Responses to Improving Network Rail's Renewals Efficiency
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Responses to ‘Improving Network Rail’s renewals efficiency: a consultation’ Industry Stakeholder Pack Page number Arriva 2 Association for Consultancy and Engineering (ACE) 9 Bootham Network Solutions Limited 14 Brian Bennett 16 Chris Fox 18 DB Cargo 20 First Group 26 Freight Transport Association 31 Freightliner 34 GB Railfreight 43 Go-Ahead Group 46 McLachlan and Tiffin 50 Merseytravel 54 Network Rail 57 Rail Delivery Group 67 Rail Freight Group 74 Railway Industry Association 78 RMT (National Union of Rail Maritime and Transport 89 Workers) Transport for Greater Manchester 95 Transport for London 99 Transport Salaried Staff Association (TSSA) 101 Transport Scotland 104 Virgin and Stagecoach Group 108 Page 1 of 1 Arriva plc Lacon House 6th Floor 84 Theobalds Road London WC1X 8NL UK Tel +44 (0 20 3882 0400 www.arriva.co.uk By email: [email protected] John Larkinson Office of Rail & Road One Kemble Street London WC2B 4AN 13th September 2017 Dear John, Response to ORR’s Consultation on Improving Network Rail’s Renewals Efficiency Thank you for the opportunity to respond to this consultation. This response is made by Arriva plc, its subsidiary Arriva UK Trains Limited and its wholly owned train operating companies (TOCs), Arriva Rail London Limited, Arriva Rail North Limited, Arriva Trains Wales/Trenau Arriva Cymru Limited (ATW), Grand Central Rail Company Limited, The Chiltern Railway Company Limited (CR) and XC Trains Limited (XC). Arriva is a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG). Arriva engages actively with the working groups established by the Rail Delivery Group (RDG) in relation to the PR18 process, which has spent time reviewing this consultation and debating feedback. We are therefore fully supportive of RDG’s response to this consultation and for the avoidance of doubt RDG’s views can be interpreted as representative of the views of Arriva. In the context of this Consultation, Arriva would like to highlight its support of the five-year funding cycle for Network Rail as this provides an appropriate level of certainty to enable the planning and delivery of the key major maintenance and renewals programme that Network Rail needs to deliver. However, it is also important to ensure continuity of funding across Control Periods to enable the planning of projects programmed for delivery early in a Control Period. If Network Rail is to deliver such schemes efficiently, the Period Review and funding Settlement processes need to be structured to provide appropriate advance funding to support this preparatory activity. While it is clear that Network Rail has not achieved the renewals unit cost reductions expected in the CP5 settlement, Arriva would highlight that efficiency needs to assessed on a broader basis by considering the impact on rail passengers and rail revenue as well. In addition, it is unlikely that a “like for like” renewal will be the appropriate solution in the context of a railway which is growing. It is also clear that the reclassification of Network Rail has reduced the range of mitigating responses available to it to address cost challenges other than by reducing renewals volumes. Arriva would suggest that some form of contingency funding pot be provided in the CP6 settlement to enable Network Rail to sustain renewals while cost challenges are addressed. Work already undertaken and Network Rail’s accelerating devolution programme show that Network Rail can improve the efficiency of its activities through closer working with its suppliers and customers. The activity Arriva plc, Registered in England No: 347103, 1 Admiral Way, Doxford International Business Park, Sunderland SR3 3XP. UK currently being undertaken to develop the Route Strategic Business Plans are an effective mechanisms for cementing this in CP6. Yours sincerely Richard McClean Managing Director Grand Central Railway Company Ltd. Pro-forma for responding to Improving Network Rail’s renewals efficiency: a consultation This pro-forma is available to those that wish to use it to respond to our consultation. Other forms of response (e.g. letter format) are equally welcome. Please send your response to [email protected] by 5pm 13 September 2017. Full name Mary Hewitt Job title Strategy and Policy Director Organisation Arriva plc, its subsidiary Arriva UK Trains Limited and its wholly owned train operating companies (TOCs), Arriva Rail London Limited, Arriva Rail North Limited, Arriva Trains Wales/Trenau Arriva Cymru Limited (ATW), Grand Central Rail Company Limited, The Chiltern Railway Company Limited (CR) and XC Trains Limited (XC). In addition, this response also covers Alliance Rail Holdings Limited and the Great North Western Railway Company Limited. Arriva is a wholly owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG). Email* Telephone number* *This information will not be published on our website. Question 1: Have we identified the main casual factors explaining