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Home , Akhtar Hameed Khan, Alimuddin (cricketer), Musa Khan, Orangi, Orangi Pilot Project, Orangi Town

From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Pilot Project’s Low Cost Model

A WaterAid report by Akbar Zaidi From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the ’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

WaterAid/Caroline Penn

This report is one of a series which analyse WaterAid’s experience in supporting integrated water, sanitation and hygiene education projects in developing countries. Other reports in the series are: WAMMA: Empowerment in practice Hitosa Water Supply: A people’s project : Making government funding work harder Contracts or Partnerships: Working through local NGOs in Ghana and

WaterAid Men dig a trench and lay pipes through compacted sewage, earth and rubbish in Prince Consort House Hassanpura, Faisalabad. 27-29 Albert Embankment SE1 7UB Telephone: +44 (0)20 7793 4500 Fax: +44 (0)20 7793 4545 Website: www.wateraid.org.uk Charity Reg No 288701 Published by WaterAid London June 2001

All rights reserved.

Cover Photo: WaterAid/Caroline Penn

2 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

A WaterAid Report TAJIKISTAN Written by Akbar Zaidi Edited by Eric Gutierrez and Virginia Roaf Mingora

June 2001 Rawalpindi AFGHANISTAN

Faisalabad

➛ 0 150 300 Kms N

Multan Contents Lodhran Uch

INDIA Introduction 4 OPP Principles of Good Practice 8 Problems of Replication 13 OPP – The Wider Impact 16 Conclusion 19 List of Acronyms and Terms 21 Bibliography 22 Acknowledgements 23

Boxes and Tables Akhtar Hameed and the OPP’s Growing Influence 12 The Anjuman Samaji Behbood (ASB) Experience in Faisalabad 15

3 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

Introduction

In 1994, WaterAid started a had radically changed the Orangi education. By 1988, four relationship with one of Pakistan’s settlement. Gone were the murky, autonomous institutions were in most influential non-governmental stinking open sewers that place to manage the OPP’s organisations (NGO) and perhaps crisscrossed the settlement and expanding concerns. The main the world’s best-known non- which posed considerable health OPP Research and Training governmental project in the large- and physical hazards to its Institute (OPP-RTI) took charge of scale provision of sanitation for the residents. Mobility improved the Low Cost Sanitation urban poor – the Orangi Pilot within the community both for Programme and the Education Project (OPP). This relationship goods and human traffic, boosting Programme. The Orangi was primarily aimed at learning home-based enterprises and small- Charitable Trust (OCT) ran the lessons from the ‘OPP experience,’ scale trading. Infant mortality rate Family Enterprise Economic and in funding projects to replicate fell from 130 per thousand live Programme that provided cheap this process inside and outside births in 1982 to 37 per thousand in and readily accessible credit. The Pakistan. Five years later, as 1991, which was far faster than it Karachi Health and Social WaterAid was to carry out some had fallen in Karachi or the rest of Development Association form of assessment of this funding, Pakistan.(Badshah, 1996: 49; and it received a proposal for a broader Reed and Vines, 1992a:19)4 The 1 The proposal was submitted by the OPP study on the impact of the OPP.1 availability of cleaner and extended and the London-based International Wishing to contribute to an space in front of houses had a Institute for Environment and Development independent critical assessment of significant social and recreational (IIED) in early 1999. the OPP, WaterAid funded the impact as well. New and relatively 2 Karachi is Pakistan’s economic centre with broader study, from which this safer play areas for children a total population of over 9 million 5 abbreviated report is derived. emerged. Women were able to residents. move around more freely and be The OPP started in 1980 in the 3 It is not very clear by how much the OPP visited by friends and relatives, depressed and crowded Orangi low-cost sanitation model is cheaper than leading some to comment that it settlement, one of Karachi’s2 most other alternatives because of difficulties in improved marriage prospects for blighted districts and its largest comparison. However, some studies have young women.6 Such success has katchi abadi with a population of 1.2 shown that sewer construction in Orangi naturally drawn attention from the million. Led by the renowned Dr are one-seventh the cost compared to those world over. The OPP experience is, (see box constructed by the Karachi Metropolitan in WaterAid and many other Corporation (KMC) due to the p.12), the OPP evolved in just a few development agencies’ view, a simplification of the technical design and years to be a remarkable self- most impressive demonstration of the elimination of middlemen, contractors funded, self-administered and self- just how much urban poor and the pay-off to professionals like maintained grassroots movement communities can contribute to the engineers. (Siddiqui and Rashid, 1997). relying on nothing more than the development of quite complex 4 The improvement in infant mortality rates resources and skills of its urban large-scale infrastructure projects. can be attributed to many factors, including poor constituents using local It also presented a challenge to reduction of solid wastes, the reduction of materials and labour in building dominant development paradigms children defecating in the streets, etc. But hundreds of kilometres of that are too technical, too reliant on most observers and official sources agree extremely low-cost underground government and donor support, that the most important factor is the sewers.3 By April 2001 these had construction of underground sewers. and which generally treated poor benefited 92,184 families in 6,134 communities as simply the objects 5 In the where an 8-12 foot lanes, representing almost 90% of of, rather than the central force of wide concrete case was built on a 2050-foot the entire settlement. There have nala local enthusiasts acquired a continuous development. also been 409 collector sewers built, pitch. and collectively the community Over time, the OPP expanded 6 It is customary in Pakistani society for the have invested Rs. 82.141 million beyond sanitation provision to potential husband’s parents and elders to (£924,000) in their sewerage cover programmes for health, visit the house of their prospective system. By the late 1980s, the OPP credit, low-cost housing and daughter-in-law.

