforementioned representatives considered the compensation to the Jewish community inadequate, Edward Moskal, president of the Polish-American Congress, wrote to then-President THE CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING PROPERTY RESTITUTION 237

Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 1996 to accuse the Polish government of “excessive submissiveness to Jewish demands” and of making excessive property restitution to the Jewish community.70 But it is the latter two controversies which have stirred up more tangible resentment against the Catholic Church and its agents. Soon after 1989, five property commissions were established: one each for the Catholic Church (Roman and Eastern rites), the Jewish Community, the Lutheran Church, and the Orthodox Church, with a fifth commission to handle claims from all other religious communities. By 31 August 2009, 1,483 of the 3,063 claims presented by the Catholic Church had been settled. Restitution to the Church was made without compensation to those losing the properties, who were typically local governments, schools, or hospitals,71 while, if a former Church property had ended up in private hands, the Church was usually given property of equivalent value from public lands.72 But some private businesses were also affected, including a private corporation which had held land used for grazing animals, and was left with the animals but no land for them to use for grazing. The property commissions operated behind closed doors, and their decisions were not subject to appeal. An attempt by two Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)73 deputies in 1996 to transfer the restitution process to the courts, thereby making the process transparent and introducing the possibility of appeal, was rebuffed by the Sejm.74 It did not help the dignity of the Church that the property commission dealing with Catholic claims operated in a corrupt way. Specifically, the Church hired agents to represent them in the claims process. These agents, in turn, when the issue of offering the Church alternative properties in compensation came up, typically submitted high estimates of the value of confiscated Church properties. Thus, when substitutions were made, the Church did very well. The agents then charged the Church a handling fee, which was often paid with a slice of the land turned over to the Church. The agents would then turn around and sell these properties at a profit. As one informant told me, for many Poles it was the corruption surrounding the Church’s gains in the property restitution process which angered them the most.75 But controversy did not end there. In two reports published in Gazeta Wyborcza, Martin Pietraszewski claimed that members of the Property Commission had been devoid of either professional qualifications or basic competence, had ruled as many as 15 times on a single case, had lost the records of 57 cases altogether, and, after returning land to the 238 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

Cistercian Order in 1994, accepted an application from that Order 10 years later for compensation for the land which had already been returned to the Order. According to Pietraszewski, the Commission then paid the Cisterians 66 million złoty!76 The records not lost by the Commission were found to lack such information as the date of application, the size of the claims, the date of the meeting with the applicants, the methodology used (if any) to verify the legitimacy of the claims, and estimates of the value of the properties transferred. But Pietraszewski concluded, on the basis of his research, that the parishes and religious orders were repeatedly overcompensated for their losses.77 All of this has, of course, contributed to public skepticism about the work of the Property Commission.

THE CHURCH AND SEX,PRIESTLY SEX ABUSE Precisely because consensus about various matters relating to gender and sex are breaking down, the Church has considered it necessary, in recent decades, to devote a larger proportion of its time than previously to denouncing various sexual notions or practices with which it disagrees. (Other subjects which occupied the Church’s attention in past centuries, including heresies, freedom of religion – denounced in the Syllabus of Errors of 1864 – and astronomical discoveries, have ceased to preoccupy the Church elders.) Among those practices which the Church continues to view as sins are homosexuality, abortion, in vitro fertilization, and the ordination of women. But even in traditionally Catholic Poland, the Church’s ability to hold people to its principles in these areas has weakened. For example, while 62% of Poles in a survey conducted in 2009 declared their opposition to any form of legal union between partners of the same sex, that suggested that up to 38% were prepared to accept such unions or had no clear opinion on the matter. Indeed, in a 2011 survey, 54% of respondents expressed support for the concept of civil partnerships.78 Moreover, only 37% of respondents (in 2009) disapproved of homosexual relationships as such.79 Nonetheless, in May 2011, the SLD introduced a draft bill on civil partnerships to regulate inheritance rights, taxes, some civil and administrative matters, and guaranteeing the right of a gay person not to have to testify against his or her partner in court.80 When that bill failed to pass, MP Ryszard Kalisz (SLD) and MP Robert Biedron (Palikot Movement) introduced a new bill on civil partnerships in January 2012.81 That bill likewise failed passage but, eight months later, spokesmen for the center-right PO THE CHURCH AND SEX, PRIESTLY SEX ABUSE 239 announced that the party would introduce a bill to establish civil partnership status for same-sex couples.82 By January 2013, three more bills had been brought before the lower house for consideration: a bill presented by the PO, which would have extended legal protection to gays and lesbians, including the right to inherit property from their partners and tax breaks. The other two bills, offered respectively by the SLD and the Palikot Movement, included additional rights. All three bills were, however, decisively rejected in the Sejm.83 Activists for gay/lesbian rights did not give up, and held an ‘Equality Parade’ in Warsaw the following June, with several thousand people taking part.84 In September 2015, Andrzej Duda, who had taken office as president the previous month, vetoed a bill which would have granted transgen- dered persons the right to change their legal gender. The following month, the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) led by Jarosław Kaczyński, won the parliamentary elections. Kaczyński, who would soon tighten the reins on some media under government control85 and initiate efforts to end the independence of the judiciary,86 had already gone on record declaring that “the affirmation of homosexuality will lead to the downfall of civilisation.”87 But the electoral victory of PiS prompted a group of lesbian and gay couples to establish a Coalition for Civil Partnerships and to announce their intention to seek to change the laws relating to LGBT rights.88 But neither the Holy See nor the Polish episcopate has budged on the issue of same-sex unions. At one point, Pope Francis (b. 1936; elected pope in March 2013) showed some signs of being open to accepting same-sex unions as worthy, but resistance from a conservative bloc in the College of Cardinals induced the pope to retrace his steps. Indeed, after raising expectations in the gay community, Pope Francis issued a report on the family in April 2016, stating “that gay people should receive ‘assistance’ to bring them back to normality, and affirm[ing that] there are ‘absolutely no grounds’ for considering recognition of ‘homosexual unions’.”89 He added that he considered it “unac- ceptable that local Churches should be subjected to pressure in this matter and that international bodies should make financial aid to poor countries dependent on the introduction of laws to establish ‘marriage’ between persons of the same sex.”90 With this, Pope Francis gave encouragement to the largely conservative episcopate in Poland. Nonetheless, there may be passages in Scripture which might suggest a different attitude, for example, the story of the Good Samaritan, which, after all, was not intended to apply only to persons from Samaria. 240 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

On abortion, the Church’s stance is unequivocal: for the Church, abortion is tantamount to murder. Many Poles disagree, as, according to a study published in 2011 in Reproductive Health Matters, every year approximately 150,000 Polish women have (illegal) abortions, and, of this number, about 10–15% of abortions are performed abroad.91 (There are only about 500 legal abortions performed in Poland each year.) Moreover, 80% of Poles believe that a woman should have a right to an abortion when her health is at risk, while 74% consider that a legal abortion should be allowed in the event that a birth defect has been detected.92 Nonetheless, a vocal minority continues to insist on a total ban on abortion, regardless of circumstances, as evinced in a march involving 1,800 persons organized by Radio Maryja in March 2007.93 The continuing polarization over the issue of abortion was reflected in the presentation of entirely antagonistic bills in the Sejm in summer 2011. While conservatives in the Sejm introduced a bill to ban abortion completely, without exception, the SLD introduced a draft bill to liberalize the regulations governing abortion, to introduce sex education in the schools, and to provide for reimbursement for abortion and contraceptives.94 Both bills were defeated. A renewed effort by conservative MPs to further restrict access to abortion – by criminalizing the abortion of seriously disabled or terminally ill fetuses – was defeated in parliament in October 2012.95 The results of the October 2015 elections brought about a political earthquake, changing the content of debates across many policy spheres, including where abortion was concerned. In March 2016, the Polish episcopate appealed to the new government to pass a law prohibiting abortion under any and all circumstances – meaning including in the event that the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest or in the event that continuation of the pregnancy posed a high risk of serious damage to the health of the woman. The day after the bishops made this appeal, Prime Minister Beata Szydło (b. 1963) declared that she favored a total ban on all abortions.96 Three former Polish first ladies – Danuta Wałęsa, Jolanta Kwaśniewska, and Anna Komorowska – registered their opposition to the proposed total ban in an open letter, while public protests took place in Warsaw, Kraków, Wrocław, Poznań, Lublin, Kielce, Toruń, Opole, Szczecin, and Białystok. In response, Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Gowin urged caution on the part of legislators, warning that “a total ban could ‘lead to rebellion which in a few years could lead to the full THE CHURCH AND SEX, PRIESTLY SEX ABUSE 241 liberalization of anti-abortion legislation.’”97 With a pro-life (pro-ban) march being staged in Warsaw on 24 April, Kazimierz Cardinal Nycz declared, “We don’t defend human life because that is what the gospel says. Not even because it’s the fifth commandment ...We defend life, because it is a fundamental value for everyone. It is the foundation of human dignity.”98 Subsequently, on 15 May 2016, pro-life marches were held in more than 140 cities across Poland.99 From then through early October there were marches both in favor of choice and opposed, both against a total ban on all abortions without exception and in favor of precisely a blanket ban, even when a woman’slifeisendangered.In September, the Sejm was presented with two bills: one drafted by the anti-abortion group “Stop Abortion”, and the other drafted by the pro-choice group “Save Women”. The bill, approved by the Sejm on 23 September, would have made it illegal to have an abortion, regardless of the circumstances – which is to say regardless of rape, incest, damage to the fetus, or danger to the life of the woman. The vote provoked rage across Poland and, on 3 October 2016, tens of thousands of women marched in cities and towns across Poland, attired in black, while on-lookers often dressed in black in a show of solidarity. Men sympathetic to the women served the marchers soup and sand- wiches. So extensive were the protests, with people boycotting work and school to take part in the protest, that, by 5 October, the MPs reversed themselves, now voting down the bill, 352 to 58. Polls taken at the time revealed an avalanche of opposition to the bill but also growing support for a liberalization of the law passed in 1993.100 Again, where in vitro fertilization (IVF) is concerned, the Church’s stand is that, although the practice is pro-life in the most literal sense, it involves recourse to artificial measures, and moreover entails discarding unwanted human embryos. Because of this, the Church remains opposed to IVF. Thus, when, in late 2008, Prime Minister Donald Tusk pledged that IVF would be partly refunded by the state, Archbishop Józef Michalik, chairman of the Polish Episcopal Conference, issued a statement, declaring that “there is no slightest doubt that IVF violates the right to live of conceived persons. As the price of one life, to give parents pleasure and give them a child, another one is killed.”101 Subsequently, when Bolesław Piecha, a PiS parliamentarian, introduced a measure to ban IVF altogether, the Episcopate immediately endorsed the bill.102 Yet a survey conducted in 2010 found that 73% of Poles supported in vitro fertilization for married couples who were unable to conceive; by 2015, 242 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

79% of Poles said that they wanted the Church to support in vitro fertilization for such couples.103 It was, accordingly, with the implicit support of a clear majority of Poles that, in October 2010, Polish MPs took up legislation to provide state funding for IVF; in response, Polish bishops declared that they would consider any MPs supporting the measure to be “outside the Church”–which is only slightly short of excommunication.104 Altogether, six alternative bills concerning IVF were introduced in the parliament in late 2010, ranging from Małgorzata Kidawa-Blonska’s bill to provide state subsidies for in vitro fertilization to Bolesław Piecha’s bill to ban IVF completely.105 Two years later (on 22 October 2012), Prime Minister Tusk announced that he was authorizing public financing of in vitro fertilization – a move supported by roughly 80% of Poles.106 Finally, on the ordination of women, while there is less support among Poles for women priests, the Episcopate’s stance is rooted in the Church’s very concept of the standing of women and men. For example, when, in 2004, the Speaker of Parliament introduced a bill concerning the equal status of women and men, the Polish Episcopate declared its opposition to any such measure which, in its view, “consumes [the] time and attention of MPs in such a difficult time for our country.”107 In other words, for the bishops, equality is of secondary importance, if even that. In this context, one might, of course, have expected that the Church would apply the most stringent measures against its own clergy, when they violate their vows of chastity, and most especially when such violations involve pedophilia. Yet, since the early 1980s, there has been a rising tide of allegations of pedophilia, involving both girls and boys, brought against Catholic priests. In the United States alone there were allegations made, during the years 1950–2002, against 4,127 of a total of 94,607 priests active during those years,108 and several dioceses declared bankruptcy after paying damages to victims of sex abuse; in Germany there have been allegations of systematic sex abuse by priests in the Regensburg diocese where Archbishop Joseph Ratzinger (elected pope in 2005, taking the name Benedict XVI) and his brother Georg held senior positions. All of this has been amply reported in the Polish press. But there have also been cases of alleged sex abuse by clergy in Ireland, The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, and Poland itself.109 The most prominent of the Polish cases involved the aforementioned Archbishop Paetz of Poznań, accused of the sexual molestation of seminarians and, as already noted, forced to resign from his post in 2002. Another case involved two priests THE CHURCH AND SEX, PRIESTLY SEX ABUSE 243 in the Diocese of Płock who were accused in 2007 of having sexually abused some of their pupils.110 There were also reports of sexual molestation in Zakroczym parish and in the parish of Starogard Gdański,111 and yet another case involved child molestation in Szeczecin, where three bishops became aware of the problem, but took no effective action.112 But, against the wishes of Paetz’s successor in Poznań, Archbishop Stanisław Gadecki and other bishops, the Vatican decided in June 2010 to lift the ban on Paetz, allowing him once more to exercise the prerogatives attached to the office of archbishop.113 Although most bishops have tried to strike a delicate note when discussing priestly sex abuse, Fr. Rydzyk’s comment in January 2011 was strident; in Rydzyk’s view, it would be best not to talk about pedophilia by priests at all since, as he put it, it harms the Church even to discuss the subject.114 In spite of the growing clamor, the Polish Episcopate declared its firm opposition, in March 2012, to any notion that the Church would or should pay compensation to the victims of priestly sex abuse.115 Moreover, although prosecutors have brought sex abuse charges against dozens of Polish priests, it has proven difficult to secure sentences and those imposed have usually involved suspended jail sentences. Convicted clergy have typically been sent back to work in parishes, “often working with children, while their victims face hostility and exclusion.”116 But, for the prestige of the Church in Poland, particularly problematic was the revelation (in spring 2010) that Pope John Paul II knew about the allegations of sex abuse and specifically “had blocked an inquiry into a paedophile cardinal [Hans Hermann Groer], promoted senior church figures despite accusations that they had molested boys, and covered up innumerable cases of abuse during his 26-year papacy.”117 In spite of this, Pope Benedict XVI pushed ahead with plans to beatify his predecessor setting the ceremony for 1 May 2011. In support of the beatification, the pope accepted that Marie-Simon Pierre, a French nun, had been miracu- lously cured of Parkinson’s disease after appealing to the late pontiff to intercede on her behalf. However, it has also been reported that the nun had not suffered from Parkinson’s at all, but from some other affliction.118 In such circumstances, Stanisław Obirek, a Polish theologian and former Jesuit priest, commented: “I believe John Paul is the key person responsible for the cover-up of abuse cases ...How can someone who is to blame for this be beatified?”119 That is a question many Catholics, including conservative Catholics,120 have asked themselves, including in Poland. But when the day for John Paul II’s beatification arrived, more than 244 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

