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t i ·11 a l r l1 i ,, 1 2020/26/37 1;c / 3 n imhlr n Ulmhlr ag Rolnn Elle Data Cuireadh chun Culreadh chun Data Cuireadh chun START of file 1 - SECRET ANGLO-IRISH SECTION WEEKLY BRIEF WEEK ENDING 30TH NOVEMBER 1990 1 C O N T E N T S 1 . Reports from Anglo-Irish Secretariat Address by the Rev. Ian Paisley to DUP Annual Conference 'Accompaniment of the British Army 2. Contact and Information Work Conversation with Fr. McCluskey P.P., Roslea, Co. Fermanagh 3. Reports from Embassy London The New Prime Minister - an Initial Assessment John Major - media reactions Discussion with Derek Hill (NIO) on Secretary of State's views on talks Birmingham Six DPP to seek to uphold convictions Gareth Peirce on DPP's decision to contest case Northern Ireland Backbench Committee - Stanbrook succeeds 4. Reports from Embassy Washington Remarks by Sherard Cowper-Coles, First Secretary, British Embassy 1 0 .. D.U.l. Confer nee l'ir ~ Als n has i \ n n1 a ~ o ~ Iaic.l:1 's sp eh wh'ch I · t acl1~ U 1ill S h t as on h sp, ech · s und on pag f u. und ~sta1d tl1at thi~ ion w s und rl'n l1 DU l1ems 1 \·es o h atten ion of M ~ rook. ou w no e aisl 1 a .. ues: - Tha the B~itish Government has agre d th t th Un'on's s will be ar of the UK negotiating team nd h i Unionis s a"'e "plenipotentiaries" with the a -·t-sh Gov ~nment then they will know exactly wh t is t ~1n pl c · and will have the advantage of being ble to gu h ir case personally and forthrightly without ny h h , might be betrayed (by the British). The suggestion that to take t lk et o betrayal is utter nonsens. y 1 if Unionists failed ta take 0 the UK team and ensur th unsc Dublin can have no pl ce wh tso v r t tny lk bou n internal settlement in Northern Ir l nd. Substantial progress and gr rn nt must b m t u h talks befor there c n be ny furth r progr s . - The Unionists leaders will be bl o d ide wh th r h is such progress and agreement as inde d will th other parties taking part. - At the end of the day whatever the decisions r eh d, thy must be put in referendum to the people or North rn I l nd. h c u 1 cont nt vari nee with the o h p eh, isley's position, us · sl1 .. is~ y· s ys Un· onis · s h ,d "every right to smile" after meeting M. Brooke in May because "the British Government did dec·ae that the conference should be suspended so that t lks should t ke place and did decide that Maryfield should cease .its normal operation under the terms of the Agreement ... When the so· y unfolded it was seen that Dublin was not opposed to giving the prior conditions .... a replacement of the Agreement ... the closing of Maryfield (my emphasis) ... the suspension of the Anglo-Irish Conferences". The reference to closing Maryfield was repeated by Paisley on Radio Ulster last Sunday. - The reference to substantial progress and agreement (my emphasis) in talks about an internal settlement before further progress can be made, is unqualified. The decision on timing is not left to Mr. Brooke. It is claimed for the Unionist leaders as well as the other parties. Paisley said on Monday that he would agree to Mr. Brooke's being an impartial go-between on timing as long as · he was convinced that Brooke was acting completely free of Dublin interference (Guardian, 28 November) which the British see as encouraging, but which still leaves the final say in Unionist hands. Yours sincerely, , Declan o•oonovan Joint secretary . 11t1 l1a ,_ 1 "' uu1 ~~.., ,. u \_,u111erc11ce 24.ii.YU ll \\as Hnrold \Vilson '"hos· 'd · d d . a1 a ,vcck ,vas l . d ·fiant nn ogmaL1c, declare that sl , a ong tune in politics. Three days ago we saw t11c Prime Minister. field, having turned her back on Uie ~e ~\ould fight on and fight lo win, but in a few short hours she had quit 1.he 1'1rs. Thatcher, tl1c Iron Lad , UL c of U1c second bullot. , d ~.apcrsonofgrcatb ·11· .. those Wl dcrgroun ,vorkcrs \\'ho b th . n 1ancc and immense talents took on the n1incrs of Bnta1n - and ~--l 1c "on., - ' Y c1r calling are 1nouldcd to hardness 1n. the f orgc' of the underground coal f ac~, Sh~ ux k on the ..\rgcntincan d' •, , . 1c"""1tors and sllc 2 Five years ugo she to 0 k on the Ulster Lo .. r won. . announced she hat! won I ho , } a 151 people, and lhe majority of the media bol.h local and rutmual, · • Wever, announced sl 1-~ · · SI · longer Prilnc ~linistcr and llic f 1c cou u not and would not win and she \\in. but \\C \vill ,vin. Ho,v nu1ny titnes ha\ c lhc. n1 dia and our 'n 111 ics ,vritr·n us off yet we have survived and prospered. i\1r~. Thai her has SO\\ nth' \Vind\\ ilh lh.r signature to the 1\nglo/lrish act of treachery but Ulster has rc,1pcd 1..t1c \\ hirl win . T da: we rii;htl y wd rightcou:I y, determinedly and defiantly, boldly and bluntly, scl up our banner \\r1th its mc.ss2gc of ,vn.r lo all tcrrorislS and its 111cssage of pc~cc to all dcmocnLS. Tu~klc Tcrroris1n. Rcstor~ D ~111ocracy. Toe hideous und cruel mark of the bc.:ist of L~rronsm is all O\ er our bclovcJ Province. It is seen in the br:mtlmar · f the thrc~ cbrk lOs' - DE:-\ TH. DESTRCCT10~ Jnd DlS.\BLEi\lENT. I. DEATH r PrO\'t'ncc 'nto.., nr..,V'"')':lfJ ll\' C T'"',:llcher's · · , . tl 1 The vcars of roJ.dwav from ~1:u-garct ,.. F'rronst.s ,1avc tumc Ou u ~ '"" '"" • • . - • ...... Th ~ , k d ·, 'l • 1"slOilCS bul with , on1b~toncs. An incrc.asmg death roll is Lh~ r .... sult of tl1~ ..:: : ·LJL lr,a,ncry IS n1::H ·c n t \'.lul n1t" ~ \\ h:ll a.re· the· lt£urcs?..... f c s on I" Lh of t.h is ,no nth . .In 19S)- when the Agrccn1cnt ,va~~ s1gnc· ....1 on 1s As I Sltd 1n the House o 01n1non ,'cd~ there \\CfC 54 killings. The follo\\Jng. )Car. 19 6 . then:·... re 61 :No ~ bcr \\ h ·n Lh ... )'Cur ,, as a l 1110s l C I l u • . . . . · : 1.:m . \ " , , killings· in 1988 there ,, ere 93 killings; m 1989, 02 k1lltngs :mtl ·o for t.'llS year. 1ihngs; u1 193' there ~ t.:rc_ 91- \\t · can nic:.1s~rc ~he :1;ony, sorro,v, hcarlbrcak, hun and lo..:s b hi::J , cry 1cc there h:n e b.:cn I killings. ,o ~ inn ·cnt vie 1. m? . f. nl!. and '\ er in·r·:ising proc ssion of m:um ·d and b rc:i, r:olh.:rs. 0 1 \\'e h~artbrc:.i..~ in a ht ,. sons tall r lig1on - for Lcrr ri has no rcs or ::i .... s~~ lh:n lh.: fonn_ "i° ..... 5 and ·,n ~ c ~ c. 1 fa:th~rs, brothers. sisters, husbands, \\ \ cs, :iug 1... class or crc~d. ccn uiurll~rs in the pJst fj\ c } cars. Of lhosc. -4 .SC::, ,, er· laui;~ .:red b} 346 The. figures sho\v 1.h:.it there h ..i, c b C the ,cs :ind 4 l - ul these \\ ere sl..1u~htcr J b) t1 IRA. 41.:-.. l all 119,\crcRon1an J , "' b ll ~ IRA. Of that nuin b er, . su ·cl in court ~,pp 'ar:in~cs and charges \Jctng ui h "l l.,t..lHVMae Dlld de astalCd desert. 11mw .ap die) o( Clllpl I nL 1 ry OUl l I nJlU u1urdcr u1osc \Vho sacriiice to &nak JSC who on 1y want their inal. c U1l!n, :..'"'""" fC ,1· lCnablcrigl . d 1.., j~C1<:.u . c funcra l o arumal O'Fce d ll lo live Th .i aoouL so called hu:nan righlS and cul the throats of jnuoccnt1 beings human bom·b:nt say Lhcy lake J~susc~ kneel at lheir Romanist mass alws. as Gerry Adams at O 10 I despicable cowardice. They Lh be blown lo bits .1 wafer form on their tongue and then go ou·t and make tooguc. Under the seal of the c enf return and get absol ~ a hellish blitz. This shows their sat.anic hatred and I Ulster revealed what he knew 0tlRAessional the priest w·~ton from the priest that proposed to put Christ on their of IRA massacres O killings Lhc intcl;. not reveal their deadly sccreL If every priest of Rome in · igcnce would b l - bl You can say those arc to c enoug 1 to solve many 01 the most tern e . : ug 1l words. I re 1 I Tlunk of the Enn1skillcn slau ,Jae P Y must be as harsh as Lr . • . • '"rriblt; crirne. Ho\v many f lh g r. Not one person b . uth and as w1comprorn1s1ng as JUSUCC. 