The Water and Sanitation Program March 2009 is an international partnership for improving water and sanitation sector policies, practices, and capacities to Accompanying serve poor people Volume

Accompanying Volume to the Guidance Notes on ‘Improving Water Supply and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor in India’ Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Accompanying Volume to the Guidance Notes on ‘Improving Water Supply and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor in India’ Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

In 2006–07, the Water and Sanitation Program–South Asia (WSP–SA) initiated a research to identify barriers to service delivery for the urban poor. The research included a review of various initiatives from across the globe that have resulted in improved service delivery for the urban poor and consultations with the urban poor communities. The present volume is a documentation of this research and supports the Guidance Notes on Improving Water Supply and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor in India.

The present volume is divided into two sections:

• Case Studies of 18 initiatives from South Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

• Consultations with urban poor communities across four major Indian cities, namely, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Vadodara, and Delhi.

Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Section 1 Case Studies on Improving Water Supply and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor Case Studies

Title City Country Page

1. Parivartan: Slum Networking Project Ahmedabad India 5

2. The Slum Sanitation Program: Reaching the Poor through Sustainable Partnerships Mumbai India 11

3. PROSANEAR: Combining Community Participation and Brazil 18 Low-Cost Technology

4. Federation of Water Associations: Giving the Poor a Voice Manila The Philippines 25

5. Orangi Pilot Project: The Poor Invest in Their Future Karachi Pakistan 29

6. Kalyani: No Subsidy Sanitation Leads to Open-Defecation-Free Slums Kalyani, Kolkata India 34 Metropolitan Area

7. Community-Managed Toilets: Solving Sanitation Problems of Tiruchirapalli India 39 Urban Poor Communities

8. The Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board: Hyderabad India 45 Organizational Reform for Improved Service Delivery

9. National Water and Sewerage Corporation: Utility Reform Helps the Urban Poor Uganda 51

10. Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board: Service Delivery in Slums Bengaluru India 57

11. Nongovernmental Organization-Assisted Water Points: Dhaka Bangladesh 65 Social Intermediation for the Urban Poor

12. Alandur Municipality: User Contributions in Infrastructure Development Alandur India 71

13. Jamshedpur Utilities and Services Company Limited: Innovative Initiative to Jamshedpur India 78 Provide Adequate Water

14. Temeke District: Community-Managed Water and Sanitation Program Dar es Salaam Tanzania 82

15. Water for All: Community-Managed Water Services Tegucigalpa Honduras 89

16. Programs to Serve the Poor Urban Areas of Lima: Lima Peru 94 Alternative Water Management Models

17. Nyalenda Water Supply Project: Delegated Management Model Kisumu Kenya 99

18. Water Trust Model: A Community-Based Initiative Lusaka Zambia 103

4 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 1

Ahmedabad, India Parivartan: Slum Networking Project

Context and Table 1: Ahmedabad at a Glance Background City Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India (City and Total population 3.51 million (2001 Census) Slum population 1.6 million people (46 percent) Service Provider) (% of total population) Service provider and status Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad, with a population of 3.51 local government million,1 is the seventh-largest city in India and the largest in the state of Gujarat. Population growth coupled population, reside in informal drainage and access or internal roads 3 in poor condition. There has been a with a rising proportion of working settlements. Most of these settlements lack of comprehensive response from population in the informal sector has lack adequate access to basic the local government for ensuring that led to the mushrooming of slums and services—the majority of the the urban poor have access to chawls.2 The 2001 Census estimates households have shared water supply, adequate basic services. that approximately 1.6 million people, limited or no access to sanitation that is, 46 percent of the city’s facilities, inadequate storm water The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC)4 is believed to be one of the better administered and financially 1 Source: Census, 2001. 2 A chawl is a low-income informal settlement. sound5 urban local bodies (ULBs) in the 3 A total of 1,668 settlements including 710 slums and 958 chawls. 4 The AMC was constituted in 1950 under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. country. Its main functions6 include 5 The AMC recorded a closing cash surplus of Rs 2,142 million (US$46 million) in March 1996. Prior to 1993-94, the AMC was a loss-making urban local body, resulting in accumulated cash losses of Rs 350 million (US$7 million). Source: Vaidya, providing protected water supply, Chetan, and Brad Johnson. 2001. ‘Ahmedabad Municipal Bonds—Lessons and Pointers.’ Economic and Political Weekly, July 28, 2001. (US$1 = INR 46, approximately, as of September 28, 2008. Conversion rates are from http://coinmill.com; all sewerage and storm water drainage, conversions in the text are approximations.) 6 As defined under the Bombay Provisional Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. construction and maintenance of

5 roads, street-lighting, disease improved revenue collection of octroi provided at an individual household prevention and monitoring, and property tax) and management level and mainstreamed with the conservancy (solid and liquid waste reforms (including modernization of the city-level systems. disposal), public transport, and accounting system and upgrading the The initiative has two components: maintaining parks and gardens.7 Corporation’s workforce). physical upgradation and The area under the Corporation’s Improvements in its financial situation community development. jurisdiction is divided into five zones allowed the ULB to undertake several under which fall 43 wards. Physical upgradation, which implies innovative development projects such extending a bundle of services In the mid-1990s, the Corporation as the redevelopment of C.G. Road, including individual water supply, initiated a set of fiscal (including completion of Kotarpur water treatment underground sewerage, individual plant, ‘Green Partnership’ for greening toilets, storm water drainage, paved the city, and Parivartan, a slum internal roads and bylanes, street Box 1: What is lighting, solid waste management, Parivartan? upgrading initiative. and landscaping.

Parivartan (literally, Key Program Community development, including transformation) is an ongoing and Initiative formation of community-based slum upgrading initiative in organizations (CBOs), women’s and Ahmedabad, which has made Highlights youth groups, mobilizing community significant progress in enhancing contributions toward infrastructure access of poor communities to Program Design development and operation and basic infrastructure and social Parivartan, meaning transformation, is maintenance (O&M) costs, ensuring services and in mainstreaming access to health and education informal or slum settlements with an ongoing slum upgrading initiative in Ahmedabad. The initiative aims at facilities, livelihood opportunities, the city level systems. Parivartan and microcredit. has demonstrated the value of ensuring access for urban poor or enabling policy and regulatory informal communities to basic An assurance was provided by the frameworks, multistakeholder infrastructure and social services in an Corporation that participating slums partnerships, presence of affordable and sustainable manner. would not be evicted for the next 10 champions of change, and Departing from the conventional years. Even though the assurance had community participation for approach, the initiative concentrates no legal binding, it provided the slum initiating and scaling up pro-poor on improvements to infrastructure dwellers a sense of security that service delivery initiatives. services (rather than on housing) facilitated their participation and However, the program had a slow pace of execution due to Figure 1: Parivartan’s Components (a) unclearly programmed and ill-timed funding; (b) absence of, or nonfunctional, links between political decisionmakers and utility managers and those between management and frontline staff; and (c) the lack of capacity at the local level to implement a large program.

7 Under the conformity legislation of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, economic and social planning as well as poverty alleviation have been added as obligatory functions of the Corporation.

6 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

ensured their readiness to contribute Table 2: Project Costs and Contributions (in Rs) toward capital costs and community- level O&M funds. Component Total cost Contributions per family AMC Community Industry, Nongovern- Institutional Arrangements social mental Parivartan has a multistakeholder institution organization partnership framework whereby Infrastructure 15,800 11,500 2,000 2,000 300 the roles and responsibilities of development the partners—including target communities, ULBs, nongovernmental Physical 6,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 organizations (NGOs), and the development private sector—have been fixed in Individual 5,800 4,500 accordance with their strengths and toilet cost abilities to deliver. Linkages 3,000 3,000 The AMC led the initiative by taking with city principal responsibility for financing the infrastructure program; ensuring linkages with city- level networks; undertaking operation Community 1,000 700 300 and maintenance of services through development its zonal offices; and ensuring Project design 480 380 0 100 0 convergence with other schemes and costs programs. NGOs are responsible for community mobilization; formation and Community fund 100 100 capacity-building of community-based for maintenance organizations; collection of community of infrastructure contributions; and undertaking community development programs. Since 2002, NGOs have also been (Rs 11,500, or US$250), the slum Once a slum or informal settlement is involved in undertaking physical community and private sector covered under the program, the development work in slums contribute 14 percent (Rs 2,000, or households become liable to pay or informal settlements. Slum US$43) each. The NGOs’ contribution property tax, which is a composite tax communities have contributed in the is Rs 300 (US$6) per household and is including water and sewerage charges form of financial contributions toward used for community development as a preassigned allocation. Property capital and operation and maintenance works. The project’s design costs were tax is calculated on the basis of the costs, and have undertaken estimated at Rs 480 (US$10) per rateable value of property; since a supervisory responsibilities during the household, these are borne by both the majority of slum or informal households construction phase. The initiative also Corporation (Rs 380, or US$8) and have an area of less than 30 square aimed at eliciting private sector private sector (Rs 100, or US$2). meters, they fall within the lowest slab and are required to pay property tax of participation in project financing The community also contributes Rs 264 (US$5) per year. and implementation. Rs 100 per household towards a Project Cost and corpus fund for the operation and Program Evolution Financing Details maintenance of services within the and Progress So Far community or settlement. The cost of infrastructure development Parivartan was conceived when Arvind was estimated at Rs 15,8008 (US$340) Mills, a leading industrial house, per household. Of this cost, while the 8 In 2004, the cost was revised from Rs 14,500 to Rs 15,800 approached the AMC with the intention (US$340-315); the cost of the component of individual toilets Corporation’s contribution is 70 percent was increased from Rs 4,500 to Rs 5,800 (US$97-126). of contributing up to Rs 10 million

7 (US$200,000) for improving the living of Ahmedabad under the Government Enabling legislations and policies: conditions in a few informal settlements of India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National An Amendment to the Bombay located in the mill’s neighborhood. Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM).10 Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, made it obligatory for the Municipal The initiative was launched with a pilot Key Outcomes Corporation to spend at least project in Sanjay Nagar, a slum with 10 percent of its own account revenue 181 households (total population: How the Poor Benefited for improving basic services in slums 1,200). The project was launched on A major impact of Parivartan has been and chawls. This created incentives August 5, 1996, and completed within in ensuring access of urban poor or for the urban local body to undertake eight months (August 1996–April 1997) informal settlements to basic services innovative development initiatives, such at a total cost of Rs 2.1 million at an individual level, mainstreamed to as Parivartan, to address issues facing (US$45,000). The ULB, NGOs, private the city-level networks. Improved the urban poor. sector, and slum community were access, provisions at individual partners in the pilot. While two-thirds of Financial health of the ULB: household level, and adequate the households were able to pay the maintenance systems have had many Improvements in the financial position upfront contributions toward capital spin-off results,11 including improve- of the ULB following fiscal and costs (Rs 2,000, or US$43), the ments in environmental sanitation management reforms—and the fact remaining one-third took a loan from conditions, better health for slum that it has a high level of autonomy SEWA Bank. A local CBO, Sanjay dwellers, decrease in the expenditure regarding the use of its funds due to Nagar Residents’ Association, was on health,12 and substantial reduction in very little dependence on state formed—it supported the NGOs in absence from work due to illness.13 government funds17—has enabled the collecting community contributions, ULB to take up several innovative The initiatives have also propelled monitoring infrastructure development, development projects. certain indirect changes at the and subsequent maintenance9 of household and city levels, including Presence of a ‘champion’: The on-site infrastructure. The initiative was shelter consolidation,14 increase in reforms and development initiatives recognized as one of the ‘Global Best income,15 and enhancement in (including Parivartan) undertaken by the Practices’ at the Habitat II Conference, property values.16 ULB were facilitated considerably by Istanbul (1996). the leadership of some key champions. The project has since been completed Lessons Learned In the initial period (1994–97), the in 34 slums covering approximately municipal commissioner of the Enabling Factors 11,500 households. Work is currently Corporation identified strongly with going on in another 13 settlements. The design and implementation these ideas and helped ensure that To further scale up the initiative, a of Parivartan was facilitated by the project got on track. Its existing proposal to cover 120 slums has been the presence of the following sustainability is partly assisted by an included in the City Development Plan enabling factors. additional chief engineer, who has championed the cause of the initiative and the pro-poor agenda considerably. 9 The skills of local community members who worked as laborers, masons, carpenters, and so on were utilized. 10 The primary objective of the JNNURM is to create economically productive, efficient, equitable, and responsive cities with a specific objective of ‘universalization of urban services’ to ensure their availability to the urban poor and for institutionalizing transparency and Security of tenure: An assurance accountability in urban service delivery and management. The JNNURM is the single largest GoI initiative in the urban sector with two sub-missions: one on Urban Infrastructure and Development and the other on Basic Services to the Urban Poor. This given by the Corporation, that it would seven-year program is currently supporting 63 cities on urban renewal and offers great potential for ensuring access of urban poor to basic services. not evict or remove participating slum 11As documented in a study ‘Wealth and Well-Being Impacts of Slum Upgrading and Improved Service Delivery to the Poor—A Case of Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad’ undertaken by the Centre for Environment Planning and Technology (CEPT), Ahmedabad. pockets for the next 10 years, has 12 Eighty-two percent of households recorded a decrease in the expenditure on health and medicines. (Source: ibid.) 13 Seventy-seven percent of the households shared that they did not miss a single day of work due to illness after the implementation gone a long way in ensuring the of the program. 14 A little over one-third of the households in Parivartan slums have undertaken home improvements. The amounts spent by families readiness of slum communities to for home improvements have ranged from Rs 500 to Rs 300,000, or US$10-6,500 (average: Rs 31,086, or US$675). The majority of the home improvements were to do with the addition of one floor, subdivision of a room, improvements in roofs, floors, and walls. participate and contribute toward 15 Approximately 58 percent of the households reported that there had been an increase in their income levels following the implementation of the initiative. the capital cost of infrastructure 16 There has been an increase in the property values in slums covered under Parivartan; the increase has been approximately 67 percent (from Rs 55,899 to Rs 93,788, or US$1,200-2,000). development and toward a community- 17 The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation depends on the state government for only 10 percent of its total revenue in the form of a grant for primary education. level corpus fund for O&M.

8 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Access to microfinance: Access to Financial resources—mere good performance (or penalties for microcredit was critical for ensuring allocations: While there appears to be poor performance). For their part, ward community financing for the physical no shortage of funds with budgetary office staff justify their reluctance to development component of the capital allocations made for Parivartan each service infrastructure in Parivartan cost. NGOs and CBOs are responsible financial year, the funds were not well communities by citing improper for collecting contributions, which are programmed. The financial planning designs, poor construction, and maintained in individual accounts with exercise is ad hoc in nature; budgetary nonadherence to prescribed norms. SEWA Bank and are handed over to allocations are usually inflated and Nonalignment with political wings the Corporation at the initiation of work do not take into account anticipated (elected representatives): The urban on-site. However, this was the case revenue flows or project imple- poor provide an enormous vote bank, only in time-bound projects, including mentation plans. The result is that while and the Parivartan initiative can be the pilot project at Sanjay Nagar, huge budgetary allocations are made, viewed as undermining the influence of the first settlement in the scale-up funds are allocated on the basis of elected officials. While there is very little phase (Sinheshwari Nagar), and in the available revenue flows. Since overt resistance to the program from slum electrification program. Parivartan was not seen as a priority the city’s elected officials, a majority of initiative, the allocated funds were In other projects, since the project the councilors use funds allocated to spent on other projects perceived implementation took so long, them from numerous state and federal to be more important for the slum households were able to pay in government welfare and poverty city’s development. easy installments. alleviation programs for infrastructure Inadequate human resources: The upgrading in slums and chawls. The Constraints Parivartan Slum Networking Program value of political grants for infrastructure While the slow pace of execution can (SNP) cell in the Corporation is grossly investments disbursed in Ahmedabad be attributed to many factors, the understaffed. A number of positions are in 1999–2000 was 11.3 times the most pertinent being the lack of vacant, with the highest numbers of SNP’s actual expenditure. By reducing institutionalization of the initiative vacancies in the Engineering Wing. the obligations of residents to within the ULB, the result has been Further, many officials have been participate in infrastructure projects that the program’s fate has been transferred from the SNP cell to other funded by these grants (for example, decided by whether it coincides with departments without replacements requiring no cash contributions as does the vision and ideology of the senior and senior SNP cell officials have the SNP), politicians have undermined municipal management or not. In large multiple responsibilities. the scaling up of Parivartan, despite part because a former commissioner their public expressions of support for Weak management links between expressed a personal interest in the the program. the organization and frontline staff: program, the management cadre and Subsequent to the implementation of Resistance from the state the frontline staff were keen to push the Parivartan, the slum is handed over to government: A principal obstacle to program forward. the ward office for the operation and upscaling Parivartan is the state The experience has been that maintenance of services. The frontline government’s unwillingness to subsequent municipal commissioners staff at the ward offices has a poor cooperate with the ULB’s innovative have not been able to sustain the pace reputation regarding customer approach to land tenure issues. The state government has declined to of the initiative. The other factors that responsiveness, and has been provide clearance (no objection have led to the tardy progress include particularly reluctant to provide certificates) for implementing the the bureaucratic routine due to which postconstruction support to Parivartan initiative in informal settlements located the project approval and release of communities. Their resistance can be on its land. funds took very long, and delays in attributed to the fact that they were mobilizing and organizing the not involved in the project design or Protracted project approval community in cases of heterogeneous implementation phase and because of process: The project approval process social structures. a lack of any incentives for recognizing is lengthy, cumbersome, and

9 time consuming. As it involves approvals associated with the initiative. The through a combination of political from various officials at different levels in primary reason for this is that Parivartan sponsorship, informal markets, and the the ULB, the central Corporation, the requires participating NGOs to have Corporation’s ward offices. SNP cell, and zonal offices, it results in skills and experience in community Offering bundled services is one inordinate delays. Discussions with NGO development as well as infrastructure important explanation for Parivartan’s partners revealed that, typically, the development, a combination that is not slow rate of expansion. While the project approval process takes readily available. anywhere between three to six months. project rules include a set of credits that Implementation difficulties due to are applied to reduce the financial Lack of partners: While the initiative nonflexible program design: A very contribution required from any aimed at inducing private sector small percentage (less than 2 percent) household that has already obtained one participation in project financing and of households covered under the or more of the eight services, this implementation, this was possible only program had access to any of the eight reduction applies only to services that in the pilot phase. In the subsequent have been obtained legally. scaling-up phase, very few private services offered. This situation sector companies have partnered with prompted the Corporation to design a The Corporation officials see little the initiative; their participation has been ‘bundle of services’. However, the need to adjust the suite of services limited to financial contributions toward situation in a majority of informal offered, or to create opportunities for capital costs in a few slum pockets. settlements in the city was quite residents to select subsets of the Despite a large and robust voluntary different, where access to water and services according to their needs sector, only three NGOs have been sanitation services has been obtained and preferences.

References

• Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology. Wealth and Well-Being Impacts of Slum Upgrading and Improved Service Delivery to the Poor—A Case of Slum Networking Project, Ahmedabad. Report of School of Planning. Ahmedabad.

• Dutta, S.S. 2000. ‘Partnerships in Urban Development—A Review of Ahmedabad’s Experience.’ Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 12, No. 1.

• Shukla, S. 2005. ‘Ensuring Access of Urban Poor Communities to Basic Services.’ Water and Sanitation Program–South Asia. New Delhi.

• Vaidya, Chetan, and Brad Johnson. 2001. ‘Ahmedabad Municipal Bonds—Lessons and Pointers.’ Economic and Political Weekly, July 28, 2001.

10 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 2

Mumbai, India The Slum Sanitation Program: Reaching the Poor through Sustainable Partnerships

Context and estimated in May 2001) lives in slums household connections. Contamination, and squatter colonies that occupy low pressure, supply at odd hours, Background 8 percent of the city’s land. This is and high access costs are problems believed to be the largest proportion frequently encountered in slum (City, Slums, and absolute number of slum dwellers settlements. In slums where there is no and Access in the world. These densely populated supply, there is total dependence on slums lack satisfactory basic services, purchasing water from informal water to Services) principally, access to adequate vendors, or on obtaining water from sanitation facilities. long distances. The city of Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay), spread over 438 square Water: Of the various water supply Sanitation: Sanitation poses the kilometers, is home to about 14 million arrangements in Mumbai’s slums, the greatest challenges in the city’s slum people. Mumbai is India’s financial most common (in approximately areas. While the city’s wastewater capital; main industrial and economic 50 percent slums) are shared collection is well developed, it does not activities have metamorphosed over connections, which cater to groups cater to Mumbai’s slums. Very high the years, yet the city has continued its of five households or more. In a third housing densities, coupled with narrow unabated growth, challenging the of the slums, there are mixed and winding lanes, pose formidable availability of adequate housing for its arrangements, comprising individual impediments to the planning and workforce. As a result, more than half and shared connections. Only five provision of wastewater collection of its population (about 55 percent, as percent of the slums have individual systems. Slum populations have been

11 Bank loan of approximately Rs 8.6 Box 2: Benefiting Mumbai’s Slums billion (US$186 million). The Slum Sanitation Program (SSP) was a The BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) implemented the World component added to the MSDP with Bank-assisted Slum Sanitation Program (SSP) as a part of the Mumbai the aim of ‘improving the health and Sewage Disposal Project (MSDP). The SSP was aimed at ‘improving the environmental conditions in Greater health and environmental conditions in Greater Mumbai, including [those of] Mumbai including [those of] slum the slum dwellers’. It was targeted at about 1 million slum dwellers dwellers’. It was targeted at about (approximately 20 percent of Mumbai’s slum population) living on municipal 1 million slum dwellers (approximately land, at about 10 percent of the MSDP project cost (approximately Rs 13.2 20 percent of Mumbai’s slum billion, or US$286 million). Implemented over 1996–2005, 330 community population) living on municipal land, toilet blocks with more than 5,100 toilet seats were constructed and handed at about 10 percent of the total over to community groups to use and maintain. This program is estimated to MSDP cost. have benefited about 400,000 people in Mumbai’s slums. Slum Sanitation Program: The program was unique in (a) fostering a participatory and demand-led Design Elements approach in a complex metropolitan environment; (b) supporting partnerships between the local government (BMC), nongovernmental organizations, The SSP defines sanitation for slums private construction agencies, and slum community groups; (c) initiating as a complex service, that is, a innovations and incentives; (d) providing superior technical specifications that package of ‘hardware and software’ helped ensure improved service quality standards; and (e) responding components designed to guarantee the creatively to an emerging market for operation and maintenance. uninterrupted use and usability of the service. The experience will be instructive for the formulation of state or national urban sanitation policy, and for the design and replication of community The design of the SSP was unique in sanitation projects in other cities and states. the following ways: • Demand-responsive participatory approach to provision of community forced to depend on public toilets Key Program toilet blocks. to meet their sanitation needs; • Incentives for private contractors, approximately, 9,700 public toilet or Initiative blocks (77,550 seats) dot the slums. nongovernmental organizations Even assuming that all public toilet Highlights and community-based blocks are in usable condition (surveys organizations to work together to Background: Mumbai show that up to 80 percent of them are jointly deliver community toilet Sewage Disposal Project and not functioning), they meet hardly blocks in a flexible framework Slum Sanitation Program 50 percent of the total demand. In a (including NGO-led partnership with few locations, mainly large sites and The World Bank-financed Mumbai the contractor, and contractor-led services settlements, a sewerage Sewage Disposal Project (MSDP), partnership with the NGO). network has been laid. In a limited approved in 1995, was primarily • Contracting innovations, such as number of cases, individual household targeted at undertaking large simple contract milestones and latrines have been connected to septic specialized sewerage works in Mumbai 100 percent contract variation. tanks or are discharged into open and strengthening the capacity of the drains. Overall, the city has not been BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation • High technical standards of able to cope with the existing sanitation (BMC) to provide sewerage services. construction and high-quality needs of slum communities, posing The MSDP involved a project cost of service levels, including 24-hour serious public health and environmental approximately Rs 13.2 billion (US$286 water and electricity, and other risks for the entire city. million), which was financed in part by a amenities, including toilets for

12 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

disabled persons, urinals, children’s toilets, and a room for the caretaker. Box 3: Unique Features of the Slum Sanitation Program’s Community Toilet Blocks • Initial community mobilization and CBO registration, eliciting household • Community toilet blocks have an average of 16 to 20 seats clearly contribution for membership. separated between the men’s, women’s, and children’s sections. • Entire operation and maintenance • Toilets are never overused, since there is a cap of 50 users per seat, and responsibility handed over to a community-based organizations in charge of management monitors the CBO, which is required to sign a number of users. Memorandum of Understanding • The layout of the block is not standardized, but is designed to fit the (MoU) with the Municipal available space. If the space is limited the block is developed in height, Corporation. This MoU spells with the men’s section generally on the ground floor, women’s and out the roles and responsibilities children’s sections on the first floor, and caretaker’s room with water tank of the CBOs and also of the on the second floor. Municipal Corporation. • Community toilet blocks always come with two key essential services: • Operation and maintenance 24-hour water and electricity supply. management: The CBO collects monthly pass charges (members) • Other standard features include bathing cubicles, urinals, and squatting and per use user charges platform for children. The latter is designed at a child-scale, with a degree (other visitors). of openness to allow for adult supervision, and is often equipped with special handles for balance. Key Strategies • A community toilet block guarantees safe disposal of generated sewage Participatory and demand- by providing connection to the municipal sewerage network. When this is responsive approach: The SSP not possible, due to a difficult location, alternative in-situ methods are stipulated that in slums where toilets used, making sure that local capacities are built within the community for are to be built, communities should be the maintenance of the system. engaged in a consultation process, during which the project and their role would be discussed. A key feature was Integrated or ‘compact’ contracts: replaced by an integrated ‘compact’ the involvement of slum communities in Initially, the SSP design envisaged a contract, led either by an NGO project implementation right from the four-step process that involved (a) or a contractor. planning stage. Communities became raising awareness about the program; eligible for the program’s benefits by (b) choice of location and type of toilet The revised roles were as follows: making an initial financial contribution by a team of engineers and community The Municipal Corporation was to toward membership. They would take workers; followed by (c) construction of create an enabling environment that an active part in planning (including site facilities by a contractor; leading to would bring the NGO and private selection and toilet block design), (d) use and maintenance of the facilities sectors to facilitate the participation of provide assistance, and oversee the by community groups. This project met slum households, and provide the construction process. NGOs were with considerable political opposition capital investment for toilet block expected to facilitate the community and institutional reluctance in the early construction. NGOs were to be mobilization and participation stages. The design also did not receive responsible for mobilizing slum processes. The program specified that a favorable response from NGOs and communities; facilitating formation of the choice of technologies and their contractors, and little progress was CBOs; providing hygiene education locations needed to reflect the collective made. These initial difficulties led to and training on operation and views of the community as documented considerable rethinking about the maintenance and CBO functioning; in the minutes of meetings. strategy; the four-step approach was and serving as the main catalyst in

13 encouraging a partnership between the than contracting out each of the per adult (up to a maximum of Rs 500, community and groups, and the individual components separately, the or US$10) per family) as membership Corporation. Private construction Municipal Corporation followed an fee. The amount was deposited in a companies were to carry out toilet integrated approach and focused joint bank account of the CBO and the construction in partnership with NGOs. on the final output (the sanitation Municipal Corporation. Construction package). This entailed setting work began after this process was Alternatively, in an NGO-led parameters for implementation (for completed. After the toilet block was consortium, they were responsible for instance, a checklist with triggers to community mobilization and CBO constructed, the CBO was required to move from one step to the next, formation as well as for construction. certify its satisfactory completion. It also minimum specifications, and so on), The latter were to help enable local had to sign an MoU with the BMC. The leaving to the contractors and the community processes, supervise MoU, which specified that the former CBOs the details of how to construction, and take full charge of would operate and maintain operationalize them in each slum; operation and maintenance the toilet blocks and that the latter contracting out a bundle of activities management of local sanitation had the prerogative to evaluate the (that is, program publicity, health and services and assets. performance of the organization and hygiene education, community replace it in case of poor performance Creating an enabling environment mobilization and participation, planning against the standards and agreed and partnerships: An enabling policy and design of sanitation facilities, parameters (measured in terms of framework emerged, embracing construction, training of CBOs). cleanliness, hygiene, transparency different stakeholders who were Implementation on the ground: The provided with incentives to participate. and accountability to members, contractor’s first task was to carry out a The goal was to respond to user inclusiveness, maintenance of the general program information campaign households’ demands and to the asset, and so on). The decision of how in all slums in the assigned ward and to preferences for which they were to operate the service is left entirely to assess willingness and readiness of the willing to pay. At first, this approach the CBO and the community of users communities to participate in the encountered resistance from politicians (from direct involvement of users in program. After this first screening because of the presence of competing, all the activities, to outsourcing of process, communities were mobilized supply-driven free service facilities. management to private service around the issue of sanitation and Delivering such a sanitation package CBOs created, if not already existing agencies, a whole range of options has is a complex task; the Municipal and active. In each slum settlement been adopted by different CBOs). Corporation could accomplish it only such an organization was registered as through strategic partnerships with a Trust or a Society (under the Bombay Key Outcomes other key stakeholders, each Public Trust Act) to obtain the legal contributing with their comparative Under the SSP, 330 community toilet status, which allowed them to manage advantage to the process. blocks with more than 5,100 toilet the community sanitation block (that is, Implementation Process obtain water, sewerage and electricity seats were constructed and handed connections, sign an MoU with the over to community groups to use The bidding process: The Municipal Municipal Corporation, open and and maintain. Implemented over Corporation would initiate the maintain a bank account to deposit the 1996–2005, this program is estimated implementation process by opening a maintenance fund and earnings, pay to have benefited about 400,000 competitive bid for sanitation services utility bills, and so on). The registration people in the slums of Mumbai. in selected wards. The bidding process of CBOs was mainstreamed to A review commissioned by the Water qualifications and mechanisms were reduce waiting time to a minimum. flexible enough to facilitate NGO and Sanitation Program and the World participation, either in association with In order to express its ‘demand’, each Bank in 2005 showed that SSP toilets private construction firms or alone, if family in the slum area was asked to have demonstrated significant experienced in construction. Rather pay a contribution of Rs 100 (US$2.1) improvement in levels of maintenance

14 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

and cleanliness compared to the capacities need to be instilled • Greater technical options and existing Maharashtra Housing and Area in these agencies so that they better quality delivery: The SSP Development Authority and older can follow a common approach, has demonstrated the feasibility of a Corporation toilets. leading to a sustainable number of technical choices and CBO-managed community specifications although only a few Challenges toilet program. were implemented. A large set of such technical options will further The implementation of a participatory • Corporation to accord priority to become necessary for scaling up. and demand-responsive approach in a sanitation: Sanitation services are Construction weaknesses in some complex environment such as Mumbai currently divided across the solid areas need to be accorded greater was not without its challenges. The waste management department attention; quality assurance systems city faces a number of policy and (for public sanitation complexes), need to be institutionalized into programming issues that need to be ward offices (operation and the management structure and addressed if the SSP approach is to be maintenance of Corporation and capacities of NGOs and scaled up. contractors. The use of the MHADA toilets), and the SSP. community as subcontractors was a Policy and A Strategic Sanitation Department positive step and a key innovation Strategic Challenges with adequate human and financial but effective capacity development resources is required to be created • Land mobilization and of subcontractors and quality notification of slums: The majority within the Corporation to take this assurance of supervisors will be of the slums are located on lands approach forward. necessary to leverage this into an with private, mixed, and effective, larger program in future. Programming Challenges Government of India agency • More NGOs and contractors: ownership. This poses a key • CBO mobilization, management, The initial stages of the SSP challenge since community toilets and sustainability: One of the provided a valuable opportunity for in the future will need to be provided limitations of the SSP has been experimentation and learning for in these areas and not only on spreading resources thin and the NGOs and contractors, although Municipal Corporation or state resultant inadequate attention to only a few participated—there is a government lands. The state needs community mobilization in some strong case for involving larger to get land-owning agencies to cases. This needs close attention numbers to participate competitively agree to the construction of toilets and monitoring since this is a key in the program. The later stages of in slums located on their lands. to ensuring sustainability for the the SSP seem to have generated • Compliance of agencies to program’s participatory and stronger interest. However, building Government of Maharashtra demand-responsive community- their capacities and institutionalizing policy: The SSP has triggered a managed approach. organizational and program management processes will be key movement towards a new, more In addition, CBOs need for a scaled-up initiative. sustainable urban sanitation policy strengthening in a number of areas for Maharashtra through greater • Better monitoring: While the SSP that constitute their core collaborative effort locally. was implemented using a management tasks (including However, compliance to these reasonably good progress mechanisms for viability, tariff- policy guidelines in the past, from monitoring system, a number of setting, accounting and disclosure, agencies such as Maharashtra improvements are possible in this Housing and Area Development social inclusion and representation, area, including improved third party Authority (MHADA), was not and improved formal contracting for concurrent monitoring of technical forthcoming due to organizational delegated management quality, and community-level constraints. Orientation and accountable to users). monitoring of program progress.

15 Lessons Learned were devolved to them. This upon allocation of responsibilities took a lot of time and effort. based on the comparative Although the community sanitation The SSP’s implementation advantages of each project partner challenge in Mumbai is far from being experience also shows that apart as part of contracts and MoUs, with addressed, the SSP experience from gaining entry for demonstration, suitable degrees of flexibility. there was a need to prove the provides a good roadmap for the future • Superior technical quality and concept in actual practice. Properly development of sustainable programs: service levels attracted people even functioning and sustainable if this meant higher capital (borne • The Mumbai experience community toilets have now come by the Municipal Corporation) and emphasizes that key constraints to to be regarded as a notable operation and maintenance (borne effective delivery of sustainable example of effective collaborative by registered CBOs made up sanitation systems for poor effort at the community level. people are rooted in government of slum households) costs. slum, housing, and land policies. • The SSP demonstrated the Households were also encouraged successful impact of a participatory, to express their demand by making Reforming these laws and policies is demand-responsive approach an upfront membership contribution essential for long-term success. A whereby community members were that would become a part of its highly skewed land market, and willing to contribute to upfront operation and maintenance control regime controlled by membership fees, pay fully for and resources for later use. Thus, the powerful vested interests underlie carry out routine operation and SSP demonstrated the effectiveness these policies in Mumbai. With maintenance, with major repairs and of constructing a high quality asset respect to slums, while there is replacements being done by the with arrangements for 24-hour evidence of some reform movement Corporation. Ensuring that local water, power, and safe waste in Mumbai, the pace of required communities take charge of disposal, and with a long potential change is too gradual to give management is key to the service life. It also demonstrated hope of seriously addressing the sustainability of any sanitation that sanitation quickly turns into an challenge. Limitations of space program. This implies that entry point for a more integrated and insecure tenure further communities participate in the approach to the provision of a wider obstruct meaningful reform efforts. program from the very beginning as set of environmental services, for Thus, provision of good quality and equal partners. The experience also instance, solid waste disposal, well-maintained community toilet demonstrates that when slums do improved drainage, and clean water. blocks becomes the only way of not have a tradition of community • The SSP revealed latent ensuring access to sanitation for participation (social capital), the entrepreneurship capacity in the city slum residents. successful mobilization for a that was ready and able to provide sanitation program through a • One of the earliest obstacles of the toilet management operator services demand-led and participatory SSP was to win political support for to CBOs in the city. The SSP has approach can work as a catalyst the program. The supply-driven thus provided a solid foundation to create active groups for the provision approach was popular for what could be a new paradigm provision of other basic when the SSP was launched. Apart in the provision of sustainable environmental services. from municipal councilors, other sanitation services in Mumbai—a political leaders—including slum • The SSP showcased the successful shift of focus away from a supply leaders, members of the state partnering of contractors, NGOs, and capital-intensive toilet legislative assembly, and the and CBOs, selected competitively, construction approach to one that national parliament—had to be in delivering quality sanitation attempts to provide incentives to convinced that such an approach infrastructure facilities, with the multiple stakeholders acting could potentially deliver good results Municipal Corporation playing the collaboratively for a more durable for communities if the arrangements role of facilitator. The SSP depended operation and maintenance regime

16 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

to help ensure improved access and well in the case of Mumbai. The operate locally. This increased quality services. municipality adopted an local sense of ownership and output-focused approach, setting accountability to the users, while • The policy of contracting out minimum specifications and reducing the burden for the the whole sanitation package, parameters for operation, but municipality to deal with integrating community organization, leaving to the contractors micromanagement during planning, design, and implementa- (NGO-construction agency) and implementation and future tion under a single contract, worked CBOs the freedom to decide how to service management.