4 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

WaterAid/Caroline Penn (KHASDA) implemented the Health Programme. And finally there was the OPP Society that administered funding from the Infaq Foundation, a Pakistani charity, for the OPP organisations. The OPP, however, was as controversial as it was popular. Despite its ostensible success and tremendous potential, the ‘OPP experience’ was perceived not to be replicable on any serious scale outside of Karachi. It faced a number of critics – from government, the international donor community, as well as Pakistani NGOs – who posed a wide array of arguments that downplayed and sometimes denied outright the OPP’s claims to success. There were critics who pointed out that the OPP experience was specific to Orangi. Orangi has a natural slope, which made secondary sewer lanes and collection points dispensable to a certain extent. Had Orangi been on flat terrain, the project may have had to rely on government and donor support from the outset. Furthermore, most Orangi Children cross over the sewage flow in Mansoor colony, Karachi. householders were acknowledged owner-occupiers, who had more community and government was criticism of NGOs that thrive on incentive and security of tenure its firm, resolute and active foreign funding which, as a result, than renters or squatters to invest rejection of any form of subsidies reinforces development paradigms their hard-earned income in sewer or funding for what it termed as that depend on complex, technical construction. Others say that the internal7 development work for inputs from highly-paid OPP was too ‘Dr Khan-centred’, poor communities. The OPP consultants and organisations and reliant on his involvement. stressed that the responsibility to rather than rely on what is Government engineers and fund the internal component rests available from communities. The industry professionals initially solely with the community. It OPP has in fact developed a doubted the quality and technical believes that government or donor reputation for taking on and standards of the OPP-facilitated money, when used for internal challenging even international sewer lines. Some critics look at development, is a corrupting donor organisations. It called the sustainability, arguing that OPP- system that undermines the initiated community organisations indigenous and self-motivated created through this process do not 7 The OPP used the term internal to refer to initiatives of communities. They actively continue once construction any form of development work that the condemned NGOs that readily work has been completed. people, communities, and lanes are accept donor money as contractors supposed to do, while external refers to the But perhaps the main point that who make a business out of responsibility of government. This is brought the OPP into conflict with development work. The OPP discussed in the following section of this a number of NGOs, the donor became known for its consistent report.

5 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

Urban Basic Services (UBS) Most of the many materials on the longer-term and relatively more programme – nominated by the OPP are documentation assembled objective perspective. Among United Nations International by the OPP itself, leading to a others, it argues that the OPP Children’s Fund (UNICEF) as one charge that there is a lack of reliable philosophy is based on simple of the ‘Best Practices’ projects for information and analysis that can community-centred principles and the Habitat II conference – a capture, put into context, and practice whose main goal is to failure, despite its own critically analyse the various make NGOs and outside change involvement with it. aspects of the ‘OPP experience’. agents peripheral to the community, that is, that the poor In 1990, when the OPP-RTI learned A further criticism aimed at the OPP community is empowered to the about an revolves around how it distanced point that they could do things on funded project for Orangi, which itself from the violence that made their own without relying much on was ignoring the work the people Karachi one of the most violent and NGOs, donor organisations or even had done and was building both divided cities in Asia. This peaked government.8 The OPP ethic is internal and external sanitation, it in 1985-86, and was largely simply to be researchers and lobbied with the Mayor to adopt localised, with ethnic roots, facilitators. It does not carry out the OPP principles. The OPP although there was the significant development and does not take its campaigned actively, pointing out involvement of the land mafia that “model” to the people unless it has design flaws and technical defects were prevalent in katchi abadis. By first established substantial links of the plan while proposing 1988 however, the violence took a with the community. Thus the OPP alternatives. As a result, a project more political colour, controlled appears as a paradox. It does not that was to cost Rs 1,300 million from areas outside Orangi, and seek a power agenda, it keeps a (£14.7 million) was reduced to a involving partisans of factions non-state, non-party role, and cost of Rs 36.2 million (£410,000) within the Muhajir Quami sometimes even identifies itself as a and 21,866 houses benefited from it Movement (MQM) and the national non-NGO player in Pakistan’s and improved community government. Thousands of lives development matrix. Yet this very monitoring roles were introduced. were lost in this strife, with curfew character is what makes it being imposed on Orangi for days Further, a component of the successful and consequently, on end. The OPP initiated the repair Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan, the threatening to those who have and rebuilding of infrastructure US$70 million (£50 million) ADB power. This explains why it has after incidents of violence, offering loan for the Sewerage become controversial to many its offices as a place for debate and Project, was withdrawn altogether development players, and why it discussion to the leaders of the due to intense lobbying, creating has fiercely strived to retain its various ethnic groups. However, both friends and enemies for the independence. critics say the OPP should have OPP both within government and used its influence to intervene and This study however, is not a full in donor organisations who were mitigate the violence. The OPP says evaluation of the OPP. It focuses embarrassed by the cancellation. it is precisely its non-interference only on OPPs low-cost sanitation Critics have charged that the OPP policy, its particular focus on programme, rather than the whole tends to be ‘rigid in its thinking’ and sanitation, and its non-involvement range of programmes it has that it is an organisation that does in issues where it has not developed since its inception. not agree with any analysis, even consolidated expertise, that has These include housing, health, when not critical, if it does not fit been its source of strength and education and micro-credit. It their own organisational framework which has made it successful. Until reviews the nature and philosophy and values. The OPP, they contend, today, the OPP stays away from of the organisation, its technical, would not accept that transparent issues that do not concern it, and as social and training approaches, the funds from donor organisations a result, is generally seen in Orangi efforts to replicate it at the micro may serve a useful purpose. as a non-partisan organisation. level, its effect on the macro policy

What compounds the controversies This study is thus a preliminary 8 This is for the internal components of the is that analyses on these issues are critical assessment of the Orangi work; the OPP has always expected that often difficult to make, because Pilot Project that tries to put the donor organisations and the government there have been too few ‘OPP experience’ as well as the would take responsibility for the external independent studies of the OPP. controversies around it into a components.

6 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

WaterAid/Caroline Penn

Raw sewage and rubbish fill the 200-foot wide drainage creek for Mansoor colony.

WaterAid/Caroline Penn level as well as its overall impact in Pakistan. The lessons are then identified and discussed in a long- term development policy perspective. The study methodology is chiefly based on a thorough review of the published and unpublished reports on the OPP; visits to the OPP project sites in Karachi and the OPP-advised projects initiated by other NGOs outside Karachi; and direct interaction with key people involved as well as informed observers. Interviews and focus group discussions were held in Pakistan, which included a participatory assessment and review of impact sessions conducted with the concerned communities in Orangi (Karachi) and Hasanpura (Faisalabad). E- mails were sent out to donor organisations, NGOs, academics, and professionals for opinions on Mansoor colony after the community laid the drainage system and pavement was put down the OPP from outside of Pakistan. by the municipal authority.