2 l,L, o c pcrpctr rought 1n for q · · N h d ·,k ·" for et the gesture of the p . . ators received ri . . ucsuomng. ot one c arge w1u, u,at g opc m sending golden c .Ii P eslly absoluuon for the deed? Ulster Protestanl5 do not ruc1 ixcs to IRA inurdcrcrs on hunger suikc. lll. D1SAOLEiv1 ~"'NT • Last Mond.iy in the House of C ' disa· bl cmen ts w·l 11c· l1 arc but a I.my· pcrccntaommons e of my. coll. eague r.{ev. W11Jmm. . McCrea read out a list of some 'A few days ago I received a comm .g . a sic~en,ng and frightening whole. 3 urucauon wl11ch I shall ,1 b more 10n. mem ers \Vere present to hear ·L . . , rcau ecausc the House should hear it. I V¥'ish that l b l 1 lS C ll d words o us. bca uuful. song were sung Lo a t h dn tle Far Across y on der Blue Lies A Golden Fairy Land.' The f tl 1lUS c and cnlhrallcd a tf L1 · · · beauty o or cm Ireland. he went on to . tl u 1ence as 1c smger unfolded to his (nends lhe f N th Ireland, then maybe at the closing of the tn~ ~no icr haunting ballad beginning, 'If you ever go across the sea to 1 bay.' The person who wrote to me about tla!'. ~n coincs ~le lovely line, 'and watch the sun go down on Gal·,vay us 1nc1dcnt conunucd 'I l d to l · tl · ' f shining as he sang. He stood tall and d , . . • ia cave 1e room. 111c singers ace was . . . prou • ) et lus sightless eyes and hearing aid told it all Charlie was blown up 16(ri yearsd w·n· ago w h11 c serving w1Lh Lhe RUC · This wmLer· 1ic w1·11 make soft toys in his dark · and silent world. His en I ic w~s more fortunate. He can at least hear.' Whal was he singing? It was 'and watch the sun go down on Galway bay. He would never sec the sun go down on Galway bay again. Scan heard someone ~noc~ing on his door 19 years ago. He looked out of the window and part of his brain fell out on the cot where his rnlam son lay because he had been shot in the head. Today, he is wheelchair bound, tota.lly dependent on his elderly parents. He needs constant nursing care. Anoi..hcr lad was a Royal Marine, a tough one. Today, he sits in a red wheelchair with 11 bullets in his stomach. A surgical collar and sling complct;: his ensemble. He was only doing his duty outside the b,v courts, protecting the public. Another gentleman got into Lhe back of his car after duty and was hurled through I.he roof by a bomb. Toda}', h;: sits in a blue wheelchair wearing a corset to support what is left of his anaLom y. Michael losL boJ1 arms. He is in his late twenties. Many things arc difficult with iron hooks or claws. This is not licuon. This is reality. Anotht'r was a hwnan fireb:ill in Londonderry after a petrol bomb struck him on Lhc back. Anot!icr carries .norc sted plates in his head Lban many of us sec in a lifetime. His epilepsy docs not help mauers.' Yet in llie 'House of Commons al that very deb ale the government insisted that there "odd be no chang.:: in their security policy. They have taken from our mouths the bread of peace_ wl'.ich we h:ivc ngnuy_c~ e~. . Tod:ly we demand a Change and an instant and inuncdiatc change 111 tl1c1r disastrous :ind de_~~ mcrc:mng security strategy. We say with Burke. 'Where there is abuse, there ough~ to be a c~::nnour bcc:iusc 1t 1s bctt ·r to ha\ c our 10 slumber broken by ll1c fire bell ll1an Lo perish amidst the n:imcs our bed. So today we hoist the flag. We raise up the standard. 'El-,n0IlIS'l'S BY OECLARlNli \VAR 0~ TlIE;\1 1 1 TACKLE Tll E 1 \. " " .. . ·t be taken olf in tl1c security b:Jltk No longer mu ·t l11c :ccurity The time has come when ll1e kid gloves 111.us 'tl one arm Lied bdiind their back. The government must show 1 forces be shackled and told to fight the terronst wi cl·,, effective actions 111ust t:lkc the place of sLr ng bul 1 115 . A · s suo1H! a v , t11at It has the \Vill to win the ,var. cuon 'fi --: . rroni t,.l!s. Thatcher. and others about dl:SlfO) ing terrorism. . ff . d many me ccuvc words. We have hc:ir LOO al• innJuonsf , . be pcnniucd 10 get on "1th. t I1c JOb. by mJkmg. a firm about extirpating terrorism. Let the secu~il~ or... cs 'tu:Hion mid a battle has got to be fought. Tlus 1s nut ·ome . Tlus is a war si . declaration of war against the terrorists. . . id dcfcncc of life and lunb. . debate lh' · ., dl suugnlc for the protccuo.n :.u ,,0vcn1111cnt has really dccl:i.rcd \\ar on the IRA. I tlunk , 1s1sauca y o csuonw1ynoc1 . u· \Ve l·' ul oultl n t u d h Lhcn s v up Iha naht ru,d cn&.crcd Lhe political in h uh.I I urn 1 on from llla history of I.he lrl h civil war Dnd the way that ouLh f tJu 1 lund. R I I D •MINA IN 11 •1\1 h t 1 nn rnbu h. or plnn killing, he must realise that he is going to be ' n p l l plculllng an ha f vour. Better to have, as 1 s.ud in the !louse of 1 l all d lhWl ann cnt pcopl murdcrcd. d r f lh d nd lh govcrnn1 nl lh t urrcn<.lcrcd tJ1cir God-given right and rd mu t r I un llull po er nnd c crci c it. By not exercising Lhat power it has m tha untr . F r tJu1t ord i for the prate uon of lhc good and the destruction of tJac rd thut h ulll pr t l th ' d nnd ll troy the vii is not being used by the government for tJ1c al. n, tun h n, " h n thos lhut kill lhcn1sclvcs rnust pay the ulli,nat.c price for their lh n, 1 mu t ~ ri at Lh lt h it · also peace to lh dcanocrats. also say ••• 'O E DEC\IOCR CY 1 d and m:id the b:lsis forth cl toralc to make a decision on lb re lhrc lhinas 1.hnt mu t achic\c before any talks r ina. -,-, clcclDratc short r.anct conlinucd ... . bccuu so U10 y sm Jc d d lo l tgh L 1cr tlw. And Lhc y we re b1 amcd .... hen 1.h c cam c ou l or c Con fer cnccs I n , y -t.h smile, but tJ1cy hod ~v/1 ~nlly 119 far ns som:: people were c:om:crnctl.Unlon!st leaders were not al.lowed even LO susnendcd so tJ t tk' ry ght to sinilc because the Briush government did decide that the Conference should be 1 · 10. Ul s should lD.k 1 1· nd the 1"'nns of u1ft, Art c P ace and did decide that Murvf1cld should cec1Se its nonnn.1 opcr~t on u er .... "" 0 rccmcnt. , Instead of t.hc press and cu, . , ·~ u, breakthrough d lh . .crs agreeing t.."iat this was a brcaktJ1rough; comments were made that 1l wasn • reu Y n d , anh .at Lt would not be altaincd but v.ihat we set oul lo get fro1n t.hc British govcmtncnt we got. The n ulC 1ong and of Dubl' I . • • th C in reached into the Drit.lsh }louse of Co1r,1nons on the 5th July last '1nd a mm1sl.Cr or e r~~nhw~ not able to say in the. Co1nmons what he wanted to say because of the power vcsi..cd through ,u.,e An 1o,""r1sl Agrecm"'nt in ,l bl' .h. M. i~ d . . ~ uic O u 111 govcm:ncnt, giving 1.hcm a velo over lhc government of u,is pnrt or He• r re:itst.y~ .ornmions. For U1e first time the House of Commons uwoko to what Ule Anglo/Irish Agreement was Y 8 u\. nnd all the argurncnt.s Lhut h:id been put by the UnionlslS in lhc House we.re now vindicntcd. From t.hat l hnvc heard "ll'J 'T" • b day never• c..t • ory rnc1nbcr of the rlouse staac! lng up in support of lhc Anglo/Iris l1 Agrcc1ncn l ut l have heard voiced by very 1nany mcn1bers who voted for the Agrc~1ncnt, t.hc oplnton or affirmalion th~l lhcy would noc vot~ for it no\v, B~.t .when tJ1c story unfoldcu it wns seen tl:at the Dublin govcrn1ncnt wus not opposed to giving the pnor conon~ons, the condilion of cons idering an o.ltcrn~Livc to and a rcpluccn,cnt of the Agreement, to lhe closing of ~1a.ryflcld to the suspension of Lhc Anglo/11 ish Confcrcr.ccs but lh:tL tJ1cy put another condition and t.h:.it conuiLJon is Uiat they inust be 1n upon u1c talks ccnccrnit~g the internal arrangements in Nortl1cn1 Ireland. To U1c uiblc where such talks take place the Irish governnicnl cun lrnvc no rcprcscnwtion for they hnvc no right to be at U1al table. The only pcoplo Ll1ut have u right to l>c nL thut table arc the conslilulional poliLical parucs and lhc representatives of Her Mnjcsty's government. They ore Lhc pcc!,lc und il is t.hcy 3lonc who must de.al wiLh lhc internal affairs of ~,ort11crn lrclUJ1d. And what is more in dealing wilh the lnLc1nal affair~ of 1 loru,cn11Ic1anc.l it is NorU1cm lrclan<.1 as a part of the 'Ul{. und not orthcrn Irclund in seine sor· ur llrnbo 1..1:it ,nny even develop to iLS annexation in a whole all Irclar1d scnlcmcnt. lt is the govcrn1ncnt or NorLllcm Irc!ancJ as parl of the UK which ,must be sculcd .. It is inlc:esting tO note t.hnt a docu,ncnt hus appear~ 'Nhich we arc told 11n.s come Croin the SDLP and Y.'hich is John Ilu1nc's idea for u solution in order to g:l talks going. If llHH docu,ncnt is studied 1ou ,,nll notice that no where docs Lhc SDLP ~cknowlccJgc that Northern lrcb.