References

• Reaching the Poor through Sustainable Partnerships: The Slum Sanitation Program in Mumbai. India Water Supply and Sanitation Feature Story. (They are available online at http://www.worldbank.org/watsan)

• Water and Sanitation Program–South Asia. September 2006. The Mumbai Slum Sanitation Program—Partnering with Slum Communities for Sustainable Sanitation in a Megalopolis.

• World Bank. 2003. Nitti, Rosanna, and Shyamal Sarkar. Reaching the Poor through Sustainable Partnerships: The Slum Sanitation Program in Mumbai, India. Urban Notes: Upgrading Experiences, No. 7, January 2003. World Bank. Washington, DC.

17 Case Study 3

Brazil PROSANEAR: Combining Community Participation and Low-Cost Technology

Context and neighborhoods, investments in urban on private water dealers who collect services in these neighborhoods have water from illegal hook-ups at the Background not kept pace. The government’s municipal system or from unsafe (Country efforts to increase water and sanitation sources such as open wells. coverage were largely concentrated on Urban poor customers were being Scenario) neighborhoods where users were able charged up to 10 times more than to pay. Attempts at connecting more Brazil’s growth in the last half century the public network water fee. For people to water and sanitation systems has been characterized by rapid sanitation, there was no alternative to had little impact on the urban poor. urbanization; between 1950 and a formal system and poor residents Approximately 21 million people lived 1991, the urban population increased were living with sewage flowing without access to safe water and from 36 percent to 75 percent, that is, openly in the communities. The lack another 44 million without access to from less than 20 million people to of adequate water and sanitation sewerage networks or septic tanks. over 110 million. While this trend has posed grave public health risks, resulted in a mushrooming and With no access to formal water and often fatal, especially among swelling of Brazil’s low-income urban sanitation systems, the urban poor rely young children.

18 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

At about the same time, the World Key Program Box 5: The Five Principles Bank and Caixa Econômica Federal of PROSANEAR I and Initiative (CEF, a Brazilian government Highlights development bank) reviewed the experiences of PROSANEAR and found • Community participation. Every project had to be In 1982, Brazil launched a small pilot some valuable lessons, which they tailored to the specific needs program called PROSANEAR (a thought could be replicated when of the community and was Portuguese acronym for the Water and combined with some innovative new to be designed with active approaches. In 1992, Brazil launched Sanitation Program for Low-Income community participation. Urban Population). The Ministry of PROSANEAR I with the help of a Interior managed the program, which US$10018 million loan and technical • Appropriate technology at was financed from federal funds. The assistance from the World Bank. low cost. To give engineers the incentive to consider program experimented with different Program Design alternative technologies, types of low-cost technology to extend PROSANEAR I established water and sanitation services to the PROSANEAR I was designed to a ceiling on the per capita urban poor. The program faced various maintain the same experimental cost for both water and technical and financial difficulties and approach as the pilot initiative. The sewerage investments. had to be shut down by the late 1980s. objective was to test new ways of • Environmental protection. All projects that provided water were required to provide Box 4: Testing Innovative Strategies sewage collection and disposal as well. PROSANEAR (a Portuguese acronym for the Water and Sanitation Program • Cost recovery. On the for Low-Income Urban Population), a program aimed at testing innovative premise that customers will ways of delivering water and sanitation services to urban poor take better care of systems neighborhoods, was launched in 1992 by the Brazilian government. The for which they have paid, program with its flexible approach has successfully encouraged learning and users were charged for innovation at every level, including technologies, institutional arrangements, installation, water use, and community involvement, cost recovery, and financial arrangements. sewage collection.

This experimental program clearly demonstrates the power of combining • House connections. PROSANEAR I financed water community participation and low-cost technology to facilitate provision of and sanitation connections for basic services to urban poor residents. Through PROSANEAR, residents of each individual household. urban poor neighborhoods learnt that they could work to improve their own communities, water companies learned that urban poor make good customers, and governments learned that innovative solutions can work. delivering water and sanitation services PROSANEAR delivered the benefits of water and sanitation services to one to urban poor neighborhoods (called million favela (urban poor neighborhood) dwellers. It also delivered harder-to- favelas). PROSANEAR I had an measure benefits, such as a heightened sense of citizenship among adaptable approach that encouraged residents, better relations between urban poor neighborhoods and local learning and innovation at every level, governments, and stronger communities and local leaders. These water and including technologies, institutional sewerage projects were starting points for much broader individual and arrangements, community involvement, community development. cost recovery, and financial arrangements. PROSANEAR I laid out a set of basic principles that guided project planners while designing 18US$1 = BRL 1.19 (as of October 1, 2008). BRL stands for Brazilian Real. Conversion rates are from www.coinmill.com site-specific plans.

19 Project Eligibility: Project planners What PROSANEAR I financed: Regional offices made up of CEF staff, developed three main criteria for PROSANEAR I financed investments including at least one engineer and selecting communities: in water supply, sewage collection, one social worker, were set up in sewage treatment, as well as CEF’s regional offices to facilitate, • Priority was given to favelas in cities complementary investments such as supervise, and monitor the local of more than 50,000 people. bathrooms and in-house connections. projects under way in that region. • All participating families whose The program also financed community During the early preparation of the local earnings were less than US$300 a mobilization and participation efforts, projects, the CEF’s regional offices month (three minimum salaries), of technical assistance, and studies to helped the executing agencies which at least 40 percent should be evaluate how well the many innovative prepare project designs and bidding earning less than US$100 a month. methods of the initiative really worked. documents. The regional offices also The projects were jointly financed by helped with community participation. • Recipients had to agree to pay for the World Bank (50 percent), local During the construction stage, the water and sewerage in water companies, state or municipal CEF’s regional staff periodically visited accordance with tariff schedules government (25 percent), and the CEF project sites to monitor progress and maintained by the water utilities. (25 percent). The World Bank loan was identify problems. The following criteria were used to made to the CEF, which in turn lent A central project coordination unit was approve individual project designs: those funds along with its own funds to set up in Brasilia, staffed by CEF the water companies or state and • The projects conformed to the engineers, community participation municipal sub-borrowers. most appropriate technical and specialists, procurement officers, and environmental standards for the Management or institutional contract administrators. This group was neighborhood, and represented the arrangements: PROSANEAR I was responsible for program planning, cheapest alternative for providing not a single project, it consisted of monitoring, and supervision of the water, sewerage, drainage, or many separate projects in different overall program advancements. They sanitation services. communities. Each project was the also provided training and technical • Water projects had a per capita product of neighborhood residents assistance to the different project construction cost of less than working with engineers, consultants, implementation teams. The central US$98, and sewerage projects had and officials of the local water agency. unit also served as an information a per capita cost of less than PROSANEAR I was implemented clearing house, exchanging best US$140 (1988 dollars). by local executing agencies, with practices and technological innovations assistance and oversight from regional between states. • Total investments for bathrooms, and national coordinating units. drainage, and solid waste disposal A Typical Project Cycle could not exceed 10 percent of the State water companies, state A PROSANEAR project began by project’s total cost. governments, and municipalities— whoever provided water services in the informing local water agencies that Geographical spread: Using the area—were the official ‘executing funds were available for water projects above-stated criteria, PROSANEAR I agencies’. These agencies identified in favelas, and that the participating set out to establish projects in a variety and assessed candidate communities. agencies would be required to include of different conditions to test how the They were responsible for community the communities in the planning and approach would work in different mobilization; development of technical building of the projects. regions (in different city sizes and options; construction, operation and geographical situations); with a variety maintenance; training; and monitoring. Project development had six stages, of institutional arrangements (executed Each agency was required to establish namely, (a) project identification; by municipalities, state water a multidisciplinary execution team (b) community mobilization; companies, or other organizations), and consisting of engineers, community (c) development of technical options in different types of communities specialists (social scientists, and so on), and presentation to the community; (organized, less organized, migrant and administrators. The executing (d) construction of facilities; (e) operation populations). PROSANEAR I projects agencies coordinated all aspects and maintenance; and (f) monitoring and operated in more than 100 of the project implementation at follow-up. Community participation was communities across 17 cities. the local level. a key ingredient at every stage.

20 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Project identification: When a request for assistance came in, PROSANEAR I Box 6: Two Distinct Approaches to Community Participation first had to determine whether the community and the project in question Each PROSANEAR project approached community participation differently, fit the program’s criteria. Teams depending on the unique characteristics of each settlement and the type of collected baseline data on site water supply and sanitation system residents selected. Each of the projects fell conditions, socioeconomic status of into one of two basic approaches to community involvement. residents, sanitation and health Participation with a project focus: When communities were relatively well conditions, community resources, active organized, and community members were fairly clear about their priorities, entities (public, private, and PROSANEAR I teams were not required to put much effort into basic community nongovernmental), and the level of organization and mobilization. Instead, the focus was on more technical aspects community organization. of the project itself, for example, choosing designs and selecting locations for the various systems. This project-centered approach required a smaller team, which Community specialists met with the meant lower costs for the overall project. Projects were completed sooner and community leaders—both formal and local water agencies needed less assistance to carry them out. informal—to start the dialog about Participation with a focus on community development:The project- the project. The broader community centered approach worked where the favelas were newly-created communities was informed about the project through without strong organizations. These communities were less likely to have a set of various community resources (vehicle- clearly identified priorities, and some basic community development work was mounted loudspeakers, newspapers, needed before the project could even be introduced. Only after communities community radio programs, religious were more organized and their priorities established was the PROSANEAR I organizations, and so on). concept presented to the communities.

The main objective at this stage was to In this community development-centered approach, meetings were likely to determine the communities’ own address many things besides water and sanitation services. Often residents development priorities and whether were eager to talk of other problems, such as their need to find new sources of revenue. Once the discussion turned to the importance of water and sanitation, water supply and sanitation services residents were more prepared to hear about how PROSANEAR could work for were high enough on that list to ensure them. If water and sanitation were simply not a priority, the PROSANEAR teams local support for the project. helped the communities contact other government organizations that could Community mobilization: The second better address their needs. step was to mobilize the community to This community development-centered approach was comprehensive and be involved in the project and participate helped the community beyond the narrow project objectives—a benefit in in project decisions. Community settlements with low levels of informal organization. However, this approach specialists went into the neighborhood required a large field team at all stages of the project, making project costs to identify the groups that could help. substantially higher. Reaching group consensus was often slow. The project became more complex if it went beyond simple water and sanitation and Women’s groups were often the most involved the local government and other agencies. There is the risk that effective allies for working in the community priorities will go beyond what the project can finance. Another community, and the women themselves risk is that if the project was spread too thin, it would not achieve its were frequently key to getting the fundamental goals. projects under way (in the favelas, women are more likely to be the head of the household and a permanent part of Drawing up plans: Project engineers community meetings, community the community). would undertake a reconnaissance specialists worked to facilitate the survey of the topography of the decisionmaking process. Once the At neighborhood meetings, residents favelas, and draw up a list of technical community had settled on a plan, each heard presentations on the technical options that would deliver the desired household signed a letter of options available, the maintenance of services in an affordable, agreement (termo de adesão), the systems, and the importance of environmentally sound manner. While promising to pay for the service and proper hygiene. engineers presented the options at maintain the systems.

21 Constructing facilities: After the Monitoring and evaluation: per capita design allocation of water community picked its plan, the Monitoring took place continuously quantity from 150 liters per person per PROSANEAR team submitted the final during the projects at two levels: public day to 120 liters. And there were proposal for CEF’s approval. The evaluation—the community residents significant variations in the sewage construction firm was contracted and themselves systematically evaluated disposal systems, ranging from on-site materials were purchased. Where project performance with the help of a systems such as absorption pit tanks communities chose to undertake multidisciplinary project team; and (Campo Grande) to condominial the construction themselves, the technical evaluation—the project team sewerage (Fortaleza, Recife, Rio de PROSANEAR team provided technical evaluated the procedures followed, and Janeiro, and Angra dos Reis). Not only assistance and supervised the work. verified whether the construction did the systems work, they cost far less Meanwhile, the engineers held activities were in accordance with than planned—below the investment operation and maintenance training community wishes. PROSANEAR ceilings established by the project— sessions for selected community teams visited the project sites after a between US$12 and US$50 per capita representatives. When construction certain period of time (six months for water supply and between US$15 was completed, the contractor to one year), to verify that the and US$123 for sanitation. conducted system testing for systems were functioning. Many a brief period. of the PROSANEAR teams hired Key Outcomes independent consultants to carry out a Operating and maintaining the participatory assessment to measure PROSANEAR delivered the benefits of systems: For six months after the community satisfaction. water and sanitation services to one systems became operational, the field million favela dwellers. It also delivered teams remained in the area to reinforce Cost-Effective harder-to-measure benefits, such as a hygiene education, review the general Technology Options heightened sense of citizenship among operation and maintenance of the residents, better relations between constructed systems, and help the The second key to PROSANEAR I’s urban poor neighborhoods and local neighborhoods develop new ways to success—in combination with governments, and stronger earn income (some became active community participation—was low communities and local leaders. artisans). For the long term, the project cost, appropriate technology. In many ways, these water and team trained selected residents to PROSANEAR engineers tapped a perform simple maintenance activities, range of cost-effective water and sewerage projects were starting points such as unclogging pipes or repairing sewerage innovations developed for much broader individual and cracked pipes. In other areas the recently in Brazil. In water supply, for community development. example, costs were kept down in operation and maintenance duties were Access to water and sanitation some places simply by reducing the contracted out to private firms. services: PROSANEAR I brought water and sewerage connections to Box 7: Choosing Appropriate Strategies about 1 million people in 60 low- income settlements across 17 cities. PROSANEAR I did not have an overall cost recovery strategy. Instead, PROSANEAR I connected more people individual projects adopted appropriate strategies. In Rio de Janeiro, the team than originally targeted19 because the organized tours for communities to water treatment plants, making them project costs could be kept low due to aware that producing water costs money. Before the construction started, the innovative use of cost-effective communities signed an agreement with the water company endorsing the technologies. The application of water supply plans, and agreeing to pay for them. In Campo Grande and creative technical designs helped push Ceará, the communities were given the choice to contribute their own labor in actual costs to US$84 for water and exchange for lower (or no) connection fees. In many cases, materials were US$104 for sewerage as compared to provided by the water companies for which they collected monthly fees from the per capita investment ceilings of the communities, in addition to monthly tariffs. Some communities collected US$98 and US$140, respectively. money and bought the materials themselves. In such cases, water companies

provided technical assistance, and taught the communities how to build the 19 The number of people obtaining water connections (900,000) systems or bathrooms. was more than four times the original target of 200,000 people. The number of people obtaining sanitation services (1,000,000) was 43 percent more than the original estimate of 700,000.

22 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

The communities played a key role in strong sense of ownership that led to low-cost technology. They accepted that keeping costs low; aware that they long-term care and maintenance of when fully informed and involved, poor would be largely responsible for infrastructure. Beneficiaries interpreted people were willing to pay reasonable paying for the new systems, PROSANEAR I as a signal that public fees for water and sewerage services. residents systematically chose the institutions recognized and served them PROSANEAR I also demonstrated that lowest-cost alternatives. as citizens and consumers. Additionally, although low-cost systems require more the initiative showed favela residents on-site maintenance than conventional Women’s empowerment: the importance of using their own ones, they can be sustainable at an Infrastructure improvements, initiative in demanding, designing, and acceptable maintenance cost, provided particularly, benefited women. Having managing their own services. the community shares the responsibility safe water piped directly into the house Communities felt empowered to obtain of basic on-site maintenance. and sewage safely removed made it further urban services such as street Most water companies adopted the possible for women to spend more pavement, electricity, garbage principles of PROSANEAR I as time on income-generating activities collection, day care centers, and the best way to work in low-income or leisure. Women were active in health posts from local, state, and areas. Construction firms also changed community meetings; they made national agencies. their approach on the basis of their decisions, and often led various work with PROSANEAR I projects. community activities. Community enterprise: The Most contractors hired community associations created or strengthened Improved environmental sanitation participation professionals on a by the project’s participation process permanent basis or worked and hygiene: PROSANEAR I also played a role in helping the favelas communities reported a decline in the closely with the community find new ways to generate revenue. participation consultants. population of disease-spreading Many associations and women’s vectors such as mosquitoes, rats, groups that had worked on the water Lessons Learned cockroaches, and fleas. The hygiene and sewerage projects went on to education component of the projects organize income-generating activities. PROSANEAR I’s ‘learn by doing’ improved people’s hygiene standards Construction of the water and approach produced many innovative and made them aware of the linkages sanitation systems created temporary ideas and best practices, as well between hygiene and health. jobs for residents by involving them in as a number of lessons. The main building systems as a way of lowering Community mobilization and lessons were: organization: PROSANEAR I teams investment costs. As a result, people worked with neighborhood groups and gained a temporary additional revenue Community participation must start organized them in areas where they did source, in some cases new skills, and a at the very beginning of project not exist. These groups provided few permanent jobs in maintenance. preparation: In the initial stages of PROSANEAR I, the community was community members with a means of Housing upgradation: Once the consulted only after the technology was getting their ideas across to project water and sewerage systems were selected and the blueprints were drawn. teams, and vice versa. Informal groups constructed, people used their own This resulted in substantial delays and often became stronger as a result of savings to improve their houses. They cost overruns as final project designs their involvement in project’s outreach built individual bathrooms, installed had to be reworked to fit the efforts, allowing them to evolve into kitchen sinks, replaced tin and wood communities’ real demand. proper civic organizations. There panels with brick walls, and other was a heightened sense of community home improvements. Cost recovery and subsidy rules identity; people who previously must be set in a clear and conceived their needs as individual More effective state water transparent manner: Although problems learned that they could and construction companies: PROSANEAR I promoted cost recovery more effectively solve their problems PROSANEAR I projects developed a through tariffs and connection fees, it did as a community. whole new business area for Brazilian water companies: low-income not indicate how much of the cost the By paying for the services and by settlements. The experience in communities should pay, and how much participating in all stages of planning, PROSANEAR I made state water should be borne by water companies building, and operating the new companies realize the benefits of or local governments. Further, although systems—communities achieved a combining community participation and water companies charged monthly tariffs

23 for the water and sewerage services, the whole range of technical options Scaling Up these weren’t high enough to cover the available to the communities. This real cost of building, operating, and happened in part because certain and Replication maintaining the new systems. options were ruled out for technical PROSANEAR I tariffs were often set lower reasons or because some of the options Encouraged by PROSANEAR I’s than the subsidized tariff already charged were still being developed and tested. success, the World Bank in 2000 to poor users of conventional water and And in some cases, maintenance initiated another phase of sewerage systems. Since the previous arrangements were not explained to the PROSANEAR through a second tariff had been set too low, the communities. In other cases, the cost International Bank for Reconstruction subsequent PROSANEAR tariff was also implications for each of the options were and Development loan of US$30.3 too low for full cost recovery and not well explained and communities million. PROSANEAR II is a technical sustainability of the new services. In these were often surprised by the amount they assistance project that builds on the cases, three solutions were tried: cross had to pay. lessons learned from the first phase, subsidizing the PROSANEAR tariff from principally the preparation of The projects should coordinate other customers; subsidizing directly from participatory integrated water supply with the local government’s local governments; or thoroughly and sanitation engineering designs urban development plan: Many reviewing the existing tariff structure. The that contemplate complementary PROSANEAR I projects needed to work first two solutions were the most infrastructure interventions. The closely with local government institutions common, but these solutions in general project is also supporting training and to be fully effective. Sewerage systems, lacked transparency. The third option was awareness-raising for municipal, for example, won’t work for long unless beyond the scope of the project, and beneficiary community, and federal local governments provide rainwater rarely took place. stakeholders in the undertaking of drainage and solid waste collection. these participatory designs, as well as Formal, long-term arrangements Future PROSANEAR projects must analyses of best-practice approaches for operating and maintaining the systematically encourage this to rolling out water supply and systems must be an integral part coordination from the beginning. sanitation and related services to slum of the design: Low-cost sanitation The local government must have a communities, and the preparation of systems require more maintenance strong commitment to poverty manuals consolidating these efforts than conventional systems, alleviation and pro-poor service approaches. This ongoing project is because they use smaller diameter pipes delivery: Local governments played expected to benefit low-income that are more shallowly laid. Communities a key role in several stages of the communities in 35 municipalities need to share responsibility of maintaining PROSANEAR projects, from identifying throughout the country. the system on-site while local water communities, promoting the project, companies or other agencies must carry PROSANEAR has also caught the to mobilizing local government out periodical maintenance work. attention of governments in other agencies. Thus, the local government’s parts of the world, including in South All feasible technical options and understanding of the project’s Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia, and the their costs must be discussed with basic concepts was important in Philippines. The challenge is to tailor the communities: Many of the gaining its support and making the the PROSANEAR approach to PROSANEAR I projects did not explain project viable and more sustainable. national and local conditions that may be very different from those in Brazil. References In the Philippines, for example, it is still widely believed that existing storm • Community Participation and Low-Cost Technology: Bringing Water Supply water drainage systems alone can handle household sewage. Also, and Sanitation to Brazil. Available at http://go.worldbank.org/QJVMV90C10 utility engineers there have had very • Katakura, Yoko, and Alexander Bakalian. September 1998. PROSANEAR: little exposure to innovations around People, Poverty, and Pipes (A Program of Community Participation and the world and are, therefore, Low-Cost Technology Bringing Water and Sanitation to Brazil’s Urban reluctant to experiment with Poor). UNDP–World Bank Water and Sanitation Program. new technologies.

24 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 4

Manila, the Philippines Federation of Water Associations: Giving the Poor a Voice

Key Program Figure 2: Flow of Benefits and Initiative

Highlights Manila Water Members or Partner Company Association Consumers To relieve Manggahan Floodway Incorporated residents from the burden of buying costly water from vendors,20 in 2001 various associations requested Manila Water Company Incorporated (MWCI) Soon after its implementation, a for piped water supply.21 Following a association was responsible for number of problems started surfacing, series of consultations between the administration of the local system, association leaders and the water including construction of distribution including (a) a conflict of interest as company, a system for water supply network and connections, elected association officers became was developed, which involved the maintenance, billing, and collection. water administrators and their tenure company selling water in bulk to the The partner association was also become coterminous with the bulk association. A mother or main meter responsible for paying for the main selling scheme where there was no was installed by the water company meter. The cost for the main meter need for periodic elections; (b) water in every community. The partner and the internal installation costs were administrators started engaging in passed on to the local consumers. This profiteering by placing unrealistically scheme was implemented in the west higher tariffs on consumers than the 20At the rate of 900 pesos a month for 6 m3. 21Average water bill: 100 pesos for 20 m3. bank in 2002. bulk tariff paid to the water company;

25 (c) the water administrators started individual household connections. Key Outcomes using substandard materials and poor However, following dialog with MWSS installation for water reticulation in order Regulatory Office, the water company, and Limitations to cut costs; and (d) the vulnerabilities and LUPON, it was decided that the of the poorest among the poor were water supply system would include Both schemes have ensured that the exposed as the residents who could bulk selling from the water company poor have access to a reliable and not afford the high connection fee with street or cluster metering where sustainable piped water supply system. each street or cluster has a street and tariffs were at the mercy of those The process of forming community meter placed at either end (as opposed better off. organizations (or associations), to the mother meter scheme in the federating has provided strength to the In 2004, when it was time for the west bank). The water company would voices of the poor and has ensured scheme to be extended to the east read the consumption from the street that they are able to negotiate bank of the Floodway, several meter, and divide it by the number of proactively with the private utility for associations came forward and active connections to determine the ensuring access to basic services. complained to the regulator—the charges for each household. The Metropolitan Waterworks and computation would be based on the LUPON is currently helping its Sewerage System (MWSS) Regulatory approved tariff of MWSS. The water members to get involved in other Office—that the services provided by company supervised the installation development initiatives. The poor in the water company were not pro-poor. of the reticulation system in the area, Manila have benefited from LUPON’s In December 2003, the entire East which resulted in standard installation actions—part of the impact has been Manggahan Floodway decided to form throughout. Every street or cluster that the MWSS Regulatory Office has a federation of associations that was to have a leader, chosen by the issued Policy Guidelines on Providing would cater to the best interests of the residents, who would serve as the point Water Services to Customers in Open residents. Thus was formed the of contact between the water company Communities and Depressed Areas. League of United People’s Organization and the residents. A water committee While the bulk selling with street or Network (LUPON), which consists has been established for every street or cluster metering scheme, which of 21 registered associations22 block, headed by the street leader. was implemented in the east bank comprising 8,814 households, that is, This committee is responsible for (guided by LUPON), was a marked approximately 45,000 people. meter reading, billing, collection, and payments, as well as repair and improvement over the previous scheme LUPON decided to conduct an maintenance. The system provided for implemented in the west bank, it awareness program for the residents, a staggered payment of connection fee still has some limitations, including to make them aware of different options ranging from 12 months to 36 months. the following: for water supply systems (including bulk selling, public faucets, group taps, and individual taps) and to ascertain Figure 3: Network Responsibility community perceptions on the (MWCI) STREET LEADERS appropriate scheme of distribution for their communities. The majority of the residents showed their willingness for

22 PFCI (437 households), Lakas ng Mahihirap (45 households), PUNAI (37 households), UNEFAI (900 households), KABISIG NAI Proper (1,260 households), KABISIG NAI Lower (400 1. Consumption households), PAPCI 1 (836 households), PAPCI 1 Lower (150 Reading households), SITIO KABABAN (154 households), KAPIT-BISIG (600 households), GENESIS (1,122 households), DIMAGTA 2. Billing (168 households), Tanglawng Pangarap (50 households), KAMPI 1 (50 households), KAMPI 2 (50 households), APNEI Exodus (900 households), SAMAGTA (642 households), 3. Repair Consumption Bill Collection Repair & SAMASA (98 households), KAPIT-KAMAY (400 households), Reading Computation & Payments Maintenance and KAABAY (50 households).

26 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Table 3: Comparative Analysis of West and East Floodway Projects

West Floodway East Floodway (LUPON-guided) Scheme Large scale bulk selling; mother Bulk selling with street or cluster metering. meter scheme. Authority The association officials were responsible A leader chosen by the residents of a particular for administering the water system. Officers street or cluster to act as water administrator. were coterminous with the existence of The street or cluster leader becomes the link bulk selling. There were no elections. between the water company and the residents. System The entire association is connected Each street or block has a street meter placed through a mother meter. A scheme called at either end. The water company reads the ‘socialized pricing’ was used by the consumption from the street meter, and divides it water company to determine according to the number of active connections to consumption charges. determine the charges for each household. Tariff and computation The tariff was determined by the Computation is based on the approved tariff of association managing the water system. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System Associations started placing higher tariffs Regulatory Office. Consumers are charged based on consumers than the bulk tariff paid to on actual average residential consumption. the water company. Physical connections, The association is in charge of placing the The water company supervised the installation installation or distribution reticulation system in the area. Resulted in of reticulation system in the area. substandard installation. Standard installation. Administration (billing, The association handles the meter reading, A water committee is established per street or collection, and payment) billing, collection, and payments. It block. This committee, headed by the street sometimes hires personnel to do the leader, is responsible for meter reading, billing, tasks, which adds up cost in operating collection, and payments, as well as repair expenses which, in turn, are passed and maintenance. on to consumers. Regulation Unregulated tariff. Water administrators Regulated tariff. Street leaders convene first started engaging in profiteering by placing before adjusting tariff rates. An internal control is higher tariffs on consumers than the bulk placed to safeguard both street or cluster leaders tariff paid to the water company. and customers. The League of United People’s Organization Network ensures that checks and balances are observed for transparency and integrity of records. Service connection and Outright payment. No cash, no connection. Staggered payment ranging from 12 months to payment terms 36 months.

• The bulk selling scheme through high risk of mismanagement and It only minimized the scope street management was good for conflict of interest. and effect. associations that had less than 500 household members. For • The street-managed scheme did • Many poor households who were associations with more than 500 not totally address the problem not capable of paying the service household members, there was a of mismanagement. connection fees were still left out.

27 • Households still insist on directly to the Manila Water A major learning from this case has individual connections. The Company Inc. been that the investments (that is, water company should shoulder time and resources) in alternative • The private sector is interested in approaches for service delivery have the cost of connection and only making money, not assisting later assume recovery through the urban poor get piped water. resulted in better access to services increasing tariff rates. This will The Regulatory Office had to for the poor and have also resulted ensure more connections, and exert its muscle to change the in the water utility reaching customers less risk from mismanagement way the company had decided to who are ready to pay for the since the payments go do business. services provided.

References

• League of United People’s Organization Network (LUPON) of Manggahan Floodway, public and private community of Manggahan Floodway, Asian Water and Development Outlook (AWDO) Report. August 23, 2007 (Singapore); available at www.adb.org/Water/ Operations/2007/Awdo-Experts-Meeting/pdf/Macabebe- Presentation-Singapore-Summit.pdf

28 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 5

Karachi, Pakistan Orangi Pilot Project: The Poor Invest in Their Future

Context and Orangi covers an area of approximately household income of PKR 2,100 8,000 acres and has a population of (US$26) in Karachi. Background about 1.2 million living across 7,289 Government agencies or service lanes spread over 113 smaller (Settlement, providers have provided a few facilities settlements.24 The township was including main roads, water lines, and created through the illegal occupation Urban Poor, electricity, along with schools and and subdivision of state land.25 The and Access hospitals. Bucket latrines or soak pits population is drawn from a wide range were the main means of disposing of to Services) of immigrant groups from India and human excreta and open sewers were Bangladesh; and Punjab province and used for the disposal of wastewater. Orangi, Karachi’s23 largest katchi abadi northern areas of Pakistan. Most find The streets were full of filth due to lack, (squatter settlement) is situated in the employment as laborers, skilled or inadequate disposal, of waste. Orangi hills, on the western periphery of workers, artisans, shopkeepers or The result was poor health; typhoid, the city. People began inhabiting this clerks; average earning per household malaria, diarrhea, and dysentery were area in 1965, and after 1972 the is estimated to be PKR 1,650 (US$21)26 common among the local population. settlement grew rapidly. per month against an average Poor sanitation and waste disposal systems reduced property values further. Although the residents were 23 Karachi is the capital of Pakistan; it is a port city and commercial center of Pakistan. 24 Source: http://www.oppinstitutions.org/athespprogram.htm aware of the problems and knew 25 Land is purchased from a middle man (the land supplier, a resourceful person having links with politicians, government departments, and the private operators) who subdivides government and some private land and sells it to the poor; in the process, the consequences of poor paying bribes of cash and choice plots to the government functionaries. People build their houses incrementally, building component manufacturing yards in the settlement provide building materials and components on credit. Initially the land supplier arranges the environmental sanitation on their health supply of water (through water tankers) and transportation but as the settlement expanded, need for water supply, sewage disposal, schools, and clinics arose. and property, they had limited capacity 26 US$1 = PKR 78 (as of September 30, 2008). Conversion rates are from www.exchange-rates.org/history/PKR/USD/T; all conversions in the text are approximations. to take any action.

29 can be integrated into the existing Box 8: Citizens Tackle Their Problems government planning mechanisms as the scale of the problem is too In Karachi, the capital of Pakistan, there is one low-income neighborhood, large to be tackled without effective Orangi, where a group of citizens has been tackling the problem of sanitation government participation and to also and sewerage systems. ensure government accountability in service provision. The Orangi Pilot Project programs have demonstrated that urban poor Since its inception, the OPP has either communities can finance and manage infrastructure facilities such as directly, or indirectly, assisted about sanitation, sewerage, water supply, solid waste disposal, and so on. It has 1 million people to upgrade their also reinforced the need for local governments to complement the peoples’ sanitation systems. work by providing the required infrastructure such as trunk sewers and treatment plants, water mains and water, colleges or universities, hospitals, Since 1988, following the success of its main solid waste disposals, and landfill sites. The component-sharing models, the OPP has expanded into concept clearly shows that where the government partners with the people, four autonomous institutions. The OPP sustainable development can be managed through local resources. Society is responsible for the allocation of funds to the three other institutions—

It was in this background that Aga Hasan Abidi, President, Bank of Commerce Box 9: Programs Implemented by the Orangi Pilot Project and Credit International Foundation, approached Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, The Orangi Pilot Project implements the following programs: the renowned Pakistani social scientist, to undertake a research project aimed at • A low-cost sanitation program, which enables low-income households understanding and developing viable to construct and maintain modern sanitation (pour-flush latrines in their action plans for ameliorating the own homes and underground sewerage pipelines in the lanes) with their problems of Orangi. Thus was created own funds and under their own management. the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP). • A low-cost housing program upgrades the thalla (block-makers yards) The OPP has been working in Orangi by introducing stronger machine-made concrete blocks, battens, and since 1980. During this time, it has tile roofing, which is cheaper than reinforced concrete. The program developed programs in sanitation, health, also upgrades the skills of local masons by introducing proper housing technology, education, credit, construction techniques. and income generation. The OPP’s • A health and family planning program for illiterate or semi-literate objective is to analyze outstanding low-income women. problems in urban poor settlements and then, through prolonged research, • Credit for small family enterprises. develop viable solutions. The OPP • A school program, which assists in the upgrading of physical and promotes community organization academic standards in private schools. and cooperative action, and provides technical support; thus overcoming most • A women’s work center program, which organizes tailors and of the constraints governments face in other garment workers into family units dealing directly with exports upgrading low-income settlements. The and wholesalers. OPP operates from the premise that the role of nongovernmental organizations • A rural development program, which provides credit and technical and pilot projects in slum upgradation guidelines to support entrepreneurs. programs is to develop strategies that

30 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Orangi Pilot Project, OPP Research of funds and capacity of local bodies to Box 10: Two Levels of a and Training Institute, and Orangi undertake the required infrastructure Modern Sanitation System Charitable Trust. The Secretary of the development work. International loans Society is Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, the were available to finance the ‘Katchi 1. Internal development, founder of the OPP. There are three Abadi Improvement and Regularization which comprises: implementing institutions, each with an Program’, where the cost was to be independent board: the Orangi Pilot recovered from consumers through • Inside the house—sanitary Project Research and Training Institute lease and development charges. latrine. that manages sanitation, housing, and The cost of such a system was • In the lane—underground social forestry programs in Orangi and estimated to be 25 times the actual sewerage line. the replication and associated training cost of labor and materials due to high for all its programs; the Orangi • Secondary or collector overheads. The OPP researchers Charitable Trust that manages the sewerage. rejected solutions based on foreign aid, credit programs; and Karachi Health 2. External development as local residents could not afford and Social Development Association comprising trunk sewer or to repay the large costs involved. that manages the health program. natural nala (open drain) Research also showed that recovery of development, and treatment The Karachi Water and Sewerage money from the poor for development plant. This remains the Board (KWSB) is the government responsibility of the government. projects had been very poor in the agency responsible for sewerage or water infrastructure development and past. But an underground sanitation maintenance in the city. However, system was devised, requiring only skills required for the construction it is able to cater to only 30 percent labor and material cost to be paid for of underground sewerage lines. of the city; the rest is taken care of by Orangi squatters themselves, if they • Sociological barriers: The by other government agencies were involved. construction of the underground and communities.27 Initial inquiries showed that residents lines required a high level of Key Program were aware not only of the sanitation community organization for and drainage problems, but their collective action, which did and Initiative consequences on health and property not exist. as well. However, they were unable to The program strategy involved Highlights take any action due to four barriers: systematically overcoming A Low-Cost Sanitation Program • Psychological barriers: Residents these barriers. believed that it was the responsibility In response to the sanitation and An analysis of the sanitation problem of government agencies to build sewerage crisis, a local foundation— resulted in the identification of four sewerage lines and to provide these the Bank of Commerce and Credit levels of infrastructure—inside the free of charge. International—set up the OPP. The first house, in the lane, secondary or priority of Orangi residents was the • Economic barriers: Households collector drains, and the main drains development of an underground could not afford the cost of and treatment plant. The house owners sewerage system. However, they felt conventional sanitary latrines and were willing to take responsibility for the that this was the responsibility of the underground sewerage. infrastructure inside the house, in the urban local bodies (ULBs) and lane, and for the secondary or collector should be provided free of cost. The • Technical barriers: Although the drains, but were not prepared to be communities were informed about lack people could build their own responsible for the main drains and houses, neither they nor the local treatment plant, which they wanted the

27 Source: http://www.oppinstitutions.org/bevolutionofsp.htm builders possessed the technical local government to shoulder.

