Security sector reform in post-conflict environments: An analysis of coherence and sequencing in Mozambique. Examining Peacebuilding Challenges of Defence, Police and Justice Reforms in a Neo-Liberal Era
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SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF COHERENCE AND SEQUENCING IN MOZAMBIQUE
Examining Peacebuilding Challenges of Defence, Police and Justice Reforms in a Neo-Liberal Era
Volume II of II
Anícia ABDULCARIMO LALÁ
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
DEPARTMENT OF PEACE STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD
2014
Table of Contents
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction...... 1
Section A – Genesis, rationale and relevance of the research topic...... 1 1.1 Setting the scene...... 1 1.2 The state of research...... 6 1.3 SSR concept and practice: genesis and synopsis of the existing critique.13 1.3.1 The Concept of SSR...... 13 1.4 Research question...... 16 1.5 Levels of analysis and timelines...... 20 1.6 The relevance of a case study on Mozambique...... 22 1.7 Importance of research...... 24 1.8 Contribution to knowledge...... 28
Section B – Research methodology...... 31 1.9 Methodology...... 31 1.9.1 Research Strategy...... 32 1.9.2 Fieldwork...... 34 1.9.3 Data Collection...... 38 1.9.4 Semi-Structured Interviews...... 38 1.10 Ethical considerations...... 47 1.10.1 Informed Consent, Confidentiality and Anonymity...... 47 1.10.2 Access and Gate-Keeper Involvement...... 49
Section C – Thesis Structure...... 50 1.11 Chapter summary...... 50
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CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review...... 56
2.1 SSR in the context of IR theory – a brief overview...... 60
2.1.1 IR Theory and SSR – Summary and Conclusion...... 67 2.2 SSR and the security-development nexus in the context of the liberal peacebuilding critique...... 70 2.2.1 SSR and the Withering Away of Politics...... 72 2.2.2 SSR and the International Political Economy of Aid...... 83 2.2.3 SSR and Liberal Peacebuilding Critique – Progress and Limits.....86 2.3 Complementing the liberal peace critique: critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage as analytical tools...... 88 2.3.1 Historical Institutionalism, Path Dependence and Critical Junctures...... 89 2.3.2 Sociological Institutionalism and Institutional Bricolage...... 95 2.4 Conclusion...... 100
CHAPTER THREE: Mozambique´s Post-Independence Political Economy and the Roots of the Civil War...... 103
3.1. Introduction...... 103
3.2 Frelimo´s state-building project and post-independence armed conflict.105 3.2.1 Transitioning into a Fragile Independence...... 105 3.2.2. Ethnicity and Corruption: Begging to Differ from the Rest...... 107 3.2.3 Ideology and the Quest for National Identity...... 111 3.2.4 Flawed Economic Policies...... 113 3.2.5 Inherited Economic Vulnerabilities...... 116 3.2.6 In the Epicentre of International and Regional Dynamics: RENAMOS´s Creation and Survival...... 118 3.3 Conclusion...... 122
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CHAPTER FOUR: Revisiting the Past–Historical Roots Mozambique´s Security Challenges...... 124
4.1 Introduction...... 124 4.2 The state security and justice systems between 1975-1992...... 127 4.2.1 Defence...... 129 4.2.2 Public Security...... 137 4.2.3 Justice...... 144 4.3 Linkages between the justice and security systems and their implications for coherence and sequencing...... 159 4.4 Conclusion...... 167
CHAPTER FIVE: Sequencing in Mozambique´s Transitions: Economic Liberalisation, Peacebuilding and Democratisation in Perspective...... 172
5.1 Introduction...... 172 5.2 Sequencing Mozambique´s triple transition...... 175 5.2.1 Sequencing and Institution Building...... 180 5.3 Economic liberalisation, peacebuilding and security dynamics...... 183 5.3.1 Reconstruction and Structural Adjustment at Odds...... 184 5.3.2 The Influence of Economic Liberalisation on Security Changes.191 5.4 Economic liberalisation and democratisation...... 203 5.4.1 Democratisation and Corruption...... 203 5.4.2 Political Expediency and Survival Tactics...... 209 5.4.3 Democratic Deficit and Political Bricolage...... 220 5.5 Conclusion...... 230
CHAPTER SIX: Disowned by inheritance – Mozambique´s General Peace Agreement and its implications for the Post-War Security System...... 234
6.1 Introduction...... 234 6.2 Negotiating the peace: wading through novelty, mistrust and the unknown...... 236
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6.3 Implementing GPA security provisions in a crisis-induced transition.....244 6.3.1 DDR...... 246 6.3.2 Defence...... 258 6.3.3 Provisions for the Police and Intelligence Services...... 265 6.3.4 Reconciliation and the Absence of Justice...... 283 6.4 Conclusion...... 299
CHAPTER SEVEN: Mozambique´s Post–Civil War Justice and Security System Challenges...... 302
7.1 Introduction...... 302 7.2 Mozambique´s post-civil war justice and security framework...... 304 7.2.1 Institutional Architecture...... 304 7.2.2 Security Decision-Making and Oversight Framework...... 310 7.3 Policy-making in the context of liberalisation...... 329 7.3.1 Public Sector Reforms and SSR...... 330 7.3.2 National Security Strategy and Policy-Making...... 341 7.4 The post-civil war justice sector reforms...... 348 7.4.1 Dynamics of Criminal Justice Reform...... 353 7.4.2 Access to Justice...... 365 7.5 Conclusion...... 377
CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusions...... 382
8.1 Learning from the case-study...... 384 8.2 Recommendations for Mozambique...... 408 8.3 General recommendations...... 410 8.4 Avenues for further research...... 414
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 419
Appendix A: Interview Questions...... 515
Appendix B: Consent Form...... 522
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CHAPTER SIX
Disowned by inheritance: Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement and its implications for the Post-war Security System
‘You may believe the flowers when you eat the fruit’ North African Proverb
6.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter (V) argued that the sequencing of the triple transition in
Mozambique reflected the priority awarded by donors to economic liberalisation over peacebuilding and democratisation, which combined with the political bricolage of the Frelimo government led to contradictory outcomes, such as the spread of corruption. In turn, these dynamics of reform and adaptation resulted in weak post-conflict state institutions, particularly in the security and justice system. Except for the reduction of military expenditure, the marginal attention paid to security matters in contrast to the prominence of economic liberalisation, led to a disregard for the challenges of the security and justice system, from the inception of the peace agreement, continuing until the immediate transitional phase, and further into the subsequent democratisation process.
This chapter focuses on the implementation of the security provisions of
Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (GPA) during the immediate transition, whilst further confirming the lesser importance given to security vis-
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à-vis economic concerns. It is important to analyse both the GPA and its implementation due to its impact on the coherence and sequencing of subsequent long-term security and justice reforms in the country, which are further discussed in chapter VII. Whilst the GPA represented an opportunity offering entry-points for security reforms, its provisions were highly disputed and limited. This precluded the drawing up of a comprehensive framework for security transformation, and resulted in missed opportunities for police and justice reforms.
However, these shortcomings cannot be solely attributed to a lack of written provisions for the implementation and monitoring of GPA reforms, nor to their weakness. Instead, the political bargaining inherent to the negotiations and which led to unintended short-term security problems must be examined.
Hence, the current analysis starts by reviewing the context and underlying power dynamics of the peace negotiations that shaped the GPA security provisions and the corresponding mechanisms of implementation.
Subsequently, given the controversy surrounding the security provisions of the peace agreements, the prescriptions for changes in the defence and police are examined, as well as the lack thereof in the justice sector. Finally, the GPA is assessed in the light of its political success, but also taking into account its short, medium and long-term limitations.
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This chapter argues that although the GPA represented a critical juncture in the history of Mozambique enabling negative peace, a more modest view of its political success is warranted. The minimalism of the security provisions and their flawed execution, the absence of concern with future security sector reform and oversight, together with the lack of measures for reconciliation and judiciary reforms are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the general praise.
6.2 Negotiating the peace: wading through novelty, mistrust and the unknown
Mozambique’s peace negotiations were part of a longer process, with roots in various diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the sixteen-year war between the
GoM and RENAMO. Amongst these were the N’komati talks and agreement between Mozambique and South Africa in 1984, and the insistence, throughout the eighties, by national religious orders, neighbouring counties such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, Botswana, Malawi and the owner of the multinational LONRHO, that the belligerents at least reach the direct negotiation stage.
None of these initiatives succeeded, and the war continued until conditions converged to give peace a chance. The end of the Cold War led to a decline in international supplies to both sides. At the regional level, starting around
1989 political change in South Africa brought about the end of support for
RENAMO. Nationally, the country was suffering from acute economic damage and social chaos in rural areas, a situation worsened by the most severe
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drought in decades. Consequently, the state lost legitimacy due to its inability to protect the population and provide humanitarian aid countrywide. These factors came together with a series of others, including the military exhaustion of the belligerents, the appeals of national religious institutions, protests of civil society and those of the population at large, to lead the parties to accept facilitation by the Santo Egídio Community, an Italian religious group. Formal peace talks began in Rome, in July 1990, leading to the General Peace
Agreement, or the Rome Peace Agreement, on 4th October, 1992 (Hume,
1994, della Rocca, 1998).
Mozambique’s peace negotiations represented a departure from the prevailing frameworks of that time. The non-governmental affiliation of observers (later on accepted as mediators)1 was crucial in promoting the perception of impartiality and trust deposited in them by the GoM and RENAMO (Hume
1994: 15-19, della Rocca, 1998). In addition, the trust-building approach adopted did not encompass the imposition of proposals (Zuppi 1995: 122-123,
Synge 1997: 18, della Rocca 1998: 95-96), unlike the typical ‘robust’ mediation in international diplomacy as exemplified in the Bosnian Dayton Agreements
(Gaeta 1996: 150, Camisar et al 2005: 28). In the case of Mozambique, the parties agreed to begin negotiations without demanding a cease-fire as a pre-
1 The mediators were members of the Santo Egídio Community, namely Matteo Zuppi and Andrea Ricardi, the Catholic Bishop of Beira in Mozambique, D. Jaime Gonçalves, and a socialist member of the Italian Parliament, Mario Raffaelli.
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condition. Moreover, when the latter was achieved they did not accord it a central enough role as to disrupt the discussion of other issues.2
Nevertheless, Mozambican belligerents were committed to dialogue because they realised the impossibility of outright military victory. As in most peace processes, parties stalled and pursued parallel strategies outside the negotiation framework, aimed at strengthening their positions. For instance, both parties allegedly pursued military actions on the ground throughout the negotiation, as evidenced by their mutual complaints of cease-fire violations to the Joint Verification Commission (Alden and Simpson 1993: 119, della Rocca
1998: 119-120, Alden 2001: 27).
In addition, the GoM advanced economic and political reforms, including the adoption of a new constitution in 1990, which, in turn, paved the way for multiparty politics (Alden and Simpson 1993: 117-118, Venâncio and Chan
1998: 54, Alden 2001: 13, 25), thereby significantly reducing the strength of
RENAMO’s bargaining position, which was based on a purported struggle for democracy. Two other tactics were deployed by the GoM to maintain power and gain access to state resources: the first was the vindication of a minimalist role for the UN in the subsequent transition (Berman 1996: 25-27, Venâncio and Chan 1998: 36, 53); and the second was the rejection of a formal power-
2 A partial cease-fire was achieved after the third round of negotiations between 08/11/1991-01/12/199 (Alden 2001: 26), but a full cease-fire was only agreed on in October 1992, when the overall agreement was signed.
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sharing solution, both before or after elections (Saul 1994: 3, Synge 1997:
116).
RENAMO, in turn, lacked a coherent negotiation strategy and concentrated on obtaining national and international recognition, as well as guarantees of support for its transformation into a viable political force (Synge 1997: 45-46,
Venâncio and Chan 1998: 43, Alden 2001: 25). This involved securing financial aid and the deployment of a strong UN force to compel the government into action, hence compensating for its weak political base and negotiation strategy (Hume 1994: 105, Berman 1996: 26, Synge 1997: 59-60, della Rocca 1998:198, Venâncio and Chan 1998: 43-44, 55, Alden 2001: 32,
Levine 2007: 368-383). These tactics inevitably fuelled suspicion, so much so that the finalised documents were ratified only when the entirety of the protocols were ready, to avoid having to make concessions or risking a change in the situation on the ground.
In this context, the mediators’ help in achieving the parties’ ownership of a peace settlement must be pointed out. Although said support failed to fully meet expectations on either side, it nevertheless served as sufficient assurance of their political survival. This was particularly important in maintaining RENAMO's commitment to the GPA. Nonetheless, and in contrast to its aforementioned innovative approaches, Mozambique’s peace process, like most peace talks at the time, focused almost exclusively on the
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belligerents, thus marginalising the needs of the population. Evidence for this includes the fact that, until very late in the negotiations, the parties played stalling games and failed to commit to an early and total ceasefire, which was required to provide relief to the populations, in face of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the country (Hume 1994: 49, della Rocca 1998: 198,
231).3
Moreover, despite the pressure of civil society to promote peace (the creation of peace movements, demonstrations and petitions), its concerns, as well as those of the emerging (unarmed) opposition and other groups in the
Mozambican society were not taken into consideration in the negotiations.
The rise of most of these players at the same time as the evolving of negotiations did not favour such an outcome, and even less so, any consideration of their formal contribution or participation in the process.
Hence, unlike the almost contemporary cases of South Africa and Guatemala where CSOs participated actively (Prendergast and Plumb 2002: 328, Stanley and Holiday 2002: 424), in Mozambique the peace negotiations were the exclusive playing field of the belligerents. In this, Mozambique fell well behind other African processes of conflict resolution, which involved a higher degree of CSOs contribution to peace negotiations - such as in the cases of Liberia
(NDI 2004: 10-11, Hayner 2007: 11-13, Atuobi 2010: 11-13), the DRC (ICG
13/02/06: 3) and, more recently, Kenya (Zanker 2013: 10-15). Yet, despite
3 See footnote 2 above.
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limited societal ownership of Mozambique’s peace agreement, everyone, including the population, political players, religious groups and non- governmental organisations, received the GPA with great satisfaction, and attempted to use it to spread the message of peace and reconciliation.
The final GPA comprised seven protocols and a number of joint declarations and communiqués. Overall, it established the issues and the ways in which they would be dealt with during the transitional period - which proved too narrow, in light of the parameters of current peace operations4 - until the first general elections in October 1994 and the exit of the UNOMOZ. In contrast to the common peace accords of that era, which mostly focused on the maintenance of ceasefires, the GPA included broader aspects, revealing a degree of understanding and anticipation of the challenges ahead. Examples of this were the references to the reintegration of the refugee and displaced populations, as well as that of the demobilised soldiers into civil life, and the search for international financing (GPA 1992 VII). It was generally felt that the agreement was admirably broad and that its flexibility would nurture future political compromise (e.g. Synge 1997: 170); however, it had many shortcomings as well. As is common following longstanding hostilities, the
GPA was implemented in an environment marked by distrust, but with supervision mechanisms designed to make it work (GPA 1992 V). It consisted of a variety of monitoring commissions with specific mandates and
4 Even at that time, Aldo Ajello, the SRSG, questioned the tight timeline for the implementation of the GPA and argued that a longer period should have been planned (Ajello 1995: 126, Berman 1996: 83, Synge 1997: 52).
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compositions, generally including the participation of UNOMOZ members, but also guaranteeing both government and RENAMO representation in all areas.
The core body was the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC), largely a political organ, which included the parties’ representatives as well as ambassadors of western states such as the US, the UK, France, Germany,
Italy, Portugal and the OAU (Venâncio and Chan 1998: 47-48). The active participation of this group and their commitment to ensuring a joint approach nurtured a good working relationship with the SRSG that headed UNOMOZ
(Ajello 1995: 125, Synge 1997: 115, 118, Alden 2001: 37, Manning and
Malbrough 2009: 85-86). It also helped the CSC to effectively overcome deadlocks, even if, in the process, they benefited from the involvement of outside players, such as regional leaders and influential businessmen (Synge
1997: 133, Vines, 1998b).
There were also subsidiary commissions, such as the Ceasefire Commission
(CFC), the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence
Forces (CCFADM) and the Reintegration Commission (CORE). These bodies, besides involving representatives from conflicting parties, also included members from the UN and designated foreign countries. In contrast, four other specialised commissions were made up solely of national citizens, namely, the National Elections Commission (CNE), the Territorial Affairs
Commission (CNAT), the National Information Commission (COMINFO) and the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL). The latter two were
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responsible for the investigation of potential instances of non-compliance with the GPA by the police and intelligence services, but played a minor role given their limited mandate (Synge 1997: 154-157).
Overall, the principal commissions carried out valuable work, but a
Mozambican interviewee who participated in one of them remarked that:
The Commissions worked in this environment of mistrust and insecurity, and even those Commissions that should have carried out technical tasks ended up being influenced…because of the political instructions, which, after all, were what dictated the general options (1.1.1- 01/09/08).
This view supported that of those who criticised the GPA for being too general, allowing excessive margin for renegotiation (Berman 1996: 86). It also illustrates the broader point of this section, namely that contested and unresolved issues from the negotiation and the agreement signing carried over into the following transitional phase and beyond. However, it is important to recognise that highly detailed peace agreements are hard to achieve (Call
2007: 6), and per se also provide no guarantee of adequate implementation
(Hutchful 2009: 17). This point has been illustrated by both the historical example of Guatemala (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 422-423) and, more recently, that of Southern Sudan (Brosche 2007: 231, Rolandsen 2011: 551-
564, Johnson 2012: 640). In Mozambique, however, the excessive room for manoeuvre during implementation inevitably called into question security- related provisions, as detailed below.
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6.3 Implementing GPA security provisions in a crisis-induced transition
Protocol IV of the GPA, entitled ‘Military Questions’ (GPA 1992 IV), was crucial for security matters and is central to the analysis in this chapter. Besides dealing with DDR and the creation of the new armed forces of Mozambique
(Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique - FADM)5, it also contained security provisions for the intelligence services (Serviço de Informação e
Segurança do Estado - SISE)6 and for the police (Polícia da República de
Moçambique - PRM)7. This protocol regulated both the activities of private and irregular armed groups (GPA 1992 IV: III) and established the withdrawal of foreign troops (GPA 1992 IV: II), such as those of Zimbabwe.
Both the general outline and the details of protocol IV focused more closely on the armed forces than on the looser framework of proposed changes to the intelligence services and the police. The reorganisation of the armed forces impacted crucially its structure, management and direction, representing an instance of institutional critical juncture. In contrast, the provisions for the intelligence services and the police dealt with the adoption of democratic principles in their activities, with special emphasis on the need for de- politicisation of the force’s members (GPA 1992 IV: IV, V). In theory this should have represented another critical juncture for these institutions, but in
5 Protocol IV of the GPA established the creation, structure, and composition of the FADM, and the Ministerial Diploma 81/95 of 07/06/95 determined its subordination to the Ministry of National Defence.
6 The intelligence services, previously known as the state secret police, were legally transformed into solely an intelligence-gathering agency in 1991 by Law 20/91 of 23/08, as part of the reforms unilaterally began by the Frelimo Government.
7 Law 19/92 of 31/12 enacted changes in the police, changing its name from previous Mozambique’s People Police (PPM) into PRM.
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the absence of monitoring, their evolution was characterised more by continuity and path dependence.
Although issues of transitional justice and the reform of the justice system were important for reconciliation and the long-term sustainability of peace, they were not written into the GPA, due to the interests and priorities of the negotiating parties as well as their understanding of the root causes of the conflict. Measures related to private and irregular armed groups (GPA 1992
IV: III) proved very difficult to implement in practice because of the dispersion of these groups throughout the territory, as well as the main parties' lack of political and military control over them.8 Another major issue concerned the sizeable numbers of militia groups throughout the country, resulting from the
GoM policy of arming citizens for their own protection during the war (1.1.1-
01/09/08, Berman 1996: 51, Alden 2001: 53). This caused additional disruptions during the implementation of the GPA, with RENAMO demanding that these groups be demobilised, prior to their own forces (BBC 17/09/93,
Venâncio and Chan 1998: 62). In addition, the existence of these groups further complicated the task of disarmament, which extended well beyond the implementation of the agreement.
8 There were accounts that social banditry was on the rise in rural areas by groups related neither to Frelimo or RENAMO (Alden and Simpson 1993: 117, 128). In addition, an allegedly pro-government group spontaneously created by peasants called ‘Naparama’ reclaimed territory from RENAMO in the provinces of Nampula and Zambézia (Alden and Simpson 1993:121, 123, Synge 1997: 34,106). Moreover, there were growing fears that some RENAMO commanders were acting as autonomous warlords (Alden and Simpson 1993: 127-128).
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6.3.1 DDR
Several scholars have assessed the DDR programme in Mozambique (e.g.
Coelho and Vines, 1994, Lundin et al 2000: 173-212, McMullin 2004: 625-643,
Vines, 2013) and it is not warranted to fully replicate these analyses here.
Mozambique’s DDR programme was an African pioneer in demonstrating that reintegration requires longer-term approaches, although reinsertion remains important in the short-term. In the immediate period, DDR was effective in reinserting the military into civilian life and in guaranteeing a peaceful election
(Synge 1997: 109, 113, Lundin et al 2000:175).
Nonetheless, DDR was at the epicentre of the bargain between the conflicting parties during transition, and closer inspection has revealed important shortcomings. One major feature concerned the long delay before soldiers' demobilisation, which was initially caused by late deployment of UNOMOZ, and afterwards by the belligerents’ reluctance to send combatants to the assembly posts (Berman 1996: 65, Synge 1997: 96, Venâncio and Chan
1998: 50-51, Lundin et al 2000: 200-201). This protracted implementation led to incidents in which the military gathered in ‘uprisings’ in assembly areas, turning later to generalised unrest in demand for swifter demobilisation
(Coelho and Vines 1994: 17, Synge 1997: 99-101). Such circumstantial obstacles were effectively sorted-out. However, shortcomings emerged as a result of the short-termism that permeated DDR, focused as it was on only safeguarding peaceful elections, instead of adopting a development-oriented
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approach and a longer-term security perspective (Synge 1997: 109, Lundin
1998: 109, McMullin 2004: 625-643). This orientation was typical at the time, as exemplified by Namibia, where the priority was equally to disarm combatants and scatter them throughout their home regions (Mashike 2005:
81) to prevent them from regrouping and posing a threat.
In Mozambique another challenge emerged from the DDR programme being discriminatory in relation to the broader community (Coelho 2003: 227), as had happened in Zimbabwe, where the ex-combatant pension scheme paved the way for their unique status in society (Dzinesa 2006: 4, Mashike 2005: 65-66).
Similarly and more recently, the result of such an approach in Liberia was that civilians pretended to be ex-combatants in order to receive benefits (Muggah
2006: 199, Jennings 2007: 209-212). In Mozambique the prevalent view was that ex-combatants were dangerous and prone to criminal activities (Berman
1996: 79, Lundin et al 2000: 187, 203, Coelho 2003: 221, 3.1.1- 03/09/08).
Although it was never proven that they did indeed make up the bulk of criminal elements, this suspicion led donors to devise a programme with substantial monetary incentives for this group. Whilst the sums paid worked as a viable safety-net until the demobilised soldiers had re-established social networks, they were reinserted into poor communities that had themselves been victims of war but had received very little post-conflict economic or psychological support (Lundin et al 2000: 188). A small attempt to address this gap emerged from the German cooperation agency Open Reintegration Fund,
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which integrated support for the demobilised within initiatives that benefitted the wider community (CAII 1997: 23), and which provided lessons for subsequent DDR programmes, such as that of the Central African Republic
(2004-2007) (Alusala and Dye 2010: 9). Yet, in Mozambique, the cultural aspect played a central role in effective reinsertion. It was in this context that the generous sums received by demobilised soldiers over eighteen months were critical, because it facilitated easier acceptance by rural communities
(Lundin et al 2000: 209), where they underwent locally defined requisites for reconciliation such as cleansing ceremonies involving rituals like sharing collective meals and making offers to the elders (Kingma 2000: 223).
Concerns with longer-term reintegration were limited to the creation of training projects that were expected to offer the combatants skills to engage in sustainable gainful employment. However, these training projects lacked quality and were marred by other shortcomings. For instance, instead of offering a wide range of training options, multiple centres provided similar training for many former soldiers in nearby areas, leading to market saturation
(Lundin et al 2000: 195). Such programmes also failed to take into account the difficulties of former soldiers in creating and managing viable micro businesses, given for e.g. their lack of knowledge of basic accounting.
Moreover, their newly acquired skills such as carpentry and shoemaking met no market demand at the rural community level, given the state of economic
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destitution at the time (4.6.4.5-14/05/05). Unfortunately, some of these mistakes were replicated later in places such as Liberia (Jennings 2007: 206).
Furthermore, insufficient consideration was given to the sequencing and coherence of links between DDR programmes and wider peacebuilding and security sector reforms. This reinforced the perception of the lack of a post-war reconstruction strategy in Mozambique, as discussed in section 5.3. As
Chapter V discussed, the simultaneous implementation of the SAP constrained reintegration in Mozambique mainly because of a lack of private sector formal employment compounded by the state’s financial incapacity to absorb this labour force, given the public expenditure caps. Reintegration was more successful in countries such as Uganda where DDR was only implemented once the economy had begun to grow after initial post-war rehabilitation (Kingma 2000: 222), or in cases like Namibia where, after previous failed attempts, the state stepped in offering public service jobs to demobilised soldiers (Dzinesa 2006: 6). In Mozambique, as in most other
African cases, the former soldiers living in urban areas had little alternative but to revert to jobs they were familiar with, such as private watchmen or as guards in the rapidly expanding private security companies (Lundin 1998: 110,
Lundin et al 2000: 192, Coelho 2003: 219). Furthermore, retraining to perform as private security companies’ guards was neither sufficient nor appropriate and these men had few skills to enable them to deal with crime in a context of peace (3.1.2.5-18/05/05, 3.1.3.5-19/05/05, 4.5.1.5-17/05/05). Again, this
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reinforces the idea that the training programmes supposed to prepare these men for new professions failed to meet market demands, and worst, failed to promote the process of demilitarisation of the mind (Coelho 2002: 195).
Similar flaws characterised the situation with medium and high-ranking ex- combatants. Reports of their involvement in regional networks of arms and drug trafficking (Gamba 1999: 22, McMullin 2004: 625-643) intended to earn them monetary compensation, suggest that the demobilisation and reintegration packages failed to address the needs of these groups (3.1.2.5-
18/05/05, Mashike 2005: 94). In addition, many of these former military personnel resorted to private security services, which grew in tandem with the liberalisation of the economy, bringing an obscure actor to the security landscape of Mozambique. Although such services were not illegal, their similarity to previous military activity calls attention to an important deficit in the process of the demilitarisation of mind frames.
Further limitations arose neither from the DDR programme nor its implementation per se, but rather from the gaps in the GPA. An example is the restriction of the demobilisation and reintegration process to the armed forces and guerrilla troops, excluding other security units, and producing negative unintended consequences, as confirmed by further analysis carried- out in Section 6.3.3.
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A case in point is that of a presidential guard corps that claimed they had been sidelined and excluded from UNOMOZ resources provided to other demobilised forces. They argued their complaints were not acknowledged until they resorted to aggressive action, holding their manager hostage in order to gain the President’s attention. Despite assurances from the highest leadership of the country that their concerns would be addressed, overnight, they became the target of an assault by the rapid reaction police and by a commando unit of the armed forces. According to their detailed testimony in the media, some of the group were killed and buried in unmarked graves inside the military garrison of the then called protection regiment. The remaining men were beaten, physically and psychologically tortured, then sent to the high-risk penitentiary, and afterwards subjected to forced resettlement
(Zambeze 26/06/2008).
This was indicative of the degree of militarisation of the entire Mozambican security sector. Compounding factors included high tension surrounding these processes due to the exclusion of security units,9 in addition to a lack of restraint and a high degree of impunity, since such incidents were neither investigated nor redressed.10 Such episodes have been part of the
9 Apparently there were groups which, although belonging to the GoM troops, were being kept from the assembly areas, probably in the context of an ‘insurance policy’, since RENAMO was also withholding some of its combatants. Hence in 22/06/1994, just over a 1,000 commandos demanded demobilisation and payment of salaries 24 months in arrears near Maputo (BBC 24/06/94).
10 This group claims to have contacted the then Attorney General, and afterwards the Mozambican League of Human Rights (LDH) which, despite efforts to help, ended-up being paralysed due to political pressure and fears of reprisals (Zambeze 26/06/2008). The LDH had mentioned this episode, although without providing any detail, in an interview carried out with the author in 2005.
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contestation narrative supported by the remainder of the civil war demobilised militants, including disabled ex-military, former intelligence service members, and ex-combatants from both the GoM and RENAMO (Zambeze 09/04/09).
This group demanded similar rights to those of Frelimo ex-combatants and veterans of the war of independence, namely a solid pension scheme and project financing to support demobilised soldiers, war widows and orphans given the lack of employment opportunities (Zambeze 24/04/08, Canal de
Moçambique 06/08/08).
After UNOMOZ monitored demobilisation, national pension provisions were set up for the demobilised soldiers according to Law 3/86. Only those that were able to prove ten or more years' service in the GoM troops during the post-independence war were eligible for a state pension. The demobilised from RENAMO received none, nor did those that were kept in the GoM troops for longer than two years,11 as these represented large numbers of people.
RENAMO ex-soldiers were later included in the pension scheme, but the criteria - including minimum age restrictions - remained the same, implying that many of those that had been child soldiers when they were recruited or abducted were excluded. In addition, the ‘Naparama’ militia was not contemplated, and in general demobilised combatants claimed that the pensions were excessively low (Coelho and Vines, 1994, CanalMoz 06/08/08).
11 Law 4/78 established in its article 20.1 that military service time ought not to extend beyond a maximum of two years.
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Nevertheless, it was only in 2009 that the subject began to receive serious consideration from the GoM, due to relentless pressure over a period of time including public demonstrations and media coverage of the ex-soldiers’ demands (Wamphula Fax 01/08/2008, CanalMoz 14/10/2010, AIM
21/10/2010). Following the GPA, the Mozambican demobilised began to adopt a highly charged tone in their public statements and regularly engaged in threats (Schafer 1998: 207-222). The situation was reminiscent of events with war veterans in both Namibia and Zimbabwe and cast a shadow of instability over the circumstances (Mashike 2005: 64, Dzinesa 2007: 85,
Krieger 2003: 208).12 This further confirms the still prevalent militarised mind set in the region, and Mozambique was no exception regarding its civil war ex- combatants, as is shown by the following statement: ‘If one of the members of government leaves the country on the demonstration day, they will not be able to return. We are soldiers, only we are on holiday, we know what we’ll do’
(Zambeze 24/04/2008). In addition, this group refused to have their problems resolved by the Ministry of Women and Social Action stating they were not a vulnerable group, and demanded instead to have their issues taken up by the
Ministry of Defence (Zambeze 09/04/2009). In the end, the GoM resorted to handing the responsibility over to the Ministry of War Veterans, which it then
12 The tactic employed was similar to that of the Zimbabwean and Namibian ex-combatants, although the Mozambican demobilised soldiers lacked the historical weight of these counterparts, who had fought in their countries’ liberation war. In Mozambique it is the civil war ex-combatants that are claiming benefits and recognition, since the independence war veterans receive their pensions and have an acknowledged status in society. In addition, one of the associations of demobilised combatants, namely the Forum dos Desmobilizados de Guerra de Moçambique (FDGM) is more vocal than the remaining ones, although ultimately they all benefit from the concessions obtained from the GoM through the use of threat. Its leader, Hermínio dos Santos, has been arrested and released several times.
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transformed into a Ministry of Ex-Combatants, creating an inter-ministerial commission to deal with such matters.