1.5 million people from some 90 countries, including Poland, crowded onto St. Peter’s Square in Roman to watch the main ceremony, while, in Poland, hundreds of thousands of Poles turned out to watch parallel ceremonies on 1 May in Warsaw and other cities.121 Just three years later, John Paul II was canonized; an estimated 800,000 pilgrims from various countries came to Rome for the canonization ceremony. In addition, some 30,000 persons gathered in Kraków, where John Paul had served as archbishop before becoming pope, to hear Masses and watch a live broadcast of the ceremony in Rome.122

FATHER RYDZYK’S POLARIZING STATEMENTS,SINCE 2004 Since 2004, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, the director of Radio Maryja, has indulged in disseminating interpretations or predictions which some might consider paranoid. For example, after the tragic death of Poland’s President Lech Kaczyński and other Polish notables in a plane crash near Smolensk in April 2010, Rydzyk made some vague insinuations about a conspiracy. In his version of the meaning of the tragedy, “Now all power falls into the hands of those who began to break down the Polish state. They’ve already arranged appointments. Then they will be able to introduce an anti-Polish and inhuman program, including Bronisław Komorowski’s ideas to use in vitro methods. Then comes the time for abortion and euthanasia.”123 Or again, in viewing the elections scheduled for June 2010, Rydzyk accused acting President Komorowski of being involved in a conspiracy with Russia’s secret service and warned that the June elections “could be rigged in favour of Russian interests.”124 Or again, in response to a question posed by a journalist for the weekly magazine Polityka in early 2011, Rydzyk expressed his concern that Poles – who numbered more than 38 million in July 2010 (an estimated 38,415,284 in July 2012)125 – might be dying out and warned that “soon there will be only 15 million [Poles],” adding ominously, “It’s all planned.”126 It is clear that Rydzyk’s remarks are not always well thought out. For example, in May 2010, after Poland was hit by severe ﬂooding in a number of communities, Rydzyk dismissed the ﬂoods as a “distraction” from the “real tragedy of Poles” which, he said, was “anti-family politics,”127 by which he meant the fact that women could obtain abortions if raped or if their health was endangered by the continuation of pregnancy. However, after he accused “the Jewish lobby” of planning to extort $65 billion from Poland (also characterizing Polish President CONCLUSION 245

Kaczyński as a “swindler”), the Simon Wiesenthal Center and the Israeli ambassador to Poland protested; the Center even launched a petition calling for Rydzyk’s dismissal as director of the radio station. Rydzyk was not dismissed, but he was compelled to issue an apology.128 Although it was not the first time Rydzyk had had to apologize for anti-Semitic remarks,129 Rydzyk’s superiors in the Redemptorist Order confirmed that he would not be punished.130 Rydzyk has both supporters and critics – among the latter, Bishop Pieronek. Interestingly, Father Ryszard Bożek, the incoming provincial of the Redemptorist Order in Poland and thus Rydzyk’s superior, suggested in February 2008 that Radio Maryja needed to be reformed and that it should not ostracize anyone. This was, as Gazeta Wyborcza reported, the first time that the leading figure in the order had spoken critically of Rydzyk.131 But he has also had his supporters, such as Archbishop Slawoj Głódź, who was responsible for overseeing the media on behalf of the Episcopal Conference in the years 2002–2012,132 and Archbishop Michalik, who served as Archbishop of Przemyśl from May 1993 to April 2016.133 Radio Maryja alienates many, but it also appeals to the most conservative elements in the Catholic community and, according to a well-known formula, by expressing views which make more sober elements in the Church shudder, it allows the Polish Episcopal Conference to present itself, by comparison with Fr. Rydzyk’s radio, as a beacon of moderation.

CONCLUSION Until recently, there was no controversy about the social insurance premiums and pensions for the clergy which were being paid by the government. But in 2012, the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk (PO) prepared legislation to terminate the Church Fund.134 While Archbishop Michalik brooded about “the new global culture [that] springs from postmodernism, which promotes moral relativism, abortion, same-sex marriage, homosexuality and so forth,”135 some 3,000 Polish feminists and their supporters marched down Warsaw’s streets in mid-March to demand that the “umbilical cord” be cut and that in vitro fertilization and abortion be fully legalized.136 Most Poles agreed that state subventions to the Church should be halted, with 65% of Poles (surveyed in early 2012) declaring themselves opposed to any state subsidies or payments of any kind to the Churches.137 In February 246 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

2013, representatives of Church and state agreed on a compromise, whereby the Church Fund would be replaced by a 0.5% tax write-off, whereby Poles would be allowed to allocate 0.5% of their income tax to go to the religious association of their choice. Taking effect in 2014, the new scheme was expected to pay for the health insurance and pensions previously covered by the Church Fund. The combination of the Church’s energetic pursuit of its social agenda in the first decade after the collapse of communism, the revelations concerning clerical collaboration with the communist-era secret police, and the Church’s embarrassingly belated and ineffective response to the revelations about priestly sex abuse of minors have certainly undercut the Church’s prestige – and not only in Poland.138 But the processes of privatization and polarization have sources independent of the Church’s handling of these challenges. Concerning the privatization of faith – the process of choosing as a private person what to believe and accept and what to reject – the data are overwhelming and convincing. For example, where abortion is concerned, only 14% of respondents in a poll conducted by the Polish CBOS agency in May 2010 agreed with the Church’s stance that there should be a total ban on abortion, with no exceptions. At the other extreme, 7% said that abortion should be available on demand, with no restrictions. Between these two extremes, 36% favored a conservative approach allowing exceptions more or less as the law prescribes (danger to the woman’s health, rape, evidence of serious birth defects), while 38% favored a liberal approach but with some restrictions.139 CBOS revisited the question of abortion in a survey conducted in April 2016 among 1,034 respondents. The agency reported that – in defiance of the Church’s teachings – 81% of respondents believed that abortion should be legally available if the mother’s life is in danger, 70% if the mother’s health is threatened, 78% if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest, and 52% if the child would be born disabled.140 Concerning contraceptives, the use of which the Church likewise condemns, 75% of Poles were reported to want to have contraceptives available, according to a Univision poll conducted in 2014,141 with roughly the same number (75.4% in 2010) believing that the cost of contraceptives should be partly defrayed by the government.142 Again, on the question of in vitro fertilization – which the Church condemns as a serious sin – 73% of respondents in the same poll, as already noted, approved of the procedure for married couples, with 43% supporting IVF even for unmarried couples.143 The CBOS pollsters also asked their sample whether gay and lesbian couples should have a right to CONCLUSION 247 civil partnerships with the same economic rights as are associated with heterosexual marriages and found that fully 45% answered in the affirma- tive in May 2010 (up from 34% in December 2003), against 47% answer- ing in the negative (down from 58% in 2003).144 Support for gay/lesbian unions remained stable between 2010 and 2013, with 44% of Poles agreeing that “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their lives as they wish,” according to an opinion poll conducted in May 2013 by the French Institute of Public Opinion.145 Finally, when asked what values are most important in their lives, religious faith was in sixth place with only 17% support, behind a happy family (84%), good health (74%), honesty (23%), peace and quiet (20%), and career (18%).146 To find religious faith ranking as less important for Poles than peace and quiet may well have come as a shock to the Church. But in terms of the traditional faith, there is more bad news for the Church in Poland. Among other things, divorce has become more frequent in recent years, with an estimated 27% of marriages ending in divorce,147 declines in both regular attendance at Mass (from more than 80% in the late 1980s to just 39% in 2015) and in the number of Poles entering the priesthood,148 and a decline in trust in the Church as well as in Poles’ confidence in its “ability to provide answers to problems in family life and on moral, social and political questions.”149 Moreover, discipline within the ranks of the clergy has weakened, with almost a third of Polish Catholic priests surveyed in 2009 admitting to having had sexual relations with women, and 12% admitting to sustaining a stable relationship with a woman, in defiance of the vow of celibacy.150 Conducted by Jozef Baniak, a professor of sociology at the University of Warsaw, among a sample of 800 priests, the poll showed that 53% of respondents wanted to be allowedtomarry.151 After conducting a subsequent study three years later, Baniak reported that 60% of Polish priests maintain sexual contact with women, and that between 10 and 15% of them have children.152 I take the foregoing measures to be indicators of a decline in the ability of the Church to enforce discipline within its own ranks and to influence attitudes and behaviors.153 Moreover, in an opinion poll conducted by CBOS in 2013, 43% of respondents said that pedophilia among priests was the Church’s biggest problem, with 23% were “appalled by the excessive, in their opinion, standard of living of the priests,” and 19% felt that alcohol abuse by priests was a serious problem.154 248 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

Not all indicators are in this direction. There is, to begin with, the fact that 93% of Poles still describe themselves as Catholics (according to a poll conducted in 2012)155, even linking Catholicism with Polish identity,156 and the further, by no means insignificant report that 73% of Poles said that they had a positive view of the Catholic Church in April 2010 – although “strong trust” in the Church plummeted to just 24% by 2016, with an additional 46% reporting “moderate trust” in the Church.157 Finally, research carried out by Ewa Gołębiowska has shown that Catholic Poles have become more resistant to seeing their sons or daughters marrying outside the faith, which is to say more in harmony with the Church’s preference of religiously homogeneous marriages.158 But the growing tendency toward the privatization of faith may also be seen to reflect a gradually shifting balance between more conservative Catholics and more liberal Catholics, which in turn relates to the polarization of Polish society which became very evident in the wake of the 2005 elections which brought Lech Kaczyński into the presidency and his brother Jarosław into the prime minister’soffice. In many ways, it is Fr. Rydzyk’s Radio Maryja which is the lightning rod of polarization in Poland, at least where religion and religious values are concerned. Here, on the one hand, Fr. Rydzyk continues to command the loyalty of his regular listeners – estimated to number 1.5 million in 2002 or about 3.9% of the population.159 Rydzyk’s most loyal followers would agree with the conservative (or perhaps, ultra-conservative) position that “progress and modernism simply represent categories of official discourse aimed at the disappearance of the Church.”160 In a similar spirit, the conservative newspaper Prawica characterized the (present) third republic as “a dictatorship of relativism in a democratic disguise” and argued that there was “no essential difference” between the (communist) People’s Republic and the third republic as regards the relationship of each to divine truth.161 On the other hand, surveys have shown that a majority of Poles view Rydzyk as “a negative influence”.162 And, in the liberal corner within the Church, one may count “ ...circles of ‘progressive’ Catholics, more liberal in their views [than the hierarchy] on social issues, usually pro- EU and propagating such liturgical ‘novelties’ as placing the Host in the hand and not into the mouth of the person receiving the sacrament of Communion.”163 If either the conservative camp or the liberal camp within the Church in Poland were to establish a clear predominance, it would likely drive at least some members of the other camp to leave the Church – as shown in the drift into the Catholic Church of some NOTES 249

Anglicans who do not accept either women priests or homosexuality. But it is not likely that either camp will establish any such predominance in the near future, and, meanwhile, the challenges outlined above will affect the Church’s standing in the short term, while generational change164 and the increasing privatization of religion will have ever greater importance for Catholicism in Poland over the long term.

NOTES 1. See Pawel Zalęcki, “How the Polish Roman Catholic Church’s Representatives Explain Decline of the Positive Estimations of the Church’s Public Activities”,inSlovak Sociological Review, Vol. 35, No. 6 (Fall 2003), pp. 533–556, on www.ceeol.com. 2. See Irena Borowik, “Why has Religiosity in Poland Not Changed Since 1989? Five Hypotheses”,inPolitics and Religion, Vol. 3, No. 2 (August 2010), pp. 262–275; and Gazeta Wyborcza (27 April 2010), at http:// wyborcza.pl/ [accessed on 2 May 2010]. 3. For details, see Pedro Ramet, “Religious Ferment in Eastern Europe”,in Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter 1984), pp. 87–116. 4. Zalęcki, “How the Polish Roman Catholic”,p.1. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., pp. 1–2, 5. 7. Ibid., p. 6. 8. Krzystof Koseła, “Religijność mlodych Niemców i Polaków”,inSocjologia Religii (Poznań), Vol. 2 (2004), pp. 125, 130. 9. Witold Zdaniewicz and Sławomir H. Zaręba (eds.), Kośćioł Katolicki na początku trzeciego tysiąclecia w opinii Polaków (Warsaw: Instytut Statystyki Kośćioła Katolickiego, 2004), pp. 292–294. 10. The results of the poll were reported, inter alia, in The Daily Telegraph and Danas. See Daily Telegraph (London), 1 April 2009, at http://www.tele graph.co.uk/news/religion/5089758/Young-Poles-rejecting- Catholicism.html [accessed on 1 April 2009]; and Danas (Belgrade), 3 April 2009, at http://www.danas.rs/vesti/svet/evropa/mladi_poljaci_okrecu_ ledja_katolicanstvu.52.html?news_id=157777 [accessed on 18 May 2009]. 11. Jan Puhl, “The Catholic Church’s Fading Inﬂuence in Poland”, Spiegel Online (11 July 2012), at http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ inﬂuence-of-catholic-church-on-the-decline-in-poland-a–843694.html [accessed on 11 July 2012]. 12. Zalęcki, “How the Polish Roman Catholic”, p. 8. One might add environmental destruction and the extinction of species to the list of social issues to which the Church has not paid as much attention as some people wish. 250 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

13. See Mirella W. Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland”,inEurope-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 5 (July 1998), pp. 821–823. 14. See Andrzej Korbonski, “Poland Ten Years After: The Church”,in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 127–128. See also Eberts, “The Roman Catholic Church”, pp. 823–826. 15. Krystyna Daniel, “The Church-State Situation in Poland After the Collapse of Communism”,inBrigham Young University Law Review Vol. 1995 (1995), Issue 2, p. 413. 16. Ibid., p. 414. 17. Puhl, “The Catholic Church’s Fading Inﬂuence”,p.1. 18. CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 12/2013, at http://www.cbos.pl/PL/pub likacje/public_opinion/2013/12_2013.pdf [accessed on 24 July 2016], p. 2 of 4. 19. As quoted in Krzysztof Zuba, “The Political Strategies of the Catholic Church in Poland”,inReligion, State & Society, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2010), p. 119. 20. As quoted in Ibid., p. 120. 21. From the Polish, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. 22. From the Polish, Liga Polskich Rodzin. 23. See Sarah L. de Lange and Simona Guerra, “The League of Polish Families Between East and West, Past and Present”,inCommunist and Post- Communist Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 527–549. 24. Zuba, “The Political Strategies”, p. 121. 25. Ibid., p. 121. 26. From the Polish, Platforma Obywatelska. 27. From the Polish, Slużba Bezpieczeństwa. 28. Jonathan Luxmoore, “Polish Church Faces Questions About Role Under Communism”,inNational Catholic Reporter (5 April 2002), at http:// natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives [accessed on 14 April 2009]; see also Antoni Dudek and Ryszard Gryz, Komunisci i Kośćioł w Polsce, 1945–1989 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2003). For a discussion and summary of the volume by Dudek and Gryz, see Jaroslaw Anders, “Poland’s Compromised Church”,inForeign Policy (July/August 2003), pp. 98–100. 29. From the Polish, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. 30. Marek Lasota, Donos na Wojtyłe: Karol Wojtyła w teczkach bezpieki (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2006). 31. “Apology for Communist Collaboration of Polish Priests”, Poland.pl (15 June 2006), at http://www.poland.pl/ [accessed on 24 November 2009], my emphasis. 32. “Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz Verify Collaborationists”, Catholic Online (30 August 2006), at http://www.catholic.org/featured/headline.php?ID= 3597 [accessed on 12 January 2011]. NOTES 251