31 The OPP developed a low-cost applied to the OPP for assistance. government and international agencies sanitation program, which enabled Following that, the OPP surveyed the have also tried to replicate the OPP low-income households in Orangi lane, prepared plans and estimates and experience by integrating it into their to construct and maintain modern handed this data to the lane manager, planning processes. To respond to sanitation, such as pour-flush latrines in who then collected money from the this demand, the OPP converted these their own homes and underground people. He was also responsible for programs into a Research and Training sewerage pipelines in the lanes, with resolving disputes and supervising Institute for the development of their own funds and under their own construction work. From the outset, squatter settlements. The Institute is management. The OPP simplified while OPP staff assisted with technical currently assisting initiatives in a sanitation designs to make them advice and support to social number of other areas in Pakistan that affordable and technically viable so that organization processes, only those are seeking to replicate the Orangi they could be implemented locally. living in the lane were responsible for low-cost sanitation program. Research into an affordable system managing the finances and overseeing took about a year. Through simplifying the work on the lane sanitation. Key Outcomes design and developing steel molds for Shortly after the work started, the The Orangi Project has been a great sanitary latrines and manholes, the OPP’s area of operation was reduced success because the sanitation system cost was reduced to one-quarter that to half of Orangi and, from 1982 to now reaches more than 90 percent of of contractor rates. The elimination of 1989, the program worked in this small Orangi residents. The key outcomes contractor’s profiteering reduced labor area. After 1989, it was allowed to of the initiative have been: rates by a further one-quarter. operate throughout the settlement. By The cost of the final proposed system 1993, nearly 97 percent of the lanes in • Improved sanitation for was approximately PKR 1,000 the area in which they had been active approximately 900,000 people and (US$13), of which about 50 percent since 1982 had installed lane sanitation 94,122 houses on a self-help basis. was the investment required inside (3,285 lanes in all). In the area in which the house and the remainder for the • Average cost of sewerage system they had begun working since 1989, lane sanitation. laid down through community there was lane sanitation in 1,689 participation is low cost, amounting Once the economic barrier had been lanes, or 57 percent of the total number to approximately PKR 1,000 overcome, OPP social organizers of lanes in this area. (US$13) per household. began talking to households to Between July 1981 and November • The residents of Orangi laid convince them to stop believing in 1993, approximately PKR 57.2 million 1.3 million feet of sewer line and government provision of services. Once (US$700,00) had been invested by invested about PKR 57.2 million households realized that they could local residents on improved sanitation (US$700,000) in the low-cost address both their health problems and and drainage. During the same period, sanitation program. If the state had low value of property for such a small the OPP had spent approximately done this, it would have cost over investment, the psychological barrier PKR 3.8 million (US$48,000) on US$10 million. was also overcome. research and extension, equal to about 7 percent of the total amount invested • Orangi residents maintain the The next step was the creation of by residents. sewerage system themselves at no community organizations. A lane, which cost to the government. in Orangi consists of 20 to 30 houses, Since 1983, community organizations, was made the unit of organization. The activists, and NGOs from other squatter • The initiative has resulted in OPP social organizers developed lane and informal settlements in Karachi and improved environmental sanitation organizations, explaining the program other cities of Pakistan have sought the and reduction in diseases. A survey to the people. Each lane then chose its OPP for help in replicating its low-cost by the Aga Khan Medical University own lane manager, who formally sanitation program. Since 1986, shows that health conditions in

32 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Orangi have improved immensely for the poor. The OPP sanitation guidance. Residents are increasingly and real estate prices have shot up. program is affordable for low-income willing to take on the costs households as they have to pay the and organizational challenge of Lessons Learned cost of labor and materials only. secondary drains. Labor costs come down further if they However, there are problems; drains The OPP has emerged as a viable contribute their labor during are silting up and prone to flooding low-cost sanitation system propelled by construction. Since people organize after rain. Untreated sewerage is community financing and community themselves and collect money drained into the sea, not only from involvement in construction and first, the problem of loan recovery is Orangi but all of Karachi. The OPP management. It helped the people of avoided. The success of OPP has now developed designs for Orangi organize themselves, and learn has proved that the concept of trunk sewers and is lobbying with the about mixing and curing of concrete development through community Karachi Municipal Corporation to get and about the proper manner of participation is the only viable option for them implemented. The residents of making inverts. low-income communities. Orangi cannot possibly develop trunk Thus, OPP reduced costs substantially The intensive training of masons in the sewers and treatment plants. and resulted in major technical technology of sanitary engineering A limitation of this approach has innovations. The high overheads, and the widespread training of lane been the inability to construct excessive profiteering, and kickbacks managers has resulted in an increased external or off-site infrastructure to to government officials in conventional level of skill and a reduced dependence integrate informal settlements into public projects make them unaffordable on the OPP for social and technical city-level networks.

References

• The Drain Gang—Pakistan, March 2000. Accessible at http://www.tve.org/ho/doc.cfm

• The OPP web site, accessible at http://www.oppinstitutions.org/ athespprogram.htm

• www.unescap.org/drpad/vc/conference/bg_pk_5_opp.htm-20k

33 Case Study 6 Kalyani Municipality, Kolkata Metropolitan Area, India Kalyani: No Subsidy Sanitation Leads to Open-Defecation-Free Slums

Context and The Kalyani Municipality is responsible Through this eight-year program (2003– for the provision of civic amenities and 11), approximately £102.1 million has Background facilities in the city. The municipality been made available for slum improve- (City, Urban covers an area of 219 square ment and development in the area. kilometers, which it manages through Poor, and 14 administrative wards. The program is being implemented by the Municipal Affairs Department, Service Provider) The Kolkata Urban Services for the Government of West Bengal, Poor (KUSP), an innovative program with the strategic overview of Kalyani, a municipality located at the aimed at improving the quality of life of the Kolkata Metropolitan northern tip of the Kolkata Metropolitan the urban poor, has been in operation Planning Committee. Area (KMA), has a population of in the KMA since 2004. Funded by approximately 100,000.28 It is estimated the Department for International Other stakeholders include State Urban that 40 percent29 of the city’s Development (DfID), the KUSP aims at Development Agency, Director of population lives in slums. The city’s facilitating pro-poor urban development Local Bodies, Municipal Engineering 52 slums are located mostly on by encouraging reforms and capacity Directorate and Institute of Local government land with limited access building in urban local bodies (ULBs) Government and Urban Studies. to basic services and facilities. and development of infrastructure A separate organizational entity known at the community, town and inter- as the Change Management Unit has municipal level. The initiative covers all been set up under the Municipal 28 The city had a population of 82,000 as per the 2001 Census. 40 ULBs in the KMA (except the Affairs Department to oversee 29 Approximately 11,000 households; a majority of the slum dwellers are refugees from Bangladesh. Kolkata Municipal Corporation). program implementation.

34 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Key Program adequate sanitation facilities. The aim of the awareness sessions was Developing a sanitation solution to highlight the direct and indirect and Initiative through community participation was impact of improved sanitation on conceived as the first activity. The health, livelihoods, and overall quality Highlights program was initiated in February 2006 of life. While the community was given and its primary objective was to put an the right to decide how the toilets Since the early 2000s, approximately end to open defecation and improve would be built, there were three Rs 4 crore (US$800,000) was spent health status in slums by facilitating overriding criteria—feces should not be under various programs for providing slum households to construct toilets seen, there should be no foul smell sanitation facilities in Kalyani slums. within their dwelling unit. Though there coming from the toilet, and no animals Unfortunately, these programs had limited impact as the project design were funds available through the DfID- or pests should be able to reach the and construction phase largely sponsored KUSP for toilet construction, feces. Community participation in toilet excluded the target communities. Many the municipality unanimously decided design and construction stage was of the toilets that were constructed not to use these funds but to mobilize achieved by developing natural leaders were being used as storehouses. Slum the community’s financial resources for from within the slum communities families, especially men, continued to building toilets. This decision by the who were leading the community defecate in the open. Simultaneously, municipality’s management was based engagement processes. the KUSP program continued to search on an understanding that when To bring down the cost of toilet for solutions to address inadequate sanitation hardware (toilets, sewerage construction, the municipality bought sanitation and poor hygiene practices. infrastructure) is provided without 500 squatter pans from Pune at the It was in this background that a need adequate community involvement rate of Rs 150 (US$3.2) each. was felt for devising a new approach in planning and financing, open However, it was found that most slum to address the sanitation, health, defecation persists. The need for households wanted better quality toilets and hygiene needs of urban poor awareness generation on the impact of and some even purchased costly communities in Kalyani. improved sanitation on health, hygiene, ceramic pans priced at approximately and livelihoods for creating open- Kalyani was selected for a pilot initiative Rs 4,000 (US$87). In general, defecation-free (ODF) communities was for community-led health and households spent between Rs 250 also recognized. While there was no sanitation. The municipality took (US$5) to Rs 5,000 (US$109) on toilet on board experts to develop a subsidy available for sanitation construction. The poorest of the poor comprehensive sanitation program infrastructure (that is, the cost of also paid for toilet construction and focusing on health and hygiene toilet construction was borne by the only a very few (three or four families) promotion along with creation of household), once the slum was certified received financial assistance. sanitation hardware. These included open-defecation-free it became This highlighted that urban poor Kamal Kar, a consultant who had been eligible for grant assistance for other communities are willing to pay for involved in similar community-led community development works (for improved sanitation once they are sanitation initiatives, and Dr. Goswami, example, solar-powered street lighting, aware of the long-term savings on health and community mobilization roads, and so on). specialist, KUSP. Dr. Shantanu Jha, health and the potential of earning chairman, Kalyani Municipality, While the program was to cover all more due to lesser man-days lost due spearheaded the brainstorming and slums in Kalyani, their prioritization to illness. planning sessions and the Community- for inclusion in the program was done Program Strategies Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) program by the municipality. The work in the was conceived. community was initiated with a Awareness on health impacts of community mobilization drive to spread improved sanitation: The municipal Program Objectives awareness about the program. This council’s health officer and the natural The CLTS program was aimed at was followed by awareness sessions leaders within the communities were helping slum communities to access facilitated by municipal health experts. entrusted with the role of generating

35 awareness among communities about slums. The pilot phase of the project • Modernizing ward offices to serve the direct and indirect benefits of was initiated in February 2006 and as a one-point contact for improved sanitation. The awareness lasted one year. The first slums customers for seeking information sessions highlighted that individual targeted were Bidyasagar Colony and on services, grievance redressal, toilets would translate into reduced Bhutte Bazaar. The first attempt to payment of taxes, and user expenditure on health, better health cover Bhutte Bazaar failed as some charges. Recently, a kiosk with status, and higher potential for earning local leaders instigated community a touchscreen computer has more due to lesser man-days lost. The members not to participate in the CLTS been installed for the convenience willingness of households to pay for program, citing the existence of other of consumers. improved sanitation facilities increased subsidy-based schemes for provision following awareness sessions. of sanitation. The first slum to be • Preparing a citizen’s charter declared ODF was Bidyasagar Colony articulating the standards for Community participation: CLTS rests and it qualified for other community service provision and redressal on the foundation of ‘natural leaders’ that development assistance after achieving of grievances. emerged from within the community. The this status. The slum was provided with municipal health officer, councilors, and two solar lamps for street lighting. At • Introducing a phone-in grievance Community Development Society present, of the 52 slums in the city, redressal system. leaders were instrumental in identifying 44 have been declared ODF where ‘natural leaders’. Once the ‘natural communities have stopped open • Establishing partnerships with leaders’ emerged, they took the lead defecation after constructing their NGOs and civil society organizations role in galvanizing the community, own toilets. By the middle of 2008, all (CSOs) to address the needs of triggering off the action within the slums in Kalyani had been covered by urban poor communities and community, and enabling engagement in this scheme. citywide environmental issues. design and planning sessions. These As a result of this program, Kalyani has ‘natural leaders’ became the focal point been awarded the Environment • Ensuring greater transparency of of the community mobilization effort. Excellence award and ‘Clean and municipal activities through the Creating incentives for ODF slums: Attractive City’ award for the last two publication of a quarterly newsletter, The municipality’s chairman has years consecutively. which has an approximate institutionalized a system for recognizing There exists great potential for scaling circulation of 10,000 households. and rewarding all wards that achieve up this approach in other municipalities The municipality’s discussions and ODF status. A chart showing all through the Government of India’s decisionmaking processes are also municipal wards along with photographs Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban filmed to guarantee transparency. of their municipal councilors, and cards Renewal Mission30 subprogram on denoting their status with respect to Basic Services for the Urban Poor. Key Outcomes achieving ODF status, is displayed in the Other Consumer-Friendly municipality’s board room. A green card How the poor benefited: The CLTS Initiatives of the Municipality means all slums in that ward are ODF, a program has resulted in 44 slums being yellow card means some slums are free The municipality has also introduced declared ODF, and all slum households from open defecation, and a red card several reforms and consumer-friendly in Kalyani now have access to means no slums are ODF. This reward initiatives in the last decade, including: individual sanitation facilities. and recognition system was put in place to create incentives for ODF slums. The program has also resulted in 30 The Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), several health benefits, including a Program Evolution—From GoI’s flagship program for urban development, is aimed at encouraging reforms at the level of urban local bodies reduction in the incidence of water- Pilot to Citywide Plans (ULBs), parastatal agencies, and the state government. The thrust of the mission is on fast track planned development of borne diseases, reduction in the the identified 63 cities and for ensuring improvement in urban The municipality introduced CLTS as a governance and service delivery so that ULBs become number of cases of gastroenteritis, financially sound and sustainable for undertaking pilot project covering five selected development initiatives. stomach ailments, and worm

36 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

infestations, along with a control in the Lessons Learned Constraints spread of polio. • The main constraint to community Enabling Factors Other benefits have been improved investment in infrastructure is the hygiene practices among target • The donor-funded KUSP, aimed at lack of security of land tenure and communities; improved environmental improving the quality of life of the fear of eviction. sanitation situation in slums, increased urban poor in the metropolitan area, earnings due to lesser man-days lost had limited success with subsidy- • The presence of subsidy- or due to illness, and improved quality based sanitation and looked for grant-based sanitation programs of life. other alternatives. Other programs undermines the community- aimed at providing sanitation financed CLTS program. The initiative has served as a starting facilities to poor communities in Learning from the Project point for greater community-led Kalyani failed to have much of an activities. The program has resulted in impact. This triggered the need for • Community financing for creation communities becoming empowered developing a new approach to of sanitation hardware is a viable and confident to take the initiative in address the sanitation needs of option for creating ODF solving their own problems. CLTS urban poor communities. proved an effective entry point activity communities and cities. whereby the slum communities were • The presence of a champion in the • The poor are willing to pay for motivated to analyze existing sanitation form of the municipal chairman. improved sanitation services. practices using participatory tools The chairman, who has held this position for the last 11 years, has In Kalyani, slum families have and techniques. been instrumental in introducing invested between Rs 250 (US$5) The poor in the slums have progressed reforms aimed at good governance, to Rs 5,000 (US$109) for from the initial activity and are taking and policies and programs aimed at toilet construction. more interest and initiative in improving ensuring service delivery to urban • A program aimed at improving their living environment. poor communities. access of urban poor communities to sanitation must, along with Box 11: Achieving Open-Defecation-Free Status creation of sanitation hardware (toilets, sewerage), have adequate inputs for generating awareness on Bidyasagar Colony slum was the first slum to be covered by the the benefits of improved sanitation Community-Led Total Sanitation program. Of 213 households, only 13 had and hygiene on health. access to toilets. The majority of the families were living below the poverty line even when both parents were working. Community representatives used • In order to proactively involve key poems and songs to motivate and inspire families to work towards improved stakeholders such as municipal sanitation and hygiene. A map of the slum was drawn and put on display councilors, innovative schemes of to show households with and without their own toilets. Following the recognition or rewards can be Community-Led Total Sanitation program, all families have individual toilets. institutionalized as incentives for facilitating ODF communities. On an average, each family spent between Rs 250 (US$5) to Rs 4,000 (US$87) on toilet construction. The time frame to becoming open-defecation- The card system developed free was just four months—this was successfully achieved due to significant by the municipal chairman in peer pressure and heightened awareness among families about the benefits Kalyani, for instance, has been of improved sanitation. A reward for achieving open-defecation-free status effective in creating incentives was the installation of solar-powered street lighting in the settlement. for ward councilors to create ODF communities.

37 • Service delivery reform at the • Once the community recognizes health, hygiene, and livelihood level of the service provider its capacity to solve its own conditions. It also has increased or municipality can ensure health problems, people become ability and readiness to improved service delivery for motivated and empowered to communicate with government the urban poor. take initiatives to improve their agencies and service providers.

Sources

• Sharma, G., and A. McIntosh. 2007. An unpublished case study on ‘No Subsidy Sanitation Leading to Open-Defecation-Free Slums in Kalyani Municipality’.

38 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 7

Tiruchirapalli, India Community-Managed Toilets: Solving Sanitation Problems of Urban Poor Communities

75 unapproved) in which reside Community toilets: The city has 359 Context and approximately 162,000 people, community toilet units with 3,146 Background accounting for 22 percent of the city’s seats.31 While 20 of these are public population. Like other urban local toilets located in commercial areas, (City and governments, the Municipal the rest are located in or around slum Service Corporation provides basic services communities. All the public toilets are only to recognized slums and leaves pay and use in nature and are being managed by the Municipal Corporation Provider) the unapproved slums outside its or private sector. service coverage. It is estimated that Tiruchirapalli, popularly known as approximately 92 percent of the Most community toilets have been Trichy, is the second-largest city in recognized slums have access to constructed by the Municipal Tamil Nadu (a state in southern India), the water supply by the Municipal Corporation. All community toilets were after Chennai. As per the 2001 Census, Corporation, through household previously managed by the Municipal the city’s population is 752,000. The connections or standposts. A majority Corporation, but in recent years the Tiruchirapalli City Corporation (TCC) of the slum communities lack sanitation local government has been handing estimates that the city has 286 slums facilities and people are forced to

(211 recognized or approved, and defecate in the open. 31 TCC, 2006.

39 Table 4: Comparative Analysis The Municipal Corporation has been supportive of the concept of Pay and use Free Total community-managed toilets for three Public 20 (12 managed by the private 0 20 main reasons: sector, eight by the Tiruchirapalli City Corporation) • To improve the management of community toilets and provide Community 167 (community managed) 172 (managed by 339 the Tiruchirapalli better service. City Corporation) • To reduce costs: Municipal Total 187 172 359 Corporation staff was previously required to clean the toilets. Toilets were, however, free to use and over the management of toilets to Key Program communities either directly or with hence made a loss. support from nongovernmental Details and • To provide services with less organizations. At present, Municipal Corporation staff: 167 community toilets are managed by Highlights A ban has been introduced on communities and 172 by the Municipal Trigger for the Initiative recruiting more sanitary workers Corporation. While the community- by the state. managed toilets are pay and use, the Until 2000, all community toilets were Municipal Corporation-managed ones managed by the Municipal Corporation. Community-Managed are free. The Municipal Corporation Due to poor maintenance, most toilets Toilet Model (Supported by plans to hand over more toilets to were dilapidated and defunct. In 2000, WAVE and Gramalaya) communities for management. a group of NGOs, supported by Gramalaya supports communities to WaterAid, began working with Box 12: Integrated renovate and take over management of communities to renovate and take over Sanitary Complexes community toilets.32 In a few cases the management of these toilets. Gramalaya has also supported Following the success of this initiative, The Tiruchirapalli City Corporation communities to build eight completely has 66 integrated sanitary the Municipal Corporation began new toilets. These toilets have been complexes, with separate toilet handing over responsibility of toilet built on sites of abandoned toilets and seats for men, women, and children, management to communities, directly have separate facilities for men and and facilities for bathing and or through NGOs. At present, around women, are children- and disabled- washing clothes. These have been half of the community toilets in the city friendly and have facilities for hygienic constructed under the World Bank- are being managed by communities. disposal of menstruation clothes. supported Tamil Nadu Urban Development Program 2. The first Community Toilets’ Gramalaya begins by establishing such complex was constructed in Management Models self-help groups in a community, Rajiv Gandhi Nagar, Tiruchirapalli, in usually two to seven groups with There are three management models of June 2001. The Corporation plans 15 to 20 members each. All the group to construct more integrated community toilets in the city, including members are also members of a SHE sanitary complexes under the management by (a) the TCC; team, of whom two are chosen as forthcoming Tamil Nadu Urban (b) Sanitation and Hygiene Education team leaders who operate the bank Development Program 3. The (SHE) teams supported by Women’s account jointly and represent the team management of all such complexes Action for Village Empowerment has been handed over to (WAVE) and the NGO Gramalaya; and nongovernmental organizations (c) Self-help groups and individuals 32 Till 2006, Gramalaya has supported 41 community and communities. toilet complexes and supported another 75 in the fiscal (with the support of NGOs). year 2006–07.

40 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Box 13: Community Toilet Model Box 15: Gramalaya: (Managed by Tiruchirapalli City Corporation) Working for Poor People

The Tiruchirapalli City Corporation still manages 172 community toilets Gramalaya was established in without community involvement. These toilets are free to use. The entire 1987 by a group of committed operation and maintenance cost—staff salaries, cleaning costs and electricity youth working in the field of rural bills—is borne by the Corporation. A sanitary worker (Corporation staff), is development. The original goal assigned to clean the toilet twice a day. The Corporation spends about of Gramalaya was to work for Rs 0.95 million (US$20,000) every year on cleaning materials. Each toilet is the amelioration of socially provided with a borewell, fitted with a pump, which is operated either by the downtrodden people under an TCC sanitary worker or a nearby resident. The ward councilor keeps a close integrated rural development watch on the working of these units and attends to major problems and approach. Since 1987, requests support from the Corporation, whenever needed. Gramalaya has been operating various rural development programs. In 1999, Gramalaya extended its area of operation Box 14: Community Toilet Model to slum communities of the (Managed by Communities Outside the Tiruchirapalli City Corporation. Women’s Action for Village Empowerment Federation) Health and hygiene education, The Tiruchirapalli City Corporation has handed over the management of the promotion of self-help 126 community toilets to communities not yet part of the Women’s Action groups among rural and urban for Village Empowerment federation by giving responsibility to a women, as well as construction nongovernmental organization, a self-help group or an individual. These of low-cost housing and toilets are run on a pay and use system, although the token system is not toilets are the prime activities followed and records of accounts are not maintained, which often leads of Gramalaya. to community disputes. The user fee is the same as that in Gramalaya- supported toilets, although users often do not pay. In many cases, NGOs are inexperienced and are unable to play an active role in supporting communities to manage the toilets and promoting health improvements. The appointment of caretakers by local politicians has been reported as a groups present details of income and major barrier to real community management. expenditure during the previous month, and members discuss management issues. When there is a major expenditure and the SHE team does at the WAVE federation. On an average, book. Most SHE teams employ two not have adequate reserves, it takes half the households in a community are cleaners (a woman for cleaning the a loan from the WAVE federation. members of self-help groups; half the women’s seats and a man for men’s The surplus funds are used for health- community is hence directly involved in seats) and a watchwoman for or sanitation-related activities in the management of the toilet. Each protecting the facility and operating the the community. self-help team takes responsibility for water pump. Each self-help group managing the toilet for a month on a managing the toilet deposits the The SHE team is responsible for fixing rotation basis. During that month, each income of the month in the bank user fees. In most toilets these are set member of the group acts as caretaker account and hands it over to the next at, for adults, Re 0.50 (US$0.01) for for a day, responsible for collecting user group meeting. In the monthly SHE defecation and Rs 2 to 3 (US$0.04– fees and maintaining the accounts team meetings, various self-help 0.06) for bathing and clothes’ washing.

41 Urination and use by children, elderly, Box 16: WAVE: Managing Community Toilets and single women is free. In some toilets where the community is WAVE (Women’s Action for Village Empowerment) is a federation of the reluctant to pay for each use, a 53 Sanitation and Hygiene Education (SHE) teams in Tiruchirapalli. The monthly card system is followed and the rates set at lower levels— federation is headed by a president, who is assisted by a secretary and between Rs 15 (US$0.32) to Rs 30 treasurer; there are 12 executive committee members. WAVE meets twice a (US$0.65) per family per month. month and discusses matters relating to problems faced by SHE teams and Charges for toilet use of Rs 30 their solutions. WAVE guides these teams in the maintenance of community (US$0.65) to Rs 60 (US$1.30) per toilets and assists other self-help groups to take over toilet maintenance of month constitute between 1–4 percent of the average household community toilets. monthly income33 and communities found them affordable.

Box 17: Technical Innovations: Community Toilet with Decentralized Wastewater Treatment

The Decentralized Wastewater Treatment System (DEWATS) is an innovative technological option for the treatment of sewage in areas where there are no treatment systems or underground drainage. DEWATS is an on-site wastewater treatment system that requires low organization, is environment friendly, and has low maintenance cost (it works on the principle of gravity flow and thus there are no electricity costs).

BORDA, a Germany-based organization, has partnered with a nongovernmental organization, Exnora International, for setting up the first DEWATS-linked community toilet in East Devadanam, Tiruchirapalli. The DEWATS module includes a biogas digester and anaerobic baffle reactor, which act as the primary treatment system, followed by an aerobic planted gravel filter and collection tank, which acts as the secondary treatment system. The wastewater from the men’s and women’s toilet flows into the biogas settler through underground pipelines. The primary treatment system is treated with cow dung slurry for micro-organisms during the commissioning of the plant. The gas production takes place after a digestion period of 30 to 90 days. The biogas is used in the community canteen. The digested slurry along with the sludge flows into the anaerobic baffle reactor where the sludge settles down due to gravitational flow in a series of chambers. The clarified wastewater is further treated in the planted gravel filter, where plants such as Cana Indica and common reeds absorb the nutrients present in the wastewater and the aerobic bacterial inoculums present in the planted gravel filter bed further digests the sludge, if any. The wastewater produced is clear with no odor and can be let out into any water body. The treated water has a biochemical oxygen demand value of less than 30 mg/liter, which is the standard set by the Bureau of Indian Standards for safe discharge of wastewater into any water body.

In East Devadanam, the DEWATS is designed to treat 9 cubic meters of wastewater per day and the gas produced from the biogas digester is utilized for the lighting of the child-friendly toilet and for cooking and heating purposes. The treated wastewater is used for irrigation in the nearby organic vegetable garden maintained by various self-help groups that is a source of income for these groups. The entire operation and maintenance is carried out by the Sanitation and Hygiene Education team.

33Ranging between Rs 1,500–3,000 (US$32–64).

42 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Key Outcomes community needs. Women now know supply, wastewater, sewage, and how to maintain accounts, records, solid waste management in all The community-managed toilet model and operate a bank account. They community toilets is a concrete step demonstrates how urban poor negotiate with bank managers that city authorities need to take to communities can be made and develop proposals for their maintain hygiene standards and open-defecation-free. From the entrepreneurial plans. Community- financial viability. Municipal Corporation’s perspective, managed toilets have created Why is community participation one of the major benefits has been a employment opportunities for self-help and management a better option reduction in costs earlier incurred group members as caretakers and for than contracting out of urban paying for salaries, electricity, and community members as cleaners, night social infrastructure? cleaning materials. guards, and sweepers. • Community participation alone For slum communities, the primary Lessons Learned can guarantee low-cost, benefit of community-managed toilet well-designed, and user-friendly complexes has been access to clean and Challenges urban slum infrastructure. and safe sanitation facilities that has The community-managed toilet model also ensured a clean living environment. • Community management alone can in Tiruchirapalli has shown that A proud sense of cleanliness and sustain capital infrastructure through achieving ODF status, or clean and well-being is commonly observed timely operations and management, healthy slums, does not require huge among communities. Access to clean by relying on members and users financial investment. What it does toilets has resulted in a decrease of as participants in this effort and not require is a local government sensitive water-borne and water-washed simply as clients for a business to the problems of slum communities diseases. A study conducted by opportunity. Institutionalizing and supportive of community action. WaterAid34 in 2001, covering eight community participation requires the It has been proved that communities communities, found that the incidence support and involvement of local can manage their own toilet units and of diarrhea had reduced from 73 to NGOs and the federation of when they do this, the toilets are much 10 percent and other diseases such individual slums’ managers into a cleaner. It has shown that managing as malaria, typhoid, skin, and worm citywide federation to become toilets leads to women’s empowerment infections had also significantly effective and engage with the with many positive impacts in reduced. The study also showed an municipality or utilities as equals. terms of personal and community 88 percent reduction in household development. This experience shows medical expenditure. • Community-managed infrastructure that after initial reluctance, communities can provide not only sanitation For the women of these communities do pay for using toilets, bathing, and facilities but can also be upgraded the process has been empowering. washing facilities. for bathing and washing facilities Women have been transformed from at affordable costs for the poorest The financial sustainability of homemakers to change agents. urban slum dwellers. community toilets is dependent upon They are using their newfound the number of users and smaller toilets The community-managed toilets self-confidence, leadership skills, and do require support for them to be supported by Gramalaya in access to government machinery to financially viable. Community Tiruchirapalli have been operational for address issues beyond sanitation for management of toilets saves six years now. All are in use, many are larger community development. Municipal Corporation money, and the well managed and communities are Women are managing the finances of public benefits resulting from ODF being declared ODF. However, a the toilet complexes along with credit communities make a strong case for number of challenges are emerging not just for family but also for the Municipal Corporation to financially both to the sustainability of the toilets support these initiatives. Further, and to further scaling up of this 34 Source: WaterAid and Gramalaya, 2001. ensuring sufficient and affordable water approach throughout the city.

43 Political Challenges • Inadequate processes for the Managing resistance from sweeper Municipal Corporation to monitor communities, whose livelihood • Political interference in the growing number of community- opportunities are being threatened appointment of caretakers in managed toilet complexes. by community-managed complexes. Municipal Corporation-managed community toilets. Technological Challenges Financial Challenges

• Local politicians pressurizing • Introducing innovative and • High household connection fee Municipal Corporation officers energy-efficient technology in for water and sewerage not to transfer free to use community-managed toilet (Rs 9,000 or US$196) is toilets to pay and use community- complexes to save costs. preventing people in the slum managed toilets. communities from getting an • Managing sewage and improving • Providing sanitation services to individual household toilet. the open drainage system people living in unapproved throughout the city to maximize • Transferring responsibility for slum communities. health outcomes. sweeping streets around toilets Administrative Challenges from Municipal Corporation to • Shifting of focus from open- SHE teams. • Delays in the Municipal defecation-free areas to totally Corporation’s decisionmaking sanitized areas, which would involve • Financial viability of slum process and frequent change tackling problems of solid waste community complexes with less of officials. management and wastewater. than 500 users per month.

References

• Gramalaya and WaterAid India. February 2007. Tiruchirapalli Shows the Way: Community-Municipality-NGO Partnership for Citywide Pro-Poor Slums Infrastructure Improvement. Policy paper.

44 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 8

Hyderabad, India The Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board: Organizational Reform for Improved Service Delivery

Context and Table 5 : Hyderabad at a Glance

Background City Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India (City and Total population 3.45 million (2001 Census) Service Provider) Slum population 1.7 million people (49 percent) (% of total population) Hyderabad,35 the capital of Andhra Service provider and status HMWSSB, semi-autonomous service provider Pradesh (a state in Southern India), has 36 a population of more than 4 million. rate has increased to 5.6 percent a It is India’s seventh-largest city and one year. It is expected that, by 2020, the of its fastest growing—over the last two city’s population will reach 11 million. decades, the city’s population has 35 The designation ‘Hyderabad’ is used to refer to the adjoining cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad, located expanded at an average rate of over Hyderabad is severely water- on opposite banks of the Musi River. 36 According to the 2001 Census of India, the population 3 percent a year; more recently, this constrained as regional agricultural of Hyderabad was 3,449,878.

45 water (including planning, design, Box 18: Customer-Focused Service Delivery Reforms construction, maintenance, operation and management of water supply The Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board undertook system) and sewerage, sewerage a series of customer-focused service delivery reforms at the end of the disposal and sewerage treatment 1990s. These included setting up the Metro Customer Care, a grievance works (including planning, design, redressal mechanism; Single Window Cell for new connection services; and construction, maintenance, operation a Citizen’s Charter outlining the Board’s service delivery and obligations. and management of all sewerage and sewerage treatment works) in the The case demonstrates how a semi-autonomous service provider can Hyderabad metropolitan area. undertake organizational change and achieve sustained improvements in Following the setting up of the Water service delivery performance for all its customers. Such improvements have Board, the World Bank approved a the potential of translating into better services for poor communities. The US$89 million loan to implement Hyderabad Water Board’s experience demonstrates how the interplay of the Hyderabad Water Supply and 43 enabling external, organizational, and individual factors can drive improved Sanitation Project (HWSSP). This project was implemented over a service delivery reform. period of eight years and is believed to have played an important role in supporting a range of organizational interests exert control over a substantial established in 1989 as a response to reforms. However, attempts to proportion of the area’s surface water the crisis in water and sewerage improve service delivery were resources. Hyderabad’s residents suffer services of the Municipal Corporation undermined due to weak supervision from lack of adequate water and of Hyderabad (MCH). A prolonged from senior managers, poor sanitation services, but the most drought (1983–85), rapid increase information management, seriously impacted are the city’s 1.7 in the city’s population, and an and resistance to change among million slum dwellers. Water supply and antiquated water supply and sewerage complacent middle-level and sanitation lines (trunk mains) extend to network suffering from persistent 37 frontline staff. roughly half of the city’s slums. Slum underinvestment had resulted in an 38 households rely on public standposts, abysmal level and quality of services Factors including the appointment of borewells, or the water board’s provided by the MCH. The state a new managing director toward the tankers39 for water supply. It is government was further forced to set end of 1997 and the unexpected turn estimated that an investment of Rs 540 up the semi-autonomous body to tap of events at the international level in million–1 billion (US$11–21 million) is finance available from the World Bank41 1998 (when the Indian Government required to extend services to the city’s for much-needed improvements in conducted a nuclear test that led to unserved slum communities.40 water supply and sewerage both the World Bank and the The Hyderabad Metro Water Supply infrastructure. The Water Board42 is International Monetary Fund and Sewerage Board (HMWSSB) was responsible for the supply of potable suspending their ongoing programs

37 Principally the result of a project funded by the British Overseas Development Authority. 38 The more than 6,600 public standposts providing access to water in slums are at a risk of being phased out as each standpost, which supplies water free of charge to residents, is a loss-making venture for a Board scrambling to improve its financial position. 39 Tankers provide approximately 40 liters per capita per day free of charge to slum dwellers lacking network infrastructure. 40 Source: A paper by Professor Jennifer Davis and Sunil Tanka, Massachusetts Institute of Technology for Henry Lee, Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government. Available online at http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Urban-Studies-and-Planning/11-479Spring-2005/3AFFDD6C-7096-4CC8-85ED-89839F8BAC15/0/ pm2background.pdf 41 The World Bank encouraged this decentralization of service delivery through attaching it as a preloan condition for Bank-funded water supply and sanitation infrastructure loans. 42 As per the provisions of Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1989 (Act No. 15 of 1989). 43 The project had six components covering (a) increasing bulk water supply; (b) rehabilitation and strengthening of the existing water system; (c) rehabilitation and strengthening of the existing sewerage system plus treatment works; (d) household latrine program; (e) resettlement and rehabilitation of people displaced by the Singur dam and reservoir; and (f) institutional strengthening.

