Shattered Hopes, Broken Promises, and Executions from Neglect

SHATTERED HOPES, BROKEN PROMISES, AND EXECUTIONS FROM NEGLECT

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION AND THE UN

Second Part

Few post-World War II historical events have had the same impact and reverberations as the 1956 Hungarian Revolution had both inside and outside the country. The first part of the present study (published in the previous issue of JCWS) and the research behind it, significantly based on recently declassified and other archival documents, focused on a special aspect of the international response to the Revolution, the United Nations` efforts to deal with the critical and urgent events during the Revolution and in the year after. This part’s focus is the tragic consequences of the Revolution, including trials, imprisonments, and executions that continued years after 1956. The limitations of the UN is rarely discussed, particularly by those of us that steadfastly believe in the mission of the UN, even though this silence had implications for dissidents and others throughout the world who stand up to dictatorial regimes. Studying these issues will not weaken the UN, but will make it stronger and more effective in the future.

1. Devoted readers

In spite of all the controversies included in the process of establishing the SpecCom, in taking testimonies and then in writing the Report the final outcome was a great achievement.1 It became a detailed chronicle of the Revolution with the explanation of its background, its effect and its influence. The Report was translated into several languages, prefaced by important politicians, distributed in hundreds of thousands of copies and still serves as a unique documentation of history.

Some of the most attentive readers and analysts of the Report were the Hungarian communist authorities – mainly in the Foreign Ministry2 and officers of the intelligence services.3 Once the Report was published, it was immediately translated into Hungarian and printed in numbered copies for distribution only to senior members of the nomenklatura. At the same time, each chapter of the Report was assigned to different ministries or to the relevant authorities,4 while experts on international law started to work on the legal justifications for rejecting the Report and proving the “propaganda character” of the UN document. The intelligence services attacked what they interpreted as the “espionage executed by the UN Committee”5 and by unmasking and denouncing the “criminals and traitors” who by their “false testimonies were misguiding the international community.”6

The amount of energy invested into the process of attacking the Report and the complexity of efforts was enormous. It proved, even if indirectly, how important the UN was to the Kádár government. While

1 the UN’s authority was questioned, its representatives prevented from entering Hungary, and the UN Charter constantly disregarded and even violated, once an official document was prepared and published, it was taken extremely seriously. Prime Minister János Kádár personally controlled the process of work that was discussed at length at the highest level in the Politburo.7 Deadlines were set for responses from the relevant ministries well before the UN General Assembly (hereafter GA) session, so an overall response could be prepared prior to the UN GA formally discussing the Report. The Foreign Ministry`s Department of International Organizations submitted a one hundred forty six page analysis to prove the “fictional” character of the text (“Andersen`s Tale” was a mild expression of their dissent).8 From the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Interior, all authorities involved or referred to, submitted their counter-arguments. A team of international law experts were assigned to work out the legal basis of the rejection of the UN investigation, headed by the communist scholar Gyula Eörsi.9 Besides referring to precedents of UN actions and interpreting the Charter to suit their own purposes, they also focused on the laws of the relevant member countries preparing the Report, and referred to controversial legal practices of Western democracies, mainly but not exclusively, with their colonies.

Very harsh wording was employed to defend Hungary’s right to its autonomy, paradoxically threatened by the UN Report and not by the Soviet invasion. In addition to rejecting the right of the UN to interfere with Hungary`s internal matters, each aspect of the work was questioned. The main point was that SpecCom used unusual methods as only “criminals” were questioned about their “crimes.”10 For the communist authorities, all witnesses testifying before SpecCom were criminals for participating in the Revolution, for illegal border crossings, or for the testimonies themselves, which were considered high treason. The three “open” witnesses were all “convicted criminals” according to Hungarian propaganda, as they all had been condemned and spent years in prison during the early 1950s. 11 Even if these early accusations against them had been fabricated and the sentences later declared unlawful, their subsequent rehabilitation could not happen as it was not applicable for those who had left Hungary. Furthermore, the other witnesses testifying and providing their own names, or later identified by the Hungarian authorities, were individually accused of different crimes, from looting to war crimes and from murder to undermining the constitutional order12. The members of the SpecCom also became targets as being partisan and having prejudices against the People`s Republic.13 Once the different texts were received, summarized, carefully edited, and stylistically reviewed, they were approved at the very highest levels both of the Party and of the Government;14 however, the Hungarian government’s reply was only made public after the Soviet government first issued its harsh rejection of the Report.15

There were several errors in the Report from which communist propaganda could profit, yet these were not often referred to, since the action of the UN, not just its Report, was the primary target of communist anger. It was, however, embarrassing that the ÁVH (State Defense Authority) was mistaken for the ÁEH (State Control Bureau) in the Report and the dates of the earlier Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy were confused with the years in office of Imre Nagy. Several inaccuracies were mentioned by the Western embassies in Budapest16 and were only partially corrected. Bang-Jensen also advised the Rapporteur of several inaccuracies, such as the reference to the legality of the revolutionary government also the legal bases of the invitation of the Soviet troops. It was also of major importance, as Bang- Jensen suggested, that the Defense Minister Pál Maléter had not been arrested by Soviet military

2 officers, as stated in the Report, but by KGB personnel, which surprised the Soviet military officers who were negotiating with Maléter under a „white” flag. However, corrections were not made. It became easy to undermine the credibility of the Report by referring to inaccuracies. Lists of corrections were supplied by Bang-Jensen several times (as he had a broader overview of the testimony, having been involved from the interviewing of many potential witnesses and the pre-selection of witnesses through review of the final drafts of the SpecCom report). His reservations and suggestions remained unanswered and often even unnoticed, and there were reasons to think that this may not have been purely accidental.17

Having the support of the Soviet Army and effective control over the country, the serious fear of the communist authorities was that the consequences of the Report might be catastrophic for the Hungarian political leadership. They tried to avoid this unwanted development. Firstly, the foreign policy of the regime started an extensive campaign to convince mainly third-world non-aligned nations that events in Hungary had been orchestrated by the imperialists, among them those colonial powers against which they were or had been fighting.18 Furthermore, little Hungary (also quite poor then) suggested to non- aligned nations that their receipt of possible future Soviet economic assistance would be tied to their future vote at the UN in this regard.19 The Hungarian diplomacy offered to trade favors in voting in international organizations and focused on specific concerns of the relevant countries (such as the question of Kashmir for India or fishing rights for Iceland) to strengthen their arguments. Embassies in the Western democracies were also ordered to attack the Report, often with the help of the local communist parties in launching propaganda campaigns on behalf of the Hungarian government (and with financial support by the USSR).20

Besides the diplomatic efforts and the legal attack against the Report, the Hungarian government also launched a very carefully conceived, planned and organized “spontaneous” campaign against the UN inside Hungary by all sectors of the population.21 It was very difficult for anyone to abstain-- bishops and rabbis, peasants and workers (tens of thousands from Csepel Island, once a revolutionary hotspot),22 intellectuals, teachers and writers (once the instigators of the Revolution), scientists, sportsmen, and women’s federation representatives were all put under serious pressure and even under duress to provide a “broad” protest against the Report.23 Thousands of cables were sent to the UN Secretary General from Hungary, representatives of the protesters were filmed handing over to the Minister of Foreign Affairs fat folders filled with signatures of protest to forward to the UN in New York. The campaign peaked as UN General Assembly started its discussion about the Report. Utter cynicism prevailed, since as Kádár smartly mentioned, the protesters did not know what they were protesting against, since Hungarian general public did not have access to the actual text of the Report24.

Once the Report was published, a strange and sad indifference characterized the leaders of the UN concerning Hungary. In the hot summer of 1957, when the UN efforts about Hungary seemed to bear small but significant fruits, the decision was made at the UN’s highest level to let the Hungarian affair “peter out.”25 Preparations were made to discuss the Report at the UN General Assembly and to vote to achieve resolutions that should be harsher than before as a result of the systematic investigation, especially since international interest in the situation in Hungary had intensified significantly after the Report became available. However, the 38th floor26 decided that the issue should be closed. When

Hammarskjöld met Péter Mód in August 1957 he clearly stated that there were two issues in which he did not want to be involved, since agreement was impossible, and one of the issues was the Hungarian question.27 A new Secretary General was due to be elected at the September 1957 UN General Assembly meeting. Hammarskjöld was the leading candidate, but any candidate could be vetoed by a major power. His desire not be involved in the Hungary Question may well have been seen as a precondition for gaining support from the Soviets.