7 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

OPP Principles of Good Practice

The Orangi Pilot Project has really A community therefore needs to be what they, not the NGO or done nothing extraordinary in ‘socially prepared’ to embark on a government, consider to be their terms of implementation, large-scale infrastructure project. priority problems. Formal intervention or invention. The But there are different physical and socio-economic considerable success of the Orangi interpretations of ‘social surveys should only be Pilot Project and its model, are not preparation.’ Certain local supplementary to these so much its technical innovations, politicians as well as NGOs in dialogues and consultations. but the nature, philosophy, and Pakistan, for instance, will interpret • Projects should generally rely on methodology of the organisation. social preparation in terms of what is readily available. The This approach has its roots in the conducting formal socio-economic community has some of the community research and extension surveys and using this as a basis needed resources for work of OPP’s founder, Dr Akhtar for convincing the national development but it needs Hameed Khan, in the rural and government or donor organisations support to fully use these agricultural communities of to allocate funds and inaugurate resources. A survey and Comilla, East Pakiston (now projects. National governments will documentation of what exists is ) in the 1960s. This have different ideas of social useful: physical conditions, approach, which made Dr Khan a preparation more closely aligned to social actors and their well-known development theorist a self-interested local political relationships, economic and worker, is based largely on the agenda. The OPP has a more conditions, technologies in use. idea of ‘social preparation’ – that altruistic, community-oriented and How the community tackles the before development work and community-inspired idea of social priority problems needs to be physical infrastructure can be built preparation. Social preparation is identified and studied. A study especially in poor communities, guided by a general strategy to is not needed to identify there has to be a prerequisite phase promote community organisation projects, but is required to of ‘social infrastructure building.’ and self-management, by providing understand the people, their Social infrastructure building can social and technical guidance that processes and relationships, and be broadly defined, ranging from encourages the mobilisation of to identify their choices. basic education, identification and local managerial and financial Decisions can then be made on training of local leaders, to complex resources and the practice of co- whether existing systems could community consultation operative self-action. Applying be either improved or whether a approaches, to setting up and these principles in Orangi was, in completely new approach is maintaining actual social many ways, facilitated by the necessary. organisations. The social community’s own self-preparation preparation that the OPP – they were already building • The conceptual plan is a undertook in Orangi was identified sewers long before the OPP was necessary tool in the process. as early as 1985 when an evaluation established. The general principles The development of a wrote, “It is apparent that of the OPPs social preparation, conceptual plan should be based considerations of external which is not a one-off but a on the following principles: application relate principally to continuous on-going process division of work into internal programme approach and through the project, are as follows: and external infrastructure organisation rather than the type components, component sharing • Existing local community and design of sanitation systems,” between the community NGO organisations are the primary and that “a totally self-help and/or government, while and principal players in the sanitation programme is only making sure that there is no cost project. They need to be partly dependent on technical sharing;9 decentralisation of carefully identified from the competence. The crucial component functions/technology; beginning, and a serious, is the sociological input if successful establishment of the optimum consistent dialogue with them implementation is to be achieved relationship between needs, and general members of the …” (Abbott and Lumbers, 1985: 30). resources and standards. community started to identify

8 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

WaterAid/Caroline Penn • Local lane leaders and activists are the key ‘frontline’ development workers. In each lane there are generally two people identified, who are either nominated or elected by the residents of the lane. They are accountable to the residents, not to the OPP, but are given technical and social support by the OPP. The two play the different roles of organiser, who represents the needs of the community to the OPP, and a treasurer who collects and keeps the money and accounts. The organiser is generally male, but the treasurer is frequently a respected older woman, who has long-term standing with the residents. • Social organisers and technicians (paid employees of the OPP) are trained to provide technical advice, and to motivate the residents. These people are also themselves drawn from the community.10 • Local communities are the repositories of wealth in ‘traditional knowledge’ developed from daily experience. A metal worker makes steel shuttering for a drain manhole in Hassanpura, Faisalabad. They can therefore become ‘experts’ in improvisation and the decision was made by the innovation. Training should be 9 Component sharing is the separation community at large to improve on provided to develop necessary between the internal component which is the existing technologies, trying skills within the community, the lane sewers and household connections this out in lanes which had not yet and the external component, which is the especially those involving local installed sewers, rather than trunk sewers and treatment plants, lane para-professionals and ‘street’ replacing existing sewers. This sewers and the sewers outside the technicians. Conventionally resolution was first taken by a community boundaries: the bulk sewers. In trained professionals such as couple of brave lane committees, many NGO projects, costs are shared engineers and architects, should and following the successful between the NGO and the community on preferably not be used as the lane sewers, through subsidies. This is installation of sewers has now been alternatives. This will also make not permissible within the OPP approach. replicated throughout Orangi, sure that skills for the either with OPP assistance, or in 10 The concept of identifying activists from maintenance of the project are some lanes, residents have been the community who were responsible for developed by members of the motivating people in the earlier days of the inspired by the OPP, but not used community in the construction project was criticised by more formal their services. A process of phase. development consultants, like the UNCHS community mobilisation in the chief technical advisor who called them Following the principle of relying organisation and implementation ‚musclemen’ when differences in approach on knowledge that already exists, of the project emerges. It is between him and Dr Khan emerged very and after extensive consultations, described as follows: early on in the project. (Hasan, 1999: 58)

9 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

Through social organisers, an initial preparation of a community for on the basis of neighbourhood or dialogue with the community/lane development. It also informs on key area committees. The lane made is made. The OPP identifies and technical details on the particular more sense as well given the then contacts an influential/active practice of NGOs and external sanitation technology used. For individual with good reputation, agents in grassroots community secondary sewers linking lanes who in turn contacts the lane development. The OPP considers to the main trunk sewers, a residents. At this stage, the OPP itself to be primarily a research ‘confederations of lanes’ have arranges a slide show/public organisation whose objective is to been created, to address the meeting explaining the salient analyse problems and then through needs of a collection of lanes. features of the low-cost sanitation prolonged action research and A further principle that needs to be programme. If the people show extension education, discover viable clarified is OPPs position on willingness and submit a written solutions. What differentiates it funding. As noted earlier, the OPP request to the OPP, the OPP from other similarly-situated NGOs philosophy clearly differentiates surveys the lane and prepares a is the strict observance of the between internal and external map and cost estimates of the following operational principles: components of development. The sewer line. These documents are • The OPP does not itself lay the internal component is defined as handed over to the representative sewers or physically undertake the tertiary level sewer lines, at the of the lane who is confirmed by the the projects. Whilst they provide lane level, while the external lane residents as their technical advice and support component is the trunk sewers, representative/lane manager. The social organisation, they make removing the effluent from the lane manager collects money from sure that those living in the lanes settlement. Funding for the internal each household as per prescribed were the very persons component, the OPP maintains, is contribution and requests the OPP responsible for managing solely the responsibility of the to provide technical guidance. The finances and constructing lane community. It should be OPP establishes physical levels in sanitation. All decisions and emphasised that the OPP rejects the lane and demarcates the responsibilities on individual matching grants or subsidies as position of the sewer line. Materials lane sewers rest with lane people, well – wherein, for example, a are then purchased by the lane while the household connection donor provides 50% of the cost and manager and labour is hired. The from the latrine to the lane sewer the community shoulders the rest. work begins. The OPP provides is the responsibility of the The OPP believes this complete tools and shuttering and supervises household owner. The community self-financing for the entire execution. The lane community is the client, internal development is the only manager expects technical co- responsible for supervising any way to create a far greater sense of operation and supervision from the contractor. The OPP role is ownership, a factor that is OPP while the OPP expects the lane limited to providing motivation, important in the construction phase manager would generally manage technical inputs (surveys, plans and critically important during the overall process as well as and cost estimates), and the loan trouble-shooting and maintenance. facilitate the maintenance of of construction equipment. The It also ensures that the sanitation accounts. But it should be stressed OPP consciously avoid creating system will be used and be that the lane manager is not any form or notion of functional.11 The OPP has not only accountable to OPP and vice versa. dependence on them by the distanced itself from NGOs and (Development Consortium, 1998:4) community. community groups that were With time, much of the inputs of funded by donors and were • The OPP support the building of the OPP in projects are taken over subsidised by non-community smaller and functional, rather by local masons and contractors sources, it has also discouraged than large-scale, social who have been trained over the some of its partners from taking organisations. It makes the lane, years, and by the community itself, funds from donors.12 But the OPP is with around 20-40 households, who have learnt by doing and not strictly opposed to donor the informal unit of observing. funding. When it is available, they organisation, rather than make sure it is used only for the The Orangi experience is more than following the conventional external component of the just a case study on the issues and practice of most NGOs of setting development, including research principles around the social up large, formal organisations and training, and that such funding