This affair raises the broader point that, during the transition, the DDR programme was not able to fully address the entirety of reintegration challenges within the framework of the peace agreement. It also failed to consider past experience and its outcomes for the target groups - as had happened in the case of the liberation war veterans- as precedent for current initiatives.13 In Mozambique, the DDR programme following the RENAMO -
GoM armed conflict was seen as a one-off solution for this transition, supporting the viewpoint that little was done in terms of long-term reintegration. Supporting this argument was the failure to acknowledge the crucial role of the state and local organisations and communities in the process (Synge 1997: 109, Lundin et al 2000: 189). Subsequently, the
Mozambican state, facing fragile economic and financial conditions, was unable to take up any longer-term initiatives to address the needs of all ex- combatant groups (4.5.1.5-17/05/05). This reinforces the view that, given the weakness of state structures in the immediate post-war phase, the international managers of DDR programmes should, from the very beginning, support national institutions that will subsequently take charge of these issues.
13 For example, in Mozambique two previous demobilisations had taken place between 1975 and 1978 (Lundin et al 2000: 174), which were not considered.
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The other outstanding issue of the DDR programme is that of disarmament, generally considered to be its weakest component (Berman 1996: 84, Synge
1997: 111, Gamba 1999: 21, Lundin et al 2000: 204). The experience in
Mozambique was unique to the extent that the peace held despite the availability of large numbers of uncontrolled small arms. Combatants did not return all the weapons in their possession, and the population also held on to the guns that had been distributed during the war, as did militia groups.14 In addition, both the GoM and RENAMO were reluctant to provide UNOMOZ with information about all arms depots, and to allow the collection and disabling of weapons in non-assembly areas.15 When this standoff was overcome, the collected weapons were neither properly stockpiled nor disposed of (Berman
1996: 73-75, Synge 1997: 127-128).
The limitations of the disarmament component were acknowledged by the
SRSG, who claimed that little more could have been achieved within the time and personnel constraints of the UNOMOZ mission. He furthermore believed that if the political problems were solved, then the available weapons would not be used to disrupt the peace, despite their widespread availability (Ajello
1995: 129). The priority given to the resolution of political deadlocks paid off in
14 Evidence suggested that ex-combatants looked upon their weapons as future sources of income either through their usage or sale; furthermore, members of the local population hid them with the aim of preventing a return to war. In subsequent years, the population left substantial numbers of arms on the roadsides, in order to be found by de-mining companies and other NGOs. They did not trust the police with this task, because they perceived them as partially responsible for the crime wave given their ineffectiveness, corruption, and involvement in crime (3.2.1-14/09/08). Interview excerpts highlighting these matters can be found in Alex Vines’ work (Vines, 1998a).
15 These provisions were determined in the GPA Protocol VI, I.-10. a). 1), 3) and UNSC Resolution 797 of 16/12/1992, although no procedural details were furnished.
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the short term, at the cost of a burdensome security legacy in the longer term, creating negative sequencing dynamics going forward.
In addition to creating a situation where small arms and light weapons became easily accessible for rampant, everyday crime, these dynamics also boosted transnational criminality in the regional market of illegal arms via South Africa
(Gamba 1999: 21, Lundin et al 2000: 206, Leão, 2004), where an equally challenging disarmament process was taking place (Dzinesa 2007: 81). Joint police initiatives such as that of Operation Rachel between Mozambique and the RSA were subsequently carried out (starting in 1996) to minimise this threat, by finding and neutralising caches of hidden arms (Chachiua, 1999).
However, it remained a massive problem with local populations lacking confidence in the police force, and therefore an NGO was authorised to continue the task. The Christian Council of Mozambique marshalled donor support to set up an exchange of arms for working tools or construction materials. They organised public weapon destruction ceremonies, and also spearheaded a cultural initiative in which arms were turned into artwork to raise awareness and educate society. However, the project had limited impact, since financial limitations prevented its spread throughout the country
(Faltas and Paes, 2004).
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In addition, the weapons represented a further threat to human security since those in good condition were handed from UNOMOZ over to the FADM
(Berman 1996: 75, Synge 1997: 110), who continuingly lacked the logistical and technical capacity to properly handle their storage and management, especially in light of regional16 and international standards (1.2.3-22/08/08,
3.1.6-19/08/08, SEESAC 2007: 7). In the middle to long-term, there were incidents with weapons depots,17 the most dramatic of which was the explosion of about 20 tonnes of obsolete equipment at the Malhazine armory in March 2007, which resulted in over 100 deaths, with more than 500 wounded and huge economic losses to the surrounding populations (AIM
News 30/03/2007).
The enquiry commission found that the most immediate trigger for the incident related to external environmental effects (high temperatures), but that there was also deterioration of the physical and chemical condition of the ammunition and explosives, as well as unsafe infrastructure and storage practices. This pointed to military negligence as, amongst other factors, the warehouse lacked a roof, leaving the obsolete ammunition exposed to the elements. Inspections were carried-out by technically unprepared soldiers and consisted simply of looking at the boxes, without any evaluation of the state of
16 Mozambique is signatory to the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition, and Other Related Materials in the SADC Region (signed in 2001, entered into force in 2004), which in its articles 8-10 contains provisions concerning state-owned firearms.
17 The record of explosions of storage of ammunition dates back to prior to the end of the civil war. The first occurrence of which there is registry took place in 1986 in Malhazine, Maputo. This was followed by post-war explosions in Beira storages in 30/10/2002 and 23/11/2006, and subsequently again in Malhazine, Maputo in January 2007 and 22/03/2007 (SEESAC 2007: 7).
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conservation of their contents (AllAfrica 26/03/2008). After the explosion, the state dismantled the armoury and minimised the economic loss to the population by building new, or renovating, destroyed infrastructure, whilst also paying for the medical treatment of the wounded (Informação da Situação
Geral da Nação 13/12/2007). However, several irregularities have been pointed out and the extent to which that support amounted to due compensation has been called into question (Zambeze 14/08/2008, Canal de
Moçambique 18/08/2008). As far as is publicly known, no one in the leadership of either FADM or the MoD accepted responsibility for this tragic occurrence. This was not surprising, however, given the testimony of a MoD senior officer, who asserted that proof of the poor conditions of the military infrastructure, and especially of those storing weaponry, had been regularly reported to the political leadership. The latter claimed that financial constraints had prevented them from addressing these problems although, following the accident, they were prepared to expend considerably larger amounts to control the damage (1.2.3-22/08/08).
6.3.2 Defence
Creation of New Armed Forces
Less controversial than DDR, the creation of the new FADM overcame significant hurdles that were not, however, considered vital by the donors, beyond their potential short-term threat to stability and elections. Protocol IV established the steps and principles to be followed, namely: 1) the
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demilitarisation of former government military and of RENAMO fighters; 2) the creation of a new armed forces composed of equal numbers of volunteers from both former government military and guerrilla forces; 3) the commitment of the new forces to professionalism, competency, non-partisanship and respect for democratic norms; and 4) the prohibition of any form of discrimination, whether racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious (GPA 1992 IV: I-i,
2.b).
Although these intentions and guiding principles were sound, the actual setting up of the new FADM proved much more difficult in practice. The GPA called for a 30,000 strong force, with 24,000 for the army, 4,000 for the air force and
2,000 for the navy (GPA 1992 IV: ii.1). Despite the fact brought up in Chapter
V that these figures were agreed to by the parties without conforming to any needs or threat assessment, in reality, the process was hindered by the difficulty of the FADM in meeting these numbers from the outset. For instance, in November 1994 the FADM comprised only 11,579 members
(Synge 1997: 106) and by 1995 that number had risen to 12,195, of which
8,533 came from former government forces, and only 3,662 were from
RENAMO (Young 1996: 2,18, Coelho and Macaringue 2002: 67). Such a state of affairs compromised the principle of equal proportionality (GPA 1992
IV: ii.2). However, given the supposedly voluntary nature of enlistment, little could be done.
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In general, as long as peace persisted, a societal apathy towards the reform of the institutions of security reigned, and this was compounded by a lack of public enthusiasm regarding the idea of a new armed forces (Malache 2002:
100, 4.1.4.5-23/05/05, 4.6.5.5-12/05/05, 4.1.1-26/02/09). In addition, the reluctance of ex-combatants to return to military service can be attributed to the hardships of war, to the mistrust derived from the long waits in the cantonment areas, and to the fact that the DDR package was more substantial than new army pay, even if the FADM compensation was higher than that of the FPLM-FAM (Malache et al 2005: 183, Alden 2001: 57). The relatively poor pay set up for the FADM also caused the most skilled personnel to leave the military in search of better-paying positions in the private sector (1.2.2.5-
16/05/05, 4.3.1.5-11/05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08). Hence, the FADM suffered from an efficiency gap given the enrolment of low-skilled personnel, a fact that was felt especially in the Navy and Air Force, who had previously relied heavily on specialised and highly skilled professionals (4.3.1.5-11/05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08,
1.1.2-22/08/09, 1.1.5-22/08/08, 1.1.6-01/07/08). Despite subsequent training programmes and the general encouragement from the leadership for military cadres to invest in their civil education, longer-term negative operational effects continue to be experienced up to the present day (1.2.1.5- 27/05/05,
1.2.2.5-16/05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08, 1.1.7-21/07/08).
These problems were aggravated by the lack of an appropriate chain of command, with regards to efficiency standards (4.3.1.5-11/05/05, 1.1.1-
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01/09/08, 1.2.2.5-16/05/05). The GPA originally established a dual chain of command (GPA) in order to build trust and balance between former government military and RENAMO forces. Although following elections a single Chief of Staff was installed, the principle was maintained, so that the remaining command positions were evenly split amongst members of both groups of forces. This resulted in inadequately skilled personnel being put in charge of positions for which they were not qualified, a fact that negatively impacted performance (4.3.1.5-11/05/05, 1.2.2.5-16/05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08).
Yet, some interviewees cautioned that the above perceptions should not be overstated. Although they reflected the hard reality of the FADM, over time, joint training and equitable distribution of resources permitted the armed forces to overcome the challenges and work towards developing a new and cohesive identity (4.3.1.5-11/05/05, 1.2.1.5- 27/05/05, 4.5.1-27/02/09). In fact, this has accorded the FADM the reputation of being the ‘laboratory of Mozambique’s reconciliation under a democratic order’ (4.3.1.5-11/05/05). This suggests that military culture, as characterised by collective preparation and discipline, hierarchy and significant civic and political education attempted to instil the ideal of non-partisanship in the armed forces (4.3.1-26/08/08), in a much easier setting than that of the rest of society.
However, this attempt at creating a symbol of institutional reconciliation was not without major obstacles. Within its ranks, old tensions and divisions did
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not immediately dissipate, and on-going rivalries contributed to an atmosphere of mistrust (Malache et al 2005: 186, 4.5.2-01/09/08, 1.1.1-01/09/08, 1.1.7-
21/07/08), despite an unequivocal prohibition of any explicit expression of political affiliation by members (Law 18/97 of 07/10/97, arts 18, 43. 2)a, 3).
Moreover, reckless public political bargains between Renamo and Frelimo played on old hatreds, thus aggravating this situation (1.2.2.5-16/05/05, 1.1.1-
01/09/08). At one point, only a public interview by the Deputy Chief of Staff - a former RENAMO guerrilla - (Savana 25/09/1998) helped to ease tensions and to instil a deeper sense of commitment to the Constitution amongst the forces, despite the interference of politicians.
Over the long-term, disagreements resurfaced, and as the renewal of the
FADM slowly started to take place with older cadres entering retirement,
Renamo opposed the process, claiming that its members were being wittingly removed due to partisan motivations (Savana 25/03/2005, 4.5.2-01/09/08,
Zambeze 18/09/2008). This assertion was supported by names and numbers furnished by a high-ranking Renamo party member to the author of this thesis.
When confronted with these data, a senior FADM officer recognised the retirement or change of functions of these cadres, but justified them in the context of staff renewal and efforts to implement the new organisational structure of the FADM (1.1.1-01/09/08).18 This structure was blighted by the flaws inherited by the FADM, which since the GPA encompassed more officers than soldiers, leading to a visible dearth of lesser-skilled personnel
18 The organisational structure of the FADM was legally established by Decree 48/2003 of 24/12.
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available to carry out basic military duties. Despite these factors, interviewees from a wide range of areas and political affiliations were, nevertheless, in agreement regarding the greatest constraints on the institutional development of the FADM: 1) poor quality material and equipment, exacerbated by the budgetary restrictions imposed at first by the donors and subsequently maintained by successive GoMs, given their focus on reducing poverty and 2) the lack of a strategy to shore up longer term efforts at defence reform
(1.2.1.5-27/05/05, 1.2.2.5-16/05/05, 4.3.1.5-11/05/05, 4.1.2.5-05/05/05,
4.4.2.5-05/05, 4.4.3.5-12/05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08, 4.5.2-01/09/08).
A major downside of the process was that UNOMOZ’s mandate did not include support for the necessary on-going steps towards an eventual defence reform. Core procedures, such as a defence review to assess the actual security needs of the country and provide it with a strategic vision for the future, were not carried out. The transformation of the defence ministry into a civilian institution did not receive sufficient support, nor was there enough encouragement for the transformation of the previous organisational culture. In fact, even the more immediate creation and training of the FADM did not fall under the responsibility of UNOMOZ, preventing DDR from becoming an entry-point for defence reform, and eventually SSR. Instead, the responsibility to support the FADM was assigned to bilateral partners (Synge 1997: 51,
Alden 2001: 56) and Portugal, France and Britain’s offers were sealed in the
‘Lisbon Declaration’ of February 1993 (Malache et al 2005: 180). Britain
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trained new FADM infantry instructors at Nyanga in Zimbabwe (BBC 27/11/93,
Synge 1997: 51,104), whilst France helped train a demining company (Synge
1997: 51, Coelho and Macaringue 2002: 64). Of the three, Portugal offered the most extensive and constant support, starting with the training of senior officers for positions of command and direction, three battalions of special forces and a marine company, and afterwards running several short and long- term military cooperation projects (Synge 1997: 51, Coelho and Macaringue
2002: 63-64). The country also committed itself to providing advice regarding the re-structuring of defence institutions and the drafting of legislation (1.2.2.5-
16/05/05, 4.3.1.5-11/05/05, 1.1.3-02/04/09). Despite the support of these countries, its impact was diminished by the lack of a clear vision and strategy regarding the reform of the defence sector as a whole (4.3.1.5-11/05/05, 1.1.1-
01/09/08). In fact, between 1992 and 1997, when Law 18/97 established objectives and guidelines for the defence establishment, there was a hiatus and little sense of direction in this institution.
These issues regarding the formation of the FADM point to an instance of critical juncture, resulting in a new military institution that suffered from low morale and a lack of clear direction. Furthermore, the lack of sequencing in the creation of a new armed forces with wider and more strategic processes of defence reform, led to poor and incomplete reform results in the longer-term.
On a more positive note, regardless of its new heterogeneous composition, the FADM has remained, thus far, under civil democratic control. This reflects
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the influence of the past history of Mozambique’s armed forces since independence, although it does not preclude the future risk of political or sectarian manipulation. Some similarities do exist between the creation of the
FADM and the FPLM-FAM, but only insofar as both required the dismantling of the previously existing armed forces, indicating that a critical juncture prevailed on both occasions. Nonetheless, the formation of the FADM also represented a radical departure from that of the FPLM-FAM, in that it entailed the inclusion of members from both sides, contrary to the FPLM-FAM process, which excluded Mozambican citizens who had served in the colonial military. Whilst this reflected the terms of power bargaining between the contending parties in the Rome peace negotiations, it also symbolised Frelimo’s capacity to learn from its past mistakes, and its greater flexibility to compromise and accommodate when faced with new challenges. However, despite the creation of the FADM representing a critical juncture, in going forward, an unwarranted continuity emerged from the legacy of the war that opposed
RENAMO to the FPLM-FAM. This concerned the apparent incapacity of many of the FADM’ members to break with their past affiliations, therefore challenging the development of a new and integrated identity of the FADM and revealing signs of path dependence.
6.3.3 Provisions for the Police and Intelligence Services
During peace negotiations, the GoM rejected RENAMO’s proposal to dismantle the intelligence services (Hume 1994: 60-61,123,126, Venâncio and
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Chan 1998: 62), as well as a subsequent one to set-up a joint command for these services (Hume 1994: 118, 120, della Rocca 1998: 228-230). It argued that the intelligence services were already being restructured, and that a state could not exist without an organisation to collect strategic information (Hume
1994: 110, 4.5.1-27/02/09). In addition it resisted the creation of an evenly mixed post-war police force (Hume 1994: 128-129, Chachiua 2000: 56, 4.5.1-
27/02/09, 3.1.1-03/09/08). As a result, no major changes were foreseen for these institutions under the GPA, and the provisions regarding them could be interpreted as no more than recommendations. They stated that the police and intelligence services ought to take into account democratic principles such as respect for the civil, political and human rights of the citizens, and ought to act according to the interests of the state, free from partisan or ideological considerations, or any other kind of discrimination (GPA 1992 IV: IV, V). In practice however, these GPA clauses were trivialised, since, even if there had been the will to enforce them, such changes could never be put into practice overnight at an ethical and institutional cultural level. Hence, both institutions proceeded with their work, although under the (weak and exclusively national) monitoring of the COMINFO and the COMPOL during transition (Synge 1997:
121, 128), leading to a tendency towards continuity and resilience of path dependence.
Although the importance of these provisions might reasonably have been defended as a matter of principle, it was also easy to believe that a poor
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outcome was to be expected, given that implementation fell primarily to the responsibility of one of the conflict parties. Prescriptions in such controversial matters should have third party accompaniment built into the peace agreement, as well as recommendations for continuity beyond the immediate transition. This brings us to a broader point, that the ownership of security provisions in peace agreements must be weighed against the need for robust monitoring measures in areas of predictable contention. Ultimately, this shortfall of the GPA led to a disturbing legacy of recurring distrust and multiple accusations between the parties, resulting as well in political and security disruptions in the medium and long-term.
Looking back, when questioned about Frelimo’s tough stance in the negotiations regarding the police and the intelligence forces, a high-ranking member of the GoM of the time, explained it in the following terms:
…the police, the intelligence and the counter-intelligence services are state instruments, but above all they are instruments of the government...governing [a country] is its role. So, unless there had been a coalition government that could have prevented problems of implementation…we needed to maintain Law and Order, which is not the same as the armed forces. These count very little in the performance of the government. In this case we could not allow measures that later on could be utilised by someone that was not interested in the success of the programme of the government (4.5.1- 27/02/09).
This statement is controversial, appearing to involve a degree of post-factum reinterpretation. On the one hand, it is difficult to understand that after building the FPLM-FAM as an icon of Mozambique’s independence, Frelimo
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relinquished it during peace negotiations with RENAMO, under the argument that the armed forces counted little for the performance of the government.
Either the FPLM-FAM had already become a nuisance to the regime19 or, as it seems more reasonable to acknowledge, said decision was taken due to the pressure to surrender something in the negotiations, the armed forces being the ‘lesser evil’. On the other hand, after efforts to create a unified and politicised security system in the post-independence period (as discussed in
Chapter IV), it sounds disconcerting that, at the time of the peace negotiations,
Frelimo’s predominant view became that the armed forces were separate from the remaining security establishment, no longer central to sovereignty and state-building.
In spite of this, the statement underscored another central point, regarding the parties’ reactions to these GPA security measures and the survival dynamics engaged in by both. Particularly useful in understanding the GoM rationale was the fact that the mixed composition of the FADM (hence no longer privy to
Frelimo’s total trust), its poor logistics and low operational level led to a growing concern about how to respond to growing criminality, and to an
19 At the time, there were differing opinions within Frelimo regarding the armed forces. The more progressive wing might indeed have seen the FPLM-FAM as a nuisance, since they had become ineffectual during the war. These forces increasingly lost command and control of the troops on the ground, and their misbehaviour deepened Frelimo’s loss of legitimacy amongst the population. In addition, whilst these forces claimed they did not receive enough funds, corruption seemed to be on the rise. Since SAP requirements mandated defence budget cuts, the finance minister at the time, Magid Osman, had already planned to ‘sanitise’ that area, having requested Swiss support for a unilateral demobilisation programme of around 45,000 men before the GPA (Berman 1996: 57-59, Alden 2001: 40, 3.1.2.5-18/05/05). Military hardliners were also unhappy with the peace process and a negotiated solution. An alleged attempted coup d’état in 1991 by General Sebastião Mabote epitomised the fractures within Frelimo at the time. Subsequently, the General was acquitted in the Courts for lack of proof, leading to rumours that the attempted coup might have been staged to deter any potential similar action from other high-ranking military officers.
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eventual domestic security crisis (4.3.1- 26/08/08, 4.1.1-26/02/09).20 This fear was intensified in light of the Angolan experience, where after rejecting electoral results, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola-
UNITA reverted back to war without significant intervention from the UN
(Berman 1996: 31-33, Synge 1997: 30-31, 4.3.1- 26/08/08, 4.1.1-26/02/09).
Taking into consideration the nine-month period between the peace agreement and full UNOMOZ deployment (Synge 1997: 37-39, Venâncio and
Chan 1998: 52, Alden 1998: 78), a retrospective analysis makes it reasonable to believe in the plausibility of the GoM-feared scenario of a security vacuum.
It was expected that all military activity would cease during this period, and that an embryonic force made up of former FPLM-FAM elements and
RENAMO’s military cadres could be jointly trained by the British military to form the core of instructors of the FADM. However, the timing of this process faced successive setbacks, with RENAMO delaying sending its candidates and thereby adding to the climate of suspicion already fuelled by its absence from the GPA’s monitoring commissions (BBC 31/07/93, Synge 1997: 40,
Venâncio and Chan 1998: 53, Alden 2001: 49). RENAMO’s stalling of the
GPA implementation, by obstructing the work of the cease-fire verification commission in areas under its control, cast doubts on the viability of the entire
20 The last visible joint action between the armed forces and public security police appears to have been carried out in September 1991, leading to the arrest of around 800 criminals (Woods 1998: 147). The GPA contained provisions to enable the FADM to deal with internal security, in case the police alone proved unable to handle criminality (GPA 1992 IV: I.i) 2.). However, the FADM was in its first stages of development and had little logistical capability. Moreover, its new leadership opposed its deployment in internal affairs. These leaders felt that the role of the armed forces was mainly limited to issues of external security; the military were to stay in the barracks and slowly rebuild its reputation, instead of risking it further in actions for which it was not prepared (4.3.1.5-05/05).
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process (Venâncio and Chan 1998: 53-55). Throughout this period uncertainty prevailed as to how long it would take for the UNOMOZ to be fully deployed. Meanwhile, a security vacuum grew, since no credible alternative had been planned to safeguard peace or to enforce law and order. It remained the prerogative of the GoM to carry out this task,21 although it was inadequately prepared to do so. In addition, upon UNOMOZ deployment, doubts persisted as to the reaction capacity of the force in case of major disturbances by either party, resulting from the lack of an explicit position by the mission’s regarding the topic, a shortcoming that most probably reflected the terms of the GoM request for UN deployment.22
Regime Survival by the GoM
Against this background of an inadequately trained and poorly resourced police force, and faced with growing levels of criminality and social banditry
(Alden and Simpson 1993: 121, Chachiua 2000: 58, 62), the GoM adopted what Chachiua called ‘an armed insurance policy’ (Chachiua 2000: 55). This consisted of at least three main measures. The first was the illegal transfer of arms and personnel from the military to the presidential guard, which the GoM claimed to be outside of the GPA provisions (Woods 1998: 165, Alden 2001:
61). When UNOMOZ wanted to verify this occurrence, the GoM resisted, invoking ‘breach of sovereignty’ to effectively circumvent collaboration with the civilian police in this field (Synge 1997: 128, Woods 1998: 164-165, Chachiua
21 Report of the UNSG S/1994/89, Addendum1, III.14. 22 The UNOMOZ was established by the UNSC Resolution 797 of 16/12/1992 under the terms of Ch VI of the UN Charter.
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2000: 56). The second was the formation and maintenance of special police units ready for intervention (Venâncio and Chan 1998: 59, Chachiua 2000:
58). The third was an institutional engineering measure, whereby the border guards and other special forces previously associated with the military were incorporated into the PRM (Synge 1997: 49, Chachiua 2000: 59, Lalá 2007:
114).
These measures, allegedly employed to close the security gap, represented a quintessential case of adaptation through informality and regime survival dynamics comparable to the conduct of other African players in similar circumstances. The Mozambican case was less extreme, however. The fragmentation of the security sector in a divide and rule fashion, as had happened in Liberia under Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor was not uncommon (Jaye 2008: 171). Other manouevres included the strengthening of a given security force, or the constant change of leadership in the security apparatus to allay the president’s fears of someone else gaining enough power to overthrow him, such as occurred in The Gambia under President
Jammeh (Sainé 2008: 93-105). These examples serve as a warning of how destructive such practices can be for the efficiency, de-politicisation and oversight of the security forces under subsequent democratic rule (Bryden et al 2008: 327). In Mozambique, the measures were much more restrained because the regime did not feel as insecure as in the cases cited, since it had always maintained control over the security forces through ideological means,
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and had no record of successful coups d’état. Also, the security forces always remained a privileged locus for the genuine encouragement of national unity, beyond regional and ethnic grounds.
However, when asked about the three main measures identified above and used by the GoM, interviewees working in the security sector confirmed the deployment of some of these regime survival manoeuvres (3.1.1.5-23/05/05,
3.1.1-03/09/08, 4.1.1-26/02/09). Nevertheless, their views were more nuanced than those stated in the literature and expressed by some interviewees, and clarified some of the prevailing rumours of that period. For instance, one high-ranking police officer confirmed that since the issue of border control had been ignored during the peace negotiation, the government opted to functionally integrate this militarised unit into the police (3.1.1.5-
23/05/05). In contrast, two senior police officers discounted the rumours that the rapid reaction police unit had been militarised through the integration of a substantial number of FPLM-FAM members. To their knowledge, this police unit derived from another whose mission had been to defend Maputo during the war, and its training had, therefore, always been highly militarised (3.1.1.5-
23/05/05, 3.2.1-14/09/08). Another GoM decision maker corroborated this view, claiming that in the past all security forces, including the police, had been organised along similar lines to those of the armed forces in defence of national sovereignty and not devoted to issues of public order (3.1.3.5-
19/05/05). Judging by these comments, the police, and particularly the rapid
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reaction unit, were inherently militarised institutions, independently of the presence of FPLM-FAM members in the PRM. These opinions contradicted widely held public beliefs as well as those expressed by some interviewees
(4.4.2.5-10/05/05, 4.6.4.5-09/05/05). This further suggests that the literature, such as Synge’s work (Synge 1997: 101) inferring that the rapid reaction force
(Força de Intervenção Rápida- FIR) was a civilian rather than a militarised force, was wrong. In fact, as regards the capacity of the police, one of the high-ranking police officers confidently stated that the FIR was the only police force that retained the ability for government intervention in case of instability.
In his words:
…no matter what the politicians’ intentions were, there was an effective need to combat growing criminality during that transitional phase, and therefore units of the rapid reaction force were indeed stationed on roads such as those linking Maputo to South Africa, where violent robberies and attacks had been reported by common citizens…whether this represented a display of force by the government…the police mission was to protect Mozambican citizens from crime (3.1.1.5- 23/05/05).
Hence, he offered a viable institutional justification for these GoM actions.
Along the same lines, another two interviewees, working for the intelligence services at the time, explained that the institutional engineering, namely the transfer of the border guards from the military to the police, was not an isolated act (4.5.1.5-17/05/05, 4.1.1-26/02/09). Several other institutional changes were simultaneously carried out, not necessarily according to a well- thought out plan, but rather as improvised coping measures given the country’s precarious political and economic transition (4.5.1.5-17/05/05).
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According to one of the interviewees, the concern within the security establishment was not just the immediate provision of security itself - although this played a role- but it related also to the capacity to sustain these services
(4.1.1-26/02/09).
With defence expenditures coming under particular donor scrutiny, the GoM knew the sector, as a whole, might face increased pressure to decrease budgets. This interviewee also expressed his opinions that some of the changes derived from unilateral GoM reforms, including those concerned with the security forces’ newly assigned missions under a democratic dispensation.
For instance, the intelligence services lost their operational mandate; hence the security force responsible for protecting dignitaries left this institution for the PRM. Immigration services also left intelligence and joined the MInt, where it had been previously. In the view of this interviewee this created the:
…mega-ministry that is the MInt nowadays…my concern is that this state of affairs is a by-product of that phase, but nowadays such concentration of forces might not be beneficial to the overall performance of that institution…even the fire brigade is under its authority! (4.1.1-26/02/09).
These examples illustrate the type of problems that these ad-hoc, rapid paced changes bring in the medium to long-term, and are indicative of the need to review the overall security architecture following transitions - something which has yet to happen in Mozambique. In addition, although these two interviewees offered plausible institutional reasons for the changes implemented, the problem was that they were undertaken covertly in a
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transitional environment characterised by political unease. This suggested ulterior motives on the part of the GoM, as was indeed confirmed by the words of a decision-maker of a subsequent government, who thought that:
There was a deliberate attitude on the part of the government of that era to not have parity in the integration of the RENAMO forces in the police. It was an instinct of self-preservation; after all it was the only security institution the government could count on… (3.1.1-03/09/08).
Thus, in light of this statement and those previously reported, it is reasonable to conclude that a convergence of political intentionality and institutional necessity led to informal security dynamics, ultimately resulting in political and institutional bricolage, which remained a contentious issue in national politics over time.
Survival Tactics by Renamo
Nevertheless, the GoM was not alone in its adoption of survival tactics. Given the mistrust between Renamo and the GoM, the GPA included a section on
‘Specific Guarantees for the Period from the Ceasefire to the Holding of the
Elections’. This section included, amongst others, measures to ensure legality, stability and tranquillity throughout the national territory, and provisions for the protection of RENAMO’s highest cadres (GPA 1992 V: III.
8,9). Since they distrusted the PRM, RENAMO leaders were entitled to keep their personal security units (GPA 1992 V: III.8, Hume 1994: 123) until after elections, when such forces ought to have been demobilised or integrated into the police (3.1.2.5-18/05/05, 4.3.1-26/08/08, 3.1.1-03/09/08). A decision maker from the MInt stated that the facilities in Machava, destined to receive
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these men were renovated; yet they never arrived (3.1.1-03/09/08). In his view, these forces whose full strength was kept outside of UNOMOZ sight23 - in the bush, since the GoM lacked full control of the territory, were indicative of
RENAMO plans to reactivate an army if needed. This explained Renamo’s unwillingness to give up control over these armed men, who ended up staying at the party’s military general headquarters in Maringué, for years (3.1.1-
03/09/08). Renamo’s adaptation attitude of retaining a protection force was no different from that adopted by the ANC in South Africa during the transition
(Dzinesa 2006: 7). It is also not too far removed from that of many African leaders, such as Sekou Touré in Guinea, who, even though he was in power, created militias he could rely on for personal security, instead of using the regular security forces that he distrusted (N’Diaye 2008: 135). In the case of
Renamo, a senior GoM member supplied the following details about these developments:
[At the peace negotiations] we proposed that the men receive specialised training and be assigned work at the house of Renamo leaders, and that they would report daily to the police command. This proposal was not entirely rejected by Renamo, but they wanted the men to report to a Renamo command and we couldn’t accept this, because there could be only one police force at the national level…so they retained a force that became illegal after the 1994 elections…[after the GPA and the elections] there was no formal permission for RENAMO to keep these men; there was only a sense of responsibility in decision- making! The new government started negotiations with Renamo to integrate these men into the police, and have the PRM protect Renamo’s leaders. They refused, saying that the PRM was not a state institution, but rather a Frelimo force, and it could not be trusted! This
23 During the DDR process, UNOMOZ had to deal with the problem that both the GoM and Renamo dragged their feet in releasing the exact number of their troops, and later on in sending them to the assembly areas. In addition, after the assembly areas had been dismantled, large groups from both sides, but especially from Renamo, came out of hiding and demanded to be demobilised, something that UNOMOZ did without recourse to assembly, so as to discharge these men more rapidly (Synge 1997: 97, 107).