\nd is a part of t.hc UK and will rcn1uin a p.art of lhc UK until its pco~1lc decide otherwise. So for Mr. l·lu~1~c it scc1ns lo be it is a unit~c.1 Irch1nd or nothing. He rnust ' acknowledge that NorLhcrn Ireland 1s \JUJL of the CI<. thnt the tnajoriLy of people arc dctcrm inid Lhat it ',\/ill continue to be a part of the CK untl he must cotnc to t.hc wble to disct!SS the govcm,ncnt of 1 orthcrn Ireland us an in lcgral po.rt of the UK. The SDLP must fncc \IP to t.hHt I!lU ttcr. Tho Dublin gt>vernmc11t entered into an Agrccrncnt with Lhc Dritish government without t1 c consent of lhc people of Norlhcrn Irclo.nc.l and NiLhoul <.:onsultatlon ·~ilh the n1njodly or the people or Nor1.hon1 lrc ., nd ond if we urc going to ha v~ a rcpl!!ccmcnt of .ind an altcrnuli vc lO tJ1c Anglo/Irish Agrcctncnt U1ut p~r. of t.hc Ag:ccn,cnt which gives authority and jurisdiction and sny to Dublin in lbc terms of the Anglo/ rish r\grccrncnl "-·hich is obnoxious to the m~JCrity of people in Northern lrclund, that part tnust be unscrainblcd. It was not our doing, il is not to our liking. It is intolerable if we arc going to have proper conditions for living in pcocc in this islo.nd nnd the British govcnuncnt hos got lo sec tlu1t lh~t part is ulso rcplncccJ. Thnt ,ncans that lhc Bnlish go y~.T~1n~ c~~-l !1~s got ~o cuts:J_jr)l.QJ)Cgc~liuti.oD~~JrillL.\.ll.9.J!.~hlin g~~~rnrncut ~~~ }DJl°)Q.s§.ii_cg~t.i~li~~__Ll~c Dr il:sh govcrn~cnt ~~s. -agfecd lho.t 1.hc C'1:_i?r.~1..s -~F ~~~.!~~Ian? ~ill. be Pll;l'l,?i~:~_l}l< :'1~g~!u~~n1pc·~~-.a_~d t!.:lt iS s01riC~ir.g .0a~. "'chinc··ouforthe L1!ks. For let n1c say thut l bcl,cvc ~.htlL 1f l!H! Bnll~ll govcrn1ncr.l U!C },r;p;1rcd to rnnkc US plcnipotcniliuicswilh·t1\cmsclvcs.-f11dc~1i1l( wHEJ?_~~1LP.g,G.9.(Th~~9K ;i,... ricgoiiiiiio1is 'Nilh DubUn ~~ct1 ~·c will . ~wcxacufwlialJ.~~µ,~1iig riiuc0?iitrwc·wiilli£~E Jli~ utivnnu1gc or Gcti1i uu1c·ro-nrgue our cusc pcr~o.1ally u.:1d · !or1.hrightly wiLhout Ol!Y...fcnr lhE!_~..S.. mig~t be bcLr~-c~. . · · ·-- -·-~· -~-- - to araue or suggest that to take part 1n such.~~~L~~~.~~11nc_~ _o!_?~~~yal on the part of UnionislS is uitcrnonscnsc~ft wouidfncfccil·oc·aoclfiiyafif we failed LO l:Jkc up our proper placc·as part of'lhc K i~,m~in- unscrnmfiling the cntun°glc1ncnt urilleilicxtaL Let rnc spclrii-our: Dubilncnniin vc rici placc.. whinsocver 'ni o.riy- ialkiabout nn1nLc.!!!nI scttfi0ifi}t ln [~iJ1cm1rclfu~~lla~·~]i !n~~~1·.r9! ~~c ~Pr~~C!~~~~~-~.. ~~-~~h~-~9-~~!ill!~9!:i~I ).artiCSOINorili'Cl'n lr:!~~yn_j .~..:..~.~- ii~v.::n.~~~-~ ;u1.~~u~~'?.11~cnt 11.~onc a~d. su~swnlfal pro~li:ss ancl ugl'~~mcn:_ must bemiiiletif'such ~!.E.cf9_r~~C!~~~~ ~~.. W.:Y _r~!·~~~!_ Progrcss_. _Th9.J.~.~1~D.1~t lcuders ~ ,Jl_l)c,. al?l.c_iQ..d. ride.: -wheJ.bCLJb~r_e_t~_hJ.y}i~yintinJ_pi_gS[CJJ7~9..~i!!£C_!!l_~1~~s i~~~~ "!1~.~ o~~~.E~:~s Ulking Pil!~:..S~ one needs to be afrnid thnt ii~o!!!c.~~¥ -~~!~1~~9ltl_sJ~,1_~~ ~c~ny_c~.. . ·· --- --·--· -wTtfi' rejard'io1iriirijcrricuL, UJ lllO government und aa11un1sU'alion of Northern lrciun Ulster's cause. I woultl IBkc t..~c fan1cus words of Rcbcn Taylor ar.d give then, on uistcr oppiicnlios l 'If l were a s~u lplor t I wcu1d c!1iscl fron1 th~ ?narble my ideal of a hero. l would mu.kc it the fi Jrc fan Ulst\!rmnn sacrificing his hopes and his )lfc on lhe altu.r of his Province and carve on its pcdcs~l L~e n~mv of Edward Carson. lf I \Vere a plirucr I 'would tnake U,c cnnva.ss eloquent with the deeds of I.he bn1v\,,~t people ho ever li ved, Whose proud spirit no power can ever cot\qucr and whose loynHy and devotion to the hc1 es f free govcn1mcnt no tyrant can ever crush and I would write under th~ picture, 'Ulslcr.· If l were u poet I would mcll he world in tears wiLh the pathos of 1ny sor.g. I would touch t.hc hcurt of hu1nnnity with the mcu:nful ""tor.1 of Clstcr's wrongs and Ulster woes. I would weave the shamrock und 01c orange lily into n gurlund of h,ry form' oolovcd Province a land that hos crJdlcd heroes untl h~s been the nursery of liberty. ~1c1Ugncd by their cnc1ni s '"ud murdered on their streets and in tl1cir homes, robbed of the fruits of their sweat and toil ar.d driven I: ·e lcav • of autumn before the keen winter winds this sturdy rucc of Ulster's sons und daughters have been sca tcrcd ov..r Lhc face of the carth but they have never forgotLcn tl1c Province that g.:1ve Lliem birth nnd the prln ·iplcs that m:.id' I.hem fr~ .' It . . . If' . W· must build our party nncl build it well. We must use c~ 'ry 01 'cm ,c~ you to sacnf1cc in unsc is 1,ncsds.f l~1I our mi;sian. We must recruit ihc you1.h of Uls1. 'r, inspire them to tcc,1n1quc to propo.gutc our message an u iJ • th , · ,, f , · T ~1 utcr thnn she ever wos before. c g.onous uis~ o maK1ng ~ stcr grc " k back to c~sy option or tu rn lo some ubjcct surrcnd.'!f. 00 501110 Wc have not put our hun d to UlC pi ou g h to l r , . trui S' it as straigh l cnn be, no rna t: r .,., hot rn "'ee AN RUNA(OCHT ANGLA-EIREANNACH ANGLO-IFUSH SE CRETARIAT I BEAL FEIRSTE BE LFAST 2 CONfIDENTIAL ,, 3 26th November, 1990. Mr Dermot Gallagher, Assistant Secretary, Anglo Irish Division, Department of Foreign A!!airs. , Dear Assistant Secretary, Accompaniment of the British AIJZlY/UDR Mr Ledlie came to the Secretariat this afternoon to hand ov r the results of the firse Six Monthly Review of Accompanime n t of the British Army/UDR conducted in the 39 Subdivisions of the RUC frum · April to September this year. I attach the document handed over by Mr Ledlie. I t i s , as e expected, and as the British undertook tc give us a t the contarancR of 19 April last, a document giving tigur es and percanta9es tor accompaniment in each of the three RUC r gins, Baltaat, Rural East and Rur~l West, distinguishing betwe n the Britiah Army and the UDR and breaking down the tigures further as between Orange, Green and Mixed areas. The following a re pints to note: - The document is a major advance over the situation of er , skatchy and vary intermittent data given to us bQ fo re n w; and it haa the v~lu• that the exereiae, aaauming it is v _li and it i• con~inuad as promiaad by the British side, will nabl• the conference to monitor th• progress or otherwise of the accompaniment policy albeit in a very generft l w y. fi9ur•• concarn only the•• oper tion• c ontact with the cofflmunity (Killaborough itiah ••id th Y b li v d •o but vould ---11· h uc. -~ ! ; I - ) - There is~ fair amount to digest . 