10 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

WaterAid/Caroline Penn should be autonomously administered by the organisation. It is on this basis, for example, that WaterAid support has been managed. There are other reasons why the OPP has been opposed to subsidies being used for internal components of infrastructure. Its experience in Orangi shows that when subsidies are used, it most often opens the route for the collapse of the project. It creates dependence, which spirals into a point where the community expects others to take responsibility for paying for the services, and when started in one community, this quickly spreads to other areas. It ends up with a whole population just waiting to be helped and simply not doing anything themselves. But perhaps most important is that community self-funding is the principal instrument that brings down the costs of projects. Subsidies, the OPP believes citing experience, tend to raise costs and give rise to wastage. When the community pays for a project on a purely self-help basis where they provide or pay for the labour and supervise the work, costs are

11 Experiences around the world show that sanitation systems constructed for poor communities many times end up not being used completely for the purposes for which it was built, for example children would continue to defecate in the streets. Razia Begum works in Hassanpura, Faisalabad to support her family with her garment 12 The OPP for instance stopped working business. with a possible partner in (Taraqqi) because they also applied to the immediately cut – designs are Finally, with the principle of Social Action Programme for core funding, simplified, methods of construction component rather than cost and another NGO, PIEDAR in Khanewal. become extremely cost-efficient, sharing, the NGO or government This is because these organisations did not profiteering and kickbacks, as well can spend scarce funding over a accept the approach of ‘component sharing’, as professional fees for contractors, wider area. but used the more standard ‘cost-sharing’. engineers and supervisors are See box. Among the partners it discouraged The OPP stresses that quality is not eliminated. The process is self- from getting donor money is the Anjuman compromised by this system. The reinforcing – without the drastic Samaji Behbood in Faisalabad and Anjuman OPP’s support role include reduction in costs, it would be Falahi Behbood in Rawalpindi, improving designs to make the predominantly because these organisations impossible to persuade low-income construction of pipes and joints did not yet have the capacity to handle families to undertake the more cost-efficient, like plain ended large amounts of funding. responsibilities of self-financing.

11 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

spun concrete sewer pipes moving on to tackle other problems essential. Weekly meetings, manufactured in small casting and extend the programme in other informed discussions between yards or a standard cast-in-situ areas. (The desire for) quick results staff and community members, concrete chamber for lane sewers. can have a damaging effect on the keeping minutes and The OPP also developed its own programme. For instance, to documentation and regular manhole design adapted to local achieve quick results in one lane, follow-up are to be maintained. conditions. The quality of the subsidies will be given; then others • Building public support for the OPP’s simplification of technology will expect the same. What makes project and encouraging and design to cut costs and make the OPP approach unique is their contributions from academics the sanitation project affordable has continual effort to respond to the and consultants are necessary. been confirmed by experience to be initiative taken by local However, aggressive marketing appropriate.13 (Siddiqui and communities and to support and like public relations blitzes Rashid, 1997 and UNDP-World enrich these whenever possible should be avoided. Bank Conference, 1996). through research and extension programmes. Fundamental to the • Transparency is standard good As the project developed, more good philosophy of OPP-RTI is the practice. All accounts of the practice principles emerged. In 1992, training of local community people organisation, including and most an OPP-RTI report summarised in technical and social especially the salary of staff, are some of these principles: organisational skills at different to be published regularly and “Working with communities levels. This training is conducted to made public. requires consistency, flexibility and develop an autonomous network of • Wider collective decision-making a low profile. An attitude of mutual community organisers and a local is always more desirable. respect, sharing and learning is resource of technical skills, needed. The concept that the enabling the communities to deal • Local issues, realities and community knows all, or that with problems independently.” concerns have to be properly technicians know all – both are (Rahman and Rashid, 1992: 2-4). transmitted through dialogue to equally incorrect. It has to be a the concerned government Other principles identified by the combined effort. Importantly, and agencies and politicians. OPP-RTI which are guidelines for unlike most NGOs, the OPP good practice are the following: emphasises the importance of 13 Government engineers and NGOs are identifying and dealing with one • Monitoring of communication now using the OPP models and standards priority problem in one area before and constant feedback are for their own sewerage systems.

BOX 1: AKHTAR HAMEED KHAN AND THE OPP’S GROWING INFLUENCE

In order to understand the OPP ethic better, it is essential to look at the personality of its founder, Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan, and how his and the OPP’s work ethic have put a distinctive stamp on development work in Pakistan. Dr Khan was perhaps Pakistan’s best known development worker. He argued strongly that functions of the state could not be taken over by NGOs. He considered the seminars, workshops and meetings arranged by foreign donors for promoting their concepts as “dating and dining get togethers.” (Hasan, 1999: 34). He criticised the donor- dependence of Pakistani NGOs, and steered the OPP to be a fiercely independent and autonomous NGO that negotiates on its own terms. The austere, frugal, and almost sufiistic personal style of Dr Khan is translated into the OPP work ethic. Unlike most Pakistani NGOs with airconditioned offices, four-wheel drives and state-of-the-art gadgetry, OPP seems poor. Salaries at OPP are far lower than at other NGOs. Yet the OPP takes pride in this. Surprisingly, by most NGO standards, there is very little staff turnover at OPP – its personnel stay on, with some moving from being the apprentices of Dr Khan for fifteen years to becoming today’s OPP leadership. OPP is thus admired, but not emulated by many NGOs inside and outside Pakistan. The OPP is unconventional in many respects and prefers to be left alone in its work. But this is precisely where its strength lies. Its influence is important and growing, though indirect and perhaps limited by the fact that it does not play a direct role in broader NGO-led advocacy campaigns. Recently, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (a NGO providing capacity building and advocacy support to CBOs and other NGOs), and the UN’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Local Initiatives for the Environment (LIFE), have accepted some of the OPP’s basic principles and applied them to their direct and indirect interventions in the sanitation sector.