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happened as police re-training was on-going, new ethics were being adopted, and a new recruitment policy being put in place…but Renamo was unable to change its views, and at that moment we were consolidating the peace… so we had to choose between the use of force to regularise the situation or attempt through persuasion… we chose to minimise the possibility of those forces becoming a source of violence and instability. We did that by limiting government action in imposing order, so that it did not become an excuse for Renamo to return to armed conflict. We concentrated instead on another strategy, which was to find and destroy as many weapons as possible (4.5.1- 27/02/09).
One Renamo representative offered a contrasting view:
Could we have accepted that the police which belongs to the Frelimo party provide our security services? We were not stupid; instead of protecting us they would have found ways to kill us…so we kept a minimal force…those men are a force we can rely on, and it’s up to Frelimo whether they will make us use it…(4.5.2-01/09/08).
Renamo’s survival dynamics and the GoM’s lenient attitude towards them allowed for the accommodation of elite interests, without making provisions for the future of Renamo’s armed men when they were no longer required as bodyguards. Years later the problem reemerged and the lack of economic opportunity offered either by Renamo or the GoM led them to create public disturbances, harassing populations and blocking a police station in
Gorongosa (The Namibian 08/12/2004). Severe political accusations were exchanged by Renamo and the GoM as neither entity wanted to take responsibility for disarming and providing these men with viable economic occupation. In June 2008, new tensions developed around the rehabilitation of the Maringué airstrip - which Renamo claimed as its property, since it had
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built it during the war - to be used for a presidential visit (Magazine
11/06/2008, Savana 29/08/08).
However, during fieldwork in August 2008 in Maringué, this researcher observed that life in the village carried on normally, despite the coexistence of
Renamo’s armed men with a FIR unit. According to villagers and public employees, these men worked at the Renamo base on a rotational schedule, and upon leaving this site, dressed and behaved as ordinary citizens (4.3.4-
19/07/08, 4.6.1-19/07/08, 4.6.2-18/07/08). Most of them grew agricultural crops, went to the administration for usual business, and it was not uncommon to see them drinking beer in the same places visited by members of the rapid reaction police when off duty (4.3.4-19/07/08, 4.6.3-18/07/08). According to the same interviewees the problem was twofold: 1) that the existence of such a military base perpetuated the idea of insecurity, thereby scaring off potential investors; 2) when politicians ‘agitated’ things in Maputo this inevitably led to tensions between Renamo men (who lived under the fear that Frelimo wanted to kill them) and the FIR, frightening the population (4.3.4-19/07/08, 4.6.1-
19/07/08, 4.6.2-18/07/08). This perception has also been confirmed in the media by the testimony of another visitor to the district (Zambeze 14/08/08).
Notwithstanding this volatile status quo, Mozambican law forbids the existence of irregular armed groups or associations (Constitution of the Republic of
Mozambique 2004, Art 52.3), and since these men have not disbanded, they
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may well be considered an illegal, private political militia. This is worrisome as neither opportunity brought-about by the crises of 2004 and 2008 was seized to resolve the problem. Although due to informal policies this group has been condoned, with growing levels of political intolerance, it is possible that in the event of extreme tension, force may well be employed by the GoM to resolve the situation.
These circumstances highlight the likelihood of future security disturbances as unintended consequences of unclear or unresolved implementation of the peace agreement’s security provisions. In an interview with a Mozambican newspaper, Renamo’s former second-in-command and chief peace negotiator,
Raul Domingos, reiterated that the Rome peace negotiations were a success.
In his words:
The GPA was well negotiated in its context. In all the agreements there’s never been full satisfaction from the parties, the attempt is to try to cover as many contentious issues as possible. If we were to review the GPA, we would say that it would be useful to incorporate the intelligence, the police and the non-partisanship of the civil service… author’s own translation (Magazine 30/08/2008).
Four general points are worth making in light of these remarks and the preceding analysis. The first is that the non-state parties and, in this case,
RENAMO as a guerrilla movement, had significant deficiencies in their capacity to negotiate on technical security issues which put them at a disadvantage, although they had a foreign adviser, paid by donors, to help them during the peace process. The second is that, despite the best advice, it
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is not always possible to overcome the asymmetrical weight of contending parties during negotiations. The third is that the survival dynamics of both parties in Mozambique’s experience corroborates the premise that some security provisions may be agreed on during peace negotiations as tactical, temporary or conditional steps (Stedman 2002: 9). Fourthly and lastly, although unintended, the consequences of flawed security provisions or implementation may derive from the parties’ genuine insecurity, which does not prevent peace agreements from being used for strategic deception, in order to create favourable conditions to secure longer term control of power and office. These were not exclusive features of Mozambique’s peace process and implementation as shown by replications in Guatemala where the government and the military exploited imprecise clauses in the peace agreement that resulted from the National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unit’s
(UNRG) lack of clarity over some defence and security issues. In the Sudan, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed, in the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, security provisions that were imperfectly understood (Hutchful 2009: 13).
The CIVPOL
During the period of implementation of the GPA, in order to level the playing field regarding security suspicions, Dlakhama and Chissano held talks in
August-September of 1993, and in an unusual instance of cooperation, agreed that Mozambique would request the UN to include a stronger CIVPOL
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component (Synge 1997: 56).24 This force of over a thousand personnel was mandated to monitor the activities of the police throughout the country, including human-rights violations and weapons verification (Woods 1998: 152-
156, Alden 2001: 60). It was also tasked with providing advice and technical assistance to the COMPOL (Synge 1997: 120, Alden 2001: 60) and help the deployment of the national police into RENAMO controlled areas. At the end of mission there were 83 CIVPOL units, 68 in government-controlled zones and 15 in RENAMO controlled areas (Alden 2001: 60). Finally, it was assigned to facilitate voter registration and the conduct of elections, a case in which its presence effectively helped bolster the population’s confidence, by restraining the behaviour of the former belligerents (Synge 1997: 56, 119, 120,
Woods 1998: 161). This reaffirmed the truism that the existence of a third party to support implementation of any peace agreement is important. Even when there is a high degree of ownership of the agreement, the potential for disruption by local actors is high. Thus, the presence of UNOMOZ and
CIVPOL, helped to instil security and confidence in the population, something that was lacking in the transition to independence, where this role had been much more poorly played by the joint-forces of the two former contenders.
This highlights that intervention by third parties is not inevitably harmful, being
24 In a report of the UNSG on UNOMOZ, detailing the requirements and framework for the mission four main areas of focus were highlighted, namely: political, military, electoral, and humanitarian. However, and despite being outside the scope of the GPA, smaller numbers of CIVPOL had also been anticipated and suggested, i.e., 128 police officers (UNSG Report 03/12/92, V.29). The Mozambican parties therefore built on this recommendation for the GoM to direct its request in late 1993, but prior to that the GoM had been hostile to this idea (Synge 1997: 158, Woods 1998: 149). The terms of deployment of the CIVPOL, after the request, were established in the UNSG Report 28/01/94, Add.1.
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able to generate positive outcomes, provided the engagement is mindful of the local context and that the support delivered is of high quality.
Nevertheless, this was not the overall case of CIVPOL, which had several limitations hampering its mission. Firstly, its deployment was delayed, starting in early 1994 and extending gradually until elections, ending in November
1994, with the exit of UNOMOZ (Synge 1997: 158, Woods 1998: 167,171,
Alden 2001: 49). Secondly, its members, coming from 29 countries with differing policing cultures, were poorly trained and poorly prepared (Synge
1997: 119, Woods 1998: 170, Alden 2001: 61). The third one concerned their weak mandate; they were unable to act on violations of human rights, merely being able to report the cases to the COMPOL, which, in turn, referred them to the MInt, which ignored them in the end (Woods 1998: 167, Chachiua 2000:
58, Alden 2001: 61). Finally, the national police saw their deployment as an interference and breach of sovereignty (Synge 1997: 121, Alden 2001: 61).25
More generally, and reflecting the minimalist policing provisions of the GPA, the UNOMOZ mandate was itself limited. It failed to include support for police reforms such as in the case of El Salvador (Costa, 1995) and it did not include policing per se, although the latter only occurred in cases such as Kosovo
(Eide and Holm, 1999) and East Timor (Hood, 2006), where the UN held
25 Mozambican security institutions have reproduced the political discourse by the GoM with regards to many UNOMOZ practices representing a breach of sovereignty. In several instances UNOMOZ posture became robust in order to compel parties to comply with the GPA. The encroachment of UNOMOZ members in the daily business of the security forces was viewed with suspicion and considered intrusive by leaders of the security sector (1.1.1-01/09/08), although originally the request for UNOMOZ deployment stemmed from the GoM.
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transitional administration authority. Nonetheless, in particular, the lack of a
CIVPOL mentoring component in the UNOMOZ mandate constituted a missed entry-point for police reform both within the GPA implementation, and during the immediate following period. Yet, it has to be recognised that if such a role had been conferred upon CIVPOL it would have been difficult to implement, given the GoM's longstanding resistance to rendering accountability on police matters during and following the peace negotiations. It is also fair to acknowledge that the CIVPOL component of UN missions was still emerging at the time of UNOMOZ (Woods 1998: 143, Alden 2001: 61), reflecting the fact that the peace-building component of peace operations was still in its first generation (Paris and Sisk 2009: 6).
6.3.4 Reconciliation and the Absence of Justice
Mozambique’s GPA included neither transitional justice mechanisms nor reconciliation measures, nor did it include provisions for justice sector reforms.
The first shortcoming has been consistently pointed out in the literature (for e.g. Lundin, 1998, Naidu, 2001, Bartoli and Jebashvili, 2005), whilst the second was absent from research engaging with the GPA, yet not from that approaching the subject from a rule of law perspective in a society undergoing democratisation (e.g. Open Society Foundation, 2006).
For instance, Lundin has argued that the peace negotiations lacked concern for reconciliation and the social reintegration of ex-combatants, even though in
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Mozambique, such post-conflict healing was essential, given the prevailing communitarian approach to the organisation of life (Lundin 1998: 106). In addition, Naidu thought that the lack of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a weakness, as it enabled mistrust to pervade the political relations between Frelimo and Renamo, in the long run (Naidu 2001: 16). These views highlight the fact that no attention was devoted either to discussing communitarian and local traditional forms of reconciliation or to a debate on the suitability of liberal cosmopolitan approaches in Mozambique.26
Two general factors explain the absence of provisions in the GPA for the implementation of justice sector reforms: a) the parties’ limited perception of the causes of the armed conflict, i.e. not linking them to the exclusionary and unjust policies that followed independence (4.1.4.5-23/05/05, 4.6.5.5-
12/05/05); and b) inadequate understanding of the crucial role of the judiciary as a mechanism of peaceful conflict resolution in a post-war society transitioning to democracy (2.1.2.5-18/05/05, 2.4.1.5-19/05/05, 2.4.1-
24/03/09).
However, it must be pointed out that internationally judicial reforms have generally been, and remain to be, the weakest link in peace agreements.
26 According to Mani the main forms of legal reparation are restitution, compensation, indemnity, satisfaction and declaratory judgement, including a combination of monetary and non-material means. Common forms of social reparation in transitional societies include commemoration, symbolic redress, official acknowledgement, apology, education, and establishing the truth (Mani 2002: 174). These mechanisms can be used in a number of different formats and combinations, including or excluding prosecutorial approaches.
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Mozambique was no exception. The Dayton Peace Accords, for example, made very little mention of judicial and police reforms (Doyle 2007: 231). Even more recently, cases like the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Liberia also neglected judicial reforms, including the prison services (Jaye 2009: 4, Malan
2008: 3, ICG 13/01/09: 20).
What is also missing in Mozambique is the acknowledgement that the lack of a formalised approach to a process of transitional justice precluded the possible first steps towards wider reforms in the justice system. Granted, the weakness of the latter served as an obstacle to the former.
Amnesty, Impunity and Community Healing
Beyond the GPA, a potential debate about a transitional justice procedure was foreclosed by the approval of Law 15/92 granting general amnesty for crimes committed between 1979 and 1992. Whilst this supported the peace process it also resulted in impunity, based on a denial of the past and the creation of a comfort zone for the ex-belligerents (4.5.1.5-17/05/05, 4.6.1.5-09/05/05,
4.6.5.5-12/05/05, Igrejas, 2008, Igrejas and Lambrança, 2008). Neither
Frelimo nor Renamo were interested in a transitional justice initiative, so they engaged in tacit cooperation on this issue, since during the war the armed forces had engaged in human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 1992: 42-
60), whilst RENAMO was notorious for atrocities (Gersony, 1988, Vines, 1991,
Human Rights Watch 1992: 42-60).
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Thus far, despite the occasional mentions of the issue in the media (e.g.
Zambeze 14/08/2008), neither Mozambicans (as an organised pressure group) nor foreigners have contested the official silence over issues of impunity in the short or longer term (van den Bergh 2009: 39, Igrejas and
Lambrança 2008: 82). Several reasons were pointed out by respondents for this lack of questioning by Mozambicans: a) the population was exhausted and impoverished by the war and so were more concerned with how to overcome their absolute destitution (2.1.2.5-18/05/05, 4.6.4.5-12/05/05); b) CSO was still emerging and did not have the strength and will to highlight such a divisive issue (4.6.4.5-12/05/05); c) there was a cultural predisposition for restoration over retribution (4.1.1.5-15/05/05, 4.6.4.5-12/05/05, 4.1.3.5-18/05/05, 4.1.4.5-
23/05/05, 2.1.1-17/09/08); and d) Mozambicans are tolerant by nature and cognisant of the importance of forgiveness for the sustainability of peace
(4.1.1.5-15/05/05, 4.1.2.5-05/05/05). Additionally, this behaviour could be a function of a mix between acceptance, fear of raising the issue, lack of societal consensus, sufficient satisfaction with cultural rituals and, simply, the willingness to move forward, as highlighted by the population of Namaponda
(4.6.5- 14/07/08).
For their part, donors overlooked this matter in exchange for stability and successful conflict resolution, especially in light of the agreement of both parties, in addition to the absence of societal contestation and a weak justice system (4.2.1-24/02/09, 4.2.4-17/09/08, 4.2.5-29/09/08, 4.2.7-25/02/09). With
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donors condoning the situation, Mozambican decision-makers effectively resisted liberal peacebuilding ideas about the indispensability of a transitional justice initiative, as was current at that time, and adopted by South Africa, El
Salvador and Guatemala. However, the countries that instituted truth and reconciliation commissions had internal forces supporting these processes, and did not merely rely on foreign pressures. For instance, in Guatemala, being unsatisfied with the establishment of a Commission of Historical
Clarification to investigate past atrocities, CSOs mobilised a ‘Campaign against Amnesty’, resulting in the state assuming official responsibility for abuses perpetrated during the war, and in prosecutions of prominent decision makers (Mani 2002: 162, Stanley 2007: 114).
By contrast, in Mozambique the prevailing views against such mechanisms were that in Latin America the problems stemmed from highly brutal military regimes, and that in RSA the conflict had been between an ‘occupier and the occupied’, whereas in Mozambique it was a fratricidal war (4.1.1.5-15/05/05,
4.1.4.5-23/05/05, 4.5.1.5-17/05/05, 2.1.1-17/09/08, Boaventura Zita quoted in van den Bergh 2009: 43). Hence, impunity prevailed, but given the purported
Mozambican tolerance, it could reasonably have been expected that the belligerents at least apologised to the Mozambican people as an act of national reconciliation, something which has yet to happen.
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In the sphere of informal justice, Mozambican communities used their traditional African restorative justice practices to deal with their traumas, reintegrate ex-combatants, and reconcile the collective (Honwana, 1997,
Lundin, 1998, Igreja and Lambrança, 2008). The assumptions behind these practices were that the ceremonies were organised with the entire spiritual community participating in cleansing rituals (including calling the dead through the local healer). These rites symbolically acknowledged the damage done, before putting the trauma aside and facing the future (Honwana, 1997).
Afterwards, the ex-combatant was psychologically reconciled with himself since the spirit of war and aggression had been expelled; he was socially reconciled and prepared for life in the community that received him, and was reconciled as well with his former enemies (Lundin 1998: 107). Despite the positive outlook of these practices, which could be interpreted as a contribution to the romanticism of the local, one interviewee realistically pointed out that the degree of forgiveness attained was something that required further study (4.1.4.5-23/05/05). This view was reinforced by the fact that ex-combatants, in particular those that belonged to Renamo, settled in places other than those of their origin (Lundin et al 2000:191, Coelho
2003:198), implying that it would be difficult to achieve reconciliation in those communities, without a more complete process of redress.
Recent research conducted by Igreja in the central district of Gorongosa that had been severely affected by war, found that in addition to local cults of
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purification and healing ceremonies, mechanisms that reflected a ‘local ethics of reciprocity’ were used to redress crimes committed during wartime (Igreja,
2010). These crimes derived from conflicts between fellow civilians, such as neighbour-related, marital and property issues, amongst others. People brought these issues to the attention of local traditional courts of justice which, given the amnesty laws, were circumspect about dealing with crimes committed during wartime (some of these included serious felonies such as murders). Nevertheless, popular pressure led some of them to give in (Igreja
2010: 59), and they performed through combining the use of procedural, restorative and retributive justice. Highly important for all those involved was the opportunity to publicly narrate their afflictions (which intertwined with war- related episodes), and obtain closure through the adjudication of a legitimate institution (Igreja 2010: 67).
On the one hand, this analysis shows that in addition to war crimes, the amnesty law fostered a wider sense of societal impunity, given that it also precluded justice in cases of common offenses. On the other hand, it demonstrated that people also resisted this imposition by trying to use the plural legal justice system to see their grievances addressed. Although this represents the experience of the particular region of Gorongosa, and more research is required to verify its resonance throughout the wider country, it is strong enough to question the conventional wisdom in Mozambique that silence and impunity was the best course of action. This is particularly
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relevant in light of the fact that communities used their cultural mechanisms for reconciliation, whilst at the political level such processes have faltered.
However, it is important to review the achievements in this field before pointing out the shortcomings.
State-Society Reconciliation
From the point of view of state processes, the triple transition enabled important opportunities for reconciliation between the state and society, in the social, economic and political spheres, but primarily in the realm of distributive, not restorative justice. In the social sphere, the state reconciled with the traditional authorities, having recognised their importance and awarded them an institutional role in the governance of the communities through law 15/2000 of 20 June (Alexander 1997: 8, Lundin 2002: 113-116, Brito 2003: 191, Kyed and Buur 2006: 563-581). The state also reconciled with the religious institutions, having reinstated a dialogue - which at the beginning led to the creation of a particular department within the Ministry of Justice to deal with these matters - and returned much of the property and assets nationalised
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 325, Baloi 1995: 510-516). In the economic sphere, it reconciled with Western donors, especially so with private capital
(since capitalism was demonised during socialism) (Abrahamsson and Nilsson
1994: 325, Francisco 2003: 165, Saul 2011: 93-101), even if that involved a swing from one extreme to another. In the political sphere, it reconciled with society by: a) enabling freedom of expression and of association, including
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ethnic, cultural and other types of collective endeavours; b) creating a democratic environment whereby other political parties and associations could exist and manifest their views; c) establishing democratic institutions for political conflict management; d) separating the state and the party, and; e) decentralising governance, so as to return power to the local level state structures (Lundin 2002: 96-138, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 325-327).
The state has also encouraged religious institutions and CSOs to help in the task of pacification and reconciliation throughout the country, and these institutions have provided an invaluable contribution (4.6.4-08/04/09). It also attempted to provide an example of institutional reconciliation through the creation of the FADM with members from the previous FPLM-FAM and
RENAMO, although the limitations of this venture were exposed when it was perceived that former Renamo cadres were being led into retirement, as discussed in section 6.3.2.1 above.
Amongst CSOs an important example of reconciliation was that of the
Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra/Mozambican
Association of the Demobilised of War (AMODEG), which had previously dealt only with the interests of ex-combatants from GoM forces, and was opened up to include those of RENAMO (Schafer 1998: 203). This was an instance where a common sense of identity and of marginalisation in the context of
GoM policies forged a strong integrative organisation.
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Contrasting with the aforementioned record of community healing and attempts at state institutional reconciliation, the former belligerents have not reconciled politically. Electoral democracy has reinforced political inequality and contributed to rising levels of conflict in the post-war period, with political discourse becoming extreme and leading to instances of direct violence and intimidation, particularly around election time. In addition, the growing levels of political intolerance since 2006 have exposed the fissures in the reconciliation attempts of the immediate post-conflict period, and the gains obtained through the state/society compromise have also been undermined by the closing of the democratic space. The lack of dialogue amongst political parties, at the intra-party level, and between state and society became patent, with Frelimo and Renamo pressured to coexist, but also unwilling to make an effort to develop a sense of commonly shared history (4.1.2.5-05/05/05,
4.6.5.5-12/05/05). They opted instead to advance their own hegemonic discourses, disregarding the plurality of voices in Mozambican society, resorting even to breaking the silence pact over past crimes.27
The resulting lack of social peace in Mozambique demonstrated that, on the one hand, the deeper causes of the armed conflict were not being addressed in the post-war period, and that newer violent symptoms were being downplayed (4.1.2.5-05/05/05, 4.1.3.5-18/05/05, 4.6.5.5-12/05/05). On the
27 Ironically, the silence pact appears to have been denounced by Frelimo and Renamo in their political exchanges in Parliament during electoral campaigns and speeches to the media. However, this occurred in order to achieve political gains, rather than stemming from a genuine will to address the past and find closure, to benefit the building of a collective memory of the country’s history (Igreja 2008: 539- 556).
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other hand, it also represented the failure of the formal reconciliation approach of silencing through the formula of forgive and forget (4.6.5.5-12/05/05). From this perspective the Mozambican nation-building project is not able to proceed prior to overcoming the existing sense of normality, and to addressing, cleansing and building a shared collective memory. Honouring the victims of war and exposing publicly the abuses committed should have been part of the process to avoid similar levels of violence in the future (4.6.5.5-12/05/05).
Supporting this viewpoint is a certain debate in the literature about whether the deeply rooted violence ingrained in Mozambique’s history throughout centuries
- including slavery, forced labour, territorial power battles, independence struggle and civil war - can be counteracted solely by informal peaceful cultural traditions, and whether this alone is enough to pacify institutionalised warfare, and defuse future cycles of violence (Wilson 1992: 527-82, Newitt
1995: 574-577).
Notwithstanding, the risks of adopting a formal transitional justice initiative remain high, given that it would entail the potential fracturing of the social fabric (even without recourse to prosecutions) without any guarantees of collective historical relief, especially in light of the narrow results achieved by truth and reconciliation commissions in countries such as El Salvador and
RSA (Mani 2002: 103-177). It would be a Pandora’s box, because the process would have to go back to the post-independence period or even earlier, into the liberation war times (4.1.4.5-23/05/05, 4.6.5.5-12/05/05). That
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would require consideration of the killings of leaders such as Eduardo
Mondlane, Joana Simeão, father Gwenjere, Lutero Simango and Samora
Machel, amongst others. Renamo would not escape the process either, with investigations over the mysterious death of, for example, Evo Fernandes, their representative in Lisbon. In addition, there were also severe human rights abuses carried out by combatants on both sides during the war, including the mistreatment to which RENAMO and the GoM subjected many Mozambicans during forced recruitment raids and campaigns. Moreover, the state-led
‘Operação Produção’, the re-education camps and prisons, as well as the security service prisons, would be scrutinised. The risks of engaging in a post- hoc transitional justice type initiative would also be compounded by the fact that ex-combatants from both parties and state agents were under indoctrination and coercion to carry out gruesome acts against their fellow citizens. To distinguish such acts from those carried out under direct orders would be a thorny task. A further complication would be the danger of reinterpretation as highlighted by Baloi and Boaventura Zita (Interviews in van den Bergh 2009: 25, 44).
Against this background, a combination of a culture of denial, pragmatic avoidance, and wilful averting of accountability for past crimes locks
Mozambique, at the very least, into an incomplete, challenged and somewhat volatile reconciliation process. Impunity for old, new, and for different types of crime reinforce each other in an environment marked by increasing outbursts
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of societal aggression that remain unaddressed, bolstering newer cycles of violence through the country’s history.
Institutional Justice Reforms and the Lost Potential to Address the Legacy of Violence
Nevertheless, opportunities to counteract the legacy of cycles of violence are not confined to temporary transitional justice initiatives, and can also be put into practice through longer-term institutional reforms in the context of state- building. However, for that to materialise it is critical that the leadership and the state first take the responsibility for the failures of earlier projects, and then engage willingly, in security and justice system reforms. These should be aimed at strengthening peaceful means of conflict resolution in society, and fostering the ethical and accountable performance of the security forces.
In the case of Mozambique, the sequencing of events meant that the GPA resulted in a lost opportunity for the reform of security and justice. This was because it lacked a formal transitional justice initiative, which was important for reconciliation, but also for contributing to subsequent institutional reforms in the security and justice system. In addition, it was also a lost opportunity because the GPA was found wanting on substantive prescriptions for institutional justice and police reforms. In particular, this meant that the all important criminal justice system, including its penal components, was ignored in the effort to address and fight crime in the aftermath of war. It also resulted
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in an absence of vetting in the security and justice system (Call and Stanley,
2001), implying that many of those who committed human rights abuses remained in their posts, perpetuating militarisation and authoritarian cultures in those institutions. It also meant that a number of these elements went on to assume the role of spoilers in subsequent reform endeavours, not to mention their suspected relationships with criminal networks and engagement in the illicit economy, further perpetuating the cycle of impunity in Mozambican society.
These were severe shortcomings in crucial areas for the short, medium and long-term development of peace and security in Mozambique. However, it must be highlighted that the entry points to reforms missed with the GPA did not inevitably mean fatal stagnation in the security and justice system, as other drivers for reforms were nurtured and used by forward-looking political and institutional leadership. Yet, the question remains whether these initiatives were able to satisfactorily tackle the issues raised above. Chapter VII sheds further light on this matter.
For now, it is important to note that in general, Mozambican justice sector interviewees believed that reform provisions in the GPA were not essential, because these were already on-going as an result of the separation of powers enshrined in the 1990 Constitution. Although they agreed that RENAMO was the only player that could have brought up the issue in the context of peace
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negotiations, they thought that this group lacked the political maturity to understand the importance of the justice institutions in the aftermath of war, and during a process of democratisation (2.1.2.5-18/05/05, 2.4.1.5-19/05/05,
2.4.2.5-19/05/05, 2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.4.1-24/03/09, 4.4.2-30/03/09). In fact, at that time, Renamo’s sense of legitimate grief had not been enough for it to focus on justice as an end - be it social or institutional justice - perhaps due to its origins as part of Ian Smith’s destabilisation efforts, only later assuming an endogenous character.
Nonetheless, a top-level institutional justice manager claimed that the absence of prescriptions for justice reforms in the GPA was highly beneficial for
Mozambique because it would have created institutional havoc in the judiciary.
In his opinion, which resonated across other interviews, the judiciary was too weak, and lacking in sufficient conditions for carrying-out proper investigations
(4.1.2.5-05/05/05, 4.6.4.5-12/05/05, Boaventura Zita quoted in van den Bergh
2009: 43). Furthermore, war crimes would either have been introduced into an already oversaturated conventional judiciary system and immensely increased the case backlog or, by setting up special mechanisms, peace would have been endangered, by extending or derailing the already long and on-going negotiations (2.4.1.5-19/05/05).
Clearly, the latter preoccupation prevailed amongst policy makers, and many also thought that there were already excessive humanitarian, economic and
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political issues that were of greater priority (2.1.2.5-18/05/05, 4.4.2-30/03/09,
2.4.1-24/03/09). One interviewee supported this interpretation arguing that justice reforms were not essential at the time, since in the post-independence period base-level popular courts did not decide on a partisan basis, because they relied mainly on extensive consultation and on consensus based decision-making (2.1.2.5-18/05/05).
Yet, within the system there were divergent ideas concerning the priority awarded to justice reforms in the immediate post-conflict phase, even if these did not stem from the GPA. Some senior officials thought justice should have been given a higher priority because changes being enacted through legal reform were progressing too slowly, whilst the demand on the system in the immediate post-conflict phase increased dramatically with the return of refugees, the resettlement of IDPs and corresponding land issues, as well as rising criminality (2.4.2.5-19/05/05, 2.1.2-03/04/09, 2.1.3-27/02/09, 2.4.1-
24/03/09).
In sum, research carried-out in this section evidenced that the absence of priority given to justice reforms highlighted the fact that lack of accountability and widespread criminal impunity were driven by the intentional agency of spoilers. In addition, the inefficacy of the Mozambican justice system and the slow pace of its reforms compounded this state of affairs. Including justice reform provisions in peace agreements may not be a panacea for the
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particular problems plaguing judiciaries in post-conflict environments. This is especially true if, as was to be expected in the experience of Mozambique, given the poor record of UNOMOZ regarding crucial security issues such as disarmament, justice was not given consideration during implementation.
However, in this case, such provisions might have renewed attention and underscored the problems faced by the judiciary, awarding the system higher external visibility and internal attention from an earlier moment, since the GPA acquired legal status.
6.4 Conclusion
The implementation of the GPA in Mozambique has been widely portrayed as a major political success, since it created the conditions for peace viability in the short and medium term, through prioritising the transformation of belligerents into political parties.
Notwithstanding, the uncritical declaration of the political success of the implementation of the GPA deserves attention, since it was accompanied by short, medium and longer-term negative impacts. Noteworthy examples are the flawed disarmament process and the minimalism of the security provisions and their deficient implementation, leading to a security vacuum where the parties engaged in survival tactics. Together with the absence of concern with ensuring the reform and oversight of the security sector, and the lack of measures to promote reconciliation and judicial reform, a heavy security-
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related legacy paved the way for the reproduction of mistrust, impunity and violence throughout time.
This evaluation has highlighted the fact that in Mozambique, asymmetrical power bargains during the peace negotiations led to unsatisfactory security clauses coupled with weak mechanisms for implementation and monitoring during the immediate transition. This resulted in unintended and negative consequences. It further showed that implementation is marked by a modification in power relations, with parties attempting to gain advantages over unresolved or contested security provisions, or in demanding compromises under pressure. Informal survival tactics were amongst those that rendered short-term advantages, but were harmful to the sequencing and coherence of institutional reforms in the justice and security system in the longer run, impairing strategic and long-term gains in state-building.
This chapter has sought to highlight how parties’ quests for their own security and power control, combined with the mandates and capacity limitations of
UNOMOZ and CIVPOL, hampered the achievement of sounder peace agreement provisions, the implementation of the GPA, and the start of SSR in general. In particular, the factors identified prevented opportunities for earlier reform in the police, for addressing impunity through reconciliation measures and judicial reform, and for linking DDR and the creation of the new armed forces to a wider and more strategic defence reform process. In the case of
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the armed forces, the FADM was allowed to emerge institutionally weak because both parties’ security interests were accommodated, even if this convergence entailed negative long-term implications for the efficiency of these forces. Moreover, improvised security arrangements that emerged from under the pressure of the GPA implementation generated rushed institutional bricolage to safeguard the contenders’ interests, such as in the case of the transfer of different forces to the MInt. Hence, besides the organisational hurdles that such engineering instigated, its unplanned nature meant that the revision of the new institutional configuration should have been carried out earlier, something which has yet to take place, reinforcing the observation that political considerations continue to supersede policy-making. This further strengthens the broader point about the need to construct a viable political process, based on trust-building and reconciliation measures in order for post- conflict reconstruction and SSR to become feasible and contribute towards a sustainable peace. As such, peace agreements require balance and not merely trade-offs between the nurturing of viable political processes and the need to not preclude, complicate or obstruct SSR in the immediate and long- term.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Mozambique’s Post-Civil War Justice and Security System Challenges
‘New things lie in front of moving feet’ Shona proverb
7.1. Introduction
Chapter VI argued that the GPA provided a framework for ensuring peace in the short and medium term, by focusing on political matters during implementation and establishing the priority of transforming belligerents into political parties. Nevertheless, this political success was marred by negative security consequences in the short, medium and long-term. These included a flawed disarmament process and the relegation of security issues and institutions to secondary importance, favouring a security vacuum that ended up with parties resorting to survival tactics. This situation was compounded by both a lack of interest in security reform and oversight as well as an absence of GPA measures for reconciliation and justice reforms. This blend of factors paved the way for the reproduction of mistrust, violence and impunity throughout the post-conflict period.