33. Fr. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, Director of the St. Albert Foundation, code 1117, in interview with the author, Radwanowice, 9 May 2011. 34. Polish News Bulletin (7 June 2006), in NewsBank – Access World News, downloaded from Georgetown University electronic databases (hereafter, GUED); and Dziennik, summarized in The Warsaw Voice (2 June 2006), at http://www.warsawvoice.pl/newsX.php/2245/printVer/ [accessed on 10 June 2009]. See also Polish News Bulletin (1 June 2006), in NewsBank – Access World News, GUED. 35. Regarding Maliński, The Warsaw Voice (30 May 2006), at http://www. warsawvoice.pl/newsX.php/2214/printVer/ [accessed on 10 June 2009]; regarding Czajkowski, The Warsaw Voice (12 July 2006), at http://www. warsawvoice.pl/newsX.php/2458/printVer/ [accessed on 10 June 2009]. Among others, he was said to have provided information to the SB about Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko – according to Der Spiegel (16 January 2007), at http:// www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,druck–459791,00.html [accessed on 15 January 2011]. 36. The Warsaw Voice (23 June 2006), at http://www.warsawvoice.pl/ WVpage/pages/article.php/2352/news [accessed on 14 January 2011]. 37. Fr. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, in interview with the author [note 33]. 38. As quoted in “Controversial Polish Priest Receives Cardinal’s Apology for Criticism”, What the Cardinals Believe (16 November 2006), at http:// www.cardinalrating.com/cardinal_36_article_4939_print.htm [accessed on 26 September 2009]. 39. “Prymas przeprasza ks. Zaleskiego”, interia.pl (6 November 2006), at http://fakty.interia.pl/news/prymas-przeprasza-ks-zaleskiego,813591 [accessed on 13 January 2011]. 40. BBC News (5 January 2007), at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/ [accessed on 7 December 2010]. 41. Author’s interview, code 1106, Warsaw, 29 April 2011. 42. I am indebted to Grzegorz Piotrowski (European University Institute) for this insight. 43. Radio Netherlands (8 January 2007), at http://www.radionetherlands.nl/ currentaffairs/pol070108mc [accessed on 25 September 2007]; Agence France Presse (AFP), 3 March 2007, from [email protected], by subscription; and Tagesschau (12 January 2007), at http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/ meldung68786.html [accessed on 12 July 2010]. 44. Voice of America (20 July 2010), at http://www1.voanews.com/english/ news/a–13–2007–02–20-voa54.html [accessed on 20 July 2010]. In March 2007, only two months after the failed installation and one month after the pope’s “special apostolic blessing” for Wielgus, the Polish press published revelations of ﬁnancial abuse in the Caritas Fund for the Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities at the Diocese of Płock. See 252 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

“Abp Wielgus tolerował afery w płockim Caritasie”, wprost 24 (2 March 2007), at http://www.wprost.pl/ar/?O=102306 [accessed on 13 January 2011]. 45. Fr. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, Kzięża wobec bezpieki: na przykładzie archidiecezji krakowskiej (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2007). 46. Atila Sinke Guimaraes, “Pope Praises Homosexual Archbishop”, Bird’s Eye View of the News (29 July 2009), at http://www.traditioninaction.org/ bev/111bev07–31–2009.htm [accessed on 21 July 2010]. 47. ORF.at news (30 January 2007), at http://religion.orf.at/projekt03/ news/0701/ne070130_polen.htm [accessed on 12 July 2010]. 48. Isakowicz-Zaleski, Kzięża wobec bezpieki, pp. 266–269, 272–277, 286–287. 49. Ibid., pp. 57–68. 50. Ibid., pp. 109–119. 51. Ibid., pp. 131–135. 52. Ibid., p. 138. 53. Ibid., pp. 100–108. 54. Ibid., pp. 185–190. 55. Ibid., p. 177. 56. Ibid., pp. 178–184. 57. These quotations are taken from “Polish Bishops Criticize Priest’s Book”,in America Magazine (19 March 2007), at http://www.americamagazine. org/content/article.cfm?article_id=5351 [accessed on 26 September 2009]. 58. AP News (27 June 2007), at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/ [accessed on 12 July 2010]; and author’s interview, code 1106, Warsaw, 29 April 2011. 59. As quoted in Jonathan Luxmoore, “Polish Bishops Say Vatican Clears Them of Secret Police Collaboration”,inCatholic News Service (12 March 2009), at http://www.catholicreview.org/subpages/storyworldnew-new.aspx? action=5811 [accessed on 30 March 2009]. 60. Roman Graczyk, Cena przetrwania? SB wobec Tygodnika Powszechny (Warsaw: Wydawca Czerwone i Czarne, 2011), pp. 369, 372–373. 61. Roman Graczyk, Researcher at IPN-Kraków, code 1118, in interview with the author, Kraków, 11 May 2011. 62. Stefan Wilkanowicz, chairman of the International Center for Education about Auschwitz and the Holocaust and former journalist at Tygodnik Powszechny, code 1122, in interview with the author, Kraków, 12 May 2011. 63. Ibid. 64. Polish News Bulletin (15 November 1991), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. NOTES 253

65. American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, press release 17 October 2013, at http://www.jdc.org/news/press-releases/2013/warsaw-jews-to- open-first-jcc.html?referrer=https://en.wikipedia.org/ [accessed on 16 October 2016]. 66. The estimate of the number of properties lost by the Jewish community after 1933 is taken from Polish News Bulletin (20 February 1997), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 67. Author’s interview, code 1112, Warsaw, 6 May 2011; confirmed in author’s interview, code 1115, Warsaw, 6 May 2011. 68. Author’s interview, code 1103, Warsaw, 27 April 2011; confirmed in author’s interview, code 1113, Warsaw, 6 May 2011; reconfirmed in author’s interview, code 1116, Kraków, 8 May 2011. 69. Polish News Bulletin (22 January 1997), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 70. Polish News Bulletin (14 May 1996), in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 71. Author’s interview, code 1103, Warsaw, 27 April 2011. 72. Author’s interview, code 1112, Warsaw, 6 May 2011. 73. From the Polish, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej. 74. Polish News Bulletin (8 May 1996) and Polish News Bulletin (29 May 1996) – both in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 75. Author’s interview, code 1115, Warsaw, 6 May 2011. 76. Gazeta Wyborcza (17 February 2012), at http://wyborcza.pl/ 1,75478,11164181,Komisja_majatowa_skrywany_raport_rzadu_Kosciolowi. html [accessed on 20 February 2012]. 77. Gazeta Wyborcza (19 February 2012), at http://wyborcza.pl/ 1,75478,11179652,Kosciol_dostal_o_kilkaset_rekompensat_wiecej__niz. html [last accessed on 15 July 2012]. 78. Polskie Radio (3 June 2011), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/ 25282,Ruling-party-divided-over-civil-partnership-bill [accessed on 3 June 2011]. 79. AFP (11 July 2009), from [email protected], by subscription. 80. ZETnews (18 May 2011), at http://www.netnews.pl/Poland-in-English/ News/Civil-parrtnership-bill-in-Sejm [accessed on 3 June 2011]. 81. Rzeczpospolita (13 January 2012), at http://www.rp.pl/artykul/ 16,791022-Lewica-w-zwiazku-partnerskim.html [accessed on 13 January 2012]. 82. Edge (7 September 2012), at http://www.edgeonthenet.com/news/inter national/news/136790/in-surprise-move,-poland’s-conservative-party-to- introduce-civil-unions [accessed on 23 September 2012]. 83. “Poland votes down same-sex civil partnerships”, Warsaw Voice (28 January 2013), at http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/ 23563/news [accessed on 24 July 2016]. 254 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

84. “Equality Parade Calls for Civil Partnerships in Poland”, Polskie Radio, English edition (16 June 2013), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/ Artykul/138703,Equality-Parade-calls-for-civil-partnerships-in-Poland [accessed on 23 July 2016]. 85. See Reporters Without Borders, at https://rsf.org/en/poland and https:// rsf.org/en/ranking [accessed on 11 June 2016]; and New York Times (3 July 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/world/europe/ polands-conservative-government-puts-curbs-on-state-tv-news.html?_r=0 [accessed on 19 July 2016], p. 1 of 5. 86. See the chapters in Sabrina P. Ramet, Kristen Ringdal, and Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (eds.), Civic and Uncivic Values in Poland: Value Transformation, Education, and Culture (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, in production). 87. As quoted in Nick Duffy, “Anti-gay Polish Party Secures Election Victory”, Pink News (26 October 2015), at http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2015/10/26/anti- gay-polish-party-secures-election-victory/ [accessed on 23 July 2016]. 88. “New Coalition for Civil Partnerships in Poland”, ILGA-Europe (16 December 2015), at http://www.ilga-europe.org/resources/news/latest- news/new-coalition-civil-partnerships-poland [accessed on 23 July 2016]. 89. Nick Duffy, “Pope Francis: The Catholic Church Will Never Accept Gay Unions”,inPink News (8 April 2016), at http://www.pinknews.co.uk/ 2016/04/08/pope-francis-the-catholic-church-will-never-accept-gay- unions/ [accessed on 22 July 2016]. 90. As quoted in Ibid. 91. Agata Chełstowska, “Stigmatisation and Commercialisation of Abortion Services in Poland: Turning Sin Into Gold”,inReproductive Health Matters, Vol. 19, No. 37 (2011), p. 103; conﬁrmed by Wanda Nowicka, executive director of the Federation for Women and Family Planning, code 1111, in interview with the author, Warsaw, 5 May 2011. See also Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw), 27 August 2010, at http://wyborcza.pl/ 1,75478,8300922,Polskie_aborcje_w_klinikach_calej_Europy.html [accessed on 14 January 2011]. Although estimates in the range of 80,000 to 200,000 illegal abortions per year are common, one agency has suggested a much lower ﬁgure of 7,000 to 14,000 illegal abortions per year, as reported to me by a Polish scholar in an email dated 6 May 2011. 92. National Catholic Reporter (31 May 2006), at http://ncronline.org/ blogs/all-things-catholic/despite-reputation-staunch-catholics-poles- show-independence [accessed on 14 January 2011]. 93. The Warsaw Voice (29 March 2007), at http://www.warsawvoice.pl/ newsX.php/3876/printVer/ [accessed on 10 June 2009]. 94. Dziennik (3 July 2011), at http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/polityka/arty kuly/343947,klotnia-w-radiu-pan-znieslawia-kosciol-katolicki.html NOTES 255

[accessed on 6 July 2011]; and Wiadomości (31 August 2011), at http:// wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80271,10207752,PO_PiS_i_PSL_ przeciwne_liberalizacji_aborcji.html [accessed on 31 August 2008]. As of 15 July 2012, the Wiadomości website redirects to TOKfm.pl at http:// www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/1,103087,10207752,Aborcja_w_Sejmie__Oba_ projekty_upadly__Ale_jednemu.html. 95. Polskie Radio (25 October 2012), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/ Artykul/116377,MPs-reject-further-restrictions-on-abortion-in-Poland [accessed on 28 October 2012]. 96. “Polish PM Favours Complete Ban on Abortion”, Polskie Radio, English edition (31 March 2016), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/ 246764,Polish-PM-favours-complete-ban-on-abortion [accessed on 23 July 2016]. 97. “Polish Deputy PM Admits Ban on Abortion could Backfire”, Polskie Radio, English edition (4 April 2016), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/ 247242,Polish-deputy-PM-admits-ban-on-abortion-could-backfire [accessed on 23 July 2016]. See also “Three Former Polish First Ladies Protest Possible Abortion Ban”, Polskie Radio, English edition (12 April 2016), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/248458,Three-former- Polish-first-ladies-protest-possible-abortion-ban [accessed on 23 July 2016]. 98. As quoted in “Pro-life March in Polish Capital”, Polskie Radio, English edition (25 April 2016), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/ 250099,Prolife-march-in-Polish-capital [accessed on 23 July 2016]. 99. “Pro-life Marches Across Poland”, Polskie Radio (15 May 2016), at http:// www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/252880,Prolife-marches-across-Poland [accessed on 23 July 2016]. 100. The Guardian (5 October 2016), at https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/oct/05/polish-government-performs-u-turn-on-total-abor tion-ban [accessed on 6 October 2016]; and BBC News (6 October 2016), at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe–37573938 [accessed on 10 October 2016]. 101. Gazeta Wyborcza (28 November 2008), at http://wyborcza.pl/ 1,98817,6000729,Bishops_Condemn_IVF.html [accessed on 12 July 2010]. 102. Gazeta Wyborcza (22 June 2009), at http://wyborcza.pl/ [accessed on 12 July 2010]. 103. CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 7/2010, at www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/ public_opinion/2010/07_2010.pdf [accessed on 15 January 2011], p. 4; and CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 3/2015, at http://www.cbos.pl/PL/ publikacje/public_opinion/2015/03_2015.pdf [accessed on 24 July 2016], p. 2 of 4. 256 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