2 the moat important point is th tin the d t given to us but shown as a . _ accomp niment ot th UDR i~ consistent lOOt in Green araas or self et nd - n average of 81% in Mixed areas of Belt st, 7, in r en r of Rural East, 401 in Mixed re sot Rur l Est, 75 in Green areas of Rural We~t and 43, in Mixad are s or Rur West • . overall, accompaniment or the UDR in Graen and M.i araas of Northern Ireland is t 70%. - These figures simply do not t lly with reports comin to he Department a.g. trom South Down which is in Rural Est. Either Nationalist rapre ent tive re misjudging the pie ur or the figures re misle ding ·n soma way, p rhaps b c use there is var~i7 generous ir1tc1·pretation by the RUC cl the patrol~ not involving direct cont et, or perhaps becaus~ the definition of reas ia skew d. - On tha last point, w• recalled previous discuaaion on the question ot sQnsitiye a. pointinq, out th t our Minist r would want to know how we could have a meanB ot assess ng what progress has been mada in theae areas which are n8tionalist areas, access routes to su~h araes, cer n mixad areas 8nd other areaa affactad by particular circumstancea. We pressed !or further examination or the matter with A view to identifying senaitiv• areas within th broad headings ot orange, Craan and Mixed. Mr Ladli s id wa would have to raise this matter at the Conterence and that what had baen given to ug was what had been agreed t tha conrerence ot 19 April. we corrected Mr Ledlie on hi ratarence to agreement, noting that the Joi~t Record t h t Conferenc• recorded the British side aa saying the datr would show what waa now being given to us, but our id saying that the Working Group should reconvene to fulfil it. ramie of identifying sensitive areas and the sop {or aa• Mr ~adlie acce~ted the correction bu • d h• h~0 ?~ w ·would not say on Friday th t we h d b en prom . . u p hi • than had now be•n giv•n. We 8 id both 1cte aomat n9 mor i h - w dd doubt brief Ministers wt care. e, L, would, no ' Minister,• understanding of t.hia l . ue howav r, that our ntereno• of 18 October 1989 wh r h rested also on the co d•d in the Joint R cord a .• · , t · n O srit.1 h aide ware rec•~ to ahare with the Irish sid h "thy would b• prepa1toring ot accompaniment in r 8 ulta of th ir mon (my mph sia) ''. This the note by the British side ot w r firm din 1990 l) • 3 ot theae figures should be made public and, in response to my question, said that if Mr Brooke was asked a PQ about the 2 level ot accompaniment by, say, Mr McNamara, ha would reply that it was not tha policy to give details of operational m~tters. comment they ,.hil~ the ~rit'ish side have given us what s~id they would ..., give ua at the Conference of 19 April, there was a prior B commitment from the Conferenca of 18 October 1989 to share the reaults ot monitoring "in areas to be agreed between the two sides". The independence of the operational management of the RUC will be brought in aid to resist deeper examination of what constitutes the Orange, Green and Mixed areas in the data but unless we can agree what are sensitive areas we will have no adequate means of testing the reports we get trcm nationalist representatives and satisfying ourselves that progress is being made .. Yours sincerely, Declan o•oonovan, Joint secretary .. .. C O P I D 8 T I L 2 UDR REGION "'ctal Aecom Toca A.ccom 3 Bal.taat. 1618 1618 1001 121 956 a~, r,,, Aural East l 95 621 2, 1 214 553 46\ 491 Rural west. 4592 2068 ~5 900 458 5.:..1 461 TOTAL 7395 4307 581 323S 1967 61t 591 MAY # ea.fast 1704 1704 1001 994 828 83l 94\ 471 Rural Ease 1390 665 481 11?5 542 461 48 Rural west 3094 -469 47\ 879 454 521 6lt TOTAL 6188 3838 621 304S 1824 601 83\ 941 Bel !ast 1644 1644 100, 997 831 42\ I Rural East 1135 ~25 46l 995 415 42\ Rural West 4520 1808 40\ 933 456 491 58\ 561 TOTAL 7299 3977 541 2925 1702 JULY 991 941 Belfast 1646 1646 1001 1172 46 ural East 1232 651 531 1430 576 44\ r eat 4561 1921 421 978 524 571 7 39 4211 57 3510 2091 L TG/12290 flt 1.,..,I\Jl .. .,~ } () :11 - 1-- .., , ~ .- 1 .. . 003 P \ 2 RUC AC~MPAHDmNT OP ARMY PATROLS APRIL - SEPTEMBER 1990 - ARMY REGION UDR Total Aecom ARMY AN D UDR\ Total Aecom 3 ,. AUGUST 1687 seltaat 1687 100, 1041 868 831 941 aural East 1324 626 471 1355 604 361 46\ Rural West 4495 1826 411 921 502 551 431 TOTAL 7506 4139 551 3317 1974 601 561 , Belfast 1483 1483 100\ 1024 867 85\ 94\ Rural East l23S 604 491 1277 524 411 451 Rural West 3677 · 1598 431 845 490 581 461 TOTAL 6J95 3685 581 3146 1881 601 S8t TOI I o .. ,l,..T # I l f : ) l C O M F I D R N T I A L APRYL ABKl ODB oraog~ Green Mixec1 Qt:AD9!1 Green 11Xld ;ol taCJt ~~/C4 l.4~9/l4~G ..ODI • 1~a11.ao 89/7• e~o,oeo I lOOl 202/202 10.01 SJj .LJ).Q.I ie,, 42/9 ) Rural East 317/203 836/409 211 64, 283/91 223/183 708/279 491 32, 82\ 391 ' 109/34 Rural west 3241/1497 12J2/537 311 461 82/15 363/255 455/188 i 43\ 18\ 701 41\ MAl Bel:ast 31/31 1553/1553 120/120 100/91 72/72 ,822/665 I 1001 100% 100, 911 1001 81% , Rural East 59/28 456/249 875/388 353/106 221/170 '601/266 t 471 ss, 4 4.\ 301 771 44~ Rural West 115/39 1854/1013 1125/417 71/19 266/212 542/223 341 551 37\ 2,, 801 4lt ' • JUNg 3elfast. 27/27 1498/1498 119/119 92/78 95/95 810/658 \ 100% 100, 1001 85\ 100% 81% 409/195 304/79 184/115 507/ 221 .{Ural East 320/132 406/198 t 41% 491 481 26, 63t 44t 48/18 237/158 "48..,.. I/ ')ao..,,-., .tura l West 99/34 3325/1279 1096/495 371 671 4Jt \ 341 381 45, JULY 234/234 902/73 7 5elrast 106/106 36/20 39/39 1501/1501 551 100, a2, \ 100, 1001 1001 492/184 220/174 718/ 218 Rural East 320/258 551/240 361/153 441 371 791 30 421 811 ' 40/14 291/221 647/ 289 3307/1465 1166/427 4S\ :urai West 88/29 )71 351 761 331 ,21 L TQ/12290 .. CYC Y .. . 1 - 3 -1 1-2i"' 1 0 : l ::>.. ~ . . r) 0 '3 p( I .. I C O N P I D B N T I A L ~J..ct)f . 2 ARMY UDR orange Green Mixed orange Gi:een Mixeg AUGUST !al fast 22/22 1564/1564 101/101 35/27 195/195 811/646 k 100, 1001 1001 77\ 1001 so, ,. 3 ~ural East 25"6/126 454/262 614/2:JB 558/190 241/176 556/238 t 49, 58% 391 34, 73\ 4)1 ~ural West 45/23 3406/1323 1044/480 61/36 298/240 562/226 511 J91 46\ 59\ 811 40\ ' SEPl'EHBER ~•l!ast 24/24 1448/1448 11/ll 78/73 90/90 856/704 1001 1001 100, 941 1001 82% ' # ~ural East 31/22 363/237 841/34! 498/127 218/162 561/235 711 65\ 41\ 26\ 741 42\ 459/218 ' 58/22 2601/1100 1018/476 67/28 319/244 ~ural West 761 471 t 381 391 471 42\ 29042/18076 11392/5232 3287/1270 3969/3198 11995/6971 rOTAL 1788/856 581 ,a, 621 46, 391 811 2 3 I CONFIDENTIAL CONVERSATION WITH FR Mo CLUSKEY, P.P., ROSLEA, CO. FERMANAGH . 26 NOVEMBER, 1990. 1 . I met with Fr McCluskey four days after the attempt to blow up tlie permanent British Army checkpoint at the Roslea 3 border crossing. 2. According to Fr McCluskey local people blame the army presence for the attempted bombing. The perception in Roslea, an overwhelmingly Nationalist town, is that the purpose of the army presence is not to defend the local community but rather that the town acts as a form of protection for the Army. 3. There is considerable resentment locally at the continued closure of the main Roslea to Clones road with its effects on the social and economic life of the area. The existence of an army post close to the Roslea/Clones road makes i t a ll the more difficult for local people to comprehend the reasons for the road closure. Fr McCluskey was told b y a British Army major that the closure resulted from a complaint by the local Church of Ireland rector (a Corni s h man). The local parish straddles the border and it was particularly galling for Fr McCluskey that the local rector could evade the inconvenience of the road closure because of access to the South across Protestant fields. - 2 - 4. Roslea is somewhat unusual in that in addition to the perm?nent checkpoint on the Monagha?/ Roslea road ther e is also a permanent checkpoint on the Roslea/Lisnaskea roa d . The resulting interface between the local community and the army leads to allegations of harassment and intimidation. 