This chapter verifies the impact of these shortcomings in the medium to long- term developments of the post-civil war justice and security system. It starts by outlining the architecture of the system, taking into account the institutional framework, the decision-making and oversight structures. Subsequently, policy-making processes affecting the justice and security system are
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analysed, in order to find entry-points and drivers of SSR other than those introduced by the GPA in the immediate peacebuilding phase. In particular, the public sector reform programme (PSR) is examined with regards to its relevance for sparking substantive reforms in the justice and security institutions. Finally, a small case study of the criminal justice system is undertaken in order to showcase how the lack of coherence and sequencing of reforms impacted medium to longer-term institutional performance.
Throughout the chapter examples of critical junctures, such as the complete overhaul of the justice sector, and of path dependence like the recollection of the experiences of the post-independence Joint Command of the Security
Forces are highlighted. Furthermore, attention is drawn onto instances of institutional bricolage, like the creation of semi-independent civil service units in charge of specific thematic areas.
This chapter argues that opportunities for justice and security system reform existed beyond the peace agreement entry-point in Mozambique, namely through public sector reforms that started in 1999. However, this process was insufficient and inadequate, and did not meet the institutional performance needs of the justice and security system. Hence, despite the introduction of specific reforms in the various institutions that compose this system, an overall framework is still missing, and could be brought about through the drafting of a national security strategy (NSS), accompanied by a coordinating structure.
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Nonetheless, the findings suggest impediments to such endeavour. These include a persistent political mistrust between Frelimo and Renamo since the
GPA, the GoM’s apparent lack of interest in developing a NSS, and a dearth of societal pressure in this direction.
7.2. Mozambique’s post-civil war justice and security framework
7.2.1. Institutional Architecture
As is the case in most African countries, the justice and security system in
Mozambique is composed of multiple actors. Formal justice institutions include the Courts, the Public Prosecutor Office (Procuradoria Geral da
República- PGR) the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC), the Institute of Legal
Sponsorship and Assistance (IPAJ), the National Penal Service (SERNAP)28 and the Bar Association. Despite a wide range of challenges with regards to infrastructure, logistics and human resources, most of these institutions are currently active at the national, provincial and district levels, jul14resolution foreseen by law.29 For example, the Centre for Arbitration, Conciliation and
Mediation was created by private initiative, to provide faster resolution of commercial and labour conflicts in the new context of free market.30
Subsequently, the GoM established a Commission of Arbitration and Labour
28 The SERNAP was created and regulated by law 3/2013 of 16/01 and decree 63/2013 of 06/12. Throughout most of this PhD research period, the operational institution was its predecessor, i.e., the National Service of Prisons (SNAPRI) created by decree 7/2006 of 17/05.
29 CRM 2004, art 212.4.
30 Created in 2002 in accordance with the Arbitration law 11/99 of 12/07.
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Mediation,31 with nationwide representation, which coordinates all extrajudicial mechanisms of prevention and resolution of labour conflicts.
In rural areas most Mozambicans still seek justice via traditional community conflict resolution mechanisms, including appeals to family elders, the healer, the régulo (traditional community leader), and the locally elected community court. In addition, local state officials such as the village secretaries - secretários da aldeia - also contribute to conflict resolution in collaboration with the community leader and/or the community court judges (4.6.5-14/07/08,
4.6.6-05/07/08, 4.6.7-18/07/08, 4.6.8-14/07/08, 4.6.9-04/07/08, 4.6.10-
19/02/09). The community courts were created to replace the former popular courts and therefore have legal status, even if they deliver customary-based justice.32 However, as explained in chapter six, due to a lack of regulation, the articulation with the rest of the state justice institutions remains ad-hoc.
Management-wise the justice sector operates principally under the auspices of the MJus, but also reports to the MInt with regards to the intervention of the
PIC and prisons. Mechanisms of external oversight include the Commission of Human Rights, Legal and Constitutional Affairs of the Parliament, the
Justice Ombudsman and the National Commission of Human Rights
31 The GoM justified its creation with the need to develop a culture of proximity, independence, impartiality and rapid delivery of justice so as to contribute to social peace (Decree 50/2009 of 11/09).
32 Law 4/92 of 06/05.
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(CNDH).33 In addition, CSOs and the media play a useful role in denouncing the shortcomings of the justice system.
The President of Mozambique is the Commander-in-Chief of the statutory defence and security forces of the country.34 He also presides over the
National Council of Defence and Security (Conselho Nacional de Defesa e
Segurança- CNDS), an advisory body providing consultation on issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity and defence of the democratically instituted powers.35
Mozambique’s formal defence and security forces comprise the armed forces
(FADM), the intelligence services (SISE), and the police (PRM), a paramilitary organisation.36 The customs37 and the immigration services38 also have paramilitary status. The presidential guard, despite being managed by a commander of the military garrison of the president’s office, is drawn from the
MInt, particularly from the branch of the Command of Special and Reserve
33 Despite this position having been set out in the 2004 Constitution and legislated by law 07/2006 of 16/08, the first Justice Ombudsman was only elected by the Parliament in 2012. Ordinary law 33/2009 of 22/12 established the legal existence of the CNDH, but it was only implemented in 2012.
34 CRM 2004, art 146.4.
35 CRM 2004, art 268.1-2, law 08/96, art 1.
36 Law 19/92 of 31/12, art 1.1.
37 The Customs Directorate reports to the Customs and Tax Authority, which is legally subordinated to the Ministry of Finance. This institution enforces revenue legislation by controlling duties and taxes whilst it also combats smuggling networks, including drug trafficking (Laws 01/2006 of 22/03 and 19/2009 of 10/09).
38 In the post-civil war period the immigration organ was a directorate of the MInt. However, the National Immigration Services (SENAMI) were created recently, and although they are still under the supervision of the MInt, now they possess administrative autonomy (Law 4/2014 of 05/02).
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Forces dedicated to protecting dignitaries. Other uniformed law enforcement forces include the forestry and wildlife rangers,39 the municipal police40 and prison guards.41
The MoD and the MInt are the core institutions responsible for the management of state statutory security forces. Equally, the Ministry of
Finance, by way of the Customs and Tax Authority, oversees customs officers,42 whilst the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Tourism administer the forestry and wildlife guards.43 In turn, the mayors and the municipal assemblies manage the municipal police, under supervision of the
MInt.44 The law explicitly states that the implementation of the municipal police regulations shall not prejudice the performance of the security forces.45
In addition, in the event of any 'alteration' in public order the municipal police and its resources are required to report directly to the PRM unit in charge of the respective territory.46 This clearly subordinates the municipal police to the
PRM, aiming to prevent potential contradictory orders. It is interesting to note that it is the municipal assembly rather than the mayor who establishes most
39 Law 10/99 of 12/07, Art 37.
40 Decree 35/2006 of 06/09, Art 8.
41 Law 3/2013 of 16/01, Art2.
42 Decree 9/2010 of 15/04, art 1.1, 1.3.
43 Decree 12/2002 of 06/06, art 107.1, 107.2.
44 Decree 35/2006 of 06/09, art 4.1.
45 Decree 35/2006 of 06/09, art 4.2.
46 Decree 35/2006 of 06/09, art 9.3.
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municipal police operational rules.47 This is a more democratic procedure than that at the national level where the president, rather than the parliament, holds considerably greater security decision-making power. However, this provision may not be innocuous. Rather, it might have been intended to ensure control by the party in power at the national level, in the event that elected mayors had competing party affiliations. Hence, this would be achieved through a usually more balanced municipal assembly, and through the close coordination with the PRM. In addition, there have been no further regulations clarifying exactly what characterises the stated ‘alteration’ in the public order, nor have any criteria been issued to guide the activation of the subordination clause.
In the field of prisons, SERNAP answers to the ‘Minister in charge of supervising the penal area’ (Law 3/2013 of 16/01, art 1). This lack of clarity may have been intentional since the prison services have previously answered to both the MInt and the MJus. Whilst its predecessor SNAPRI was clearly under the aegis of the MJus during the prolonged process of unification of the prison system in the post-civil war,48 this legal vacuum enables easy institutional re-engineering should it be required. It may also denote a turf war between ministries and reluctance on the part of the MInt to relinquish any
47 Decree 35/2006 of 06/09, art 5, 6.
48 Decree 7/2006 of 17/05, art 2.
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power as happened previously with the civil identification service (4.3.5-
10/02/09, 2.1.6-30/09/08).
A collective organ, namely the Joint Command of the Defence and Security
Forces (Comando Conjunto das Forças de Defesa e Segurança-CCFDS) provides inter-institutional coordination at the operational level. However, despite the plethora of statutory state security actors described above, the
CCFDS consists merely of representatives from the defence, police, intelligence and the military garrison of the President’s office.
Private security companies constitute non-statutory yet legal security actors.49
There are also both state encouraged and spontaneous informal security entities, such as community policing groups, vigilantes and neighbourhood watches. Moreover, despite the explicit prohibition of military or paramilitary armed groups50 other than those regulated by the state, the former belligerent and leader of Renamo has maintained an active militarised force.
The Defence, Security and Public Order Committee of the Parliament carries out external oversight over the security sector institutions. The media has cautiously denounced malpractice of the security forces, yet the role of the
CSOs in this field has been negligible.
49 Decree 26/90 of 29/11.
50 CRM 2004, art 52.
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7.2.2. Security Decision-Making and Oversight Frameworks
Mozambique has a presidential system of government, with the president serving as both the head of state and head of government, despite the existence of a prime minister. Nonetheless, the constitution attempts to balance justice and security decision-making between the president as the commander-in-chief, the council of ministers and the parliament. In addition, the operationalisation of the CNDS as a consultative organ on security matters, and of the CCFDS as a coordination mechanism represents features that potentially balance the president’s views. This is important in light of the cultural legacy of Frelimo’s centralisation of security decision-making around the president, which prevailed during the liberation war and the post- independence phase.
President and Government
The president holds the power to declare war, state of emergency, state of siege, celebrate treaties, announce partial or total mobilisation of the population and preside over the CNDS.51 He is responsible for appointing, discharging and dismissing the chief, deputy chief and branch commanders of the armed forces and other officers according to specific law, as well as the general commander and deputy general commander of the police.52 In the justice sector, he appoints the presidents of the constitutional council, the
51 (CRM 2004, art 161 and 161) e)
52 Idem
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supreme court, the administrative court, and the deputy president of the supreme court as well as the general state attorney and the deputy general state attorney.53
As argued in chapters five and six, matters of reform in the security sector received limited attention during peacebuilding given donor conditionality and the GoM’s shifting priority towards poverty reduction. With the coming of
President Guebuza into power in 2005 a new dynamic and leadership was devoted to the system. Whilst the justice and security system did not become a priority, the operationalisation of organs such as the CNDS and the CCFDS represented progress in terms of establishment of fora to discuss sector- related as well as transversal security matters (4.5.4-09/09/08, 1.1.6-01/07/08,
1.1.8-21/07/08, 1.1.1-01/09/08). The justice field also received renewed attention, with reform initiatives gaining new impetus. How these institutional reforms and the operationalisation of these organs translated into better justice and security for the people and a more efficient and transparent system, is a more intricate question that is implicitly discussed throughout the chapter.
Nonetheless, the responsibility for ensuring territorial integrity, public and social order, security of the citizens, as well as legality in the country, belong to the council of ministers and specific organs that work under government control as described in the previous section.54
53 (CRM 2004, art 159) g) h), 239.1)
54 (CRM 2004, art 203.1, 2, 204.1) b)
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Parliament
In turn the parliament sanctions the suspension of constitutional guarantees and the declarations of the state of siege and state of emergency. Importantly, it defines the defence and security policy upon hearing the CNDS, and ratifies treaties and the participation of Mozambique in the international organisations of defence.55 In the justice sphere it elects the justice ombudsman, ratifies the appointment of the presidents of the constitutional council, supreme court, administrative court, and the deputy president of the supreme court, and is entitled to grant amnesties and sentence remissions.56 Furthermore, the parliament has the authority to question the government on security and justice matters when it deliberates about the programme of the GoM and the council of ministers’ activities.57 These prerogatives are quite similar to that of most other African Anglophone and Francophone countries, such as Nigeria or
Senegal (Agokla et al 2010: 282). However, there are cases where
Parliament also holds constitutional power to declare war like in Mali and Cote
D’Ivoire (Kougniazonde 2010: 25), and where it is entitled to scrutinise and approve the deployment of armed forces to foreign missions like in Benin and
Niger (Alao and Loko 2008: 35, Anonyme 2011: 191).
Thus, in a similar mode, the prerogatives of the Mozambican parliament provide margin to countervail the security decision-making power of the
55 (CRM 2004, art 179. 2) g, n, u)
56 (CRM 2004, art 179. 2) h, i, v)
57 (CRM 2004, art 179. 2) j, k)
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executive in theory, but in practice, much depends on the composition of this organ. The adopted electoral system of proportional representation tends to produce parliamentary majorities, which can be unhealthy for democratic decision-making, with the party in power outvoting the opposition. According to certain interviewees the level of debate on state policy, after the first multiparty elections when Renamo had considerable representation in parliament was much higher than when Frelimo increased its majority (4.1.2.5-
05/05/05, 4.6.3.5-13/05/05, 4.1.1-26/02/09). As regards security matters, for example, the parliament made a significant achievement through demanding that the GoM presented a general policy on defence and security, before approving the tabled law on national defence and the armed forces (1.1.1-
01/09/08, 4.3.1-26/08/08). Transcripts of the parliamentary sessions where the draft law was discussed confirm the essential role of the opposition in raising difficult questions, such as for example the required apolitical nature of the armed forces, and the lacuna concerning instances of coup d’état (Minutes of the 5th ordinary session, plenary session 3, 31/10/96).
The external oversight role of the Defence, Security and Public Order
Committee of the Parliament over the security sector institutions has been important for holding the GoM accountable for its actions in this area.
However, the challenges have been ongoing given that the Commission, for example, has not had enough technical support to help in researching and drafting laws (4.4.1-21/09/08). In addition, a continuing problem has been that
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related to the quality of monitoring carried out. The modus operandi was for the Commission to inform a given security institution that it would visit to supervise ongoing activities. Therefore, the security institution was allowed time and room of manoeuvre to get their business in order. The fact that there was no opportunity for impromptu supervision was very limiting to the activity of the Commission (4.4.1-21/09/08, 4.4.2.5-10/05/05, 4.4.3.5-12/05/05).
In the justice field, the Commission of Constitutional Affairs, Human Rights and Legal Issues of the Parliament has recently had its oversight activities complemented by those of the Justice Ombudsman and the National
Commission of Human Rights (CNDH).58
The Commission of Constitutional Affairs, Human Rights and Legal Issues carried out its supervisory role over the institutions of the administration of justice by verifying the legislation produced and undertaking control missions in loco (4.4.2-30/03/09). The work of the Commission appeared to generate positive impact (2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.2.1-03/04/09). On the one hand, every institutional reform had to acquire a legal format and the Commission verified such documents and their content with regards to their conformity with the
Constitution (4.4.2-30/03/09). On the other hand, the visits carried out centrally, as well as in the provinces and districts allowed for verification of
58 Despite this position having been set out in the 2004 Constitution and legislated by law 07/2006 of 16/08, the first Justice Ombudsman was only elected by the Parliament in 2012. Ordinary law 33/2009 of 22/12 established the legal existence of the CNDH but it was only implemented in 2012.
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whether the GoM sector plans were being implemented (4.4.2-30/03/09). One outcome was to put pressure on the institutions of administration of justice to keep their work within the legally established deadlines, so as to prevent the violation of citizens’ rights (4.4.2-30/03/09, 2.2.1-03/04/09).
However, less glowing opinions existed. These advanced that carrying out oversight over the institutions of the justice system was far from straightforward because of the independence of the judicial power (2.1.1-
17/09/08, 4.4.2-30/03/09). The most difficult issues to tackle were not directly related to the implementation of plans and strategies, rather they concerned the resistance to change that emanated from the corporate interests of the different groups within the justice system (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09). For example, there was opposition to the introduction of term limits for the posts of
Attorney General, President of the Supreme Court and President of the
Administrative Court. In addition, when controversial matters were at stake, the institutions of the justice sector tended to oppose any wider discussions of the legislation in public forums (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.2-03/04/09). The following passage is illustrative:
‘The resistance to change…the resistance to the democratisation of the organs of the system is inside the sector, so what can be done? It is necessary to expand the discussion of these problems beyond the sector; it is necessary to include academia, CSOs and the general public in the debate. But the sector is deeply interlinked with the ‘power’ and tends to succeed in preventing these issues from being openly debated. They debate amongst themselves…the judges, the attorneys, the lawyers, but they do not discuss with the citizen…with the citizen they do not want to debate (2.1.1-17/09/08).
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Therefore, this is a strong indication that external oversight of the judicial power has yet to be made effective (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09, 2.1.2-
03/04/09).
The Ombudsman is charged with guaranteeing citizens’ rights, certifying that legal procedures are duly followed, and ensuring that justice is respected in the performance of the public administration. However, the figure does not hold decision-making power and can only make recommendations designed to guide the competent organs to make restitution for, or prevent further illegalities and injustices.59
The CNDH, despite not having been set up by the constitution, has the mandate to promote, protect and monitor human rights in the country.60 As in the case of the justice ombudsman, the CNDH lacks the authority to open legal cases; its role is to report its findings to the judiciary. Yet, its composition has been a matter of public debate. Three of its members are appointed by the GoM, three are elected by the parliament (where the party in power has a majority), four are chosen by CSOs and one by the Bar Association,61 suggesting an attempt on the part of the GoM to keep control of its work.
59 CRM 2004, art 256, 257, 259.
60 Ordinary law 33/2009 of 22/12 established the legal existence of the CNDH but it was only implemented in 2012.
61 Law 33/2009 of 22/12, art 6,7.
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There are clearly a number of institutions working in the field of human rights, including also a specific department within the MJus and NGOs, and this very diversity creates the need for a coordinating framework, if effective results are to be achieved.
Besides the aforementioned, two other transversal parliamentary commissions have a potential watchdog role over the justice and security system institutions. They are the Planning and Budget Commission, and the Petitions,
Complaints and Grievance Commission. Through the ‘power of the purse’ budget analysis of the resources allocated to each justice and security system institution can be carried out, discussed and monitored, as well as verified comparatively to other sectors. The petitions commission was created as a permanent body given the sheer volume of public complaints received by the
Parliament (4.4.2-30/03/09), a sign that the common citizen increasingly used the law of petitions to claim and redress rights.62 However, in comparison with other areas of state administration, there have been fewer complaints concerning misconduct of the defence and security forces and/or their management institutions (4.4.2.5-10/05/05, 4.4.3.5-12/05/05, 4.4.1-21/09/08).
This is true despite the common knowledge that lower ranking security agents tend to behave abusively, not only in terms of public harassment and corruption, but also resorting to the excessive use of force. Much of this behaviour has gone unpunished, although complaints are likely to rise due to the work of the justice ombudsman and the CNDH.
62 Law 02/96 of 04/10.
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Against this background, even if the parliament is no longer limited to a rubberstamp role as had been the case in the period of one-party rule following independence (as described in chapter four), in practice it is noticeable that the President as the chief of government and the commander- in-chief of the security forces, holds the great majority of decision-making power. This suggests that instances of path dependence and critical juncture with regards to justice and security decision-making patterns have balanced each other out in the medium term. Mozambique is not therefore, atypical in the African landscape, where modest progress has been achieved in the last two decades, in terms of institutionalisation of parliamentary structures (Ebo
2008: 16). It also corroborates the research findings that formal oversight provisions may not be fully implemented given the lack of parliamentarian capacity and will, or the presence of political obstacles (Ebo and N’Diaye,
2008; Kougniazonde, 2010, N’Diaye, 2010).
CSOs and Media
The CSOs and the media lack legal decision-making power yet they may potentially play important roles in the reforms and supervision of the justice and security system. SSR literature has enunciated a number of potential roles for CSOs to play with regards to the justice and security sector. Some of these include: a) performing as a watchdog; b) fostering change through the promotion of public debate around security issues; c) supporting the development of legislation that fosters norms of democratic governance; d)
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providing technical assistance to policymaking and policy implementation processes; e) promoting dialogue and trust building by bringing members of the security forces together with the society at large; f) providing training for the public and officials to improve security literacy, g) carrying out SSR research and disseminating results; and e) representing the interest of societal groups and local communities in security policy debates (Hutchful, 2003, Ball,
2006b, Caparini and Fluri, 2006, OECD-DAC, 2007, UNDP, 2008).
However, differently to the experience of South Africa’s post-Apartheid transition where CSOs played an active role in the initial security transformation process (Le Roux, 2002, Cawthra 2003: 41, Hutchful 2009: 25,
Africa 2011: 11), in Mozambique, their position was highly limited due to a combination of factors. Historical legacies that constrain CSOs engagement in this area are: a) the culture of secrecy around security matters; b) the idea that security is the sole responsibility of a restricted group of officials and experts; and c) the fear of state reprisal (4.3.2.5-18/05/05, 4.1.2-25/02/09, 4.6.4-
08/04/09, 4.6.11-22/07/08). All of these constitute manifestations of path dependence, whereby past experiences constrain current developments. In addition, the dearth of information about ongoing justice and security programmes in conjunction with a lack of expertise on specialised security and justice subjects have also limited CSOs' confidence to engage in meaningful interactions, much less to play a watchdog role (4.1.2.5-05/05/05, 4.6.11-
22/07/08, 4.6.12-16/02/09). Furthermore, no financial support has encouraged
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sustained CSOs engagement in this area (4.6.1.5-09/05/05, 4.6.5.5-12/05/05,
4.1.2-25/02/09, 4.6.4-08/04/09), substantiating general research findings that donor funding to develop the capacity and activities of CSOs on security governance matters have not been prioritised (Born, 2003, OECD-DAC, 2004,
Bryden and Olonisakin, 2010: 9).
Notwithstanding, the situation regarding defence and intelligence is quite different to that concerned with the spheres of policing and justice. Matters of corruption, human rights’ abuses, and police ineffectiveness in the face of growing criminality have been on the CSOs and donor agenda for some time, due to their critical and immediate impact on people’s daily lives (4.6.2.5-
09/05/05, 4.6.5.5-12/05/05, 4.1.2-25/02/09). Whilst several NGOs have worked selectively on specific justice issues, the League of Human Rights
(LDH) has been working continually to monitor human rights, train paralegals, and carry out advocacy through its national network.
The following passage illustrates the limits of CSOs involvement regarding defence, intelligence and the police:
Ah, security issues are a taboo in this society…if people speak, they speak quietly…the mutual distrust between civilians and security personnel is considerable, partly because of the legacy of the post- independence police state, but also because of an increasingly perceived closure and intolerance in the current political affairs. Who wants to champion democratic security governance and be arrested under the pretext of committing a crime against the state? (4.1.2- 25/02/09)
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Clearly, the reluctance of CSOs and the general population to enquire into these matters has been encouraged and furthered by the state. This quote also brings up the risk of incurring legal charges were one to question specific security issues. That has been a particular worry on the part of the media who have played a vocal role in denouncing malpractice of the defence and security forces. However, besides reporting on specific security issues, no truly thorough analysis of the changes in this field has been undertaken, as has been common in other countries in democratic transition such as Croatia
(Jurisin, 2003). Journalists lack sufficient preparation regarding subjects of security and justice, which prevents any systematized interrogation or scrutiny
(4.6.2.5-09/05/05, 4.6.3.5-13/05/05). In addition, a generalised lack of access to simple sources of information from the state security institutions in question has not helped (Agenda 20-25 2003: 68, 115, 160). It was hoped that forthcoming legislation protecting the right to information would improve the situation (4.6.1.5-09/05/05, 4.6.11-22/07/08).
Following the end of the civil war, issues of defence and intelligence have lost importance in both domestic and external political and societal arenas. In addition, the efforts of the FADM were mostly invisible to the general public, except during natural disasters such as floods, so security reform issues received little media attention (4.6.1.5-09/05/05, 4.6.2.5-09/05/05, 4.6.3.5-
13/05/05, 1.2.2-14/09/08). Further disincentives to reporting on national security issues besides the threat of legal action included psychological and
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physical harassment, as well as the threat of reductions in advertising contracts as potential retribution for speaking out. As a result, newspapers have been very selective about what to report (4.6.1.5-09/05/05, 4.6.2.5-
09/05/05, 4.6.3.5-13/05/05, 4.6.11-22/07/08, OSISA 2013: 7).
The findings described above pinpoint the many challenges to conducting true horizontal oversight in Mozambique. The limited performance of the media, the CSOs and the society in general concerning security matters is worrying as it impairs the growth of potential pressure groups who might advocate for the spread of democratically-oriented change in the justice and security system. Hence, Mozambique corroborates the broad finding that although much thinking has gone into conceptualizing civil oversight of SSR, it has yet to be truly implemented in practice (Millar et al 2009: 7).
The CNDS and the CCFDS
The National Council of Defence and Security and the Joint Command of the
Defence and Security Forces are organs whose work informs the security decision-making of the President of Mozambique. If fully implemented, in addition to potentially offsetting the propensity of the unitary state structure to concentrate power in the president, they may also counterbalance monolithic positions held by this actor.
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The CNDS is charged with providing its opinion prior to any declaration of war, as well as regarding any potential suspension of constitutional guarantees, plus any declaration of state of siege and/or state of emergency.63 It is also entitled to issue its opinion about the criteria and conditions of use of the areas totally or partially destined to defence and security of the national territory, and to analyse and accompany the initiatives of other state organs that aim to guarantee the consolidation of national independence, the strengthening of democratic political power and the maintenance of law and order.64 Finally, an alteration made in the 2004 constitution entitled this entity to issue opinions regarding foreign peace missions.65
The creation of the CNDS, often seen in a positive light in terms of building a more institutionalised security apparatus, in contrast to the fluidity of the post- independence phase (J.Veloso-08/04/09, 4.5.5-20/09/08), has nonetheless been controversial.66 Renamo MPs, in particular, argued for broader representation within this organ, since membership was solely restricted to security sector government authorities and the top echelon of the security forces. They argued for the inclusion of representatives of both the CSOs and the political parties, given that national security decisions affected all
63 CRM 2004, art 269) a) b)
64 CRM 2004, art 269) c) d)
65 CRM 2004, art 269) e
66 The feedback from the parliamentary commissions about the draft law of the CNDS was riddled with disagreement as the following documents attested to: Commission of Human Rights, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Parliamentary opinion document 8/96 of 23/02, and Commission of Defence and Public Order Parliamentary opinion document 1/96 of 28/02.
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Mozambicans, who should be consulted (Minutes of the 4th ordinary session, plenary session 14, 01/04/96). In contrast, Frelimo MPs argued that, although limited to a consultative function, the organ dealt with sensitive security issues and that the composition and discussions should therefore be restricted
(Minutes of the 4th ordinary session, plenary session 14, 01/04/96). The entity was approved as initially proposed, but positive changes were made in the
2004 constitution. The CNDS transitioned from being an organ designed to advise the President to being an advisory council for the state.67 Five MPs elected by the parliament were added to the council, although in exchange the
President's office also obtained the right to appoint two members of its choosing.68
The fact that the CNDS is a consultative organ and that its recommendations are not of a binding nature actually opens up the possibility of including CSOs and academics specialised in the issues under discussion. That might be the case if Mozambique security decision-making processes aimed at inclusiveness and accommodation of the needs of a wider range of population groups. However, with the exception of the Police strategy development process which included multiple level consultations (4.2.2.5-11/05/05, 3.1.2.5-
18/05/05, 3.1.6-19/08/08, 2.1.4-24/09/08), and the discussions about military service matters involving the public (1.2.1.5-27/05/05, 1.2.2.5-16/05/05, 1.2.3-
22/08/08), security issues are still shrouded in secrecy. A considerable
67 CRM 1990, art 158.1 and CRM 2004, art 268.1.
68 Law 2/2005 of 12/04, art 2.
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number of interviewees shared similar perceptions that security issues are mainly decided upon by an elitist, capital-based minority, often missing information about local level contexts and lacking contact with the everyday security challenges faced by the common citizen (2.1.4-24/09/08, 4.3.7-
19/02/09, 2.4.3-20/03/09, 4.6.9-04/07/08, 4.6.6-05/07/08, 4.6.5-14/07/08,
4.6.8-14/07/08, 4.6.7-18/07/08). Admittedly, there are issues that might best be kept out of the public eye at the risk of compromising operations, but there should be specific classification criteria, and matters of non-disclosure ought to be discussed in specific executive forums.
Such concerns might have contributed to the motivation behind the creation of the CCFDS in 2004, which envisaged inter-institutional coordination at the operational level (4.5.4-09/09/08, 3.1.1-03/09/08). The aims of the CCFDS are to share information, articulate initiatives of public security, state security and national defence, and to encourage collaboration in the implementation of the defence and security policy. Participants include representatives from the defence, police, intelligence, and the military garrison of the President’s office and they meet at the central, provincial, and district levels.69
Those members of the CCFDS who granted interviews were generally in agreement about its practical importance for exchanging information, sharing means, and promoting joint effective collaboration (1.1.6-01/07/08, 1.1.8-
69 Presidential Decree 45/2004 of 02/02, arts 1-7.
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21/07/08, 1.1.1-01/09/08, 3.2.2-02/07/08, 3.2.3-16/02/09, 3.2.4-17/02/09,
3.2.5-18/02/09, 3.2.6-20/02/09). However, implementation throughout the country has taken longer than anticipated, and it appears that the concept behind the organisation has not been fully grasped, and that so far its achievements have been limited to the sharing of information with no solutions being proposed or implemented (1.1.1-01/09/08, 4.5.4-09/09/08). In the opinion of some participants, this has resulted not only from a deficient understanding of the mission of the CCFDS, but also from the insufficient skills of personnel working at the district levels (CIRESP 2005: 25, 4.3.2.5-18/05/05,
1.1.1-01/09/08, 4.5.4-09/09/08, 4.3.2-02/04/09, 3.2.7-30/03/09). In addition, given the institutional culture of ‘waiting for the boss's orders’, there has been a generalised lack of initiative from members of lower civil service ranks, heightened in the defence and security forces because of the hierarchical command structure (2.1.4-24/09/08).
The CCFDS was founded upon the legacy of the actual, but not legally institutionalised, Joint Command of the Security Forces of the post- independence period discussed in chapter four. Some of the interviewees thought that positive aspects of that experience were being recalled in the present functioning of the CCFDS (1.2.1.5-27/05/05, 4.5.5-20/09/08, 1.1.4-
12/08/08, 1.2.2-14/09/08) even if, as pointed out by another participant, the security challenges at that earlier period were totally different than the current ones (4.5.4-09/09/08). Hence, this represents a case of institutional path
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dependence, although, in the later instance the entity, the CCFDS, now enjoys legal status.