104. Reuters (19 October 2010), at http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSTRE69I1X720101019 [accessed on 24 October 2010]. 105. Agence France Presse (22 October 2010), in LexisNexis Academic Universe; Warsaw Business Journal (25 October 2010), at http://www.wbj.pl/arti cle–51719-six-ivf-bills-in-parliament.html [accessed on 13 April 2011]; and Warsaw Voice (2 November 2010), at http://www.warsawvoice.pl/ WVPage/pages/articlePrint.php/14490/news [accessed on 13 April 2011]. 106. According to a survey conducted in September 2012. See Reuters (22 October 2012), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/22/us- poland-fertility-idUSBRE89L1BJ20121022 [accessed on 22 October 2012]. 107. HLI-Europa News (29 April 2004), at http://www.hli.org.pl/ [accessed on 7 May 2004]. 108. “Executive Summary of the Research Study Conducted by the John Jay College of Criminal Justice”,athttp://www.usceb.org/nrb/johnjays tudy/exec.pdf [accessed on 13 January 2011]. As of 12 March 2011, this report was available at a different website: http://www.nccbuscc.org/nrb/ johnjaystudy/exec.pdf. 109. Swiss info.ch (19 March 2010), at http://www.swissinfo.ch/ [accessed on 15 January 2011]. 110. Rzeczpospolita (3 March 2007), at http://www.rp.pl/artykul/105562. html?print=tak [accessed on 9 April 2011]. 111. Regarding Zakroczym, see Życie Warszawy (6 March 2007), at http:// zyciewarszawy.pl/artykul/215352.html?print=tak [accessed on 10 April 2011]. Regarding PAP (30 March 2007), at http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/ drukuj.html?wid=8795986&ticaid=1c163 [accessed on 7 April 2011]. 112. Gazeta Wyborcza (10 March 2008), at http://www.wyborcza.pl/ [accessed on 12 July 2010]. 113. Polskie Radio (17 June 2010), at http://www.thenews.pl/national/arty kul133740_vatican-absolves-polish-archbishop-accused-of-sexual-molesta tion.html [accessed on 13 January 2011]; and Rzecspospolita (17 June 2010), at http://www.rp.pl/artykul/495391.html [accessed on 13 January 2011]. 114. Pardon (31 January 2011), at http://www.pardon.pl/artykul/13536/ryd zyk_nie_mowmy_o_pedoﬁlii_to_szkodzi_kosciolowi [accessed on 3 February 2011]. 115. Wiadomości (14 March 2012), at http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiado mosci/1,114883,11342994,Episkopat_przyjal_dokument_dot_pedoﬁlii_ Brak_tolerancji.html [accessed on 22 March 2012]. 116. Jonathan Luxmoore, “Priest abusers receive light sentences, most still serve in parishes”, National Catholic Reporter (8 February 2012), at NOTES 257

http://ncronline.org/new/accountability/clerical-power-thwarts_vic tims-poland [accessed on 9 February 2012]. 117. The Sunday Times (4 April 2010), at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ comments/faith/article7086738.ece [accessed on 13 January 2011]. 118. Poland.pl (14 January 2011), at http://www.poland.pl/news/article, Pope_John_Paul_II_to_Be_Beatified_May_1,id,453730.htm [accessed on 14 January 2011]; and The Sunday Times (4 April 2010) [see previous note]. 119. As quoted in The Sunday Times (4 April 2010) [see previous two notes]. 120. See Thomas C. Fox, “Conservative Catholics Question Beatification of John Paul II”,inNational Catholic Reporter (22 March 2011), at http://ncron line.org/print/23617 [accessed on 18 April 2011]. 121. Warsaw Business Journal (2 May 2011), at http://www.wbi.pl/article– 54352-beatification-of-john-paul-ii-celebrated-across-poland-html [accessed on 4 June 2011]; and Katholisch.de (2 May 2011), at http:// www.katholische-kirche.de/Nachricht.aspx?NId=6354 [accessed on 4 June 2011]. 122. Warsaw Voice (28 April 2014), at http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/ pages/article.php/28088/news [accessed on 16 October 2016]. 123. Gazeta Wyborcza (12 April 2010), at http://www.wyborcza.pl/ [accessed on 4 May 2010]. 124. the news.pl (10 May 2010), at http://www.thenews.pl/national/print. aspx?id=131243 [accessed on 28 May 2010]. 125. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook –“Poland”,athttps:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html [accessed on 1 January 2013]. 126. Polityka (Warsaw), 1 February 2011, at http://www.polityka.pl/spolec zenstwo/felletony/1512766,1,z-zycla-sfer.read [accessed on 3 February 2011]. 127. Pardon (28 May 2010), at http://www.pardon.pl/artykul/11640/ryd zyk_powodz_to_odwracanie_uwagi_od_problemow [accessed on 28 May 2010]. 128. BBC News, 11 July 2007 and 13 July 2007, at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/ [both accessed on 3 April 2010)]; and Catholic News Agency (26 July 2007), at http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/polish_priest_apologizes_ for_verbal_attack_on_polands_president/ [accessed on 14 January 2011]. 129. See BBC News (13 April 2006), at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/ [accessed on 4 March 2010]. 130. Krakow Post (16 August 2007), at http://www.krakowpost.com/article/ 372 [accessed on 14 January 2011]. 131. Gazeta Wyborcza (5 February 2008), at http://www.wyborcza.pl/ [accessed on 12 July 2010]. 258 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

132. tvn24.pl (2 October 2007), at http://www.tvn24.pl/12690,1523341,wia domosc.html [accessed on 14 January 2011]. 133. Author’s interview, code 1114, Warsaw, 6 May 2011. 134. Wiadomości (16 March 2012), at http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiado mosci/1,114884,11355931,Tusk__Nie_ruszamy_na_antykoscielna_kruc jate__ale_niech.html [last accessed on 15 July 2012]. 135. “Church Under Attack, Says Leading Archbishop”, Polskie Radio, English edition (21 February 2012), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/ 90856,Church-under-attack-says-leading-archbishop [accessed on 15 March 2012]. 136. “Protesters Demand Cut in ‘Church and State Umbilical Cord’”, Polskie Radio, English edition (12 March 2012), at http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/ Artykul/92945,Protesters-demand-cut-in-Church-and-State-umbilical- cord [accessed on 20 June 2012]. 137. Wiadomości (3 March 2012), at http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiado mosci/1,114883,11360849, Sondaz_Tylko_39_proc_Polakow_oddaloby_Kosciolowi.html [last accessed on 15 July 2012]. 138. An opinion poll conducted among 3,000 respondents in the USA in 2010 found that 82% believed that the scandal of priestly sex abuse of minors had “damaged the prestige of the Catholic Church.”–PR Week (2 April 2010), in LexisNexis Academic. 139. CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 7/2010, at http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publi kacje/public_opinion/2010/07_2010.pdf [last accessed on 24 July 2016], p. 3 of 4. 140. CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 4/2016, at http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publi kacje/public_opinion/2016/04_2016.pdf [accessed on 24 July 2016], p. 4 of 4. 141. Robert McClory, “Contraception, the Univision Poll, and the Pope”, National Catholic Reporter (18 February 2014), at https://www.ncron line.org/blogs/ncr-today/contraception-univision-poll-and-pope [accessed on 24 July 2016]. 142. Jarosław Olszewski, Hanna Olszewska, Anna Abacjew-Chmyłko, and Lukasz Chmyłko, “ Sexual Behavior and Contraception among Young Polish Women”,inActa Obstretricia et Gynecologica Scandinavica, Vol. 89, No. 11 (November 2010) at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/ doi/10.3109/00016349.2010.520080/full [accessed on 24 July 2016]. 143. CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 7/2010 [note 139], p. 4 of 4. An opinion poll commissioned by Polish Radio and conducted by the Homo Homini Institute in 2010 reported that 60% of respondents said that they would ask for in vitro fertilization for themselves if they could not have children by NOTES 259

other means. – TheNews.pl (24 October 2010), at http://www.thenews.pl/ national/?id=142150 [accessed on 13 April 2011]. 144. CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 7/2010 [note 139], p. 2 of 4. 145. The French institute surveyed people in 13 West European countries and 12 East European countries, including Greece and Russia. See Michael Lipka, “Eastern and Western Europe Divided over Gay Marriage, Homosexuality”, Pew Research Center (12 December 2013), at http://www.pewresearch. org/fact-tank/2013/12/12/eastern-and-western-europe-divided-over- gay-marriage-homosexuality/ [accessed on 24 July 2016] 146. CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 7/2010 [note 139], p. 1 of 4. 147. Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 13 March 2009, at http://www.sueddeutsche. de/leben/877/461503/text/print.html [accessedon24April2009]. 148. Süddeutsche Zeitung (4 April 2009), at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/poli tik/306/464900/text/print.html [accessed on 24 April 2009]; AFP (13 May 2010), from [email protected], by subscription; and Jonathan Luxmoore, “John Paul II still looms large, but Poland’s church is changing”, National Catholic Reporter (4 April 2015), at https://www.ncronline.org/news/ global/john-paul-ii-still-looms-large-polands-church-changing [accessed on 24 July 2016]. 149. David Herbert and Max Fras, “European Enlargement, Secularisation and Religious Re-publicisation in Central and Eastern Europe”,inReligion, State and Society, Vol. 37, Nos. 1/2 (March/June 2009), p. 88. 150. “Heikle Umfrage unter polnischen Priestern”, Vereinigng kath. Priester und ihrer Frauen e.V. (8 March 2009), at http://www.vkpf.de/index.php? option=com_content&view=article&id=264:heikle-umfrage-unter-pol nischen-priestern&catid=28:nachrichten&Itemid=44 [accessed on 15 January 2011]. 151. Author’s interview, code 1121, Kraków, 12 May 2011. The results of the poll were also reported in The Daily Telegraph (23 February 2009), at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/ 4788059/Majority-of-Polands-Catholic-priests-want-end-to-celibacy.html [accessed on 6 April 2010]. I was told, however, that the article in the Daily Telegraph was inaccurate in what it reported about Tygodnik Powszechny. 152. Gazeta.pl Wiadomości (30 July 2012), at http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/ wiadomosci/1,114875,12217693,_60_proc__polskich_ksiezy_utrzymuje_ kontakty_z_kobietami_.html [accessed on 30 July 2012]. 153. For an assessment of this trend from a Catholic perspective, see Janusz Mariański, “Reconstruction or Disintegration of Moral Values in Poland: A Sociological Essay”, in Irena Borowik (ed.), Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (Warsaw: Zakład Wydawniczy “Nomos”, 1999), especially pp. 368–371. 260 7 CONTROVERSIES IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

154. CBOS, Polish Public Opnion, 10/2013, at http://www.cbos.pl/PL/pub likacje/public_opinion/2013/10_2013.pdf [accessed on 24 July 2016], p. 2 of 4. 155. “Changing Religiosity of the Poles”, CBOS, Polish Public Opinion (April 2012), at http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2012/04_ 2012.pdf [accessed on 1 January 2013]. 156. Irena Borowik, “The Roman Catholic Church in the Process of Democratic Transformation: The Case of Poland”;inSocial Compass, Vol. 49, No. 2 (2002), p. 240. 157. Gazeta Wyborcza (27 April 2010), at http://www.wyborcza.pl/ 1,91446,7818960,CBOS_Polacy_dobrze_oceniaja_kosciol_wojsko_i_poli cije.html [accessed on 2 May 2010]; and CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 2/ 2016, at http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2016/02_ 2016.pdf [accessed on 24 July 2016], p. 3 of 4. 158. Ewa Gołębiowska, “Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in Poland”,inEast European Politics and Societies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2009), p. 383. 159. Jacek Kucharczyk and Olga Wysocka, “Poland”, in Grigorij Mesežnikov, Ol’ga Gyárfášová, and Daniel Smilov (eds.), Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2008), p. 81. 160. Patrick Michel, Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe: Catholicism in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, trans. from French by Alan Braley (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 77. 161. Prawica (27 March 2011), at http://prawica.net/opinie/25237 [accessed on 27 March 2011]. 162. As cited in The Canadian Foundation of Polish-Jewish Heritage (19 May 2006), at http://polish-jewish-heritage.org/eng/06–06_The_Pope_is_ comimg_to_Poland.html [accessed on 15 January 2011]. Please note that “coming” is spelled “comimg” in the URL and the link will only work if this misspelling is used. 163. The Warsaw Voice (28 January 2004), at http://www.warsawvoice.pl/the polishvoice/4632 [accessed on 19 March 2004]. 164. The importance of generational change is also noted by Grace Davie, who notes “ ...that the younger generations of Europe have effectively lost touch with the institutional churches in terms of anything approaching regular practice.”–G. Davies, Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 180. CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

I In reflecting on the 1,050 years since Duke Mieszko accepted Christianity for Poland, it seemsapparentthat,insomeways,the Poles’ attachment to the Catholic Church was greatest during the communist era. The reason for this is simple: during the 42 years that the communists ruled Poland, they asserted an organizational monopoly snuffing out almost all independent organizations except for the Church, which thus remained as the Poles’ sole potential defender and resource for anti-communist resistance – at least until the establishment of the Independent Trade Union Solidarity in summer 1980. In the first decade of communism, leading up to 1956, the Church itself was under attack, with some of its bishops incarcerated. But beginning in October 1956, with the release of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński from prison, the Church gradually assumed theroleofprotectorofthePolesandgadflytotheregime.Perhaps noimagecapturesthisaswellasthatofpriestsadministeringcom- munion through the bars of the locked gates at the Gdańsk shipyard to Solidarity activists in 1980. But the Church also took on the regime at various points – for example, when Wyszyński offered an articulate, point-by-point critique of proposed amendments to the Polish constitution in the mid-1970s or later with the various visits throughout the 1980s by Pope John Paul II, the ‘Polish pope’,

© The Author(s) 2017 261 S.P. Ramet, The Catholic Church in Polish History, Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-40281-3_8 262 8 CONCLUSION in the course of which he spoke out in defense of human rights, including the right to establish independent labor unions. This role as defender of the Poles was limited in time and, in any event, not monochromatic since, as noted in the previous chapter, there were also bishops and ordinary clergy who chose to enter into collaborative relations with the state security service. But looking back in time, to the ﬁrst century following 966, the Christian Church was an outsider and, while some Poles were prepared to accept the new faith, seeing the congregation of saints as a substitute for their lost polytheist universe, others wanted to hold onto the old religion, resulting in pagan uprisings in the eleventh century. However, the subsequent armed incursions by Muslim Tatars in the thirteenth century, by Muslim Ottomans in the sixteenth century, and by Protestant Swedes in the seventeenth century only reinforced a growing sense among Poles that Christianity was their religion, and Polish elites came to think of their country as the antemurale christianitatis, the defensive wall of Christianity. This role as the defender of Christian Europe was best symbolized in the Poles’ contribution, under the command of King Jan III Sobieski, to the defense of Vienna from the Ottoman Turks in 1683. But in the meantime, Poland had been rocked by the Reformation. Many of the nobles and gentry converted to Lutheranism or Calvinism – but perhaps in most cases for political rather than religious reasons, seeing Protestantism as a foil against the powerful Catholic Church hierarchy. But the peasants, unable to read Protestant literature, had no interest in a reformed Christianity – least of all one that was downgrading the Virgin Mary and the saints. The cult of the saints was dear to the hearts of Poles and the Virgin Mary was the most important ﬁgure, typically the object of greater devotion than the triune God. Indeed, as Barbara Strassberg has pointed out, “the Virgin Mary and the saints acquire[d] such a level of ‘sanctity’ that we may almost speak about a form of ‘polytheism’.”1 The Catholicism of the peasants, indeed of Poles generally, was not and is not primarily doctrinal, any more than it is, for example, for Americans. What the Poles most valued, certainly in the early modern era, was not the splendor of the Holy Trinity or the virgin birth or even the Assumption of Mary into heaven – although these certainly had some importance – but rather the celebration of the faith in everyday life, whether through religious processions or collective venerations of the saints or hymns sung to Mary, Queen of Heaven, or celebrations of saints’ days. I 263

