The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Mui) and Its Quasi- Legislative Power: How Did Mui Acquire and Exercise It?
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1 THE COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN ULAMA (MUI) AND ITS QUASI- LEGISLATIVE POWER: HOW DID MUI ACQUIRE AND EXERCISE IT? ALFITRI Faculty of Sharīʿa, Samarinda College of Islamic Studies (IAIN Samarinda) Samarinda, East Kalimantan, Indonesia Paper presented in the 2nd Studia Islamika International Conference 2017 Organized by Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia 8-10 August 2017 2 1. INTRODUCTION The role of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, hereinafter MUI) has been depicted as an anomaly given its vague status in Indonesian politics. Earlier in the 1980s, the MUI was considered as no more than the creature of the New Order authoritarian regime to endorse the government policies on matters affecting Muslims in Indonesia through its fatāwā (singular: fatwā) and admonitions. When it recently transforms itself into an independent leader on Islamic values and becomes critical to government policies, the MUI is feared to spread rigid Islam in Indonesia. Recent developments in Islamic legislation and codification in the field of sharīʿa economy, however, uncovers a pattern of institutionalizing the MUI authority over Islamic law interpretation. In the case of Islamic financial services, the state now institutionalizes a mechanism for ascertaining sharīʿa compliance of Islamic banks in Indonesia. The state vests the MUI with the authority to determine sharīʿa compliance and the Sharīʿa National Board, the MUI’s organ, run the authority technically by issuing fatāwā related to financial services. Their implementation is supervised at the financial institution level by the Sharīʿa Supervisory Board which is appointed on the recommendation of the Sharīʿa National Board.1 The Sharīʿa National Board’s fatāwā are then absorbed into the Central Bank Regulations by means of a regulatory process within the Sharīʿa Banking Committee which is under the authority of the Central Bank.2 1 Elucidation of Law No. 21 of 2008 concerning Sharīʿa Banking art. 1(12) of Law No. 21 of 2008: “Sharīʿa principles are the principles of Islamic law in banking activities based on the fatwā issued by the agency having authority in the determination of the fatwa in the field of sharīʿa;” art. 26(2) of Law No. 21 of 2008: “The Sharīʿa principles as referred to in art. (1) is ruled by the Council of Indonesian Ulama,” art. 26(3) of Law No. 21 of 2008: “Fatwa as contemplated in art. (2) is promulgated in the Central Bank Regulation.” 2 Elucidation of Law No. 21 of 2008 concerning Sharīʿa Banking, art. 26(4): “The Sharīʿa Banking Committee, consisting of the elements of the Central Bank, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the public with a balanced composition, has expertise in the field of sharīʿa and numbered eleven people.” 3 Why have the MUI fatāwā apparently been so influential in administering Islamic legal traditions within the sharīʿa economy, despite not holding a monopoly on fatāwā issuing authority in Indonesia? According to Lindsey, the regulatory changes since Soeharto's fall in 1998 have expanded MUI's formal role in the state system for the administration of Islamic legal traditions in Indonesia, especially in the field of sharīʿa economy (muʿāmalāt).3 These changes have intensified the MUI's influence and the legal authority of its fatāwā. The MUI thus has been granted new institutional roles by the state, even monopolies in some cases, when it comes to halal certification, Islamic finance and the ḥajj pilgrimage. Lindsey argues that the MUI has now begun to accrue quasi-legislative powers resembling those enjoyed by state ulama councils and state muftī elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but not previously available to any modern Indonesian fatwā-producing body.4 Lindsey admits he did not study how the quasi-legislative power exercised by the MUI, especially the Fatwa Commission of the MUI (hereinafter the FC-MUI). This paper aims at extending Lindsey’s findings by examining particularly the policy of the FC-MUI to make the FC-MUI the single door for fatwā production in Indonesia. My argument here is that, the MUI seeks to further intensify the acceptance of its fatāwā among Muslim communities in Indonesia so that there is a legal determinacy in the answer to the questions posed for resolution. This is done by engaging as many fatwā commissions and Islamic organizations as possible in the fatwā production. For this purpose, the MUI organizes the biannual collective ijithād forum called Ijtima Ulama where they seek to resolve contemporary problems faced by Indonesian Muslims. In exercising and maintaining its status as the most authoritative institution for fatwā production, the FC-MUI thus acts as the ‘reviewer’ of the Ijtima Ulama resolutions prior to promulgating 3 Tim Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and state regulation of the ‘Islamic economy’,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 48, no. 2 (2012), 258. 4 Ibid, 259. 