Whilst the interviewees did not question the usefulness of the CCFDS, its make up is nonetheless quite limited in face of the plethora of state statutory security actors described above. Thus, there is room for improvement regarding the regular participation of representatives from other official uniformed forces.
In addition, as the entity deals only with operational matters, a gap persists with regards to debate and decision on strategic policy. According to one interviewee, there might be scope to approach strategic matters, but a change in the concept of the organ would be required, since as of the date of the interview, the organisation and structure of the CCFDS had not allowed those types of issues to be brought to the fore (4.5.4-09/09/08). There had been limited room for debate of strategic security matters at the CNDS as well, as issues were selected according to their currency (4.5.2-01/09/08, 1.1.1-
01/09/08, 4.5.4-09/09/08, 4.5.5-20/09/08). The following quote is illustrative:
The operationalisation of the CNDS and of the CCFDS represents immense progress in terms of platforms for debate of security issues that were previously non-existent. It is to the merit of president Guebuza that he effectively utilises these organs to inform his decision- making… but that is not equal to saying that there is consensus on every matter, or that he always follows the recommendations made. Moreover, it should be clear that although a wide range of topics are tabled at the CNDS, there has been no attempt to treat it as a coordinating organ at the strategic level. The coordination organ is the CCFDS, which discusses operational matters as well as the ongoing
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reforms of the different areas and even crosscutting issues such as the military service, the pension system of the demobilised, or the implications for Mozambique of a conflict in Zimbabwe...so there is strategic thinking being done… the point is that, in practice, not only strictly operational matters are discussed. But I can’t say that the need to articulate a national security strategy has ever emerged from those debates (4.5.4-09/09/08).
This points out the fact that consultative and coordination mechanisms, despite their limitations, are usefully in place in Mozambique’s security sector, but that none of the participating actors have proposed to establish a national security strategy. Security issues were debated and decided upon as a matter of necessity arising from ongoing daily business. Even the shared understanding of the need to re-structure the security sector in the medium term (4.5.2-01/09/08, 1.1.1-01/09/08, 4.5.4-09/09/08, 4.5.5- 20/09/08) was treated according to the proposals of each institution. Therefore, a strategic approach to the management of the security sector, which, in principle, should be upheld by a national security strategy, has been lacking. The need for a national security organ able to coordinate the production of such a strategy has also been obvious.
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Fig. 14 Overview of Mozambique’s security sector actors
7.3. Policy-making in the context of liberalisation
As explained in chapter five, in Mozambique, despite the end of the war in
1992, state institutional development only gained currency from 2000 onwards prompted by a change in the western donors’ focus from one of emergency towards one of development (Hanlon, 1997: 61-62, Hodges and Tibana 2005:
146, Hanlon and Smart 2008: 240). This change, together with the legacy of central planning, emphasised the drawing up of strategies as a main concern of state-building. Mozambique currently produces an impressive number of strategy documents both at the central, provincial and district levels as well as in transversal areas such AIDS; this would seem to suggest that strategic thinking and planning are driving institutional reforms. However, the quality of these documents with regards to the accuracy of institutional diagnoses,
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needs assessment, outlining of alternative directions, identification of priorities, programming, resource allocation, monitoring and evaluation, and adaptation to changes during implementation has been questionable (1.1.1-01/09/08,
2.1.4-24/09/08, 4.3.5-10/02/09, 4.1.2-25/02/09). Part of the problem lies in the lack of ownership of these policies by Mozambicans (Hodges and Tibana
2005: 109, Tamele 2007: 4) and in the lack of harmonisation and coherence between them (4.4.2.5-10/05/05, Hodges and Tibana 2005: 83-84, Tamele
2007: 5). In addition, one interviewee argued that the trouble did not lie in the absence of policy integration, but rather stemmed from the ‘lack of intention concerning the actual results of these externally fostered processes’ (4.6.2.5-
09/05/05). The interaction between the public sector reform programme and ongoing substantive reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors illustrate this general dynamics at play.
7.3.1. Public Sector Reforms and SSR
The ‘Global Strategy for Public Sector Reform 2001-2011’ has emerged to equip the Mozambican state to better implement its policies and development programmes in order to address the needs of the citizens (CIRESP, 2005).
The process started in 2000, with the creation of the Interministerial
Commission for Public Sector Reform (Comissão Interministerial da Reforma do Sector Público-CIRESP), which provided political leadership and supervision.70 Additionally, a Technical Unit of Public Sector Reform (Unidade
70 Presidential Decree 5/2000 of 28/03.
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Técnica da Reforma do Sector Público-UTRESP) was established to manage and coordinate reforms.71 The public sector reform programme (PSR) focused on six areas: a) rationalisation and decentralisation of structures and processes of service delivery; b) improved formulation and monitoring of public policy; c) professionalisation of the public sector employees; d) improved financial management and accountability; e) establishment of good governance practices to combat corruption; and f) reform management
(CIRESP 2005: 8).
One of the main steps consisted of an initial functional analysis of each ministry, and in the case of justice, including not only the MJus but the entire sector (CIRESP 2005:15). It was stipulated that each ministry should have a dedicated and technically strong team to work with the external consultants hired by UTRESP. The ministerial teams should provide leadership and decide on prioritisation from the initial diagnosis through to implementation.
Despite these well-meaning provisions, one participant well versed in the process pointed out important shortcomings. The PSR followed a system of vertical planning, leading to UTRESP being seen as the reform implementing agency instead of each state institution. This limited the initial involvement from the sectors and the provinces, as if reforms were something independent from the institutional development work they were carrying out. There had
71 The Council of Ministers created UTRESP through Decree 6/2000 of 4/04 and extinguished it in its 33rd Ordinary Session held in 24/09/2013 (Nandiwe, 2013).
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also been other units working on important aspects of technical state reform, such as in the legal, financial and IT areas with, however, very little coordination amongst them. A major shortcoming had also been the lack of interaction with citizens, who saw the PSR as having little or no impact on their lives. Also, one of the main objectives of the PSR was to achieve the reduction of administrative costs, a goal that was not generally met because the Mozambican state actually needed to expand in order to provide services on an equitable manner to all citizens. Finally, despite improvements in the management of state institutions, donors were asymmetrically preoccupied with the reduction of costs and the elaboration of a global anti-corruption strategy (4.3.5-10/02/09).
The MJus, the MInt and the MoD were included in the public sector reform programme, but the PRM and the FADM were not. This served as a first hint of the limited efficacy of public sector reforms as a driver for SSR.
MoD interviewees complained that any potentially useful state reform programmes usually awarded very low priority to defence (1.2.2-14/09/08,
1.2.3-22/08/08, 1.1.5-22/08/08). Some accepted the priority accorded to social areas, but they pointed out that the defence sector could not be expected to make progress at a similar pace, given the financial constraints imposed (1.2.1.5-27/05/05, 1.2.3-22/08/08). Some positive improvements in administrative and management procedures were recognised as arising from
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the PSR, however no synergies were seen to have developed with the ongoing and substantive defence reforms (1.2.2-14/09/08, 1.2.3-22/08/08). It was also pointed out that a lack of expertise on the part of external consultants with regards to the armed forces led to the exclusion from analysis of important topics which had been previously foreseen in the ToR’s, such as force strength (1.2.3-22/08/08, 1.1.1-01/09/08). The institutional analysis of the MoD undertaken by the consultants resulted in an internal plan for the implementation of recommendations; however, execution had been slow mainly due to a change of leadership in the sector (1.2.3-22/08/08).
Substantive defence reforms continued, nevertheless, whilst not necessarily in a top-down or in a linear manner, since that was not how policy-making is done in Mozambique. For example, the lack of a national security strategy represented a serious handicap in terms of a clear definition of the concept of security in the present context of the country (1.1.5-22/08/08,1.2.3-22/08/08).
Also, had it been ready, the strategic concept of defence should have ideally informed the work of the Agenda 20-25 (the orientating framework for long- term national development). Regardless, no formal input from the defence sector was actually requested to contribute towards the formulation of the development agenda (1.2.3-22/08/08).
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The sector had carried on working to operationalise the law of national defence and armed forces,72 through the drafting of the strategic concept of defence, to be followed by the military strategic concept, and the force size and structure. Nonetheless, taking into account that the war had ended in
1992, policy-making was slow, and the drafting of institutional development plans for the MoD and the FADM were still ongoing. Still lacking was a ‘lei de programação militar’, i.e. a legal instrument also commonly adopted in
Francophone countries like the Central African Republic (Kougniazonde 2010:
25; Solness 2010: 238), and which regards the planning of military budget with implications for the training and re-equipment of the forces in the short, medium and long-term. This was due to a dearth of political commitment to increasing defence expenditure (1.1.5- 22/08/08, 1.2.3-22/08/08, 1.2.2-
14/09/08).
This relegation of defence also meant that a policy on equipment was delayed.73 The Navy, for example, had never received technical and material investment from the GoM, including the acquisition of vessels since independence, meaning that the few boats that it possessed originated from donations. In addition, funding limitations did not only concern major investment areas, they also affected the daily management of the FADM.
Hence, in order to minimise the situation, a food production programme had
72 Law 18/97 of 07/10
73 The equipment policy for the Defence and Security Forces is foreseen in Law 17/97 of 01/10, Art 6.
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been instituted, so as to achieve self-sustainability in this area (1.2.2-14/09/08,
1.2.3-22/08/08).
Most internal defence reform achievements concerned the production of legislation, for example, a military justice code and military discipline regulations had been produced. Yet, in general it took too long for these documents to be discussed and approved in the Council of Ministers and
Parliament, even if they concerned the discipline of the forces, crucial in their interaction with the public, and which were in demand by field commanders
(1.1.6-01/07/08, 1.1.8-21/07/08, 1.2.1-27/08/08).
But even concerning legislation, for example, the new civic service law, stipulated that it was subjected to the military service bylaw, whilst the latter did not foresee its usage in the context of the civic service. This suggested that the civic service needed its own bylaw. Hence, inconsistencies pervaded these processes and, by way of learning from experience, existing legislation was revised in an ongoing cycle, as was the case with the military statute and the military service law (1.2.2-14/09/08, 1.2.3-22/08/08).
The usefulness of the PSR for the institutions of the administration of justice was also criticised since the justice sector had already begun drawing up its second integrated strategic development plan (PEI II) (2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.1.7-
29/09/08, 4.3.5-10/02/09). Despite potential contributions of the PSR regarding issues of management and human resources, the activities
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coordinated by UTRESP had their own glitches, like for example the change of methodology guiding the functional analysis in the midst of the process (2.1.6-
30/09/08, 4.3.5-10/02/09). This led to a clumsy process in which the timing of
UTRESP - justice sector interaction was subject to delay. The external consultants’ report was strong. However, by the time it arrived, the Vision of justice and the PEI had already been discussed and, often, the problems identified, had already been dealt with by the respective institutions (2.1.7-
29/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08). Taking into account the delays, and given the fact that the justice sector officials themselves had actually undertaken most work, it was decided to maintain the focus on the ongoing justice reforms (2.1.7-
29/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.4.2-26/02/09, 2.2.1-04/04/09, 2.1.5-08/04/09). For example, the MJus had nearly completed its new organic structure with work carried out internally, and was concerned mainly with upcoming reforms, which derived from the implementation of the PEI II (2.1.6-30/09/08). As explained by one interviewee:
‘We prepared all the substantive institutional reform work ourselves and when the consultants came in, there was not much thinking left to be done. Now they do their work and the UTRESP has to tick its own boxes…but these consultants and these state’ special commissions earn a lot of money with these programmes and assignments, when it is the actual people from the sector that have to do the work…and of course civil servants knowing about this, are not always eager to collaborate’ (2.1.6-30/09/08).
Hence, there was a general feeling that the PSR process in the Justice sector had been carried out to legitimate the position of the GoM with regards to developments in this sector, since donors had begun to press for results
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around the year 2005 (2.1.7-29/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.4.2-26/02/09, 2.2.1-
04/04/09, 2.1.5-08/04/09). In addition, for UTRESP, it was a matter of fulfilling its work agenda74 and being able to report to donors on the comprehensive nature of their work (2.1.7-29/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 4.3.5-10/02/09).
The ministry of interior officials were, in general, sanguine about their PSR experience (3.1.6-19/08/08, 3.1.3-21/08/08, 4.3.5-10/02/09). Whilst the institutional development strategy of the MInt had already been completed, they thought that the PSR presented no harm provided there were clear guidelines (3.1.3-21/08/08). There had been a clear delimitation of the areas in which the consultants could work, and they interacted with a strong internal
MInt management team. The fresh perspective of external consultants was well received since they were ‘nationals who possessed a modicum of previous knowledge of the sector’ (3.1.3-21/08/08). In addition, it was thought that a diagnosis of a similar nature, if undertaken by inside people, might have been of lesser quality as officials might work to protect their individual interests and to resist change (3.1.6-19/08/08, 3.1.3-21/08/08). It had always been clear that the consultants could make recommendations but did not have the authority to mandate courses of action. Hence, implementation of feasible recommendations had already begun, but the reform management team was still scrutinising those change suggestions that required caution (3.1.3-
21/08/08). Consequently, the changes already being implemented referred to
74 The mid-term report on the ‘Global Strategy for Public Sector Reform 2001-2011’ listed as one of the main achievements of its component of ‘Good Governance and Combat to Corruption’ the approval of the Justice PEI (Ministério da Função Pública 2006: 14).
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improvements in citizen service delivery, but not to institutional engineering.
Yet, this was not necessarily negative, taking into account the serious deficiencies faced by the police in this area (4.3.5-10/02/09).
In terms of the MInt own internal reforms, progress had been made concerning the design of strategic plans, but a lack of financial resources to implement them represented a major obstacle (3.1.6-19/08/08, 3.1.3-21/08/08, 3.2.7-
30/03/09). This was the case with the strategic plan of the PRM (PEPRM
2003-2012), which was thought to be obsolete by some, given the MInt's new institutional development strategy (3.1.3-21/08/08, 3.2.7-30/03/09). Yet, others believed it to have been a good orientating work instrument that had only lost currency because of the leadership change that led to new agenda setting (3.1.6-19/08/08, 1.2.3-22/08/08, 2.1.4-24/09/08, 4.6.13-21/08/08 3.1.4-
09/04/09). This had caused discontinuity and lack of attention to the PEPRM by the new leadership,75 resulting in donors losing interest in funding an area, which per se is difficult to fundraise for (3.1.6-19/08/08, 4.2.5-29/09/08, 4.2.3-
24/09/08). Some donors and MInt officials perceived this process as trying to start from afresh when there were already solid instruments to work from
(4.2.3.5-17/05/05, 3.2.13-22/07/08, 3.1.6-19/08/08, 4.2.4-17/09/08, 4.2.3-
24/09/08). However, others were equally persuasive in arguing that the MInt encapsulated other entities besides the PRM, which needed to be addressed
75 The outcome evaluation of the UNDP project of support to the PRM mentioned that the PEPRM follow- up steering committee barely functioned, and that the MInt Unit in charge of follow up remained a year without a director, following the departure of its predecessor (UNDP 2007: 13,14).
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(3.1.3-21/08/08, 3.2.7-30/03/09). Therefore, an institutional development strategy for the MInt was developed incorporating a new PRM component, and a new donor in the field, the EU, provided funding (EU FED/2009/21701).
Legislative work, such as the revision of the rules of discipline of the PRM was ongoing, and there had been a surge in cases of disciplinary action given the more expeditious internal inspection services.76 Policemen working at the provincial, district and administrative post level complained about the stagnation in career progression (3.2.11-11/07/08, 3.2.9-16/07/08, 3.2.13-
22/07/08), however, central management clarified that this occurred in the period following the change of leadership, and that in 2008 the situation had been corrected and normalised (3.1.3-21/08/08, 3.1.4-09/04/09). The decentralisation of financial management systems to the district level was also underway (3.1.3-21/08/08, 3.2.7-30/03/09). However, major policy and operational issues were still outstanding. On the one hand, a public order and security policy that ought to have followed the defence and security policy has never been approved despite the production of initial drafts (PEPRM 2003: 42,
3.1.6-19/08/08, 4.1.1-26/12/09). There had also been mention of a national strategy for crime prevention, but doubts persisted as to whether that would materialise (4.6.13-21/08/08, 3.1.1-03/09/08).77
76 In 2008 there had been a general increase in criminality and systematic extra-judicial killings by the police were reported. There were also instances of the PRM being infiltrated by criminal elements and allegations of fights between rival police groups (O País 01/08/08, Fim de Semana 04/08/08, Diário de Moçambique 02/08/08, Amnesty International, 2008). 77 A national conference on criminality took place in March 2009, and the Minister of Justice announced that a strategy for prevention and combat of crime would be drafted in the following three months. In
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On the other hand there were complaints of unequal treatment in terms of work conditions amongst the security forces. Within the PRM the grievances concerned the dire conditions of the border guard units and the relegation of the PIC, whilst other units such as the FIR received increased attention. With regards to other forces general dissatisfaction existed in relation to the better conditions of the customs officials, particularly when they were stationed side to side (3.2.2-02/07/08, 3.2.13-22/07/08, 3.2.14-12/08/08, 3.2.4-17/02/09).
Three main patterns are discernible from the accounts of the PSR in the defence, police and justice: a) that the work of consultants was overrated and overpaid when most work was carried out by in-house staff given the limited expertise of consultants; b) that the UTRESP and the ministries at stake perceived each other as just wanting to tick boxes, as opposed to using the
PSR as a central driver of reforms and c) that the PSR results were useful in terms of improving management and administrative procedures, but did not address the core business of the justice and security system reforms. Hence, the process was inadequate for providing a reliable entry-point or becoming a driver for substantive reforms, a fact which justifies an evaluation of the need for a NSS.
March 2014 a ‘National Strategy for Crime Prevention’ was finally tabled for public discussion and contributions in an open conference (BBC África 16/03/2009, Jornal Notícias online 18/03/2014).
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7.3.2. National Security Strategy and Policy-Making
Since the country's generalist statebuilding programmes failed to address the specific issues of justice and security institutional performance and service delivery, it was thought that a specific instrument such as a national security strategy might contribute to useful improvements. Each CNDS institution member plus those of the CCFDS ought to implement the 1997 defence and security law, which is the general policy umbrella of the security sector, in addition to the constitution. However, this policy is clearly in need of overhaul, due to inconsistencies arising from its preparation without the requisite threat or needs assessments. In addition, it was drafted almost unilaterally by the
MoD, given the absence of the mechanisms of discussion and consultation that exist nowadays amongst security institutions; it was also urgently submitted to Parliament in order to provide a legal instrument on which to base financing (4.3.1.5-13/05/05, 4.3.1-26/08/08, 1.1.1-01/09/08). Moreover, some in the security sector held the view that it was drafted under the excessive influence of external advisors, who conveyed the model that they knew best, rather than the one most suited to the country's needs (1.2.2.5-16/05/05,
1.2.2-14/09/08, 2.1.4-24/09/08, 3.1.1-03/09/08, 4.1.1-26/12/09). Hence, it was generally thought the law needed revision. What differed was that, for some, it was not a priority because each institution’s reforms were advancing and nothing was blocked by the outdated law (1.2.2-14/09/08, 2.1.4-24/09/08).
Others argued it was a priority, despite being conscious of the time that it
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might take, given the sheer volume of revised and new laws that required parliamentary approval (1.1.1-01/09/08, 4.1.1-26/12/09).
The revision of the defence and security policy could, in principle, result from a process of development of a national security strategy, anchored in a joint security needs assessment including society consultation, as has happened for the Agenda 20-25 and the PEPRM.
The process could be driven by a national security council and its coordinator, although there is no need for creating more institutions or mechanisms per se; it is not worth having several of these if none of them actually carry out their responsibilities. What is needed is to put the requisite processes into place.
Since the end of the civil war, neither an integrated threat assessment nor a security review or needs assessment have been undertaken in Mozambique, as happened for instance in South Africa, Uganda and Sierra Leone (Le Roux,
2002, Hendrickson, 2007, Albrecht and Jackson, 2009, Kondeh 2010: 156-
166, Conteh 2010: 177-188).78 As explained previously, each security institution has been producing and sharing its own ongoing analyses, yet an integrated perspective of the whole has been lacking, resulting in a poor basis for both policy- and decision-making. Another consequence is that, whilst efficiency reforms are ongoing at the various institutions (1.1.5-22/08/08,
3.1.1-03/09/08, 1.2.2-14/09/08, 2.1.4-24/09/08, 3.1.2-25/02/09), major
78 Sierra Leone is evolving its capacity for longer-term security thinking, and has recently launched its second security sector review report 2012-2022 (allAfrica, 22/04/2014).
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synergies may be lost because each is trying to do what is best within its own area, instead of thinking as well of how its contribution fits into the total.
Hence coherence and sequencing of the reforms are negatively affected, leading to losses in opportunities for collaboration, and preventing the maximisation of efficiency in the delivery of security to the population.
In addition, there exists the risk that security institutions may evolve towards greater autonomy (as suggested by the latest developments of the Customs and Tax Authority, Immigration Services and Prisons Services) whilst coordination becomes weaker. As such, a mechanism of coordination at the strategic level might be a suitable solution, whether that requires the creation of an entirely new national security council or, for instance, an overhaul of the
CCFDS, with the subsequent inclusion of a national security coordinator or advisor to manage the organ.
Such an organ could also undertake monitoring responsibilities. This extra layer of ‘internal’ security sector oversight might provide potential benefits in a country where external mechanisms of accountability are weak. It could also monitor that any reforms of the security forces are put at the service of the citizens, and not used to repress internal political opposition and economically motivated protests. In addition, supervision by peers might serve as an incentive to pursue excellence in human resource management and inspection mechanisms at the various institutions. The release of a yearly report by the
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national security organ would potentially help improve the quantity and quality of security information in the public domain,79 which would increase accountability and contribute to improving the image of the security forces.
However, the creation or adaptation of such an entity is not without risks. For example, there is the danger that the differing security institutions might perceive a loss of autonomy which could possibly lead to turf wars amongst them, as was the case during the post-independence period (J.Veloso-
08/04/09, 4.5.5-20/09/08), and which would only serve to obstruct progress.
Nonetheless, provided clear leadership were to stem from the commander-in- chief, the national security advisor could play a coordinating rather than a directing role. If the functions of this hypothetical national security organ were to be previously debated and fully understood by all stakeholders, there would be potential for the success of such an endeavour in Mozambique (4.5.2-
01/09/08, 1.1.1-01/09/08, 4.5.4-09/09/08).
A national security strategy would establish mechanisms for setting agendas and policies as well as procedures for decision-making and implementation, in
79 This would be innovative, especially if the information covered the entirety of security sector institutions. In general, African countries display a dearth of public information on security expenditure, as attested by the Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index. For example, in terms of budget transparency the countries placed in the high-risk level fail to release detailed defence budget documents, and any information that is published is highly aggregated or vague. Most African countries rated feature in the high-risk rank, with the exceptions of Ghana that is placed in the middle of the table, and South Africa, which belongs to the group of low risk countries. These countries, such as Brazil, Poland and the UK make both the proposed and approved defence budget publicly available, for example on government websites (Transparency International 2013: 33). Mozambique is not featured in this ranking, however if it did, it would fall in the high-risk category, because the data that is publicly available through the publication of the general state budget is aggregated and vague.
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addition to providing a basis for the allocation of resources and functioning as an instrument for evaluation (Bearne et al, 2005, Mutengesa and Hendrickson,
2008, UN 2012: 118).
Furthermore, in Mozambique a NSS could establish mechanisms of connection between the statutory and the non-statutory security forces, and attempt to address the imbalance of access to safety and security between the poor and the rich. Also, just by looking at security threats from a narrow point of view, it is clear that both the state and the citizens are losing out before the growing multiplicity and complexity of criminality. The list is extensive ranging from drugs, arms, and human trafficking to corruption, illegal imports (including smuggling of stolen vehicles and counterfeit medicine), money laundering, organised assassinations, abductions and extortions, trafficking in human body parts, obstruction of justice, bank robberies, illegal forestry timbering and exports, illegal mining (including extraction of semi-precious stones), illegal fishing in territorial waters, poaching and illegal killing of elephants and rhinos
(Mosse and Gastrow, 2002, 1.1.6-01/07/08, Goredema, 2013). Hence, the sheer size of the task is obvious, suggesting the need for prioritisation and for the identification of areas for joint security collaboration and intervention. In addition, crisis management improvements would result, based on a gradation of the level of threat, lowering the risk of miscalculations in shaping intervening actions and avoiding disproportionate use of force (Mutengesa and
Hendrickson 2008: 72). Whilst decision-makers are not oblivious to these
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challenges (1.1.1-01/09/08, 3.1.1-03/09/08, 4.5.5-20/09/08, J.Veloso-
08/04/09), it emerges that the lack of policy coherence and sequencing of reforms, which partly derives from the fragmentation of the sector, limits the operational capacity of the security forces, preventing them from fulfilling their legally established missions efficiently.
Despite these facts representing strong justifications for a NSS, the view of the interviewees varied. Those representing the organs examined above thought that the absence of a legal document in the format of a national security strategy in no way impeded good management of the sector. That was because parts of what would be the NSS were already set out in existing legislation and had only to conform to reality, since the strategy existed in the minds of the security decision-makers (4.4.3.5-12/05/05 1.1.1-01/09/08, 3.1.1-
03/09/08, J.Veloso-08/04/09).
Participants at a workshop on security issues, on the other hand, argued that an unwritten strategy was insufficient because it allowed an excessive reliance on individual’s characters and perceptions without a counterweight, and because it was not clear if all security decision-makers thought along the same lines. In addition, the same participants expressed the concern that the absence of such a legally adopted strategy together with the dearth of public information on the activities of the security sector prevented any serious oversight, compounding the evident disregard for the views of the populations
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regarding security decision-making. Lastly, a third view was that it was not important what came first, a deficient defence and security policy or a likely deficient NSS, because the existing legal instruments were a reflection of the immediate post-civil war transitional context. This participant found, however, that, given the dynamics of these processes, the potential development of a
NSS had not been ruled out. It remained to be decided where it would come from, because change required a dialectic pressure (4.1.2.5-05/05/05).
However, the findings of this research suggest that the creation of a NSS in the short to medium-term appears unlikely for three main reasons. Firstly, a high level of political mistrust resulted from unresolved security problems rooted in the AGP implementation; these included Renamo’s maintenance of a militarised force, which reinforced the GoM’s tendency towards security secrecy. Secondly, the GoM appeared to lack interest. The absence of a legally approved NSS frees it from a concise framework for accountability and lessens the possibility of internal and external oversight of the justice and security systems. Finally, there is little likelihood that groups in society will arise to clamour for a NSS.
What was also visible was that conceptually there was a difficulty in integrating security and justice matters, unless talking of the criminal justice system.
Hence a case study of coherence and sequencing ongoing criminal justice reforms is warranted.
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7.4. The post-civil war justice sector reforms
As stated earlier on, justice sector reforms were not a GoM priority after the civil war. This was partly due to a restricted development of the justice system by the GoM following independence, as explained in chapter four. This manifestation of path dependence was reinforced by the absence of justice reform provisions in the GPA differently to what happened in Burundi for example (Ball, Gasana and Nindorera 2012: 13), and by the decision not to undertake a transitional justice process, as per the analysis in chapter six.
Nevertheless, despite the peace agreement not being a driving factor in this instance, justice sector reforms proceeded, powered by the parallel process of democratisation.
With the creation of the Supreme Court in 1989 and the realisation that peace was unavoidable, impetus for change began to arise within the sector (2.1.1-
17/09/08, 2.4.2-26/02/09, 2.4.1-24/03/09). The 1990 Constitution instituted multiparty politics and the separation of powers, thereby providing the legal framework for a series of institutional changes. The justice sector, previously based on a unified judicial power, was completely overhauled, constituting a critical juncture.
The MJus lost authority over the courts and saw its structure dismembered; an autonomous Office of the Public Prosecutor (PGR) was created.80 The MJus retained control of notary and registry services, as well as of legal advisory
80 Law 6/89 of 19/09, CRM 2004, art 237, Law 22/2007 of 01/08.
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and legislation drafting functions. The responsibility for prisons was now shared by the MJus and the MInt, since the intelligence services had lost this function (2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.1.2-03/04/09). In addition, the state’s goal of providing free legal aid to the poor, which had never come to fruition in the post-independence era, was revitalised by the Institute of Sponsorship and
Legal Aid (IPAJ) that was created under the auspices of the MJus. This ministry was also awarded responsibility for training the staff of the entire system of administration of justice, and therefore the Centre for Legal and
Judicial Training (Centro de Formação Jurídica e Judiciária- CFJJ) was established under its supervision. Moreover, the MJus was now credited with handling the delicate liaison with religious institutions seeking redress from the post-independence conflict with the state. However, the new challenges were enormous. Not only was it necessary to revamp the concepts and institutional structures associated with the justice sector, but also the MJus, in particular, had lost its most skilled personnel, which had migrated to the courts, the PGR and the private sector (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.2-03/04/09).
The new MJus found itself unequal to the herculean task of overhauling legislation, which is still ongoing to this day. Hence, in a manner similar to that in other public policy areas, political dynamics kicked in and a semi- independent organ, the Technical Unit for Legal Reform (Unidade Técnica da
Reforma Legal-UTREL) was created. This entity was not initially subject to the
MJus, reporting, instead, directly to the Prime-Minister; this instance of
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institutional bricolage came about in order to please donors, who were otherwise unwilling to award financing, for fear of embezzlement (2.1.1-
17/09/08). The logic was similar to that of other semi-independent state units such as the UTRESP. In this case, however, the MJus was sidelined for a long period, hindering the coherence and sequencing of legal work and impeding harmonisation of work. In the words of one interviewee:
The UTREL is a technical organ created to achieve a task the MJus was unable to perform immediately following the civil war. However, that capacity should have been built within the ministry and not to the side… the situation has remained unchanged until today, and although work relations have improved considerably, there is no excuse for such a state of affairs. The unit should be incorporated in the MJus, together with its capacity and resources (2.1.2-03/04/09).
Another participant familiar with the situation added:
It’s true that donors preferred the creation of specific units and commissions because it made it easier to monitor budgets. However, we also have to realise that the quality of leadership matters…the GoM, apparently disinterested in the justice sector, appointed people that lacked dynamism to drive the MJus, and donors also wanted to ensure that their resources were put to good use…we just have to think about the reasons behind donors’ direct support for the courts… (2.1.3- 27/02/09).
This is illustrative of the pressure exerted by the political economy of aid that was brought to bear on institutions undergoing rapid change, and it suggests the potential negative consequences for capacity building in the medium to long-term. In addition, it highlights how the quality of the leadership responsible for reforms makes a difference in how the processes are run and donor resources mobilised.
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The Public Prosecutor Office had to start from scratch as a newly autonomous and independent institution since most skilled staff had transitioned to the courts (2.2.1-03/04/09). There was a dearth of human and material resources, and a lack of presence throughout the country. This implied that the only rule of law institution represented in most of the country was the police, since the courts were also preoccupied with infrastructural expansion (2.2.2-23/09/08,
2.2.1-03/04/09). The effect on the control of legal due process was dramatic, given the gross insufficiency of the police concerning legal procedures and deadlines, which resulted in the systematic violation of citizens’ rights (2.2.1-
03/04/09, 2.1.3-27/02/09).
However, improvements have been made in recent years with the consistent rise in numbers of PGR skilled staff and their allocation to the provinces and districts. In addition, whilst there were longstanding grievances by the PGR staff owing to greater GoM funding of the courts, it was also recognised that as time went by the GoM increased both its attention to and demands upon the
PGR’s results; consequently, materials were beginning to be allocated in a more meaningful way (2.2.2-23/09/08, 2.2.1-03/04/09). The challenges of human and material resources were continual. Hence, the focus had begun to turn to the quality of delivery of the PGR, and towards educating people about the institution’s role, since they were only familiar with the police and the courts (2.2.2-23/09/08, 2.2.1-03/04/09).
