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Poland External Relations Briefing: Reactivation of the Weimar Triangle? Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska

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Poland External Relations Briefing: Reactivation of the Weimar Triangle? Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 33, No. 4 (PL) October 2020 Poland external relations briefing: Reactivation of the Weimar Triangle? Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 Reactivation of the Weimar Triangle? In mid-October, a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany and Poland took place in Paris. The consultations of the heads of diplomacy of the Weimar Triangle states were the first in such a formula since 2016. This is an important change and a step forward for this tripartite cooperation that has been in abeyance for several years. It used to be a key communication channel from Warsaw to Berlin and Paris and vice versa. Today the forum is not used, but potentially it can be an important transmission belt of concepts for European integration and cooperation. MFA’s meeting in Paris The talks held on October 15, 2020 in the French capital city by the heads of diplomacy of France, Germany and Poland - Jean-Yves Le Drian, Heiko Maas and Zbigniew Rau - focused on the most important challenges of the last months and the near future. During the meeting, the Ministers centred primarily on the dynamic situation in the neighbourhood of the European Union (especially in the context of the current developments in Belarus), European Union relations with the Russian Federation, and the prospects of strengthening of the Eastern Partnership. Moreover, the Ministers discussed the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Libya. The agenda of the talks also included transatlantic cooperation, security issues, EU relations with China and the strategy towards the Indo-Pacific region. During the meeting the Ministers discussed matters related to security policy, both in the bilateral dimension and as part of the work at the EU and NATO forums. Besides, the heads of diplomacy of the three states presented national strategies for counteracting the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as discussed the issues of migration and border management of EU Member States. On the day of the meeting, a joint declaration of the Foreign Ministers was also concluded, confirming the position of the European Union calling for action for peace, security, democracy and human rights, and to protect the values on which the EU was founded. The Ministers underlined there, that: "the Weimar Triangle plays an important role not only in agreeing a common position, but also in initiating efforts to shape Europe with greater internal solidarity 1 and combined strength in the international arena. Joint talks showed how much our analyzes of crisis situations are convergent, and how much we want to strengthen our cooperation." When is the meeting of heads of state? The talks held in Paris were intended to be an introduction to the summit of the leaders of Poland, Germany and France. Three parties have been waiting quite a long time for a top- level meeting, as the last summit of the leaders of the three countries (Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel and Bronisław Komorowski) was held in 2011 in Wilanów near Warsaw, Poland. For the following years, tripartite contacts in the Weimar Triangle formula were avoided. For various reasons - it seemed that the Triangle could no longer fulfill its task; that it was excluding other countries from the internal dialogue; or that it did not have the thread of understanding that had previously united the leaders. Yet, in February this year, French President Emmanuel Macron - during his official visit to Poland - promised to organize a meeting of the leaders of the three countries on July 14 in Paris. On that day, Poland was to be the guest of honour of the parade on the Champs Elysees, and Polish President Andrzej Duda was to walk alongside the French leader, and then take part in consultations with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Obviously these plans were thwarted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The matter of the summit meeting was postponed. Currently, however, French diplomacy wants to work out an opportunity to manage the organisation of the summit. As the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized: "we want to organise the summit as soon as possible next year. We are looking for a symbolic date, a symbolic place for this event." It can already be assumed that the end of August 2021 would be ideal, because then the Weimar Triangle would celebrate its 30th anniversary. Importance of the Weimar Triangle The triple cooperation of France, Germany and Poland was indeed established in August 1991 in Weimar by the then foreign ministers of these three countries. The starting point for the creation of the Weimar Triangle was the understanding of the need to maintain cooperation between the three countries, which was to be crucial for the future of the continent. It was about reconciliation, understanding, pursuing common interests and developing a culture of talks. Its establishment was aimed at overcoming the divisions of Europe through the integration of Poland with the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. This goal was achieved through 2 Poland's accession to NATO in 1999, and to the EU five years later. However, the cooperation within the Triangle continued in the following years, also after Poland's accession to the Community. From the very beginning this forum brought together unequal partners who often had different expectations about the future of the continent (more / less European integration, key sectors of European integration, its main directions), yet it was an attractive forum for exchanging experiences and creating a (certain) community of political positions. Poland's accession to the EU forced a new definition of the tasks and functions of the Triangle as a framework for political dialogue at various levels of government of the three countries. Nevertheless, Weimar cooperation meant not only political contacts, but - perhaps by all means - social contacts. Especially youth exchanges, contacts between cities and regions, and cultural cooperation are today crucial for this tripartite cooperation. Meetings of Polish, French and German youth are held as part of the Polish-German Youth Cooperation. The existing Polish-German and Polish-French partnerships are a convenient framework for Weimar's interregional cooperation, and the three-way contacts of the regions are called “small Weimar Triangles” (they realise in this way the sub-state relations). A model example is the cooperation between the Polish region of Silesia, the French region of Nord Pas-de-Calais and the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Moreover, many tripartite cultural events are organized - like the Adam Mickiewicz Award, granted for actions for reconciliation and cooperation in Europe. Therefore, cooperation within the Weimar Triangle has a very strong basis for action and great potential for further development, especially now, when talks on the future of the European Union are underway. Is a future for the Weimar Triangle possible? Currently, the Weimar Triangle is especially a place of consultations and elaboration of common positions on trilateral cooperation in terms of social issues. But politically there is a question of its importance - is this format of cooperation still valid today? Or - could it transform into a new, stronger core of the European Union? Or - what are the development prospects for this body? Despite the many critical words that have been spoken about the Weimar Triangle (the term journalists used once is that it is more "a facade than reality"), it must be said that probably all three countries have some hope for its revival. Undoubtedly, the Triangle connects the 3 partners who are important in terms of demographics, politics and economy of the Community, and its voice should be taken into account. Looking at the future of triangular cooperation, today it can be stated that it has some development paths: • the Triangle could act as a “clearing house” to reconcile the EU's internal interests and resolve conflicts; • the possible meetings of Weimar finance ministers could provide an appropriate forum to discuss the situation in the EU (still, there is a serious obstacle to this because Poland is not in the euro area); • the triangle could be a political catalyst for action within the European Community: o through the implementation of the consultations between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs before important meetings within the EU or the European Council; o through the introduction of the practice of tripartite visits of the MFA to third countries; o through the introduction of coordinators for Weimar cooperation in each Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this way the Weimar Triangle could indeed become an important link in the European Union. A prerequisite would be the political will to maintain such cooperation as well as a sustained, visible and daily involvement of all partners. 4 .
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