3 • It would not be difficult to envisage a serious confrontation in the future arising from attempts to reopen the Cl ones road. 5. The Nationalist population of Roslea vote Sinn Fein a lthough Fr McCluskey felt that there be little active involvement with the IRA in the town. He spoke with some bitterness of a lack of SDLP organisation or interest in South Fermana gh. ~L., Mary Whelan November 1990 3 ~MBAS.ito NA hCIREANN LONOAIN \1A/ 17 Grosvenor Place SW1X 7HR IRISH EMBASSY. LONDON cnNFIDENTIAL 29 November 1990 Dear Assistant Secretary THE NEW PRIME MINISTER: AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT While John Major's leadership campaign offered few clues to the direction which his Government is likely to take, his Cabinet reshJffle confirms the view that he is a person who, despite his image as h~ir apparent to the Thatcher inheritance, will in practice be very mJsh his / own man with a distinctive style and a reordered agenda of political priorities designed to reunite the party after the trauma of ~h~ past { three weeks and to maintain an opinion poll lead o~er Las0Jr beyond tte initial honeymoon period. Northern Ireland is, however, one area where continuity is likely to be most apparent. There is little, on the public record at least, co indicate the new Prime Minister' s position on Irish issues . ror a :ime yesterday, rumours were circulating at Westminster to the ef:ecc t .. a: the NIO might figure in the reshuffle . In the event , the rro --i2.s untouched . As we have earlier reported , he told a news con:erence last Friday (23 November) that he was "not going to a~.:.ounce policy changes on Northern Ireland on this occasion''· He has, howe ver, so~e familiarity with Northern Ireland issues. He ser·,ed (as p2.rc :if ri.:. s duties in the Whip's Office) , as Northern Ireland Hhip :or a p2rioa tn 1983 when Jim Prior was Secretary of State . In this pose he woula have haa to liaise with the NI Backbench Committee and with those Ps 2ctire during NI Questions. He would also have had some measure of concact /with the Unionists . In previous contacts with the Embassy . he has / indicated an interest in Irish affairs and his support for the Hnglo /, Irish Agreement . On the other hand, Sir Geoffrey Howe tol o me last evening that on Northern Ireland "as on many other issues" I ajor , s ;:? mind is a tabula rasa. For a period in the summer of 1988 Mr Major was spoken of as a possible Secretary of State for Northern Ireland . As e reported at t ha t time there were suggestions that he would have r1aa some interest 1n he job because the posts he had held until then had been more te~hn1 al ~han political . It is also worth noting that he served for a per1~a a~ PPS to Sir Patrick Mayhew during his time as Minister of State at the Hcrr.e Office. • • • 2 Despite hj s pubJ ic profj.J e as a rather duJ J humourless technocrat, hj s pr i v_a te manner is engag i.ng, pleasant and self-deprecating. In a c~nversation yesterday with Mr Hayes, Major's· poltt1cal adviser during h:s short stint at the FCO, Maurice Fraser, descrjbed him as relaxed and outgoing. He was 11ot one to stand on ceremony and, according to Fraser, while at the FCO he, on occasion, discomfi.tted the bureaucratic I I hierarchy of the Forelgn Office with hi.s i conocl astj c enquirtng manner [ and his no nonsense "shjrt sleeves rol]ed up" approach. He listened however to his officials and foJJowed closely hi.s briefLng material. The more informal approach at the Treasury sujted his style and temperament better and it is Jjkely that in filling vacancies at No 10, in the policy uni.t and in other key areas, he will turn more to the Treasury than other Government Departments. He has, for example, appointed Gus O'Donnell, h1s press offi.cer at the Treasury to replace Bernard Ingham. Fraser's assessment of the new Prime Minister's personality is echoed by MPs to whom we have spoken. Those who knew him during his period in the Whips Office, for example, recall his amiable relaxed manner combined wjth shrewdness and sound judgment. There is, however, a view that he will need to show in public more of the firmness and vigour he is said to display behind closed doors and that he will have to change his rather boring tone of voice and generally improve his public speaking. His first objective as Prime Minister will be to secure party unity and heal the damaging wounds arising from the leadership contest. In the short term, this may require him to be all things to all men as he tries to draw together the deeply divided wings of the party. In t he longer term, however, our contacts suggest that his natural instincts are likely to see him moulding the party in a more centrist mou l d. Those who know him have stressed to us that his frequent references during the leadership campaign to the need to create a classles s meritocratic society arise from a deeply held personal conviction forged by his upbringing in modest circumstances in Brixton. In the longer term, therefore, many of his younger supporters from t he Thatcherite 'no turning back' group who see him as their standard bearer may find that Major's natural instincts wiJl, in ime, l ead him to distance himself and his Government increasingly from t he cruder monetarist aspects of the Thatcher years. By conviction and temperament it seems that the new Prime Minis er will be inclined to work for consensus and to place a much greater reliance on Cabinet agreement and support. From what we hear, he wilJ be well content, other than perhaps in the economic area, to leave Ministers to get on with their own particular portfolios. Labour MPs with whom we have spoken have privately welcomed MaJor's victory. From a Labour perspective, of the three candidates Hese1t1ne was the one Labour feared most. Labour are playing up the continuity the T~at her era which Major's election represents. In terms f ~ p 1 , will suit Labour to argue that under Major 1 w 1 • • • 3 be a case of ''mor M'since h ' for a start,e ofMajor the same"is co . . Th.is analysis. may prove faul t y however ic ae 1 Heseltine as Secretar mmitted to reviewing the poll tax. Wi.th unpopul~r and electorally dam! ~f State for ~he Environment, this most to survive for much lon . ~ing of Mrs Thatcher's poli.c ies i.s unlikely ger in its present form. ? Labour also feel that M . ~ , Kinnock a much needed e~Jor:s relatt~e inexpertence fay give Nei.J. at Prime Minister, s Qu ~~ in the twice weekly glad i. tori.al exchanges Kj.nnock •·s poor handl. es ions· It should be noted, however, that a groundswell of cri~~~iof Mrs Thatcher,'s resignation has sparked off level . There is as sm i.n ~he parliamentary party and at grass r oot s last week's no-conr·~rong f eeling that he and the party lost ground i.n . 