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Notwithstanding, the drive for reform of the Justice sector as a whole initially came from the courts, specifically the Supreme Court. Given the manifold and immediate challenges of reconstruction and the lack of a holistic peace- building vision for the country, the GoM failed to make Justice sector reforms a priority (2.4.1.5- 19/05/05, 4.3.1- 26/08/08, 2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.4.1-24/03/09), leading to severe negative consequences.
To begin with, the justice and security system was highly vulnerable and incapable of dealing with corruption; it became, instead, a focus of malpractice infiltrated by organised crime (2.4.2.5-19/05/05, 2.1.4-24/09/08, 2.1.6-
30/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09).
The second implication was the low level of preparedness and subsequent delays in response time when tackling post-war societal conflict, especially in civil law issues which had been rendered ‘invisible’ during the armed conflict, but also in respect to the challenges of economic liberalisation (2.1.2.5-
18/05/05, 2.4.2.5-19/05/05, 2.1.4-24/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09).
The third consequence was that the separation of powers was interpreted in excess, leading to a situation whereby an absence of genuine and extensive debate between the executive and the judicial powers about the reforms and re-configuration of the system resulted in the courts closing in on themselves
(2.1.4-24/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.1.7-30/09/08, 2.4.1-24/03/09, 2.2.1-
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03/04/09, 2.1.5-08/04/09). This implied that similarly to cases like the DRC
(OSISA 2013a: 51), the courts, in particular, in addition to asserting their independent judgement, also developed self-management mechanisms with zero interaction with the other justice entities.
The fourth repercussion was the unevenness in the timing and pace of reforms amongst the institutions of the criminal justice system. The courts progressed at a steady and effective rate whilst the PGR took longer to catch up.
Although the MJus was generally slower, it did eventually improve as regards, for instance, prison reforms. The PIC, on the other hand, despite efforts at overhaul, changed little. This inadequate attention to the sequencing of criminal justice reform resulted in uneven levels of performance and effectiveness, and to a general breach of citizens’ right to access to justice.
This materialised, for example, in the shortage of public legal defence for the poor, extended pre-trial detention periods, and a significant backlog of pending court cases.
7.4.1. Dynamics of Criminal Justice Reform
With the increased pace of court reform, the other criminal justice institutions began to feel excluded. Certain interviewees argued that the courts advanced faster not only because of inheriting the most qualified personnel, but also owing to a head start dating from early 1989. Thus, when donors expressed interest, the courts had already achieved a greater level of clarity of vision
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regarding the remodelled justice system (2.4.2.5-19/05/05, 2.4.1-24/03/09,
2.1.3-27/02/09). The following quote is illustrative:
We had a vision of the entire judicial sector in the Supreme Court…we were aware that we could not function well if the PIC, the PGR and even the MJus did not work well because of their responsibility for legal reform and the prisons. However, there was now a separation of powers and it was not our function to tell the others how to work…yet, we tried to share our views with the colleagues of the PGR. They were as competent as we were, but they had different perspectives on how to proceed, so we had to leave them. The Supreme Court has also tried to redirect donors towards the PGR, but it appears they were unable to capitalise on the contacts established. Was it a leadership or strategic planning issue?...The only thing I know is that a few years later we were called by the President to an emergency meeting and we [the Supreme Court] were accused of making progress, whilst having abandoned the PGR…(2.4.1-24/03/09).
Resentment at this accusation was echoed by other court interviewees
(2.4.2.5-19/05/05, 2.4.2-26/02/09); yet people from other justice institutions also claimed that despite the circumstances, once aware of the imbalance, the courts could have changed their ‘arrogant’ posture (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.4-
24/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.2.1-03/04/09, 3.2.8-08/04/09). The following quote is representative:
For contextual reasons the system became unbalanced, it’s true, but once we started to address the imbalance, the blockages were there…if you notice… the judges had been appointed to leadership everywhere, in the MJus, in the CFJJ, in the PGR…now tell me: when I finish the commission of service, where do I go back to? To the court, so when I’m in these other posts, I’m not going to encourage or approve changes that are going to negatively affect my future status, privileges and income, am I stupid? Of course there are exceptions amongst the judges, but they are usually sidelined by their colleagues (2.1.1- 17/09/08).
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For others, inside and outside of the justice sector, these matters were not straightforward. All agreed that the dynamics that had been created at the level of institutional development of the courts resulted from genuine attempts to enhance the independence of the judiciary, and this was regarded as a serious issue. However, different views coexisted. There were those who thought that since the funding allocation to the justice sector depended on the
Executive and since the President appointed the leadership,81 no real independence of the judiciary existed (2.4.4-18/02/09, 2.1.2-03/04/09, MARP
2009: 177-178). For others, it was not so much a question of the GoM determining the budget or the formal appointment procedures, but rather because the leading judges were part of the previous unitary political and judicial system. Therefore, they could not have become entirely independent from Frelimo overnight, and were vulnerable to political pressure, both regarding management and case decision-making (4.6.5.5-12/05/05, 4.6.14-
09/07/08, CIP 2006: 7, 12, MARP 2009: 188). A third view was that judiciary independence and even that of the PGR staff related essentially to their discretionary decision-making power in the cases before them. Management was best carried out by the Executive, namely by the MJus, which needed to develop capacity in that area so that the judiciary could concentrate on their core business, namely the delivery of justice to the citizens (OSISA 2006: 33,
2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.2.2-23/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.1.5-08/04/09).82
81 CRM 2004, Art 159 g) 82 However, whilst advisable from a functional point of view, the passage of management from the Courts to the MJus is not without risks. For example, Burundi’s experience where the justice support programme is anchored at the MJus is showing difficulties of strategic engagement with non-ministry justice actors.
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Hence, it was patent despite attempts to build independence, the political power retained considerable leverage over the judicial set-up, even if the latter held bureaucratic autonomy. This is the reverse of effective justice systems where judicial independence from political interference exists, whilst at the technical level interdependence with other security and justice institutions is adopted for improved management performance. The above also confirms the fragmentation of perspectives on the criminal justice system reform and highlights how the asymmetry deriving from the initial lack of sequencing in the development of the different institutions of the system was reinforced over time. The animosities and turf wars between the different institutions were not ignored by the Executive, which, in 2001, created an organ to coordinate inter- institutional activity, i.e., the ‘Conselho de Coordenação da Legalidade e
Justiça’ - CCLJ.83 However, this organ did not initially include formal MInt representation and the gap was clearly identified in the PEPRM (PEPRM
2003: 39). Some interviewees complained that whilst the MInt was often accused of resisting cooperation, in fact they were excluded and considered unworthy by the people working in the justice institutions (3.1.3.6-20/05/05,
3.1.1-03/09/08, 3.2.8-08/04/09). Hence, it is noticeable how security and justice tended not to be seen as part of an integrated system, but rather as different functional sectors.
Moreover, the MJus is concentrating the use of resources around its own requirements and impairing financial allocations to the Constitutional Court (Ball, Gasana and Nindorera 2012: 40).
83 Presidential Decree 25/2005 of 27/04.
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Meanwhile, the CCLJ was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the separation of powers, and was dismantled following court orders.84 However, a similar unit under the guise of advising the justice minister was created to carry out similar articulation tasks.
In the meantime, both the MJus and the MInt had engaged in drawing up strategic plans, namely the abovementioned PEI I (2002-2006) and the
PEPRM (2003-2012). These documents were drawn up in isolation without any sharing of experiences or consultation for mutual learning purposes. This was peculiar because both plans mentioned the existence of the other criminal justice institutions and acknowledged the need for improved coordination as key to effectiveness (PEI I 2002: 10, PEPRM 2003:12). Hence, an opportunity was lost to capitalise on synergies that might have addressed earlier some of the shortcomings identified in the intersections of the criminal justice system, namely, the activity of the PGR/PIC and the prisons.
Most interviewees shared the opinion that these gaps derived from the lack of genuine local demand for those plans, which stemmed mainly from donor pressure to have documents drafted in a short period of time as a proof of
GoM commitment to justice reforms (2.1.2.5-18/05/05, 2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.6-
30/09/08, 2.1.8-30/09/08, 2.4.1-24/03/09, 2.2.1-03/04/09, 2.1.5-08/04/09).
Whilst the PEPRM appeared to have resulted from a much wider internal and external consultative process and was driven by the leadership of the MInt, the
84 Judgement decision nr 5/CC/2007.
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same did not occur with the PEI I (4.2.2.5-11/05/05, 3.1.2.5-18/05/05, 3.1.6-
19/08/08, 3.1.1-03/09/08). An international consultant, (with minimal involvement of the justice sector institutions) drafted the latter and some considered it as merely a ‘shopping list’ (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09, 2.4.1-
24/03/09).
A less critical view of PEI I asserted that it had served as a learning experience and that it had reinforced the belief on the part of the justice leadership, as well as that of the MInt, of the need for genuine coordination
(2.1.7-30/09/08). However, others argued that the benefit was minimal because awareness of this issue had actually already begun to rise owing to everyday justice failures. Nonetheless, partly because of the lack of ownership of the PEI I, as well as its amorphous nature, the development of a
Vision document for the justice sector, which was an ancient idea, gained currency and began, with input from across the sector and also from society.
Yet, that locally rooted initiative remained indefinitely in the pipeline, since donors were impatient with the time taken up by these processes and threatened to suspend funding. The result was that the drafting of the PEI II concluded before the completion of the Vision document (2.1.4-24/09/08,
2.1.7-30/09/08, 2.1.8-30/09/08, 2.4.1-24/03/09, 2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08,
2.1.5-08/04/09, 2.1.3-27/02/09). That constituted an inversion of the most sensible policy-making process, but it was recognised that discussions that had taken place during the drawing up of the Vision draft were useful for the
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drafting of PEI II (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.1.7-30/09/08, 2.1.8-
30/09/08, 2.1.5-04/08/09). In addition, the drafting of the PEI II had been a pragmatic decision. The PEI I had expired, learning had taken place, and the
GoM wanted an overall justice sector document bringing the planning of the various institutions into alignment. This not only would allow donors to see the whole, preventing them from picking which institution to support, so as to correct earlier imbalances, but it would also strengthen the basis for future institutional development of the sector (2.1.4-24/09/08, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.1.7-
30/09/08, 2.1.5-04/08/09).
The PEI II was generally seen to be an improvement with regards to comprehensive ownership and coverage of the sector.85 The national staff of relevant institutions was responsible for its coordination; all the justice institutions contributed and the ministry of finance was consulted, as was society (2.1.7-30/09/08, 2.2.1-03/04/09 2.1.8-30/09/08, PEI II 2009-2014). For example, the PGR, the MJus and the IPAJ underlined the importance of having the PEI II as an umbrella instrument for the development of their own individual strategic development plans (2.1.5-04/08/09, 2.1.4-24/09/08, 2.1.6-
30/09/08, 2.1.8-30/09/08, 2.2.1-03/04/09).
Yet, those with critical views pointed out that, although it was a much better document, coordination was limited to those areas where there was
85 The document mentioned the lack of a holistic approach on the part of the PEI I and included core contributions regarding the role of the PRM (PEI II 2009-2014).
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agreement, and the process had not forged the required sense of common vision and future direction (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09, 2.4.1-24/03/09).
One danger was that not all institutions embraced the PEI II equally. There was also the risk that any potential change in leadership might disrupt the implementation process. Also, once institutions began to focus on drawing up individual institutional plans, with concrete and quantified output deliveries designed to please donors, it became easy to lose sight of the main and overall goal of providing quality services to the people (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.3-
27/02/09, 2.4.1-24/03/09). Examples of disapproval included the Bar
Association complaints that they had been excluded from the development of the PEI II. However, those in the mainstream institutions argued that an internal leadership change in the association had caused that impression, whereas the previous leadership had actually been involved. In addition, some thought that the association was dissatisfied because they thought they ought to have received state funding to provide legal assistance to the poor, instead of the budget being concentrated in the IPAJ (2.1.8-30/09/08, 2.2.1-
03/04/09).
Another well-received feature of the PEI II was the fact that it foresaw the implementation of decentralisation, an area in which the justice and security system lagged behind other state sectors (2.1.4-24/09/08, 4.2.5-29/09/08,
2.1.7-30/09/08, 4.3.2-02/04/09). Yet interviewees from the MJus, the Courts and the PGR working at the provincial and district level held the opinion that
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the PEI II was mainly carried out centrally, with minimal consultation at their level (2.2.3-12/07/08, 2.2.6-16/02/09, 2.4.4-18/02/09, 2.4.3-20/03/09). Whilst the volume of work made it difficult for those in the provinces and districts to regularly participate in policy and planning processes (2.1.5-08/04/09, 2.4.4-
18/02/09, 2.2.7-17/07/08), they also complained that when they made the effort, their contributions did not always receive due attention from those responsible at the central level (2.2.8-07/07/08, 2.4.3-20/03/09, 2.2.5-
19/02/09). These interviewees remained hopeful, however, that implementation of the PEI II would resolve the problems faced by the district level institutions, which because of finance centralisation at the provincial level, sometimes lacked sufficient funding for even basic stationery. In addition, they hoped it would provide the resources necessary for an adequate and timely distribution of newly enacted legislation and jurisprudence (2.2.3-
12/07/08, 2.4.3-20/03/09), a deficiency commonly felt in other post-conflict
African countries such as Kenya and Sierra Leone (Chopra 2008: 14, OSISA
2014: 57).
However, the most critical issue was that the criminal investigation police saw its progress blocked, despite the great amount of work that had gone into its reform. New organisational legislation had been proposed and new, more qualified staff had received specialised training (3.1.3.5-19/05/05, 3.1.3.6-
20/05/05, 3.1.6-19/08/08, 4.1.1-26/02/09, 2.1.3-27/02/09). Nonetheless, disagreements regarding institutional location and management (whether the
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PIC would report to the MInt, the PGR, or the MJus or remain entirely autonomous) dragged on. The reform efforts carried out lost momentum and from 2004 up to this date, nothing changed. The waste of opportunity and resources, the fact that the current line of command still keeps the PIC under the PRM, together with the vulnerability of the PIC to infiltration by organised crime increased donors’ reluctance to finance substantial reforms (3.1.6-
19/08/08, 4.6.13-21/08/08 3.2.8-08/04/09, 4.2.3.5-17/05/05, 4.2.1-24/02/09).
Importantly, this police branch was kept unchanged as a result of political motives and turf wars, whilst other criminal justice system institutions were making considerable progress. Centrally, as well as in the provinces and districts, resentment on the part of this police force was visible, and they also blamed the lack of progress on delays that followed every change in the leadership of the MInt and of the PRM (3.2.11-11/07/08, 3.2.10-14/07/08,
3.2.9-16/07/08, 3.2.5-18/02/09). Most interviewees found it acceptable if the
MInt wanted to maintain the PIC under its hierarchical authority, as long as it was removed from the influence of the PRM, and functionally subordinated to the PGR in terms of the instruction of criminal cases. The following quote is telling:
In the current system the PIC is hierarchically subordinate to the PRM, and some in the police thought that this gave them the power to interfere even in legal cases…but that is the problem of people and not of institutions...Also PIC agents are a highly specialised police force and they should not be used to patrol the streets, to perform electoral monitoring or other policing tasks because, when they do so, criminal investigation stops. However, what is most important is that even if the PIC remains under the aegis of the MInt it must be provided the adequate human and material means to work with and for the effectiveness of the criminal justice system (2.2.2-23/09/08).
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Other interviewees, however, thought the delay was not just a matter of different aspects of organisational models (3.1.4.5-10/05/05, 3.1.3.6-20/05/05,
2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.2.2-23/09/08), change in the leadership or lack of will to engage with fracturing issues inside the GoM itself (3.1.3.5-19/05/05, 2.2.2-
23/09/08, 4.1.2-25/02/09). They attributed responsibility to the fact that an effective PIC represented a threat to many of those in the elite with connections to organised crime. According to this view many elite members were taking advantage of this weakness in the justice system, inclusively to remain unpunished for embezzlement and other white-collar crime (4.6.5.5-
12/05/05, 4.6.14-09/07/08, 4.6.13-21/08/08, 4.6.4-08/04/09). Thus, in this specific case, donor pressure was ineffective and procrastination of reforms prevailed.
Some participants managed to see a silver lining in all this process of cooperation and resistance with donors. Firstly, it was pointed out that donor resources had been key to the progress achieved to date, given the country’s dearth of financial resources and the poor allocation of funding to the justice system. Secondly, owing to the Executive’s earlier lack of interest in the justice sector, donor influence and demand had been indispensible for encouraging the GoM to dedicate more attention to the sector; the problem was that this donor pressure had come-in late, only around 2004-2005.86
Other factors pressing the GoM included the increase in common and
86 The 2005 aide memoire of the GoM/donors joint review of cooperation was scathing in noting that little progress had been achieved in the area of Justice (Aide Memoire 12/05/05: 7-9).
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organised crime, court ineffectiveness, the PGR inability to fulfil its role, pressure from the media and society at large, and growing corruption. Donor pressure, however, had been crucial (4.6.5.5-12/05/05, 2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.1.7-
30/09/08, 2.1.5-04/08/09, 4.6.4-08/09/08). This was true in spite of the fact that their primary goal was to establish a solid environment for a market economy to function. Donor objectives, therefore, included: the provision of adequate means for the resolution of commercial and labour conflicts; a clamp down on corruption; improved frameworks for activity and financial monitoring; and, to a lesser extent, justice for the poor, a topic which had begun to receive more attention in contemporary donor statements (2.4.1-24/03/09, 2.1.1-
17/09/08).
Fig.15 Mozambique’s Criminal Justice System
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7.4.2. Access to Justice
Theoretically Mozambique guarantees ‘equality before the law’,87 however, in practice, following two decades of democratisation and justice reforms, access to justice is still highly inadequate. Much has been done in terms of training skilled staff and creating material conditions for the presence of justice institutions throughout the country. However, due to the immense size of the territory, it is still a major challenge to provide the necessary infrastructure, logistics and trained personnel (2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.2.1-03/04/09, 2.3.1-
25/02/09, 2.2.9-10/07/08, 2.4.4-18/02/09). The reforms carried out have continually focused on institutional engineering, a necessary but insufficient step towards achieving the actual delivery of inclusive justice and human rights protection.
A series of problems common to other post-conflict countries undergoing democratisation have compounded the lack of access to justice. Mozambique has significant numbers of people without documentation and who go without access not only to justice, but also to education and health services. This is still the case, despite recent efforts from the notary and registry services of the
MJus to engage in community outreach activities (2.1.6-30/09/08, 2.1.5-
08/04/09).
The low level of general education and legal awareness amongst the population, in addition to the lack of readily available information on legal
87 CRM 2004, art 11) e
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developments, prevents people from knowing and demanding their rights.
Furthermore, linguistic barriers exist, as many people do not have full command of the language of justice, Portuguese, not to mention obstacles arising from the complexity of legal terminology that is often unclear and inaccessible to lay persons. CSOs have carried out legal awareness campaigns in the communities, and the police, state prosecutors and judges, have also embarked on actions of legal sensitization in rural districts, albeit not in a systematic manner (2.2.9-10/07/08, 2.2.3-12/07/08, 3.2.10-14/07/08,
2.4.4-18/02/09, 3.2.5-18/02/09, 2.4.3-20/03/09).
The focus groups organised as part of this research highlighted the local people’s insufficient legal understanding and their informal protest with regards to the outcomes of certain legal procedures. For example, although participant communities reported that no harm came to thieves, additional questions to triangulate information uncovered that the chamboco (a leather instrument for whipping people) was regularly used in many locations (4.6.5-
14/07/08, 4.6.6-05/07/08, 4.6.7-18/07/08, 4.6.9-04/07/08), representing an instance of path dependence with regards to the use of lashes during the colonial and post-independence periods. In addition, there were numerous complaints that justice was not applied as they remarked that corruption on the part of either the police or the judges meant that criminals would often reappear very soon after arrest (4.6.5-14/07/08, 4.6.6-05/07/08, 4.6.7-
18/07/08, 4.6.8-14/07/08, 4.6.9-04/07/08, 4.6.10-19/02/09). Conversely, police
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commanders reported that local people were often reluctant to understand that releases were due either to insufficient proof, bail, or sentence substitution by fines that reverted to the state coffers. Hence, this was a point of contention between the people and the authorities, leading the police to increase the number of public sensitization sessions on the legal process. Nonetheless, officials pointed to logistical constraints such as lack of transport and fuel, which limited the ability to fully cover their jurisdiction (3.2.12-11/07/08, 3.2.10-
14/07/08, 3.2.3-16/02/09, 3.2.4-17/02/09, 3.2.5-18/02/09, 3.2.6-20/02/09).
Unfortunately, and despite the positive legacy of the post-independence period when state radio broadcasted legal awareness programmes in local languages, and essential legislation was reproduced in newspapers, that experience has not been reclaimed to provide access to legal information.
The country’s sheer size means that huge distances must be travelled before people can reach their formal institutions of justice, despite the state’s efforts to extend coverage to at least the district level. Still, there are time and transportation costs to be covered, not to mention the additional difficulties brought about by the rainy season, when many secondary and tertiary roads become impassable (4.6.5-14/07/08, 4.6.6-05/07/08, 4.6.7-18/07/08, 4.6.8-
14/07/08, 4.6.9-04/07/08).
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Furthermore, justice is not delivered as a free public service to the poor. Not only are private lawyer services prohibitively expensive (and available only in the largest cities), but also state-sponsored legal representation is scarce.
Some improvement has been seen in the quantity of free legal assistance provided by the IPAJ (which in the past used to charge their clients due to underfunding), however unmet needs and insufficient quality of services remain a problem (Amnesty International 2012: 21). Nonetheless, this is progressive if, for example, compared to the situation in Zambia, where legal aid is not even a constitutional right (OSISA 2013b: 15). Mozambique’s bar association has contributed some pro bono work, but it could raise its level of involvement were it to partner with other CSOs and universities to carry out legal clinics (4.6.5.5-12/05/05, 2.1.4-24/09/08). Importantly, similarly to the situation in Kenya or the DRC (Chopra 2008: 28, OSISA 2013a: 132) the regular costs of judicial processes are expensive for the average Mozambican, as pointed out by one interviewee:
One of the cornerstones of access to justice is the ability to offer justice free-of-charge to the poor…we have an article establishing access to justice in our constitution, as well as access to education and to health. We pay minimal fees in the latter services, but in justice it is as if we are paying a private company…Of course the courts are resisting changes in this area since the extra money they make complements their logistical needs and salaries…I get that, but then there should be a study of how much courts are going to lose and the state needs to make that up …the onus cannot remain on the citizen (2.1.1-17/09/08).
Compounding these obstacles is a cumbersome bureaucracy and the resulting delays in formal judicial processes, limitations which enable corruption, and
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mean that those who lack the financial resources to pay in order to accelerate their cases could see their conflict take years without ever obtaining justice.
Moreover, it is necessary to point out a further obstacle to justice, which is the de facto disrespect for the law displayed by security and justice personnel.
Common infractions include: arbitrary detention and arrest, denial of the principle of presumption of innocence, non-observance of the right to a lawyer, prolonged pre-trial detention, extended imprisonment after serving sentence, and physical and psychological ill-treatment by the police and prison guards, amongst others (Amnesty International 2012, OSISA, 2012, Lorizzo 2012).
Nevertheless, the Legality Commissions, a coordination mechanism working at the provincial and district levels including the representation of the public prosecutor, the PIC, the judges and prison services have made progress towards ensuring due process in terms of detentions, arrests and improved investigation and instruction of judicial processes (2.4.3-20/03/09, 2.2.9-
10/07/08, 2.4.4-18/02/09, 3.2.5-18/02/09, 3.2.6-20/02/09).
Another significant problem, common to countries such as Zambia, Lesotho or even Swaziland (OSISA 2013b: 100, OSISA 2013c: 107, OSISA 2013d: 137-
140) is the derelict condition of the prisons. Facilities are overcrowded, in poor state of repair and unsanitary whilst inmates also suffer from deficient food and health care conditions. Prisoners are neither separated by age, type of crime nor phase of the legal process, a fact which provides a breeding ground
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for new criminals, rather than rehabilitating those in existence (2.3.2- 30/09/08,
2.3.1-25/02/09). Despite the lengthy period of prison reform, the system began from very poor starting conditions. Hence, inmates have not yet witnessed any consistent improvements in living conditions or judicial treatment (Lorizzo,
2012).
The situation described above is well understood by both the GoM and its international partners. Thus, a 2006 EU funded project designed to improve access to justice attempted to complement the more structurally oriented reforms with concrete short and medium term deliverable outputs.88 The project was based at the MJus, although it financed sector-wide initiatives in line with the goals of the PEI II. A legal clinic was organised by university law students, for example, under the supervision of the IPAJ in select prisons and police stations. Training and workshops were undertaken on issues such as human rights, domestic violence and family law involving participants from across the sector including the police, prison guards, ministry of justice officials, IPAJ, relevant CSOs, the bar association, as well as traditional leaders. It also rehabilitated forensic investigation facilities for the PIC in three provinces (UNDP, 2007).
One pilot initiative was particularly important. It aimed to bring justice closer to the poor, whilst strengthening justice services coordination at the district level.
88 It was noticeable that Access to Justice programmes appear to have become fashionable, for example, around the same year donors such as the Danish Government and the EU funded similar programmes in Zambia and the DRC (OSISA 2013b: 8, 56, OSISA 2013a: 139-140).
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It consisted of the construction and full equipment of one-stop justice shops in three districts. These courthouses, whose name translates as ‘palaces of justice’, were intended to simultaneously house the IPAJ, the police, the prosecutor and the judge. In this way, the flow of the judicial process was enhanced and speeded up, and citizens no longer had to go to different places to solve their problems (UNDP, 2007). An official made the following comment:
… ‘palaces of justice’…the designation is skewed, and I would have preferred ‘houses of justice’, but the infrastructure is not the most important thing. The concept underpinning their functioning is where the real value is. The citizen gets there and finds all institutions represented in one place, and from the beginning, has the IPAJ representative there to provide assistance. It also eliminates the authorities’ main pretexts for justifying their ineffectiveness, i.e. the lack of working conditions and the failure of their colleagues to adequately perform their jobs. By being together they have to collaborate and learn from each other if necessary. In addition, drawing on this collaboration, the idea is to take up again the post-independence practice bringing all the members of the justice authorities in a group into the outlying administrative posts to administer justice there. That, yes, represents bringing justice closer to the citizen (2.1.4-24/09/08).
Some interviewees were more critical and, despite acknowledging the positive accomplishments and the commitment from the people working on the project, they pointed out that the title of ‘palaces of justice’ was inappropriate because it was reminiscent of the colonial mindset and could drive the poor away, since palaces were for the rich and powerful (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09, 2.4.1-
24/03/09). However, the main problem was that these donor projects tended to be piecemeal and lacking in sustainability, even if they contributed towards meeting some of the PEI II goals (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09, 2.4.1-
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24/03/09). These critics argued that the essential problems had yet to be tackled, with underlying issues such as the organisation of the justice system,89 corruption and the articulation between the formal and informal justice institutions being left unaddressed.
However, in practice, the lack of integration between the state formal justice system and that of customary conflict resolution mechanisms is commonplace in Africa, even in those instances where customary law is legally recognised
(Chirayath et al 2005: 3). Mozambique’s constitution recognises the existence of legal pluralism90 and law 4/92 substituted the post-independence base-level popular courts with community courts. Despite recommendations for the institutionalisation of these courts and the adoption of subsidiary regulations
(for e.g. de Sousa Santos e Trindade, 2003, ‘Anteprojecto da lei de bases da organização judiciária’ p.22-25) these have never been produced, with detrimental outcomes for the overall delivery of justice in Mozambique
(2.4.2.5-19/05/05, 2.2.3-12/07/08, 2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.1.3-27/02/09, 2.4.1-
24/03/09). This reflects the predominance of the argument that community
89 In Mozambique there has been a schism concerning justice reforms, between those that proposed a revised judiciary law establishing the wider bases of functioning of the justice system, including matters such as the articulation between formal and informal justice entities, access to justice and evaluation of the justice administration system, and those that opted for a more limited approach focusing exclusively on the organisation and functioning of the courts. Law 24/2007 of 20/08 approving the new judiciary organisation shows that the latter prevailed. In addition, there has been a rift between those that promoted the introduction of courts of appeal, and those that advocated that such tasks should remain the competence of the Supreme Court. The Superior Courts of Appeal were created (Law 24/2007, art29. 1) b).
90 CRM 2004, art 4.
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courts belong to an informal sphere of justice, and that therefore the state should not intrude excessively on their workings (2.4.2-25/02/09).91
Nonetheless, fieldwork and the literature revealed unevenness in the existence and workings of community courts throughout the territory, and demonstrated the existence of a diversity of mechanisms used for conflict resolution (WLSA 2000: 145). For example, in one of the districts visited during fieldwork, the institution of traditional leadership had been eradicated and locals elected their representatives, instead (4.6.9-04/07/08). Another administrative post lacked a community court because the judge position was unpaid and ‘in today’s market economy, no one has the time to sit under the tree and solve problems, instead of earning their living’ (4.6.10-19/02/09).
Police representatives and prosecutors described great diversity even within districts (2.2.9-10/07/08, 2.2.3- 12/07/08, 3.2.12-11/07/08, 3.2.2-02/07/08).
The following quote is illustrative:
A major concern is that there are crimes that are covered up for cultural reasons. In particular, there are cases of unreported sexual abuse and even rape of children…it is not uncommon that if the family asks the rapist for a mattress and he complies, no complaints are presented…but this is much more common in the interior rather than on the coast, and legal education campaigns have reduced this practice (2.2.3-12/07/08).
91 Despite, or because of, the lack of additional regulations, the MJus, together with district administrations and formal judicial authorities appear to have felt the need to provide orientation to the process of creation of community courts, in the context of enlarging people’s access to justice. As such, they began organising the expansion of these courts throughout the territory, according to criteria of high population density needs and prioritisation of those districts lacking formal justice structures (Salimo 2011). However, this development reinforces the need for additional regulations and some formal guidance, as opposed to allowing a fully informal and random locally driven process.
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This shows as well that serious human rights abuses persist, despite the
(admittedly insufficient) legal awareness campaigns and the training of paralegals in the communities by the LDH. As in other African countries, such as Liberia and Kenya, in Mozambique women and young people also tend to be discriminated against by community courts (WLSA 2000: 145, ICG
06/04/06: 15-17, Nyamu-Musembi 2003: 27, Chirayath et al 2005: 4).
Another example of inconsistent practice is that of the community policing initiative. In some communities people only provide information to the police, whilst citizen policing groups have been set up elsewhere that carry out patrols and, in case of flagrant crime, may arrest suspects and hand them over to the police (4.6.5-14/07/08, 4.6.6-05/07/08, 4.6.7-18/07/08, 4.6.9-04/07/08, Kyed,
2010). Some such citizen groups have worked well (4.6.5-14/07/08), although the approach has been less successful in other locations, due to insufficient numbers of participants, given the absence of payment to volunteers (4.6.6-
05/07/08, 4.6.7-18/07/08). In other communities young volunteers were unemployed and sometimes resorted to abusing their authority to extort resources from local citizens (4.6.10-19/02/09).