46 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

and withdrawing from India and numbers and a diversity of citizens who of his complaint. MCC operators Pakistan),44 created a window of participated; the directness of citizen forward the complaint by placing opportunity for senior managers to grievances; and the gratitude shown by a call to section managers based implement a series of bold service citizens towards staff in undertaking in the neighborhood from where the delivery reforms in late 1990s. this process of engaging with them. complaint has originated. Once This process is believed to have addressed, section staff is required The Water Board does make network facilitated the creation of a conducive to call the customer care operators connections affordable for poor environment for service delivery to clear complaints from their households by participating in some reforms. The campaign resulted in complaints database. Government of India schemes such greater willingness among staff, as the National Slum Development An important innovation of the MCC especially senior and middle-level Program.45 Between 1992–1998, the has been the establishment of an online managers, to do something about the Board also undertook a large low-cost computer-based program, called the citizens’ problems and grievances. sanitation initiative that involved building Complaints Redressal Efficiency (CRE), over 20,000 twin-pit pour-flush latrines Following the campaign there was to monitor section staff performance. in outlying slum neighborhoods as part considerable pressure from citizens, This program calculates the percentage of the HWSSP. politicians, and the media to respond to of complaints that are redressed within citizen concerns and improve service the service norms outlined in the Key Program delivery. These public expectations Water Board’s Citizen’s Charter. This for change, combined with support tool has transformed the supervisory Highlights for service delivery reform among role of senior managers as they now managers, led to the implementation have accurate quantitative performance Precursor to Service of three innovative service- data with which they can hold section Delivery Reform: Customer focused reforms. managers accountable for complaints Meets Campaign service delivery performance (low Service Delivery Reforms The catalyst for service delivery reforms CRE percent). in the Water Board was an initiative The Water Board introduced three The Single Window Cell (SWC): This called the Customer Meets campaign, innovative service-focused reforms in initiative was aimed at reforming new undertaken over a two-week period in the late 1990s, that is, (a) Metro connection services. It was established November 1998. The aim of the Customer Care; (b) Single Window Cell in April 1999 as a dedicated office campaign was ‘to mold board system; and (c) a Citizen’s Charter. employees to dedicate themselves to based at the Water Board’s head office customer care’. It was achieved Metro Customer Care (MCC): This to receive, process, and coordinate all through face-to-face meetings between was launched in February 1999 to new water and sewerage connection senior managers and citizens in order address citizen concerns articulated applications. Prior to this reform, citizen to learn about the consumer’s service during the Customer Meets’ campaign applications for permission to connect needs and concerns. regarding section managed complaints to the water or sewerage network were submitted at section offices where they In attending these meetings senior services. It is a dedicated office, were processed and approved by managers were confronted with large operational 24 hours at the Water Board’s head office to receive and section managers before being sent to subdivision and division managers for 44 In 1998, when the Andhra Pradesh State Government and coordinate the response to complaints the Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board were additional approval. Once approved, on the verge of securing a US$300 million loan from the World lodged by citizens. A specially Bank to undertake a second water and sanitation infrastructure citizens had to hire private plumbers, and service delivery improvement project in Hyderabad, the designated toll-free telephone number Indian Government’s decision to conduct a nuclear test in May who often had close ties with section 1998 placed this project on an indefinite hold. Both the World is available for lodging complaints. Bank and the International Monetary Fund suspended their staff, to physically make a new ongoing programs and withdrew from India and Pakistan. 45 The program provides a federal subsidy of 50 percent of the When a customer registers a complaint connection. Four months after connection charge (approximately US$115) for households in the city’s approximately 800 designated slum neighborhoods. he is issued a complaint token number establishing the SWC, the Green The charge can also be paid in installments over a five-month period without interest. through which he can track the redress Brigade—a dedicated team of

47 26 Water Board staff and private sector contract—was established to physically Box 19: Metro Customer Care: Has It Really Improved Service connect all approved new connection Performance for Slum Residents? applications for which payment had been received. While roughly a third of the Water Board’s customers reside in slum neighborhoods, fewer than 10 percent of calls to Metro Customer Care (MCC) Citizen’s Charter: The Citizen’s are made by slum residents. This can be attributed to lack of access to Charter, launched on January 26, 2000, telephones, little experience of lodging telephone complaints, and usually no outlines measurable service delivery experience with the automated touch-tone systems like the one used by MCC. norms for a range of services provided While the call to the service can be made free of charge from any commercial by the Water Board. The publication of telephone booth, booth attendants refuse to place calls without payment. Slum the Charter was a landmark as it residents thus usually continue to file complaints in person at the section publicly acknowledged the Water offices. Section office managers are faced with strong incentives to give priority Board’s commitment to improving to complaints submitted through the telephone hotline. While the section service delivery. managers have been instructed to use the hotline to phone in any complaints The Citizen’s Charter clearly articulates they receive from customers who lodge their complaints in person at their the performance standards for each offices, they have no incentive to log such complaints as the monthly ‘efficiency service provided by the Board. It ratings’ by which their performance is evaluated are calculated using only data provides details of the processes and from hotline complaints. time period for accessing different Source: A paper by Professor Jennifer Davis and Sunil Tanka, Massachusetts services provided by the Water Board, Institute of Technology for Henry Lee, Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy for example, release of new water School of Government. Available online at http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/ supply and sewerage connections,46 Urban-Studies-and-Planning/11-479Spring-2005/3AFFDD6C-7096-4CC8- water supply standards,47 billing 85ED-89839F8BAC15/0/pm2background.pdf services, and complaints procedures and guarantees. It also outlines customer obligations. or solicit bribes. The simplified more accessible, and 44 percent felt it Key Outcomes procedures have ensured easy access to be more polite and respectful. for consumers to the new service. A The MCC reform has improved Some key outcomes of these majority (96 percent) of MCC users initiatives are:48 surveyed found procedures easy complaints service delivery for citizens to follow. across all income groups throughout Metro Customer Care: The setting up the city. Since the MCC was of the MCC has ensured standardized The customers who engaged with the established, all complaints registered procedures for seeking redressal of new service have perceived significant through the system are now being grievances for customers of the Water changes in staff behavior. MCC users addressed, as opposed to past Board. Prior to the formation of the ranked the service to be better on practice where it was common for MCC, section staff intentionally accessibility, politeness, and respect complaints never to be addressed. The complicated complaint procedures as than what was in place earlier. average time taken for complaints to be this provided an opportunity to either However, only 19 percent of slum redressed is 4.8 days for MCC users defer responsibility to private plumbers residents reported that the service was and 6.8 days for customers from slum settlements. Higher levels of customer 46 Process for issue of application forms; process and time limits prescribed for acceptance of filled in application forms; process and satisfaction were recorded among timings for payment of fees; and process of release of water supply connection and sewerage connection. 47 Including details about water supply timings, standards for water supply; quality standards, and so on. 48 Research findings derived from Caseley, Jonathan. December 2003. Blocked Drains and Open Minds: Multiple Accountability customers from slum settlements than Relationships and Improved Service Delivery Performance in an Indian City. IDS Working Paper 211. The study surveyed an equal 49 number of households (80) from Metro Customer Care users (that is, from middle- and among MCC users, and this can be high-income localities) and direct customers (that is, from urban poor settlements). 49 Forty-seven percent of customers from slum settlements and 29 percent of Metro Customer Care (MCC) users thought MCC was a attributed to the reduction in time taken good service. Forty-seven percent of customers from slum settlements and 45 percent of MCC users stated they had a good response from MCC to their complaint. for complaint redressal ever since the

48 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

MCC was established. This provides Active citizen engagement has been mechanisms such as the Customer convincing evidence that this reform the key to the organization’s overall Meets campaign, and subsequently has improved complaint services for success in delivering improved through the implementation of the poor city residents living in slum services to citizens (both middle MCC and SWC reforms, have communities, even though they have class and urban poor) throughout provided citizens with an opportunity not directly engaged the service.50 the city. to place pressure on the Water Board to improve service Single Window Cell: Prior to this External Factors and delivery performance. initiative, procedures varied widely Institutional Arrangements across sections due to lack of Organizational Factors standardized procedures, weak Legal status: The Water Board’s legal supervision, and corruption. The status as a semi-autonomous Recentralization of selected organization located outside the SWC reform has improved information aspects of frontline service traditional government bureaucracy transparency through the free delivery: Complaint and new provided enhanced autonomy to the distribution of a clear and detailed connection services were made the Water Board’s management, which two-page brochure, explaining responsibility of head office staff, has resulted in greater independence application procedures and the fees to which placed pressure on them to in decisionmaking, leading to be paid for different types of new demonstrate improved performance. organizational changes that would not connection applications. Recentralization also radically altered have been possible earlier. established hierarchical relations This reform has halved the average The establishment of a Board of between section managers and their time to approve and issue a new Directors consisting of senior immediate supervisory middle-level connection application from six to three government administrators (Indian managers, which had impeded and months. There has also been an Administrative Service–level officers) compromised the flow of performance improvement in the volume of new and elite politicians with diverse information to senior managers prior connection applications processed51 professional expertise to advise the to the reform. These traditional and in making new connections. This management has also played an relationships were no longer viable as was achieved without any changes in important role in driving and there was simply too much at stake for the staffing levels or resources sustaining reform. senior managers. In both reforms, allocated to the SWC. citizen interface—one of the most Involvement of the media: The media difficult areas for senior managers to has been used effectively by the Water Lessons Learned: monitor with regard to frontline staff Board to communicate information performance—was recentralized. This Enabling Factors directly to citizens. Media criticism was provided senior managers with greater also used to strengthen the top Multiple relationships, operating access to reliable information on staff management’s resolve to undertake between external factors, organizational performance and citizen concerns. organizational reforms to improve factors and individual factors, have service delivery. Decentralization of management collectively contributed to sustained authority: The management authority organizational change and improved Active citizen engagement: Active was decentralized by placing all section service delivery performance.52 citizen engagement through formal staff under the responsibility of section managers. This decision enhanced the

50 Sixty-three percent of customers from slum settlements were satisfied with the Water Board’s complaint services while this was the ability of section managers to manage case for only 46 percent of Metro Customer Care customers. This difference could be due to the higher expectations from the service among educated and better-off Metro Customer Care customers. section work and it made a significant 51 Over two three-month periods (July to September 1999 and 2002), the number of new connection applications submitted to the Single Window Cell increased by 43 percent (from 4,636 to 6,612). contribution to improved service 52 Findings based on Caseley, Jonathan. December 2003. Blocked Drains and Open Minds: Multiple Accountability Relationships and Improved Service Delivery Performance in an Indian City. IDS Working Paper 211. delivery performance.

49 Pro-reform champions: The catalyst in 1997, and executive director help the organization for cultural change and improved in 1998). or a sense of duty) was effectively tapped by senior managers to service delivery performance at the Individual Factors Water Board can be attributed to motivate section staff to achieve set The high levels of work motivation goals and targets. the appointment of two young, have been achieved without external professionally competent, and incentives (pay, promotion, and This has resulted in improved pro-change Indian Administrative recognition). An existing and most likely individual and overall service Service officers (as managing director latent public service motive (wanting to delivery performance.

References

• A paper by Professor Jennifer Davis and Sunil Tanka, Massachusetts Institute of Technology for Henry Lee, Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government. Available online at http://ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Urban-Studies-and- Planning/11-479Spring-2005/3AFFDD6C-7096-4CC8-85ED- 89839F8BAC15/0/pm2background.pdf

• Caseley, Jonathan. December 2003. ‘Blocked Drains and Open Minds: Multiple Accountability Relationships and Improved Service Delivery Performance in an Indian City’. IDS Working Paper 211.

• Shukla, S. ‘Draft Case Note on Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board’s Metro Customer Care’, prepared for Guidance Notes on Grievance Redressal Mechanisms, created for Water and Sanitation Program–South Asia (Performance Improvement Program).

50 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 9

Uganda National Water and Sewerage Corporation: Utility Reform Helps the Urban Poor

Context and In the urban water sector, the National sewerage services to 22 urban Water and Sewerage Corporation areas.53 Its mission is ‘to provide Background (NWSC) is a public corporation wholly efficient and effective water and (Country and owned by the Government of Uganda. sewerage services, applying Service The Corporation was established in innovative managerial solutions to the 1972 by Decree No. 34 and its legal satisfaction of customers and other Provider) position was further strengthened by stakeholders in an environmentally Statute No. 7 (1995), which was later friendly manner’. Uganda is located in East Africa with incorporated into the National Water only 15 percent of its population living The Corporation has a head office and and Sewerage Corporation Act in urban areas. In recent years the service providers (operators) in the (2000). Under the new legal Government of Uganda and its utilities 19 urban areas (large towns) under its framework, the powers and structure and infrastructure service providers jurisdiction. While the operators of the Corporation were revised to have proactively pursued new manage day-to-day operations, the enable it to operate on a commercial management approaches such as head office is responsible for and financially viable basis. public private partnerships and other 53 These towns include Kampala, Jinja/Njeru, Entebbe, Tororo, initiatives aimed at improving The Corporation is currently Mbale, Masaka, Mbarara, Gulu, Lira, Fort Portal, Kasese, Kabale, Soroti, Bushenyi/Ishaka, Arua, Mubende, Masindi, accountability and transparency. mandated to manage water and Hoima, Lugazi, Iganga, Malaba, and Mukono.

51 large-scale investments, asset the existing infrastructure they have not was a running monthly deficit of management, operations support, and been matched with the necessary approximately USh. 348 million performance monitoring. commercial and financial management (approximately US$300,000) despite a capacity that can ensure the delivery of high average tariff of USh. 1,100/m3 Key Program sustainable services in the medium to (US$1.00/m3). The Corporation was in long term.’ a state of near-bankruptcy. It also had and Initiative to contend with a number of other While the Corporation had sound threats, including debt-servicing Highlights infrastructure, abundant water obligations falling due and a Value resources, and enabling legislative Situation Prior to Reform Added Tax law that compelled it to pay framework, it was plagued with taxes on any increases in bills. The In 1998, the Corporation was not a problems such as a large and inefficient government was willing to support the healthy organization. The World Bank labor force with conflicting and Corporation by freezing the debt noted in its report, ‘Over the last 10 overlapping roles, high unaccounted- (US$100 million) for some time to years, the Government of Uganda in for water (more than 50 percent), poor give the Corporation a chance to partnership with the World Bank and customer service, low collection recover, if serious managerial efforts other donors have made significant efficiency (approximately 71 percent), were initiated. investments (over US$100 million) in substantial accounts receivables (Days the urban water and sewerage sector. Receivable Ratio of about 420 days), Performance While these investments have and corruption within the workforce, Improvement Initiatives contributed immensely in rehabilitating especially among frontline staff. There To address managerial inefficiencies in the Corporation, the government appointed a new Board of Directors54 Box 20: Performance Improvement comprising representatives from local Leads to Positive Impact governments, business community, professional bodies, environment The National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), Uganda, has been groups, and government ministries undertaking a comprehensive performance improvement program since 1998. (including Finance, Water, Health, The Corporation undertook strategic programs addressing five key performance and Small-Scale Industries). The areas: water production and sewerage services, water distribution services, composition and structure of the Board customer care services, revenue generation services, and cost reduction. In enabled it to exercise its governance carrying out the reform process, due consideration was given to professional functions and was able to shield the change management to cope with possible resistance to change. Corporation from political interference The reform initiatives have had positive impact with increases in service and and patronage. The Board appointed a network coverage, reduction in unaccounted-for water increases in connection, new Managing Director, Dr. William Muhairwe, who was given the mandate and metering efficiency. Annual turnover has improved from about US$11 to rethink strategies for performance million to US$34 million. Positive cash flows have helped finance network improvement. His appointment led to expansion and enabled maintenance programs an emphasis on commercial viability to be implemented. and for using ‘customer care’ as an While the Corporation has made significant improvements in its financial and organizing theme. The Board and new commercial performance, there have been limited initiatives to serve the poor. management signed a Performance The poor benefited mostly from reduced connection fees, increase in Contract with the government in connection efficiency, and establishment of consumer grievance redressal September 2000, which clearly spelt mechanisms. It can be assumed that everyone, including the poor, benefited from a much more efficient utility. 54 The terms of the Board of Directors and the Managing Director were coming to an end.

52 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

out roles and obligations. The Under this program, customer improvements in billing, targets and reporting procedures service centers and front desks unaccounted-for water, revenue institutionalized accountability, were put in place, customer surveys collection, arrears reduction. and without introducing a separate agency to capture customer wants were cost reduction. They created for monitoring. conducted, and amnesty for illegal more confidence among water use instituted. The most managers and heads of support At the strategic level, the following notable was the expansion of the services departments. programs were implemented: customer base and the increase • Area Performance Contracts • 100 Days Program (February– in the number of break-even towns (APC) II and Support Services May 1999): This was a high impact to six from three. In addition, Contracts (SSC) II (December program that addressed five key revenues increased and some of the 2001–November 2002): The APC II performance areas: water profits were reinvested to extend and SSC II were a strengthened production and sewerage services, water mains by an additional form of the APC I and SSC I. Under water distribution services, 20.5 kilometers. these programs additional key customer care services, revenue • Area Performance Contracts performance areas were introduced, generation services, and cost (APC) I and Support Services for example, the reduction of reduction initiatives. The program Contracts (SSC) I (October suppressed accounts. In addition, focused on reversing operational 2000–October 2001): The APC the incentives structure was and financial inefficiencies through and SSC were contracts signed redesigned according to SMART aggressive revenue collection between the Corporation’s (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, strategies and cost cutting headquarters, area managers, Realistic, and Timely) criteria to measures (including rationalization and heads of support service enhance staff motivation to work of the medical scheme and departments (including harder. Further, the obligations of reduction of travel costs, which was maintenance, procurement, and either party were reviewed and a part of the establishment costs). stores). The contracts were redefined to reduce the occurrence Some of the achievements of this designed to give a new outlook to of performance constraints identified program included the reversal of the previous change management in the APC I and SSC I. the financial performance of the programs and to address the Corporation from a deficit of Organizational change was targets set out in the Corporation’s USh. 348 million to a profit of accomplished through two Performance Contract signed with USh. 331 million (US$206,875). other initiatives: the government in September 2000. Another great achievement was the The main characteristics of the • S-T-R-E-T-C-H Out Program improvement in the public image of APCs and SSCs were increased (2002–2003): During the course of the Corporation, which enhanced autonomy for area and support the implementation of the APCs, it the customers’ willingness to pay. departments, clear separation of was realized that there were still • Service and Revenue responsibilities, enhanced some organizational governance Enhancement Program, SEREP I commercial orientation, creation of issues that needed to be improved and II (August 1999–August result and output-oriented upon to accelerate the achievement 2000): The SEREP programs management, and increased of APC II objectives. A tailor-made followed the 100 Days Program and accountability. Other characteristics program named S-T-R-E-T-C-H were designed to consolidate its included improvement of cost Out, whose many concepts were achievements and further improve effectiveness, efficient service benchmarked and adapted from performance. The main emphasis delivery, and the introduction of world-class organizations (such as was on restoring customer incentives or disincentives as General Electric), was instituted. confidence in the ability of the drivers of performance. The APCs The main characteristics of the Corporation to deliver services. and SSCs resulted in major program were reduction of

53 bureaucracy, increase in speed of implementation process, emphasizing Other commercialization activities work, simplicity and self-confidence; both processes and outputs. To ensure carried out by the Corporation included worker involvement; organizational learning among peer companies, the the indexation of tariff to protect it from boundarylessness; stretched targets Corporation carries out regional externalities such as inflation and take that were far above SMART targets; networking through a recently into account changes in production and rewards for achievement of established ‘External Services’ unit, costs, and thus maintain its real value. stretched targets. There was which shares experiences and The tariff was indexed with effect from increased simplicity, demonstrated renders consultancy services to peer March 2002 following Cabinet approval. by informal dressing (T-shirt wear for companies, on a cost-covering basis. The indexation allows for annual everybody) on every Friday to show adjustment of the tariff, and entailed a Complementary to internal programs, that all staff are the same and are six percent increase in the first year of working toward a common the Corporation also realized the need implementation, which was a significant objective. The management also to engage the private sector in its achievement for the reform process. collaborated with the union to operations. As an initial move, it reduce excess staff by half from outsourced some of its noncore The Corporation has also put emphasis 1,800 in 1999 to 900 in 2001, activities including grass cutting, on developing its management without any industrial unrest. building maintenance, vehicle repairs, information system, a key ingredient and guard services. The service to a robust commercialization process. • One-Minute Management improvement management contract in In line with this, networking of its offices Program (2003) created Kampala55 city—the Kampala Revenue and computerization of systems56 procedures for promoting individual Improvement Program (KRIP) contract (billing, financial, procurement, payroll, performance accountability. voice over IP, Lotus Notes, customer Individual staff accountability was that had been in operation from complaints tracking, call center, and so introduced by asking each staff to December 1997 to June 2001—was come up with a vision, a mission, strengthened. The new management on) were undertaken. In addition, the and goals describing his or her rationalized the incentives and Scala Accounting System was planned role in achieving corporate monitoring structure through modernized and expanded and a new objectives. The achievement of renegotiations in order to make it more fixed assets register based on the goals was then monitored in performance-based. After the expiry of Scala module was introduced from periodic appraisals. the KRIP management contract in June July 1, 2001. 2001, the Corporation mobilized a The Corporation is currently The Corporation also implemented strong team to run operations in implementing Internally Delegated some measures to improve services Kampala, which was followed by a Area Management Contracts for customers, including reducing the second management services contract (IDAMCs) aimed at giving more average time to deal with complaints, with ONDEO Services, a French autonomy to area managers (partners), using GIS–based (or geographic management utility company, signed in defining roles and responsibilities more information system-based) customer January 2002. This contract was clearly, and creating better incentive records, introducing a Customer terminated in early 2004 but this plans that allocate more operating risks Charter, introduction of account contract management experience has to partners. The partners are paid for balance checking system through local proved useful for managing area taking on these risks through increased telephone, and direct debit system with service contracts. incentives. By passing more risks to local banks. partners, the head office is able to In terms of initiatives to capture the encourage more innovation and work 55 Kampala city covers approximately 70 percent of commitment. To rationalize the National Water and Sewerage Corporation operations voice of the poor, it has appointed in terms of water production, customer base, and monitoring and evaluation activity, a revenue generation. a community development officer 56 Major computerization initiatives were implemented in checkers system has been 2003 and these were funded by the German Development in its commercial and customer Cooperation through the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für introduced to strengthen the IDAMC Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH). services department.

54 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Accomplishments number of staff per 1,000 connections, perception that a big commitment to from 35 in 1998 to around seven in serve the poor could threaten achieving and Challenges 2006. Similarly, its operating ratio the commercial targets and staff (1998–2005) (revenues/operating costs) has incentive payments that are specified in decreased from 0.90 to 0.75 from the performance contracts. The poor The reform initiatives from 1998–2006 2000 to 2003. This has been a result benefited mostly from the reduced have had positive impacts. Notably, of improving the performance of the connection fees and an increase in service coverage has increased from Corporation’s own staff and by connection efficiency. Response time to 48 percent to 70 percent. The water engaging with the private sector. customer complaints decreased from one week to less than 24 hours. It can network coverage has increased On the financial side, annual turnover 57 be assumed that everyone, including by 52 percent. In addition, new has improved from about US$11 million the poor, benefited from a much more connections increased from 3,317 to to US$34 million. Because of this efficient utility. 23,312 per year. As a result, total performance, operating profit after connections are up from 50,826 depreciation has improved from losses If the government is to substantially to 148,312 (or 70 percent of target of US$0.4 million to a surplus of improve services to the poor, future population served, from a population US$3.0 million. Positive cash flows reforms will need to clearly set out base of 1.7 million people in 2006). have financed network expansion and targets, funding and incentive Unaccounted-for water has fallen from enabled maintenance programs to be payments for improving services in 51 percent to 29 percent. Metering scheduled and implemented. low-income areas. To agree to, and efficiency (proportion of metered achieve, a Universal Service Obligation accounts to total accounts) has How the (USO), clear allocation of roles between increased from 65 percent to sector institutions will be necessary, 99.6 percent, while connection Poor Benefited as well as holding those institutions efficiency (proportion of active accountable for services to poor areas. connections to total connections) While the Corporation has made has improved from 63 percent to significant improvements in its Lessons Learned 93.9 percent. commercial performance, there have The Corporation has improved its been limited initiatives to serve the Challenges commercial viability; it has reduced the poor. This is probably due to a Despite its accomplishments, the Corporation still faces challenges Table 6: Improvement in Performance in the area of sewerage where the coverage is only 10 percent. Performance indicator 1998 2006 Sewerage investment costs are very Service coverage 48% 70% high and the Corporation is currently Network coverage Increased 52% finding it hard to devote resources to New connections every year 3,317 23,312 such investments. Total connections 50,826 148,312 The Corporation also faces the Collection efficiency 60% 96% challenge of serving the poor Unaccounted-for water 51% 29% communities where cost recovery is Metered accounts (%) 65% 99.6% questionable. The original approach to serve the poor was through the use of Staff every 1,000 connections 35 7 water kiosks or communal taps. Connection efficiency 63% 93.9% However, it was found that the water Operating ratios 0.90 0.75 vendors at these points sell water at Annual turnover $11,000,000 $34,000,000 a price 48 times that offered by the Corporation. This ‘middleman’ effect Profit Loss $0.4 million Profit $3 million defeats the whole objective for which the pro-poor tariff was set. It affects the 571,300 kilometers (km) of water mains extensions, 1,060 km from internally generated funds and 140 km from external funding. willingness and ability to pay and

55 restricts consumption, thereby The composition and structure of the relatives or network expansion for obstructing health enhancement new board of directors enabled it to their constituencies, managers could initiatives. In order to address this exercise its governance functions and devote their scarce resources to more problem, the Corporation has come up was able to shield the Corporation productive activities. Donor support in with a new connection policy, which from political interference and the form of financial and technical aims to subsidize access (by providing patronage. The managing director assistance added to the capabilities access for pipe lengths up to appointed thereafter was instrumental of the organization. 50 meters with a nominal fee of about in planning strategies for performance Customer and public confidence in US$30) and charge consumption at improvement, placing emphasis on commercial viability, and for using the Corporation’s performance affordable rates. The policy also ‘customer care’ as an organizing improvement initiatives turned out to incorporates a network intensification theme. The tough stance, coupled be another external factor that activity in poor communities to reduce with participation, transparency, and motivated staff to innovate further. connections lengths to individual tangible results from short-term- The Corporation’s turnaround was households. Consequently, each oriented programs brought everybody good news, and captured media household in urban poor communities on the ‘performance bandwagon’. headlines. Pride, based on genuine is encouraged to connect a yard tap Externally, the Corporation enjoyed accomplishments, gave confidence to and pay directly to the Corporation. significant support from the midlevel managers that they were on Enabling Factors Government of Uganda, which the right track. This case reflects resulted in debt freeze and common sense since it builds on The major incentive or drive to change noninterference with the Corporation’s principles that have demonstrated was the threat of privatization. management. Being somewhat their worth. The lessons from Managers and staff were aware that insulated from political pressures Uganda’s NWSC experience also there were many potential substitutes, meant that managers could focus on show the value of experimentation which would be implemented if commercial issues in the early years of and decentralization—without losing improvements at the Corporation were reform. Instead of fending off powerful contact with experts at the center. not forthcoming. political leaders who sought jobs for First, a hardworking and committed board of directors with a good mix of skills is necessary if an organization is to make meaningful progress. In addition, a dynamic utility management and staff team References motivated by clear vision, mission, and objectives is fundamental • Mugisha, Silver, and Sanford V. Berg. ‘Turning around Struggling to success. State-Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries: The Case of NWSC Uganda.’ A paper prepared for a seminar on ‘Reforming Further, it is necessary to secure Public Utilities to Meet the Water and Sanitation Millennium government and donor commitment Development Goal’ at the United Kingdom’s Department for to support key initiatives such as debt International Development, July 4, 2006, organized by the World freeze, pension reform, and payment Development Movement and WaterAid. of government debts. In addition, the • Muhairwe, Dr. William Tsimwa. ‘Improving Performance through following factors have been the pillars Internal Reforms by the Public Sector: A Case of National Water and of reform: promoting managerial Sewerage Corporation, Uganda.’ Paper presented for Water Week. autonomy through decentralization; World Bank: Washington DC, March 4–6, 2003. (Dr. Muhairwe is the strengthening information systems via Managing Director of the National Water and Sewerage Corporation.) monitoring and evaluation programs; • Samson, Kevin. March 2005. ‘Regulating Public and Private and providing incentives to managers Partnerships for the Poor—Case Study of Uganda.’ through comparative competition, DfID Knowledge and Research Contract R8320. Institute of Water and financial incentive packages and Environment, Cranfield University. associated with meeting targets.

56 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 10

Bengaluru, India Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board: Service Delivery in Slums

Context and data, maintains that there are only 367 located in areas far from the main slums in the same area, but with a much network.61 However, this did not mean Background (City, greater population of 592,000 people. that slums did not have access to water Slums, Utility, Official figures put the proportion of the supply; in fact, a 2001 survey reported city’s population residing in slums that over half of the slums had access to and Access between 8–15 percent. the water supplied by the Water Board, either through public taps or through to Services) Until recently, most slum dwellers individual, mostly illegal, connections. obtained water from a combination of Public taps never provide a good level of It is estimated that approximately private borewells, water vendors, 58 20 percent of Bengaluru’s 6.5 million government tankers, public taps, and service: there are up to 50 households population lives in slums with little or no illegal tapping of the Water Board’s lines. per tap, water supply is for short periods access to basic services. According to Legal household connections were rare on alternate days, and long queues the Census of India (2001), the Greater in slums, as the Water Board didn’t are common. Metropolitan Bengaluru area59 had 733 provide connections unless the residents The Water Board is a publicly-owned ‘slum enumeration blocks’ that housed could provide proof of tenure, which water utility created in 1964 by the state 345,200 people. The Karnataka Slum most slum dwellers were unable to do.60 government of Karnataka. Its primary Clearance Board (KSCB), based on 2004 In addition, an estimated 250 slums were tasks are providing water supply, sewerage networks, and sewage 58 Earlier known as Bangalore. 59 Under the jurisdiction of the Bangalore Mahanagar Palike (that is, the Bangalore Municipal Corporation). disposal; ensuring the sufficiency of 60 Only 53 of all the slums in the city had formal tenure and very few residents of these slums actually paid any property tax. domestic water supply to the required 61 This was because the municipal boundary revision to include 27 new wards and extend the borders of 28 older wards occurred as late as 1995. These new areas had yet to be provided with water distribution systems. standards; and levying and collecting

57 such as the Bangalore Mahanagar Box 21: Increasing Access for Slum Households Palike (the urban local body) or KSCB. Given these obstacles, very few slum Over a five-year period from 2000 to 2005, the Bangalore Water Supply and communities had, in the past, Sewerage Board experimented with service delivery in slums, first through approached the Water Board for new three pilot projects under a donor-funded program, and then through a newly connections. Instead, improving slum created Social Development Unit (SDU). By early 2005, the SDU had water supply was left to one of the mobilized 46 poor communities, approximately 10 percent of the city’s slums, of which more than half had successfully connected to the Water Board many authorities responsible for network and continue to be served with water, receive bills, and make the development of the city and payments. The Board’s work in slums achieved important objectives of improvement of the slums, such as the increasing the number of slum households connected to the metered Bangalore Development Authority, the network, decreasing the slum dweller’s dependency on ‘free’ water through urban local body (ULB), or the KSCB. public taps or illegal connections, and reducing nonrevenue water. Although the Water Board still has a long way to go to roll out the program to Key Program the nearly 400 slums in the city, progress is real and many lessons have been and Initiative learned. The SDU and the utility have gone through an important learning period and the slum program has transitioned successfully from a discrete Highlights pilot project to a citywide program. Moreover, as the SDU and engineers have developed their approach and learned from their own mistakes, the Precursor for the Initiative— pace of new slum connections has increased. Pilot Projects under AusAID Project

Three pilot projects were implemented water charges on a no loss, no profit recently, the Water Board’s service to under an AusAID master planning basis. The Water Board faces many slums consisted solely of supplying project, designed to demonstrate challenges—it is struggling to cope with water, on behalf of the Bangalore how water and sanitation services insufficient funds, an aging distribution Mahanagar Palike, to the public taps63 could be delivered by a utility to slum system, high unaccounted-for water, connected to the network, and households. At the suggestion of the explosive population growth, expanding maintaining some borewells in areas AusAID project team, the board of urban boundaries, hiring and promotion beyond. The Water Board’s policy directors of the Water Board adopted a constraints, high bulk water costs,62 and regarding land tenure requirements resolution to accept government-issued political interference primarily in tariff was a barrier for residents of informal ‘lease-cum-ownership’ documents setting. On the positive side, the Water settlements to obtain legal connections, provided to some slum dwellers rather Board is one of the best-managed and as was the cost. A critical point relevant than actual land titles as an adequate most efficient utilities in the country. It to service to the poor was that the Water basis for granting connections. boasts of 100 percent metering, the Board itself did not pay for capital This decision was later informally lowest staff-to-connections ratio in the investment in new distribution mains extended by the chief engineers to country, an effective customer grievance to connect previously unserved redressal system; and an active program include ration cards, identity cards, neighborhoods. The capital works to reduce nonrevenue water. election cards, and even electricity bills, division of the Water Board finances new as admissible proof of occupation. Historically, the Water Board had infrastructure through direct ‘deposit The tacit support of the state urban few incentives to work in slums. Until contribution’ of funds from third parties, development department was crucial; the secretary of the department was a 62 One of its major sources of bulk water, the Cauvery River, is 100 km away and water must be pumped to the city at great expense; member of the board of directors that as a result, the Bangalore Water Board's production costs, at close to Rs 20 per m3 supplied, are the highest of any major urban utility in India. adopted the initial resolution and did 63 There were about 15,000 public taps fed by the Bangalore Water Board network, and another 3,000 supplied from local boreholes. About half of these taps were in low-income areas and about a quarter in slums. not object to the practice. Taking this

58 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

administrative and bureaucratic route Trigger for the Initiative major loss of revenue if no one paid for circumvented going to the state it. Given the Water Board’s mandate to The city stops paying for public legislative assembly for approval, where operate on a ‘no profit, no loss’ basis, taps: The Water Board was the issue could have been bogged and its ongoing struggles to reduce responsible for the management of nonrevenue water, it could not afford to down in lengthy debate. The three public taps64 while the ULB was continue the practice of supplying slums for the pilot projects were responsible for paying for the water. water free of cost. It was also clear that carefully selected to represent different This water was provided free of charge a citywide disconnection drive would kinds of slums present in the city—one to users. In 2002, there were incite large-scale opposition from the a small, dense slum in the city center, approximately 15,000 public taps community and councilors. This got the one a medium size slum without land supplied by the Water Board’s network Water Board to start thinking about titles in a newly added ward, and of which it billed for water supplied at how to curb this loss of water and one a large partially planned slum fully 7,000 taps.65 In theory, the ULB was to revenue, ideally transforming users of ‘declared’ by the KSCB. pay for the water bill from its revenues, public taps as customers with using a pricing structure based on domestic connections. Community participation was a central gauging the water flow. The last component of the projects, and it gauging exercise took place in 1997 The network is extended to all showed that nongovernmental when it was estimated that the average wards: Although 27 new wards were organizations could rally slum public tap supplied 22,000 liters of added to the official ULB roster in communities to work with the Water water per day, billed at Rs 3,000 1995, only the original 73 wards were Board’s engineers and other frontline (US$65) per tap per month (equivalent supplied with the mains and distribution staff. The overall experience of the to Rs 4.5, or US$0.09, per m3, a very network, and of these only 45 had pilots was very positive—more than low rate equivalent to less than the systems that provided complete 1,000 slum households (approximately lowest block of the domestic tariff and coverage. The ULB, which was 6,000 people) became new well below the Water Board’s cost for responsible for funding basic utility customers. supplying water). In practice, the ULB infrastructure within municipal paid these bills erratically and, by 2002, boundaries, decided to pay for the full A combination of shared and individual had accumulated arrears of nearly extension of the Water Board’s piped metered connections were installed Rs 150 crore (US$30 million). network to the new and partially-served and, on an average, 70 percent of wards. The ULB agreed with the Water In 2002, certain of its inability to finance households in the project slums Board’s capital works division to divide future payments and large arrears, the participated. In addition, AusAID paid the work into three major contracts, ULB obtained the urban development private contractors to install sewerage nine wards each, instead of the usual department’s approval to cancel the networks, construct new drains, proliferation of small contracts. This arrangement for municipal funding of improve roads, and establish solid ‘Package Program’, as it came to be public taps and to finalize a debt waste management systems. A local known, was completed in 2005. While repayment plan. The decision was water and sanitation committee was piecemeal projects to extend the pipes justified on the basis that it was the established in each slum as the would have been slow and unlikely to Water Board’s social responsibility to institutional focal point for community provide water to slum dwellers and to reach slum areas, under the Package participation. The pilots demonstrated fund public taps through its own cross Program distribution mains were to be that slum dwellers were willing to pay subsidies. Water supplied to public installed in practically every street in the regular tariffs for utility water and that taps amounted to 20 percent of all city. Even if slum households could not individual and group connections were water going into the Water Board’s afford to connect to the pipes through a viable option in dense, poor slums. distribution system, and represented a the Water Board’s regular individual connections, their chances of securing access to water through other means 64 Subject to the 1964 Act. 65 The others were unauthorized or deemed to be out of service, though in practice they still operated. increased exponentially. Network

59 extension thus mobilized the Water shared connections for groups was retained in the same position on a Board to consider working with slum of five to 10 families as an contract with the Water Board. This dwellers to pre-empt a surge in illegal alternative option. was an important signal of the connections, informal connections Water Board’s willingness to continue • Connection fees were reduced for obtained through political pressure, and working with slums. Although the unauthorized public taps. slums to a rate that covered the SDU was strongly supported by some cost of the meter only, with any members of senior management, it Project Design additional costs being absorbed by faced several organizational challenges. The events mentioned earlier created the Water Board’s maintenance It was not given a budget or support an enabling environment that prompted division, and the domestic tariff staff, and consisted essentially of the the Water Board to start considering structure was modified to introduce single officer heading it. The capacity the unconnected urban poor as a lower minimum monthly charge, and character of this particular person potential customers. which considerably lowered the proved to be a crucial factor in monthly bill for those using small The Water Board initiated a series of volumes of water. translating the willingness to work bold policy changes, including: with slums into actual outcomes. The Water Board also made changes • The requirement for formal tenure to its own organizational structure by Another obstacle was the fact that documents to be submitted with creating an in-house SDU. As there the SDU reported to the corporate applications for new connections were no suitable personnel within the planning division, a legacy of the was replaced with a simple utility to head this unit, the officer who AusAID project, despite the fact that obligation to prove occupancy. had been seconded from the state the vast majority of the SDU’s • The Board decided to innovate Women and Child Development work was with field-level engineers with service levels, allowing Department to the AusAID pilot project from the maintenance division.