Between 1772 and 1795, not only was Poland carved up by its neighbors, but Poles’ understanding of their place in the world was shattered and reconstructed. With the loss of their state, Poles could no longer speak of Poland as the antemurale christianitatis; Poland was now an occupied nation and two of the states which had annexed territories inhabited by Poles were not even Catholic. The Poles still thought in terms of defense, but now they had to defend their culture and way of life, their religion, even their language against pressures for Germanization (in Prussia/ Germany) and Russianization. But, as shown in Chapter 3, the Holy See and the Polish episcopate responded with caution. Pope Gregory XVI thought it best to seek to reach accommodation with the three emperors, rather than encourage rebellion by Catholic Poles. Hence, in his encyclical of 1832, Cum primum, he wrote that “the obedience which men are obliged to render to the authorities established by God is an absolute precept which no one can violate, except if by chance something is commanded which runs counter to the laws of God or of the Church.”2 When the Poles rose in rebellion against the Russian tsar in 1830 and again in 1863, there were a few priests and monks who joined the rebels and even four bishops who endorsed the insurrection of 1830–1831; but the majority of bishops and priests either counseled abstention from the insurrection or simply kept silent. When the revolt of 1863 broke out, “[p]erhaps as many as 15% of the parish clergy acknowledged the rebels as the legitimate national government, but as an institution the Church urged the rebels to lay down their arms and accept Russian rule.”3 Eventually, the tsarist government held 21,000 persons, among them 466 clergy, responsible for participation in the 1863–1864 uprising. “More than 30 priests were sentenced to death and around 100 were sentenced to penal servitude. Several hundred paid with exile for their part in the struggle for independence.”4 But in the narrative later fashioned by the Church, the priests who joined the uprising were remembered, and the attitude of the Holy See and of the majority of the Polish bishops was forgotten. In this way, the Church endeavored to cast itself as the champion of the Poles rather than, in the main, as an institution characterized by cautious prelates who prioritized the Church over the nation. But this narrative was effective and, as Janusz Tazbir has noted, “[t]he partitions retarded processes of laicization which [had begun] to develop in Poland during the Enlightenment,”5 and provided the conditions in which the Church could lay claim to being the Polish nation’s greatest protector. 264 8 CONCLUSION

Although the Poles had enjoyed limited autonomy in certain regions during certain time periods in the era of the partitions – the Duchy of Warsaw, the Duchy of Posen, and the Congress Kingdom – autonomy could not slake Poles’ thirst for independence, and thus, the achievement of independence in 1918 was a crowning moment for Poles, which the Church likewise celebrated. For the Church, however, the establishment of the Second Republic (of 1918–1939) presented an opportunity to regain control of properties lost to the Orthodox and Protestant Churches in the previous century, and also to seek new privileges, above all in the schools. The interwar era was also a time when some clergy (including bishops) embraced Dmowski’s equation of Polish and Catholic, and fanned the anti- Semitism already rife in Poland. Even today, as shown in a CBOS poll in 2013, there are greater numbers of Poles expressing antipathy toward the Jews than those expressing sympathy or acceptance.6 During the years of independence in 1918–1939, the Church was no longer in the position to claim to be the Poles’ defender; it was, rather, the religious hegemon – loved by many, but a hegemon nonetheless. World War Two changed all of this. During the five-and-a-half years of Nazi occupation, September 1939-February 1945, the Church suffered together with the Polish people and this shared fate welded a strong bond between the two. Even so, as noted in Chapter 5, alongside hierarchs such as Archbishop Sapieha of Kraków who openly opposed the Nazi occupation authorities and heroic priests and nuns whose actions to save Jews earned them recognition as “Righteous Among Nations”, there were also bishops such as Czesław Kaczmarek of Kielce, Jan Lorek of Sandomierz, and Teodoro Kubina of Częstochowa who urged Poles to accept Nazi rule. Bishop Kaczmarek explained that, in his view, disorder had to be avoided and order preserved and, accordingly, that it was best for Poles “to loyally cooperate with the authorities.”7 After the war, the communist authorities saw the need to incarcerate those who had collaborated with the Nazis in this way and put Kaczmarek and others on trial, accusing the bishop, among other things, of active support for the Third Reich and of direct collaboration with the Gestapo. They were sentenced on 22 September 1953, with the bishop receiving a 12-year sentence and other defendants receiving prison sentences ranging from five to 10 years.8 In any event, thanks to the Calvary of Nazi occupation and thanks also to atheist-communist rule during the era of the Polish People’s Republic, the bond between Church and the Polish people grew stronger than ever before, giving the Church a certain amount of political capital which it II 265 quickly squandered in the years following 1989. At one point, Adam Michnik conjured up a vision of a kind of collaborative relationship between the Church and the democratic left,9 but Poland’s episcopate soon alienated the left by pressing its agenda in areas of abortion, religious instruction in the public schools, and the protection of Christian values in the broadcast media, while hampering divorce and blocking recognition of same-sex partnerships. After the October 2015 elections, the polarization between the ruling PiS, in something like a coalition with the Church, and the more secular citizens, including women who just want to have access to abortion in the cases of rape or incest, has opened up a great gulf between the Catholic Church and a section of the Polish population. Today, the Church makes no pretense about serving as the protector of the Polish people; it looks back rather to its earlier role as antemurale christianitatis, defending Catholicism nowadays not from Muslims or Protestants but from the European Union, secular intellectuals, and sexual minorities.10 Christians sometimes say that “the way forward is the way back”–by which they mean to return to earlier principles, perhaps imagined as being protected in some pristine and idyllic past. But, if this short account of the Catholic Church in Polish history has demonstrated anything, it is that there has never been an idyllic past or an idyllic present for the Church in Poland. Whether suppressing pagans or fighting Tatars, Ottomans, and Swedes or responding to the Protestant Reformation or trying to survive the Partitions, the Nazi occupation, or communist rule, most of Polish history has involved challenges to Polish religion and culture and, sometimes, to the very survival of the Polish nation. And during the Second Republic and the Third Republic (as post-1989 Poland calls itself), even during these times the Church has not been satisfied and has seen itself under threat – whether from Jews and Freemasons in the interwar era or from the European Union, secular intellectuals, and sexual minorities today. The Polish Church, thus, bears the scars of the past and its behavior is affected by those scars. Whether it can move beyond its memories of past suffering and its sense of being ever under threat is a challenge for the Church in Poland in the decades to come.

II Throughout its millennium-long history in Poland, the Catholic Church has always been a political actor. It acted politically in the tenth to the twelfth centuries when it employed the political-military machinery 266 8 CONCLUSION available to suppress the polytheists. It acted politically when it launched and carried out the Counter-Reformation to roll back its Christian competitors. The Vatican acted politically when it sought concordats with the tsar of Russia, the Austrian Kaiser, the government of the (interwar) Polish Second Republic, the communist People’s Republic, and the post-1989 “Third” Republic, just as it acted politically in advising Poles to desist from rebellion in the nineteenth century. Those few bishops who collaborated with the Nazis during World War Two or the 10–15% of bishops and priests who collaborated with the communists later acted politically, just as those bishops and ordinary clergy acted politically when they spoke out against various acts by the Nazis or the communists and tried to save the lives of Jews from the former. Those clergy who made their churches available for independent cultural events during the communist years were acting politically, and again let us not forget the cagey staff at Tygodnik Powszechny who, being pressed by the SB to come for “informational meetings”, decided to coordinate among themselves in advance of such meetings, in order to feed the SB information which would serve the interests of the newspaper. Furthermore, Popes Pius XI and XII acted politically in issuing their denunciations of Nazism in their encyclicals Mit brennender Sorge (1937) and Summi Pontiﬁcatus (1939), just as they did in issuing Divini redemptoris (the anti-communist encyclical of 1937) and Acta Apostolicae Sedis (the 1949 decree threatening Catholics with excommunication if they supported communism). Similarly, Pope John Paul II’s papal visits to Poland in 1979, 1983, and 1987 were quintessentially political in character, as were also his encyclicals Centessimus annus (1991) and Sollicitudo rei socialis (1998), with the pontiff advocating the cause of independent labor unions and human freedom in his visits to Poland, and advocating concern for fellow human beings, the right to private property, and the rule of law in his encyclicals of 1991 and 1998. With the collapse of communism in 1989, the Church immediately pressed forward with its agenda to ban abortion, protect Christian values in the broadcast media, and introduce Catholic religious instruction in state schools. And ﬁnally, after October 2015, the Church resumed its struggle to obtain a complete ban on abortion and eliminate the few exceptions to the ban which had been allowed since 1993. The Church, in short, has always been and is today a political actor, both in seeking to protect its institutional interests and in seeking to promote Catholic values. It could not be otherwise. II 267

During the communist era especially – though not only then – the hierarchy and clergy took risks to oppose injustice and protect the innocent. Sometimes, as in a pastoral letter issued by the Polish Episcopate in March 1981, the Church advised caution (in this case on the part of the leaders of the Solidarity trade union) while not forgetting to remind the ﬂock of the courage its clergy had displayed in the past. “It is often forgotten,” the letter read

that ...when everything was silenced under the pressure of political terror, the Church alone did not back down, and its bishops and priests paid for their courage with imprisonment, with the loss of their Church positions, and with heavy criminal ﬁnes. The Church, the Episcopate of Poland, the bishops stood in defense of those who were oppressed and wronged by the government during the various periods of social tension in our country.11

But such boldness emerged only sporadically in the Polish Church’s long history. Certainly, there were priests who took the side of Polish rebels in the insurrections of 1830–1831 and 1863 and, as already noted, more than a thousand Polish priests were exiled to Siberia between 1864 and 1914. However, for much of the Polish Catholic Church’s history after 1772, it was on the defensive and a posture of accommodation to existing political reality seemed to provide the best assurance of institutional survival. The Church was largely on the defensive during the era of the partitions, and clearly on the defensive during the years of Nazi occupation and yet again during the ﬁrst decade after the end of World War Two. The various expropriations of Church property by the communists after 1945 and incarcerations of bishops and priests bear witness to the Church’s weak position after the conclusion of World War Two. Yet, after Władysław Gomułka returned to the helm in October 1956, things began to change and Church leaders were able to obtain concessions, including the return of the editorship of Tygodnik Powszechny to Jerzy Turowicz, access for chaplains to Poland’s hospitals, the return of nuns and priests who had been driven from their convents, and the establishment of the Catholic parliamentary group ‘Znak’, among other concessions. Finally, after December 1970, Cardinal Wyszyński and other bishops and clergy were in a position of relative strength, allowing them to speak out on various issues and to make demands. There was always a risk with taking sides against the regime. Wyszyński himselfwasimprisonedin1953afterherefusedtocondemnBishop 268 8 CONCLUSION

Kaczmarek, who had been convicted of having been an “active” supporter of Adolf Hitler – a charge which historians consider false. But, on balance, while the resilience of the Church in Poland owes much to the courage of deﬁant clergy, it surely owes at least as much to the cautious calculations of the Vatican in the era of the partitions and probably owes something likewise to the “keep your head low” posture adopted by some clergy in times of crisis. For the Church, institutional survival and strength have been the highest priority but, ironically, its survival and strength have been promoted rather than weakened during periods of foreign occupation and crisis. Religion, it seems, is sometimes strongest when it is challenged, combatted, and persecuted.

NOTES 1. Barbara Strassberg, “Changes in Religious Culture in Post[-World] War II Poland”,inSociological Analysis, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter 1988), p. 344. 2. “Cum Primum” (On Civil Disobedience), Encyclical of Pope Gregory XVI, 9 June 1832, Papal Encyclicals Online, at http://www.papalencyclicals. net/Greg16/g16cumpr.htm [accessed on 26 March 2016]. 3. Brian Porter, “The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History”,inThe Slavic and East European Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Summer 2001), p. 295. 4. Ewa Jabłońska-Deptuła and Jan Skarbek, “W dobie między powstaniami (1832–1864)”, in Jerzy Kłoczowski (ed.), Chrześcijaństwo w Polsce: Zarys przemian, 966–1979 (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1992), p. 445. 5. Janusz Tazbir, Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe: Myths and Historical Reality (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, N.D. [1984?], p. 126. 6. CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, 2/2013, at http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publi kacje/public_opinion/2013/02_2013.pdf [accessed on 25 July 2016]. 7. As quoted in Klaus-Peter Friedrich, “Collaboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’: Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Winter 2005), p. 736. 8. Stefan Rosada and Józef Gwóźdž, “Church and State in Poland”,in Vladimir Gsovski (ed.), Church and State behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), p. 226. 9. Adam Michnik, The Church and the Left, trans. from Polish by David Ost (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 10. For further discussion of the Church’s fear of and antipathy toward sexual minorities, see Anna Szwed and Katarzyna Zielińska, “The War on Gender? NOTES 269

The Roman Catholic Church’s Discourse on Gender in Poland”, in Sabrina P. Ramet and Irena Borowik (eds.), Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland: Continuity and Change since 1989 (Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 11. Polish Catholic Church, “Excerpt from a Letter from the Episcopate to the Parish Clergy of Poland in 1981”, Making the History of 1989, Item #11, https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/items/show/11 [accessed 9 October 2016), 6:20 a.m. US time, 12:20 p.m. Norwegian time] APPENDIX – TIMELINE, 966–2016

966: Duke Mieszko’s conversion to Christianity 997: Beheading of Bishop Adalbert of Prague (known in Poland as Wojciech) 1022: Revolt against the Piast dynasty, with pagan participation 1066: Revolt by pagans 1140: Arrival of the Cistercian Order in Poland 1215: The Fourth Lateran Council, which made annual confession and communion mandatory for all Christians 1241: Invasion of Eastern Europe, including Poland, by a Tatar (Muslim) army 1337–1341: Renewed war with the Tatars 1386: Founding, through marriage, of the Jagiellonian dynasty 1378–1417: The Great Schism, with rival popes sitting in Avignon and Rome and, beginning in 1409, with a third pope residing in Pisa 1454–1466: The Thirteen Years’ War 1520: The Edict of Thorn (Toruń), by which the King of Poland banned the importation of Martin Luther’swritings into Poland 1529: The ﬁrst siege of Vienna by Ottoman forces 1551–1553: New Testament published in Polish 1563: First translation of the entire Bible into Polish 1564: Arrival of the Jesuit Order in Poland