This distant system of formal justice in conjunction with a diverse and uneven provision of informal justice was the background to comments by justice and security authorities at the district level. They reported that they regularly attempted to resolve conflicts on the basis of informal mediation (excluding
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criminal cases) (3.2.11-11/07/08, 2.2.3-12/07/08, 3.2.10-14/07/08, 4.3.4-
19/07/08, 3.2.5-18/02/09, 2.4.3-20/03/09). If possible and where necessary, there was coordination between judges, prosecutors, police, local state authorities, community judges and traditional authorities to hasten conflict resolution, and in general, there had been no problems of interpretation with regards to the principle of separation of powers. They argued that this approach was quicker and made more effective use of their limited time and resources. If the parties, after hearing about the implications of the legal route, persisted in following that path, then the formal law was applied. One judge, in particular, said that it was very demanding to play both roles, but that otherwise the number of cases pending would be even higher. It was also reported that citizens were not always satisfied with the decision of the community court and frequently used the district court both as a parallel mechanism, as well as a form of appeal (2.4.2.5-19/05/05, 2.2.2-23/09/08,
2.4.4-18/02/09, 2.4.3-20/03/09). This represented an instance of institutional bricolage, in the sense that formal authorities such as the police and judges attempted to play an informal conflict resolution role, taking into account both common sense, local traditions and the spirit of the law to resolve issues. The judge also mentioned that, whenever possible, and together with the other members of the legal commission and local administration, they organised days for legal campaigning in the communities, although this had to occur on
Sundays, making it difficult for all parties to participate. Also, although they
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had received training on these matters at the CFJJ, few judges resorted to these practices since it was very time consuming (2.4.3-20/03/09).
However, the abovementioned collaboration between the diversity of justice and security actors at the local level appeared to be itself marred by conflict when sensitive issues were at stake, such as those related to electoral processes, corruption, and certain criminal cases. In these instances there were reports of undue pressure, or of refusal to accept legal decisions taken by justice officials (2.2.8-07/07/08, 2.2.3-12/07/08, 2.4.4-18/02/09, MARP
2009: 184, 188). Also, in many places, the community courts themselves produced sentences pervaded by political ambiguities related to the one-party political inheritance of the popular courts, displaying patterns of path dependence. In the words of one of the interviewees:
The new community courts inherited the same infrastructure, structure and personnel from the previous popular courts. The renewal of judges occurred in several places as a spontaneous and locally driven process, without guidance from the law or the central justice authorities, perpetuating the single-party mainframe of conduct… not to mention the election of people linked to Frelimo and the continuous use of material with Frelimo’s insignia! Of course this entailed contradictions with other conflict resolution actors, such as the religious leaders and traditional authorities, trying to imprint tolerance within a new multi-party framework... Also, given that traditional authorities became closer to Frelimo, there were people complaining that decisions were being taken in support of Frelimo’s rather than the general population’s interests, with courts becoming ineffective in resolving, for instance, electoral- based conflicts. So, the legitimacy of these courts was at stake, as well as the need to transform them into non-partisan structures, in light of the goal of building a cohesive and reconciled society (2.4.2.5- 19/05/05).
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Thus far the GoM has not addressed these contradictions. Therefore, it is reasonable to wonder whether the accidental vacuum created by the absence of regulations specifying the workings of the community courts, has not been perpetuated to serve Frelimo’s political interests. In this manner an additional mechanism92 of local party societal control has been encouraged, therefore revealing an instance of political/institutional bricolage.
This analysis demonstrates that access to justice is not an independent, projectised outcome, but depends on many other factors, including structural ones, which take longer to address. As such, it needs to be integrated as a perspective that crosscuts strategy, plans and implementation of all justice institutions. This implies that ‘hardware’ matters such as the build-up of infrastructure, and ‘software’ approaches including training and sensitisation of citizens, need to be addressed in parallel and not in a linear sequential manner, as has happened in Mozambique.
7.5. Conclusion
This chapter has confirmed that JSSR processes are affected by challenges of resistance to change, quality and change of leadership, cumbersome bureaucratic and legal processes, the relegation of justice and security issues by the executive, and a correspondingly poor funding allocation. This has
92 This mechanism is indicated here as an additional measure of political control because the task of the community court judges is, in principle, solely to rule on the cases that are brought before them. They do not hold executive or administrative mandates, which are reserved to the traditional community leaders and representatives of the local organs of the state. Nonetheless, these judges are elected and command authority within their communities, and therefore these mechanisms are susceptible locus of attempts to create and/or maintain power hegemony.
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been compounded by a vulnerability to political expediency on the part of the executive and donors, at times leading to political/ institutional bricolage arrangements.
Despite recognising the existence of non-state actors, Mozambique’s complex justice and security system remains excessively focused on the configuration of formal institutions. The mainstream defence, police and intelligence institutions, although not the major beneficiaries of state funding, are still the front line institutions regarding membership in core collective security organs such as the CCFDS. The creation of the CCFDS, the CNDS, the successor unit to the CCLJ and the Legality Commissions prove existing awareness of the need to devise mechanisms of coordination to improve the delivery of security and justice services to the public. In addition, the CNDS in particular, despite being only an advisory body, included a range of opinions, potentially counter-balancing the President’s hegemony in security decision-making.
Whilst the presidential system favoured the concentration of executive power in the hands of the President - a feature reinforced by the legacy of the liberation war and post-independence - a system of checks and balances was formally in place. This led to the establishment of horizontal oversight, with the parliamentary commissions, the CSOs and the media increasingly playing a watchdog role. Nonetheless, the numerous difficulties, such as the veil of secrecy covering the work of the security institutions, impaired their ability to
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bring pressure to bear in order to further the spread of democratic-oriented change in the justice and security system.
Although the GPA did not constitute an entry point for institutional changes in the police and justice sectors, both areas saw incremental reforms develop from the inherent need to tackle post-civil war challenges. The public sector reform, which could have constituted an additional driver of substantive reform in the security and justice system, failed to meet this objective, despite positive contributions towards the improvement of management and administrative procedures. Hence, an evaluation of the need for a national security strategy was warranted, in order to address the vacuum concerning debate and decision on the development of strategic security policy, which takes into account the security sector as an integrated whole. The absence of such a framework meant there is no proper basis for discussions about security prioritisation, resource allocation, and institutional collaboration to occur, which, in turn, has hampered the efficient delivery of security to citizens. It has also negatively affected policy coherence and the sequencing of security reforms, which were being carried out within an individual institutional logic, far from a holistic approach.
However, the likelihood of enacting a NSS in the short to medium-term appears unlikely for three main reasons. Firstly, intense political mistrust has arisen as a result of the unresolved security problems rooted in the AGP;
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these include Renamo’s maintenance of a militarised force, which has reinforced the GoM’s tendency towards security secrecy. Secondly, the GoM appeared to lack interest. The absence of a legally approved NSS has freed it from a concise framework for accountability and lessened the possibility of stronger internal and external oversight of the justice and security systems.
Finally, there was little likelihood that groups in society would arise to clamour for a NSS.
Furthermore, the proliferation of sector based and transversal strategies tailored to donor requirements instead of organic needs and demands, led to questionable degrees of implementation and follow up. It also highlighted a lack of ownership of these processes by Mozambicans, a fact that raises a warning flag about the potential development and implementation of a NSS for merely ceremonial purposes.
In the justice sector, the GoM’s failure to prioritise justice reforms from the start had severe consequences. These included the vulnerability and incapacity of the sector in dealing with corruption, and insufficient preparedness and subsequent delays in response time to post-war societal conflict. In addition, the excessive interpretation of the principle of separation of powers has led the institutions of the criminal justice system towards deficient interaction, with considerable levels of heterogeneity regarding the depth, timing and pace of reforms. This inadequate attention to the
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sequencing of criminal justice system reform has resulted in the almost total stagnation of reforms with regards to criminal investigation progress to date.
Furthermore, despite intensive justice reforms over the last two decades, key questions such as the relationship between the formal and informal institutions of justice have not been consistently addressed, thus hindering citizens’ rightful access to justice.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusions
’The roof rests on the builders’ Mozambican Proverb
The focus of existing policy-driven SSR research on problem solving has created the perception of the neutrality of SSR, obscuring the power relations that permeate its implementation. In the last decade a growing body of SSR literature has been addressing this flaw by critically engaging with political contestations surrounding justice and security reforms. This thesis adds to those efforts by contributing a case study on coherence and sequencing of
Defence, Police and Justice reforms in Mozambique.
The case study has been built on a theoretical framework that produced critical analysis of SSR based on the liberal peacebuilding critique, complemented by a summary review of IR theories. This framework has been combined with elements of historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, drawing respectively on the concepts of critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage. As shown in figure 42 critical junctures and path dependence paradoxically coexisted and succeeded each other in Mozambique’s history, even if continuity and rupture were sometimes framed by conscious decision-making, and other times emerged as unintentional consequences.
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Fig. 16 Mozambique’s case study manifestations of path dependence and critical junctures in a continuum since independence
The combined theoretical framework has enabled the production of a country case study that bridges the usually missing elements in SSR policy research, i.e. the historical state-building trajectory, the contextual political and conflict analysis, and the dynamics of the political economy of aid. Jointly these have been shaping justice and security institutional reforms in Mozambique in the long-term. Permeating these three factors is an analysis of the self-interest of
Mozambican elites’ in advancing or blocking certain justice and security reforms, as well as a nuanced appreciation of intra-party political dynamics and the impact of the unfolding democratisation process on SSR at the macro level. At the meso-level the alignment and contradictions between the implementation of SSR and simultaneous peacebuilding initiatives such as
DDR and transitional justice in a neo-liberal economic context were analysed.
Finally, at the micro-level, the origins, drivers of change, patterns of resistance, and mutually supporting or undermining implementation of
Defence, Police and Justice reforms were examined, considering their impact on coherence and sequencing.
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8.1 Learning from the case study
The central research question of this thesis’ case study was:
How did reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in post-civil war Mozambique evolve in the short, medium and long-term, and what factors affected the coherence and sequencing of these changes, and the ability of these institutions to fulfil their missions?
The findings established that the post-civil war (1992-2009) reforms in defence, police and justice followed different timings and paths, with distinct entry-points and drivers of change. The GPA served as the entry-point for the reform of the armed forces, and the former belligerents as the main drivers of change. These reforms were implemented in the immediate peacebuilding period, although within the limits of institutional re-structuring, without a major security assessment preceding wider defence reforms. Subsequent medium and longer-term progress has been slow, given the general relegation of SSR by the GoM and the donors in light of the priority given to economic growth and poverty reduction.
With regards to the police, despite GPA recommendations for ensuring their apolitical nature and respect for human rights, no institutional reforms were set out or derived from the peace agreement. Reforms only began after the first post-GPA elections, driven by the GoM whose priorities had turned towards internal security, with two intents. The first was to improve efficiency to better tackle rising criminality. The second was to build a force on which the regime could rely in security crises, given that the FADM was resource depleted and
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‘unworthy’ of trust for integrating members of both the government’ troops and of the Renamo guerrillas. In the medium and longer term the GoM has maintained support for these reforms, although with distinct levels of commitment by the leadership at different times, and with an imbalanced focus between different internal security areas. Nevertheless, the GoM has not been able to allocate the necessary funds for internal security reforms, although it has enjoyed the specific support of different donors over time.
The justice sector was not contemplated in the GPA given that neither Frelimo nor Renamo viewed it as an important source of conflict. Also, both parties tacitly agreed to circumvent formal mechanisms of reconciliation and transitional justice. The absence of GPA provisions for justice reforms in conjunction with the reconstruction priorities led the GoM to neglect this area, allowing members of the sector itself (in particular the Supreme Court) to drive the changes, which stemmed from the new constitutional disposition of separation of powers. Although much better prepared than the defence or the police, rivalry and unequal institutional reforms stalled progress in this sector.
Shortcomings in areas where performance relies on successful intersection such as that of criminal justice highlighted these imbalances. The courts, representing the judicial power, made faster progress in implementing reforms than either the autonomous public prosecutor’s office, the prisons, or the criminal investigation police, the latter two falling under the authority of the
Executive. The GoM allocated limited resources to the justice sector, which
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was nonetheless able to attract donor funding from an earlier stage. In the medium to longer-term, these reforms gained increased attention by the GoM, due to a combination of factors, including donor pressure.
The different timings, entry-points and reform drivers underscored the fact that
Mozambique’s justice and security system was not integrated, and different cultures and levels of preparedness were pervasive. This resulted in lack of coherence and sequencing of reforms in the system when seen from a holistic perspective, given that each sector, and within it, each institution, followed its own reform path with nominal interaction with its peers. Whilst this problem was minimised with coordination mechanisms intended to increase operational efficiency, a strategic framework for SSR is still lacking.
Those reforms that were pushed through by the donors tended to include more negotiation and more institutional advances and setbacks, such as in the
Justice sector. In comparison, those that were advanced by the GoM such as in the Police, whilst enacting resistance to change from the professionals of the sector were more easily bargained and implemented. This variation was due to perceptions of ownership and legitimacy, but also concerned the trade- offs that each actor had to offer. For instance, donors faced greater difficulty in compromising on certain liberal peace principles such as human rights; while the GoM was less disciplinary with regard to that, for as long as they obtained efficiency of the security forces.
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In addition, the case study identified several common factors that shaped the coherence and sequencing of Mozambique’s justice and security reforms, affecting the subsequent performance of the sector. These comprised:
1) The resurgence of path dependence, bringing continuity with old practices,
which were frequently incompatible with current institutional environments
and aims. An example was the excessive secrecy surrounding security
matters.
2) The emergence of unforeseen circumstances that required unorthodox
responses, such as when Renamo decided to retain a militarised unit for
the protection of its dignitaries, instead of demobilising it, and the GoM
acquiesced to maintain peace. Moreover, the methods used usually
conflicted with the values driving reforms, or with the legitimate interests of
other justice and security stakeholders.
3) The use of political and institutional bricolage by the GoM and other
powerful internal institutional actors in order to circumvent unwarranted
prescribed aspects of reforms and deal with spoilers. An example was the
concentration of security forces and weapons under the auspices of the
MInt by the GoM, and the resistance to allow UN verification.
Nonetheless, the use of bricolage as a tactic of adaptation to difficult
circumstances implied the relegation of policy-making and institutional
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reforms to a lower priority relative to concerns with political, security and
economic survival.
4) The pursuit of justice and security reforms by the GoM and by other
institutional internal actors without the genuine involvement of a multitude
of stakeholders such as relevant parliamentary commissions, CSOs, the
population at large, and other non-state actors. This was the case with the
production of the first strategic plan of institutional development of the
justice sector.
5) The adoption of sector based and/or transversal strategies tailored to
respond to donor programme requirements, instead of catering to organic
needs and demands, leading to questionable degrees of reform
implementation and follow up, such as in the instance of public sector
reforms.
6) The absence of vision, reinforcing the tendency of ‘learning by doing’,
reactivity and ultimately reform tokenism.
7) The prevalence of a given type of incrementalism which upon
encountering high levels of resistance to change, more often than not led
to gratuitous reversals in reforms.
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8) The quality of institutional leadership and human resources, and the
impact of their inadequacy, substitution or rotation during reform.
An additional six research questions complemented the central and generic one, namely:
1) How do the roots of SSR in the liberal peace paradigm constrain its
capacity to attain the goals set in the policy agenda, and is there
potential to overcome these flaws?
This thesis analysed the roots of SSR in the liberal peace paradigm through a review of the literature that treats SSR as a comprehensive process, enmeshed in global, regional, national and local power dynamics. Firstly, this was done through a brief audit of SSR in the context of IR theories, which unveiled the apparent neutrality, homogeneity, and compassionate nature of the global SSR agenda in view of its roots in the liberal peace project. The analysis carried out exposed the potential limitations of SSR given the hegemonic and co-optation attempts of this agenda by powerful international and national players, which limit the emancipatory promise of SSR policies.
Secondly, the literature review assessed the implications deriving from the roots of SSR in the liberal peace paradigm through an analysis of SSR based on the liberal peacebuilding critique. This was justified given the common origins and numerous parallels and between the two agendas. This
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examination has asserted that the transformative power of SSR was curtailed first by the apolitical pretence deriving from its emergence within the security- development nexus mainstream. Its subsequent developmentalisation led to deficient political analysis concerning the commitment of the recipient countries’ ruling elites and donors in implementation, originating a deficit with regard to considerations of inclusive ownership, sustainability and political risk management. Furthermore, despite accumulation of SSR practice and lessons identified, this learning has been prevented from translating into practice due to contradictions that underlie the liberal peacebuilding agenda.
Whenever there have been competing goals between distinct peacebuilding policies, SSR remained disadvantaged, especially if governance aspects were at stake, when compared to higher strategic priorities of donors’ interests.
However, the hegemonic pretensions of donors and of the implementing countries’ ruling elites surrounding a particular SSR agenda were usually met with fundamental contestations from other (usually sub-national) actors.
These contestations generated processes mediated by dynamics of negotiation, resistance and accommodation, and also compounded the difficulty of learning beyond specific context, since such interactions entail unexpected developments and unintended outcomes.
The analysis of SSR in light of the liberal peacebuilding critique has therefore reinforced the requirement for more realistic assessment of what can be
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achieved through SSR, given its level of unpredictability and sensitivity to multiple factors, pressure and tensions.
Nonetheless, these analytical tools were insufficient to understand in practice how these dynamics of negotiation unfolded in the context of institutional justice and security reforms in Mozambique and whether there is any potential to overcome the limitations identified above. Thus, a combination of historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism drawing respectively on the concepts of critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage were utilised to complement the case study analysis. This framework enabled scrutiny of multiple actors’ formal and informal interactions and inherent power relations that affected coherence and sequencing of Mozambique’s institutional justice and security reforms in the short-to-longer term. Through the interplay between deductive and inductive analyses, extensively backed- up by the voluminous data gathered from field research in Mozambique, patterns of institutional continuity and rupture, as well as of elite and people stasis, learning and innovation were identified and examined. In carrying out analysis, the focus placed on the methods utilised by Mozambicans to withstand externally pressured adjustment, including coping strategies through cooperation, resistance, and accommodation, revealed attempts to manage and control the pace, shape and depth of change. This demonstrates that the scope for agency of local actors is not fully limited by the external hegemonic constraints that derive from SSR roots in the liberal peace paradigm.
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However, for these constraints to be overcome in a transformational and emancipatory direction there needs to be a constellation of national and local actors that act as a unified force towards the goal of attaining genuine collective interests of justice and security. The legitimacy of such justice and security reforms is reliant upon inclusive ownership in the process of setting and implementing the agenda. This requires vision, leadership and good willed elites, but also informed and fearless civil societies and people that actively claim their rights. Unfortunately, in many cases such as Mozambique, this combination of factors that goes beyond SSR into the social and economic ethos and political fabric of the countries at stake is lacking. Ultimately, this leads to missed opportunities to overcome the constraints that derive from
SSR origins in the liberal peace paradigm.
In spite of the above, and from within a problem-solving perspective, the application of this combined theoretical framework underscores the need to reject the quest for coherence and sequencing of SSR as a standard formula, and highlights the requirement to understand them through approaches that go beyond traditional institutional structuralism. This draws attention to significant improvements that can be achieved through the design of flexible strategies to accommodate conscious actions upon evolving interactions, and via engagement in adaptation and enhancement through iterative approaches to programming and implementation of SSR.
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2) How did Mozambique’s post-independence political economy and
justice and security reforms contribute to the outbreak of the civil
war? How did they compare with, and influence reform immediately
following the civil war and, later, in the longer-term process towards
democratisation?
Mozambique represented a hopeful case of independence aspiring to the development of an African socialism. Differing from the majority of African countries that were hampered by rentierism, ethnicisation of politics and politicisation of security, Mozambique was an exception to the neo-patrimonial model that swept the continent in the post-independence period. Frelimo’s elite rejected individual enrichment and corruption, and did not engage in tactics of subjection of the security sector to manipulation for private economic gains and protection of particular groups. Yet, whilst the euphoria of building socialism postponed dynamics of rampant capital accumulation, it did not avert the outbreak of the armed conflict, which first adopted the form of a regional destabilisation war waged by Rhodesia and South Africa’s Apartheid.
The case study analysis showed that Mozambique’s post-independence period was mainly characterised by rupture with the old colonial state structures. Yet, although discursively and to a large extent in practice, Frelimo distinguished itself from colonial thought and performance, the critical juncture represented by independence, and by building security and justice institutions
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from afresh, was tempered by the subtler ideological path dependence of modernism.
Another critical source of continuity was pragmatic decision-making, which was often driven by the similarity of the challenges and security threats faced by the colonial regime and by Frelimo, such as in the case of administering territory or fighting insurgency. Such continuities embodied the persistence of exclusionary dynamics with regards to those groups perceived by Frelimo as associated with colonial rule, shattering any chances for reconciliation within
Mozambican society, and creating vulnerabilities that were exploited for the emergence of the civil war.
Path dependence stemming from colonial rule interacted with another type of continuity deriving from Frelimo’s liberation war traditions and governing experience. Nonetheless, whilst the former was often prompted by unexpected circumstances and the need to cope with unintended consequences, Frelimo deliberately used the latter, making it ideologically and sequentially prominent in comparison. However, the ruling applied to limited areas under tight social, economic, political, and security control, when transferred to a much wider territory with lesser state capacity, resulted in a sizeable share of the population engaging in resistance. These contestations were met by Frelimo’s resilience strategies for power maintenance based, on the one hand, on the use of violence, and on the other, on the increase of
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legitimacy through the creation of governing structures inclusive of the people.
Regrettably, the use of violence over society became predominant, resembling the colonial order that Frelimo had intended to dismantle, and carving a deeper wound that was utilised to trigger and sustain civil war after independence.
The simultaneous manifestation and convergence of both legacies furthered the disparity between Frelimo’s discourse and practice, strengthening the tendency towards problem solving based on reactivity and pragmatism.
Strategic and medium to long-term policy-making in the justice and security arenas were subordinated, with coherence and sequencing of institutional building policies being systematically overridden whenever they competed with tactical political considerations.
These institutional development policies were downgraded in light of the paramount need to adapt to the demands of the civil war, which became the main driver of institutional change. In this sense, coping measures were put in place through, for example, the creation of the Joint Command of the Security
Forces to coordinate operational performance, an experience whose legacy was recovered in the post-civil war era. Importantly, to address existing gaps in the justice and security system, Frelimo resorted to institutional bricolage, creatively designing institutions through the combination of formal elements with flexible societal-based arrangements. Such was the case in the security
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establishment, featuring formal security forces alongside democratic structures of people’s power, and in the justice arena - with the formation of a hybrid judiciary - with professionally trained magistrates working together with untrained judges nominated by the people. These institutional bricolage solutions addressed pragmatic governing concerns, at the same time as they conferred functional legitimacy on the institutions created, given the participatory nature of their design. However, performance-based legitimacy was also essential, and was achievable only through the degree and quality of delivery of the security and justice institutions, which unfortunately was dismal.
This was not only due to insufficient capacity, but also to the plentiful excesses the security forces committed with impunity. These forces were under
Frelimo’s political civilian control, which also bore responsibility for the misdemeanours committed by the quasi-formal securitised structures of people’s power. It was also under Frelimo’s socialist political regime that draconian legislation was adopted and subsequently implemented by the judiciary in response to a failing economy and emergence of illicit trade and black market practices. Frelimo’s rhetoric of punishment was matched in practice through the institutionalisation of violence, and the abuses perpetrated were in total contradiction to the spirit of freedom and justice that it proclaimed at independence. The nation and state-building project suffered in the immediate term, but these outcomes also had longer-term repercussions affecting the post-civil war reforms. Amongst these were the dire reputation of
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the security and justice institutions, the closed nature of security decision- making, and the institutional culture of reactivity instead of proactive change.
3) How did Mozambique’s triple transition shape the context and
direction of the post-civil war SSR?
The post-civil war security and justice reforms were also affected in their direction and initial outlook by macro-level changes deriving from
Mozambique’s triple transition from a central planning model to a market economy, from one-party to multiparty politics, and from war to peace. A central finding was that the sequencing of these transitions, mainly driven by donors’ strategic goals, but actively adopted by the GoM, consisted of prioritising economic over political liberalisation. This meant that peacebuilding and democratisation not only began at slightly later points in time, but also took a back seat to economic liberalisation, resulting in the objectives of the latter prevailing whenever in tension with the immediate needs of the former. The result was an environment in which reconstruction requirements and economic growth prescriptions contradicted each other, leading to the emergence of weak post-conflict state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors.
The diktat of economic growth under neo-liberal policies of poverty reduction led to the downgrading of security and justice reforms over time; insufficient
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attention was devoted to them, beginning with the peace agreement and continuing on through peacebuilding and subsequent democratisation phases.
The lack of support for SSR negatively affected the capacity and effectiveness of the post-war security and judicial establishments, as well as of those institutions responsible for their democratic oversight. As a corollary, after twenty years of peace, a major strategic review of the security sector has yet to take place, although token progress has been attained through incremental reforms in the justice and security institutions.
The coincidence of interests between the donors and the Frelimo GoM, which enabled the neglect of the justice and security systems, was based on the former’s interest in maintaining the myth of Mozambique’s success story, and the latter’s desire to guarantee the inflow of financial resources. This favoured the unfolding of at least three serious unintended consequences with longer- term political and institutional manifestations. The first was that the GoM, despite the abovementioned convergence of policy interests, used political bricolage to attempt to circumvent donors’ prescriptions and to consolidate internal political power by diminishing the democratic space. In turn, this pernicious use of political bricolage drove other national actors such as
Renamo to resort to political expediency, amplifying the protest against the liberal peace achieved. The second unintended consequence was the
‘democratisation of corruption’ and engagement in neopatrimonial ruling logics, aggravated by the infiltration of an already weakened justice system by
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criminal networks. The third was the subordination of institutional reform and public policy-making to the dynamics of the GoM’s adaptation to donors’ demands. That resulted in the dereliction of defence, public security and justice related policies and reform, relative to those of the economic and social service spheres, neglecting the fact that the latter are unsustainable without the former.
Similarly to what had taken place during the independence period, the transitional and peacebuilding stages following the civil war represented critical junctures, whereby the old system, institutions and modus operandi were dismantled very quickly. However, over time, and as the new system became more institutionalised, patterns of path dependence became prevalent, insofar as Frelimo’s political choices of the post-civil war period began to resemble those made in the post-independence. Increasing party centralisation, the monopolisation of political power, the downplaying of political and societal dialogue, and growing political intolerance are examples of such similarities, which have been gaining strength at the expense of reversing democratic gains achieved earlier in the transition. Yet, this pattern of path dependence is not inevitable, nor does it signify that the situation fully resembles the past. Rather it means that, despite the similarities, the situation differed in that Frelimo has managed change through the employment of political bricolage. In practice this suggests that the GoM has adopted some older tendencies whilst simultaneously embracing new elements of
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democratisation, such as elections and partial media freedom in a bid to maintain its power anchored on internal and external legitimacy.
This strategy of adaptation through political bricolage has nonetheless demonstrated that the Frelimo elite is only selectively learning the lessons of the civil war, disregarding the weight of inequality, exclusion and political intolerance as likely triggers of longer-term violent conflict. Nowadays
Frelimo’s elites carry no resemblance of the modest and austere posture adopted after independence; in lieu aggressive and unethical capital accumulation introduced via economic liberalisation in the post-civil war became the rule, deepened by the extractive industry boom. This shows the lack of willingness to learn from Africa’s post-independence experience of patronage politics and economic exclusion as breeders of grievances, which lead to outbreak or recurrence of violent armed conflict. Until now, this posture has rendered the Frelimo elite high financial, economic and political returns. Yet, the country is currently on the path of fierce politics; the future has already been put at risk in light of Renamo’s current reversion to military action in exchange for political, economic and institutional gains, including an old demand for parity in the security forces.
4) How did coherence and sequencing (or lack thereof) of post-civil war
reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors impact changes in
these institutions, in the short, medium and long-term?
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The case study also focused on the transition from war to peace, more specifically, through a meso-level analysis of Mozambique’s peace agreement and subsequent justice and security reforms. A summary of critical junctures, path dependence and political and institutional bricolage instances in the post- civil war era across the defence, police and justice sectors is offered below in figure 43.
The GPA allowed crucial gains in terms of peace viability in the short and medium term, as a result of concentrating on political matters during implementation by prioritising the transformation of belligerents into political parties. Nonetheless, this success requires qualification since in particular its minimalist security provisions brought marked negative impacts in the short, medium and longer-term.
The asymmetrical power bargains between Frelimo and Renamo during the peace negotiations led to security clauses that were unsatisfactory to both parties, coupled with weak mechanisms for implementation and monitoring during the immediate transition. The implementation was marked by modifications in power relations, with the parties attempting to gain advantages over unresolved or contested security provisions such as DDR, and demanding compromises under pressure. Unintended negative consequences materialised in the form of improvised security arrangements that assumed the shape of informal survival tactics, which rendered short-term
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advantages to the GoM and to Renamo. For example, Renamo maintained a militarised force outside the institutional purview of the state security forces under the pretext of the personal security of its leader. The GoM resorted to institutional bricolage by, for instance, concentrating in the Ministry of Interior some services and special security units previously associated with the military or the intelligence services, such as the immigration and the border patrol. Yet the parties’ quests for their own security and power in the immediate term, combined with the mandates and capacity limitations of
UNOMOZ and CIVPOL, hampered the achievement of sounder peace agreement provisions, the implementation of the GPA, and the start of SSR in general. Noteworthy flaws in the peace agreement and its implementation, with medium and longer-term impact, included the faulty disarmament process and the lack of concern with ensuring the simultaneous reform and oversight of the justice and security system. In particular, opportunities for earlier police reform, for addressing impunity through reconciliation and judicial reform, and for linking DDR and the creation of the new armed forces to a wider and more strategic defence reform process were lost. In the case of defence, the FADM was allowed to emerge institutionally weak because both parties’ security interests were accommodated, even if this convergence entailed negative long-term implications for the efficiency of this force. This heavy justice and security-related legacy paved the way for the reproduction of mistrust, impunity and violence over time.
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Fig. 17 Illustrations of critical junctures, path dependence and institutional bricolage in the post-civil war era
5) What opportunities for change existed beyond those provided by the
peace agreement entry-points for SSR, and how could security and
justice reforms be approached in a comprehensive and home-grown
manner?
This case study demonstrated that further opportunities for justice and security reforms emerged over time without being linked to the entry-points provided by the peace agreement. The GPA did not constitute a de facto entry point for institutional changes in the police and justice sectors, but both areas saw incremental reforms develop from the inherent need to tackle post-civil war
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challenges. For instance the micro-level analysis enquiry on the criminal justice system reforms was highly illustrative of some of the problems of coherence and sequencing as further described below.
Another opportunity for SSR unrelated to the GPA was the public sector reform programme enacted in 1999, which despite positive management and administrative improvements, unfortunately failed to materialise substantive
SSR advances in Mozambique. On the one hand this was due to its late start in the justice field, and on the other hand on the employment of transversal methods lacking the required focus, specificity and security expertise in the fields of defence and police. Hence, to become a value added entry-point for
SSR, public sector reform programmes need to consider this articulation and award necessary attention and specificity to the justice and security system from the initial design phase.
In general, changes in the defence sector proceeded at the slow pace characteristic of a neglected institution, whilst public security, although receiving greater attention by the GoM after the first general elections, was met with insufficient funding, aggravated by abrupt changes in the leadership and reform plans. In the justice sector, the GoM’s failure to prioritise and drive reforms from the start has had severe consequences. Besides the vulnerability and incapacity of the sector to deal with corruption, this included an insufficient preparedness and subsequent delays in response to post-war
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societal conflict. In addition, the excessive interpretation of the principle of separation of powers has led to deficient interaction between the criminal justice institutions and to a marked level of heterogeneity regarding the depth, timing and pace of reforms. This inadequate attention to the sequencing of criminal justice reform has resulted in the paradox of (uneven) progress at the level of the courts, public prosecution, public defence and prisons, alongside the total stagnation of reforms with regards to the criminal investigation police.