The small scale of the financial Box 22: Rationalizing Tariff Structures investment made by the Water Board in Connection costs: Normal rate for a new domestic connection: the slum program is noteworthy, and Rs 1,800 (US$39). was another challenge the SDU faced. Households wanting to connect were In slums required to pay for the out-of-pocket • For plots less than 150 square feet, only the water meter cost is covered: costs associated with the purchase of Rs 550 (US$13). the meter, materials to connect to the • For plots between 150 and 600 square feet, a sanitary charge is added: distribution network, and plumbing Rs 800 (US$18). costs. The Water Board’s financial • If slum dwellers coordinate and have their additional piping and taps installed obligations were thus limited to the by the same plumber, the additional cost per household is between Rs 800 salary of the head of the SDU. This low (US$18) and Rs 1,000 (US$23). risk approach allowed it to experiment Tariffs: The old tariff structure required all customers to pay a minimum charge working in slums. equivalent to 15 cubic meters of water a month. Most slum dwellers consumed around half this amount. The new tariff reduced the minimum charge to 8 cubic Project Methodology meters. A family using this amount or less now pays Rs 73 (US$1.7) per month, and Strategy compared with Rs 115 (US$2.7) under the old structure. For shared Between 2002 and 2005, the SDU connections, the total volume consumed is divided by the number of families initiated work in 46 slums following sharing a tap, after which the same tariff structure is applied to the amount consumed by each family. a series of steps, which are detailed below.

60 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

• The selection of slums was based • Distribution of water and billing Role of the NGOs: It was important to on good relationships with NGOs commenced as soon as meters establish a degree of cohesion within forged during the pilots and were issued. the community through intense subsequent postpilot operations, as fieldwork by the SDU, which was well as on need, client demands, • Water was supplied on alternate greatly assisted in this by forming engineer requests, state of network days for two to six hours at a time. partnerships with local NGOs. The extension, and water availability. latter introduced the SDU to key • Monthly billing was carried out • The SDU ensured that the local community leaders, aided in mobilizing by meter readers and cash distribution network was either the community, assisted slum dwellers payments were collected at the already in place through the in filling out applications, collected service station. Package Program or feasible connection fees, and generally acted as through minor extension works the liaison between the community and from nearby mains. Community mobilization: The importance of community mobilization the Water Board. They also assisted • Initial forays into communities in the process of connecting slums with savings for households unable to consisted of preliminary cannot be overstated. The slums in pay the connection fee upfront, or assessments of the existing water Bengaluru had to be treated as a holding cash on behalf of individuals and sanitation situation, meetings ‘unit’, at least in the initial stages of until a family was ready to submit its with local leaders and community application. NGOs were also effective bringing them on to the network. groups, and door-to-door house advocates and applied pressure when For technical and management visits during which the slum engineers delayed new connections or program was explained, information reasons, at least half the households stalled in other ways. Two NGOs that on service levels (individual had to commit to connecting by the SDU had worked with during the connections, private connections) registering their applications and pilot projects—Association for Voluntary and costs was disseminated, and paying the initial connection fees. This Action and Service, and Mythri Sarva willingness to connect to the strategy of dealing with slums as Seva Samiti—were willing to continue network was assessed. communities made the work engaging with the Water Board without particularly daunting for the Water • Site visits with the Water Board’s remuneration. They went on to broker Board’s engineers, unaccustomed to local service station engineers were deals with the Water Board in five mass connections and the dynamics made, to bring engineers on board, other slums, most of them locations introduce them to the community, of poor neighborhoods. where they had a long history of and discuss technical issues. The SDU did not have any systematic involvement. The SDU was able to • Application forms were distributed, method of eliciting community engage with eight additional NGOs, either directly to residents or preferences and ascertaining local many of which coordinated women’s through community leaders demand. Initial forays into a given slum groups and thrift and credit societies and NGOs, who monitored and consisted largely of informal meetings that were also tapped to enhance assisted in compiling and with residents or community leaders, community mobilization. collecting them. followed by a lane-by-lane assessment Role of the engineers: The SDU also • Applications were submitted for based on visual observation and had to engage with the subdivisional approval, with proof of occupancy discussions. The SDU chose specific and service station engineers. Most and the connection fee, in batches people who had a record of engineers stayed out of the early of about 50 at a time. community leadership and expressed stages of community mobilization, an interest in the work, to act as • Meters were issued and slums becoming involved only when a slum connected to the network after liaison and representatives of the was ‘ready’. Their inputs consisted of at least 50 percent of the slum community in later negotiations with determining how slums could be had been paid. engineers and NGOs. connected to the nearest network,

61 deciding the hours and timing of supply Lessons Learned: needed to increase revenue. Around depending on distribution cycles for the the same time that the SDU was entire service station, and issuing Enabling Factors rolling out the slum program, senior monthly bills once meters were and Constraints management started increasing installed. Many engineers had never monthly revenue targets for service stations. When the gap between worked in slums before, and those that The success of the Water Board’s slum projected collection and revenue had, often recalled bad experiences program has been extremely varied. targets for a given service station when poor services led to tension. The One reason for this is that engineers was large, slums presented a new SDU spent a lot of time sensitizing and frontline staff were not required to customer segment. However, when them to the nature of the program, how respond to overtures from the SDU, the gap was small or revenue it worked, and what was required of and compliance with the slum program targets could more easily be met them. For example, the SDU helped the was not a factor in their monthly through high-tariff-paying industrial engineers innovate with solutions for performance assessments. As a result, connections, the incentive was late payments and arrears, as well as in the initial stages, the SDU had to rely much lower for engineers to engage the conversion of illegal connections to on goodwill from Water Board staff to in slum work. High revenue targets legal, metered connections without get responses to its requests for thus motivated engineers to penalty. Working with the engineers technical and management support. consider connecting slums, was challenging. In most instances, the Even when engineers and their field even though this was not their Water Board staff, from the engineers staff were willing to engage in slum original purpose. down to the valve men, needed to be work, their ability to do so was not convinced of the merits of the program guaranteed. Whether the SDU received • Senior management also and the reason they should spend their positive responses to its requests for emphasized the regularization of time working with the SDU to broker assistance depended both on personal illegal connections. Service station complex neighborhood agreements. factors (such as staff members’ engineers made greater efforts to Key Outcomes empathy with urban poor and local work in slums with the SDU when political alliances) and on professional subdivision and division superiors proactively sought to decrease Of the 46 slums in which the SDU environments (such as performance illegal connections. started working, 26 had been incentives given by superiors connected to the network by early and the characteristics of the local • Service stations in areas with small 2005. In these communities 4,300 service stations). pockets of slum households had a households, or 65 percent of the total, There were no direct incentives for higher rate of servicing the poor. chose to take a connection and were engineers to work in slums, or Engineers, particularly those being provided with water on alternate organizational targets associated with encountering slums for the first time, days. The record on bill delivery by the slum program. The new attention to were more willing to try their hand in meter readers and payment by slum the urban poor by senior management a small slum than a large one. dwellers has been mixed but it is was not communicated to frontline • Engineers working either in areas estimated that well over half of the engineers in an explicit manner. They with acute water scarcity or newly connected slum dwellers do were merely informed that they could problems of ‘tail-end supply’, or in receive and pay their bills regularly. now connect slums to the network the 27 newly added wards where through individual connections. In If the 1,000 households connected the network was incomplete, were practice, engineers responded to the during the AusAID pilot program are more reluctant to work with slums. SDU according to a set of indirect to be included, the Water Board has This was because once new incentives and disincentives: brought just over 5 percent of the connections were sanctioned and slum households in the city onto its • Slums provided an untapped meters issued, engineers were customer base. market for engineers when they made accountable and had to

62 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

provide water and collect payment. disconnection carried some weight. residents as legitimate urban citizens If not, they risked the wrath of a The greatest success was in those and valid customers of the utility. local politician, visits by slum areas that had been newly Once external triggers made finding dwellers en masse to register networked, and in slums with no new ways to serve the poor a complaints, and a future pattern of access to groundwater. low collections from a dissatisfied necessity, the Water Board developed customer base. • Involvement in slum affairs by a program to do this in halting and elected officials: The active piecemeal ways. However, the very fact • Engineers and frontline staff participation of elected officials in that the initiative was somewhat ‘fuzzy’ responded, or failed to respond, to slum affairs could have either a offers some interesting strengths. Since the SDU based on their own positive or a negative impact. Not all the objectives of the program were perceptions of the nature of slum political intervention was bad and, in never clearly defined, the SDU was able work. These were sometimes based many cases, elected members of to focus on mobilizing stakeholders on facts and prior experience of the ULB and the state legislative rather than on meeting output-oriented working with urban poor and assembly acted as champions, targets. This enabled innovation and sometimes on personal convictions, calling for accountability and putting close engagement with stakeholders, some inaccurate, about what slum pressure on engineers to complete enabling the SDU to experiment with dwellers and their environments works on time. However, the methods to mobilize slum communities were like. political imperative to secure votes and, even more critically, ways to Three of the most important by appearing to be the sole provider engage field-level engineers. The characteristics of a community that of a new service was sometimes an slow start enabled intense involvement affected success were: obstacle. Engineers often had to of frontline staff with the SDU, delay new connections in order which convinced these engineers • The presence of active, to appease political ambition, of the merits of the approach and reputable, and well-networked particularly in 2004, which was an gradually brought them on board as NGOs and community-based important election year. Once a reformers themselves. organizations (CBOs): In the most slum was connected to the successful cases, local CBOs and network, detrimental political However, the program also continues NGOs introduced the community to interference diminished. At this to suffer from several weaknesses: the SDU, provided extensive inputs, point, politicians were more likely to • The SDU remains severely and acted as ongoing liaison. engage in demanding better understaffed and underfunded. NGOs with the longest presence in operation and maintenance from the Achieving citywide scale will require communities and the most Water Board when it lapsed into significant changes to the SDU as pro-active extension workers poor service delivery. achieved the best results. an organization. The Water Board’s program to serve • The extent of investment in the the poor has several strengths from • Incentives for staff to engage with existing supply arrangements: which useful lessons can be derived. the poor are still weak. Apart from Engineers encountered the most From the utility’s perspective, the the unintentional effects of revenue resistance in slums where residents initiative is consistent with effective targets, there have been no direct already had access to illegal supply management—increasing the incentives for engineers to work or good quality groundwater. Water consumer and revenue base, in slums. obtained through illegal connections regularizing illegal connections, and • There is an almost total reliance on was free, slum dwellers were reducing nonrevenue water. From the NGOs as voluntary, unremunerated unlikely to suddenly agree to pay for perspective of the slum dwellers, the partners. Communities without the same level of service, though program provided a better quality of the promise of reliable legal service water supply, enabled communication links to suitable NGOs are likely to delivery combined with the threat of with service providers, and recognized be bypassed.

63 • Initial beneficiaries have not been to them remains limited. This on the part of the utility to consulted as to the success of the means that although some form of address sanitation or hygiene program so far and whether their participation by slum dwellers in slums, either through private demands are being met. There has exists, it is limited, unsystemized, sewer connections or through been no monitoring of outputs or and not always genuine. community toilets. periodic assessment of the program • The Water Board continues to to date. • The Water Board’s efforts to date have been almost entirely confined operate without an explicit poverty • Although slum dwellers are to water. Apart from a few policy. The pro-poor program is consulted and they can opt out, individual connections to the really no more than a series of they are under intense pressure to sewerage network and the experiments and decisions that regularize illegal connections, and installation of individual latrines, have, over time, developed into a the choice of service levels offered there has been no concerted effort meaningful whole.

Source

• This case study has been summarized from Connecting the Slums: A Utility’s Pro-Poor Approach in Bangalore. Water and Sanitation Program Field Note, January 2006.

64 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 11

Dhaka, Bangladesh Nongovernmental Organization-Assisted Water Points: Social Intermediation for the Urban Poor

Context and 20 million by 2020, making it the the city urgently need rehabilitation and world’s third-largest city. This upgrading. To meet the Millennium Background large-scale migration creates Development Goal of 80 percent tremendous strain on an already coverage by 2015, the Water (City, Urban crowded city with limited inhabitable Authority needs an investment of Poor, Utility, and land due to topographical constraints, US$500 million.67 limited infrastructure, and a low level of The poor quality of life in the slums of Nongovernmental public services. Around 55 percent of Dhaka prompted a group of doctors Organization) the city’s population lives below the poverty line, half in slums and squatter to set up the nongovernmental settlements. Access to water supply, organization (NGO) Dushtha Shasthya Dhaka is one of the fastest growing sanitation, solid waste management, mega-cities in the world, with an and other social services is extremely 67 A break-up of investment required: to acquire mechanical estimated 0.3-0.4 million migrants, equipment for treating wastewater, US$30 million; to limited in these settlements. rehabilitate the existing water system, US$1.2 billion; to open mostly poor, arriving into the city new areas to cover 70 percent of the total area, US$500 66 million. The Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority has annually. The city’s population is Water and sewerage services in Dhaka proposed to secure Taka 750 million from World Bank/France currently estimated to be around for the 4th Dhaka water supply project; the Government of (and Narayangonj) are organized and Bangladesh is funding three other water supply improvement 12 million and is projected to grow to projects worth about Taka 17 billion; a fifth project (water managed by the Dhaka Water Supply treatment plant) has no identified funding yet. (US$1 = Bangladeshi Taka 68 [approximately, as of October 3, 2008]. and Sewerage Authority. Water, Conversion rates are from www.coinmill.com; all conversions in the text are approximations.) 66 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. sanitation, and sewerage services in

65 Box 23: Encouraging Community-Based Organizations Key Program and Initiative The main aim of the initiative was to create access to legal, affordable, and safe water and sanitation for slum dwellers through the establishment of Highlights community-based organizations and on a capital cost recovery basis. The Precursor Initiatives process was anchored by a local nongovernmental organization, Dushtha and Program Objectives Shasthya Kendra (DSK), which played a critical role as an intermediary between urban poor communities and formal government agencies or The DSK first attempted to install hand service providers. It also lent initial capital funds and provided technical pumps in slums, thinking that users could support for construction. The DSK facilitated processes with community draw water from shallow tubewells but participation for designing water points, selecting placement of infrastructure, the Water Authority’s deep tubewells did and formulating guidelines on water access and cost sharing. not leave them enough water. The DSK struggled hard to persuade the Water The DSK approach demonstrates how ‘informal’ communities can access Authority and the Dhaka City Corporation ‘formal’ services. The key principle is to respond to demand for water (DCC) to provide access to piped water indicated by communities’ willingness to pay. The case demonstrates how services to residents of informal communities willing to form self-help groups or community-based settlements and slums. The Water organizations can be encouraged and supported to maintain water points Authority had till then largely excluded and work towards improving hygiene habits and health status. slum dwellers from its service coverage. In 1992, following continuous negotiations with the water authority, the Kendra (DSK) in 1988. The DSK’s main DSK’s work on health in the slums DSK was able to convince the utility to goal was to seek effective ways of made it realize that one of the major give access to piped water systems providing community health care reasons for the incidence of disease to two bastis (slum communities) in services to the poor—it began work by and poor health was the lack of safe Mirpur area. starting a free weekend clinic. The drinking water. The principal purpose of the initiative was to create access to legal, affordable, and Box 24: Program Components safe water; improved environmental sanitation; hygiene promotion; and Software improved health status in slums based • Community action plan development through a participatory approach. on the work of community-based • Formation of community-based organizations and community organizations and on a capital cost management groups. recovery basis. The challenge was to demonstrate and prove that • Technical, hygiene promotion, and community management capacity community-managed initiatives are training for community-based organizations and community management groups, for community members. successful; and on the strength of such experience to influence and push local Hardware governments or utilities to make • Community water points. investments in projects that would benefit • Community toilets. the urban poor and slum dwellers.

• Community sanitation blocks. Process • Solid and liquid waste management. The DSK employed a system of • Storm water drainage. participatory rapid appraisal to gather descriptive data on the community,

66 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

including needs and aspirations agreement, signed by the community mediating with DCC mainly to obtain vis-à-vis water and resources available, with the DSK, calls for the total cost of permission for road cutting and location through interviews and discussions. the infrastructure to be repaid over of water points on the local body’s land. The main criteria adopted to select a 30 months, with an initial period of six This NGO has mobilized, organized, community for setting up a water months when the households were and prepared slum communities to point was: not required to make any payment. operate and manage water points, bear Following community meetings, each the capital cost, and regularly pay the • Expressed community demand and family’s share in the infrastructure cost water bills. It has also played an willingness to pay for services. and its corresponding share to the instrumental role in incorporating • Technical feasibility. monthly water bill was computed technical developments and facilitating according to its usage and ability the provision of alternative sources • Avoiding communities accustomed to pay. (such as rowing pumps, shallow to free water and sanitation services wells with hand pumps, and spring To generate revenue to pay off the loan, and those dominated by mastaans source improvements). (musclemen or influential people pay the Water Authority’s water bills, who control slum areas). repair the water point when necessary, The DSK raised community awareness and employ a caretaker, the community on effective water use and right of • Positive participation of key local collects fees for water connection and access to water. It partnered with local government institutions, that is, water use. Fixed prices have been communities and the municipality to lay the Water Authority and the DCC. agreed for collecting a kolshi of water communal sewer lines, drainage • NGO intermediation. (equivalent to 20 liters), bathing or facilities, and connections of private washing clothes. Community members toilets to main sewers after The DSK organized the residents of have agreed to pay monthly or daily, communities paid the capital costs, the slum communities to build shared depending on their circumstances. with bank accounts transferred to water points, and then applied to the the water committee’s name. The These poor slum dwellers have a good Water Authority to legally connect DSK also assisted water communities repayment record, and are never late the water point to the utility’s mains. with management skills and with their payments. They know that Each water point had an underground technical support. storage reservoir and a concrete this costs less money than buying platform, with two simple suction hand water from street vendors. In addition, Addressing Women’s Needs the water is cleaner. So they pumps, which served approximately In undertaking these projects, WaterAid understand the economics and also 100 families. The Water Authority and its local NGO partners have also appreciate the opportunity cost of agreed to provide the connections after been exploring the particular problems the DSK obtained permission from the having to walk to collect water. They associated with assuring that women’s DCC to use the site, and after it paid a really value the water. needs are addressed in the provision of security deposit and guaranteed that The community committee that water and sanitation services. Through the bills would manages the provision of water the development of water user be paid. and sanitation is made up entirely committees, local NGOs were The DSK introduced the water points to of women. determined to ensure that women were the residents as community owned, involved in decisionmaking processes Role of Dushtha and managed infrastructure for which for the installation of water points, as Shasthya Kendra the residents were to pay for the it is predominantly women who will construction costs and security Since 1991 the DSK has served as an benefit from them. A women’s NGO, deposit. The residents agreed to take intermediary between the slum Phulki, has been successful in ensuring an interest-free loan of US$960 from communities and the Water Authority. genuine women’s participation in these the DSK to cover the costs of water It has taken responsibility for the mixed committees. It worked through point construction and connection. The provision of water connections and the problems in relation to women’s

67 involvement in the committees through opportunity for expanding and The initiative has effectively integrated gender training, working with men, not mainstreaming water supply and environmental sanitation and hygiene just women, in discussing different sanitation services to many slum areas promotion interventions. The integration gender roles, and what individuals in Dhaka. Five development partners of these components is vital to ensure could do to address them. This has led (Asian Development Bank, Danish sustainable access of the target to more effective management systems International Development Agency, populations to legal basic services that and a more sustainable supply of water Japan International Cooperation will allow them to live and work with a and sanitation services. Agency, Department for International dramatically reduced incidence of Development, UK, and World Bank) are Replication disease and an increased potential to currently negotiating a ‘Partnership maximize the benefits of economic Framework’ with the Government of Such was the success of this project opportunities. Moreover, safe Bangladesh to identify necessary that the Water Authority and the DCC environmental sanitation practices by policy reforms that will enhance the agreed to scale up the program in slum dwellers, on the scale planned, collaboration with WaterAid, Water and development partners’ investments to have the potential to have a positive Sanitation Program, UNICEF, and Plan benefit the Water Authority. An impact on the wider city environment. International, along with the DSK and important aspect of this Partnership five other local NGOs (Bangladesh Framework will be an unequivocal The enhanced self-help and community Agricultural Working People’s policy statement regarding the eligibility management capacity of slum dwellers Association, Activity for Reformation of of slum dwellers to receive formal water will have a lasting benefit for future Basic Needs, Population Services and supply and sanitation services. development initiatives. The process Training Center, Rural Health and has helped communities achieve Development Society, and Phulki). Key Outcomes maturity of leadership, especially for A total of 110 community-managed women in the community, to run the The collaborative effort of the Water water systems have been established management of the water points on a Authority and its development partners and are running successfully, benefiting regular basis. (the DCC, implementing agencies, around 60,000 slum dwellers. local implementing NGOs, and the In 2000, one of the water points was Further expansion of these communities) has created an transferred to stand-alone community arrangements is being planned by the opportunity for the urban poor to have management, that is, without support Water Authority for one of the largest legal access to safe and affordable from DSK staff. Other water points slum concentrations in Dhaka, which water and sanitation facilities. were also subsequently transferred. would potentially provide to over The main criteria for transferring to The Water Authority has been able to 250,000 slum dwellers. In addition, with stand-alone community management increase its revenue by increasing the communities having successfully were (a) presence of water point number of legal customers, and demonstrated to the government that management committee; (b) regular residents of informal settlements have reducing its system and revenue losses monthly meetings; (c) attendance of the capacity to manage and maintain by turning illegal connections into legal women; (d) women leadership; (e) male communal water points, the Water connections. The assisted communities attendance; (f) regular payment of the Authority is now allowing communities are paying bills on a regular basis. Water Authority’s bills; (g) regular to apply for water connections on their As of June 30, 2000, DSK-targeted payment of capital loan installments; own, without the need for an NGO communities had paid Tk. 473,572 (h) maintenance and cleanliness of the as a mediator. (US$7,054), or 94.12 percent, of water point; and (i) expressed An International Development Agency– the bills invoiced. Communities ‘ownership’ of the facility. The approach funded project currently under continue to meet their obligations to the has been accepted as an effective tool preparation will provide a greater water utility. for providing water and sanitation

68 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

services to communities living in slums Constraints • Mediation and negotiations for the and squatter settlements. Several rights of the urban poor by an NGO The program has not been without its NGOs and programs of international can be successful. It was only problems. One of the most important agencies have begun to replicate through the DSK’s continued lessons that have been learned is that this model. negotiations with the Water the social dynamics of different Authority that water points were Recognition of the model’s communities are unique. The other supplied to slum communities. effectiveness has also been reflected issue relates to the time that is in the National Water Policy of required for acceptance of new • Community ownership is critical for the Government of Bangladesh, 1998. models for pro-poor service delivery the sustainability of any project. The by municipal authorities. Working with first attempt for a water point in a The experiences of the DSK and other the Water Authority and the DSK took slum was taken over by the local NGOs have provided an important time, but acceptance was created mastaan. The second attempt put basis for addressing the need to slowly and surely. The influence of management of the water point in mainstream water supply and sanitation service provision to slum areas. international organizations was the hands of the community also a major factor to help convince themselves, who did not allow a Current efforts are aimed at ensuring sceptics within local authorities take-over by the mastaan. It is that the Water Authority continues to and utilities. almost impossible for an outside manage and actively expand its service NGO, such as the DSK, to extort provision by subcontracting and While the lack of land tenure for slum any control or pressure over slum licensing NGOs and other small and dwellers has been raised in the past as leaders; the control has to come medium enterprises, which can an issue that disqualifies slum from within the slum community. address the specific hardware and communities from receiving formal Community ownership should be software needs of communities in slum services, the practice adopted by the taken to the extreme goal of leaving areas in a flexible manner. Water Authority in recent years has the entire process up to community been to look for opportunities for members, from negotiations Lessons Learned providing services. with the Water Authority, to Enabling Factors Lessons Learned implementation of the water point and keeping local power seats out • The presence of an NGO There are several important lessons of the process. consortium, including the DSK, garnered from the DSK’s negotiations Population Services and Training with the Water Authority to provide • If a community is already Center, and Proshika, with technical water to urban slum communities. accustomed to making installment and financial assistance from Among them are: payments or regular payments of WaterAid, Plan International, any kind, such as through • There is a willingness and ability and UNICEF. microcredit loans, they are more among the urban poor to pay for likely to make timely payments for basic service delivery. The myth, • A culture of partnership that services such as water. facilitated relationships among that providing service delivery NGOs, the Water Authority, the to poor communities requires • As with any successful project, DSK, and slum dwellers. heavy subsidies, has been cooperation between field staff and disproved. Additionally, the upper level management is • The presence of champions and Water Authority benefited from essential. The commitment of senior supporters at the Water Authority the increased revenue, which acted level managers in the government or and the DSK who were receptive to as a motivator to continue the utility is as important as the commit- working with NGOs. working relationship. ment of NGO field-based staff.

69 References

• ‘Dhaka, Bangladesh: The NGO as Mediator with the Water Authority.’ Taken from a leaflet Urban Water Points by WaterAid, Bangladesh.

• ‘DWASA’s Initiative on Piped Water Provision for Urban Slum Dwellers.’ Paper presented by Muhammad Nurul Huda Mian, Commercial Manager, Dhaka Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DWASA), at the Regional Consultation Workshop on Water and Poverty, September 2002, Dhaka, Bangladesh; available at www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2002/Third_Water_Forum/ case_studies_presentations.pdf

• ‘The Challenges of Service Delivery for Dhaka’s Poor’; available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BANGLADESHEXTN/Resources/ 295759-1182963268987/ch4.pdf

70 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 12

Alandur, India Alandur Municipality: User Contributions in Infrastructure Development

Context and infrastructure. Tamil Nadu suffers from of Tamil Nadu, decided to significantly a higher-than-national average expand the existing sewerage network. Background incidence of acute diarrheal diseases in However, there were severe limitations Tiruvannamalai, Ramanathapuram, on the quantum of funds it could Tamil Nadu is one of India’s most Vellore, Virudhunagar, and Cuddalore access from the central and state urbanized states, with 44 percent of its districts, which have a lower government. The Tamil Nadu population (27 million people) residing percentage of households with water Government thus devised a sewerage in urban areas. Sanitation has tended source within their premises. development strategy that would to remain the most neglected aspect of require ULBs to work in partnership public infrastructure provision—few of To remedy this situation, the with citizens, so that these two groups its 794 urban areas have even partial Government of Tamil Nadu has sought together defray a larger part of sewerage systems. According to the to reform the state’s water sector. Most capital and project costs and relieve 2001 Census of India, 36 percent of notably, it granted urban local bodies the financial burden on the the urban households in the state have (ULBs) the freedom to raise water state government. no toilets; only 86 percent of urban charges as necessary. In some cases, households in the state have access it has allowed limited private sector The first sewerage project under the to safe drinking water, and just involvement—some municipalities new initiative was launched in Alandur, 44 percent have a water source within contract specialized companies to known as the ‘Gateway of Chennai’ their own premises (Census, 2001). maintain their water treatment facilities. due to its proximity to the metropolis. Water contamination is a persistent In 1997–98, the Department of The shortage of ULB funds had danger due to limited sanitation Municipal Administration, Government compelled Alandur’s local political

71 become a multistakeholder project Box 25: Community Response Energizes Work involving the municipal authorities, the private sector, community-based Alandur Municipality in Tamil Nadu is improving sanitation services to slum organizations and, most significantly, the dwellers through an inclusive approach that benefits all segments of the people. These partnerships manifested township. The effort demonstrates how services can be improved where themselves in various aspects and there is strong political commitment coupled with effective communication stages of the project. As part of another strategy, transparency, and partnership with community-based organizations. initiative, care was also taken to ensure Nearly 8,350 of the 23,000 households that paid for the service are now that the poorest people, who could not connected to a sewerage network (as of 2005). These include 500 slum afford private sewerage facilities, were households from a total of 7,000. A large number (43 percent) of slum not left out. Provision had been made for dwellers have opted and paid for individual sewerage connections. community toilets for these segments. Project Approach and Design

The project is currently ongoing in 64 leadership to find alternative means by Key Program urban areas in Tamil Nadu. Although the which to finance needed development state government initially mooted the works. They were able to successfully and Initiative idea, it is the ULBs that drive it sell the idea of a sewerage system Highlights operationally in close coordination with (part-financed by user contributions) to the Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage the city’s residents. Board (TWAD) or Metrowater.68 Both Situation Prior to the Initiative actors (ULBs and the two parastatals) This initiative fueled similar demand in Till 2000, Alandur had no sewerage report to the Tamil Nadu Government’s neighboring Valasaravakkam, which system—a majority of its households Department of Municipal Affairs. generated matching requests to the (95 percent) had septic tanks. state government from municipalities Once a ULB decides it is interested The sewage, disposed outside the and town panchayats surrounding in launching a sewerage scheme, municipal limits, posed immense health Valasaravakkam and Alandur. These municipal councilors sell the idea to their hazards as it served as a breeding early demand-led initiatives made state constituencies through the local resident ground for mosquitoes and diseases, welfare associations. Citizens are briefed agencies confident that the scheme besides affecting groundwater sources. about the merits of sewerage systems could be replicated in other urban The risks for the town—with a vis-à-vis septic tanks, including improved areas. Target agglomerations were population of 147,000 of which slum groundwater, reduced mosquito and selected (many district headquarters) dwellers constituted nearly smell problems, and a rise in property and detailed plans, including possible 23 percent—were high. The situation values due to environmental user contributions, drawn up. In the was even worse in the 33 slum areas improvements. Similar messages are subsequent phase, the initiative tended where almost 7,000 families resided. communicated through pamphlets, the to become supply-led, though in many print and electronic media, and localized cities—Pallavaram, Ambattur, and Project Details public announcements are made in target neighborhoods. Other strategies Madurai—there are signs of persistent To address these problems, the may also come into play—such as demand emanating from residents Alandur Municipality initiated a project implied messages that those not joining or their welfare associations, and the to build an underground sewerage the scheme may be denied some ULB itself. Coimbatore, too, has system. At the heart of the project’s services by ULBs, or that those joining shown signs of strong demand, as it success so far lies a well-planned after the cut-off date may have to pay a has stayed on course for more communications strategy that has higher deposit. than five years to negotiate a sewerage evoked strong and positive community scheme on its own terms, even though response. Willingness to pay among 68 While the Tamil Nadu Water and Drainage Board is there has been a minimal grant 97 percent of the households surveyed responsible for building water and sanitation infrastructure throughout Tamil Nadu, Metrowater services only the Chennai component available. was another factor that helped it Metropolitan Area.

72 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Once communities have decided that User contributions: ULBs collect Project costs and sources of they want to avail of the scheme, capital contributions from the public in finance in Alandur: The total project an intense process of dialog and two installments—50 percent before cost is estimated at Rs 340 million negotiation ensues, involving local the state government releases funds for (US$7 million). The Municipality has elected representatives, ULB officials, the project, and 50 percent during raised funds from the TNUIFSL and the relevant parastatal. This implementation. Users also separately and the Tamil Nadu Urban Finance includes a detailed discussion of how pay for sewer connections and monthly Infrastructure Development project costs might be brought down, sewer maintenance charges (which are Corporation, an agency channelizing and the benefits of self-financing versus designed to cover the actual cost of funds from the Governments of India loans. A similar process of negotiation maintenance). The capital costs for and Tamil Nadu for infrastructure begins among state agencies, ULBs, the scheme include operation and projects. The project also received and resident welfare associations maintenance costs for one year. Since deposits from the town’s residents. regarding the quantum of deposits, public contributions are the smallest Project Strategies sewer connection charges, and component (and are generally used to monthly sewer charges to be required service part of the external finance The project, designed to provide from participants. cost), ULBs make every effort to keep essential and basic facilities to all the the loan component as small as residents, included a sewerage network Scheme Financing possible. The average contribution per consisting of the main sewer line, Average costs: The average cost of household is about US$142. It may branch sewer line, and manholes; the each project is US$11 million per urban range from US$33 to US$445, construction of a sewerage pumping area. ULBs bear an average cost of depending on the value of the property station; the laying of pumping mains; US$3.5 million (26 percent of capital in cities that have used this system for a sewage treatment plant; and costs) and users contribute an average determining the amount of contribution low-cost sanitation. of US$2.2 million (16 percent of to be paid. Institutional arrangements: Private scheme costs). To finance capital Monthly sewer charge: The average sector participation was considered costs, ULBs often supplement their domestic monthly sewer charge is important for the project. Accordingly, own resources with loans from state US$3.5, though it could range from a a private partner, the TNUIFSL, was financing institutions, such as the Tamil low of US$0.66 to a high of US$11. nominated to coordinate the Nadu Urban Infrastructure Financial The average monthly sewer charge for investigation and to structure the Services Limited (TNUIFSL) and the commercial properties is US$939 and Tamil Nadu Urban Finance and finances for the project. The project Infrastructure Development the average monthly sewer charge for was structured such that an Corporation, and national finance industrial properties is US$12. engineering, procurement, and institutions such as HUDCO and the Commercial charges themselves are construction contractor not only Life Insurance Corporation of India. 2.5 times that of domestic charges, designed and built the underground The Government of India and of Tamil and industrial charges 3.5 times. The sewerage system, but also financed, Nadu also provide supplementary parastatals oversee the construction of designed, built, and operated the grants. In 21 of the 64 participating the physical infrastructure, which is sewage treatment plant. An urban areas, up to 70 percent of then handed over to ULBs to operate. independent project management scheme costs are being financed by The contractor used to build the consultant controlled, supervised, and grants from the National River infrastructure is responsible for reported on the project; the Municipality Conservation Directorate (Government maintenance during the first year, and organized the public mobilization and of India), which provides money for may or may not be reappointed frequently reviewed the project. The water pollution projects. ULBs have depending on performance. In most Government of Tamil Nadu and also raised funds from the World Bank- cases, ULBs continue to contract out TNUIFSL also reviewed the project financed grant component of the Tamil operation and maintenance, even after regularly. A special committee, which Nadu Urban Development Fund. the first year. was formed to monitor the operation of

73 the accounts, brought transparency to the Municipality directly if problems CBOs on managing the facility. The financial transactions. arise. This two-way communication CBO establishes a member register, seeks to ensure the project’s fixes and collects the monthly fees from Mobilization and communication: transparency, accountability, the households, and maintains the Effective and timely communication to and effectiveness. toilets. The Municipality finances the involve key partners and, importantly, construction and connection, while the the people themselves in the initiative, Progress so far: The ongoing project CBO finances the maintenance and formed a key part of the project, (that began in 2000) had in 2005 repairs. There is no connection fee, but especially in the initial phase. connected, in its first phase, nearly a repair fee of Rs 200 (US$4) per The Municipality made a strong and 8,350 of the 23,000 households that connection is collected from each concerted effort in spreading paid for the service. Nearly 500 slum member household. The monthly fees awareness about the project. households out of 7,000 had a are fixed by the local CBO and the An election-style campaign was sewerage connection. A large number charges range from Rs 20 (US$0.44) launched—officials and councilors (43 percent) of slum dwellers have to Rs 50 (US$1.12) per family. traveled in auto rickshaws to inform opted and paid for individual Nonmembers also pay a charge fixed people about the project; local cable sewerage connections. by the CBO, in most cases around Re television networks were roped in; Services for the poor: Even as the 1 (US$0.02) every visit. Fourteen toilets pamphlets in English and Tamil were underground sewerage project of had been constructed in 2005 to serve distributed; and door-to-door Alandur rolled on to provide sewerage poor clusters in the Municipality based canvassing was done with municipal connections to slum households, many on demand articulation by the people. sanitary workers joining hands with poor households that could not afford senior municipal staff to spread the to pay for these services were left out Outcomes message. Active use was made of the of this program. local press. In addition, on-site The public participation component has meetings were held with residents’ The inclusive approach: To ensure triggered an expansion of sewerage associations and the public to explain that the poor or the unreached are not schemes from 14 (out of 794 urban the scope and benefits of the project. excluded from the benefits of this areas across the state, excluding The concerted awareness and sanitation project, the Municipality has Chennai) to 64 urban areas. Moreover, mobilization campaign led to the made provision for community toilets. the project gives equal attention to formation of associations from which Where a need is identified, either by small as well as large agglomerations. two persons were chosen to work part- slum dwellers or by the Municipality, The scheme is in active operation in time to collect deposits and connection public toilets are provided by the one-third of all the areas covered, and fees from the residents. The money Municipality on its land. When located in the investigation, drawing board or was deposited into an account, and relatively close to the sewerage negotiation stage in the remaining status updates were communicated to network, the toilets are connected to it, two-thirds. the public every month. There was thus otherwise septic tanks are used. The full transparency regarding the financial facilities are also provided with water The TWAD is implementing or aspects. The communication has and electricity. coordinating the scheme in 50 out of continued during the implementation 64 urban areas, while Metrowater is phase as well, in the form of a Partnership for the Poor doing so in 11 areas. In Tiruppur, the feedback and grievance redressal This initiative involves civic authorities, New Tiruppur Area Development system. Members of the public can community-based organizations Corporation Ltd—a special purpose voice their concerns through a (CBOs), and the final beneficiaries or vehicle—is implementing the scheme. complaint register that is reviewed daily slum residents. To manage public The Tamil Nadu Government intends to by the project management team and toilets, women’s groups have been gradually expand the scheme to the twice a week by the municipal formed with support from the entire state once its success has commissioner. People can also contact Municipality. The Municipality trains the been proven.