12 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

Problems of Replication

While the OPP model has inspired of urban Pakistan. The city’s female about replacing or incorporating a attempts at replication in 59 literacy, in particular, is higher by system rather than introducing a settlements in 11 cities in Pakistan, about fifty percent. The average new one. with 23,151 households having laid Karachi income earner also gets 1.6 Despite these Orangi-specific their sanitation lines at a cost of Rs. times more than his or her advantages, it can still be argued 31.993 million (£360,000) (outside counterpart in other cities. More that the reason for the failure of Orangi) the most persistent recent estimates suggest that replication in other communities criticism levelled against it is the Karachi’s per capita income is two may have to do more with lack of any substantial replication and a half times that of the national problems of social preparation or of its approach outside Orangi. If average. (Hasan, 1999:141). It can with the nature, ability, capacity indeed it is a model that offers a therefore be assumed that Orangi’s and resources of community solution to the varied sanitation residents are generally better off groups and local NGOs, rather than problems of poor communities, a than those living in katchi abadis with the technical OPP model lack of replication suggests that the outside Karachi. itself.15 For example, residents of approach simply fails in other areas Another key factor is Orangi’s Faisalabad and Lodhran, despite where it has been attempted or that advantage of topography – its their lower incomes, have paid it is dependent on many factors natural slope eliminates the need much higher costs for their that are present only in Orangi. A for pumping sewerage. The slope sewerage systems than the closer examination of the problems makes it easier to demonstrate the residents of Orangi. Also, in of replication will indeed reveal efficacy of the OPP model, and the Karachi, 2,950 houses in Manzoor that to a certain degree, the OPP existence of natural nalas makes Colony alone built their system in may have been successful in links between the internal and flat terrain. In Faisalabad, 2,578 Orangi because of factors and external sanitation far easier. In houses have also built their sewage conditions peculiar to the cities with flat terrains, external systems in flat areas and are organisation, to Orangi and sanitation and sewerage facilities – continuing to do so. Karachi. These factors therefore such as pumps, trunk and have to be discussed as well, in Another reason why replicability secondary sewers – are a order to properly appreciate the is likely to be low is that in many prerequisite before any internal success of the OPP. communities where OPP’s help is development efforts can be sought, community groups and What makes the Orangi township started. In Orangi, there was no NGOs are not prepared to observe and the other urban poor immediate need for external the OPP’s strict adherence to self- settlements of Karachi different is development, which usually reliance and freedom from that a large percentage of residents increases the costs of sanitation dependence on donors. This was are second generation urban systems. Also, this made it initially the case with the residents, unlike in many towns possible to be independent of the community group Anjuman Samaji and cities in the rest of Pakistan, municipal governments, at least Behbood (ASB) in Dhuddiwala, and the Punjab in particular, where initially, the municipality being Faisalabad, led by social worker- urbanisation is still largely due to responsible for the management of cum-politician Mr Nazir Ahmad recent rural-urban migration.14 the secondary and trunk sewers. Wattoo who thought that the OPP Residents of urban poor A factor often overlooked is that in was a funding agency that doles settlements in Karachi are therefore many communities where there is a out funds (see box). The Boo Ali familiar with urban basic services, desire to introduce the OPP’s low and have had some experience cost sanitation model, an open with sanitation problems as well as 14 1998 Pakistan Census. drain sewerage system already sanitation solutions in crowded 15 For more, see Zaidi (1999) The New exists, unlike in Orangi where no urban areas. Also a key factor is Development Paragidm: Papers on formal sewerage systems existed. that Karachi’s literacy level is about Institutions, NGOs, Gender and Local Hence the problem in these areas is thirty percent higher than the rest Government, and Jalazai (1998) The NGOs much more complicated as it is Conspiracy in Pakistan.

13 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

WaterAid/Caroline Penn

A clean street after the project in Hassanpura, Faisalabad.

Sena Welfare Society in for internal development, arguing lessons on dealing and working Muzzaffargarh and the that since there is money available, with government institutions. The Organisation for Participatory why not subsidise potential AFB, which made initial errors in Development (OPD) in Lahore beneficiaries. Since taking an the beginning, has now installed were initially interested in approach that utilised subsidies some 9206 running feet of sewerage replicating the OPP model. But for the internal components of the lines funded by about Rs1,042,000 organisational problems and high infrastructure development, YCHR (£11,840) of community money17 personnel turnover at Boo Ali Sena has not been as successful in this (OPP Progress Report, December worsened, and since then it has aspect of its work, only expanding 2000). folded. In the case of OPD, an the number of households covered The attempts at replication tell us internal review led to the closure from 720 to 1391 in the last five that models should only be used of their sanitation programme, and years.16 for guidance – each community the organisation eventually shifted The ASB initiative however, as well will have its own specific context its focus to credit, education and as the project started by the and problems that require certain health, also initiated and Anjuman Falahi Behbood (AFB) in innovations. These attempts supported by OPP. The Youth Rawalpindi, turned out to be suggest that there are some basic Commission for Human Rights successful sanitation projects as principles that need to be adhered (YCHR) formed in 1989 in the well, not because they strictly Punjab was seen as the best followed the OPP model, but replication of the OPP model. But 16 YCHR progress reports. because they improvised and its success led to many offers of adapted innovations to suit local 17 The cost of this community initiative is funding from multilateral and situation and problems, on OPP- one-eighth the cost of what it costs bilateral donors for different kinds RTI advice, and through OPP – RTI government, a piece of information of community-based work. YCHR conveyed by a councillor who used to have research. Both experiences provide now allows a 30 percent subsidy civil works done in the area.