1569: The Union of Lublin, merging the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into a single, federated Commonwealth 1577–1578: Lutherans granted freedom of worship in Poland 1596: The Union of Brest, bring a large number of Orthodox parishes into union with Rome as Eastern-Rite Catholics 1655–1660: The Second Northern War (between Sweden and Poland) 17 July–12 September 1683: The second siege of Vienna by Ottoman forces, ending with a victory over the Ottomans by Christian forces commanded by King Jan III Sobieski of Poland 1716: A ban on the construction of any further Protestant churches in Poland 1772: First Partition of Poland, between Prussia, Russia, and Austria 1781: Edict of Toleration issued by Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II, abolishing most forms of discrimination against Protestants in the Habsburg crown lands 1788–1791: The ﬁrst Russo-Turkish War, ending with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and other territories 1791: Passage of a new constitution for Poland, establishing a hereditary monarchy and abolishing the liberum veto 1793: Second Partition of Poland, between Prussia and Russia 1795: Third Partition of Poland, between Prussia, Russia, and Austria 1807–1813: The Duchy of Warsaw, functioning as a partially autonomous French satellite 1815–1848: The Grand Duchy of Posen, functioning as an autonomous unit with the Kingdom of Prussia. 1815–1867: The Congress Kingdom, existing as a partially autonomous region within the Russian Empire, with the Tsar of Russia serving also as King of Poland 1817: Reestablishment of the University of Lemberg (Lwów) 1830–1831: The November Uprising against Russian rule 1846: Revolt in Kraków 1848: Revolutionary upheaval across much of Europe 1849: Conclusion of a Concordat between the Holy See and Russia 1850: The April Ordinances, issued by Kaiser Franz Joseph of Austria, regulating Church-state relations 1855: Conclusion of a Concordat between the Holy See and Austria 1863: The January Uprising against Russian rule 1866: Cancelation of the Concordat by the Tsar of Russia; the Austro- Prussian War, ending in Prussian victory APPENDIX – TIMELINE, 966–2016 273

1867: The Ausgleich, dividing the Habsburg Empire into Austrian and Hungarian units, thereby creating Austria-Hungary 1869: Closing of the University of Warsaw for the second time; Polish introduced as the language of public instruction in Austrian Galicia 1870 or 1871: Launch of the Kulturkampf by Berlin with the dual objective of undermining Polish national consciousness and subordinating the Catholic Church to the German bureaucratic apparatus 1871: German unification under the Hohenzollern dynasty = the Second Reich 1872: The Jesuit Order banned in Germany 1873: German mandated as the language of instruction in all schools in Germany 1875: Repudiation of the 1596 Union of Brest by Russia 1886: Passage of a settlement law allocating funds for the German government to purchase Polish estates and turn the land over to German settlers 1907: Introduction of universal male suffrage in Austria 1914: Outbreak of World War One 1916: Establishment of a Regency Council by Germany and Austria, as a provisional government for a future Polish state 1918: The Regency Council transferred authority to Marshal Piłsudski; end of World War One 1918: Restoration of Polish independence 1919: Recognition of Polish independence by the Holy See 1919–1920: The Russo-Polish War, ending in significant territorial gains by Poland 17 March 1921: Adoption of interwar Poland’s first constitution 18 March 1921: Treaty of Riga, ending the Russo-Polish War 1925: Conclusion of a Concordat between the Holy See and Poland 12–14 May 1926: Marshal Piłsudski’s coup d’état 23 April 1935: Adoption of interwar Poland’s second constitution 12 May 1935: Death of Marshal Piłsudski September 1939: Nazi invasion of Poland, initiating World War Two 1944: A left-wing front backed by the Soviets, calling itself the Polish Committee of National Liberation, presented its claim to govern Poland, subsequently declaring itself the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland May 1945: End of World War Two in Europe 12 September 1945: The communist regime declared the 1925 Concordat null and void 274 APPENDIX – TIMELINE, 966–2016

1946–1947: Nationalization of Church printing presses and suppression of various Catholic periodicals, dissolution of Catholic lay organizations, seizure by the regime of 375,000 hectares of land belonging to the Church January 1947: Rigged elections, with official results claiming that the communist-led bloc had won 80.1% of the vote; after the elections, Peasant Party leader Stanisław Mikołajczyk fled the country 1948: Upon the death of Cardinal Hlond, Pope Pius XII turned to then-Bishop Wyszyński to succeed as Primate of Poland and inherit the office of Archbishop-Metropolitan of Gniezno and Warsaw 1 July 1949: The Vatican issued Acta Apostolicae Sedis, a decree threatening with excommunication any Catholics cooperating with communists or defending communist ideas 1949: Nationalization of the Church’s hospitals by the communist regime 23 January 1950: Seizure of the property of the Catholic charity “Caritas” by the regime; Church-state agreement 14 April 1950: Signing of an agreement between the Polish Episcopate and the Polish government July 1952: Passage of a new constitution, identifying the country as the People’s Republic of Poland August 1952: Closure of the theological faculties at the universities of Kraków and Warsaw 25 September 1953: Arrest of Cardinal Wyszyński 26 October 1956: Release of Cardinal Wyszyński from detention 1971: Transfer of German ecclesiastical properties in the Oder-Neiße region to the Catholic and Evangelical Churches of Poland 17 October 1971: Beatification of Maximilian Kolbe 1975: Publication of draft amendments to the Polish constitution, referring to Poland’s “unbreakable fraternal bond with the Soviet Union” 16 October 1978: Election of Archbishop Karol Wojtła of Kraków as Pope, taking the name John Paul II June 1979: First papal visit to Poland by Pope John Paul II Summer 1980: Emergence of the Independent Trade Union Solidarity 13 December 1981: Proclamation of martial law and the suppression of Solidarity 10 October 1982: Canonization of Maximilian Kolbe June 1983: Second papal visit to Poland by Pope John Paul II June 1987: Third papal visit to Poland by Pope John Paul II April 1989: Relegalization of Solidarity APPENDIX – TIMELINE, 966–2016 275

May 1989: Passage of three laws guaranteeing the Church’s legal status and right to organize radio and television programs, and guaranteeing religious freedom May 1989: Semi-free elections, ending communist rule in Poland September 1990: The Senate passed a restrictive bill on abortion December 1990: Lech Wałęsa elected president of Poland 1991: Establishment of Radio Maryja by Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk October 1991: Parliamentary elections, with the Democratic Union, Democratic Left Alliance, Catholic Election Action, Center Civic Alliance, Polish People’s Party, and Confederation of Independent Poland winning at least 46 seats each in the lower house of parliament, the Sejm December 1992: The Sejm voted to institute a new law requiring that radio and television broadcasts respect Christian values February 1993: President Wałęsa signed into law a strict bill outlawing abortion with only a few exceptions July 1993: Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka signed the Vatican draft text of a Concordat September 1993: Parliamentary elections, with the Democratic Left Alliance winning 171 seats in the 460-seat Sejm, followed by the Polish People’s Party with 132 seats, and the Democratic Union with 74 seats November 1995: Aleksander Kwaśniewski (SLD) elected president of Poland September 1997: Parliamentary elections, with Solidarity Electoral Action winning 201 seats in the 460-seat Sejm, followed by the Democratic Left Alliance with 164 seats, the Freedom Union with 60 seats, and the Polish People’s Party with 27 seats 25 March 1998: Ratiﬁcation of the Concordat between the Holy See and the government of Poland October 2000: Aleksander Kwaśniewski (SLD) re-elected president of Poland September 2001: Parliamentary elections, with the Democratic Left Alliance winning 216 seats in the 460-seat Sejm, followed by the Civic Platform with 65 seats, the Self-Defense Party with 53 seats, the Law and Justice party with 44 seats, and the Polish People’sParty with 42 seats July 2002: The European Parliament called for the legalization of abortion in all current and prospective EU member states 276 APPENDIX – TIMELINE, 966–2016

2003: Priestly vocations reached a 50-year high May 2004: Poland joined the European Union 2 April 2005: Death of Pope John Paul II 19 April 2005: Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger elected Pope, taking the name Benedict XVI 25 September 2005: Parliamentary elections, with the Law and Justice party winning 155 seats, followed by the Civic Platform with 133 seats, the Self-Defense Party with 56 seats, the Democratic Left Alliance with 55 seats, the League of Polish Families with 34 seats, and the Polish People’s Party with 25 seats, with two seats reserved for the German minority; no other parties obtained parliamentary representation October 2005: Lech Kaczyński (PiS) elected president of Poland October 2007: Parliamentary elections, with the Civic Platform winning 209 seats in the 460-seat Sejm, followed by the Law and Justice party with 166 seats, the Left and Democrats (an alliance of four parties including the Democratic Left Alliance) with 53 seats, and the Polish People’s Party with 31 seats, with one seat reserved for the German minority: no other parties obtained parliamentary representation 6 June 2010: Beatiﬁcation of Jerzy Popiełuszko 4 July 2010: Bronisław Komorowski (PO) elected president of Poland May 2011: Beatiﬁcation of Pope John Paul II October 2011: Parliamentary elections, with the Civic Platform winning 207 seats in the 460-seat Sejm, followed by the Law and Justice party with 157 seats, Palikot’s Movement (an anti-clerical party) with 40 seats, the Polish People’s Party with 28 seats, and the Democratic Left Alliance with 27 seats, with one seat reserved for the German minority: no other parties obtained parliamentary representation April 2014: Canonization of Pope John Paul II 28 February 2013: Abdication of Benedict XVI as Pope 13 March 2013: Jorge Mario Cardinal Bergoglio elected Pope, taking the name Francis May 2015: Andrzej Duda (PiS) elected president of Poland October 2015: Parliamentary elections, with the Law and Justice party winning 235 seats in the 460-seat Sejm, followed by the Civic Platform with 138 seats, Kukiz’15 (a right-wing party led by a rock singer) with 42 seats, Modern (Nowoczesna) with 28 seats, and the Polish People’s Party with 16 seats, with one seat reserved for the German minority: no other parties obtained parliamentary representation APPENDIX – TIMELINE, 966–2016 277

December 2015: The PiS-controlled parliament rushed through changes to the regulations governing the Constitutional Tribunal, intended to undermine its independence March 2016: The Constitutional Tribunal declared that the changes made to its operations were illegal and unconstitutional March 2016: Open letter issued by the Polish Episcopate, calling the 1993 law on abortion a “compromise” and demanding that there be a total ban on all abortions September 2016: The Sejm voted down a pro-choice bill and voted to approve a bill to ban all abortions October 2016: Following protests across Poland by tens of thousands of pro-choice women, the Sejm took a second vote on the bill to ban all abortions and voted it down SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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THE ERA OF THE PARTITIONS, 1772–1918 Alexander, John T. Catherine the Great: Life and Legend (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Batkowski, Henryk. “Die Polen”, in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, Vol. 3: Die Völker des Reiches, I. Teilband (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1980): 522–554. Bérenger, Jean. A History of the Habsburg Empire 1700–1918, trans. from French by C. A. Simpson (London and New York: Routledge, 2014). Biskup, Marian. “Preußen und Polen: Grundlinien und Reﬂexionen”,in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, New series, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1983): 1–27. Bjork, James. “A Polish Mitteleuropa? Upper Silesia’s Conciliationists and the Prospect of German Victory”,inNationalities Papers, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2001): 477–492. Blanke, Richard. “Bismarck and the Prussian Polish Policies of 1886”,inThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 1973): 211–239. Blanke, Richard. “The Development of Loyalism in Prussian Poland, 1886– 1890”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 52, No. 129 (October 1974): 548–565. 282 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Rosenthal, Harry Kenneth. “The Election of Archbishop Stablewski”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1969): 265–275 Sambuk, Daria. “Die russische Frage: Polen in der Reformdiskussion des Zarenreiches (1856–1863)”,inJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2010): 508–536. Schmidt-Volkmar, Erich. Der Kulturkampf in Deutschland 1871–1890 (Göttingen, Berlin, and Frankfurt: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1962). Shedel, James. “Emperor, Church, and People: Religion and Dynastic Loyalty during the Golden Jubilee of Franz Joseph”,inThe Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January 1990): 71–92. Smith, Helmut Walser. German Nationalism and Religious Conﬂict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870–1914 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995). Trzeciakowski, Lech. The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland. trans. from Polish by Katarzyna Kretkowska (Boulder, C.O.: East European Monographs, 1990). Trzeciakowski, Lech. “The Prussian State and the Catholic Church in Prussian Poland 1871–1914”, trans. from Polish by Stanislaus A. Blejwas, in Slavic Review, Vol. 26, No. 4 December (1967): 618–637. Volkmann, Hans-Erich. Die Polenpolitik des Kaiserreichs. Prolog zum Zeitalter der Weltkriege (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016). Wandycz, Piotr S. The Lands of Partitioned Poland (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008). Wandycz, Piotr S. “The Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy”,inAustrian History Yearbook, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1967): 261–286. Weeks, Theodore R. “Deﬁning Us and Them: Poles and Russians in the ‘Western Provinces’ 1863–1914”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring 1994): 26–40. Wolff, Larry. The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). Wolff, Larry. “Inventing Galicia: Messianic Josephinism and the Recasting of Partitioned Poland”,inSlavic Review,Vol.63,No.4(Winter2004):818– 840. Wolff, Larry. “Kennst du das Land?’ The Uncertainty of Galicia in the Age of Metternich and Fredro”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Summer 2008): 277–300. Wolff, Larry. The Vatican and Poland in the Age of the Partitions: Diplomatic and Cultural Encounters at the Warsaw Nunciature (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1988). Zawadzki, W. H. “Russia and the Re-Opening of the Polish Question, 1801–1814”,inThe International History Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (February 1985): 19–44. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 285

THE INTERWAR REPUBLIC Bender, Ryszard. “I Wojna Światowa i Polska Niepodległa (1914–1939)”,inJerzy Kłoczowski (ed.), Chrześciajaństwo w Polsce. Zarys Przemian 966–1979 (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1992): 507–551. Benecke, Werner. “Zur Lage der russisch-orthodoxen Kirche in der Zweiten Polnischen Republik 1918–1939”, in Hans-Christian Maner and Martin Schulze Wessel (eds.), Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918–1939 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002): 123–143. Biskupski, M. B. “Paderewski, Polish Politics, and the Battle for Warsaw, 1920”,in Slavic Review, Vol. 46, No. 3–4 (Autumn–Winter 1987): 505–512. Chojnowski, Andrej. “The Controversy over Former Uniate Property in Interwar Poland”,inNationalities Papers, Vol. 16, No. 2 (September 1988): 177–190. Fiddick, Thomas. “The ‘Miracle of the Vistula’: Soviet Policy versus Red Army Strategy”,inThe Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 1973): 626–643. Hetherington, Peter. Unvanquished: Joseph Pilsudski, Resurrected Poland and the Struggle for Eastern Europe, 2nd ed. (Houston, TX: Pingora Press, 2012). Holzer, Jerzy. “The Political Right in Poland, 1918–39”,inJournal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12, No. 3 (July 1977): 395–412. Jędrzejewicz, Wacław. Piłsudski: A life for Poland (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1982). Krasowski, Krzysztof. Episkopat katolicki w II Rzeczypospolitej. Myśl o ustroju państwa – postulaty. —realizacja (Warsaw and Poznań: Radakcja Naukowa, 1992). Leszyński, Paweł A. Stosunki Państwo-Kościoł w Koncepcjach Oraz Praktyce Rządów Obozu Piłsudczykowskiego (Gorzów Wielkopolski: Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim, 2008). Michael, Holger. Marschall Józef Piłsudski 1867 bis 1935. Schöpfer des modernen Polens (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag Nf. GmbH, 2010). Modras, Ronald. The Catholic Church and Antisemitism in Poland, 1933–1939 (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). Pease, Neal. “Poland and the Holy See, 1918–1939”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Autumn 1991): 521–530. Pease, Neal. Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter: The Catholic Church and Independent Poland, 1914–1939 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009). Pease, Neal. “The ‘Unpardonable Insult’: The Wawel Incident of 1937 and Church-state Relations in Poland”,inThe Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 77, No. 3 (July 1991): 422–436. Plach, Eva. The Clash of Moral Nations: Cultural politics in Piłsudski’s Poland, 1926–1935 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006). 286 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Polonsky, Antony. Politics in Independent Poland 1921–1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1972). Rothschild, Joseph. “The Ideological, Political, and Economic Background of Piłsudski’s Coup D’État of 1926”,inPolitical Science Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (June 1963): 224–244. Sadkowski, Konrad. “From Ethnic Borderland to Catholic Fatherland: The Church, Christian Orthodox, and State Administration in the Chelm region, 1918–1939”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Winter 1998): 813–839. Strakhovsky, Leonid I. “The Church in Contemporary Poland (1919–1930)”,in The Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (October 1932): 328–340. Szeruda, Jan. “The Protestant Churches of Poland”,inThe Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 16, No. 48 (April 1938): 616–628. Zieliński, Zygmunt, and Stanisław Wilk. Kościół w Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej (Lublin: Towarzystwa Naukowego KUL, 1980).