Archival revelations prove that the majority of the SpecCom members wanted to continue the work, in accordance with the GA resolution establishing the SpecCom (“from time to time to prepare additional reports).”28 As the history of the Revolution and the subsequent “Reprisal” became clearer, it also became clear that action by the UN could be very helpful for the Hungarian people, especially those who continued to be arrested, tried, and imprisoned or executed. The thought was that even though the past was over, the future could be positively influenced by a pro-active international organization. Confidential correspondence and unpublicized instructions from the UN Secretariat, however, avoided further SpecCom meetings and any additional SpecCom Reports. Cordier, the Under Secretary General, communicated the decision to Protitch, who wrote a letter to Jordan, saying that “it would be inadvisable” to produce a new Report as “it would be difficult to find an appropriate focus for a third report, since it would have mainly to center around the reports of trials and executions.” It is not clear whether Cordier received that the consent of the Secretary General to discourage the SpecCom members from having additional the reports that were desired by a majority of the SpecCom members and were envisioned by UN GA Resolution 1132 (XI). The decision was obediently and effectively executed by the SpecCom Secretary, William Jordan and the Rapporteur Shann. The later “reports” were published by special representatives and did not have the same strength, influence and effect as the earlier one.29

In Hungary too people were thinking about the future, information kept arriving in New York and those reading the original documents could picture the enormous preparations in Budapest for the 10 September 1957 General Assembly session. The number of court cases started to grow, the intensity of the “Reprisal” accelerated. Before the UN started its GA session, total police alert was ordered in Hungary.30 Members of the intelligence services were activated and instructed to control any kind of “unlawful activity” and to report constantly. The networks of agents worked hard to forward secret information to the political police about any possible preparations, phone lines were bugged, and security at military bases increased. Fearing that it could became a target for protesters, the Foreign Ministry Building in Budapest31 was guarded by two machine-gun units, while all classified documents were removed from the building. Armed members of the so-called Workers` Militia, the paramilitary group established after the Revolution with the primary task of fighting “counter-revolutionaries,” guarded all the strategic posts with the most advanced weapons, which were gifts from the People`s Republic of Czechoslovakia. 32

In spite of all these preparations, rumors were spreading in Hungary (as anxiously reported by communist party functionaries) that the Soviets were already “packing up”.33 They would leave Hungary after September 10, as the UN`s Resolutions could no longer be disregarded. In the atmosphere of total terror, some slight optimism, even hope, was unfolding. The UN would finally help.

2. Communications received

The Report served as a renewed occasion for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution condemning again the USSR and Hungary based on the Report’s thorough and well-founded description of the events.34 However, the two condemned countries disregarded the resolution as they had the preceding ones and they both attacked the UN and the SpecCom in harsher terms than before. The General Assembly requested Prince Wan Waithayakon, the President of the session and the representative of Thailand at the UN, to serve as a Special Representative for the Hungarian Problem to ensure that the UN resolutions were observed -- quite a difficult task, considering the events of the previous eleven months. While Prince Wan was a prominent politician representing a non-aligned nation, it was easy for the Hungarian government to criticize the inappropriateness of an aristocrat to control the implementation of a UN Resolution regarding a communist country. Marxist-Leninist ideology and social rhetoric could easily stigmatize aristocrats as class enemies of the People`s Republic, just as were the Hungarian aristocrats who35 were accused of returning to Hungary during the 1956 Revolution to reconstruct the “feudal-capitalistic” system of pre-WWII. It took less than two months for the Prince to realize that he was unable to achieve anything with the Hungarian authorities; however, he did not return his mandate but promised that he would still do his best.36

This promise, made jointly with the UN resolution, was the basis keeping the Hungarian “problem” on the agenda both inside the international organization and in Hungary. All the broken promises and unlawful measures were finally listed in an official UN document, from the Soviet false pull-out of Budapest during the Revolution to the Kremlin`s promise to rethink relations with “fraternal” countries, from the abduction of members of the Imre Nagy government from the Yugoslav Embassy in spite of Kádár`s guarantee that they would be able to return home, to the arrest of Maléter and his companions when negotiating under a “white flag.” There was also the General Assembly resolution that supplemental reports would focus not only on past events during the Revolution, but also on the present events concerning the fate of thousands of people facing trials in spite of Kádár’s promised amnesty for those participating in the Revolution.37 The Western rhetoric, that Hungary would not be abandoned after the bitter experiences of the October days, created the expectation that at least the UN would not overlook or forget the Hungarian people. The magnitude of these hopes resulted in the large amount of “Communication Received” by the SpecCom, which kept collecting information and internally circulating it as before. These documents were also safeguarded by Claire de Héderváry in spite of having, as time went by, a more senior position that conflicted with her work on the Hungarian question.38

From the great amount of documentation received a comprehensive picture can now be made regarding how often and what information the UN was receiving about what was happening in Hungary. The Secretariat staff also continued to collect press articles and media reviews (radio broadcasts and later television programs included) from Hungary, and from the USSR, providing information about the economic, political, cultural and other aspects of the “Consolidation” in Hungary. Special emphasis was given to the consequences of the Revolution, particularly to information about arrests, trials, sentences, imprisonments, and executions, which were carefully listed. As official sources were not always available or reliable, estimates and exaggerations were not unusual. For example, a report of 21 June 1957 referred to 2,000 persons killed and 35,000 deported. These numbers were vastly overstated.39 Sadly,

5 these reports were just filed away with no action considered, much less taken. As news could hardly be obtained on certain topics from official Hungarian sources, Western diplomats regularly visited the court buildings of Budapest taking careful notes about announcements of trials (on the courtroom doors) with dates and times, the names of the accused, the charges against them, and often also the sentences. The embassies in Budapest forwarded the information to their governments which submitted the information to the UN, as documented in archives.40

The renewal of hope raised by the Hungarian issue being placed on the General Assembly`s agenda encouraged people inside Hungary to forward information to the UN. Thus participants` relatives, friends, fellow ex-inmates, and sympathetic observers submitted data in any way they could. Many of them also shared their experiences about the methods of the regime`s suppression and described the ways that the authorities were trying to consolidate their power. Collecting and smuggling information out of the country was extremely risky,41 whether by sending it with those who could travel outside Hungary (a few scientists and artists were allowed to travel exclusively for official reasons), or by mailing letters with no or false return addresses. Contacts with the refugee community were also secretly established from Hungary and the relevant organization, association or community, which then contacted the UN.42 Even larger studies were submitted to the UN (for example, a very professional description of the situation in the media43 and a reliable picture about the military being “purified” after the Revolution).44 Other documents covered several aspects of refugees` fate in the new world including unemployment, facing prejudices, difficulties with the Yugoslav authorities, and inability to find a country willing to accept them.

However, all these items were only listed and then filed away. The lack of any account of the relevance or importance of items on the “List of Communications Received by the Committee” later proved to be tragic. The UN also seemed to ignore that by the legal terminology of the early Kádárian terror, it was considered an “enemy power.” Thus, submitting information to the UN was “spying” and the legal charge for such activity remained “high treason.” The intelligence services, both in Hungary and in the UN, focused on the information that came out of the country and tried to stop or obtain as much of it as they could. And sadly, they were quite successful.

3. The `Second Report`

The monthly “Lists of Communication Received” documented the worrisome development that death sentences were growing in number and some people were executed even on minor charges. All too often when a life sentence was appealed, it resulted in a new sentence of execution by hanging. In the last half of 1957 and the first half of 1958 there was increasing concern about a growing risk that the lives of the leaders of the Revolution too would not be spared. Imre Nagy and Pál Maléter were also symbols of the Revolutionary government and as long as they were alive the hope and ideals of the Revolution could also be alive. International law could also be applied in both cases. The Secretary General had personal involvement and some responsibilities regarding both Imre Nagy (who had sent him a personal appeal during the critical days of the Revolution)45 and for the ex-Defense Minister Pál Maléter. Hammarskjöld had promised Maléter`s former wife (the mother of their children) when he met her in New York that he would do everything he could for the sake of Pál Maléter.46 The Hungarian

6 authorities regularly rejected all requests for information, considering the inquiries as interference with the internal affairs of the country, and denied for a long time that trials would be staged against them. The Rumanian government did not allow UN observers to enter Rumania to meet the arrested Prime Minister and his associates. They did forward Imre Nagy`s expression of gratitude for being able to stay in friendly Rumania.47

The news about Maléter was more unnerving. In August 1957, the month before the scheduled re- appointment of the Secretary General, the UN received a cable from Brussels written by Görgy Heltai, one of the most important refugee politicians and arguably the most important witness before the SpecCom four months earlier. He reported that Maléter’s driver and bodyguard, who had been shipped by train to the USSR and then returned to Hungary before escaping to Belgium, was willing to testify.48 However, the crucial information, which might have caused the SpecCom to meet again and prepare a supplemental report, became no more than an item on the “Lists of Communications” which just indicated that another witness was available to testify at a time when there might have been thousands of other refugees who would have been willing to testify. There was no indication that the potential witness was Maléter’s driver and bodyguard. Both Maléter`s fate and Heltai`s cable were practically disregarded. Bang-Jensen repeatedly raised this issue as he could well remember Heltai`s long and extremely important testimony that he had given in full to the SpecCom and was aware of the risks of ignoring such a potential witness communication.49 The fact that Heltai sent a cable, rather than a letter, from Brussels also suggested the importance of the message that was ignored by the Secretariat and remained unknown to those in New York interested in Maléter`s fate.

Dag Hammarskjöld was re-appointed as Secretary General at the September 1957 General Assembly Meeting. After the GA meeting, it became clear that Hungary would not face any serious consequences for disregarding the UN General Assembly resolutions. The Hungarian authorities had no reasons for not freely continuing their “Consolidation” and “Reprisal.” Major trials were secretly initiated, as Imre Nagy and Pál Maléter were accused of high treason for attacking Hungary`s constitutional order, and Imre Nagy’s appeal to the UN became a major item in the indictment as it was interpreted as requesting military aid against his own country and risking the outbreak of a general war.50 There were growing signs that the lives of the former leaders of the Revolution were threatened.