14 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

to in order to attain some level of internal development that the OPP principles for good practice. accomplishment, rather than follow adheres to very strictly, there is Three other NGO projects that have a preconceived map or structure. much room to manoeuvre under its recently started offer potentially Once those basic principles are basic principles. Another thing to important and interesting lessons. followed, there is enough room to consider is that the OPP experience These are Lodhran Pilot Project in adapt and innovate, which perhaps is only one case study. There is a Lodhran, the Environmental in itself is also a principle to be growing body of organisations Protection Society in Swat, and the recognised. Apart from the which have been influenced by the Conservation and Rehabilitation principle of the rejection of OPP, which are providing many Centre in Uch. subsidies and external funding for other important lessons and

BOX 2: THE ANJUMAN SAMAJI BEHBOOD (ASB) EXPERIENCE IN FAISALABAD

Since the 1960s Mr Watoo’s social work in Dhuddiwala consisted of inviting local politicians to dole out funds and inaugurate projects. In 1979 and 1984, Mr Watoo ran in local elections but lost both times. In 1987, he met the OPP’s Arif Hasan at a seminar in , and was subsequently invited to visit the project in Karachi. Disappointed when he found out the OPP was not an organisation that could provide funding for his project, he nevertheless became interested in its work. He visited the OPP a number of times over six years, and posed the problem of how the OPP approach could be replicated in his community that was dependent on the promises of politicians, on the infrequent public work schemes of the municipality, and would therefore likely reject any self-help initiative. A partnership eventually developed, and OPP proposed that ASB begin a credit programme so that the trust of the community could be regained. A loan of Rs 100,000 (£1,136) was made available to ASB by OPP for this credit programme, and soon after a six-month agreement was signed between ASB and WaterAid for the former to map the existing water and sewerage facilities in Dhuddiwala in order to initiate and replicate the OPP infrastructure model. The credit programme became a success, and laid the groundwork for initiating other projects and a pilot water supply project in nearby Hasanpura financed and managed by the community. The social preparation entailed showing each household how much they were to save if water connections were undertaken on a self-help basis. Community activists were identified to further reach out to the community. Eventually a Water Supply Committee of the residents was set up. A loan from WaterAid was made available to the ASB, with responsibilities for payment resting with the Water Supply Committee. Soon the project necessitated negotiations with the Faisalabad Water and Sanitation Authority (WASA) to tap into their main line. But this proved to be a difficult task, as numerous reasons were given why this could not happen. The principal reason though was the typical reservations government departments had in dealing with NGOs. Conflicts also emerged within the residents’ Water Supply Committee. A connection to the main line was eventually made. By June 1999, about 30 percent of houses in Hasanpura had been given legal connections, and 30% of WaterAid’s loan has also been recovered. At about the same time, the sanitation project for Dhuddiwala was also started. Since some degree of social mobilisation and community contacts had already been established and activists identified, work here became far easier. Again, the problem was negotiating with WASA to connect lane sewers to their trunk sewers as Faisalabad was on a flat terrain. ASB had to build a collector sewer, and it was decided that its cost would not be paid by the community directly until the lane sewers have been built. This increased the costs to each household to twice that in Orangi. When the first lane sewer was being built, differences arose amongst its members and work stopped. In order to expedite the process and revive community interest, ASB gave a loan to the community to complete the construction. Knowing OPP’s position, the ASB kept this move secret. The demonstration of the success of this first lane became the key for the residents of other lanes to take interest and approach the ASB for assistance in laying their sewerage lines. The ASB’s innovation paid off. ASB has now assisted communities in installing 52,120 running feet of sewerage lines, serving 2578 households at a cost to the community of Rs7,182,137 (£81,615) In many ways, the ASB experience has disproved many of the OPP’s critics.

15 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

OPP – The Wider Impact

As the OPP experience in low-cost, • The efforts to respond to calls for components slowed down, community-based sanitation policy advice, from government compounded by the frequent projects increased, its organisational groups and organisations transfers of government personnel philosophies, methodologies as well working with community-based assigned to the project. As a result, as its technical expertise developed. organisations, both international the internal components that were The OPP’s technical capabilities and Pakistani. installed did not function properly. even surpassed those of The OPP also felt that the SMC was In 1990, the OPP was invited by government’s. Survey plans and technically incompetent, having no UNICEF and the commissioner of maps of Karachi’s katchi abadis made concept of levels, joints and Sukkur to participate in the Urban painstakingly through the years are gradients and a general disinterest Basic Services (UBS) programme to stored in its databases, which is in the work. This department’s replicate the OPP process in Sukkur something that not even the organisational culture was deemed a city in . The OPP became a relevant government agencies have. to be too ad hoc. The OPP thus consultant to UNICEF and took It was inevitable that in time, the considered the project a failure, and some responsibility for shaping the OPP would be drawn into larger was surprised when UNICEF programme, provided technical policy debates as well as projects on nominated it as one of the ‘Best inputs, trained project engineers, a wider level. The OPP expanded its Practices’ project for the Habitat II organisers and activists, and focus from community-managed Conference. monitored and documented the projects to include large-scale entire process.18 The first thing that The OPP was invited in 1991, this projects addressing multiple the OPP learned from this project time by the World Bank, to communities, secondary level trunk was how partnerships like this had participate in the Collaborative sewerage and ultimately, advocacy a more complicated nature: despite Katchi Abadi Improvement and lobbying on Karachi-wide clear delineation of roles and Programme (CKAIP).19 Like the sanitation plans and policy. From responsibilities, problems and UBS, the project had many partners, OPP’s experience the knowledge as conflicts amongst partners almost including the SKAA and the well as the vantage point routinely occurred. UNICEF and Hyderabad Municipal Corporation developed, which enabled it to the Sukkur Municipal Corporation (HMC). The SKAA was responsible actively engage state agencies, local (SMC) were co-financiers of the for the overall co-ordination and co- politicians, international NGOs and external components of the project. financed the project. The HMC was donor organisations. The Public Health Engineering the other co-financier and was The OPP’s wider impact and Department (PHED) was to design responsible for the implementation growth into a more strategic the external sanitation and and maintenance of external organisation can be analysed from supervise construction. The Sindh sanitation. OPP was the principal its experience in four areas: Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) advisor, providing training in social was to ensure that the residents got and technical matters on external • The attempts to scale up the OPP leases and ownership rights for the and internal sanitation. The World experience in Sukkur and land. The OPP was the consultant, Bank Shelter Team was to take Hyderabad in partnership with technical adviser and trainer. And responsibility for the facilitation and UNICEF and the World Bank like all other OPP projects, the monitoring of the project and for (WB); community had to finance the channelling funds to the OPP. • The attempts to work with the internal component. Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority 18 UNICEF was interested in initiating the As soon as the project started, (SKAA) in developing nalas into programme in two other towns in the Sindh conflicts arose between the three trunk sewers; simultaneously, but the OPP, following its government departments (SMC, philosophy of focusing and consolidating in • The research and lobbying on PHED, SKAA), mostly concerning one area before moving to other localities, the ADB-funded Greater Karachi the timely allocation of resources insisted on working only in Sukkur initially. Sewerage Plan; and for operation and maintenance. The 19 The CKAIP was a World Bank and Swiss construction of the external Development Co-operation initiative.