WORLD WAR TWO Broszat, Martin. Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961). Friedrich, Klaus-Peter. “Collaborationina‘Land without a Quisling’: Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II”,inSlavic Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Winter 2005): 711–746. Kleßmann, Christoph. “Nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik und Nationalitätenfrage im GG (1939–1945)”,inJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,Newseries,Vol.18, No. 4 December (1970): 575–600. Kochanski, Halik. The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). Madajczyk, Czesław. Die Deutsche Besatzungspolitik in Polen (1939–1945) (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1967). Pohl, Dieter. “Polen und Juden under deutscher Besatzung 1939–1945: Zu einigen Neuerscheinungen”,inJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1990): 255–260.

THE COMMUNIST ERA Barberini, Giovanni. Stato socialista e Chiesa cattolica in Polonia (Bologna: CSEO biblioteca, 1983). Chrypinski, Vincent C. “The Catholic Church in Poland, 1944–1989”, in Pedro Ramet (ed.), Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990): 117–141. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 287

Chrypinski, Vincent C. “Church and Nationality in Postwar Poland”, in Pedro Ramet (ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics, Rev. & Expanded ed (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989): 241–263. Chrypinski, Vincent C. “Church and State in Gierek’s Poland”, in Maurice D. Simon and Roger E. Kanet (eds.), Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek’s Poland (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981): 239–264. Dahlmann, Hans-Christian. “Die antisemitische Kampagne in Polen 1968”,in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2008): 554–570. de Weydenthal, Jan B. The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline, Revised ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986). Diskin, Hanna. The Seeds of Triumph: Church and state in Gomułka’s Poland (Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2001). Dolan, Edward. “Post-War Poland and the Church”,inThe American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (February 1955): 84–92. Dudek, Antoni, and Ryszard Gryz. Komunisci i Kośćioł w Polsce, 1945–1989 (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2003). Kenney, Padraic. Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945–1950 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). Kunicki, Mikołay Stanisław. Between the Brown and the Red: Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in 20th-Century Poland – the Politics of Bolesław Piasecki (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012). Łatki, Rafała (ed.). Stosunki Państwo-Kościoł w Polsce 1944–2010: Studia i materiały (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademika, 2013). Luks, Leonid. Katholizismus und Politische Macht im Kommunistischen Polen 1945–1989. Die Anatomie einer Befreiung (Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1993). Luxmoore, Jonathan. “The Polish Church Under Martial Law”,inReligion in Communist Lands, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1987): 124–166. Micewski, Andrzej. Cardinal Wyszyński: A biography, trans. from Polish by William R. Brand and Katarzyna Mroczkowska-Brand (San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984). Micewski, Andrzej. Katholische Gruppierungen in Polen. Pax und Znak, 1945– 1976, trans. from Polish by Wolfgang Grycz (Munich/Mainz: Kaiser und Grunewald, 1978). Michnik, Adam. The Church and the Left. trans. from Polish by David Ost (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Monticone, Ronald C. The Catholic Church in Communist Poland 1945–1985: Forty years of Church-State Relations (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1986). Osa, Maryjane. Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 288 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ramet, Sabrina Petra. Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995). The Roman Catholic Church in People’s Poland (Warsaw: The Central Priests’ Committee, Afﬁliated to the Organization of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy, 1953) Rosada, Stefan and Józef Gwóźdž. “Church and State in Poland”, in Vladimir Gsovski (ed.), Church and State behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955): 161–252. Siedlarz, Jan. Kirche und Staat im kommunistischen Polen 1945–1989 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1996). Strassberg, Barbara. “Changes in Religious Culture in Post[-World] War II Poland”,inSociological Analysis, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter 1988): 342–354. Szajkowski, Bogdan. Next to God ...Poland: Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland (London: Frances Pinter, 1983). Valkenier, Elizabeth. “The Catholic Church in Communist Poland, 1945–1955”, in The Review of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July 1956): 305–326. Wyszyński, Stefan Cardinal. A Freedom Within: The Prison Notes of Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, trans. from Polish by Barbara Krzywicki-Herburt and Rev. Walter J. Ziemba (San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983). Zieliński, Zygmunt with the cooperation of Sabina Bober, Kościoł w Polsce 1944– 2007 (Gdańsk-Zaspa: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2009)

YEARS SINCE 1989 Daniel, Krystyna. “The Church-State Situation in Poland After the Collapse of Communism”,inBrigham Young University Law Review, Vol. 1995, Issue 2: 401–420. de Lange, Sarah L., and Simona Guerra. “The League of Polish Families between East and West, Past and Present”,inCommunist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 2009): 527–549. Eberts, Mirella W. “The Roman Catholic Church and Democracy in Poland”,in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 5 (July 1998): 817–842. Graczyk, Roman. Cena przetrwania? SB wobec Tygodnika Powszechny (Warsaw: Wydawca Czerwone i Czarne, 2011). Isakowicz-Zaleski, Fr. Tadeusz Kzięża wobec bezpieki: na przykładzie archidiecezji krakowskiej (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2007). Jackowska, Natalia. Kośćiol katolicki w Polsce wobec integracji europejskiej (Poznań & Gniezno: Instytut Zachodniego, 2003). Korbonski, Andrzej. “Poland Ten Years After: The Church”,inCommunist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 2000): 123–146. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 289

Koseła, Krzystof. “Religijność młodych Niemców i Polaków”,inSocjologia Religii (Poznań), Vol. 2 (2004): 123–154. Koseła, Krzystof, Tadeusz Szawiel, Mirosława Grabowska, and Małgorzata Sikorska (eds.) Tożsamość Polaków a Unia Europejska (Warsaw: Instytut Badań nad Podstawami Demokracji, 2002). Lasota, Marek. Donos na Wojtyłe: Karol Wojtyła w teczkach bezpieki (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2006). Leszczyńska, Katarzyna. “The Standpoint of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the Czech Republic Towards Europe, the European Union and the European Integration Process”, in Dinka Marinović Jerolimov, Siniša Zrinščak, and Irena Borowik (eds.), Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation (Zagreb: Institute for Social Research, 2004): 253–275. Luxmoore, Jonathan. “Poland Rethinks Supervision of ‘Sects’ After Minority Church Complaints”,inChristianity Today (posted 1 March 2001, http:// www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2001/marchweb-only/3-5-24.0.html [last accessed on 27 April 2013] Luxmoore, Jonathan. “Poland’s Catholic Bishops Reject Criticism of Dominus Iesus”,inChristianity Today (posted 1 September 2000), http://www.chris tianitytoday.com/ct/2000/septemberweb-only/34.0b.html [last accessed on 27 April 2013] Mazurkiewicz, Piotr. (ed.) Kościoł Katolicki w przededniu wejścia Polski do Unii Eurpejskiej (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2003). Ramet, Sabrina P., and Irena Borowik (eds.) Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland: Continuity and Change since 1989 (Basingstoke and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). Zdaniewicz, Witold, and Sławomir H. Zaręba (eds.) Kośćioł Katolicki na początku trzeciego tysiąclecia w opinii Polaków (Warsaw: Instytut Statystyki Kośćioła Katolickiego, 2004). Zuba, Krzysztof. “The Political Strategies of the Catholic Church in Poland”,in Religion, State & Society, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 2010): 115–134. INDEX

A B Abortion Bach, Alexander, 93 ban on, 202–209, 241 Badeni, Count Kazimierz, 94 and Radio Maryja, 205–207 Bain, R. Nisbet, 15 revisions to law on, 207–209 Balicki, Zygmunt, 129 Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 157, 266 Baptism, 14–23 Adamski, Bishop Stanisław, 158 Bartel, Kazimierz, 127 Aggiornamento, 193 Baziak, Eugeniusz, 160 Agricultural collectivization, 154 BBWR, 133–134, 136 Alexander I, Tsar of Russia, 51, 53, 69 Beck, Colonel Józef, 137 Alexander III, Tsar of Russia, 59–64 Benedict XV, Pope, 98 Antemurale Christianitatis, 23–26 Benedict, XVI, Pope, 218, 233, 243 Anti-Semitism, 111, 132, 152 Bergoglio, Cardinal Jorge Mario, see Anti-Zionist campaign Francis, Pope of 1968, 167 Berlusconi, Silvio, 214 April Ordinances, 90 Bez dogmatu, 215 Aquinas, Thomas, see Aquinas, Biedroń, Robert, 215, 238 Thomas Bierut, Bolesław, 155 Aryanization, 148 Biłiński, Leon von, 94 Augustus II the Strong, King Biskup, Marian, 73–74 of Poland, 32 Bismarck, Otto von, 76, 79 Augustus III, King of Poland, 32 Blanke, Richard, 76 Auschwitz concentration Blaszyński, Fr. Wojciech, 72 camp, 201–202 Bolesław I Chrobry, Duke, 16 Ausgleich (1867), 93–94 Bolesław II Śmiały, King of Poland, 19 Austrian Galicia, see Habsburg Galicia Bolesław the Forgotten, King Austrian sector (1772-1918), 3, of Poland, 16 82–96 Boniecki, Fr. Adam, 217

Brezhnev, Leonid I., 171 Church-state relations Buddhism, 120–121, 140n36 after the collapse Budenny, General Semeon M., 114 of communism, 195–196, Bujak, Zbigniew, 202 202–205, 208–209, 213 in the early 1950s, 160–161 under Gierek, 168–173 C under Gomułka, 162, 163, Calvinism, 26–28, 41, 262 165–167 in Poland, 121 in the Habsburg Empire, 82–96 Caprivi, Leo von, 80–82 in the interwar era, 122–123, Caritas, 158 125–126, 127–133, 137–138 Casanova, José, 193 under Jaruzelski, 174–178 Castlereagh, Lord, 69 in Prussia/Germany, 65–82 Catherine II “the Great”, in Russia, 50–64 Empress, 41, 42, 44, 47 Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz, 211, 217 Catholic Church Colonization of the eastern agenda, 229–231 territories, 79–80 controversy about Columb, General, 73 collaboration, 231–236 Committee for the Defense of the educational and charitable Country (KOK), 174 engagement, 196–198 Communism, 3–4, 153, 157–158 in the era of Kaiser Franz Concordat with Austria Joseph, 89–92 (1855), 90–91 and parishes, 32 Concordat with Poland and political engagement, 227 (1925), 125–126, 131 polling data, 230, 246 Concordat with Poland post-communist era, 228–229 (ratiﬁed in 1998), 195 property restitution, controversy Concordat with Russia (1847), 57 surrounding, 236–238 Concordia, 92 and sex abuse, 238–244 Confessio ﬁdei catholicae christiana Catholic Election Action (Hozjusz), 31 (WAK), 200 Congress of Ems, 84 Catholicism, 8, 14, 113, 132–133 Congress Kingdom, 53, 54 Catholic Reformation, 20, 29–32 Congress of Vienna, 53, 69–70 Catholic University in Lublin Constance, Council (KUL), 150, 158, 197 of (1414–1418), 23, 31 Catholic Youth Organization, 197 Constitution of March 1849, 93 Center Party, 78 Constitution of 1935, 134 Centessimus annus (encyclical issued Constitution of 1921, 122–123 in 1991), 266 Constitution of 3 May 1791, 47, 49 Christian values, 195 Counter Reformation, 29–32 INDEX 293

Crimean War, 58 Engelberg, Ernst, 75 Cum Primum (encyclical issued Era of reconciliation, 81 in 1832), 55, 57, 263 Eulenburg, Count Botha von, 80 Curzon, Lord, 114 Europeanization, 211 Ćwikliński, Ludwik, 94 European Union (EU), 193 Czartoryski, Prince Adam, 51 and Church, 209–214 Częstochowa, 64, 73, 171, 192 and draft constitution, 212

D F Dąbrowski, General Jan Henryk, 68 Fakty i mity, 215 Dalbor, Cardinal Edmund, 112, Feliński, Archbishop Zygmunt 124–126, 130 Szczęsny, 61 The Deluge (Sienkiewicz), 161 Ferdinand I, Kaiser, 89 de Madariaga, Isabela, 41 Flottwell, Eduard, 71 Democratic Left Alliance Forefather’s Eve (Mickiewicz), 98 (SLD), 196, 208, 211 Förster, Bishop Heinrich, 79 Democratic Party, 173 Francis, Pope, 218 d’Estaing, Valery Giscard, 212 Franz, Georg, 75 Dettmer, Günter, 75 Franz I, Kaiser of Austria, 83–86, 89 Die Ostmark, see Ostmark, Die Franz Joseph, Kaiser of Austria Dinder, Bishop Julius, 79 and King of Hungary, 89–92 Divini redemptoris, 266 Friedrich II “the Great”, King Dixon, Simon, 41 of Prussia, 42, 44 Dmowski, Roman, 111–113, 116, Friedrich Wilhelm II, King 124, 129–130 of Prussia, 66, 68 Dominus Iesus, 216 Friedrich Wilhelm III, King Duchy of Warsaw, 51, 52, 68–69 of Prussia, 71 Duda, Andrzej, 239 Friedrich Wilhelm IV, King Dunajewski, Julian von, 94 of Prussia, 71 Dymek, Walenty, 150 Fulmann, Bishop, 146 Dziwisz, Cardinal Stanisław, 232

G E Galicia, see Habsburg Galicia Eastern-Rite Catholic Church, 51, 57 Gallicanism, 84 Eberts, Mirella, 216 deﬁned, 107n202 Ecumenism, 194 Galon, Bishop, 19–20 Edict of Toleration (1781), 83 Gamrat, Bishop Piotr, 31 Emigration, 58–59 Garampi, Giuseppe, 44 Endecja, 123–124 Gazeta Polska, 233 294 INDEX