Yet nothing had happened other than the continuation of the “ritual” of exchanging letters between the UN Secretariat and the Hungarian UN Mission, with the UN expressing its concerns and the other rejecting any interference with Hungary`s internal affairs. On 14 May 1958, Béla Varga, one of the most senior member of the Hungarian refugee community,51 and other exiled personalities requested an urgent meeting of the UN about the latest developments in Hungary. Rumors from Budapest about pending trials for Imre Nagy and the other leaders of the Revolution were extremely worrisome (and unfortunately very accurate—they would be executed less than a month later).52 The US UN Mission had previously submitted a very detailed list of trials pending with the names and bios of the leaders of the Revolution both to the UN Secretariat and to the Hungarian Mission. The UN may not have been able to save their lives; however, the silence by the UN may have encouraged the Hungarian authorities to proceed with its plan. The meeting between Mód and Hammarskjöld followed the instructions from the Hungarian FM “to obtain information very carefully about the intentions of the SpecCom” before the

7 conclusions of the trials of Nagy and Maléter.53 The UN’s attention and the expressions of concern by the international community did help to avert death sentences in other cases.54 The massive silence from the UN in this new phase of “Reprisal” would also encourage the Kádár regime to continue its “Consolidation.”

When the death sentences and the news of the executions of the former Prime Minister, the former Defense Minister, and their associates were announced first in Moscow, then in Budapest, on 16 June 1958 the UN seemed to be totally unprepared to respond, as the Héderváry Collection shows.55 Several members of the SpecCom were away from New York and those present were uninformed about the Hungarian situation and quite confused about what to do.56 After the reconvening of the SpecCom,57 a communiqué was finally released on 21 June 1958, condemning the executions. As the minutes of the SpecCom meetings suggest,58 one of the main concerns of those present was not to undermine Prince Wan Waythayakon`s authority as Special Representative, yet no one knew if he had been informed and, if so, whether he was planning to take some action. It took nearly another month to establish contact with the Prince and then to compose and issue a Report about the trials and the sentences.59 A great part of this second UN Report focused on the reasons for the UN’s inaction throughout the previous year, quoting from the many returned letters sent to the Hungarian authorities and the several failed attempts to receive information from the governments involved (Hungary, USSR, Yugoslavia, and Rumania).60 The Second Report was not discussed at the General Assembly session until 22 September 1958, more than three months after the executions, and it was not followed by any kind of emergency measures by the UN.

This 1958 Report obviously could not and did not have the depth or importance of the 1957 Report. Meanwhile Hungarian politicians worked out a very detailed plan to avoid any kind of expected sanctions or “attack” by the UN (which did not happen). The preparations in the Foreign Ministry started well before the sentences were announced61 and in spite of the uproar of the international community, the Hungarian diplomats soon revealed that hardly any repercussion followed the judicial murders.62 On 12 December 1958 the work of the SpecCom was effectively over by the silent consent of the representatives of the five countries comprising it.63 After Prince Wan`s term of inaction, another Special Representative took over the job, Sir Leslie Knox Munro from New Zealand. However, he had more limited authority than his predecessor.64 Besides the eventual difficulties,65 both the Secretary General and his deputy Andrew Cordier “consoled” the Hungarian UN representative that the Hungarian government should not really consider Munro`s role significant, since he had no proper office but was only using temporary locations and the “secretary” working for him has other duties for 95 % of her time.66 This secretary was the same Claire de Héderváry who certainly had enough time to continue to safeguarding all the documents that would create one of the largest collections of post-Revolution history. The Collection of document details how the silence of the UN greatly assisted the completion of the Kádár’s “Consolidation” bringing enormous suffering to the people of Hungary.

4. `Case Studies`

The `narrative of the post-revolutionary history is not necessary linear and is hard to describe in its complexity in chronological order. The following case-studies may serve as examples of the issues and concerns and refer to different directions the research has taken or may take in the future.

a. The `disappointed` bourgeois politician

The most dramatic press campaign of the Kádár regime to counterattack the Report was based on the fabricated return to Hungary of a significant refugee politician as a result of his stated “disappointment in the anti-Hungarian defamation campaign” expressed in the 1957 UN Report.67 Imprisoned in the early 1950s and possibly broken after torture, Miklós Szabó became an agent for the intelligence services while in prison. His new bosses helped him ”escape” to Austria before the Revolution with a fictional story (”legenda” was the term of the intelligence services) of how he escaped to free soil.68 Once in the Austrian capital, his prestige as an ex-political prisoner, with right wing convictions, made him a respected figure. He soon became a key player in the expatriate community. When the Revolution broke out he traveled to Hungary for few days then returned to Vienna where he became instrumental in receiving the refugees arriving in tens of thousands. Financially, as well as politically, he was involved in several aspects of the post-revolutionary exile activity having a position also in the “refugee parliament” in Strasbourg.69 Being sometimes a controversial figure, corrupt and often intolerant, he also created some problems with the refugee movement.70 He was also involved in the UN SpecCom`s activity in Vienna. He collected and forwarded documents of different types to assist in the investigation. When he “disappeared” from Austria,71 many thought he had been kidnapped or killed.72 When he later reappeared in Hungary, he first publicly presented himself as a disillusioned refugee and voluntarily served the government`s anti-UN propaganda by sharing his “experiences” about the anti-Hungarian activity of the SpecCom with the interested public. Several years later, he admitted that this role was just assigned to him since he had been an intelligence agent since his release from prison. Bringing back many documents to Hungary, he claimed that he had all the names of the SpecCom`s witnesses.73

b. The Recycled Nazi

During the Revolution, the talented painter György Szennik (with the code name “Szeles”) was another of the very few people to offer his services to the secret police soon after 23 October 1956. A celebrated artist in pre-WWII Hungary, he was extremely successful with his propaganda posters that had been commissioned by leaders of Nazi Germany, using simple and harsh messages of anti-Semitic, anti- Bolshevik or anti-American content.74 In the early 1950’s, Szennik was first condemned to death and then, when his sentence was commuted to a life term, he was recruited as a prison informer.75 Initially, he reported about his fellow inmates, but after being freed he continued to report on friends and colleagues of the same convictions (extreme right). He soon joined the Revolution and following instruction from ÁVH officers, he became involved in founding different associations and reporting about them.76 After the Soviet invasion, he volunteered to bring in Red Cross supplies from Vienna. He established contacts with different resistance groups,77 transported food and medication to them, and reported their locations, to enable military action to be taken against them. He also claimed that he had “extremely valuable documents for the UN”78 thus he was trusted by the members of the resistance movement to make submissions to the UN and request urgent help from the UN. The intelligence

9 services later trained him to be an agent in the refugee community and he was sent to Austria with the assistance of the Hungarian intelligence services.79 Once outside of Hungary, he was contacted by secret service officers, but he was not as diligent as before and unable to execute the instructions received from Budapest. Being greedy and confused, he was later called back to Hungary and threatened with a prison terms if anything was revealed about his secret tasks.

c. The Seducer of the UN Commission

For many Hungarian refugees the presence of Tamás Pásztor at the SpecCom’s office in Vienna was disturbing, since he was known as a prison informer in the early 1950’s and many inmates` lives were ruined by his reports.80 Fluent in several languages, attractive and cultivated, Pásztor participated in the Revolution, and then left for Vienna before the second Soviet invasion; there he became instrumental in establishing the refugee political network and, because of his knowledge of languages, later assisted in the collection of information for the UN SpecCom investigation. He was approached several times by the Hungarian secret service to continue working for them. They tried to blackmail and threaten him, yet he warned the Austrian police that Hungarian undercover agents were active on Austrian soil, which created dramatic stories published in newspapers in Vienna.81 His involvement in the UN SpecCom soon included a romantic relationship with Ita Glance, William Jordan's secretary, whom he married, but because of his murky past his American visa was denied for years.82 Having several love affairs simultaneously, as the Hungarian intelligence services carefully reported, he was also busy for several years continuing to submit reports to the UN SpecCom based on “first-hand accounts” originating in Hungary.83 Serious pressure was exerted on him, including trying to get him to work for the Hungarian intelligence service by using his aging mother`s fate back in Hungary to blackmail him.84 No evidence has been seen in the archives, that these efforts were successful.

d. The French Connection

The Hungarian intelligence services either broke the code of the French diplomatic cables or had other means of obtaining messages between FM in Paris and the French Embassy in Budapest from 1 January through 15 September 1957, which were the crucial days of the preparation of the SpecCom investigation and submission of its Report to the UN General Assembly.85 The messages from the Embassy dealt with the information provided to the UN, including eventual clarifications of data and instructions to work. Important names, locations and events were mentioned and discussed. Copies of the messages received by the Embassy from Paris are today in the archive of the communist political police. Even years later, in 1959, Péter Földes, a Hungarian journalist claiming to represent the “opposition” of the existing government, made a lengthy statement at the French Legation in Budapest to be sent to the UN that was forwarded through diplomatic channels to Paris and then to the French UN Mission in New York.86 Arrested in 1960, he denied any kind of involvement in “unconstitutional activity” until he was confronted with a copy of his testimony. He then broke, spent several years in prison, and was freed only six years after the 1963 general amnesty.