74 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Empowering ULBs: This scheme has interfaced directly with the contractor bank with a nominal interest rate. In put ULBs at the center of planning, on a regular basis. They have such cases, the bank pays the deposit implementation, and maintenance of pressurized contractors to limit works directly to the Municipality. Poor users networked infrastructure. It de facto to one ward at a time so that these are also given the choice of paying in addresses the widespread concern may be quickly completed. All two installments a year (on the pattern that initiatives for local development households in the ward are informed of existing property tax payments). In rarely come from ULBs, which are about impending works and their some cases, poor users have insufficiently consulted on user duration. A citizens’ committee is requested ULBs for a further leeway of charges, property tax, octroi, the set up to monitor the quality of two months, and the latter have optimal role of parastatals in water work, including safety aspects, and complied. Poor users who cannot supply and sanitation services, and regular meetings are scheduled with afford a connection are encouraged to so on. the contractor. use pre-existing public toilets, which will eventually be connected to the new Empowering users: Since the official Rise in property values: Property sewerage system. sanction for the sewerage system of a values have reportedly increased as a city is preceded by actual collections of result of the sewerage scheme. Lessons Learned deposits from users, users are part of Accountability to the poor: The the decision on whether their city needs scheme covers areas that include Success Factors such a system and how much it should concentrations of poor residents. cost. On successful completion users, The scheme has succeeded in invoking Thirty-one of the 64 participating cities municipal councilors, and municipal strong demand and continuing political have slum populations that average officials exude pride and confidence in acceptance throughout the state. A 20 percent of the total population. having successfully achieved a number of factors have been crucial to Nonetheless, the scheme is not challenging, almost unattainable, its attaining this level of credibility. predicated on the concept of differential service for their area. rates for the poor. Officials cite a A strong set of incentives for each More serious study of costs: Since number of reasons to explain the stakeholder: Each set of actors had a there is considerable debate on scheme’s insistence on a strong motivation to ensure the assessee contributions and their nondifferentiated rate for the poor: success of the scheme. Users wanted relationship to total project costs, the improved sanitation services, a better • Urban poor already pay elected representatives who make the environment, and a rise in the value of nondifferentiated per unit rates for decision about the loans to be taken by their property. They also did not want to water and power. ULBs tend to exercise responsible risk being denied a water connection financial planning. For instance, the • Exempting or reducing capital should they not participate. Municipal state government has responded to contributions for any one category councilors felt they could claim requests by ULBs to recost the of users will open a Pandora’s Box personal credit and draw political scheme, in some cases even modifying and radically slow momentum, at a mileage from their role as initiators of the engineering design to reduce costs. time when no city has fully the scheme. ULB officials and the completed a sewerage scheme Government of Tamil Nadu both saw it Collaborating with the contractor: under the new initiative. in their interest to have an expanded Additionally, the collection of user sanitation network to show. The TWAD contributions has tended to put Officials at all levels, however, appear to and Metrowater got more infrastructure pressure on both elected be conscious of the need to fully work to do than ever before. representatives and municipal include all residents in the scheme area functionaries to ensure that the project as far as possible. Thus, in some ULB commitment: The spearheading is completed in a timely and quality municipalities, families that have been role that ULBs have played in moving conscious manner. Alandur’s and unable to pay have been given the the scheme forward is a key element in Valasaravakkam’s ULBs, for instance, option of taking a loan from the local its success—most especially as they

75 have engaged with the public directly were required, such as the ‘Nammake have any enforcement mechanisms and not depended on external Naame’ and World Bank-funded over the parastatals, since monitoring resources, such as consultants and initiatives. Partly for this reason, the and enforcement are performed only by nongovernmental organizations sewerage scheme did not provoke the state legislature, the audit wings of (NGOs). The methods of engaging with resistance from the local political class, the parastatals, and the Department of the public are those that fit with ULBs’ which in other parts of India has often Municipal Affairs. existing institutional arrangements, so sought to gain electoral mileage from they can last over time without external blocking schemes in which the poor No menu of options: There was no inputs or support. are required to pay. The fact that the effort to present users with a menu of maintenance of sewerage assets can desirable and possible options for Residents’ welfare associations: also be taken up under the ‘Namakke urban improvements in their city, Such associations have played a key Naame’, under continuing community which they would like to contribute role in fostering user demand for the participation arrangements, further toward. While the sewerage initiative scheme, and in maintaining pressure to adds to the political and financial sells the idea of the scheme to the move the initiative forward. Not only did attraction of the scheme. populace and encourages them to they spearhead deposit mobilization, make contributions, it does not really they also monitored construction and The sustainability of investments: draw users into a discussion of what forwarded complaints to the ULB, Since operation and maintenance other priorities there might be for including some on the need to better charges are fixed on the basis of actual improvements to their areas. manage roads during sewer installation. costs, ULBs and parastatals have, by Additionally, the project makes no and large, been able to recover The communication and attempt to engage users or their operating costs. Through various mobilization strategy: Public support elected representatives on the measures instituted in the past and user contributions were quickly following issues: (including the threat of severing mobilized due to the scheme’s connections for persistent nonpayment • Whether a sewerage scheme is a innovative and concerted and so on), the proportion of revenue cost-effective solution to the communication strategy. As a result, receipt to billing has been quite high. environmental issues faced by the ULBs were able to assuage public fears Additionally, since the ULB handles town, and whether a centralized or about unaffordability and to appeal to operation and maintenance through decentralized model of sewerage individual assessees’ self-interest. contractors, it has been able to carry treatment should to be adopted. The media also played a key role in out contractual refinements to make mobilizing public opinion in favor • A detailed plan on how to the service more efficient. of the scheme. implement the scheme with the Wide-ranging political support: All least possible inconvenience to the Financial health of the ULBs: Tamil Nadu’s major political groupings public, which includes monitoring Another key innovation in the project is continue to support the program. This and ongoing reporting to the public that it has compelled ULBs to rely on is partly because large-scale public during and after implementation. loans, rather than on government participation allows for a much larger monies. Since these loans have to be • Damages to be paid by the number of such projects to be taken up serviced, there is a pressure on ULBs contractor, by a defined authority in within a shorter span of time, which to be more financially responsible—and the TWAD or Metrowater, and by reflects positively on the political to engage more deeply with respect to ULBs, if members of the public are leadership as well as the bureaucracy. the financing, implementation, and involved in accidents related to the operation and maintenance of Limitations works being implemented. the scheme. Insufficient accountability: As yet, • Continuing reporting to the public The existence of precedents: Tamil the accountability relationship between (perhaps twice a year ahead of Nadu had, for some years, been home ULBs or users and parastatals is still the property tax due date) on to projects in which public contributions very weak. Neither users nor ULBs scheme performance, number of

76 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

connections, per capita wastewater Little involvement by qualified Political and administrative issues treated, untreated discharges, NGOs: Such organizations appear within ULBs: Although the two main treatment standards met, operation to have played a minor role in the political formations in the state have and maintenance costs, user initiative. Were they more involved, broadly shown a commitment to the charges collected, and so on. they might have been a useful reform process, at a local level their • Some form of monitoring by citizens entity in engaging with ULBs and rivalry can affect the functioning of or elected representatives of the parastatals on the technicalities ULBs and the sewerage scheme. treatment plant (problems with involved in the scheme, leading Additionally, protracted vacancies in the access to electricity supply, whether to a better public understanding ULB’s top executive positions can treatment process followed as of all the financial and the other create a vacuum in the ownership and stipulated, and so forth). liabilities involved. implementation of the scheme.

References

• ‘Engaging with Citizens to Improve Services.’ Case Study 4: Participatory Planning and Budgeting in Kerala: The People’s Plan Campaign. Abridged from a study by Anjana Mehta. WSP–SA.

77 Case Study 13

Jamshedpur, India Jamshedpur Utilities and Services Company Limited: Innovative Initiative to Provide Adequate Water

Context and renamed Jamshedpur in tribute to Tata division. However, the company could Steel’s founder Jamshedji Nusserwanji not focus on service delivery within its Background Tata. Spread over an area of 64 sq km, existing corporate structure, which (City and the city has a population of 700,000.70 was not its primary line of business. Jamshedpur has been the only Indian The town division was severely Service Provider) city to be selected UN Global Compact constrained by financial, human City in 2003, winning over Bengaluru resource, and technical limitations The contemporary history of due to the good infrastructure that were hampering the effective Jamshedpur can be traced back to the conditions and quality of life. provision of basic services. early 1990s when the Tata Iron and Steel Works was established in a small Till 2003 municipal services in the city It is in this context that the town of Sakchi, situated in the East were provided by Tata Steel’s town Jamshedpur Utilities and Services Singhbum district of Bihar that later Company Limited (JUSCO), a wholly became a part of the new state of 69 The state of Jharkhand was carved out of Bihar on owned subsidiary of Tata Steel, was 69 November 15, 2000. Jharkhand. In 1919, Sakchi was 70 Census, 2001. set up on August 25, 2003, under the

78 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Box 26: A Private Service Provider Takes the Initiative Key Program and Initiative In an industrial township in Jamshedpur, India, a private service provider (the Highlights Jamshedpur Utilities and Services Company Limited, or JUSCO) has made attempts to provide adequate basic services (water) to urban poor and Situation Prior to the Initiative

informal settlements located outside its industrial area. The trigger for the Tata Steel’s town division had been initiative was the state government’s decision to constitute a municipal providing services to people in areas corporation in this industrial township. This proposal was met with severe outside the Tata command areas. resistance from all sections of the citizenry—the urban poor got together and Known as bagan areas, these are under lease to Tata either industrially or demanded services from JUSCO. In response to the requests, JUSCO residentially and mostly constitute slum started a pilot project that initially covered two slum areas and was colonies and other non-Tata residential subsequently scaled up to cover other settlements. JUSCO is committed to colonies. Water was being supplied extending its service coverage to all currently unserved areas. through public standposts, borewells and hand pumps71 free of charge. The initiative’s success can be attributed to an effective community Additional to these some government agencies including the Public Health mobilization, organization, and consultative process, which has enabled the and Engineering Department and service provider to respond to the needs of slum households. A flexible Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee72 installment-based system has enabled households to pay installation were also providing services in bagan charges. Simple systems and procedures put in place by the service provider areas. The services were intermittent, have streamlined the process of seeking new connections and ensured unreliable, and unsafe.73 Since it took transparency and accountability. over operations in 2003, the utility has been expanding its service coverage to bagan areas.

Table 7: Jamshedpur at a Glance Trigger for the Initiative In the wake of the state government’s City Jamshedpur, Jharkhand, India proposal to constitute a municipal corporation in Jamshedpur that would Total population 700,000 (2001 Census) be responsible for providing basic Service provider and status JUSCO, private service provider services, especially to areas outside the Tata command areas, the residents of bagan areas began demanding piped water connections from the water utility. Companies Act (1956). The company health and horticulture services; The citizens came out in unison against was carved out from Tata Steel’s town construction services; and integrated division and was spun off as a separate facility management. The company serves approximately 500,000 people 71 Standposts (550), borewells (80), hand pumps (150). company with a mandate to improve 72The Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee (JNAC) was with 40,000 water connections of formed in 1924 by the then Bihar state government under the quality of civic services in the state’s Municipal Act though within limited areas of Jamshedpur. It provides which only 20,000 connections supply operation basic services were being taken care of by Tata Steel. JNAC and Tata Steel worked in close comprehensive municipal services in water to Tata employees and the rest collaboration since the inception of the JNAC but the cohabitation did not last long. A little political wrangling in the the city including water and wastewater provide water to non-Tata customers, last half of the 1990s ended it. Tata Steel continued the provision of basic services as allowed by the then Bihar services; management of municipal which is a growing customer base of government, which is now continued by JUSCO. 73 The water supply was below the accepted BIS potable solid waste; power services; public the company. water standards.

79 the state government’s proposal and covering approximately 2.5 sq km and were held between the BAVS and voiced their preference for the city to be a population of 28,050. JUSCO to decide the modalities of the an industrial township rather than a project planning, implementation, and municipal corporation.74 The pilot was initiated with a survey and financing. Once that was done, an mapping of slum colonies and existing undertaking was signed between the The residents of the slum settlements infrastructure. The survey and mapping two project partners. Since the came together and formed a exercise helped the utility estimate the connections were to be made to committee, the Bagan Area Vikas demand for new connections and to individual households, separate Samiti (BAVS), registered as a assess the status of the present contracts were signed with each nongovernmental organization. The infrastructure. The process also helped household or connection required. BAVS had a central committee headed the service provider ascertain the by a president chosen by the residents. project’s technical and financial The water utility has put in place a It was to be the point of contact for the feasibility; it helped estimate additional detailed procedure for seeking and utility in this corporate-citizen water, new infrastructure requirements, providing new connections in the partnership aimed at providing services and approximate project costs. bagan area, which came into effect to the residents of the bagan areas. from November 2004. Scale-up Phase Pilot Initiative • A written request, in a format The water utility started with the pilot The initiative began with a pilot project in Uliyan and Bhatia and soon prescribed by the water utility, is to approach covering a narrow service moved on to other slum settlements be made by prospective customers. area. The rationale for the pilot (see Table 8). The format includes a joint letter approach was to enable the service written by all residents of a colony Community Participation provider to better understand and seeking water supply to their and Financing for address the needs of the slum settlement. This request includes Installation Charges settlement residents and to effectively names and particulars of all deal with any emerging issues or Community participation has been residents who are seeking water problems. The pilot project was a cornerstone of the project connections; it also lists out the launched in Uliyan and Bhatia areas implementation strategy. Discussions terms, conditions, and procedures to be undertaken following the demand for the water connections. Table 8: Scaling up the Pilot Project • A site inspection is then carried out by the utility to establish the viability Area Number of Population Status and feasibility of new water connections connections in the area. Uliyan and Bhatia 5,500 28,050 Completed • Once an affirmative assessment is Ramdeo Bagan 135 786 Completed made, individual customers who Laxmi Nagar 865 6,920 Completed were part of the joint request have to apply separately for their own Teacher’s Colony 100 534 Completed 24 x 7 water connections.

Vidyapati Nagar 488 2,928 Completed • The upfront installation charges are Total 7,088 39,218 to be paid by each prospective customer to the utility. The installation amount varies from colony to colony (from anything 74 The 74th Constitutional Amendment provides for the formation of municipal corporations or, alternatively, industrial between Rs 5,000 to Rs 12,000, or townships where the city has the backing of an industrial house that is willing to provide basic services. US$108–260) and is determined by

80 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

the (a) number of applicants; and additional floor. In some colonies, for Lessons (b) distance from the water tower, instance, in Teacher’s Colony, round-the- which decides the length of the clock-supply residents have to pay Learned: required pipeline. Rs 1,000 to Rs 1,200 (US$23–28) every Enabling Factors month. The water utility proposes to Technical Factors replace the flat-rate system by metered and Constraints Though individual applications are and consumption-based tariffs. made, unless a certain proportion The initiative can teach a few Key Outcomes of payments are received the work important lessons to other government or private utilities that are cannot be commissioned. The How the poor benefited: The initiative trying to reach people in unplanned installation charges are not required to has resulted in expanding the service settlement colonies in cities. be paid upfront in full and the amount area that was traditionally outside the can be paid in installments, which are scope. It has resulted in improved The initiative’s success can be worked out for individual connections access of urban poor or informal attributed to an effective community and colonies. In case applicants settlements to individual level water mobilization, organization, and cannot pay the upfront installation supply, which is of good quality and consultative process, which has charges, free connections have also reliable. In the five bagan areas enabled the service provider to been provided at the sole discretion of covered, the initiative has resulted in respond to the needs of the the managing director of the utility. improved access to water supply for slum households. approximately 7,100 households and Customers from the slum settlements 40,000 people. A flexible installment-based system pay a flat rate of Rs 120 (US$3) per has enabled households to pay month for potable water supplied How the water utility benefited: installation charges. Simple systems three to four times a day for two to The additional service coverage has and procedures put in place by the three hours each. There is an extra increased the revenue of the water service provider have streamlined the charge of Rs 110 (US$2.5) for every company by 8 percent. process of seeking new connections.

References

• Aggrawal, Pronita C. June 2006. Jamshedpur Utilities and Services Company Limited: Improving WSS Services through Private Sector Partnerships. Water and Sanitation Program–South Asia Field Note.

• Benita, S. An unpublished case study on Jamshedpur Utilities and Services Company Limited’s attempts to ensure service delivery for the poor.

81 Case Study 14

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Temeke District: Community-Managed Water and Sanitation Program

Context and provision of WATSAN and related piped water for residents; a survey of services in the city and surrounding 4,000 homes conducted in 2001 Background areas. The privatized utility currently has revealed that only 11 percent of the (City, Urban 86,000 customers; the remaining residents had an individual water unserved population of the city obtains connection and the remaining obtained Poor, and Access water through informal supplies, often water from traditional wells, community of dubious quality and at a price well kiosks, or purchased water from to Services) beyond that paid by the water and privately owned wells or water vendors. sewerage authority’s customers. Sanitation takes the form of poorly built, Dar es Salaam’s population is unmaintained latrines, and open estimated at 2.5–3 million, accounting Temeke is one of three municipalities garbage pits and sewers. According to for approximately 25 percent of that comprise the metropolitan area of the 2001 survey, 78 percent of the Tanzania’s urban population. In the Dar es Salaam. It is organized into residents have access to pit latrines late 1990s, there were 55 informal 24 wards and 97 streets. Though while the remaining are forced to settlements in the city accommodating approximately 50 percent of the capital defecate in the open. Water and approximately 80 percent of the city lives in Temeke, it is extremely sanitation-related illnesses were high in 75 population. The water supply and underserved with respect to basic informal settlements. sanitation services have been in a services. The development of the perennial state of crisis. The Dar es municipality has been unplanned and, Salaam Water and Sewage Authority as a result, overcrowded dwellings 75 Taken from an unpublished situation analysis report, produced by WaterAid-Tanzania, as part of an ongoing (DAWASA) is responsible for the have proliferated. There is virtually no study on private sector participation in Dar es Salaam.

82 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

community, and other actors, leading Box 27: Communities Manage Their Own Water up to a participatory urban appraisal of seven communities. The appraisal The Dar es Salaam Community-Managed Water and Sanitation Program was focused on water needs, resources, implemented in an attempt to address water and sanitation needs of the and local geographic characteristics. peri-urban population in Temeke municipality. The case study illustrates the Once initial relationships were complexity of implementing a community management program in a peri- established and data was collected, a urban environment. It shows that community management within informal workshop was convened to develop a settlements requires a number of strategies, institutions, and agencies to logic model for the program, which ensure an effective and sustainable improvement effort. Inclusion of key identified core problems and related institutions (including government entities at various levels, nongovernmental effects, desired solutions, indicators of organizations, local community-based groups, and citizenry) ensures that the progress and success, and relevant agencies are involved in program development, and that a assumptions and risks. comprehensive support network is available when needed. Project Goals and Approach While this approach is likely to face a number of political, legal, and technical issues that require effective and timely responses, it also demonstrates The Dar es Salaam Community- the potential for creating more sustained efforts, since individual system Managed Water and Sanitation components are created and formed in relation to a larger, more Program was implemented in an integrated system. attempt to address unmet water and sanitation needs of the peri-urban population in Temeke municipality. The primary purpose was to increase Key Program concluded that community access to clean and safe water through management of water was feasible and the creation of procedural systems, and Initiative that sufficient interest existed among stakeholders groups, and the government and community leaders for construction and maintenance of Highlights the effort. WaterAid, with its history of improved hardware. The broader goals working in rural Tanzania, was selected of the project also included improving Trigger for the Initiative to be the program’s facilitating the lives of citizens through increased In 1997, a major drought adversely organization. WaterAid’s work in Dar es economic activity, reducing the impacted Dar es Salaam. Informal Salaam consisted of rehabilitating negative effects of poor water and settlements, already experiencing borewells76 in seven streets in the sanitation on health, and improving limited access to water, descended into informal settlements. social harmony across the community. a state of emergency—prompting the WaterAid proceeded to work with The community management approach United Kingdom’s Department for the Temeke municipality in 1988, to was designed within a demand- International Development (DfID) to develop methodologies that support response framework, stressing the fund the drilling of emergency borewells community groups in managing their importance of community involvement throughout the city. The DAWASA, own water supplies, by organizing in planning and decisionmaking. however, was unable to manage these water user associations in each street. This included an expectation that borewells due to staff and budget Preparatory activities began in citizens contribute money or labor in limitations. The DfID and the DAWASA September 1998 when WaterAid support of needed infrastructure and discussed the possibility of local established contact with a variety of that they provide management and communities managing these directly, stakeholders including government, ongoing support of all developed thereby taking greater responsibility, in systems and hardware. the long term, for supporting their own water needs. The DfID also 76 These boreholes were put into place by the Tanzanian The program focused on 11 streets in government, with UK DfID funding, at the time of the commissioned a study, which drought in 1997. three wards. In the first two years,

83 seven community water supply umbrella structure called the People’s Key Project Strategies schemes77 were constructed, serving Voice for Development (PEVODE) was Mobilization and the development an estimated population of 43,000 developed to help convene members of of WUAs and WUCs: Mobilization residents through a network of the various WUAs and WUCs across was a critical strategy used in the 50 public standposts. Two schemes participating streets. implementation of the program. The were subsequently added, extending Ward- and municipal-level first step was to raise awareness the public standpost network to participants: The Department of among the general population about 72 domestic points. Water, Health, and Community the possibility and requirements of Key Project Partners Development (WAHECO) team managing water systems locally. comprised extension workers from Much of the program’s efforts were From these initial mobilization meetings, government departments assigned to implemented through a large and WUAs were created, consisting of work with specific communities. The diverse set of community and street representatives with an interest in extension agents served as the primary governmental groups, which can be working on water issues. These WUAs link between the municipality and local organized into three functional areas, were responsible for operating and street representatives. The various namely, facilitating organizations, maintaining the water points. This street chairmen, representing community groups, and ward- and included collecting fees for the water government activities at the street level, municipal-level participants. drawn by residents, documenting all were important for mobilizing residents sales transactions and ensuring broken Facilitating organizations: Two and obtaining resources within down pumps were repaired. The fees organizations played key facilitating participating communities. Seen as a collected by the WUA help pay for the roles in the program—WaterAid and critical gatekeeper and known as the costs of repair and maintenance, as Dar es Salaam City Commission. ‘custodian’ of the water infrastructure, well as for the caretaker. WaterAid helped convene groups, program activities were frequently manage discussions related to project required to have this person’s support WUA members subsequently elected design, organize implementation, and and approval before advancing. WUCs—representatives consisting of facilitate networking and coordination among groups; the Dar es Salaam Box 28: Primary Responsibilities of Water User Committees City Commission served as the government’s facilitating organization, calling major stakeholder meetings and • Working with local elected officials and other authorities to ensure coordinating government efforts. construction of the water system. • Involving the community in decisionmaking and representing members of Community-level groups: At the the Water User Associations. community level, a complex set of associations and committees were • Convening and holding biannual community meetings of the Water developed to manage and implement User Associations. project activities. Water User • Establishing a water tariff based on a cost and feasibility assessment. Associations (WUA) comprised community members who stood to • Managing finances related to the local water system. benefit directly from project efforts. • Reporting on financial status to Water User Associations and monitoring Water User Committees (WUC), principal actors. comprising elected individuals from the WUAs, served as the primary • Employing the staff necessary for the daily operations of the community management body. An water system. • Ensuring timely maintenance and repairs.

77 The technology consists of medium-depth boreholes • Supervising and protecting all water sources and collection points. (40-60 meters deep) with electric submersible pumps and an overhead tank serving piped reticulation systems.

84 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

8 to 10 volunteer members, three- federation, the PEVODE, established as Skills and technical assistance fourths of which were required to be an umbrella organization of the training: For the community women. Women were to hold positions community management structures. Its management effort to be successful of treasurer, and either secretary or role involved helping convene members and sustainable, a great deal of training chairperson of the committee. The of various WUAs and WUCs across and technical assistance was required mission of these WUCs was to develop participating streets and to provide a to increase the skills of participating appropriate sustainable water variety of supportive services (including citizens. Basic training in the areas of development plans that were the provision of finance and accounting community mobilization, conflict manageable and affordable for their support to WUCs; training and resolution, group facilitation and respective community. They were support in a number of technical areas training, leadership, project responsible for planning, supervising, including emergency repair of hardware management, gender sensitivity, and coordinating all activities related to systems; establishment of health and bookkeeping, and resource water improvement efforts. Through sanitation committees; organization development was conducted. WUC efforts, citizens were encouraged of ‘development days’ that brought A second major training area focused to make contributions in the form of together project partners to on the development of more money or manual labor for construction demonstrate achievements and technically-oriented skills including and operation and maintenance. discuss ongoing needs; and advocacy facilities construction, operations and for community, city, and national water maintenance, and the monitoring of The street chairmen played an and sanitation policy). water levels and quality. important role in the WUCs’ activities by facilitating community meetings and Health, hygiene and sanitation Training events were frequently exercising their influence to promote education: Hygiene and sanitation repeated to ensure that as new people the program. Community contribution education committees were introduced joined the project and others left, skills targets were established, identifying into the community management were appropriately transferred. A train- the amount of funds required to be programs once the WUAs and WUCs the-trainers approach was utilized with obtained before construction of any were in place. These were established WaterAid training local agency staff water-related hardware could be to help communities use newly who would, in turn, train community initiated in a given street. acquired water and sanitation members. The PEVODE provided resources more effectively, and to training in a number of technical areas When repairs were requested by the improve overall environmental sanitation including emergency repair of hardware WUAs, it was the WUC’s responsibility and hygiene behaviors. The systems, money management, and to contact the appropriate workforce, banking activities. WAHECO also committees were formed with the help and ensure the completion of work. provided training to WUC and WUA of the PEVODE and the WAHECO and Water systems also required that highly members and street government activities focused on training and specialized and technical tasks be officials in participatory development awareness campaigns related to health performed, such as testing water and community mobilization and sanitation behavior, household quality, assessing water table levels, techniques, health and hygiene visits to teach appropriate hygiene and siting of new water points and knowledge and practices, gender practices. The PHAST78 toolkit was the pipes. The Water Authority provided sensitivity, and technical aspects of primary health curriculum utilized by technical expertise and training to constructing and maintaining facilities. WaterAid and WAHECO team to help local resource people in many of structure educational activities. Linkages and support networks: A these areas. carefully arranged network of support The WUAs faced similar problems in and monitoring was established among 78 The Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation relation to operating and maintaining (PHAST) methodology was developed by the World Health participating agencies to ensure the their rehabilitated borewells. To address Organization in 1993. It focuses on changing hygiene proper functioning of committees and a behavior in developing countries through a process of technical and bureaucratic problems, assessing current health and hygiene knowledge, and requisite level of transparency and visualizing and implementing improved hygiene behavior they organized themselves into a best suited for a given community. accountability in program activities. This

85 included maintaining relationships that it was critical for them to become • Water associations and committees between the various committees and independent, registered entities with continued to function effectively and government actors at the ward, legal authority—before the Water accumulate resources. As of May municipal, and street levels. Key Authority became fully privatized. With 2002, Ferry’s WUC had collected monitoring areas included overseeing this legal standing, WUCs would be 1.3 million Tanzanian shillings financial accounting and monetary able to buy and sell bulk water, allowing (US$1,139), and KMB collected procedures, achieving fair communities the ability to manage their 700,000 Tanzanian shillings representation within participating water supply and services independent (US$613). communities, and overseeing the daily of the new private operator. operations and maintenance of newly • New water facilities were One of the most critical installed water points. constructed in communities, accomplishments with regard to the improving the quality of life for The WAHECO team and the municipal development of networks and linkages citizens. In Ferry, eight water points water engineer for Temeke were at the municipal level was the were established, one water tank empowered to conduct a monthly establishment of the Municipal Water constructed, and one borehole examination of financial records for and Sanitation Coordinating drilled. In KMB a borewell, tank, and each WUC. The street government Committee. This group was established several water points were in chairperson exercised his right to to link participating agencies and progress as of November 2002. monitor all water selling procedures organizations at the municipal level to • Populations with access to safe and expenditure along with an address water and sanitation in a water points greatly increased. independent controller appointed by collaborative and systematic manner. Ferry’s water points served 4,000 the WUC. Additionally, audits were citizens (formerly, there were no conducted twice yearly by an auditor WaterAid played a central role in the safe, functioning communal water assigned by the district zonal director. development and arrangement of the points in that street) and though The WAHECO team also provided a various stakeholders into a support KMB did not have newly established critical link between the ward-level network for the community water points as of November 2002, government and streets to ensure management effort. It facilitated a plans were in place for developing consistency between municipal- and broad, collaborative agenda that enough to serve 5,000 people. street-level water and sanitation plans. incorporated the strengths of WAHECO further assisted in supporting participating institutions, helping to • Improved sanitation was also the health of inter-group relationships define roles and ensuring that a system observed in KMB. This included by holding regular meetings with the was in place for monitoring the integrity the building of one ECOSAN toilet WUCs and street government officials and transparency of the initiative. and the addition of toilets in to resolve any emerging problems and local schools. when critical project decisions were Key Outcomes • Due to the PHAST interventions, made. The Water Authority’s The program achieved a number of health committee work, and the involvement also served important successes, including accomplishments implementation of CtC, safe linkage functions. WAHECO’s extension related to the establishment and water handling and storage team provided ongoing technical functioning of water associations and activities improved. support to WUAs and WUCs on issues committees; increased access to related to water, sanitation, health, and • The program saw significant levels water; improvements in sanitation, community development. At the time of of involvement by women and hygiene and health; and increased the program’s implementation, the children in their water and sanitation involvement of women and children in Water Authority was in the process of activities. Women hold officer the water and sanitation efforts.79 becoming privatized. When WaterAid positions in their water committees, and the WUC members became aware and in KMB, the women’s of this change in status, they realized 79 This section is based on data for two streets, namely, Ferry and Keko Mwanga B (KMB). committee from the PEVODE has

86 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

helped to establish an active and Political interference: Because water second strategic move in effect growing women’s water group. committees enjoyed no legal standing protected the WUAs from the threat of as independent organizations with privatization and allowed communities • The institutionalization of the decisionmaking authority, tensions to continue managing and investing in community management model emerged between street-level their own water management system. through the Water Users government officials and the WUCs. Constitution provides opportunities Collaboration and coordination: The Street leaders attempted to use their for replication in other areas of sheer number of collaborative partners authority for political or financial gain. Dar es Salaam and urban or peri- also caused problems and, at times, The involvement of street chairpersons urban centers. hindered progress. The PEVODE, for in decisionmaking efforts also resulted example, found that working with the in the perception that the water system Challenges for Water Authority caused delays in the and related activities were being used repair of water systems since spare the Program for political patronage. Due to the parts were required to go through the potential influence of street latter rather than to the former directly. The Dar es Salaam Community- chairpersons, both direct and indirect, Trusting collaborative relationships Managed Water and Sanitation their participation needed to be between the government and Program experienced a number of managed. Other concerns were raised communities took time to develop. The significant challenges in its efforts to in relation to the Water Authority’s WUCs did not want to show WAHECO achieve the program’s objectives. impending privatization, with fears their accounting books and did not Some of the major challenges reflected being expressed about potential acknowledge it as an authority in water issues of community mobilization, seizures of water facilities by the private systems management. WAHECO, political interference, and difficulties operator, effectively stripping the power however, worked hard to make its related to group coordination and authority of the WUAs to manage presence known in communities and and collaboration. community water points. was able to establish trust with the Mobilization: Certain segments of the Many of these challenges were WUCs over time. Coordination and community were difficult to mobilize addressed legally and statutorily. collaboration was also important to due to past experiences with The WUAs became independent lessen the duplication of effort and to development projects or concerns that community-based organizations, with ensure greater efficiency. This required the focus of this program might be clear independence from the street work on the development of clear roles water-related commercial activities. government. The organizations and responsibilities and a great deal of A great deal of distrust was initially developed a Constitution that was ongoing inter-group dialog. However, expressed about the program due to a adopted by all stakeholders and this remained an area of some difficulty, large number of failed development created binding bylaws that governed at times straining relationships and projects in the past. Water vendors activities. The Constitution articulated leading to confusion regarding who raised concerns that the program the democratic nature of the WUAs, was responsible for what areas. would compete directly against their and defined the roles and interests and they, therefore, did not responsibilities of all parties (including Lessons Learned want to participate. Some of these the WUC, the street government, the concerns stemmed from a lack of A number of important lessons were municipal engineer, and other understanding about the potential learned through the examination of this stakeholders). It further outlined the benefits of the program to water users project’s efforts. and vendors. In response, WaterAid, consequences of not meeting WAHECO, and street government described expectations and Community management programs representatives engaged in an intensive accountabilities. The WUAs also must fit within larger policy information dissemination effort, which applied for the legal right to buy water frameworks: A clear understanding of was largely successful in changing in bulk from the Water Authority and to national and local policy frameworks public opinion. sell this to community members. This within which a program operates

87 greatly contributes to the project’s A broad, cross-sector network is Capacity building for community success. Since the program partners essential for sustainable management requires time: In the understood government policies and the community management present case, developing and training role these played in water and sanitation schemes: In a community the WUAs and WUCs, and the PEVODE efforts, they were able to leverage management initiative, it is not enough infrastructure took a great deal of time to intervene with water users alone. and effort. Included in this process was WAHECO extension workers and the Programs must involve all relevant the development of formal structures, Water Authority’s employees to provide stakeholders, including all government skill development, policy formation, technical assistance to communities. and community-based organizations collaboration with other entities and, Having an understanding of policies and engaged in similar efforts, to ensure finally, implementation. Such efforts their implications allows implementers to that broad support is secured. necessarily take time, particularly when be aware of potential political threats to Community management also the groups are newly formed. A program efforts. requires ongoing and intensive efforts minimum of two to three years may be to maintain network relationships needed before achievements will At the time of the program’s and involvement. become apparent. implementation, the Water Authority was in the process of becoming privatized. A variety of skills—including Careful selection of a facilitating When WaterAid and the WUC members community mobilization, skill building, organization is critical to success: became aware of this change in status, technical assistance, training in WaterAid brought to the effort a deep financial management and banking, knowledge and understanding of they realized that it was critical for them health and hygiene education, community management efforts and to become independent, registered operations and maintenance of processes, strong facilitation skills, and a entities with legal authority before it physical structures, and so on—are clear methodology for coordinating the became fully privatized. required for such a program to be program’s development and successful. Given the diversity of implementation. In addition, it was With this legal standing, WUCs would expertise needed, the participation of viewed as being relatively neutral among be able to buy and sell bulk water, a host of agencies was required, the various participating agencies, which allowing communities the ability to mandating that significant resources is essential for developing trust and manage their water supply and be spent on simply managing the motivating organizations with often services independent of the new network of participants to ensure their competing interests to work toward the private operator. lasting and meaningful participation. realization of larger objectives.