Gazeta Wyborcza, 215, 237 Holy See, 19, 25, 40, 98, Generalgouvernement, 145 131, 235 George III, King of the United Home Army, 149, 152 Kingdom of Great Britain Homophobia, 198–200 and Ireland, 41 Homosexuality, 198–200 Germanization, 74, 76, 148 public attitudes about, 238 German uniﬁcation (1871), Polish Hoym, Karl George reaction to, 74–75 Heinrich von, 66 Gierek, Edward, 167, 168–173 Hozjusz, Bishop Stanisław, 28, 31 Gilon of Toucy, 19 Human rights, 147, 267 Glemp, Cardinal Józef, 174–177, 192–194, 198, 211, 214–216, 232 I Goldscheider, Max, 24 Innocent III, Pope, 20 Gołuchowski, Count Agenor, 94 Institute of National Remembrance Gomułka, Władysław, 161–167 (IPN), 241 Göral, Suffragan Bishop, 146 Interwar Republic Gossler, Gustav von, 81 (1918–1939), 111–138 Gowin, Jarosław, 216, 240 and anti-Semitism, 111 Grabski, Władysław, 115, 121, 125 and borders, 114–117 Graczyk, Roman, 235 and Church, 113, 122–123, Grand Duchy of Posen, 70, 71 125–126, 127–133, Grande Armée, 68, 69 137–138 Great Novena, 164–165 and Concordat, 125–126, 131 Gregory VII, Pope, 19 and constitution of 1920, 122–125 Gregory XVI, Pope, 40, 59 and demographic and confessional Grifﬁth, Sanford, 116 make-up, 117–121 Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich, 172 and early years 1921–1926, 121–126 Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Hanna, 196 and Protestants in, 121 and rule by the colonels 1935–1939, 135–138 H and Sanacja 1926–1935, 126–135 Habsburg Empire, 74, 82–96 In vitro fertilization (IVF), 241–242 Habsburg Galicia, 86–96 Isakowicz-Zaleski, Fr. Tadeusz, 177, Halecki, Oscar, 15 231–235 Herman, Duke Władysław, 19 Herzog, Theodore, 75 Hilberg, Raul, 220n30 Hlond, Cardinal August, J Primate, 128, 130–135, 146 Jancarz, Kazmierz, 234 Hohenzollern, Bishop Johannes Jan III Sobieski, King of Poland, 25, von, 67 132, 262 INDEX 295

Jansenism, 84 Kulturkampf, 75–77 deﬁned, 107n203 Kultusministerium, 71 Jaruzelski, General Wojciech, 173, Kwartalnik Historyczny, 94 175, 176 Kwaśniewski, Aleksander, 196, 200, Jasna Góra, 25, 32, 64 207, 208, 211, 213 Jászi, Oscar, 94–95 Jędrzejewicz, Wacław, 136 Jesuits, 31, 65, 72, 150 L Jews, Nazis and, 151 Landtag, 74, 75 Jogaila, Grand Duke of Lithuania, 21 Law and Justice party (PiS), 216, John XXIII, Pope, 23, 193–194 230, 239 John Paul II, Pope, 171, 193, 218 Lazarus, 13–14 Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor, 43, League of Polish Families (LPR), 230 47, 83–86 Ledóchowski, Archbishop Josephinism, 84 Mieczysław, 77–78 Lempa, Florian, 199 Leo III, Pope, 15 K Leo IX, Pope, 19 Kaczmarek, Bishop Czesław, 146, Leo XIII, Pope, 78, 79 151, 159–160, 264 Leopold II, Holy Roman Kaczyński, Jarosław, 239 Emperor, 47, 85 Kaczyński, Lech, 244 Lepa, Adam, 230 Kakowski, Cardinal Lepper, Andrzej, 210 Aleksander, 111–112, 117, Leszczyński, Paweł, 114 124–126, 127 LGBT Rights, 239 Kania, Stanisław, 173 Liberum veto, 41–42, 44, 46 Kaunitz, Prince Wenzel Likowski, Bishop Edward, 81, 96 Anton, 43, 86 Lippomano, Luigi, Papal nuncio, 28 Kazimierz I the Restorer, Duke, 16 Lorek, Bishop Jan, 146 Kazimierz III the Great, King Lutheranism, 27, 31, 41 of Poland, 20–21 Łysa Góra, 16 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, 155 Kietlicz, Archbishop Henryk, 19 Kłoczowski, Jerzy, 72 Komorowski, Bronisław, 244 M Korytowski, Witold von, 94 Mackiewicz, Stanisław, 61 Kościuszko, Tadeusz, 47, 49, 60 Madeyski, Stanisław von, 94 Kossakowski, Bishop Józef, 49 Maliński, Mieczysław, 232 Kotliński, Roman, 215 Maria Theresa, Empress-Consort Krasicki, Bishop Ignacy, 67–68 and Queen, 42–43 Krasowski, Krzysztof, 130 Martial law, 55, 60, 174–178 Kubina, Bishop Teodoro, 146 Marwitz, Bishop Johannes von der, 78 296 INDEX

Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 173, 181 Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, 53–58 Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa, Paşa, 25 Nicholas II, Pope, 19 Metternich, Count Clemens Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, 63 von, 87–88 Nie, 215 Michalik, Archbishop Józef, 231 Niedziela, 198, 215 Mickiewicz, Adam, 98 Norbertines, see Premonstratensians Mieszko I, Duke, 4, 15, 261 Nowa lewica, 215 Mieszko II Lambert, King of Nowicka, Wanda, 203 Poland, 16 Nycz, Cardinal Kazimierz, 241 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 154 Miliutin, N. N., 61 Miller, Leszek, 211 O Mit brennender Sorge (encyclical Obirek, Stanisław, 243 issued in 1937), 266 Ochab, Edward, 155 Moczar, Mieczysław, 167 Okęcki, Bishop Antoni, 67 Morality, religion and, 7, 246–247 Orthodox Church, 56, 57, 62, Morning Courier, 127 63, 129, 237 Mościcki, Ignacy, 127 Ossoliński, Jerzy, 25 Mühler, Heinrich von, 75 Ostgebiete, 150 Müller, Leonhard, 75 Ostmark, Die, 82 Muszyński, Archbishop Ottomans, 5, 24–25 Henryk, 210, 212 Myśl Katolicka, 64 P Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 115 N Padlewski, Zygmunt, 60 Napoleon Bonaparte, 51, 68 Paetz, Archbishop Juliusz, 234 Napoleonic Wars, 51 Paganism, 18 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 117 Palikot Movement, 239 Nasz Dziennik, 215, 232 Papal visits to Poland, 178–179 National Democrats, 112 Pascal II, Pope, 19 National Rights, 147 Pascendi Dominici Gregis Natural Law, 215–216 (encyclical issued in 1907), 64 Nazis, 145–146, 151 Paskievich, General Ivan, 55–56 and occupation of Patriotic Priests, see Pax Poland, 147–149, 267 Pax, 146, 156 and plans for the Catholic Pease, Neal, 124 Church, 152 Piasecki, Bolesław, 146, 156 and policy regarding the Catholic Pieronek, Bishop Tadeusz, 192–193 Church, 149–150 Piłsudski, Marshal Józef, 97, 111–115 Neo-absolutism, 93 balancing act, 128–130 New Testament, 27 BBWR, 133–134 INDEX 297

Catholicism not under and Seventh Congress, 169 siege, 132–133 and Znak, 163 Church-state relations Politics and religion, see Religion under, 130–132 and Politics crisis and transition, 133–13 Polityka, 215, 244 and Orthodox Church, 129 Poniatowski, Archbishop Michał PiS, see Law and Justice party Jerzy, 67 Pius VI, Pope, 84–85 Poniatowski, Prince Józef, 47 Pius IX, Pope, 40, 78–79, 91 Poniatowski, Stanisław, see Stanisław Pius X, Pope, 64 (Poniatowski), King of Poland Pius XI, Pope, 123–125 Popiełuszko, Fr. Jerzy, 176, 177 Pius XII, Pope, 155, 192 Porter, Brian, 130 Podoski, Gabriel, 44 Potocki, Count Alfred, 47, 94 Poland Poznań baptism of, 14–23 Carmelite monasteries in, 66 borders 1939-1951, 153 monastery buildings in, 67 and Counter-Reformation, 29–32 and Protestant Reformation, 26 double crisis, 20–23 PPS, see Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in medieval Times, 17 Premonstratensians, 19 partition during World War Property restitution, controversy Two, 148 surrounding, 236–238 and Protestant Reformation, 26–29 Protestant Reformation, 2, 26–29 strikes of summer 1980, 172 Protestants, 5, 27–29, 31, 82, Tatar army, 23–24 121, 262 Polish corridor, 118 in Germany Polish-Lithuanian in interwar Poland Commonwealth, 3, 22 Prusinowski, Fr. Antoni, 73 and ﬁrst partition to May 1791 Prussian Poland (1772–1918), 65–82 constitution, 42–47 Bismarck era, 77–80 population of, 41 Caprivi era, 80–82 second and third partitions conﬁscations of Church of, 47–50 facilities, 66–67 and World War One, 96–98 eastern territories, colonization Polish News Bulletin, 211 of, 79–80 Polish Peasant Party (PSL), 154–155 1830 uprising in Russia and its Polish Socialist Party (PPS), 95, 97, repercussions among Prussian 123, 154 Poles, 70–73 Polish United Workers’ Party and Germanization, 74, 76, 148 (PZPR), 155 German language as lingua and Church-state franca, 72 relations, 166 Grand Duchy of Posen, 70 and martial law, 174 Kulturkampf, inception of, 76–77 298 INDEX

Prussian Poland (1772–1918) (cont.) S Revolution of 1848, 73–74 Sapieha, Cardinal Adam, 112, Przegład Katolicki, 63 124–126, 132, 146 PSL, see Polish Peasant Party (PSL) Schrötter, Friedrich Leopold Puttkamer, Robert von, 80 Freiherr von, 66 PZPR, see Polish United Workers’ Second Vatican Council Party (PZPR) (1962–1965), 13, 216 Security Service (SB), 231–236, 266 Sedlag, Bishop Anastazy, 71, 72 R Sejm, 2 Raczyński, Bishop Ignacy, 67 on abortion, 205, 240 Raczyński, Marshal Kazimierz, 67 broadcasting license, 206 Radio Maryja, 193, 205–207, 215, Calvinists in, 27 240, 248 elections to, 137 Radziwiłł, Prince Edmund, 79 the Four Years’ Sejm, 45–46 Ratti, Msgr. Achille, 116, 123 and the November See also Pius XI, Pope Uprising, 55 Ratzinger, Cardinal Joseph, 242 and Piłsudski, 111, 127, 133 See also Benedict, XVI, Pope and reform, 46 Redner, Bishop Leo, 79 and sex education, 207 Reformation, see Protestant Self-Defense Party, 210 Reformation Sex abuse, 238–244 Re-Germanization, 148 Sexuality and elections, 200–201 Reichspost, 137 Sigismund II Augustus, King of Reichsrat, 95 Poland, 27 Reichstag deputies, 89, 92 Sigismund III, King of Poland, 31 Religion and morality, polling data Sikorski, General Władysław, 115 about, 228–229, 246–249 Sikorski, Jan, 178 Religion and politics, 1–4, 7–9 Simmel, Georg, 7 Religious totalism, 137 Skworc, Bishop Wiktor, 234 Repnin, Nikolai, 44 Sławek, Walery, 135–136 Republic of Kraków, 87 SLD, see Democratic Left Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 43–44 Alliance (SLD) Rural Solidarity, 173 Słowo Powszechne, 156 Russian sector of Poland Sobieski, Jan III, King, see Jan III (1772–1918), 50–64 Sobieski Russo-Turkish war, 45 Socialism, 64, 153, 162 Rydz-Śmigły, Marshal Solidarity Election Action Edward, 135–136 (AWS), 200 Rydzyk, Fr. Tadeusz, 205, 210, 215, Solidarity Independent Trade 244–245 Union, 6, 146, 173, Rzeczpospolita, 208 176, 194 INDEX 299

Sollicitudo rei socialis (encyclical issued U in 1987), 266 Umiński, J., 32 Spying on Wojtyła, 231 United Peasant Party (ZSL), 173, 178 Stablewski, Archbishop Florian, 81 University of Lemberg, 88 Stanisław Augustus, King of University of Warsaw, 40 Poland, 31, 44 Urban, Jerzy, 215, 216 Staszic, Stanisław, 18, 130 Ustinov, Dimtry, 173 Stefan Báthory, Prince of Transylvania, 31 Stepinac, Cardinal Alojzije, 192 V Summi Pontiﬁcatus (encyclical issued Voss, Bishop Otto von, 67 in 1939), 266 Swedish-Polish War, 32 Syllabus of Errors (Pius IX, 1864), 78–79, 91 W Szydło, Beata, 240 Wahl, Adalbert, 76 łę Szyszkowska, Maria, 198 Wa sa, Lech, 173, 176, 194, 196 Wandycz, Piotr, 92 Wawel Cathedral, 135 T Weiglowa, Katarzyna, 31 Targowica Confederation, 47 Weygand, General Maxime, 115 ł Tatar army, 23–24 Wielgus, Archbishop Stanis aw, 146, Tazbir, Janusz, 263 233 – Teodorowicz, Archbishop Józef Wielopolski, Alexander, 59 60 Teoﬁl, 112, 119, 124–125, Wilhelm I, Kaiser of Germany, 74 126, 134 Willisen, General Karl Wilhelm von, 73 Teutonic Order, 24 Witos, Wincenty, 117, 121, 125, 126 ł ł Thiel, Bishop Andreas, 79 W adys aw, Duke, 19 ł ł Thomas, Aquinas, W adys aw IV Vasa, King of Saint, 30, 216 Poland, 25 ł Tischner, Fr. Józef, 218, 234 Wojty a, Cardinal Karol, 193, see John Totalitarianism, 136–137 Paul II, Pope – Treaty of Riga (1921), 116 World War One, 96 98 – Tribuna, 215 World War Two, 145 152, 264, 267 ń – Trybuna Ludu, 160 Wyszy ski, Cardinal Stefan, 146 147, Trzeciakowski, Lech, 76 171, 174, 194 Tukhachevsky, Marshal Mikhail Wyzwolenie, 117 Nikolayevich, 114 Turowicz, Jerzy, 267 Tusk, Donald, 241, 242 Z Tygodnik Powszechny, 155, 159, 163, Zaleski, Wenzel von, 94 235, 236, 266 Zastrow, General Friedrich von, 66 300 INDEX

Zawadzki, Hubert, 53 Zuba, Krzysztof, 231 Zeidlitz-Trütschler, Robert von, 81 Zubrzycki, Geneviève, 9 Znak, 163, 267 Zycie Warszawy, 157, 164 ZSL, see United Peasant Party (ZSL) Życiński, Archbishop Józef, 213