e. The Codebook of Ceylon (Sri Lanka)

The activity of the Soviet intelligence services at the UN and elsewhere has been documented by many writers including some Soviet defectors.87 The Soviet diplomat and secret service officer V. A. Grusha88 established friendship with a junior member of the Ceylonese UN Mission named Samarasekara, who provided a copy of the Ceylonese code book. Caught by the FBI, the Soviet citizen was deported while the Ceylonese employee was only suspended (with pay) and after a long and seemingly gentle process, he left the UN.89 If the plot had not been uncovered, the Soviets would have been able to intercept coded messages in connection to the SpecCom Hungarian investigation that were being sent to and from SpecCom member Gunewardene (the Ceylonese UN Ambassador) and Colombo.

f. The Lukács `Conspiracy`90

One of the most tragic cases was that of László Lukács and his companions, Alajos Czermann and Ákos Tumbász. After the Revolution a messenger from Alfonz Lengyel (a refugee outside Hungary) approached Lukács, who was Lengyel's ex-prison mate,91 with the request to provide information about Hungary to the UN. Lukács and his two friends decided to obtain and to forward as much information as possible to provide a dramatic picture to the world of what was happening in Hungary. Being inexperienced in clandestine ways, they were also unaware that they were receiving requests for information from the West that were beyond the scope of the UN investigation. Meanwhile some of their contacts were not only intelligence agents but others were entrapped by the political police, first and foremost, by the Csaba F. Nagy, the messenger between Hungary and the West, who was an agent.92 The head of the Lukács group recruited Ákos Tumbász and Alajos Czermann, fellow ex-prison mates, into the secret plot. Two others had been recruited by the political police (arrested, first then threatened with execution).93

It is hard to distinguish the proportion of sheer provocation from what was an assignment from the refugee community (that sometimes did “overplay” its role).94 Obtaining information about Soviet troop movements was one of their tasks, as it was important data for the UN; however, it was considered military intelligence by the authorities. Lukács established contacts with his young brother-in-law who was living close to both a Soviet army base and the uranium mines in Pécs. The “recruited spy” succeeded in approaching a planted undercover counter-intelligence officer of the Soviet Army.95 The police followed all his steps to uncover the whole “network.” When they were arrested, young Tumbász and his secretly married wife were trying to escape to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav border guards returned them. The investigation was an easy task for the intelligence services to document, since they had been involved with cooperating with co-conspirators throughout the plot. However, documents suggest that this information was not shared with the legal authorities96 to avoid any questions of possible entrapment. The Budapest Military Court sentenced Lukács to death, while Tumbász and Czermann received life terms, and those less involved were sentenced to a few years in prison. After the condemned appealed, the Supreme Court`s Military Collegium Special Council changed the two life sentences to death by hanging. They were executed in January and March of 1959. The information they provided to the UN was filed away, the same way as the information about their executions were.97

5. Conclusion

Particularly during the Cold War, it was probably easier for those not involved in the daily business of international politics to believe that the UN would be able to consistently apply the ideals underlying the founding of the UN and the principles in the UN Charter when dealing with international crises.

In dramatic historical moments, the contradiction between principles and practice can become fatal, particularly when Cold War super powers are on the opposite sides of an issue. Thus was the case for the Hungarian revolution, when people fighting on the streets and later suppressed by a foreign power had their ultimate hope in the United Nations; however, neither their leaders nor the pragmatic diplomats inside the international organization shared this “naivety.”

We may not fully know until more crucial documents become available to scholars and researchers, whether it was the law of history that ideals cannot be consistently introduced into the daily working of power games or that there were more important issues and factors for the UN to consider when it was confronted with the “problem” of Hungary. Further research may help provide a clearer picture of important past moments of history. Almost 60 years later, few key participants of the Hungarian Revolution are alive today but there are still many unanswered questions regarding the UN’s response to the Hungarian Revolution. Answering these questions, may provide the UN with the means to respond better to future crises.

1 United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, General Assembly, Official Records, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 18. (A/3592) New York: 1957.

2 Péter Mód submitted five copies of the Report to Budapest on 26 June 1957 with the comment: “Such a dirty document has never been produced in the history of the UN.” “A New York-i főkonzulátus iaratai” [Documents of the Hungarian consulate general in New York], NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-24-a. Box 2. The very same day the Hungarian News Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda – MTI) published in its confidential series (“Bizalmas”) the whole Report as a special issue, thus obviously they had earlier access to it. Stenograph copies of the report were available and distributed only by the signature of the person assigned to read it. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-k Box 94.

3 The analysis of the Report by the secret services was part of Volume III of “Counter Revolution in the Mirror of the State Security Work.” (Ellenforradalom az állambiztonsági munka tükrében), HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.9. V- 150352/2.

4 The Ministry of Justice gave a lengthy analysis attacking the legal basis of the UN investigation, and rejected the statements of the Report about the trials in Hungary. The author (or principal organizer of the text) was the communist scholar and expert on international law Gyula Eörsi. Draft of 5 August 1957. NAH (MNL-MOL) IM 00/4/1959. The Ministry of Defense also contributed a detailed analysis concerning the military aspects of the Report, which is preserved in the Archive of the History of Military (Hadtörténeti Levéltár) 1956. 8. Gyűjtemény, 202-221 folio.

5 The reports submitted by the embassies of Western democracies in Budapest were described as “countries that had antagonistic feelings towards Hungary and were instrumental in the preparation for the counter- revolution submitted their intelligence reports to the UN.” Report on 7 July 1958 (“About the Activity of the UN Committee”), NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-k Box 55.

6 Kádár wanted the Hungarian response to the Report to be “offensive” instead of “defensive.” Members of the SpecCom were conclusively accused of siding with the “fascists” who were “terrorizing the population in Budapest” in October and preparing to massacre communists in November 1956. “These are serious accusations against the members of the SpecCom who omitted these facts and attempted to misguide the GA and to lie to the international public.” 13 September 1957, “Summary of the thesis of the speech given at the UN GA” NAH (MNL- MOL) XIX-J-36 (Embassy of Vienna).

7 The debates were also of great importance, confronting views of the political leaders of Hungary György Marosán, Ferenc Münnich, János Kádár and many others. These revealed the major differences between the more “pragmatic” politicians and those rejecting any kind of foreign interference as “imperialistic manipulations.” The Politburo meeting on 27 August 1957 gave the final guidelines for the response to the Report. In this document “peace was threatened by the events in Hungary” and “the USSR restored it in the spirit of the UN.” Following this logic, the UN infringes its own Charter by “whitewashing” fascists. The minutes are preserved in the HSWP papers, NAH (MNL-MOL) M-KS 288f. 41. ö.e. (in 3 March 1957 the Deputy FM István Sebes suggested that the UN should thank the USSR for defending the world from WWIII instead of criticizing Moscow) NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-o. Kádár’s handwritten comments and corrections on the Government`s Statement are kept in NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX- J-1-j Box 56.

8 See the analysis and comments in NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 56.

9 Gyula Eörsi (1922-1992) worked as a legal expert and jurist instrumental in shaping the legal frames of both the Stalinism and then the Kádárian “Consolidation.” He served also as a Hungarian consul in the US and became an expert of international law. In this position he supported the efforts of the Hungarian UN Mission to defend its position and to reject the arguments of the UN Report.

10 Following the directions of the FM, the word “refugee” was translated by Hungarian officials as “absconders.” NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-k Box 94.

11 Anna Kéthly had been arrested by the Stalinist political police and spent years in prison on fabricated charges, as a “betrayer of the working class.” József Kővágó was arrested also in the 1950s and sentenced unjustly. The 1950 convictions were quashed on 21 August 1957, but this did not apply to Kővágó, since he had left the country. NAH (MNL-MOL) XX-10-k 52465/1957. Even two years later, rehabilitation was denied as he “became a leader of a counter-revolutionary group that had escaped to the West,” as explained in a letter by the Minister of Justice Ferenc Nezvál on 23 May 1958, see NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-E-1-v IM Box 2. In the early 1950s Béla Király was instrumental in the newly-organized Hungarian communist-led army. He was then arrested, tortured, and

sentenced. The process of his rehabilitation started after 1953 and by 29 October 1956 he was rehabilitated (on 31 October the Presidential Council also approved it). However, on 18 April 1957 Ferenc Ledényi, chief judge at the Supreme Military Court, objected to Király`s rehabilitation and the earlier sentence was revalidated (NAH MNL- MOL) Kb.T. 014/1952/53. The secret services planned a very complex defamation campaign against him that included both his role during WWII and later his function in the Hungarian Communist Army. He had been involved in the “purification” of the army and assisted military intelligence. In this regard, relevant documents were made available by the Hungarian secret services to those concerned. His Stalinist activity was mentioned as were his Stalinist publications, together with his “confession” for being a British spy. His ex-wife was recruited as a secret agent (code name: “Pécsiné”) and even his assistant in Hungary worked for the secret services (code name “Virág”). Accusations included looting, corruption and homosexuality. HAHSS (ÁBTL) Király Béla 1525/1.The plan with the code name “Radet” is described in HAHSS (ÁBTL) Király Béla 1525/2.