1 ence debate , as a result of what many feel was an u~neces~arily ungracious response to the Prime Minis ter's resignation combined. with a n ina· b·1· i ity effec tiv· ely to handle interruptions to ' his prepared speech. The first test for the new Pr i me Minister is likeJy to arise 1n the foreign policy area. One of his first callers yesterday, after his return from Buckingham Palace, was the Forei.gn Secretary. From ou r contacts, we underst and that their conversation focused mainly on the Gulf crisis . It is clear that in this and in other areas Maj or will lean heavily on the support and advice of his Foreign Secretary. It is also sure that in style and negotiating tactics there will be a marked change of attitude toward European issues. The new Prime Minister has already made clear his conviction that at the forthcoming I nter Governmental Conference in Rome , Britain will be able to ne~ti ate a treaty acceptaole to the Government and Parliament. In tone and style, the strident , combative approach of Mrs Thatcher will be replaced by a softer, consensual approach. It would be wrong however to confuse Major 's modest low key style with any substantive weakness on his part. He has risen through the ranks with remarkable rapidity . This not only reflects his undoubted ability but also his toughness and resilience . Yours sincerely ~ 1' I (.. I . Andrew O' Rourke Ambassador Mr Dermot A Gallagher Assistant Secretary Anglo-Irish Divisi~n Affairs Department of Foreign Dublin 2 AMRASAID NA hEIREANN, LONDAIN 17 , GROSVENOR PLACE, SW1X 7HA Telephone: 01-235 2171 TELEX: 916104 IRISH EMBASSY, LONDON Confident i a 1 /2~ o>1 ' H, w r.l,( ; /2 e,f November 1990 ~ttl/ ~ Mr. Dermot Gallagher Assistant Secretary Anglo-Irish Division Dear Assistant Secretary John Major: media reactions In conversations yesterday with a range of Westminster media contacts, I gathered the following comments about (i) the new Prime Minister's general style and approach; and {ii) his likely stance on Anglo-Irish relations. General One contact, who knows Major well and is currently preparing the first Major biography, described him as a thoroughly sane, balanced ·and likeable individual who is easy to work wi.th. He is c~uti,")us 1 n the sense that he is unwilling to pronounce on any subject on which he is not fully briefed. Once he feels at home wi.th a subject, however, he is decisive and tough-minded. My contact rejects completely the "wimp" allegations made about Major. No wimp would have got as far, and as auickly, as Major has done. His success in persuading Mrs Thatcher to join the ERM illustrated his determination but also his powers of per$uasion. On one or two occasions (though not in recent years), Major had public disagreements with Mrs Thatcher. The story qoes that, when (as a junior Whip) he had a public altercation with the Prime Minister, he was saved from immediate banishment by Denis Thatcher, who clapped him on the back and commended him warmly to his wife. The general consensus is that, after eleven years of stridently ideological politics, Major will offer a welcome return to a more restrained and pragmatic style of government. While he is •ary on money•, his views on most other subjects are •straight down the - 2 - middle". Ma r k'1 ng a clear cha ng e f ro rn •r s a~ c er • s P e s 1 ~ e style, he will underline the principle of col ective aec s1 in Cabinet and will allow Ministers to runt eir - -e .. own. Yes t erd a Y ' s re s hu f f 1e , whi c h wa s mo re ex tie s i · e t a e C e d~mons~rates a determination to put his own sta po e e With the departure of some senior members, ad of ~resh ta~ent into junior Ministerial positio s, proJect an image of youthfulness and energy i or er o Labour's rival attractions. Chris Patten as Party c ai a Clarke at Education, William Waldegrave at Healtn ad ·or-3 in the Treasury will be important assets. ow bound i to Ca discipline, Michael Heseltine should also be a ajor e ec or (provided he finds an acceptable solution to the pol -ta ro- The replacement of Bernard Ingham with Gus O'Donnell, Major's Treasury spokesman, should bring to an end t e e~n. 1 of lobby briefings for the purpose of undermining Cabine Mee genia1, easygoing and well-liked individual, O'Donnell :s a 38-year-old graduate of Warwick University who has wor·e Treasury for the past ten years. Though Major thin~s i • some older members of the lobby have remarked$ urly , Others, who have found him fairly outspoken as a ~r0as n. expect him to become much more circumspect in his ne~ It is general]y expected that Major will n t -311 ~n next autumn (probably October). He needs a ~1e3r economic indicators before he can risk goinq t0 tl knows that his initial honeymoon peri0d wi 11 n~t l ~~ that, a~ the former Chancellor, he will b economy's shortcomings until things b gin last round of speculation about a possihl advised strongly against thi~ in Cabin t. \.,\ ul 1 r • .. inflation reaching about 5%-61 befo r h n 1 unlikely to happen before next autumn. On the assumption that h gets th timing r'i 1ht, m l - media contacts expect that Major wi 11 w, n tht nt (narrowly) for the Tori s. Thy xp et th t, more familiar with him and r cogni s s his n~ , ht • atur• over th coming month•· Whil h n r q 1n4 t wul ud •, he at la •t will not 1i n t p pl ( "th t aingly did). Ae of'\ ntact put it, M j r will , equ 11 y , h w1. 11 no tu r n t h m f • In .. n t r ha• "ow b n L hou lad r fr h y r > m m 1 d, ackt n; M j r' • r ahn •• nd, , n P rt,"' u l r 118e-e di th t \ l l Th l l h m - 3 - concessions to the . right-wing T · him elected; and that, co . or:es who were instrumental i n ge tt ing will cost him th mbined with his lacklustre appearance , thi s e next election. Anglo-Irish relations In the .view of several contacts, there will he no s ignificant departure from current British Government policy on NI and Anglo-Irish relations. Major is a known supporter of the Anglo- Irish Agreement hut has otherwise neve r expressed a view on Irish i ssues. He indicated at a press conference last week that he envisaged no policy changes in this area. Unlike his predecessor, there is no "emotional Unionism• in Ma jor 's outlook. While Mrs Thatcher was brought up on a diet of fer ?e nt nationalism, and was close to both Airey Neave and Enoch Powe l l , Major was never exposed to such influences. He owes no debt t o the Unionists and should be unaffected by the feelings of guilt vis- a - vis the Unionists which reportedly plagued Mrs Thatcher. His app roach is likely to be pragmatic, middle-of-the-road and char3cterised by wno strong feelings in either direction•. In the field of Anglo-Irish policy, Major will rely heavily on : ~e advice of his cabinet colleagues and of the releva~t c~~i l serv::ts. In the former respect, Douglas Hurd may prove the ey . 1gu r e . 1ne Deputy Prime Minister in practice if not in.nam~, Hurd i~ li~e:~ to bl · nfluence on Major. It 1s highly u nl1' Yours sincerely David 1><>noghue Presa and Iaformatton Officer ") - ..J - conccs$iOns to the ~· h . "· l 9 t -w 1 ng T · him elected; and that . or1es who were instrumental in getting . . , comb1 ned with his lacklustre appearance, this w1 11 cost him the next- c 1 ect1on.. Anqlo-Irish relations - In th ,view of several contacts, there wi 11 he no significant a parture from current ar·t· h Anglo-Iri~h relation 1 .1s . Government policy on NI and s. MaJor 1s a known supporter of the Anglo-Irish Agreement but has otherwise never expressed a view on Irish issues. He indicated at a press conference last week that he envisaged no poljcy changes in this area. Unlike his predecessor, there is no "emotional Unionism" in Major's outlook. While Mrs Thatcher was brought up on a diet of fervent nationa1ism, and was close to both Airey Neave and Enoch Powell, Major was never exposed to such influences. He owes no debt to the Unionists and should be unaffected by the feelings of guilt vis-a-vis the Unionists which reportedly plagued Mrs Thatcher. His approach is ]ikely to be pragmatic, middle-of-the-road and characterised by "no strong feelings in either direction". In the field of Anglo-Irish policy, Major will rely heavily on the advice of his cabinet colleagues and of the relevant civil servants. In the former respect, Douglas Hurd may prove the key figure. The Deputy Prime Minister in practice if not in.nam~, Hurd i~ likely t o · ld ·a ble influence on Major. It 1s highly unlikely t ha t w1c· cons1ld erat k ·mportant step on Anglo-Irish. re 1 at1ons· w1t· i..1• out MaJor wou a e any 1 . the full backing of Hurd. He will also have the advice of Pet er Brooke and of Tom King and Chris Patten. appetite for detailed briefing paper s He i s a 1 so known. to. have I anunderstand that briefing. . papers were being prepared by off1c1a1·1nst. he NIO yesterday morning for Major's urgently prepared attention. You r s s i nc ere l y D~~~~ David Donoghue Press and Information Officer ~M&.SAIO NA h CIRC.A.NN , LONO ..IN 1 7 Grosvenor Place SWlX 7HR 2~ Novemb~r 1990 Mr Dermot Gallagher Assistant secretary 4 Department of Foreign Affai r s Dublin 2 near Assistant sec retary Basi s for Brooke's 'upbeat' view of progress on t alks -.;:- I spoke to David Hill last evening (at Joe Hayes' reception ) about the reports that Secretary of State Brooke was 'upbeat' about t he prospect for talks. He said that this optimism was based mainly on three things. Brooke was very struck by the Taoiseach's ope nness at their 1. meeting in Ballyconnell and his expressed wi]lingness to be helpful. He had been very encouraged by the atmosphere of the meeting. 