4 them as a fatwā. Some Ijtima Ulama resolutions which do not pass the review, therefore, cannot or are not promulgated as a fatwā, such as the case of the obligation of corporate zakat in Islamic law. To this end, the discussion in this paper begins with overview of the MUI’s origin and development and the relationship between the MUI’s fatāwā and the state’s legislative agenda, especially in the area of the sharīʿa economy. Given the extensive design of MUI regulation of financial services, my concern is whether the MUI can then expand this authority into other field of Islamic law, and if so, why and how the MUI does that. Then, it explains methods and procedures of issuing a fatwā adopted by the FC-MUI and, then, it examines how the FC-MUI exercises its quasi-legislative power through reviewing the Ijtima Ulama resolutions. Particular analysis is made on corporate zakat resolution as an obligation in Islamic law. The role of the MUI in deciding to frame corporate zakat as a mandatory duty enforceable by the Indonesian government is important, because the obligation itself is ambiguous in Islamic jurisprudence. There is no concept of a legal person in classical Islam; thus the duty of zakat only applies to natural persons; so there is no precedent for applying the duty of zakat to a legal person in classical Islam. Following confirmation of its status in the 1980s by an international zakat forum, a decision was made by the Ijtima Ulama of the All Indonesian Fatwa Commission of MUI and Islamic organizations in 2009, requiring the payment of corporate zakat. However, the resolution of 2009 Ijtima Ulama on corporate zakat has not yet been promulgated as a fatwā by the MUI. This paper considers these problems in light of data gathered through interviews with informants involved in the 2009 Ijitima Ulama, as well as documentation of ulama’s opinions either in the form of treatises such as book chapters or seminar proceedings. 5 2. OVERVIEW OF THE COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN ULAMA’S ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT a) When and why the MUI was instituted? The MUI was officially established during the first National Conference of all Indonesian Ulama Councils on 21-27 July 1975. From the literature we know that its bylaws were signed by the assembly, comprising 53 leading ulama of Indonesia and a board of directors of the local MUI on 26 July 1975. The final day of the conference, i.e. 27 July 1975, saw the instalment of a board of directors for period 1975-1980 by the Minister of Religious Affairs.5 The narrative history of the MUI mentions that the aspiration of ulama to have a special forum for all ulama across Islamic organizations came from both government and Islamic organizations. Firstly, for example, the all Indonesian Ulama Conference (Musyawarah Alim Ulama se Indonesia) on 30 September 1970 in Jakarta was organized by the Center for Indonesian Islamic Propagation (Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia). In this event, many ulama suggested the establishment of an ulama council which would have a fatwā body. The Center itself was set up by the Minister of Religious Affairs. The idea came from Ibrahim Hosen’s paper quoting the decision of the Majmāʿ al-Buhūts al-Islāmiyya in Cairo in 1964 on the need for and significance of practicing collective ijtihād. Hamka, the then first general secretary, rejected the idea on the same occasion, especially on the point of inviting secular scholars to get involved in the practice of collective ijtihād. He recommended President Soeharto appoint a muftī who would advise the government and Muslim communities, instead. Given this, the conference 5 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Wadah Musyawarah para Ulama, Zu`ama dan Cendekiawan Muslim (Jakarta: Sekretariat MUI, no date), 85-91. 6 merely recommended that the Center review the possibility, but this recommendation went unnoticed for about four years.6 Another key historical event was workshop for Islamic preachers (mubāligh) on 26-29 November 1974. The workshop produced a consensus to establish an ulama council which would guide Muslims’ participation in national development. The consensus was reached because of a strong suggestion from President Soeharto who saw the need for a nationwide body of ulama to represent Muslims in an interreligious body.7 The consensus, however, meant that the format of the ulama council was left to the discretion of each region pursuant to their local conditions. This consensus was further supported by Soeharto during the closing ceremony by stating that the existence of some sort of ulama and religious leader forums were badly needed for national development. This would be impossible if the community, especially the religious adherents, did not get together in a special forum. The president thus urged that ulama and religious leader forums to be instituted, so that each forum representing ulama or religious leaders from a given religion in Indonesia could talk and cooperate in fostering harmony, mutual understanding, and respect among religious adherents in Indonesia.8 On 24 May 1975, at an event of the Council of Indonesian Mosques (Dewan Masjid Indonesia), Soeharto again stated his aspiration for seeing the development of the Council of Indonesian Ulama.