12 The Ministry of Interior provided information to the FM, specifying the charges against several witnesses. For example, Sándor Kiss was accused of saving Nazis after WWII, Tamás Pásztor admitted his intelligence activity for the US, László Bereczki had murdered and dismembered a Soviet soldier in 1945, etc. ”Summary,” 31 July 1957. NAH (MNL-MOL) XX-10-k.

13 The strategy of the Foreign Ministry included “attack the members of the SpecCom personally.” Andersen was an easy target, but they found excuses to undermine the credibility of Slim and Gunewardene as well. See HSWP documents NAH (MNL-MOL) M-KS 288f. 41. ö.e. In 1970 the “Hungarian Question” was the basis of a propaganda play performed in Budapest in Thália Theater by Károly Kazimir - György Pálffy, A magyar kérdés (The Hungarian Question) for which secretly obtained intelligence information was used, further insulting and accusing the members of the SpecCom and Secretariat staff, including Povl Bang-Jensen and Claire de Hedervary.

14 The extraordinary government meeting dedicated to the Report and to the answer given at the UN was held on 31 August 1957.

15 The Soviet control was obviously exercised over the whole process, Imre Horváth mentioned at the 21 August 1957 Politburo meeting “I have spoken to comrade Gromov [military commander of Budapest] about the UN session […] and he called comrade Kuznetsov, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moscow.” HSWP papers, NAH (MNL- MOL) M-KS 288f. 5/37 ő.e. Besides the statement of the Hungarian government, the speech to be delivered by its UN representative was the crucial issue. On 17 July 1957 a 25 page draft speech was sent from Budapest to Péter Mód, that was constantly corrected and modified due also to the consultations with the “friendly delegations” (mainly that the USSR). “A New York-i főkonzulátus iaratai” [Documents of the Hungarian consulate general in New York], NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-24-a. Box 1. See also “Sebes” NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-n Box 63. The responses to the Report were carefully monitored and documented by the SpecCom Secretariat as the Hedervary Collection proves; even radio broadcasts from Moscow and Budapest were translated and filed. The earlier ones were the 22 June 1957, “Esti Hirlap” (popular Hungarian newspaper) and Moscow Radio on 27 June 1957. (Hedervary Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 1 tk / 12.

16 “French Observations” were submitted and also “Comments by H. M. Legation” as kept in the Hedervary Collection OSA (1-3-1-2). As many other French diplomatic messages these were also known by the Hungarian secret services. Bang-Jensen regularly gave detailed descriptions of the inaccuracies. Some of those were corrected, many were not. Bang-Jensen Archive NSL MC Fond 413, Box 11. These are also kept in the Hedervary Collection, OSA. NSL MC Fond 523. 2. Tk / 20.

17 The suggestions of Bang-Jensen were kept in the documents of the Secretariat of the SpecCom, for example on 23 May 1957 concerning the crucial paragraphs of Chapter VIII (about the meeting of Andropov, Kádár and Imre Nagy). Hedervary Collection, OSA, NSL MC Fond 523. 2. tk / 28. Bang-Jensen regularly contacted the Rapporteur, then the chairman of the SpecCom but his suggestions were rejected later his participation in the work was suspended. NSL MC BJA Fond 413, Box 16. The conflicts significantly accelerated in the months to come concluding in Bang-Jensen`s firing from the UN in 1958 after three highly questionable disciplinary procedures. The activity and role of Povl Bang-Jensen in the work of SpecCom was the subject of a research conducted from 1992 to 2004 by the author of the present study. Based on recently available archival evidence, the author plans to continue this research. See also Footnotes 90 and 194.

18 The campaign included a three-member delegation (Károly Szarka, János Péter, Pál Rácz) visiting countries that might be convinced to vote against the Report and a carefully thought over strategy executed to accept the arguments of the Hungarian government.

19 On 7 July 1957 Péter Mód reported from the UN that “comrade Arkadiev spoke with the Ceylonese representative” that the signing would badly interfere with their “well developing political relations.” “A New York-i főkonzulátus iaratai” [Documents of the Hungarian consulate general in New York], NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-24-a. Box 1. The efforts of the Hungarian diplomacy were supported by Moscow sending threatening cables to the relevant countries visited concerning economic assistance. Throughout the visit of the Szarka group both Soviet and Chinese assistance was helpful as revealed later by the delegation. “The work of the delegation was greatly facilitated by the fact that the USSR handed over a Memorandum to representatives of the African and Asian UN members.” In Tunisia the delegation was not received, however in Egypt, in Ceylon and in India they were meeting with the leaders of the countries (Nasser, Bandanaraike, Nehru). NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 116. For the general overview of the visit by Szarka on 20 September 1957, see in NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j-o.

20 The Hungarian Chargé d’Affairs in Washington, Tibor Zádor, systematically visited representatives of Third World countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Sudan, Libya, etc.) from 12 September 1957. See (“Documents of the Washington Embassy”) NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-29. The London Embassy contacted D. N. Pritt (1887-1972), a British lawyer who prepared a systematic study for the rejection of the Report. His arguments included the unclear source of information, the lack of cross-examination, and the anonymous witnesses` statements should be rejected by any court, etc. as reported from London by the Hungarian Embassy on 3 December 1957. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J- 41-a. (He later also tried to justify the Imre Nagy trial in 1958 as A. Rahman vividly described in his book, Magyarország 1956-1959. pp. 218-219.) Several communist parties broke apart after the Hungarian 1956 Revolution, but some followed the hard line of Moscow. In Austria, Denmark, France, the Hungarian government was able to achieve some success; in Britain and Belgium, however, it could not. The membership loss in the

Communist Party in the US was enormous membership fell from 20-25,000 to 6-7,000 in 1957, as reported to Budapest in the Documents from the Hungarian Embassy in Washington NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-29.

21 Decided on at the highest Party levels, it was carefully executed by the relevant institutions. NAH (MNL- MOL) XIX—J-1-j Box 56. The exact ”choreography” can be followed from the vast documentation of different agencies, organizations, and federations. Even the press coverage was carefully planned. See documents of the FM leaders (“Külügyminisztréirumi vezetők iratai,” Horváth Imre) NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-n Box 26.

22 Within 48 hours the Peace Committee of the Csepel Metal Works collected 22,000 protest signatures. Documents of the FM leaders (“Külügyminisztréirumi vezetők iratai,” Horváth Imre) NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-n Box 26.

23 Lord Hartley Shawcross (1902-2003) one of the chief prosecutors at the Nurnberg trials, gave a detailed statement to the SpecCom on 21 June 1957 about current events in Hungary. He emphasized that a “system of legal repression is continuing and increasing […] more than twice as many persons have been tried in the past months than during the first four months after the revolution.” He referred also to the new laws, to the harsher sentences and the growing number of executions. It was kept in the files of the SpecCom Secretariat (Héderváry Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 3. Tk / 38 and was also reported by the Hungarian Embassy in London, on 27 June 1957. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-41-a.

24 The Ministry of the Interior listed the sources from which the Report could be known in Hungary, mainly via the RFE, the BBC (the UN witness Pál Ignotus being the head of the Hungarian Desk), Voice of America, and by smuggled printed copies into Hungary often “bound in the cover of communist leaders` books.” 2 September 1957 Minutes of the meeting of the Deputy Minister of the Interior. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-B-1-y Box 2.

25 The Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende on 21 June 1957 found a parallel between the inaction of the League of Nations before WWII and the UN in 1957. (Hedervary Collection, OSA, 768-819) Concrete evidence can be found in the correspondence between the UN Secretariat and the relevant SpecCom members preserved in the Bang-Jensen Archive NSL MC Fond 413. Box 66.

26 The offices of the Secretary General and his deputies were located on the highest level of the building. The expression “38th Floor” became a synonym for the UN top leadership.

27 Reports of Péter Mód sent back to Budapest on 19 September 1957, NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 55.

28 General Assembly Resolution 1132 (XI) of 10 January 1957 and “Future Work of the Committee” dated 9 April 1957, which also referred to the method of “gathering data on the development of the situation in Hungary” and referred to the “possibility of future reports to the GA and to member states.” (Hedervary Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 1. Tk / 1. Gunewardene, the Ceylonese representative, was heavily criticized at home for his

participation in the work of the SpecCom, yet declared that the work had to be continued on 25 July 1957, in Colombo, as registered by the UN BLCU UN Archive, DAG 1.1.1.3. Andersen also agreed with the continuation of the work and so did Slim, as the same documents indicate.

29 BLCU UN Archive DAG 1.1.1.3. The first interim report was published in February 1957, then the main report in June 1957, and a final one was issued in June 1958 after the execution of Imre Nagy and his associates.