2. The NIO read hopeful signs in the DUP l e ader' s address to the party conference. Brooke felt that he had had a very good me e ting with the three 3. /I SDLP MPs and Joe Hendron. I said that I thought that the Secretary of State s hould no t have b en surprised at the Taoiseach's attitude. It was, after a ll, the attitude he had adopted all along. The Government had demonstrated the i r preparedness to be flexible but there had not been a corres pondi ng flexibility on the unionist side which could give one hope that the talks could progress in a logical way. I said that, from the reports I had seen of Paisley's speech, he seemed to be reiterating the preconditions he had set for talks. Hill said that t)leY had been encouraged by the speech on the baais that they considered that he we• •etting out hie atall and preparing hie constituency for hi s »-ftLciJl•tLon in talk• with the Iriah aovernment. Pa1aley had aent to arc,o:lie • t:4St of tit• -,..eh le which he bad underlined the aection which il!lt a..r•t•irr of ltate'• attention. Hill later aent ' .'£11m·.:::-..llt4 • lhe onderllned Met ion 1• on page 4) . - 2 - Brooke had been encouraged by the talks wi th the SDLP and had felt that theJ went well. Hill said that at t he p revious meeting the Bri 1sh side had f~lt that the SDLP had not prepared the me eting and had et together only Just before coming into the room. In contrast this tie, they felt that the SDLP had co-ordinated their position we ll . Brooke, having ta en Paisley's ~ending and underlining of the text as a positive gesture, had specifically set out to probe with the SD LP whe ther Unionist participation as part of the Bri t ish team wa s an insurmountable proble. He had been pleased to learn that this was not so. I aueried the optimistic interpret ations being g iven to events, not leas_ because Paisley had also underlined the section on ' substantial 4 progress'. Hill said that, arguably it could be s a id to be a move towards talks on the basis of stated public positions. However, t e ~ain reason for the 'buoyant' feeling, which he was prepared to admit could evaporate, was that they detected a greater willingness generally cob~ flexible on both sides and a desire to keep things going when tie par 1es could easily let things run into the sand. Yours sincerely Counsellor National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988 ABSTRACTION OF PART(S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8 Form to be completed and inserted in the original record in place of each part abstracted (i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed: 840/3901 (ii) How many documents have been abstracted: 1 (iii) The date of each such document: 30/11/1990 (iv) The description of each document: Confidential report relating to legal issue (v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8 (4) (b) and (c) Name: Clare Hanratty Grade: CO Department: Foreign Affairs Date: 07/12/2020 National Archives Act, 1986, Regulations, 1988 ABSTRACTION OF PART{S) OF A RECORD PURSUANT TO REGULATION 8 Form to be completed and inserted in the original record in place of each part abstracted (i) Reference number of the separate cover under which the abstracted part has been filed: 840/3901 (ii) How many documents have been abstracted: 1 (iii) The date of each such document: 30/11/1990 (iv) The description of each document: Confidential report relating to court case {v) Reason(s) why the part has been abstracted for retention: Section 8 (4) (b) and (c) Name: Clare Hanratty Grade: CO Department: Foreign Affairs Date: 07/12/2020 •.1 • OA ' 17 Grosvenor Place, London SWJ X 71IR • t C /-P..>t" ~ &V~ ~ ~ -f!,.f' Confidential ~.,!/ ~ 7\ November, l 990. Mr. Dermot Gallagher, Assistant Secretary , Department of Foreign Affairs , 4 Dublin. The NI Backbench Committee: Stanbrook succeeds by default Dear Assistant Secretary, Overshadowed by the furore caused by the leadership election, the annual contest to fill vacant posts on the backbench committees went ahead th·s week without fanfare. Until Michael Heseltine threw his hat in the ring in the leadership contest, it was virtually certain that Mi cha~l Mates would be the candidate of the left wing of the party - the so ca lled Lollards group - in the election to fill the post of Cha'irman, left vacant by the killing of Ian Gow. When Heseltine entered the leadershjp contest, however, Mates abruptly dropped all other c orrun i trm., n ts to concentrate on his role as campaign organiser. . In the absence of any other contender, tvor Stanbrook, thf rH m1 n of' th right wing '92 group', was duly returned unoppos(.,d. Temple-t,iorris, the only other possible contender, wa s no t pr pared o stand. You wi 11 recal 1 that he feels that his posit i ~ n n c, -Cha j 1 m~•n of the Inter-Parliamentary Body disqualifies him from al so h 1 ad i 1,g 11p th backbench conni ttee. He is, however, a Vice-Chairman of th,· c0111111 i 1 toaether with Henry Bellingham who moves up from hi s form r roJ Secretary of the Canmittee. The two new .Joint Secretar1c a r And, ·w Munter, MP for Basingstoke and David Wilshir , MP for the M1ddl const tuency of Spelthorne. o m • mo • -2- Stanorook's extremist views on Irish issues are mirrored i n his strident right wing stance on a whole range of topics. His vi ews on immigration for example are.classically Powellite and he has over the years waged a one man battle 1n the House of Commons against the Commission on Racial Equality. Bis public comments over the years on I r i sh quest ions however have ~ee~ es~ecially damaging. A particular low poi nt was his descr1pt1on 1n July 1982 of the Irish community in Brit ain as "the sea in which the IRA swam". Every now and again he returns to this theme, attacking the rights enjoyed by the Irish community under the 1949 Ireland Act. 4 Unfortunately, the new Joint Secretary of the Committee, Andrew Hunter, is cast in something of the same mould. It was Hunter who las t year returned from a trip to Bophuthatswana with stories of alleged IRA/ Communist ANC plots. His colleague as Joint Secretary, Dav id Wilshire, one of the 1987 intake of Conservative MPs is, as yet, something of an unknown quantity. He was anxious to serve on a backbench committee and was apparently directed by the Whips to the NI one . Temple-Morris feels that he will turn out to be a useful counterbalance to Hunter. Stanbrook's text book on extradition is due for updating shortly and in this connection I will try to establish some contact with him. From previous experi;nce this may prove to be a futile exercise. _If he rebuffs our approach however it will at least serve once again to . underline for the record the intransigent and marginal nature of his position. Yours sincerely, V }!oe Hayes Counsellor 4 FAX f>~'-'1 c... C 24 November, 1990. ~ M.Ll.../ ~~- ~ v)./ To: H. Q. From: Washington For: A/Sec. Gallagher From: B. Scannell Subject: Remarks by Sherard Cowper-Coles, 1st Secretary, British Embassy 1. I understand that a statement on the situation in Northern Ireland made by Sherard Cowper-Coles, First Secr 1e t a ry at the British Embassy here and who deals almost exclusive ly with Irish issues, has featured prominently in the Iri s h pape=s in the last few days. Cowper-Coles told me today thac his . remarks arose from his attendance at a private seminar in Boston on 11th October organised by the Investor Responsibility Research Centre essentially dealing with t.e MacBride Principles. 