16 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

WaterAid/Caroline Penn As with the UBS project, delays were recurrent. Work on the external component had not begun one year after the agreement, and four years later was not even completed. In these four years, the SKAA had seven Director Generals replacing one after the other. The HMC had eight administrators during this period. The project director, appointed from the HMC, was replaced three times. The project also suffered from having to follow cumbersome government procedures, affecting payments and eventual work output and speed. The World Bank team, like UNICEF, also wanted to work in Abdul Razak and Ershad Bibi have a piped water supply at their home in Hassanpura, three towns simultaneously. There Faisalabad, making it easier for them to make chutneys which they sell for a living. were also procedural issues regarding monitoring and then establish a more equitable also improved and streamlined its reporting, which often ignored the relationship with government own structures and procedures to way OPP operated. Hence, the agencies and get them to serve their improve such relations. In the project likewise failed. interests. (Hasan, 1997: 95) The OPP coastal areas of Karachi, there has OPP learned from these two realised that perhaps the better way been an OPP-SKAA partnership, experiences that working with to change government was to create with the OPP playing the role of government, especially in donor- conditions outside government – in facilitating internal development, funded schemes, was fraught with the community and amongst NGOs while the SKAA took responsibility difficulties. On one hand it was – that would force government to for external development. In 1994, a essential for the OPP to work with shape up. But even then, formal agreement was signed that these projects, as wider impact can government was not at all totally gave the OPP a training and only be achieved when working resistant to change from within. monitoring role as well as an directly with government, which Further interaction by the OPP with advisory role for the SKAA. Change often brings in the donor the SKAA did produce positive from within soon became evident. organisations. But on the other results, owing largely to results- Weekly meetings, site visits and hand, government was in itself an oriented and reforming civil community interaction became arena for competing political servants who managed to get into routine for SKAA employees. interests and factions, and its key positions once in a while. Mobile lease offices and site offices bureaucracy ran inefficiently and were brought into the localities to The OPP and SKAA began talking was tainted with corruption. Not make it easier for people to reach to each other in 1988. The SKAA wishing to totally abandon SKAA services. And the SKAA was created to regularise the katchi interaction with government, the slowly took on more community- abadis in Sindh. It was to take OPP decided that its role in future centred principles, taking extensive charge of processing ownership or similar programmes would be to measures to involve the community entitlement claims, upgrade and strengthen the community through in its work and innovating to adapt develop these areas, and provide motivation, training and technical itself to the requirements of the social and physical services once the assistance. Rather than spend time community. This mode of working locality was ‘notified’, i.e. accepted on indifferent, if not hostile proved itself as the SKAA became as a proper legal settlement. The government functionaries and one of the few, if not only SKAA, especially during the times engineers, it would arm community government department that had when Tasnim Siddiqui was Director- organisations with surveys, plans, become financially self-sufficient. General, had an open mind and estimates, and viable alternatives. But like other government interest in working with NGOs, and With these, the communities could departments, the SKAA was subject

17 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

to repeated changes in its empowerment, but it can also be use. The project design had not taken leadership, which has had an argued that this in fact is what cognisance of conditions in Korangi, impact on the working relationship government can do in terms of and ignored that already in 72% of between SKAA and OPP. making full use of resources while the lanes, sewerage lines and small requiring some amount of secondary sewers had already been The OPP has been able to build on community contribution. This is laid by the residents at their own cost this positive experience and is clearly only a valid argument if it or using funds from local councillors. currently training municipal can be shown that the government The design did not consider as well engineers from three cities, has resources to spend on essential that these sewerage lanes drain out Faisalabad, Multan and infrastructure development, which into natural nalas flowing in the area, Gujranwala, as part of a new at present is not the case. Part of and instead planned to install UNDP Plus Programme, which is the success of the ASB is due to expensive trunk mains along the using the OPP approach as the their argument that unless the main roads in Korangi. basis of the programme. people carry out this essential work OPP and its allies lobbied the The OPP’s experience with the themselves, the work will not be Governor of Sindh resulting in the Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project carried out at all. The FAUP is establishment of a committee in provides some contrasts between scheduled to close in December 1999 to review the design and to different approaches. The FAUP is 2001 after which its long-term follow the OPP principles of internal a government project that impact on government approaches and external components. As a undertakes internal development, can be assessed. result, a least cost option for the as well as secondary and tertiary The biggest advocacy challenge of project was prepared which brought external infrastructure building in the OPP to date was the campaign it down the cost to US$20 million. the Islamnagar, Noorpura and launched when it found out in 1997 Shadab Colonies of Faisalabad.20 It Through this work, the most that the Karachi Water Sewerage is principally funded by the United significant victory was the Board (KWSB) was set to implement Kingdom’s Department for cancellation of the US$70 million the Korangi Waste Water International Development (£48 million) ADB loan for the Management Project. The cost of this (DFID).21 As the FAUP was starting, Korangi22 Waste Water project was US$100 million (£68 they requested assistance in policy Management Project, of the Greater million) and US$70 million (£48 development from the OPP and the Karachi Sewerage Plan. This was million) of this was to be provided FAUP uses the technical standards despite the presence of strong through an ADB loan. The project set by the OPP. Over time OPP vested interests, especially in the was part of the Greater Karachi realised that their principle of no Foreign Aided Projects Office of the Sewerage Plan. At that time, the OPP cost-sharing for the internal KWSB. ADB officials, according to was already dealing with the Karachi component was being ignored, and newspaper reports, were surprised Metropolitan Corporation, the SKAA withdrew their support, although at how the “country rejected a loan and other government agencies. The dialogue between the OPP and the by a lending agency.” project was to make an extensive FAUP continues. The community investment in physical infrastructure The provision of alternative only had to pay 50% of the internal at great cost to the city. It consisted of strategies is an important feature of component costs, with the constructing a sewerage treatment this work. Faisalabad Development Agency plant, the rehabilitation and (FDA) providing the balance, extension of about 120 kms of drawing from the DFID grants and sewers, and extensive construction of government resources. Also, the 20 Faisalabad is a major city in the Eastern new trunk sewers. The OPP, with a FAUP provided full funding for Punjab, with a population of 2 million. The coalition of NGOs, academics and city almost tripled in size from 70,000 to trunk sewers. others, documented the existing 180,000 between 1941 and 1951, due to the The contrast between the ASB and infrastructure in the Korangi influx of refugees from India after 1947 FAUP brings into focus the settlement. On that basis, by (Alimuddin; 1999; 3). disparity between two different providing a detailed study and an 21 FAUP do not publish their accounts, so it approaches to funding. The FAUP’s alternative proposal in the process, is not known the extent of funding for this fifty-percent internal development this coalition argued that the project. subsidy can be challenged for existing infrastructure could be put 22 Korangi is an industrial area in the south creating more dependence than to better and far more cost-effective of Karachi.