30 On 5 September 1957 “Total alert ordered for the time of the UN GA's discussion of the Hungarian question.” Detailed orders were given to all police forces and paramilitary units, including secret agents and informers. Preventive arrests were executed, personal control of traffic was instructed and every police center was given ammunition, weapons, gas and food. Each unit had to report in every two hours (“Order of the Minister of Interior # 43.”) NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-B-1 Box 31.

31 Instructions to safeguard the FM in Documents of the FM leaders (“Külügyminisztréirumi vezetők iratai”) NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-n Box 72. The 1956 Revolution had started at the Bem statue next to the FM Building as an expression of solidarity with the Polish people (Josip Bem was a Polish general fighting for the Hungarian independence in 1849).

32 On 30 March 1957 support worth three million Czechoslovak Krona was given to Hungary, dedicated to equipping the newly founded Workers` Militia, the paramilitary volunteer organization with the exclusive task of “fighting counter-revolutionaries.” (“Külügyminisztréirumi vezetők iratai,” Horváth Imre) NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-n Box 26.

33 Reports about the people`s “mood” to the Budapest HSWP leaders. The reports were published and analyzed by Edit Poór – Gergő Bendegúz Cseh, “Az ENSZ és Magyarország 1957” [The UN and Hungary 1957] Társadalmi Szemle, 1995/5. p. 88.

34 The Report was approved by the UN GA on 14 September 1957, after the debate from 10 September 1957. The resolution condemned the Soviet interference and requested those involved to observe the UN Charter. 1133 (XI). The SpecCom was also in charge to continue its activity, as understood also by Hungarian diplomats in September 1957. NH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 55.

35 The repeated accusations targeted Count Festetics, Count Esterházy, Prince Löwenstein and even the aristocrat Pallavicini (called Pálinkás) who was instrumental in the liberation of Cardinal Mindszenty. Investigations proved that Count Miklós Festetics and Count Albert Apponyi entered to Hungary during the Revolution. Investigation report on February 26, 1957. NHA (MNL-MOL) XX-10-k 52465/1957.

36 On 9 December 1957 Prince Wan reported to the UN GA that he could not achieve anything with the Hungarian authorities. Documents suggest that he was not even too diligent in making efforts to do so. The

Hungarian diplomats reported on 10 December 1957 that Prince Wan was quite relieved NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 56. The British UN Ambassador understood earlier that the Secretary General “remains indifferent to the Hungarian issue and is unsympathetic toward the Special Committee” as reported on 28 May 1957 to London. FO 371/128679.

37 A letter of the FM on 11 December 1956 instructed that the amnesty was applicable “only to the fact of escaping” see NAH (MOL) XIX-J-20-a. The “Reprisal” was unprecedented, even in Hungary`s turbulent history, after the 1956 Revolution more people were sentenced and executed than the combined totals for all earlier failed revolutions. See 1956 Kézikönyve. III. Megtorlás, op.cit. The issuance of supplemental reports was also mentioned by Duckworth-Barker at his press conference, see “A New York-i főkonzulátus iaratai” [Documents of the Hungarian consulate general in New York], NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-24-a. Box 2.

38 The documents in the Hedervary Collection clearly demonstrate how well the UN was informed about what was happening in Hungary. One of the most substantial parts of the papers were the “List of Communications received by the Committee,” published quite frequently and including often several dozen, if not hundreds, of items. (Héderváry Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523.

39 21 June 1957 Report (Hedervary Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 1 tk / 12.

40 The US Embassy had the best sources and most accurate references, which were sent to Washington as seen from the cables of 17, 21, 25 June 1957, see USNARA 764.00/7-1757, -2157, -2557. These were submitted to the SpecCom; handwritten notes in the archive show that even the change of sentences was registered by the Secretariat, see Hedervary Collection, OSA, NSL MC Fond 523. 12 tk. /192. Cables about more death sentences were stored, while the International Commission of Jurists continued to regularly report about the legal “Reprisal.” The Hungarian FM obtained a copy on 27 May 1957, and later a 72-page report gave exact data of name, case, age, profession, time, court, term, appeal, etc. summarizing the sentences between 9 September 1957 and 31 January 1958. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 82. The Hungarian authorities' own summary of 31 July 1957 regarding the period between 4 November 1957 and 30 June 1957 included 21,987 court cases, 56 deaths, 16,427 prison terms, 4,098 fines, 820 “other instructions” (internment or recruitment as agent in return for amnesty), while the military courts condemned in the same time 21,987 persons, 62 to death, 1,183 prison and 350 “other.” Documentation of the Ministry of Interior, NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 82.

41 Pál Pális, working for the radio in Győr (Transdanubia), was accused that his radio reports were quoted in the SpecCom Report. Initially sentenced to death, he was later judged to be a “good communist” who resisted the “extremists” and received prison term. Note to the Control Department of the Ministry of Justice, October 24, NAH (MNL-MOL) 1957. XIX-E-1-v IM Box 2.

42 The Hungarian émigré groups that already established contacts with the government of the relevant countries were instrumental in forwarding information from Hungary. In the US Béla Varga, Pál Fábián and Sándor Eckhart were the most prestigious persons and the Hungarian Committee the organ they formed.

43 13 March 1957 “Situation and Developments of the Hungarian Press after the Revolution” (Marked as “Confidential” and “Read and destroy” – which obviously was not done) added “Source Vienna, confidential summary up to 4 February 1957.” The analysis is masterful and by someone who obviously had an intimate knowledge of all facets of the situation. It is mentioned, for example, that out of 600,000 copies of the Party organ only 20-30,000 were sold, there were burning of these newspapers in Budapest, naming also those who were, fired, arrested, etc. (Hedervary Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 3. Tk. / 7.

44 25 November 1957 “Written testimony of Juluis v[on] Mathe, major, about the army, based on his experiences in Hungary until 15 December 1956. (Hedervary Collection OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 4. Tk / 62.

45 Those contacting the UN or the Secretary General personally emphasized that Hammarksjöld had a special responsibility concerning Imre Nagy. Hammarksjöld finally sent a cable on December 23, 1957 to the Hungarian FM that he would be willing to, as interpreted by the communists ”personally be involved in the process at the Hungarian government concerning the annullation of the proceedings against those actively involved in the Hungarian counter-revolution.” NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-k Box 55.

46 See The New York Times, 10 September 1957. The inaction of the Secretary General in this case is all the more surprising. Hammarksjöld was willing to travel to Hungary on condition that his success could be guaranteed. As the US Mission reported on 17 December 1957 “[Hammarskjöld] will not go unless he has absolutely firm assurances that he can save Maléter.” USNARA 315/12-1757.

47 On 17 December 1957, Péter Mód and Imre Hollai met with SpecCom member E.R. Fabregat and Montere de Vargast, who appealed “for mercy for Maléter”: this the Hungarian diplomats understood, answering that “there is no such trial in Hungary” but did not exclude that there might be one later. Report of the Hungarian UN Mission of the same day to the FM; see NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box. 209. On 20 December 1957 the SpecCom sent a letter to the Hungarian FM about the trials and executions, saying that the Committee “would be appreciative of precise information on these matters and requested an assurance that the highest humanitarian standards were being applied.” Mód returned the letter since he believed that it infringed the UN Charter. (Héderváry Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 3. Tk. / 37.

48 Item 34. “Cable dated 6 August 1957, from Mr. George Heltai suggesting the hearing of a witness by the Committee” BLCU UNA DAG 1.1.1.3. Trevelyan files; see also the Héderváry Collection, OSA and NSL MC Fond 523. Heltai had reasons to do so, as the original UN resolution referred to the continuation of the work of the SpecCom. The concerns were raised when István Dobi gave a press conference on 10 May 1957, as also reported by The New York Times, emphasizing that the Hungarian regime “planned propaganda trials,” accusing Maléter of spying for the British and ”plotting to make himself dictator of Hungary.” (Héderváry Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 8. Tk. / 110.

49 Following this episode, Povl Bang-Jensen wrote a letter on 20 September 1957 to Under Secretary General Ralph Bunch stating that Bunch should investigate the matter of Maléter’s bodyguard “since I should think that

most would feel that it was your duty to do so.” See NSL MC BJA Box. 35.

50 Péter Kós travelled to Moscow to consult with the Soviet Deputy FM Patolichev on 22-25 July 1958, followed by a Politburo meeting in Budapest on 26 July 1958 and an FM “tactical plan” on the 28 July 1958. The arguments against Imre Nagy and his “companions” included the “re-establishment of fascism in the heart of Europe.” At that time, the Soviets already knew that there would be no emergency GA session on Hungary. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 55.

51 Included in the “List of Communications” was the message from Béla Varga requesting the meeting “to discuss the latest developments In Hungary” and also submitting “details of recent measures.” (Hedervary Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523.3. tk / 36. After receiving many letters and cables of concern, Jordan sent a message to Hámori on 15 May 1958, suggesting two types of draft letters to acknowledge the receipt of messages, one if they were to be included in the “List of Communications” and another if not. (Hedervary Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 13. Tk / 204.

52 When meeting on 20 April 1958, Péter Mód invited Hammarskjöld to visit Hungary during the summer. The Secretary General avoided accepting the invitation referring to his many meetings already scheduled; see NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 209.

53 See “A New York-I főkonzulátus iaratai” [Documents of the Hungarian consulate general in New York], NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-24-a. Box 5.