References

• Calaguas, Belinda, and Virginia Roaf. ‘Access to Water and Sanitation by the Urban Poor.’ Paper presented at Development Studies Association Conference, Manchester, September 2001. Available online at http://www.devstud.org.uk/publications/papers/ conf01/conf01calaguas.doc

• Dar es Salaam Community-Managed Water and Sanitation Program: A Case Study for the Water for People and the Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of International Affairs under Water for Africa Program.

• Glöckner, Heike, Meki Mkanga, and Timothy Ndezi. ‘Local Empowerment through Community Mapping for Water and Sanitation in Dar es Salaam.’ Environment and Urbanization 2004, 16: 185.

88 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Case Study 15

Tegucigalpa, Honduras Water for All: Community- Managed Water Services

The expansion of water and sanitation Entity (ERSAPS) and National Water Context and infrastructure and delivery of services to and Sanitation Council (CONASA), Background (City, peri-urban neighborhoods has proved which have sector coordination and difficult due to their location (above the planning functions. The utility, by and Service Provider, official height limit of ‘1,100 meters large, makes systems available to and Peri-Urban above sea level’ for providing communities that have water sources infrastructure), higher associated costs capable of meeting the demand for Neighborhoods) of installing necessary infrastructure water for at least the next 20 years. (such as multiple pumping stations), The paradox of low-income peri-urban Current estimates place the population history of informal development, and communities is that they pay up to of Tegucigalpa to be approximately illegal land tenure. It is estimated that 100 times more for unreliable service 1.1 million80 and it is estimated that the approximately 38 percent of the city’s of poor quality as compared to city’s population will double over households are not connected to the communities connected to the formal the next 25 years. Approximately formal piped water supply system. system. In 2005, SANAA registered 40 percent of Tegucigalpa’s residents The National Autonomous System of 113 communities serviced by water live in peri-urban neighborhoods81 that Aqueducts and Sewers (SANAA) is the trucks, either privately operated or have developed informally, often on governmental entity charged with the owned by it. While these trucks pay steep hillsides surrounding the city. responsibility of executing, operating, approximately Lps. 0.025 (US$0.001) and maintaining water and sewerage per gallon, they sell water to poor systems in Tegucigalpa. It is regulated households at Lps. 0.40 (US$0.02) per 80 UN-Habitat, 2003. 81 Approximately 350 in number. by the Water and Sanitation Regulatory gallon. Based on these figures and the

89 Tegucigalpa for management and was Box 29: Collaborative Initiative used to leverage additional bilateral financing from the governments of The ‘Water for All’ initiative has been in operation in Tegucigalpa, Honduras Taiwan, Canada, Holland, and Japan. since 1987. The program, a collaborative initiative between the government The result was the establishment of a service provider, National Autonomous System of Aqueducts and Sewers legal foundation, entitled ‘Agua Para (SANAA), UNICEF, and the private sector was aimed at addressing the Todos’ or ‘Water for All’. service delivery gap to marginalized peri-urban neighborhoods. To date, the Each collaborating partner involved Executing Unit for Settlements in Development, a special unit that was contributes distinct components to created within SANAA, has constructed 116 small-scale water supply the model based on its skills and systems benefiting an estimated 80,000 residents (approximately 30 percent) expertise: the Agua Para Todos of the city’s peri-urban communities. Foundation finances physical infrastructure and uses its knowledge The key features of these models are community participation through the of the private sector to source required establishment of Water Administration Boards, a revolving fund that allows for materials at affordable prices; the cost recovery of capital costs from beneficiaries and user charges for UEBD83 takes a proactive role in the water use. participating communities and is responsible for community mobilization, The model demonstrates how low-income communities can be valuable undertaking project programming, partners in decentralized service delivery where communities manage implementation, supervision of operations locally. construction, and capacity building of the Water Administration Board; and UNICEF funds technical assistance and number of water trucks in operation, it Key Program promotes a hygiene education program is estimated that the residents of in the target communities. Tegucigalpa’s peri-urban communities or Initiative spend between US$6.9–9 million Program Strategies dollars annually, which is up to nine Highlights The small water supply systems times the average annual revenue developed by the UEBD, under the generated by the utility. Water for All aegis of the ‘Water for All’ initiative, In response to the lack of basic In 1987, to address the service delivery integrates community participation services and poor environmental gap to marginalized peri-urban through the Water Administration conditions in peri-urban neighborhoods, a collaborative initiative Board, cost sharing, and a revolving neighborhoods, the utility has was launched by the water utility, fund that allows for cost recovery of 82 attempted to make its policies flexible UNICEF, and the private sector. A capital costs. to ensure access in a viable and distinct subdivision, Executing Unit for sustainable manner. Alternative Settlements in Development (UEBD), The most important component of solutions to water service delivery have was established within the utility for these models is a significant been initiated to address the service program implementation. The secured component of community participation. gap including the ‘Water for All’ (‘Agua seed funding for the program To achieve community acceptance and Para Todos’) program and the recently (approximately US$400,000) was to ensure sustainability, the UEBD launched ‘Water for Life’ (‘Agua Para transferred to the private sector partner, places emphasis on organizing the Vivir’) initiative. These alternative Chamber of Commerce and Industry of community and creating a Water programs have been developed as provisional projects in the expectation 82 The private sector involved in the partnership included the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tegucigalpa, the Honduran that a definite solution will be provided Council for Private Enterprise, the Association of Communication Media, and the Televicentro Corporation. 83 In areas where the National Autonomous System of Aqueducts and Sewers (SANAA) does not operate the systems, in the middle or long term. nongovernmental organizations assist a dialog between the community and SANAA with the objective of initiating collaboration.

90 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Box 30: Small Water Supply Systems for Peri-Urban Communities

The Executing Unit for Developing Neighborhoods (UEBD) is executing a series of projects in which small water supply systems are constructed for peri-urban communities, including the following:

Direct water sale from the main network to communities through a meter: The UEBD has executed several autonomous projects connected to the main supply network of the city. This model involves connecting to the main supply network, a system of secondary networks that feed one or more public tanks so that users receive a direct service from the city’s network. In many cases, house connections have been made, where consumption is measured with macrometers. This system needs storage tanks, macrometers, secondary networks, and public or community cisterns. The UEBD has also developed many systems that are supplied by wells where water is pumped to a storage tank for ongoing distribution. The UEBD has built 95 such systems covering 28,985 houses and benefiting 176,913 persons in peri-urban neighborhoods.

Consumption is invoiced through a macrometer, which registers the consumption of the entire community. The Water Administration Boards (JAAs), or councils of the neighborhood, are responsible for the maintenance and operation of secondary networks, including the collection of user charges. The amount charged covers the operating and administrative costs, the payment of the water bill as measured by the macrometer. and the payment to a revolving fund, which finances projects for five to 10 years, free of interest. When the JAA makes full payment to the fund, the UEBD provides confirmation to the commercial area of the National Autonomous System of Aqueducts and Sewers to establish the rate to be charged subsequently.

Community tanks supplied by tank cars for ongoing distribution: Another system that the UEBD is implementing in peri-urban neighborhoods that are distant or have difficult access is the communal water tank supplied by cistern-cars. It is considered as a provisional solution in cases where it is not feasible to connect to city-level water networks. Water supply by cistern-cars results in higher costs than the previous system since cistern-cars need fuel for transportation. This system needs storage tanks (supplied by tank cars), secondary networks, and public or community cisterns. A variant of this system is one that has a reservoir (storage tank) supplied with water by a tank truck, which subsequently feeds public tanks through secondary networks. Twenty-one such projects have been implemented, supplying water to more than 59,232 persons (9,872 households). The JAAs are responsible for administering the system, delegating the duty to ensure an ongoing supply through tank cars and for collecting water expenses from the population.

Administration Board (JAA) or a community JAAs have been formed new system (this stood at US$ 42 and neighborhood council for managing the across a large number of communities. 26 days of labor per household in one water supply systems. community).84 A system of public taps The JAA mobilizes and organizes or individual household connections are To be eligible for the program, community residents, and works in created and the consumption is communities are required to establish a collaboration with the UEBD for the measured by a macrometer. The JAA JAA, consisting of a group of men and construction of small, networked water operates and maintains secondary women, selected by community supply systems. Each provides a networks and collects water usage members through popular vote. predetermined amount in the form of charges. Assigned tariffs cover the To ensure that such JAAs remain their labor toward the construction of a administrative and operating costs, the integrated with the community, their membership is required to change every two years. However, an individual 84 To facilitate system expansion as urbanization rates continue to rise is a challenge for the Water Administration Boards given the capital investment required. To this extent, a practice commonly employed is to categorize a household requiring a new connection who is already a member of the JAA and levy associated charges for its inclusion in the network. In one peri-urban community, US$212 is levied on a household belonging to an existing family of the community, which participated in the construction of the network and provided the financial may be re-elected for an additional contribution, US$318 to newly-arrived households, and US$477 to households that opted not to participate in the initial construction phase or contribute financially. The latter charge is intentionally very high in order to promote widespread community engagement in term. In some communities inter- system development from the outset and prevent the creation of free riders.

91 payment of the water bill from the water other words, to develop a ‘culture Lessons Learned utility or localized small-scale vendors,85 of water’. and repayment to a revolving fund86 Constraints There was a significant lack of that finances these projects without understanding of the physical interest for five to 10 years. JAAs are • There is often a conflict in many logistics, financial costs, and communities between the JAA also responsible for securing necessary environmental impact involved in the and the local patronato (a Local land for placement of holding tanks. successful delivery of water and Development Committee that exists Certain groups of the community may sanitation services. Water in every municipality in Honduras) not be charged for the services, conservation was ‘non-existent’ and for the right to operate water including the elderly, schools, or many did not comprehend why water, systems. Its governing board is churches in which case the costs which is viewed as a natural gift, selected by community members are borne by the general community should carry a cost. This resulted in and represents community interests through their payments some households that were within their respective municipalities. to a JAA. connected to the network to choose Given their legal status, patronatos This peer-selected group is trained by not to prioritize payment for services, are also the official means by which the utility, encompassing key aspects or allow monthly billing to accumulate a community can obtain financial, of tariff setting, considerations for over time to a sizeable amount. JAAs technical, and other support from system operation and maintenance, are strongly placed to act as municipal, private, and national disinfection practices, network important agents of social change authorities to implement local expansion, and general administration within low-income communities and development projects. To this of the JAA. The JAA is responsible for to propagate new approaches to extent, many patronatos perceive decisions on appropriate technology, water management. that JAAs infringe upon their legal operation and maintenance of the new status within a community and their JAAs operate like socially-minded systems, tariff collection, and overall ability to assume operational legitimate businesses, where administration. According to the United responsibilities within the ‘investors’ are the community Nations (1998), JAAs are often ‘the first water sector. Conversely, JAAs members themselves to whom the type of organizations to achieve argue that the key difference JAAs are accountable, and from improvements for the community’. between the two organizations is whom they receive the social the unilateral focus that JAAs have Although varying in size and capacity acceptance and financial backing on water issues and the fact that all based on community engagement necessary to provide service delivery funds are singularly invested in levels, the JAA assumes responsibility at affordable costs. water sector-related initiatives. for the planning, implementation, and • Each JAA exhibits unique strengths, management of water and sanitation Outcomes weaknesses, and approaches to systems while also promoting management methods based appropriate patterns of use and To date, the UEBD has benefited an largely on its composition. providing technical support within and estimated 80,000 residents of Undeniably, not every JAA beyond their communities on issues of Tegucigalpa through engagement with possesses the capacity to operate plumbing and water treatment. Another over 116 JAAs, representing some and maintain a water supply important role they play is to assist in 30 percent of the city’s peri-urban system. There are certain limitations: the social outreach and awareness communities, with an investment of while some succeed in providing building of water service delivery—in approximately US$8.7 million.87 excellent service to their communities, others fail. Central to 85 The Water Administration Boards are not under any obligation to purchase their water from the utility, and may opt to buy from localized small-scale vendors. this dichotomy is the notion of 86 These investment costs are then repaid by participating communities, without interest, over a period of three to seven years. 87 UNICEF 2005; BDP, 2006; SANAA, 2006. community leadership, which is

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fundamental to the sustainability of scale of collaboration utilized in this learned from analyzing best practice any JAA. There is no profit model points to how service providers cases and synthesizing their motivation or other tangible reward or utilities might approach the characteristics into a formalized for participating and volunteering expansion of system networks to urban platform on which decentralization with JAAs, making them reliant on poor communities that will be processes for low-income urban the commitment and personal drive necessary with unabated urban growth. settlements could rest. Those JAAs of participating individuals. While Through the effective use of public- exhibiting sound management there are numerous success stories private partnerships, service providers practices have succeeded in emerging from efficient and well- or utilities could feasibly harness the providing 24-hour chlorinated organized JAAs, a lack of necessary technical and financial service at reasonable tariffs, which support necessary to expand services institutionalization and dependence allow for the system’s sustainability to marginalized communities where on personality-driven leadership and expansion. In the Tegucigalpa operations can be locally managed. is a limitation. neighborhood of Villa Cristina, for Further, the ability to recover capital example, the JAA charges • The legality of the plots of land is investments through cost recovery approximately US$5 every month to one of the most frequent mechanisms should provide an each household that covers water obstacles encountered by the water incentive to service providers or utilities consumption, and all related costs utility’s UEBD, nongovernmental to consider adopting such models as including operations, energy organizations (NGOs), and they assume control of water and other institutions working in sanitation systems in urban areas. consumed at pumping stations, these neighborhoods. monthly salaries of seven support It is not enough to construct staff, and the financing of system Learnings autonomous water systems; it is expansion to vacant land with indispensable to ensure the existence capacity for 350 households. The ‘Water for All’ model serves as a of units that will manage them with strong example of how low-income efficiency. JAAs and neighborhood Given the movement toward urban communities can take ownership councils have shown tremendous decentralization in Honduras, of development processes and be potential to effectively manage local it is in the best interest of the valuable partners in decentralized level water delivery systems if provided Honduran government and the service delivery. These systems are the right inputs through promotional community to actively engage very close to having access to a activities, capacity building, and with the JAA, and to ensure its conventional house connection. The monitoring mechanisms. Much can be operational effectiveness.

References

• Dickson, Eric. November, 2006. Tegucigalpa: Management Models of Water and Sanitation: Approaches to Decentralization in Honduras. Urban Poverty and Environment Report Series 4. Urban Poverty and Environment Program.

• Rivera, Kenneth. May 2006. Improving Water Supply, Sanitation and Health Services for Low-Income Urban Communities in Latin America: Tegucigalpa Case. Field Research in Seven Latin American Cities.

93 Case Study 16

Lima, Peru Programs to Serve the Poor Urban Areas of Lima: Alternative Water Management Models

Context and Callao.88 The city has experienced industry) as well as by domestic unplanned spatial expansion and effluents, pesticides, and agricultural Background demographic explosion. drainage is limiting its use. In addition to the permanent water shortage in the Lima and Callao (referred to as Lima) is (Country, City, city, particularly during summer, water the second-largest desert city in the supply is also affected by droughts. and Service world, after Cairo. Water has always Provider) been a great concern in Lima as it is Since the 1950s, there has been a located in a dry region with low rainfall growth of informal settlements in Lima, the capital of Peru, is located levels (an average of 0 to 10 ml a year). the urban fringe of Lima. Informal on the central coast, between the Although the Rímac, Chillón, and Lurín settlements are inhabited by Andes Mountains and the Pacific Rivers cross the city, their volume of new immigrants and are called Ocean. Over 8 million people, water is low and varies seasonally. The shanty towns. approximately 29 percent of Peru’s Rímac89 basin is a significant water The main actors in the water and population (27,219,264 inhabitants), source, but high contamination caused sanitation sector in Lima are the live in Metropolitan Lima and by industries (especially the mining Drinking Water and Sewage Company of Lima (SEDAPAL, S.A.); the National 88 The Region of Metropolitan Lima has 7,237,745 inhabitants and 43 districts while the Callao region has 811,874 and six districts. Superintendence of Sanitation Services 89 The Rímac River has a greater volume of water during summer months because this period coincides with the rainy period in the Andean area. (SUNASS); the councils of the region;

94 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

and several civil organizations and para la Vida, an important (SEDAPAL) (2005), 90 percent of the community groups. A conventional nongovernmental organization (NGO) population of Metropolitan Lima and management model prevails in Lima, in promoting better water access, only Callao has access to drinking water which the supplier is a public company 40 percent of councils carry out any and 85.5 percent to sewage systems. that distributes water through primary type of activity related to trucked water According to SEDAPAL’s PAC and secondary networks. distribution (such as surveillance of (Coverage Expansion Program), there is water spouts and police raids)— an unserved market of 750,000 The SEDAPAL is a public company 20 percent make arrangements inhabitants, which is currently supplied that provides water and sanitation with the water company, and by aguateros who distribute water from services in Lima. It is a state-owned 28 percent do not carry out any tank trunks in poor conditions, at company subject to private law, which related activity. inappropriate hours and at high prices. was established as a stock corporation According to Fomento para la Vida, with administrative and financial Civil organizations are key actors in there are 1,104,755 people living in autonomy. It has a board of urban poor shanty towns. For example, settlements in Lima who are supplied shareholders (with two members) and a ECO CIUDAD provided technical by tank trucks. The conditions of tank board of directors (with six members) and social assistance for the trucks and other water sources (water appointed by the National Fund for implementation of the Drinking Water spouts) are very poor. People living in Financing State’s Business Activities for Shanty Towns (APPJ) project. This neighborhoods without water have to (FONAFE). Its coverage extends to the organization has been working with walk long distances on foot to find Province of Lima and the Constitutional low-income communities, and currently water, and costs paid to suppliers Province of Callao. Its jurisdictional promotes small credit for water (tanks or trucks) are very high. The scope includes the 49 districts of networks and encourages training to poorest groups living in the urban fringe Metropolitan Lima, 43 of which are bring about cultural changes. It also end up paying up to 10 times more under its management while six promotes the recycling of greywater than common water users. This are administered by their own through natural systems to irrigate situation made it imperative to develop municipalities. The water and sewage green areas in several urban districts. sustainable local models tailored company has triple regulation and The Foro Ciudades para la Vida is an association of 83 civil society to the real needs of the urban control: (a) as a public company, it is institutions (including universities, poor community. regulated by the Ministry of Economics municipalities, private organizations, through the public office FONAFE; and NGOs) that has been promoting Key Program (b) as a water and sanitation company, sustainable development in 29 cities it is regulated by SUNASS; and (c) by and Initiative of Peru since 1996. Alternativa also the Ministry of Housing, Construction, participated in social promotion Highlights and Sanitation, the body that governs and technical training in different the water and sanitation sector. settlements of the districts of The APPJ and the Poverty Eradication SUNASS is the entity in charge of Carabaillo, Ancón, and Ventanilla under Program in Poor Urban Areas of regulating and supervising services the APPJ. It plays a part in the Poverty Metropolitan Lima (PROPOLI) are Eradication Program for Poor Urban nationwide. It regulates and oversees two successful examples of local water Areas of Metropolitan Lima. Fomento the provision of sanitation services at management models. The Coverage para la Vida has also Expansion Program is a utility-led national level in order to ensure that played a significant role in the initiative to ensure access of these are rendered with adequate systematization of data on the water supply and sanitation in quality, coverage, and prices. population without water and sewage, unconnected neighborhoods. Local governments participate, and on water quality monitoring. The APPJ is a pioneering initiative in though partly, in the supply of water According to Servicio de Agua Potable terms of its massive implementation to communities without house y Alcantarillado de Lima/The Drinking and community management system. connections. According to Fomento Water and Sewage Company of Lima It is an experience of public-private

95 partnership devoted to the organized as a company and generates was implemented in 2003 following an development of capacities among a model for cost-effective provision of agreement between the European urban poor communities to manage basic services, which can even Union and the Ministry of Women’s basic services locally. The program was generate profits to be reinvested. Made Affairs and Social Development. The initiated in 1993 in an emergency, to up of users, these committees were in program has a time span of five years fight a cholera epidemic. The project charge of managing the supply system. (2003–2008) and is being implemented lasted seven years (1993-2001)90 and The model needs a management team in 10 poor urban districts of benefited 337,500 inhabitants. It that perceives its work as more than an Metropolitan Lima, targeting slightly involved building autonomous drinking economic activity and proposes an more than 3.1 million people. water systems in peri-urban areas, integral approach to water and its which were earlier not served by the effects. The communities that have The participation of the community and water utility. The APPJ was a bilateral adopted this type of systems not only community organizations is essential. program involving the European Union satisfy a need, but also gain new skills The training of water watchers, Vigías and the water utility as a counterpart of to manage other services. Another del Agua, has ensured that they have the Peruvian government. Both parties important aspect of this project gained experience in measuring water signed a tripartite agreement with has been its adaptation to local quality, controlling the quantity of the local municipality prior to the contingencies and needs throughout chlorine in the water supplied by tank implementation of works. the program implementation phase. trucks. This initiative has led to the legal institutionalization of two committees The project was managed by a This model has shown that building through district ordinances. management unit (European and autonomous drinking water systems is national codirector appointed by the not enough; it is essential to ensure the The Coverage Expansion Program water utility) and an advisory committee existence of units that manage them (PAC) is an initiative to ensure access made up of representatives of the efficiently. Good system management of water supply and sanitation in participating bodies—CENCA Urban requires higher investments in unconnected neighborhoods. It is an Development Institute, SEDAPAL, promotion, training, follow-up, and initiative led by the water utility with the ministries, and NGOs—who gave their monitoring activities of organizations in financial support of the World Bank.92 consent to the works. Works were charge of administering the systems. It involves the construction of implemented by the beneficiaries who The main objective of the PROPOLI condominial networks instead of were represented by the governing program is to integrate the poorest traditional network systems.93 The board of the settlement, the district population into the development municipality, the water utility, and condominial water and sewage processes of its districts with local project staff. system delivers services to each governments as strategic partners. housing block or group of dwellings— The most crucial component of this PROPOLI’s activities are implemented condominiums—rather than to each model is the participation of the under four components: (a) citizen housing unit. Thus, the required length community through the participation of participation and institutional of the network is considerably shorter civil organizations91 and the Drinking strengthening; (b) training for income than that of a conventional system, and Water Surveillance and Administration generation; (c) equal opportunities; and this, in turn, allows branches to adapt Committee (COVAAP)—the latter is (d) health and sanitation. The program to local topographic conditions. This type of system is based on the 90 It consisted of three phases: (a) initial phase (August 1993 to December 1993); (b) transition and adjustment phase (January 1998 to September 1998); and (c) final phase (October 1998 to March 2001). 91 The institutions that have participated in the APPJ are: Alternativa (Center for Social Research and Education for the Poor), APDES (Social Promotion and Development Association), CEPROMUP (Center for the Promotion of Poor Women), CENCA (Urban 92 SEDAPAL invests US$10 million and World Bank US$20 Development Institute), CIDAP (Population Research, Documentation and Consultancy Center), CIDEPROC (Research, Project million for the first phase. Development and Training Center), CIPUR (Research and Regional Urban Projects), CCODEINGESA, ECO CIUDAD, ISU CIUDAD 93 The condominial system is commonly used in Brazil. See (Urban Development Institute), IDEAS (Investigation, Documentation, Education, Advice and Services), IPES (Informal Economy Melo, José Carlos. 2005. La experiencia de los sistemas de Promotion Institute), KALLPA (Association for the Promotion of Health and Development), MORAY, OACA (Environmental Advice aguas y alcantarillado condominiales en Brasil. Water and Office), SEA (Educational Services El Agustino), and SER (Rural Education Services). Sanitation Program–Latin America, LEDEL SAC, Lima, Perú.

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decentralization of water supply Lessons Learned: nonusers’ representatives—are agents or sewage treatment facilities to with knowledge, resources, and rights. avoid costs associated with the Enabling Factors Their active participation in the transportation of fluids over long governing boards and the creation of and Constraints forums for consensus that take into distances. Another important aspect of consideration their points of view are condominial systems is that they The PAC and the APPJ are two fundamental to engender appropriate develop a much closer relationship interesting management models that political decisions. The experiences of can be replicated in other cities. Their between service providers and users, Alternativa, ECO-CIUDAD, CENCA, adaptation to social and physical thus encouraging both parties to come Fomento para la Vida, Foro Ciudades conditions, the promotion of to an agreement to facilitate service para la Vida, and IPROGA, among community participation in the expansion and adaptation to local other small- and medium-scale management, control and use of needs and constraints. experiences, prove that cooperation resources, the encouragement of new mechanisms and management models local leadership and greater The condominium becomes a physical can work efficiently. commitment of the population, and the unit of service provision and a social lower costs of these methodologies New technologies: New technologies unit for facilitating collective decisions and technologies turn these systems must be creatively sought to obtain and organizing communal actions. into practical and real alternatives to more sustainable models with higher These systems are as much as address the unsatisfied needs of the impact. The experience of condominial 30–50 percent more economical than population in terms of drinking water systems is an interesting and low-cost conventional systems and are key and sanitation. alternative. Furthermore, the need to promoters of community participation, strengthen innovation capacities and These alternative programs involve and specifically of water and sanitation generate synergies among existing all actors and incorporate new committees that are efficient in knowledge is perceived. It is necessary technologies at lower costs in to develop technologies that take into resource management. In addition, comparison with conventional systems. consideration the region’s topography they contemplate the adaptation to Associative management models and resources. land and social conditions, and suggested by the APPJ and PAC bring promote the wise use of resources as greater sustainability due to the Legal framework: Forums for open well as capacity building. The participation of communities and the discussion must be created to establish application of this new methodology incorporation of alternative technology. appropriate basic rules tailored to the and technology implies a cultural Furthermore, in the long term, they water and sanitation demand of the change, not only among users with have brought about a positive change unserved peri-urban segment. Rules in people’s habits as well as in internal respect to hygiene habits, water use, are needed that acknowledge and organizational structures. and payment practices, but especially legitimize alternative service among the utility’s technicians and These leading initiatives proactively management models at the community professionals who are used to the established cooperation relationships level (such as the COVAAP). conventional system. with other institutions, thus minimizing Considering that Lima is the second- the traditional ‘clientelism’ between the driest city of the world, it is necessary Most residents have not only installed a population and the authorities and to review and amend the General Law faucet, but also kitchens and full generating new local initiatives. on Water at the national level in the light bathrooms. Currently, bids are being Success and sustainability indicators of the region’s critical situation and from called for other projects in order to in relation to these initiatives are a comprehensive perspective on the scale up the program and reach as follows: management of hydrographic basins. 30,000 connections (equivalent to Involvement of civil society: Institutional framework and 230 settlements) by 2008. Civil organizations—and users’ and management models: The services

97 provided by public utilities are model alternative (for example, the doubled in 25 years. Therefore, inefficient and do not satisfy people’s COVAAP). It is necessary to have it is essential to invest in needs. To make services profitable, greater sector regulation and to infrastructure and services. The public-private partnerships are recommend a clear state policy with establishment of more equitable recommended. The participation of realistic goals. rates that take into consideration direct actors in the provision of Financing models: The population users’ financial resources and services is a successful management of Metropolitan Lima has almost water needs is under discussion.

References

• Urquiza, Gastón, IIED-AL, with the collaboration of Andrea Tammarazio. June 2006. Field Research in Seven Latin American Cities, Improving Water Supply, Sanitation and Health Services for Low-Income Urban Communities in Latin America. BPD Water and Sanitation, WSP–LAC.

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Case Study 17

Kisumu, Kenya Nyalenda Water Supply Project: Delegated Management Model

Context and The coverage of water and sanitation devolved water and sanitation services services is very low, there are only to water service boards; for instance, the Background 8,000 active water connections and Lake Victoria South Water Services only a very small percentage of Board in Kisumu. The water service (City, Urban households have a sewer connection. boards contract water service providers Poor, and To a large extent, water services are to deliver services to consumers. being provided by small-scale private In Kisumu the Lake Victoria South Service Provider) operators, well or borehole owners, Water Services Board (LVSWSB) has owners of the few functional contracted the Kisumu Water and Sewerage Company (KIWASCO) Kisumu, located on the shores of Lake connections who resell water to their to operate water supply and Victoria, is the third-largest city of neighbors, and nearly 1,000 retailers sanitation services. Kenya. The city has experienced high (water carriers). population growth rates (4.74 percent In order to address the problems of low The Kenyan National Water Act (2002) every year) and its population has coverage of water and sanitation was aimed at improving water and increased from 113,000 in 1969 to services in Kisumu’s peri-urban areas, sanitation service provision through approximately 350,000 at present. the water company has taken the better governance and setting up of Approximately, 60 percent of the city’s following initiatives: population resides in peri-urban new sector institutions. The reforms settlements (United Nations Human have created a new institutional • Employing five staff members on Settlement Program, 2003). framework, which has effectively a part-time basis, involved in a

99 pro-poor unit aimed at addressing to the existing water network, it remains spread. It is necessary for the operator service improvement in slums. grossly underserved. to possess a certain level of education The staff of this unit includes and business experience along with In this delegated management model the managing director, technical basic communication and accounting for water service delivery, the water and commercial managers, skills. As the informal sector service company sells bulk water to a private among others. providers do not have bank accounts operator (private entities or community- and keep their savings either at home, • Reducing the price of water to based organizations) who is or invest in land or rental units, the kiosks in slums from Ksh 80/cu competitively selected and contracted guarantee requirement has been kept meter to Ksh 35/cu meter (US$1.10 to operate and manage the network. flexible—documents ranging from land to US$0.48). The operator is also responsible for titles to bank statements are accepted billing, revenue collection, and minor • Developing a special metal box to as ‘proof of financial viability’. maintenance. The network extensions lock water meters to prevent to nonserviced areas (tertiary Since operators are selected from the tampering. At present, 103 such distribution and customer care) are same geographical area, they are meter locks have been installed, also delegated to the private operators known to the community. This helps to which has resulted in more accurate based on output-based aid schemes. not only prevent vandalism and illegal billing of water supplied to kiosks This model reduces the administrative connections, it also aids revenue in slums. costs of the water company and collection. This model has community improves its operational efficiency participation as a core strategy; the Key Program (by reducing nonrevenue water target community is involved in all and Initiative and increasing revenue collection aspects of the selection process per capita). including reviewing applications, Highlights short-listing applicants, interviewing To ensure fair selection of operators finalists, and recruitment. The fact Program Design and to counter nepotism and that the private operator is selected corruption, the water company has put The Kisumu Water and Sanitation with the community’s consent ensures in place a transparent and competitive Project (KWSP)94 is an innovative higher acceptability and fewer bidding process. The water company problems in service provision and public-private partnership aimed at works closely with the target revenue collection. rehabilitating and expanding water and community to create an application sewerage infrastructure and enhancing form that is user friendly and The first phase of the NWSP covered services to the city’s unserved peri- appropriate for local conditions and approximately 10,000 people. It was urban areas. A component of the norms. The application forms are made envisaged as a blueprint, which could KWSP is the Nyalenda Water Supply available at easy to access and ‘high be replicated in the remaining areas of Project (NWSP), which covers traffic’ places such as churches, the the settlement and other settlements Nyalenda, Kisumu’s largest low-income chief’s compound, and at the water within the water company’s jurisdiction. settlement with approximately 14,000 company’s office. As the probability of At present, phase I and II of the project 95 households. While all residents are selecting strong candidates is higher have been completed and 12 lines landowners with freehold titles, a when more applications are received, are operational, covering the entire majority of them are poor. Although the the water company provides adequate settlement. The existing 600 connect- settlement is located in close proximity time for the news of the positions to ions will be transferred to the master operator lines, and the old ‘spaghetti 94 The Kisumu Water and Sanitation Project is being implemented in two phases. The Short Term Action Plan aims at physical lines’ that were rampant with leaks and investments urgently needed in the city, undertaken parallel to the implementation of institutional and management reforms. Upon its completion (according to a set of criteria), the Long Term Action Plan relating to rehabilitation and extension of the water and illegal connections will be disconnected. sewerage system of the Kisumu urban area, will be implemented. The Agence Française de Dévelopment has provided 20 million Euros to the Lake Victoria South Water Services Board under this project. 95 Location/sublocation Male Female Total Total households Area (sq km) Density Community outreach is important to Nyalenda A 12,507 11,224 23,731 7,069 2.8 8,475 Nyalenda B 13,162 12,482 21,644 6,887 6.1 20,955 ensure community participation in the

100 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

initiative. An outreach campaign is risk of defaulting customers is small-scale providers in the water conducted prior to any capital works to minimized for both the water company services supply chain. allow the community to voice any and the private operators through a Second, the LVSWSB (the asset holder) concerns and to assist with design (for prepayment system. The private and KIWASCO (the water company) advising on the best locations for the operator pays a Ksh 15,000 (US$210) have demonstrated the political will to lines) and implementation. Also, deposit to the water company; solve the challenge of serving the poor, building community ownership is domestic customers pay a Ksh 1,000 and assigned a strong mandate to the helpful in project implementation. (US$14) deposit to the private operator; water company to improve services Residents may allow for pipes to and kiosk customers pay a Ksh 5,000 in uncovered areas. traverse their property and help monitor (US$70) deposit to the operator. The the works to guarantee quality operator and the water company have Third, the water company has workmanship. Three components are undergone positive changes in terms of the right to withhold these deposits in key for community mobilization: performance and has an increasing case of nonpayment. (a) forming a community committee; culture of learning, capacity building of (b) holding a communication strategy The tariffs translate in reduced staff, and improving customer service— workshop; and (c) community connection and consumption costs all vital for serving the poor better. mobilization. Adequate financial and for the customers, from US$56–21 human resources have been allocated Constraints for a connection, and between 10–25 for this effort. percent less on water prices depending One of the main challenges facing the on the consumption band. project is that demand continues to Key Outcomes outpace the supply of water throughout The model is also positive for the water the city. It is envisaged that the Agence The delegated management model for company: the KIWASCO has increased Française de Dévelopment investment water services is an innovative its revenue collection three-fold from project (see footnote 94) will increase partnership between the water customers in Nyalenda. Reducing the production of water over the company and private operators. The unaccounted-for water will be central next five years. approach makes it possible for peri- to improving the performance of the urban households to have a private Second, infrastructure improvements water company, and the delegated (individual) connection at reduced have been undermined by occasional management model is helping it move prices as compared to the earlier vandalism. Vandalism is not exclusive in that direction. situation of paying high prices for to the delegated management model or poor service. This model allows the Enabling Factors even to the water sector but is still development of a range of services detrimental to delivering quality (private connections, shared and Constraints infrastructure and services. standpipes, commercial kiosks) to Third, the fight against illegal match the demand of households, Three key policy and institutional connections has been slow. The while maintaining the overall ingredients have been crucial to the problem will not be fully addressed until sustainability of the water company. success of this project: Customers have also reported all spaghetti network customers are improvements in water quality.This First, Kenya’s recent policy changes in transferred to the operator lines and the model officially recognizes that rising the water sector made the delegated old individual connections are cut off. block tariffs may be detrimental to management of water provision In addition to ensuring the availability of households that resell water and offers possible. The major changes brought water and curbing vandalism and illegal a commercial tariff that does not rise about by the 2002 National Water Act connections, the project has faced with increasing levels of consumption. reforms allow for public-private three other significant challenges: Minimizing the business risk is another partnerships in the management of (a) building the capacity of the water integral characteristic of the model. The water services. The Act also recognizes company to manage the project;

101 (b) ensuring adequate levels of determine tariffs; (b) a participatory environments where nepotism and community mobilization; and methodology for selecting the project bribery regularly guide appointments. (c) selecting qualified operators. area; (c) designing a process for Further, operators have a significamt transferring existing customers (where role in the success of the project and Lessons Learned applicable); (d) defining the roles and strong candidates are needed to take responsibilities of the operator; the position. The delegated management model and (e) developing a thorough may be used for water service provision Revisiting communication and communication and outreach strategy. in low-income areas where there is a outreach strategy: Although supportive policy framework, the Community mobilization: Allocating community outreach should be water supply is sufficient, and the adequate financial and human continuous, a concerted effort should utility has access to funding for new resources to mobilization efforts is be made to engage with the infrastructure. A number of key points critical to ensure community community as the capital works and lessons learned from project participation. Based on the experience are implemented. implementation may be useful of the NWSP, funds should be The purpose of this intensive effort is to when preparing and planning a earmarked for outreach and the introduce the operators to the similar project. outreach campaign should be community; remind the community of conducted prior to any capital works. Project planning: A detailed action the operator’s roles and responsibilities; plan eases the task for the utility since a Recruiting and selecting operators: and reassure the community that they delegated management model will be The utility should organize a transparent may complain directly to the committee new to most water utilities. The plan and competitive bidding process for or to the utility if there are any should include (a) financial analysis to selecting operators, especially in grievances with the operators.

