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Poland External Relations Briefing: Reviving the Weimar Triangle and Rapprochement with the West Dominik Mierzejewski

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Poland External Relations Briefing: Reviving the Weimar Triangle and Rapprochement with the West Dominik Mierzejewski ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 6, No. 4 (PL) April 2018 Poland External Relations briefing: Reviving the Weimar Triangle and rapprochement with the West Dominik Mierzejewski 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu In August 1991, when Poland and other Central European countries started their transformation the Weimar Triangle (the Committee for the Support of Franco-German-Polish Cooperation) was shaped by the Polish foreigner minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Roland Dumas Minister of Foreign Affairs from France and the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Germany Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Initially, informal meetings have evolved over time and have became the regular triangle consultations. The primary goal for Warsaw-Berlin-Paris consultations was to strengthen dialogue and relations between then-two NATO members and members of the European Union with the biggest central European country. Over time in 1990s the Foreign Ministers consultations has been developed and the Ministers of Defence started consultations in 1997, Ministers of Justice in 1997, and Ministers of Finances in 2001. What should be also mentioned the mechanism for the parliamentary dialogue was set up in 1992. The biggest political achievement of the format was opening consultations of the Heads of State and the Governments in 1998. This political consultations were followed by the growing number of social and cultural interactions e.g. growing numbers of sisters cities, or youth exchange and cultural cooperation. The most important goal of the cooperation within the Weimar Triangle, however was to overcome the intraeuropean divisions between the West and the East, and introduce "young democracies" of the Central and Eastern European countries mainly Poland to the community of European states. By this means it continues the construction for the united Europe. In August 1991 three foreign ministers declared that Poles, the French and Germans are particularly responsible for the development of such forms of good neighbourhood in Europe that will prove themselves in the future. The cooperation with France and Germany strengthened the Polish position in negotiation with NATO and the European Union. In fact in was in the interest of both sides. By building channels of consultations Poland received reliable partner in full filling its aspiration to be part of the democratic world. On the other hand Germany and 1 France had big partner in the Eastern flank of Europe that secured their interests and security vis a vis Russia. In 1999 and 2004 Poland joined NATO and the European Union respectively and the goals for the further cooperation should have been redefined. In the enlarged EU, the Weimar Triangle plays the role of a forum for consulting and working out common positions on key European policy issues. The main areas of cooperation in the Triangle format were the strengthening of the Common Security and Defense Policy, the European Union's external relations and European policy. In the recent dynamics of Polish foreign policy the will for having more cooperation with Germany and France is visible. It is seen in the Minister of Foreign Affair professor Jacek Czaputowicz declarations, as well as mutual visit in Warsaw Berlin, and Paris. During his last visit to Paris Minister Czaputowicz declared that bringing up the Weimar Triangle at the level of heads of state and government is possible. At the moment Minister of Foreign Affairs from Germany and Poland have political will for the meeting, and the French counterpart Le Drian said that the meeting within the format is perceived as possible. Moreover, as declared by the Polish minister the President Macron visit to Warsaw is schedule for this year. In this context, he pointed out that 2018 was year of important anniversaries. We celebrate our century of independence, the French will celebrate the end of World War I very solemnly, (...) November 11th there will be large celebrations - this is also the opportunity to meet. Summarizing his conversations with Le Drian, he said he thought he had managed to reach an agreement. Now the date of convening this meeting will be set by France after consultation with the minister (foreign affairs of Germany) Heiko Mas and Jacek Czaputowicz, and France will be the host. There was a very good conversation, I got a proposal from Minister Le Drian to start working on the renewal of the strategic partnership between our countries as said the Polish Minister. reported Czaputowicz. He noted that the current partnership agreement with France is valid until the end of 2018. 2 As was mentioned during the Minister Czaputowicz visit to Paris Polish- French cooperation continued all the time "at various levels", including in the economic sphere. However, due to the fact of controversies over the latest reforms in Poland the political relations may provide some turbulences at the political level. The latest changes in the Polish policy towards the European Commission and the will for cooperation have been notice in Paris, and the room for further dialogue and consultations is opened. The attitude of Paris to the postulate of the revival of the Weimar format is generally positive. Although the format was shaped in order to build the platform for further integration, it was shaped by the major countries in Europe. During the meeting with the French counterpart both sides admitted that the compromise reached by tree parts of Poland, Germany and France would well foretell the decisions taken in the wider circles at the European Union level. In this context Polish position reflects also common interests of the countries from the Central and Eastern Europe. The voice of Poland via the Weimar triangle might be seen as advocating for the common interests of the Baltic states, the Visegrad Group, Romania and Bulgaria within the EU. This common voice is based on the issues of on maintaining the financing of cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy as well as on security matters. This compromise between three governments might not be the easy to be achieved. France articulates the interests of the Euro zone countries, and migration crisis and its own vision of integrations in Europe. But as declared by the Polish minister it appears that compromises between Poland and France are possible in many issues e.g. European unity, maintaining a common agricultural policy, also on cohesion policy. What should mentioned Poland does not oppose France's demand for funding for new EU tasks, but at the same time maintaining a high level of financing of traditional policies. Poland is ready to increase the contribution so that it could be, firstly, to fill the gaps after leaving the UK with the EU, and secondly, to finance new challenges for the European Union. Polish 3 Minister repeated that Poland's and Germany's foreign policy goal is a strong European Union, which is not divided into various speeds and areas. Berlin is also interested in reviving the Weimar Triangle. As was said by Heiko Maas - the German Minister of Foreign Affairs We appreciate the recognition of the importance of relations with Poland in the government program and in the coalition agreement. We are happy that Poland occupies an important place - which I have been assured - in German policy. Poland is ready with Germany and other Community states, including France, to solve EU problems and "take responsibility for the reforms of the European Union. When it comes to the cooperation and strengthening relations with Germany the issues of the justice system reform has appeared. Polish side repeated that the solutions applied during the reform of the justice system are consistent with the law and values ​ ​ of the European Union. Moreover Minister Jacek Czaputowicz discusses that the threaten of the collapse of the whole judicial system in Poland is probable, and the government could not recognize the illegality of some of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal. Conclusions The rapprochement between the government in Poland with German and French counterparts is considered as possible. The dialogue and rather soft approach sponsored by the Polish government should be perceived as natural and shaped as the outcome after evaluation of the current position of Poland in the European Union. After two years of growing controversies and tensions the main powers in the European Union have presented more sceptic view for cooperation with Poland and Warsaw realized that this approach failed to strengthen Polish position in Europe. Poland, that would like to be perceived and treated as the important power needs to cooperation with the Western countries. In other words, the undertaken initiatives of "Intermarium" (Three Sea Cooperation between Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas countries), and closer 4 relations with Hungary could not play the dominant role in Polish foreign policy. On the one hand this rapprochement is due to the Polish assessments, but on the other France and Germany might see Poland as the partner in resolving European problems. All sides acknowledged that Europe needs the peaceful neighbourhood. From this perspective the Weimar Triangle should be perceived as the additional mechanism for consultations in the sphere of security and defence. From this perspective the bilateral cooperation between Poland and France will be renewed especially after the controversies with the agreement with Airbus Helicopters. The second area for potential dialogue should refer to the European Union second pillar of European Foreign and Defence policy. From the second perspective the cooperation and dialogue will be channelled by different multilateral formats like the Weimar Triangle. The first step for the further strengthening the European Union external capacity should be rotted in the fact that member states should meet NATO defence expenditure requirements.
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