54 József Gáli and Gyula Obersovszky, young writers, were first sentenced to death and the international uproar made the Hungarian authorities change the sentences to life terms.

55 On 1 July 1958, in the ”Provisional Summary Report of the 74th Meeting” of the SpecCom Jordan stated that the monthly summaries included information concerning Hungary, based on press reports and broadcasts “but not on the secret trials and executions.” (Hedevary Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 12. Tk / 19. The Hédeváry Collection proves the opposite, as on 18 January 1958, in the List of Communications there is a telegram about the secret trials of Maléter and others, including Géza Losonczi, Minister of State of the Imre Nagy government (who had died in prison earlier), József Szilágyi, journalist, and Miklós Gimes, journalist and politician. On the next day, 2 July 1958, in the ”Provisional Summary Report of the 75th Meeting” Andersen even ”congratulated the principal secretary and his staff on the excellent monthly summaries.” (Hédeváry Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 3 tk / 37.

56 On 22 May 1958, SpecCom member Mongi Slim told the Hungarian Chargé d’Affairs Tibor Zádor that “the activity of the SpecCom seems to be untimely.” Later, on 28 May 1958, Gunewardene revealed to the Hungarian diplomat that he learnt only from the press what was happening in Hungary after the publication of the Report. Andersen sometimes called him, but seemed to be “tired of the whole case.” NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-29-a (Washington) Box 15. These meetings reconfirmed the prior thoughts of the Hungarian government concerning the

expected responses to the executions.

57 On 21 June 1958 the SpecCom issued a communiqué by E. Ronald Walker, Australian representative substituting for Shann (Meinstrop substituted for Andersen and Corea for Gunewardene, Kedadi for Slim) condemning the oppression and the reign of terror, and calling the executed leaders “symbols of hope.” (Héderváry Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 3. Tk / 37.

58 Fabregat and Slim were both anxious because the Special Representative “had not communicated with the Committee and had taken no further action on behalf of the accused.” They suggested including it also in the Second Report. Andersen answered that it would be “very unfortunate to give the impression that there were conflicts between the Special Representative and the Committee.” See the “Provisional Summary Records of 78th and 79th Meetings of the SpecCom,” 16 and 17 July 1958. (Hedervary Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 3 tk / 36.

59 Finally on 17 July 1958 Schreiber was able to read Prince Wan`s cable with the appreciation of the communiqué of the SpecCom. “Provisional Summary Record of the 80th meeting,” (Hedervary Collection, OSA). NSL MC Fond 523. 3 tk / 37.

60 The Hungarian FM noted with relief that two of the four chapters dealt with documenting the activity of the SpecCom. “Report of the FM regarding the UN,” 6 August 1958. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 55.

61 The planning in the Hungarian FM regarding the “expected attacks” – obviously referring to possible public reaction to the planned executions – started on 24 April 1958. See the “Proposal of the Collegium” NAH (MOL) XIX- j-1-o. Box 6. On 7 July 1958 there was an “Operation plan” summarizing the efforts of Hungarian diplomacy prior to the executions and giving guidelines for the actions of an eventual emergency GA session. 20 June 1958, “Operational Plan” NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 55. There were also plans to launch a campaign focusing on individual countries with actions planned and persons to be contacted by the Hungarian politicians, including Nasser, Sukarno and Nehru. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 53. India requested special information about the trials and the Hungarian politicians were prepared that the “Hungarian mandate would be an issue raised sharply.” Notes on 30 July 1958. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 55.

62 The only Western lawyer who had access (after the fact) to the Imre Nagy trial was Denis Nowell Pritt, who had been contacted by the Hungarian Embassy in London as early as in 2 January 1958. While he was a Western lawyer, Pritt had been awarded the 1954 International Stalin Peace prize. He was invited to Hungary after the executions on 1 July 1958. The New World Review published his article “The Trial of Imre Nagy” after meeting in Hungary with prosecutors, lawyers and consulting the documents. For him it was “a regular trial […] under regular procedures […] with reasons to be a closed trial.” The hearings started in February 1958 and resumed in June for a week. Imre Nagy’s “prosecution and execution was a necessity” he concluded, as “almost every country would have sentenced him to death.” NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-j-41-a (London).

63 The SpecCom explained its position in the Special Report on 14 July 1958, as ”since the Committee cannot submit this report to the GA in view of resolution 1132 (XI)” it did not have the same authority as the former one. (Héderváry Collection, OSA) NSL MC Fond 523. 11 tk / B. The report by the Hungarian UN representative about the XIII GA included “even if the tone is quite sharp, the SpecCom`s activity is over by the silent consent of members.” 26 January 1959, NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-j-1-o. Box 6. E. Ronald Walker, who was currently heading the SpecCom, revealed to American UN Ambassador Lodge, that the “Committee has outlived its usefulness.” USNARA 320.11/12-458

64 See the UN resolution 1312 (XIII) on 12 December 1958.

65 Munro had been a rival for Hammarskjöld for the position of Secretary General, yet later became unpopular among delegates. The US Mission reported on 26 November 1959 that he was “thoroughly disliked by virtually all members” USNARA 764.00/11-2659. Even the Hungarian intelligence services knew about his “problems with alcohol.” HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.2.5. 0-8-079.

66 Report of Péter Mód on 3 March 1959. NH (MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 231. Later even the Secretary General communicated to Mód during his visit on 17 April 1959 that “the Secretariat does not attach significance to Munro`s assignment, conclusively does not provide him with particular assistance.” NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 231. Later it was changed that Hammarskjöld “does not support Munro`s actions” as reported on 4 June 1960. Documents of the FM leaders (“Külügyminisztréirumi vezetők iratai,” Péter János) NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J—1-n Box 53d. The secretary working for Munro actually was in the Department previously headed by Protitich but then by Under Secretary General of Political & Security Council Affairs, Anatoly Dobrynin, who reported about his activity to Péter Mód. On 20 May 1959, Dobrynin even requested that “the only person dealing with the Hungarian issue be assigned to another area to work.” Report of Péter Mód on 20 May 1959. “A New York-i főkonzulátus iaratai” [Documents of the Hungarian consulate general in New York], NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-24-a. Box 6.

67 The timing of the campaign and that of the remigration overlapped the GA debate on the Report. It coincided also with the first anniversary of the Revolution. The Party leaders carefully planned on October 7 1957, both the protests concerning the activity of RFE the other refugee movements ”proven to be fascists” and decided to declare ”persona non grata” the two prominent Western diplomats most concerned about the current Hungarian political situation, British Ambassador Leslie Fry and the French Cultural attache Turbet-Delof. NAH (MNL-MOL) M-KS – 288 fm. 32. Cs. 1959 7. ö.e.

68 Miklós Szabó (code name “Mihály Kerekes”) arrived in Austria on 10 December 1955, after being an agent in the prison from 1953. He had close connections with leading politicians in the Hungarian refugee movement and was supposed to proceed to the US. However, he stayed in Vienna and became extremely active during and after the Hungarian Revolution. Even if his secret connections with the Hungarian services had been broken, he clearly reestablished them after February 1957. HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.2.1. Bt-255/4. See Éva Sz. Kovács, “A magyar hirszerzés tevékenysége Ausztriában 1945-1965” [The Activity of the Hungarian Intelligence in Austria 1945-1965], Betekintő: Budapest, 2013.2.

69 See his correspondence with Sándor Kiss, preserved at the Archives of the Danubian District of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church of Hungary, briefly Ráday Archives (RA) C/243. Letter on May 31, 1957.

70 ”Hidfő,” the extremist Hungarian newspaper published in the West, claimed years later in the article on October 10, 1959, that Szabó was a secret agent throughout as were many other members of the Revolutionary Parliament and RFE. Press review submitted by the Hungarian Legation in London NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-41-a.

71 Ambassador Frigyes Puja reported at length on 28 October 1957 about the ”disapearance” of Miklós Szabó, referring to the ”shock” in the refugee community and at the US Embassy. A report was submitted by Tamás Pásztor (see later) in response to the request of the US consul regarding the real knowledge of Miklós Szabó and the UN investigation. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-36. (“Documents of the Vienna Embassy”), Box 16.

72 Two more leaders of the Revolutionary Parliament came home with him along with a carefully selected set of documents. Even the British Foreign Office was concerned that he was being interrogated in Budapest. See the cable of 13 September 1957 FO/371/128685.

73 At a press conference Szabó claimed that he had the whole list NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-k Box 127. The UN Secretary General received the English translation of the press conference on 23 October 1957, and instructed Protitch “provide me urgently with all the information.” See BLCU UNA DAG 1.1.1.3. Protitch files. Protitch contacted Bang-Jensen who answered on 24 October 1957 “This seems unlikely to me, concerning the safeguards I have taken from the beginning to protect the list.” BLCU UNA DAG 1.1.1.3. Protitch files. While Szabó would have known the names of some of the witnesses in Vienna, it would have been hard to learn the names of witnesses testifying in New York, Geneva, Rome and London. Bang-Jensen was later ordered by Protitch to turn over the list of the witnesses’ names but he refused to do so. See UNA S/0466-0139. The Secretary General insisted that the list be turned over, which was hard to understand. As Bang-Jensen wrote to Hammarksjöld on 22 November 1957 “I am surprised that you should make an issue of what is of no practical significance, and feel so important, that you, without explanation, disregard the feelings and fears of the witnesses, and the specific conditions made by them.” NSL MC BJ Archive, Box 33. The list was later burned and the conflict greatly contributed to the controversies between Bang-Jensen and some UN leaders.