2. Cowper-Coles said that he probably had been a b_t eve~ enthusiastic in what he said but the reports a ctri~uted him were basically correct though out of c ontext. ~e had circulated at the time an unedited transcript of his intervention. 3. Cowper-Coles believes that the person behind the l eaking f his remarks is Patrick Doherty, Assistant to the New Y rk City comptroller, Elizabeth Holtzrnann. He said that he ha largely humiliated Patrick Doherty at this seminar in t h ei ~ 4iecuaaiona on the MacBride principles and in response Doh•rtY w.. getting his own back on him rather successfull . ~ ...... _ ------==------~----===-=---~ ... --....i...... ------• ~=--=------=------=•--- _.,.~ - - •-----.._' - - ~__ · ~ ~ ,_ ~ '~? ..,_ .. ~~l ~ .\ ~~ .... ~ :I' ••/· :.-•; ~ •.,,. es n1on1sts• • envoy • • ' politi..:ian~ on both sides to bcha,c Referring to the new Fair f- Sl NH>R B1t11~h d1plonuu in P1oteitant maiority had l:n1plo)'ment law - which has MK\.·essfully ensured i1s dnn1inan~e hke grown-up~ ... \\' ., , tu n g t o n h .t s rn a d c a n fa I led i b fa rsl test and is bein1 b} ngg,ng the plllitical syslct11. by , t " h ll11 !'i h I Jl g .1 t Uh: k < 0 lJ O I O 111 :\ I It tried to encourage the sort of re, •~ed - Mr. Cowper-Coles said t"1s11hg the balance of the , oh1tl 1.111 111 N,Jrthern Jtcl.1nd. polatKal d1alogu~ s~cn 111 the llSA hl' had pnvately told the fiair by housing p,)licy and h) ,h• . l·u 111g thl'lll of l etr.1 ans their c..:conon1). and most c1vihLed dcanocra~tcs. l:n1plo}ment Commission that "·on,llfucnt!'> ,111d 1cfu~1ng h) b~ha\C~ n1 a n I p u I,t t I n g •· V ir l u ally c, cry a r c a nothing would be more helpful in lt~c g1 i..l\' n- ups. of pubh~ and perhaps, private life:· f)cnying that Ireland \\as A,ncraca than .. to have a few Spcuking at a conference on Britain ·s lasl colony. he said: "The sa~riflcial lambs··. He was SIIR It A Sherard lH\pcr-Colcs. f1rs1 I· a , r E ,n p I o y men l i n N o rt her n B r i t i s h G o v e r n ,n e n t has n o / would move vigourously. He . e(r<"t:.tr) nt th~ Bnt1sh En1bass), lrelun~, organised b) the Investor econon1ic or strategi~ interest in rtcaded w11h the Irish Govenpaeat 101 j un uud1euce of An1eri an Rctipon~1b1ltty Research Cenlrt, re1na1ning in Northern Ireland ... to ren1ove the Constuuuonal bans b u s I n e~ ~ rn c n I n 8 t sll n . t ha t f he M 1 . Cowper- oles a(\;US~d Bntish taxpayers suhs1dised social on abortion and divorce... Until orchern Oll>nists had poltticaans of pract1~1ng "the ~e~urity, welfare. support for they make il clear in tkei,r e 01 b u r r a c d s u l" c e ss i , e 8 r i t i h George Bush S~hool of Politi,al industry, job creation and securaty IConstitution that they do not dM11l jO\trnnu!nl b , proclairnins lhear Leuder~hip ... h> the tune of five billion dollars a I he whole island. in deflfflCI of to rhe Cro"n and lhe ·rhcy read the polls and, at the year, for a population of 1.6 wishes of a million people. HI n1on. slighte~t sago of crat1c1sn1 fron1 the 011 llions. until confidence bu1ld1n1 under way, the reahly as tM exlrc1nhas. drew ba~k. .. It is an enlightened, benevolent He ~a,d the biggest and ~·orst dictatorship in which the British Northern Ireland ~ it IS a very odd m1qJlte of the: \\' c 1n1ins1er ,\ "ell as 1crroris1n. the British 11oliti~al creuuon - ha IOI te ,o,crrunenl had 10 deal with ··the Governmt!nt finds itself Joing p .1 rl , ~1 tn e n l h ,ul be c n t I ~ t n1adt! to wor~ from the trOldNI far more dal f1cult and delicate much more than 1t really wants Of I hen, J rl;land go, ern itself ( .. up.~· t o. bet"e~n 1922 and I 72 . the problem of persuading the -:-__:=::;;;;;ai------.:::::=------I'll ...... t;lni , ,, ' I on H' a , C nd Gerry· Ad m • • .. .. ·,. I ·--1· -. I • , 1 i I l • I ., I~ I t ~ l I ! . Bv Ruth O'R•illy in liMHaat He ~acted Sinn Ftln dlim• tt\lt Nor I t1nd M•ry C rolan in DubOn tham lrNnd waa Brttaln'1 fttlt and lMt col• I onv, dNcrlbfnQ 11 •• "an enliGhttn~. I UNIQNIS TS rounded ;,ngniy la11 nJght on benawJent dlctatarthlp In wf,~ tht Brititn ~ n,o, B r1t11n d1plom,t 'wf"IO ~llogeoty ac• Go\fi•mm11nt flnde itMlf doing much mor• .... cu ea th m ot bouay1ng the,r conl'tft'Uents than tt r•Hy wants to'·, the report said. nd , etus,ng 10 grow up. Bmain had no economic or 5tnlt~,c in• I Th OUP', Sammy Wi~n dubbttd Mr tweat in Nv-ng In Northam lrund 1nt1 ttie Sh rard Cowper-Coles ·a second G.arry Brttllh taxpayer 1ub1ldlsed th1 poou1at1on ,,, .... ····4·-.. ' ...... Ad. m ·· snd Ulster Union~ John Tayior of 1.&n to ~· rune of $5 bUUon I year, n, 10 hl! would pni~ss the Foreign Otnce to aUegedly UKI. - , m, tiim from nis pan Fim Secnr:ary _ On top of tackllnQ param,litarie,, the t the Britf h Emb8sev ;" ~Va1hlngrcn. Brftfth Government had the ''f1r mote dff. A Duclin n,wspap1r Y'lllterctny repontd ficuft and deficate problem of per!u,ding th t ,\1r Cowoor-Col• told a US con· th• polltlclan1 on both sidet to behave tike f r nc . on 'a,r •mDtOYTT'ffit In Nortr,ern grown-ups''. frc1 no th:n Un1on11ts wetW ··1n embarrass• The reatity of Nonhem lrel•nd, ht ment to tn W1 rm1n1t1r Governmtnt·· . reput~f~ told bu11neumen. waa ''1 very H IIAgaolv told rh• 801Ton conftrence odd pohac.al creatJon ~icn haa ta be made th t tho ''b OQest ~ nd 'M'lrwt'' make of th• to work. from the grouna up''. Br1t..sn P rth,m n, t'\aa bwn to itt Normem Litt night OUP Preu officer Stmmy· lr l11nd O\' ,n 1tulf beM-1Hn t9Z! .tnd 1972. Wlllon bra~~ .~r Cowoer-Colel' ill1ged remarks as Ilea and dffCrtbeci tht emlre nd ho 1cf, the Sunday f ndapenaent For.elgn Office, wn,~h ;1 fad by Conser. r portod, tnat rt,8 Prot85"03nt malorrty an vatrve Parry f•1d1rat,~c, candidtte Dougfa1 ,u rf'd 1t1 dom,nltnc• by ·'rigging the H\Jrd, •• ''1 ptt ot vfpera·, potitla I sygtQ11\ cw11rcng the b.ilanca ot rhe " H• h11 used 1he ume ·old rhetoric as conomv !nd msnic,uJar.ng housing DOficy Gerry Adams an~ should be reca1t1a im , nd in Jlv a ery re.a of puottc lif 1' ' . meatattfy from h,1 Pott" tne &at B if The pape-r fso cla,mld he s.a,d that councitf or tatd. e aat 14 Un,on,st deci reuons of Jo a tV to the At • time wfien the British G~ . St · - -••nrmtnt Crown t, d em rr;IQd !i ec as51\ e 8m1Sn , rytng ro rmprov, the image of Narthem ernmerHi. Ireland, someone 81 ser,jor th· h W I · 11 II &SIC• ccordJng to the r 11, Mr C wper• e Y gone out of his way ta und, .... C f 1 ,a p l,t,c,an, m N rcnem t~llnd efforts. 'n,IMI ttl } i,r et111•'1 t I "~.nro .. ~tlfl, "rhnnl f Poait, · l uad ,,n p .. , raao,ng thf op1n10" Arna MP ~ onn T11vfnr u,a .. - I brln\J ,ho ,ub,•ct \lg in r'•rOa~ 111. WQU d r,oUs nd t " ugntNt gr, 1 at ol critiettm to h M "t• "' a Jd rom ram,1r,. dra 1ng back. ave , cow~ar-Coltt ttmoved f h,1 r,c,n. - - . ·-- • Coif ins:backs use of Live,. . TV links • END of file