References

• Morel, Alain. Urban Global Practice Team. Guidelines Case Study on Kisumu. Prepared by WSP–Africa.

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Case Study 18

Lusaka, Zambia Water Trust Model: A Community-Based Initiative

Context and (56 percent) and sanitation (90 water, which it was supplying through percent). Residents of peri-urban areas 34,500 connections covering only Background (City, spend a lot of time collecting water, 34 percent of the city’s population. The Urban Poor, and usually from shallow wells, which is residents of low-income settlements often of poor bacteriological and located in peri-urban areas were the Service Provider) physical chemical quality, resulting in worst affected by the utility’s poor high incidence of water borne diseases. service levels. Some factors that have Zambia is one of the more highly constrained the Water and Sewerage urbanized countries in sub-Saharan Local authorities are responsible for Company to extend services to Africa.96 Zambia’s capital city Lusaka providing water supply and sanitation peri-urban low-income settlements was estimated to have a population of services in their service areas, which include legal status of the settlements, 1,120,000 in 1996. The city has include peri-urban areas (WSS inadequate existing infrastructure to 33 peri-urban areas (locally known as Act No. 28 of 1997, Section 10). facilitate service delivery, and lack of compounds), which account for Local authorities are encouraged to capital investment required to extend 60 percent of its population. The water form commercial entities. services to these areas. In line with the national policy and action plan for supply and sanitation services in these The provision of water and sanitation delivery of water and sanitation services settlements are poor, inadequate, and services in Lusaka is the responsibility to peri-urban areas, the Water and unreliable; a majority of the residents do of the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Sewerage Company set up a peri-urban not have access to safe water supply Company, which is a private liability unit in 1995 to address the service company wholly owned by Lusaka City delivery gaps in these areas. 96 This case study is based on Community-Managed Council. In 2003, the water company Schemes—The Water Trust Model: Facilitating Access to Water and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor in Lusaka, was producing a monthly average of The Government of the Republic of Zambia. Prepared by Rose Lidonde, Consultant, Water and Sanitation Program–Africa Region. March 2008. 76.2 million cubic meters of treated Zambia embarked on a sectorwide

103 Program Details Box 31: Water Trusts Deliver Better Quality Services The efficient operations of the trusts lie in an institutional structure that The Water Trust Model has at its foundation community-based service has clearly defined roles and providers for providing water supply and sanitation in peri-urban areas of responsibilities. The structure Lusaka. While the Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company was responsible comprises board members who are for water and sanitation services, the service levels were inadequate, responsible for providing direction on inefficiency levels were high (as reflected by a high unaccounted-for water of policy and implementation strategies; a 58 percent), and service was poor and unreliable. Water trusts were set up management team that is responsible to build capacity of local communities for providing services in their own for the day-to-day operations of the settlements. Established with assistance of CARE, an international trusts such as overseeing the selling of nongovernmental organization, working in partnership with Lusaka Water and water by vendors or tap attendants, Sewerage Company and Lusaka City Council, the trusts are now ensuring collection and remittance of independent water systems, managed by the communities and registered funds to the trusts cashiers, and under the Land Perpetual Succession Act of the Laws in Zambia. general maintenance of the water A recent evaluation study showed that compared to services delivered by the systems. Vendors or tap attendants Water and Sewerage Company, the water trust systems were delivering sign a water point operation and maintenance contract with the better quality services in a cost-effective manner. The distance traveled, the management, and receive a monthly time spent collecting water, price of water, and the amount of water used by commission based on 331/ percent households are more favorable in peri-urban areas served by the water 3 of total sales. An operation and trusts as compared to those served by the water company. At present, maintenance system, where the water the water trusts are serving a population of 600,000 people in vendors or tap attendants ensure that 13 peri-urban settlements. any faults are reported in time to the management, and attended to as soon as they are detected, is in place. The trusts continue to train their staff on restructuring in 1993, which has peri-urban areas. The water trusts are operation and maintenance and seek independent water systems, managed resulted in an enabling policy technical support from the water by the communities and registered environment for international company at a fee. Currently only the under the Land Perpetual Succession nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Water and Sewerage Company has the Act of the Laws. The water trusts were to develop and implement innovative license to provide water and sanitation set up with assistance from CARE, an community-based management services in urban areas and local international NGO under the CARE models that uphold the interests of management institutions like the water PROSPECT project and in partnership both urban poor communities trusts provide water using the Water with other stakeholders (for example, and governments. and Sewerage Company’s license. Lusaka City Council and the Water and Key Program Sewerage Company). The goal of Water trusts and sanitation: While setting up the water trusts was to the trusts have considerable options and Initiative build the capacity of local communities and guidelines for water supply, there to provide water and sanitation are no clear implementation strategies Highlights services in their own communities for the provision of sanitation facilities. and to supplement service provision There is also limited experience among Aim and Objectives by the water company. At present, community-based providers on delivery The water trusts are community-based the water trusts are serving a of sanitation services in peri-urban service providers for water and population of 600,000 people in areas. The few attempts by local sanitation services in Lusaka’s 13 peri-urban settlements. authorities and NGOs such as CARE

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have targeted public sanitation Box 32: Significant Players on the Reform Process amenities, which are not so popular at household levels. The challenge for The Lusaka City Council is a core signatory to the water trust accounts. The sanitation service delivery is further Council is responsible for resolving conflicts related to water and sanitation. enhanced due to a lack of institutional In addition, the Council facilitates the recruitment and appointment commitment for sanitation and it is not processes for management staff and board members, audits books of always clear who is responsible. For accounts, and provides legal advice regarding registration of the water trusts instance, in Lusaka, the Water and in collaboration with the water company’s legal office. Sewerage Company is the licensed The Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company provides technical support to the service provider and is mandated to water trusts and is responsible for repairing any major faults with costs paid provide water and sanitation services in by the trusts. The Water and Sewerage Company appoints one member of peri-urban settlements. The Water and its staff to represent it on the board, who in turn provides guidance on Sewerage Company’s capacity to technical aspects of service provision. Where required, the Water and respond to sanitation demands, Sewerage Company provides technical training for management staff. It also however, is limited and water supply undertakes water quality testing and monitoring along with providing advice on the current set tariffs approved by the regulatory board. At present, the has been accorded a higher priority Water and Sewerage Company holds the license for the service area and is than sanitation. responsible for the payment of the license fee, which is 1 percent of the total The Kanyama Water Trust: annual billed amount. A Case Study The National Water and Sanitation Council is a regulator, and is responsible Kanyama is one of the peri-urban for monitoring the performance of service providers and for licensing water providers. settlements where the water trust model has been scaled up. The water

Box 33: Role of Key Partners in the Water Trusts

The board is made up of representatives from the resident development committees, local authorities, Lusaka Water and Sewerage Company, and selected members of the community. The board is responsible for providing policy direction, developing implementation strategies, sanctioning of procurement, and employment of staff, including the scheme manager. Generally, the board consists of nine members called trustees.

The management team is responsible for the day-to-day management of the scheme. The board employs the manager who in turn hires the rest of the staff based on the criteria set by the board. The scheme manager’s role is to supervise the operations of the staff such as water vendors or tap attendants (who sell water on behalf of the scheme), plumbers, and cashiers. The manager is answerable to the board.

Vendors or tap attendants are recruited from among community members. The selection criterion is basic numerical and reading skills. The tap attendants or vendors sign a water point operation and maintenance contract with

1 management and receive a monthly commission, which is 33 /3 percent of total sales. Vendor’s encash collections every day at the trust offices located within the area being served. The water is sold in 20 liter containers to individuals or organizations or as a daily entitlement to monthly prepaid customers. Water vendors or tap attendants also ensure that any faults are reported as soon as they are detected. The model allows for an extra pool of vendors to be trained to ensure continuity in case one is not available due to illness or other factors.

105 is pumped from two borewells, dozed Category Application Fees with chlorine gas using online dozers, stored in overhead reservoirs, and Application fees for all categories Zambian Kwacha 1,000 (US$0.30) distributed by gravity. The necessary infrastructure construction and Connection fees for domestic customers Zambian Kwacha 100,000 (US$30) community capacity building to manage all aspects of water service Connection fees for commercial customers Zambian Kwacha 200,000 (US$60) delivery were undertaken under the CARE PROSPECT project. While the Security fees for domestic customers Zambian Kwacha 30,000 (US$9) project was envisaged to cover a population of approximately 85,000 Security fees for commercial customers Zambian Kwacha 70,000 (US$21) people, the Kanyama water trust currently serves approximately Public standpipe tariff: Prepayment Zambian Kwacha 5,000 per month (US$1.50) 145,500 people. The water trust has a production capacity of 288 m3/hour Public standpipe tariff: ‘Pay-as-you-go’ Zambian Kwacha 100 (US$0.03) and a storage capacity of 400 m3. per three 20-liter containers There are 101 standpipe or public connections and 120 yard or Flat rate tariff for private connections Zambian Kwacha 40,000 household tap connections in the per month (US$12) community. Water is supplied two times every day (from 6 am to 11 am, and 2 pm to 6 pm). Prior to approving new household and the trusts operate a flexible bill Water services are decentralized to four connections, a technical team payment system. In addition to cash sectors of the compound. The sectors evaluates the hydraulic capacity of the payments at the tap stand, prepayment have independent water pressure system. cards may be purchased at K5,000 per zones, served by separate water month, giving an entitlement of seven abstraction, treatment or pumping, The water trust has differentiated the 20-liter containers per household per storage and distribution systems. connection charges between month, which translates into a discount Each sector has a plant attendant, a household and commercial use. of about K30 per three containers. plumber or meter reader, and a cashier, Security fees are used to hire guards to However, the ‘pay-as-you-fetch’ who are all employed by the trust on a protect the newly laid pipeline to system is more popular, mainly due to permanent basis. The trust has counter vandalism. The tariff is also affordability limitations. engaged 101 water vendors on a differentiated according to whether CARE carried out an evaluation in mid- temporary basis, who operate the water is drawn from a public standpipe, 2004 to ascertain the impact of the public tap stands, receive revenue from or from a private house connection. PROSPECT project in the target areas. All the rates set by the water trust are the users, and in turn present it to the The study compared three peri-urban cashiers. The priority of the water trusts approved by National Water and settlements (Chaisa, Chibolya, and is to provide water services to Sanitation Council, Zambia’s water Kanyama) where the project was community members, through public services regulator, who is also expected implemented, with Kalikiliki peri-urban standpipes. However, in some cases to regulate attributes of the service settlement, which did not participate in such as the Kanyama water trust, delivery. However, there is little the project. The evaluation sample individual household connections have evidence that the water trust services consisted of 801 households from the been provided (120 household taps). are being subjected to effective scrutiny project areas and 300 households from

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the non-project area. The evaluation supplement service provision by the service provider. Since community revealed that key service levels of water water company. members have dug many wells, while services provided by the water trusts sanitation services are limited there are • The water trust model has resulted in are much higher than those of levels of serious concerns about the quality of increased revenue collection by service delivered by the water water and environmental sanitation increased coverage and better company. The distance traveled, the as a whole. collection efficiencies. In Kanmaya time spent collecting water, the price of Water Trust, the monthly revenue Recommendations and water, and the amount of water used collection is Zambian Kwacha 8 Lessons Learned by the household were all more million (US$2426) with collection favorable in the peri-urban areas served The case study demonstrates that efficiency of 90 percent and operating by the water trust. Further, 76 percent partnerships between communities, ratio of 80 percent. of respondents from the project areas NGOs and water service providers are were satisfied with the level of service capable of bridging the service delivery offered through the public tap stands. Enabling Factors gap in poor peri-urban areas. It also More than half of the respondents and Constraints brings to light that community- (57 percent) rated the hours of managed models of service delivery operation at the public tap stands as Challenges can provide better service levels than satisfactory. However, 18 percent conventional water utility or service The relationships of the water trusts with thought the number of tap stands was providers, at least in the short to the Water and Sewerage Company are inadequate, and 51 percent indicated medium terms. This model has shown not formalized in the absence of a signed that water services provided by the that the recognition by policymakers of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) alternative service providers, such as water trust were more expensive than between the Water and Sewerage community-based service providers in before the project. This is not Company and the water trusts regarding surprising, as 46 percent of the the use of the former’s license for supply water and sanitation service delivery, respondents previously obtained water of water. The operations of the water can ensure better services for urban from shallow wells at no fiscal charge. trusts are not regulated, thus rendering poor communities. the unformity of water quality, The development of a clear regulatory accountability, and transparency Key Outcomes framework by the regulatory authority standards of service delivery difficult. in support of community-based service The key outcomes of the water trust As the water trusts are not licensed by providers or management systems is model have been: the regulator, they do not apportion any of their revenue to the license fee for the vital to render uniformity in water • Provision of adequate and quality service area. quality, and accountability to water services to peri-urban areas consumers and transparent service or communities, which were earlier While the water trust model promotes standards. There is need to formalize not served by the Water and cost-effective and sustainable services, the relationships of the trusts with there are still free water sources within Sewerage Company. major urban service utilities, for the trust’s service areas, jeopardizing its instance with the Water and Sewerage • Improved water service delivery for sustainability. Sanitation improvements Company. An MoU defining the mode a population of 600,000 people in are still notably limited and the challenge of operations and support for the trusts 13 peri-urban settlements. is how to develop a partnership between can be agreed upon and signed. the Water and Sewerage Company • Capacity building of target and the city council on issues of Support to local initiatives and ensuring communities to enable them to environmental sanitation. Currently, there linkages to development of national provide water and sanitation is no formal framework for environmental urban water supply and sanitation services in their own settlements to impact assessment in place for the programs is important.

107 This case study has demonstrated of involving the community at all for support of the sanitation that the poor can pay for services as stages of the project cycle process, agenda, so as to ensure that long as there is an efficient as this promotes community environmental sanitation is management system in place, along ownership, empowerment, and accorded due attention and with accountability and transparency. sustainability. Last but not least, the commitment for purposes of The study also shows the importance study demonstrates the dire need intended health benefits.

References

• Lidonde, Rose. March 2008. Community-Managed Schemes—The Water Trust Model: Facilitating Access to Water and Sanitation Services for the Urban Poor in Lusaka, Zambia. Prepared for WSP–Africa.

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Section 2 Consultations with Urban Poor Communities Scope and Methodology

Aim Table 9: Slums Covered by the Consultations

The urban poor living in slums and City Slums covered informal settlements are the most disadvantaged with respect to access to Mumbai • Milan Nagar Cooperative Housing Society, Mankhurd basic services. Urban poor communities are not recognized as legitimate citizens • Sathe Nagar of the city and are considered a ‘burden’ • Shivaji Nagar, Bainganwadi by utilities and service providers. A Bengaluru • Pillana Gardens majority of such informal communities Vadodara • Jalaram Nagar either completely lack, or have inadequate access to formal systems for • Baisasur Nagar, Sonia Vihar water supply, sanitation, and solid waste Delhi • Trilokpuri management. Existing governance structures make it difficult for the urban poor to have a ‘voice’ in the city’s Methodology development process or in specific Coverage programs targeted at them. In order to obtain a representative The consultations were conducted using sample of the urban poor, the participatory research techniques The main aim of the consultations with consultations were conducted in four including focus group discussions, the urban poor was to record the issues major cities, namely, Mumbai, anecdotal interviews, group interviews, they confronted related to water supply Bengaluru, Vadodara, and Delhi in and general consultations. The and sanitation. It was considered January and February 2007. consultations were facilitated by Geeta imperative to take their views on board Sharma, WSP–SA, supported by Benita to fully understand the barriers and The consultations covered urban poor Sumita, Consultant, WSP–SA. The communities, located on the fringes solutions to service delivery. The utilities (Social Development Unit of and outskirts of cities, that have consultations were also aimed at Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage absolutely no access to formal service Board) and local nongovernmental ascertaining their demands and delivery systems. The consultations organizations (Society for Promotion of aspirations vis-à-vis provision of water have tried to record the voices of Area Resources Centre in Mumbai, and sanitation services and their inputs women, men, and children whose daily Mahila Housing Sewa Trust in Vadodara, on solutions to ensure equitable service struggle for survival includes facing and Datamation Foundation in Delhi) delivery, as well as for mainstreaming humiliation and fighting for water helped conduct the consultations in the them within the city’s fabric. and toilets. respective cities.

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Overall Findings

Water Supply • The quality of water was identified as arguments and fights in the queues a problem in all communities. A and children are often bullied and majority of the communities reported pushed aside by the adults. Women • A majority of the slum communities that the initial supply of water was have to adapt to the circumstances; lack access to formal water contaminated. The coping they are forced to use the toilets supply. They collect water from mechanisms, however, differed from when the queues are shorter neighboring settlements, buy water community to community—some because they are pressured with from vendors or depend on tanker communities disposed the initial their household responsibilities and water supplied by the utilities. water supplied while others strained cannot afford to spend so much • Women and children spend a lot of and boiled it. time waiting. their daily time collecting water. • There is high level of aspiration • That there is poor level of To meet household water among slum communities to have maintenance of the toilet blocks was requirements, several trips have to individual water connections. This a universal complaint in all be made to the water source. also got reflected in a large number communities. The toilet doors are Women and adolescent girls of communities that have extended often broken, latches pulled off, who are largely responsible for the water pipes till their houses in pans are damaged, and there is collecting water complained of an attempt to have household- clogging due to improper use, breathlessness as well as body level supply. rendering several of the toilet seats aches and backaches. unusable. The houses near toilet • In the interactions, diseases such as blocks have to bear the brunt of the • The communities that lack access jaundice, hepatitis, dysentery, and overflowing septic tanks. to water supply have to face diarrhea were identified as frequently numerous physical hardships for occurring diseases due to poor • Owing to unclean and overcrowded collecting water. Additionally, they quality of water and sanitation. toilets and lack of electricity in toilet waste economically productive blocks, women often change their time collecting water. Sanitation body clocks to answer nature’s call. • Erratic supply or inappropriate They are forced to use toilets either • A majority of the communities have timing of water supply creates late at night or very early in the access to community-level toilet problems for women who have to morning. In cases where they are facilities. There are a negligible adjust their work schedules and forced to defecate in the open, number of individual toilets. sleeping patterns to be able to darkness offers a modicum either get up early in the morning • Inadequate provision of toilets results of privacy. However, going out in the or stay up till late at night for in long waiting time, especially during night exposes women to social collecting water. the morning hours. This leads to risks. The fear of being sexually

111 Box 34: Community Voices The Urban Poor Want Connections “We can manage without electricity but not without water. There are too to Formal Water many fights that we face every day in our struggle for water…” (Resident, Pillana Garden, Bengaluru) and Sanitation “If we get water, many of our life’s problems would be solved.” Systems (Resident, Idgah Mohalla, Bengaluru) The cross-section of the urban poor “I am unable to cook food on time as there is no water. My husband beats covered by the consultations included me up if the food is not ready when he gets home. It is not his fault; communities or families that are keen to after all he needs food after a long working day.” connect to formal supply systems and (Resident, Idgah Mohalla, Bengaluru) have individual-level access to water and sanitation services. Many have attempted to connect to formal systems violated in the toilet blocks at night water vendors. In the case of toilet by forming local community groups and is very real for young girls and facilities, they pay anywhere between extending infrastructure lines to their Rs 1–2 (US$0.02–0.04) per use. They women. It is not unusual for women houses or lanes or by seeking formal also have to pay for the cleaning of to encounter drunken men, drug connections from utilities or service septic tanks. users, and antisocial elements in the providers. Their requests to water utilities toilets at night. The absence of The hidden costs incurred by urban poor or service providers have fallen on deaf latches on doors, broken doors, users for medical treatment of diseases ears since the utilities do not recognize and broken roofs create an caused due to inadequate and poor them as ‘legitimate’ citizens and atmosphere of tension and quality services add to their economic potential consumers. While many of their stress for women when they use burden. Economically productive time attempts to access formal services have the toilets. lost while collecting water and waiting in been in vain, the communities are still long queues to use community toilets, is hopeful that some day they will have • The community toilets are devoid of an economic loss for the poor. equal access to basic services. special facilities for children, due to which the children are forced to Box 35: Community Voices defecate in the open. “My biggest need is safe toilets. All this waiting till it’s dark or dawn to go out Poor Users Pay to defecate is now telling on our health.” More for Services (Women from Trilokpuri slum, Delhi) “When my young daughters go to the toilet blocks, they are teased and The poor pay for services (including ridiculed by the boys. I can no longer let them go alone. They have to wait till I am home and escort them. We dread going there after dark.” water and toilets) at rates that in most (Women from Trilokpuri slum, Delhi) instances are much higher than payments made by formal settlements for services. The consultations with urban poor communities brought to Box 36: Community Voices light that in some settlements residents pay as much as Rs 300–400 (US$6–9) “We have run from pillar to post for the last eight months. We have for installing illegal connections, assurances that water will come in two months but it has been eight months including payments to the water mafia, now…how long can we wait? We are left with no choice but to go back to ‘valve man’, and plumber. Per bucket stealing water.” (15 liters), they pay Rs 10–15 (Resident, Mankhurd, Mumbai) (US$0.22–0.32) to buy water from

112 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

City-Level Findings

Mumbai The families that stayed back in unit in the corridors and are used by Nagpada continue to struggle for basic three families on a sharing basis. A majority of the families still face Milan Nagar Cooperative Housing services such as water and toilets. Society is a resettlement colony in The families use public toilets for which problems related to water as the Mankhurd, an area located in Mumbai’s they have to pay Rs 2 (US$0.04) per pressure of water supply is very low eastern extremity. Eighty-six families use. Water supply is through shared and it doesn’t reach the higher floors. that were earlier residing in Nagpada connections, which are illegal Despite making numerous (Byculla), a squatter settlement, have extensions from a connection provided representations to the local authorities been resettled here under the Mumbai to an adjacent building. As many as (ward office of BrihanMumbai Municipal Urban Transport Project. 50 to 100 families depend on one Corporation) and the local elected connection and each family has to pay representative (ward councilor), there is The remaining 500 families, a majority no improvement in the water supply of which work in the informal sector (as Rs 200–300 (US$4–6) for getting these situation and tankers continue to be the domestic helps and untrained laborers), connections (including payments to a only source of water. continue to stay in Nagpada as they ‘valve man’ and plumber). Every time found the resettlement site very far the taps are disconnected they have to Sathe Nagar is a slum with from their work places. In 1989 the pay for reconnecting. The houses are approximately 3,000 houses settlement was threatened with eviction small (approximately 64 sq ft) and (approximately 10,000 people). and asked to vacate the land within temporary in nature, but the families 24 hours. The eviction notice helped are large, because of which some Shivaji Nagar is a slum located in the Bainganwadi area. Most of the galvanize the community and people members (both male and female) are residents are daily laborers or are came together to seek proper forced to sleep on the footpath. resettlement. Facilitated by the Society self-employed. Water is sourced from a for Promotion of Area Resources The resettlement colony is a complex nearby reservoir. Usually, families make Centre, the women of the community with eight high-rise buildings with seven groups and employ a plumber to create became members of Mahila Milan, floors each. Individual dwelling units a common or shared water point close started self-help groups and took a consist of one room, loft, and bathing to their homes. Approximately lead role in identifying sites for area. While the room has an area of 85 percent of the families get water resettlement. The women recount that 180 sq ft, the loft is 100 sq ft. The supply in this manner and they pay this process was highly empowering. toilets are located outside the dwelling Rs 75 to 100 (US$1.6–2) for water

113 Lakshmi, 50, has been living in her newly allotted house in Milan Nagar Jyoti has three members in her Cooperative Housing Colony for the last eight months. Her husband is the only family—her husband, child, and earning member of the family with an average daily earning of Rs 200 (US$4). herself. Her husband carries mud Lakshmi manages the household and takes care of her children, a daughter and and earns Rs 100 (US$2) per day. a son. From this earning they have to pay approximately Rs 20 (US$0.40) The area of her house is 180 sq ft and she has a loft and a bathing area within for water per month and Rs 2 her house. She shares a toilet with two other families. Water is a major problem (US$0.04) per use of the public or as the pressure is low and doesn’t reach the higher floors. She has to walk long shared toilet (Rs 250, or US$5, distances to get water, on some days tankers are the only source of water. per month). Lakshmi is a member of Mahila Milan, a group working on women’s issues. Prior Water is supplied by a private to shifting to Mankhurd, Lakshmi lived in Nagpada, a squatter settlement. The vendor who has installed a motor. community was served an eviction notice and asked to vacate the site within 24 In case of power failure the supply hours. The women of the colony got together to negotiate with the authorities is disrupted. The private vendor for suitable resettlement. They identified four sites for resettlement (Goregaon, also charges varying rates for Borivili, Charkop, and Sion) and finally zeroed in on Mankhurd. The entire water. They also have to get water process was empowering for the women as they learnt about different types of from tanker at Rs 1,100 (US$24) lands and also learnt how to communicate with the authorities. “It took us 15 per tanker. years to get the government to make these houses for us, 25 km away from where we were living before,” laments Lakshmi. The community uses a public or shared toilet, which has 10 seats According to her, shifting to the resettlement colony has meant improved access on the ground floor for women and to basic services and a better quality of life although there are still problems another 10 seats on the first floor related to water supply. for men. Approximately 270 families use this facility. Jyoti says, “The main problem is Shehnaz and Shakira migrated to Mumbai seven years ago. They are not water supply or toilets, but the members of Mahila Milan and help conduct surveys and gather information overall poor sanitation condition of (family photos, ration cards, birth certificates, and so on) on pavement the slum. Laying internal roads communities/households. The information gathered is used as proof of eligibility would save us a lot of trouble by the municipal corporation for resettling pavement communities. during the rains. Women and children would feel more secure at According to these women leaders, water is a major problem in their colony. night if street lights are installed. While there is piped water supply, the pressure is very low and thus while the We also need more toilet seats.” lower floors get some water, the higher floors get none. The families have requested the authorities for better water supply but till date there has been no The land belongs to the Collectorate, and they have to pay improvement. They have made representations to the BrihanMumbai Municipal a tax on each plot at the rate of Corporation and the local corporator, but were yet to get redressal. Rs 9,000 (US$124) for a 15-year Shehnaz says, “We have paid heavily, Rs 5,000 (US$108) for the connection, period—even when they do not and pay Rs 300 (US$6) per month for the water bill. There have been months own the plots. The Municipal when there has been no water supply but we have still received bills. We will not Corporation also charges them for take this lying down any longer.” collection of garbage. supply every month. The remaining Another six toilets have been facilities, with eight such squatting families purchase water from a water constructed by Maharashtra Housing pans. The ratio of people per seat is vendor who sells water in a tanker. and Area Development Authority with very high. The prevalence of open MLA97 funds. The toilets constructed defecation is limited due to the There are two toilet complexes in the under SSP have children-specific presence of community toilets. In the slum that were constructed under the old toilet complexes, there were a lot of

Slum Sanitation Program (SSP). 97 Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA). problems. First, it was not secure for

114 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor

Baisasur Nagar has four rows of toilets because of the investment Rehana has five members in her houses (approximately 100 houses), required. The other problem that the family and she is the sole earning which access water through three hand community faces is water supply, which member. She pays the municipal pumps. Most men work as vendors, is very erratic and of poor quality. In a corporation Rs 100 (US$2) as cycle pullers or watchmen. A family month, expenses toward getting water rent. They have been residents earns on an average Rs 3,000 (US$64) are as much as Rs 300 (US$6). per month. The land belongs to the here since 1985 and have been Due to lack of water, residents can’t issued a photo pass as proof of state government and so far they have maintain proper personal hygiene occupancy. The family has access little reason to fear eviction. Most of the (they can’t bathe regularly, and are able to a group connection for which homes have individual toilets, in homes to wash their clothes only once a the group pays Rs 1,500 (US$32) that don’t members are forced to fortnight) which, in turn, causes many per quarter. Her monthly electricity defecate in the open. health problems such as skin rashes, bill can go up to Rs 300 (US$6). Because of the lack of water, chores boils, and so on. Now, water and Health is a major concern due to are left undone and women find it poor environmental conditions and sewerage lines have been laid but the difficult to ease themselves. One of she spends up to Rs 150 (US$3) a connections to the households still their biggest concerns is lack of toilets. month for medical aid. remains to be done. Many families, however, can’t afford Jalaram Nagar is a squatter settlement. A majority of the residents Sharda Ben is a domestic worker women to use the toilet at night due to are migrants from Maharashtra. There lack of electricity and absence of doors. and earns up to Rs 1,000 (US$21) per month. She faces problems is one hand pump, which has been Lack of water also limited the use and due to poor and erratic water provided by the corporation. Prior to maintenance of the toilet complex. The supply. She laments that it takes the installation of the hand pump, the maintenance of the old toilet blocks her half-an-hour to fill two buckets residents had paid Rs 18,000 (US$387) was extremely poor. Children also at a time from a hand pump that is to install group connections. The group feared using the toilets as the seats located about 10 minutes away connections are no longer functional. were big and the parents did not send from her house. In a day, her The residents have reported the matter their children fearing that they could fall family requires up to 10–15 into the septic tanks. buckets and she has to make to the city authorities but their numerous trips to the hand pump. complaints have fallen on deaf ears. Another issue confronting the In the morning, she fills water for Most residents have to source water community is the presence of antisocial the morning chores after which from a nearby society. They spend elements and political factions who she goes for work; she fills up hours filling water, which is an ordeal for are not happy with the positive water for the rest of the day both men and women. developments in the slum. after she returns from work. Sometimes, her husband helps With support from Mahila Housing her in getting water. She says that Vadodara Sewa Trust, residents of Jalaram Nagar when her daughter helps her fill have approached the corporation to Most slums in Vadodara have illegal water it is easier. demand individual water connections. water connections because the city At times when the hand pump They have also been helped in does not have a policy to supply water becomes dysfunctional, they have constructing public toilets, but because to slums. Vadodara has a cumulative to buy water from the owner of a property tax, which also includes water nearby field who has a well. She the nearby residential society charges. For plots that have an area recounts that it takes even up to a complained to the corporation, a water less that 25 sq m, the corporation does week to fix the hand pump. connection to the toilet complex has not levy property tax. not been provided.

115 • While the community has laid its Bengaluru Nagaraj, a rickshaw driver, earns own pipelines to get water, there Rs 150 (US$3) a day. He is the Pillanna Garden, Bharatmata has been no supply from the only earning person in his five- Quarters is a slum with about corporation. Such a system has member family. He has been living 170 houses. Most residents are from been set up for groups of 25 here since 1969 and his family still Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere in households and it cost each struggles to access basic Karnataka, and have been living here household Rs 3,000 (US$64). services. He has approached the for the last 25 years. Most residents concerned authorities with his work as domestic help or make • The community is willing to pay application for water and other incense sticks at home. The biggest anywhere between Rs 150–200 basic amenities. Initially, he went source of income for families (US$3–4) if the people are assured to the corporation, after which he is rag-picking. good water supply. approached the councilor. In the last two years, Maithiri Sarvaseva • Problems encountered due to lack He pays Rs 15 (US$0.32) to buy a Samiti, a nongovernment organization of water: “We live in unhygienic a drum of water (200 liters) from a working with the Karnataka Slum conditions because of which vendor who comes once or twice Clearance Board, has helped the illnesses are also rife. Money goes a week. Nagaraj prefers an residents construct their homes. While into medicines and consulting individual connection and is ready the total cost of constructing a house is doctors too.” to bear its costs. Rs 35,000 (US$754), the residents had to make an upfront payment of Toilets Rs 5,000 (US$108), followed by installments of Rs 300 (US$6) per till 8 pm. There are no legal electricity • The Municipal Corporation of Delhi month. Each dwelling unit is 18 feet x connections, residents get together has provided a few public toilets. 10 feet with attached bathrooms. While and take illegal connections or These toilets are overcrowded and extensions from nearby poles. They pay houses have been constructed, the poorly maintained, and this forces approximately Rs 100 (US$2) a month provision of basic services, including residents to defecate in the open. for electricity. There are several water and sanitation, is very poor. self-help groups in this colony. Through • A lot of families, who can afford to Access to water is limited and the savings accumulated in these construct individual latrines, have residents take water from a borewell groups, families have been able to done so. located close to their community. make improvements to their homes. They pay Re 0.50 for 12 liters but the • Women use the public toilet in the water quality is very poor. There is also Delhi morning and at night. They feel a tap, located on the main road, constrained and cannot use the Trilokpuri is a resettlement slum provided by the corporation. The toilet freely; they feel their that was developed in 1976. It has queues for water are very long and daughters too cannot use the 36 blocks. people spend hours collecting water. toilets safely. If they visit the toilets The residents have approached the Primary Concerns more than one or twice in a day, corporation to remedy their water they are teased by the boys. The Water woes, and suggest that it is feasible to women face several medical install at least one tap for three houses. • There is a lack of water supply. problems as they are unable to Due to lack of water, the families use Women and children have to fetch maintain personal hygiene during public toilets, which are open only water from other places. their monthly periods.

116 Global Experiences on Expanding Services to the Urban Poor Water and Sanitation Program– South Asia World Bank 55 Lodi Estate New Delhi 110 003 India

Phone: (91-11) 24690488, 24690489 Fax: (91-11) 24628250 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: www.wsp.org

March 2009

WSP MISSION: To help the poor gain sustained access to water and sanitation services.

WSP FUNDING PARTNERS: The Governments of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America; the United Nations Development Programme, The World Bank, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: AusAID provides WSP–SA programmatic support. This document has been peer reviewed by Catherine Revels, Chris Heymans, and Ravikumar Joseph (WSP–SA); Anup Wadhawan (formerly with WSP–SA); Glenn AUTHORS: Pearce-Oroz, Mario Alejandro Suardi, Genevieve Connors, and Raghu Kesavan Compiled by Geeta Sharma (Regional (World Bank); Jeremy Colin (Water Sector Specialist); and Arnab Roy (Kolkata Urban Communication Specialist, WSP–SA) and Services to the Poor Program). Thanks are also due to P.K. Mohanty (Joint Secretary, Shikha Shukla (Consultant, WSP–SA). Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India) and Alkesh Sharma (UNDP) for lending their experience and inputs to the development TASK MANAGER: of this document. Geeta Sharma

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed are entirely those of the author Editors: Meenakshi Shedde and Anjali Sen Gupta and should not be attributed in any manner to The World Bank, to its affiliated Pictures by: Geeta Sharma (WSP–SA) and Sajid Darokhan organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the companies Created by: Write Media they represent. Printed by: PS Press Services Pvt. Ltd.