74 He was a member of several extremist organizations during WWII and reported also from the front line. Later, he joined the SS and was involved in anti-Semitic atrocities, besides creating propaganda posters for the Nazis. HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/1.

75 On 21 February 1957, Szennik recalled that he was “given assignments” by prison officers of Vác to report on inmates in 1950 (both cases he listed were based on fabricated accusations, “Standard” case and the Joint Military Staff [VKF/2] “conspiracy”). HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/1.

76 The Summary of Szennik’s activity on 2 March 1957 refers to him as offering his services to “the newly founded political police already on 7-8 November [1956] to continue his work. Based on his activity many leading counter-revolutionaries were arrested and many groups arrested planning to leave the country.” HAHSS (ÁBTL)

3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/2. On 19 December 1956, the agent referred to Tamás Pásztor as his contact person in Vienna regarding the relief activity. HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/1.

77 On 4 November 1956, he characterized the resistance groups as “unorganized yet devoted as they hope the UN will help them.” He also transported Red Cross supplies to these groups, including the Széna tér group. In descriptions and in drawings Szennik “documented his experiences about the hiding places of counter- revolutionary groups thus the Soviets could annihilate them.” Summary of Szennik’s activity on 2 March 1957. HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/1. Later he reported also about the revolutionary radio station`s transmitter (Rákóczy adó) and suggested to ask for Soviet help in crashing the resistance on spot. He also described the road where the members of the Széna tér group had withdrawn (”Solymár, Ördöglyuk, 424. magassági pont [benchmark]”) See the report of “Szeles” on 13 November 1957. HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/1.

78 On 15 January 1957 “Szeles” reported that Géza Bánkúti a famous sportsman would soon to leave for Vienna. He also reported that Miklós Komján claimed to have documentary film footage about the Revolution. The agent “Szeles” offered to forward the film to the UN. HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/1.

79 On 26 April 1957 it was reported that the II/3. B. sub-department “installed” an agent jointly with the Intelligence Department to fulfill agent`s tasks in the West. HAHSS 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/1. (The whole process of the training is documented in the files.)

80 Pásztor later made a statement in the West to the effect that “my activity as a prison informer did not hurt anyone, on the contrary it helped.” However, this appears untrue, according to archival documents. His prison reports were later sent to the West by the Hungarian secret services in order to undermine his credibility. HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.2.3. Mt 499/1. “Szeles” reported to the Hungarian intelligence service that Pásztor “Organized for the UNO [UN] Hungarian Question the collection of witnesses and the verbatim records.” HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt- 493/1.

81 He was carefully approached several times by the Hungarian intelligence service however, Pásztor already warned the Austrian authorities. See “Aktenvermerk” May, 2, 1958, and “Erklarung” on May 8, 1958, in the Austrian State Archive, Zl.I-3083/58 res. The newspaper Schilling Express on July 5, 1958 also covered his story.

82 The US Embassy in Vienna contacted Szennik to give a “sincere opinion” about him and whether or not they should issue him a visa. HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.1. “Szeles” Bt-602/1. A cable dated 18 November 1957 from the ”Interagency Defector Committee” refers to the military attaché and recommends that ”based on CIA information furnished by this office” Pásztor’s visa should be denied. USNARA 764.00/11-1857.

83 See for example “Hungarian Situation” 17 June 1957 (1-15 June). NSL MC BJA Fond 413. Box 34.

84 See the report of agent “Roger” HASHH (ÁBTL) 3.2.3. Mt 499/1 and the transcribed phone calls, documents of the approach to his mother that were the basis of the instructions for the Hungarian intelligence

agents in Vienna.

85 ”Tájékoztató jelentés Hammarskjöld magyarországi utazása és az ENSZ Ötös Bizottságával kapcsolatban a budapesti francia követség 1957. Január 1 és szeptember 15 közötti levelezése alapján.” HAHSS (ÁBTL) BM II/2. 4 January 1958. Forwarded to the FM on 6 September 1957, as ”List of items received from the Ministry of the Interior” cables of the French Embassy, item 59. NAH (MNL-MOL) XIX-J-1-j Box 80. It is not clear if the security breach occurred during transmission by cable or messenger or if there was a source for the Hungarians in the French Embassy in Budapest or in the Foreign Ministry in Paris.

86 Interviews (Oral History) with Péter Földes for the 1956 Institute, by András B. Hegedűs and András Kovács in 1983 and in 1988. Oral History Archive, # 150 (360 pages and attachment). NSL 1956 Institute and Oral History Archive.

87 See, for example, Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate. New York: StMartin’s Press, 1994.

88 The FBI already was watching Grusha, as he violated the rules applicable for UN diplomats. See the FBI Report of 1 May 1956 in: NSL MC BJ Archive Box 55.

89 In April 1957 Grusha was ordered back from New York. The Soviet UN Mission rejected any accusation that his imminent dislocation was due to any kind of activity not appropriate to his diplomatic status. See USNARA 611.64/4-857. They interpreted it as “Soviet effort to prevent the publication of the UNO Report on Hungary.” Samarasekara obviously was aware of the fact that turning over the code book was illegal, as he attended the Ceylonese UN Mission’s office after hours and secretly smuggled the book back later. The code system was based on the one used by the British Commonwealth. The New York Times interpreted it as a fact that “Samarasekara turned over the Hungarian data to Vladimir Grusha” on 7 April 1957. The Ceylonese employee was suspended (with full pay) and then left the UN with no stigmatization or disadvantage for his future work. His wife worked for the UN Secretariat.

90 There are several folders in the HAHSS regarding the “conspiracy,” “Laci és társai,” ”Lengyel Alfonz,” ”Lukács László és társai ügye” that covers the whole ”plot.” The investigation folder (Vizsgálati dosszié, Lukács László és társai) clearly referred to ”intelligence activity by the assignment of Western powers against the People’s Republic of Hungary.” Minutes of interrogation, April 10, 1958. Lengyel was referred to as ”encouraging spying” to obtain ”such data that can be used by the UN GA when dealing with the Hungarian Case.” The accusation referred to ”high treason;” see HAHSS (ÁBTL) V-146.247.

91 In 1949, Lengyel and the others were arrested and accused with fabricated charges concerning the so- called “Grősz-trial.”

92 Csaba Füzeséry-Nagy was mentioned in the correspondence as Csaba F. Nagy and worked under the code name of “Szilvási.” His brother living in Hungary, György F. Nagy (code name ”Regős”) was also involved in the conspiracy and served also as a police agent. See HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.5. 0-1311 ”Lengyel Alfonz körözési dossziéja”.

93 Béla György László offered to obtain false identification cards; see the minutes of interrogation on 20 May 1958. HAHSS (ÁBTL) V-146.247. (László was also an agent.) The other agent was Dezső Horváth, as the Report on 18 March 1958 summarizes. HAHSS (ÁBTL) V-146.247-2. (Vizsgálati dosszié, Kulács László és társa) F. Nagy worked for Department II/2. Horváth and László for II/5. (Horváth was arrested on 12 November 1957 and ”in the first minutes he offered his services” as the report claims. He was given the code name ”Péter Kovács”). HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.5. 0- 12132 (Laci és társai).

94 Alfonz Lengyel, in his letter sent to Csaba F. Nagy (undated), asked for exact information for the UN regarding deportations and other aspects of the ”Consolidation,” about industry, agriculture, cultural life, etc. He claimed that it was ”requested by the UN” to be informed about negotiations with Cardinal Mindszenty. Lengyel asked for information about army bases and troop movements as possible references for future armed resistance (which was obviously not a UN issue). HAHSS (ÁBTL) 3.1.5. 0-1311 ”Lengyel Alfonz körözési dossziéja.”

95 Lukács recruited his brother-in-law, Ferenc Bajzik, a senior student of agriculture undertaking field work close to Pécs, to obtain information about the uranium mines and the Soviet Army base close to the city. Investigation minutes on 16 April 1958. HAHSS (ÁBTL) V-146.247. Once Lukács even visited Bajzik with Csaba F. Nagy. Bajzik worked as an interpreter for Soviet military personnel and approached an officer ”Alexeiev,” who was an agent, as revealed from the ”Plan of Observation,” 8 March 1958. Agent ”Regős” offered Bajzik US$3,000 to obtain a Soviet gun (as suggested in the ”Operational plan” of 25 January 1958.)

96 ”The documents are not to be used in the investigation and can not be transferred neither to the prosecutors nor to the courts” was the conclusion of the joint meeting of Political Police Departments II/8 and II/2 headed by József Szalma and Jenő Hazai, on 5 June 1958. See Note (“Feljegyzés”) HAHSS (ÁBTL) V-146.247. 1.

97 Hedervary Collection, OSA, NSL MC Fond 523. 12 tk / 38.