recent trends in efficiency? Do you have any views on their relative importance? Until recently, Arriva has had little visibility from Network Rail as to the cost effectiveness of Network Rail’s delivery of its maintenance and renewals activity. This contrasts with the significant engagement that has been undertaken in areas associated with Operations and train service delivery and to some extent on the delivery of enhancement programmes. However, the introduction of Route Scorecards and the PR18 process is starting to enable greater transparency in this area. On this basis, it is difficult for Arriva to comment on the full detail of what might be the causal factors underpinning the recent trends in the efficiency of Network Rail’s delivery of renewals outlined by ORR. Arriva is unable to comment on the detail of Network Rail’s efficiency improvement plans for CP5 or to how Network Rail responded to the expected results not being delivered as it has had limited visibility or engagement with what these may have been. Impact of availability of Access for renewals delivery While Arriva does recognise that gaining access to the railway to carry out work is a complex process, it is not aware of any specific instances where problems in this area have impacted on Network Rail’s cost effectiveness. It is the case that more trains are using the network, including earlier first trains and later last trains. This is as it should be as the rail industry makes better use of its capacity to meet passenger and freight customer requirements. While this makes engineering access potentially more disruptive, it does not preclude Network Rail from working in partnership with its Operator customers to seek and secure the engineering access it requires while having due regard to the needs of passengers and freight customers. Clearly, acting to protect the interests of passengers and freight customers, operators will wish to scrutinise and challenge Network Rail’s engineering access requests – indeed, ORR’s expectations are that this should increasingly be the case. Operators, who have a consideration of their customers’ needs, will want to: Understand the impact on their customers and ensure that this disruption is necessary Validate that the engineering access will be efficiently used Confirm the condition that the route would be handed back in as that it is clear what impacts there may be on the service delivered to passengers immediately after the planned disruption. However, Operators do not “refuse” Network Rail access as seems to be implied in the ORR Consultation Document. Indeed, Network Rail have access to significant powers to book the engineering access they require. Arriva’s experience is that this process is well managed at a local level with strong engagement between the Network Rail and operator teams. Impact of delayed start to CP5 renewals programme and renewals programme replanning Arriva did see and was concerned about the “log-jam” of renewals activity that occurred in the last year of CP4 – this caused significant disruption to passengers at the time and was followed by a marked reduction in activity at the start of CP5. While this remains conjecture as Arriva has no direct evidence of causal linkages, this could well have been associated with distraction of Network Rail delivery teams away from planning for early CP5 schemes as they worked flat out on the execution of the CP4 projects. It is also worth observing that many of the renewals projects programmed for early in CP5 were very challenging in their nature and would be expected to have required significant planning effort. It may well also be that the workload associated with the PR13 process itself interrupted the planning of the CP5 schemes. We would encourage ORR and Network Rail to ensure that this does not happen again and that appropriate, transitional, measures are put in place. It is possible to infer that the initial hiatus in delivering the CP5 projects followed by further deferral of projects may well have led to higher unit costs as a result of re-planning and reduced volumes. It could also be sensibly concluded that the increased cost control pressures associated with borrowing limits post reclassification have accelerated and compounded this effect, as volumes of renewals were reduced again. Impact of combining asset improvement with renewals delivery. With increased devolution of authority to Network Rail Routes, Arriva has seen a greater focus on ensuring that the maximum benefit is delivered through planned renewals including the delivery of asset capability improvements. Achieving such synergies should be considered to be an example of efficient infrastructure management and not “scope and cost creep” as seems to be implied. We would encourage further collaborative work such as this to maximise efficiency. Arriva does not expect Network Rail to simply renew assets “like for like” but would expect assets to be renewed in “modern equivalent form” reflecting today’s technologies and asset capabilities.