18 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

Conclusion

In many ways, the OPP model is need to make any financial organisation interested in sewerage unique. By not doing very much, it decisions regarding its own or the disposal. Consequently, OPP’s has achieved a great deal. The community’s money. Unlike many emphasis has turned to dealing main feature of the OPP model is other groups working with with issues of the nalas and its simplicity, based primarily communities, OPP does not invest addressing issues related to the upon the notion that people/ any of its own money in the form Greater Karachi Sewerage Plan, communities have been dealing of physical infrastructure, nor does looking at the city as a unified with problems from time it take any money from the integrated whole, rather than at immemorial, and they always community. This ‘money-less’ pockets or areas of the city. Some come up with solutions. The relationship between OPP and the critics of the OPP felt that it needed solutions may be inappropriate, community, where the OPP does to look at the city as a whole from costly and badly designed. not invest cash directly other than the time of OPP’s inception. With Nevertheless, the spirit of the OPP some of the broad overhead costs hindsight, the influence of OPP in model is that people can and do which OPP incurs, is quite unique policy making and in giving help themselves. Perhaps a key to the NGO sector. advice, could not have been assumption of the OPP model is possible had it not focused on The OPP model works on the this faith in the ability of people to Orangi and consolidated its gains premise that the community will address their own problems. there. It is the result of that work identify what they want, rather Unlike many well-meaning ‘social which has permitted OPP to play a than outsiders (whether local or workers’ or NGO development far more influential role in the foreign) coming and telling them workers, the OPP model city’s sanitation and sewerage what is good for them (the acknowledges the community’s programmes. community). OPP feels that people ability to help itself. have been too dependent upon While much of this Study has Another aspect of the originality of government coming and solving argued that the OPP low-cost the OPP model is its co-option of their problems. As governments sanitation model has been a activists working in the community have become less able to address success, one cannot ignore the areas As a result, those who work with growing problems, donors seem to where OPP has failed to measure the community to explain the OPP have filled that void. A key issue of up to expectations. There are some model are members of the the OPP model is the aim to end areas of weakness in the OPP community itself, rather than any sort of dependence, and allow model and its intervention and outsiders who may not be sensitive the community to build its own they are highlighted in this final to or familiar with the sociology confidence in its own abilities. The section. Some recommendations on and dynamics of the community. OPP does interact with donors, and how to overcome these problems is funded by international donors are also discussed. A key factor that makes the OPP as well, but primarily for research model unique and adds to its The OPP’s methodology in and extension. The main form of simplicity is the view that OPP mobilising communities could ‘subsidy’ that OPP itself gives other will not do development and will benefit from a review. While in CBOs/NGOs is in the form of its not take its model to the people essence, this process has been considerable experience and unless it has first established extraordinarily successful in laying technical and social expertise. substantial links with the sewers and improving the sanitary community. The OPP is not in the Estimates show that 82 percent of environment of the katchi abadis, business of constructing lanes in Karachi now have sewer and the residents have continued to infrastructure. It is simply a lines laid in them. It is logical that maintain these sewers and improve support organisation of an one thinks about the next stages in their environment through the advisory nature. Because the OPP the disposal system. Collector planting of trees, developing home does not need to get involved in lanes, secondary and trunk sewers schools and health programmes, construction, it does not need to and treatment plants, should starting up small businesses and make any promises and does not become the concern of any other linked activities, there is some

19 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

criticism that the voice of the that there was evidence of broken it must also acquire competent weakest and most vulnerable within manhole covers and blocked technical expertise in these areas. the community such as women or sewers (although a very small OPP too, may have to ‘learn’ to new settlers, is not fully heard. percentage of all sewers laid). This accommodate NGOs that look to it suggest that there could be a There are a few issues specific to the for inspiration but find difficulty in problem with standards and OPP as an institution which are also implementing its principles. maintenance, but as the problem areas. Whereas one ‘Aloofness,’ a term used to describe government’s own engineers are recognises the high commitment of OPP’s general attitude towards now also using these standards for OPP staff and acknowledges the fact many NGOs, could perhaps be their own designs, this should be that unlike most NGOs, there has replaced by advocacy (amongst effectively monitored. Further, been little staff turnover, the fact NGOs), a function and role that it there could be a need to modify that the same people have been has to execute. Also, it needs to manhole cover design to take into involved in OPP and that it has not disseminate its materials more account the heavier trucks which grown in terms of professional staff, widely, and written in a more are now using the roads. is also cause for concern. As OPP reader-friendly and accessible considers moving into new areas Solid waste is a problem of manner, especially as it strives to and beyond the lanes where it endemic proportions and unless generate further policy dialogue started, it may also need to acquire this issue is also addressed between NGOs, government, the services of more professionals. It simultaneously with the laying of donors, policy makers and already has a number of important sewers and health education, politicians and as it takes on larger links with professionals and also sewers will continue to be clogged issues that it has often set aside runs training sessions, but perhaps causing problems with before. it needs further full-time staff, maintenance. AFB in Rawulpindi Even with these concerns, it is clear especially at a mid- and senior level. has included a solid waste that the OPP experience is replete This is also true for the Anjuman management aspect to their work. with lessons and insights that can Samaji Behbood in Faisalabad, which Now that OPP is increasingly create an impact not only for these is largely a one-man show; there is involved in city-level projects, communities, but also for NGOs, far greater need to incorporate more designing treatment plants, donor organisations and staff at the ASB. external sanitation infrastructure, government agents far beyond Visits to Orangi where OPP had etc., and is being asked to design Pakistan’s borders. helped in laying sewers showed many of the structures it criticises,

20 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

Acronyms and Terms used throughout From the Lane to the City

OPP Orangi Pilot Project OPP-RTI Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute KHASDA Karachi Health and Social Development Association OCT Orangi Charitable Trust KMC Karachi Metropolitan Council BCCI Bank of Commerce and Industry UNCHS United Nations Centre for Human Settlements SKAA Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority HMC Hyderabad Municipal Council FAUP Faisalabad Area Upgrading Programme CKAIP Collaborative Katchi Abadi Improvement Programme UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Fund UNDP United Nations Development Programme WB World Bank UBS Urban Basic Services FDA Faisalabad Development Authority Katchi abadi Informal settlement Nala Natural drainage channel

21 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

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22 From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Kazi Adil Ahmed Shafi and Towhida Yesmin of WaterAid Bangladesh.

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