Furthermore, despite justice reform over the last two decades, the core issue of the articulation between the formal and informal justice institutions has not been consistently addressed, reflecting a disregard for the citizens’ rightful access to justice.
Despite recognition of legal pluralism, and of the existence and role of non- state actors in the delivery of security and justice, Mozambique’s justice and security system remains excessively focused on the configuration of formal institutions. In the everyday reality of Mozambique there are a myriad of actors, which deliver justice and security closer to the population, without obeying to any common regulation. The provision of these services varies across the country and no overall human rights standards or common penalty framework has been instituted to guide traditional leaders or local community courts. Community policing initiatives also assume many shapes and forms ranging from operation under close police scrutiny, to wider degrees of independence, and loose collaboration. In sum, the lack of standardised
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practice creates a situation whereby people experience security and justice provision in very different ways across the territory. It is also in this realm that local people’s agency shapes this same provision of justice and security, at times questioning liberal values with the application of instituted cultural practices. The lack of oversight in turn also propitiates abuse, such as in the cases where police officers are constrained in the effective implementation of their legal duty by fear of reprisals from the community.
An analysis of the possibility of approaching SSR in a comprehensive and home-grown manner considered on a positive note the creation and wide membership of core collective security and justice organs such as the Joint
Command of the Defence and Security Forces and the Legality Commissions.
This proves the existence of awareness towards the need for institutional coordination in order to improve the delivery of security and justice services to the public. Nevertheless, and despite their positive contribution with regards to operational performance, none of these mechanisms is used to debate and decide upon comprehensive and strategic justice and security reforms. Also, there was no evidence of such discussions at the level of the National
Commission of Defence and Security, which despite being merely an advisory body, included a range of opinions, potentially counter-balancing the
President’s hegemony in security decision-making.
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Hence, the need for a national security strategy deserves contemplation, in order to address the vacuum concerning the development of strategic security policy, taking into account justice and security as an integrated and comprehensive system. The absence of such a framework in Mozambique has resulted in insufficient foundation for justice and security prioritisation, resource allocation, and institutional collaboration, which, in turn, have failed to maximise the delivery of these services to the citizens. It has also negatively affected the policy coherence and the sequencing of security reforms, which have been carried out in the absence of a major strategic security review since the end of the civil war according to an atomistic institutional logic, which is far from holistic.
However, the likelihood of enacting a home-grown national security strategy in the short to medium-term appears unlikely for three main reasons. Firstly, intense political mistrust arose from unresolved security problems rooted in the
GPA; these included Renamo’s maintenance of a militarised force, which reinforced the GoM’s posture of security secrecy across time. Secondly, the
GoM appears to lack interest. The absence of a legally approved national security strategy frees it from a concise framework for parliamentary and societal accountability and lessens the possibility of stronger internal and external oversight over the justice and security system. Finally, there is little likelihood that the CSOs, the media and society at large would arise to clamour for a national security strategy, or for democratic-oriented change in
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the justice and security system, given the limitations of their watchdog role.
Hence, without Mozambicans at large owning a strategic security thinking process, the potential development and implementation of a national security strategy risks serving merely ceremonial purposes, or worse, being used to prompt efficiency to clamp down on internal dissent.
6) What broad lessons can be identified for future reform in
Mozambique and what recommendations can be made to improve
the design and implementation of SSR in general?
8.2 Recommendations for Mozambique
Based on the findings of this study, it is pertinent to offer the following recommendations for future justice and security reforms in Mozambique.
1) The GoM should consider the necessity and viability of developing a NSS to
guide comprehensive justice and security reforms. The process should
entail the genuine involvement of state and non-state actors and could
serve to build confidence amongst political and societal actors and, it is
hoped, demystify security matters. Setting up such a framework under the
current threat of Renamo military action could be considered risky but,
history teaches us, there is no optimal time to carry out such policy-making
processes in Mozambique. The fact that opportunities to engage in the
development of a NSS were lost during the last two decades of relative
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stability reinforces the point. The current security crisis might represent an
opportunity for a full security review, which could also double as an
instrument to allay the fears of all influential players, including the political
opposition, as well as the donors and investors.
2) The GoM should further facilitate security and justice system development
by accelerating the approval of the existing draft legislations, setting up
internal and external checks and balance mechanisms, and seeing to their
implementation and monitoring without undue political interference.
3) The GoM should take extra care in the choice of leaders for the justice and
security institutions. There is a need to adequately balance the
characteristics of political trust with those of vision and a thorough
knowledge of the sector, as well as of leadership capacity. In addition, care
should be taken to avoid abrupt leadership changes during major reforms,
given not only the loss of momentum and strengthening of the existing
internal institutional resistance to change, but also the overall waste of
resources.
4) The GoM has been reducing its dependence on Western donors and is
diversifying its sources of income and therefore has gained room for
manoeuvre to re-evaluate the distribution of resources amongst the different
areas. It is pertinent to consider whether the justice and security system
should be transparently awarded further resources given their dual impact:
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directly on people’s daily lives, and as a core area of governance, with
strong implications for state legitimacy. In particular the long-delayed
reforms of the criminal investigation police require urgency, as this
stalemate impacts negatively on the overall functioning of the criminal
justice system.
5) The GoM should quickly draft, approve, and implement policy and
legislation establishing guidelines on security expenditure. This would
enable it to legitimately invest in the sector and re-equip the security forces
in a responsible and accountable manner through the gradual allocation of
funds as the economy permits. Importantly, it would also allow it to avoid
pernicious political, security and economic bricolage, which only aggravates
political, societal, donor and investors mistrust.
8.3 General recommendations
This case study on Mozambique has also generated recommendations for the design of reform strategy, planning and implementation, as well as for relevant guidance concerning SSR prioritisation that might be applied in other contexts.
1) For SSR to become feasible in contexts of conflict resolution it is first and
foremost necessary to construct a viable political process anchored in
genuine trust building and reconciliation. In addition, any peace
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agreements need to balance political viability against the need to not
preclude or obstruct the enactment of SSR.
2) In addition to the usual focus on military restructuring, peace agreements
should contain solid entry-points for other security and justice reforms,
including oversight, even if detailed frameworks are not feasible due to the
reluctance of the contending parties. In the case of transitions from non-
armed conflict, the document guiding changes (normally by way of a
constitutional review) should entail provisions for a comprehensive security
review, which might serve as an entry-point to SSR.
3) The development of a justice and security strategic assessment in the post-
war is a prerequisite for comprehensive SSR, whether or not that entails the
development of a formal national security strategy. A framework for reform
is essential to reduce the risk of negative political and security bricolage. It
encourages trust building, enhances coherence and sequencing, and
avoids excessive tokenism of reforms that typically leads to unsustainable
bricolage outcomes.
4) Although it is advisable to root the seeds of SSR in the immediate post-
conflict period it might not be feasible to do so. Therefore, a careful
evaluation of political and security conditions is required to assess whether
international partners should engage immediately or instead wait for better
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opportunities. Entry-points for the development of SSR also appear in the
medium-term after the end of conflicts, at the initiative of national
governments or other relevant justice and security stakeholders. In
addition, the processes of democratisation and of public sector reforms (so
long as adequately planned and tailored for this specific need in the justice
and security arenas) may also present entry-points for SSR. Whilst
admittedly this sequencing of SSR may be uncertain and slower, it might
pay off in terms of local ownership, policy coherence, and sustainability.
5) Political dialogue regarding justice and security system reforms ought to
feature in the agenda of donors - with due respect for the security needs of
the country at stake - even if they are not supporting SSR in the immediate
term. This dialogue with national stakeholders (as opposed to solely with
the government) can serve as a step in the process in order to raise their
awareness and to help develop the momentum and drivers capable of
piloting SSR beyond the initial post-war period.
6) SSR must be aligned with general state financing from an earlier stage to
prevent the marginalisation of the justice and security system, and to
ensure that no matter how marginal, the allocated funding is well-managed,
and that it remains sufficient to drive the process, making it sustainable in
the longer-term.
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7) SSR in post-conflict environments requires the guarantee of intensive and
almost uninterrupted long-term financing, given the usual inadequacy of
national government resources. Spending on the set up of SSR, on
training, and on basic infrastructure is unavoidable if the results are to be
lasting. Nevertheless, the return on these investments is rarely immediate.
8) Whilst the findings of the case study strongly point towards the need to
implement reforms in the justice and security system in a simultaneous
manner to avoid institutional imbalances, this may not be practical given the
shortage of resources. In such cases, those areas with immediate impact
over ordinary peoples’ daily lives should be prioritised.
9) In comparison with those reforms implemented under external pressure in
the immediate aftermath of war, incremental SSR over time tends to be
more sustainable, provided the reforms enjoy a certain degree of local
ownership; otherwise they are both highly vulnerable to backlash and
reversal.
10) Finally, this thesis has underscored that although liberal political and
economic reforms have a dramatic impact on the functioning of the justice
and security system, they may not be sufficient to push through specific
reforms in this area, including those concerning oversight. In most cases
a directed SSR approach is required, even if at the outset the possibility to
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address all areas of reform simultaneously is curtailed by political reasons
or prioritisation of resources. However, the adoption of focused and
detailed approaches in the design and revision phases, allows issues that
are not addressed immediately to remain on the medium to longer-term
SSR agenda. This is essential to keep recalling the need to tackle
unaddressed areas with potential to turn into cause of instability.
8.4 Avenues for further research
The investigation carried out in this thesis increased awareness of the fact that the SSR research agenda still has plenty of unchartered waters. Two pertinent avenues for further research emerged for macro level examination.
The first comprises the need to understand comparatively how security and justice reforms evolve in post-authoritarian countries undergoing democratisation outside a post-conflict framework. In this typology what are the reference frameworks for justice and security reform? How is the process designed, which issues deserve the most attention and how are priorities selected? Is there scope for wider ownership of reform processes, and is reform initiative more likely to emerge from other counters of society beyond the executive? Are those processes subjected to more intra-societal scrutiny and rifts? Does this lead to more transparent and sustainable positive changes, even if formal justice and security processes are not enacted?
Whilst similarities certainly exist between post-conflict and non-post conflict
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SSR environments, the differences are worth studying, since the drivers, priorities, scope, depth, pace, and sustainability of reform processes may require nuanced assessment. Increasingly countries in transition are faced with the need to tackle justice and security reforms and find themselves constrained by the excessively prevailing post-conflict SSR thinking and model, which also fails to account for SSR as a means of conflict prevention.
The second topic for macro level examination is that of the viability and specificity of SSR practice in stabilisation environments. How are political and military components of SSR factored in such missions and which prevails?
Can the balance between governance and efficiency be attained in the face of the immediate need to train and equip? Is it possible to design and enact a process of inclusive ownership for reforms under these circumstances? Is it worth investing in such a process given the fluidity of the security situation and of the actors involved; i.e. is it viable to place the seeds for what is expected to be a comprehensive justice and security reform in the aftermath of war? Since conflict (including military operations) is extremely dynamic in such environments can SSR play a useful role in terms of short-term conflict resolution without compromising longer-term reform processes? This is pressing for political, strategy and planning purposes since peace operations in such environments, such as in the case of Somalia or CAR, require guidance in this regard.
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Additional research themes have been identified, which can be placed at a meso level. The first of these concerns the requirement to understand how
SSR is being carried out within Global South Cooperation, and more specifically in the context of African-to-African support. There is a growing trend of SSR support by African countries to its peers (e.g. Nigeria to Sierra
Leone, Angola to Guinea Bissau, Uganda to Somalia) and therefore it is pertinent to interrogate how this type of support differs (or not) from that provided in the context of Western/non-Western security assistance. Which, if any, normative frameworks guide the African-to-African justice and security reform assistance, for instance do they refer to the AU SSR Policy? What principles drive this assistance and are they aligned with the providers’ strategic foreign policy goals? Is this support framed in a comprehensive SSR framework, looking for complementarities with projects supported by other cooperation partners of the implementing country? Does support focus on the political dialogue, institutional reform - including internal inspectorates - and wider democratic governance, besides train and equip? This constitutes an avenue of research worth pursuing on its own in order to learn about the politics of engagement of African states in the provision of SSR support to its peers.
The second topic of research at the meso level concerns the need to develop knowledge about how specific SSR policies come about and particular programmes are designed. What factors influence decisively these
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processes, and where lies the major stumbling block in transforming identified lessons into learning? Whilst the literature reviewed suggested that their incorporation into policy is occurring, the translation into programming and implementation appears to persist in greater difficulty. Is this explained by slow organisational adaptation, by the higher order strategic goals of the main international SSR actors, or by a deeper ideological resistance of the liberal peace paradigm espoused by those that support reforms? Is the explanation based on other factors, not yet mapped? Or in a combination of all three listed; in which case how do they combine into different configurations, and in which context does each factor prevail? This type of research is important to understand also how the increasingly standard practice of international and national consultations (for e.g. including multiple donors, as well as cross- governmental, and inclusive of non-government national and local actors) genuinely results in the incorporation of the inputs provided by the different actors in the ultimate decision-making on justice and security programmes.
Finally, one of the most pressing issues for further SSR research that needs to be carried out at a micro level of different contexts is related to the need to understand the workings of formal and informal institutions with regards to the configurations of power and hybrid responses that result from their interaction.
Despite current rhetoric that non-state actors cannot be overlooked in security and justice programming orthodoxy prevails in the majority of programming in this field. As such, cross-case comparison is important given the likelihood to
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identify stumbling blocks and enablers of justice and security reforms that might elucidate about what can be worked upon, and what is best left out to its own devices. This type of research is also important to shed light on the possibilities for reconciliation of liberal values with those of different value systems, such as those rooted in ancient cultural African traditions and in
Muslim life principles. Understanding what is irreconcilable may be a better way of generating programming solutions for accommodation, instead of persisting in engineering liberal-based solutions that are fundamentally defeated at their roots.
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Interviews
Interview 1.1.1 with a Mozambican Top Military Decision-Maker at the FADM, Maputo, 01/09/08.
Interview 1.1.2 with a Mozambican Senior Military Decision-Maker at the FADM, Maputo, 22/08/09.
Interview 1.1.3 with a Mozambican FADM Officer, Maputo, 02/04/09.
Interview 1.1.4 with a Mozambican Senior Military Decision-Maker at the FADM, Maputo, 12/08/08.
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Interview 1.1.5 with a Mozambican Senior Military Decision-Maker at the FADM, Maputo, 22/08/08.
Interview 1.1.6 with a Mozambican Senior FADM Officer, Maputo, 01/07/08.
Interview 1.1.7 with a Mozambican FADM Officer, Maputo, 21/07/08.
Interview 1.1.8 with a Mozambican Senior FADM Officer, Maputo, 21/07/08.
Interview 1.2.1 with a Mozambican FADM Officer, Maputo, 27/08/08.
Interview 1.2.1.5 with the Mozambican Minister of Defence, Maputo, 27/05/05.
Interview 1.2.2 with a Mozambican Director at the Ministry of Defence, Maputo, 14/09/08.
Interview 1.2.2.5 with a Mozambican Director at the Ministry of Defence, Maputo, 16/05/2005.
Interview 1.2.3 with a Mozambican Senior Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Defence, Maputo, 22/08/08.
Interview 2.1.1 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 17/09/08.
Interview 2.1.1.5 with a Mozambican Official at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 17/05/2005.
Interview 2.1.2 with a Mozambican Director at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 03/04/09.
Interview 2.1.2.5 with a Mozambican Consultant at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 18/05/05.
Interview 2.1.3 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 27/02/09.
Interview 2.1.4 with a Mozambican Official at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 24/09/08.
Interview 2.1.5 with a Mozambican Senior Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 08/04/09.
Interview 2.1.6 with a Mozambican Senior Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 30/09/08.
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Interview 2.1.7 with a Mozambican Official at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 29/09/08.
Interview 2.1.8 with a Mozambican Senior Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 30/09/08.
Interview 2.2.1 with a Mozambican Senior Decision-Maker at the Office of Public Prosecutor, Maputo, 03/04/09.
Interview 2.2.2 with a Mozambican Official at the Office of Public Prosecutor, Maputo, 23/09/08.
Interview 2.2.3 with a Mozambican Official at the Office of Public Prosecutor, Nampula, 12/07/08.
Interview 2.2.5 with a Mozambican Official at the Office of Public Prosecutor, Gaza, 19/02/09.
Interview 2.2.6 with a Mozambican Official at the Office of Public Prosecutor, Gaza, 16/02/09.
Interview 2.2.7 with a Mozambican Official at the Office of Public Prosecutor, Sofala, 17/07/08.
Interview 2.2.8 with a Mozambican Official at the Office of Public Prosecutor, Cabo Delgado, 07/07/08.
Interview 2.2.9 with a Mozambican Official at the Office of Public Prosecutor, Maputo, 10/07/08.
Interview 2.3.1 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 25/02/09.
Interview 2.3.2 with a Mozambican Senior Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 30/09/08.
Interview 2.4.1 with a Mozambican Judge of the Supreme Court, Maputo, 24/03/09.
Interview 2.4.1.5 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Supreme Court, Maputo, 19/05/05.
Interview 2.4.2 with a Mozambican Supreme Court Judge, Maputo, 25/02/09.
Interview 2.4.2.5 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Justice, Maputo, 19/05/05.
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Interview 2.4.3 with a Mozambican Judge, Gaza, 20/03/09.
Interview 2.4.4 with a Mozambican Judge, Gaza, 18/02/09.
Interview 3.1.1- with a former Mozambican Top Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 03/09/08.
Interview 3.1.1.5 with a Mozambican Senior Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 23/05/05.
Interview 3.1.2- with a former Mozambican Top Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 25/02/09.
Interview 3.1.2.5 with a Mozambican Senior Police Director, Maputo, 18/05/2005.
Interview 3.1.3- with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 21/08/08.
Interview 3.1.3.5 with a Mozambican Top Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 19/05/05.
Interview 3.1.3.6 with a former Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 20/05/05.
Interview 3.2.13 with Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Interior, Sofala, 22/07/08.
Interview 3.1.4- with a Mozambican Official at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 09/04/09.
Interview 3.1.4.5 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 10/05/05.
Interview 3.1.5 with a Mozambican Senior Police Official, Maputo, 20/09/08.
Interview 3.1.6 with a Mozambican Senior Officer at the Ministry of Interior, Maputo, 19/08/08.
Interview 3.2.1 with a former Mozambican Top Decision-Maker at the Police, Maputo, 14/09/08.
Interview 3.2.2 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Police, Cabo Delgado, 02/07/08.
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Interview 3.2.3 with a Mozambican Senior Police Officer, Gaza, 16/02/09.
Interview 3.2.4 with a Mozambican Senior Police Officer, Gaza, 17/02/09.
Interview 3.2.5 with a Mozambican Senior Police Officer, Gaza, 18/02/09.
Interview 3.2.6 with a Mozambican Senior Police Officer, Gaza, 20/02/09.
Interview 3.2.7 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Police, Maputo, 30/03/09.
Interview 3.2.8 with a Mozambican Senior Official at the Police, Maputo, 08/04/09.
Interview 3.2.9 with a Mozambican Senior Police Officer, Maputo, 16/07/08.
Interview 3.2.10 with a Mozambican Police Officer, Nampula, 14/07/08.
Interview 3.2.11 with a Mozambican Police Officer, Nampula, 11/07/08.
Interview 3.2.12 with a Mozambican Police Officer, Nampula, 11/07/08.
Interview 3.2.13 with Mozambican Senior Official at the Ministry of Interior, Sofala, 22/07/08.
Interview 3.2.14 with a Mozambican Police Officer, Nampula, 12/08/08.
Interview 4.1.1 with a Mozambican Senior researcher, Maputo, 26/02/09.
Interview 4.1.1.5 with a Mozambican former University Rector, Maputo, 15/05/2005.
Interview 4.1.2 with a Mozambican Senior Academic, Maputo, 25/02/09.
Interview 4.1.2.5 with a Mozambican Senior Academic, Maputo, 05/05/05.
Interview 4.1.3.5 with a Mozambican Senior Academic, Maputo, 18/05/05.
Interview 4.1.4.5 with a Mozambican former University Rector, Maputo, 23/05/05.
Interview 4.2.1 with a Diplomat at the US Embassy, Maputo, 24/02/09.
Interview 4.2.2.5 with a UNDP Official, Maputo, 11/05/2005.
Interview 4.2.3 with a UNDP Technical Advisor, Maputo, 24/09/08.
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Interview 4.2.3.5 with a Representative from the Spanish Embassy, Maputo,17/05/05.
Interview 4.2.4 with a Diplomat at the Netherlands Embassy, Maputo, 17/09/08.
Interview 4.2.5 with UNDP Senior Staff, Maputo, 29/09/08.
Interview 4.2.7 with a Senior Diplomat at the UK High Commission, Maputo, 25/02/09.
Interview 4.3.1 with a Mozambican Senior Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Maputo, 26/08/08.
Interview 4.3.1.5 with a Mozambican Decision-Maker at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Maputo, 11/05/2005.
Interview 4.3.2 with a Senior Official from the Ministry of Planning and Development, Maputo, 02/04/09.
Interview 4.3.2.5 with a Mozambican Senior Director at the Ministry of State Administration, Maputo, 18/05/05.
Interview 4.3.3 with a former Mozambican Provincial Governor, Maputo, 14/08/08.
Interview 4.3.3.5 with a Mozambican Senior Director at the Ministry of Plan and Finances, Maputo, 20/05/05.
Interview 4.3.4 with a Member of the District Administration, Maringué, Sofala province, 19/07/08.
Interview 4.3.5 with a Senior Official at the Ministry of State Administration, Maputo, 10/02/09.
Interview 4.3.7 with a Member of the District Administration, Gaza, 19/02/09.
Interview 4.4.1 with a Mozambican Renamo MP, Maputo, 21/09/08.
Interview 4.4.1.5 with a Mozambican Frelimo MP, Maputo, 05/2005.
Interview 4.4.2 with a Mozambican Frelimo MP, Maputo, 30/03/09.
Interview 4.4.2.5 with a Mozambican Renamo MP, Maputo, 10/05/05.
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Interview 4.4.3.5 with a Mozambican Frelimo MP, Maputo, 12/05/2005.
Interview 4.5.1 with a Mozambican Top Level State Decision-Maker, Maputo, 27/02/09.
Interview 4.5.1.5 with a Mozambican Senior Official at National Council of Defence and Security, Maputo, 17/05/2005.
Interview 4.5.2 with a Mozambican Member of the National Council of Defence and Security, Maputo, 01/09/08.
Interview 4.5.3 with Mr Jacinto Veloso, Member of Mozambique’s National Council of Defence and Security, Maputo, 08/04/09.
Interview 4.5.4 with a Mozambican Senior Official at National Council of Defence and Security, Maputo, 09/09/08.
Interview 4.5.5 with a Mozambican Senior Official at National Council of Defence and Security, Maputo, 20/09/08.
Interview 4.6.1 with a Renamo District Party Delegate, Sofala, 19/07/08.
Interviews 4.6.1.5 with a Mozambican Director of a national newspaper, Maputo, 09/05/2005.
Interview 4.6.2 with a Frelimo District Party Delegate, Sofala, 18/07/08.
Interviews 4.6.2.5 with a Mozambican Director of a national newspaper, Maputo, 09/05/2005.
Focus Group 4.6.3 with Liberation War Ex-combatants, Maringué, Sofala, 18/07/08.
Interview 4.6.3.5 with a Mozambican Director of a national newspaper, 13/05/05.
Interview 4.6.4 with a director of a Mozambican NGO, Maputo, 08/04/09.
Interview 4.6.4.5 with a director of a Mozambican NGO, Maputo, 12/05/2005.
Focus Group 4.6.5 collective meeting with the population of Namaponda, district of Angoche, Nampula, 14/07/08.
Interview 4.6.5.5 with an officer of the NGO League of Human Rights, Maputo, 12/05/05.
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Focus Group 4.6.6 collective meeting with the population of Nonge, district of Mueda, Cabo Delgado, 05/07/08.
Focus Group 4.6.7 collective meeting with collective meeting with the population of N’Saua, village of Subué, district of Maringué, Sofala, 18/07/08.
Focus Group 4.6.8 collective meeting with the population of Namina, district of Mecuburi, Nampula, 14/07/08.
Focus Group 4.6.9 collective meeting with the population of N’Gapa, district of Mueda, Cabo Delgado, 04/07/08.
Focus Group 4.6.10 collective meeting with the population of Malehice, district of Chibuto, Gaza, 19/02/09.
Interview 4.6.11 with a director of a Mozambican NGO, Beira, 22/07/08.
Interview 4.6.12 with a director of a Mozambican NGO, Xai-Xai, 16/02/09
Interview 4.6.13 with a former Senior Official at the Ministry of Interior, 21/08/08.
Interview 4.6.14 with an officer of the NGO League of Human Rights, Nampula, 09/07/08.
Personal E-mail Communication with Mr Sérgio Vieira, 11/09/08.
Legislation and Official Documents
Acordos de Lusaka, 07/09/1974, assinados entre a FRELIMO e o Estado Português; (The Lusaka Accords, 07/09/1974 signed between FRELIMO and the Portuguese state).
Acordo de Cessar-Fogo assinado entre a Frelimo e o Estado Português, Setembro de 1974; (Cease-Fire Agreement signed between FRELIMO and the Portuguese state, September 1974).
Acordo Geral de Paz de Moçambique, 1992 African European Institute: Amsterdam; (General Peace Agreement of Mozambique).
Aide Memoire 12/05/05, Joint Review between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Programme Aid Partners.
497
Constituição da República Popular de Moçambique 1975; (Constitution of the People’s Republic of Mozambique, 1975).
Constituição da República de Moçambique 1990 Minerva: Maputo; (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 1990).
Constituição da República de Moçambique 2004 Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique: Maputo; (Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique 2004).
Decreto-Lei 39 997, 29/12/54, Introduz a reforma prisional nas colónias através de disposições legais inicialmente introduzidas pelo Decreto-Lei 26 643; (Decree-Law 39 997, 29/12/54, introduces Prison Reform in the colonies through earlier legal provisions set-up initially in Decree-Law 26 643).
Decreto 1/75 de 27/07, Definição de tarefas, funções e competências de cada Ministério; (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, delimiting the attributions of several Ministry’s).
Decreto 21/75 de 11/10, Cria o Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular (SNASP) e define as suas atribuições; (Decree 21/75 of 11/10, establishes the National Service of People’s Security (SNASP) and defines its attributions).
Decreto 25/75 de 18/10, Determina a integração da Polícia Judiciária no Ministério do Interior e altera a sua designação para Polícia de Investigação Criminal; (Decree 25/75 of 18/10 determines the integration of the Judiciary Police in the Ministry of Interior and changes its designation into Criminal Investigation Police (PIC)).
Decreto 26/75 de 18/10, Cria, sob o Ministério do Interior, os serviços de actividades associativas e religiosas e de re-educação e refugiados; (Decree 26/75 of 18/10 creates new services under the Ministry of Interior, namely Religious and Association activities, Re-education services and Refugees).
Decreto-Lei 54/75 de 17/05, Cria o Corpo de Polícia de Moçambique; Decree- (Law 54/75 of 17/05, establishes the Police Corps of Mozambique).
Decreto Presidencial 69/83 de 29/12, Define as atribuições do Ministério da Justiça; (Presidential Decree 69/83 of 29/12, defines the attributions of the Ministry of Justice).
Decreto 3/86 de 25/07, Aprova o Regulamento de Previdência Social e Reforma nas Forças Armadas de Moçambique; (Decree 3/86 of 25/07, Approves the regulations of social security and pensions in the Mozambican Armed Forces).
498
Decreto 8/87 de 30/01, Regulamento do Investimento Directo Estrangeiro; (By-law containing regulations on Foreign Direct Investment in Mozambique).
Decreto 26/90 de 29/11, Concernente à Permissão do exercicío de actividade e protecção e segurança de pessoas e bens sob forma de empresas de segurança privada e aprova o seu Regulamento; (Decree 26/90 of 29/11, Concerns the authorisation and regulations of the activity of private security enterprises).
Decreto 15/2000 de 20/06, Estabelece as formas de articulação dos orgãos locais do Estado com as autoridades comunitárias; (Decree 15/2000 of 20/06, institutes ways of articulation of Local State Organs with Community Authorities).
Decreto12/2002 de 06/06, Regulamento da Lei de Florestas e Fauna Bravia; (Decree 12/2002 of 06/06, By-law containing the regulations of the Law on Forestry and Wildlife)
Decreto 48/2003 de 24/12, Aprova a Estrutura Orgânica das Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique; (Decree 48/2003 of 24/12, Approves the organic structure of the Mozambican armed forces).
Decreto 7/2006 de 17/05, Cria o Serviço Nacional das Prisões; (Decree 7/2006 of 17/05, Creates the National Prison Service).
Decreto 35/2006 de 06/09, Aprova o Regulamento de Criação e Funcionamento da Polícia Municipal; (Decree 35/2006 of 06/09, Approves the By-Law of Creation and Operation of the Municipal Police).
Decreto 50/2009 de 11/09, Cria a Comissão de Mediação e Arbitragem Laboral (COMAL) e aprova o respectivo Regulamento; (Decree 50/2009 of 11/09, Creates the Commission of Mediation and Labour Arbitration, and approves the respective Regulations).
Decreto 9/2010 de 15/04, Aprova o Estatuto Orgânico da Autoridade Tributária de Moçambique e revoga o Decreto n° 29/2006, de 30 de Agosto; (Decree 9/2010 of 15/04, Approves the Organic Statute of the Customs Authority of Mozambique and revokes Decree 29/2006 of 30 August).
Decreto 63/2013 de 06/12, Aprova o Estatuto Orgânico do Serviço Nacional Penitenciário, abreviadamente designado por SERNAP; (Decree 63/2013 of 06/12, Approves the Organic Statute of the National Penitenciary Service, which will use the acronym SERNAP).
499
Decreto 6/2000 de 04/04, Cria a Unidade Técnica da Reforma do Sector Público (UTRESP); (Decree 6/2000 of 4/04, Creates the Technical Unit for the Public Sector Reform).
Diploma Ministerial 81/95 de 07/06/95, Publica o Estatuto Orgânico do Ministério da Defesa Nacional; (Ministerial Diploma 81/95 of 07/06/95, Publishes the organic statute of the ministry of national defense).
EU FED/2009/21701, Project of Support to the Institutional Development of the Ministry of Interior, Representation of the European Union Commission in Mozambique.
GPA (1992) Protocol IV.I.2a Acordo Geral de Paz de Moçambique/ General Peace Agreement of Mozambique African European Institute: Amsterdam.
GPA (1992) Protocol IV.6.iii.1)c) Acordo Geral de Paz de Moçambique/ General Peace Agreement of Mozambique African European Institute: Amsterdam.
GPA (1992) Protocol IV/IV, IV/V Acordo Geral de Paz de Moçambique/ General Peace Agreement of Mozambique African European Institute: Amsterdam.
Acórdão n° 5/CC/2007 de 26/11, Concernente ao Decreto Presidencial n° 25/2005, de 27 de Abril (declara a sua inconstitucionalidade); (Judgement decision 5/CC/2007 of 26/011, relating to the Presidential Decree n°25/2005 of 27/04 (declared unconstitutional).
Lei 4/78 de 23/03, Institui o Serviço Militar Obrigatório, para todos os cidadãode ambos os sexos; (Law 4/78 of 23/03, Institutes Compulsory Militar Service, for all citizens of both sexes).
Lei 12/78 de 02/12, Estabelece a Organização Judiciária; (Law 12/78 of 02/12 establishes the Judiciary Organisation).
Lei 2/79 de 01/03; Institui os Crimes contra a segurança do povo e do Estado Popular; (Law 2/79 of 01/03 institutes the Crimes against the Security of the People and of the People’s State).
Lei 3/79 de 29/03, Estabelece o Tribunal Militar Revolucionário; (Law 3/79 of 29/03, establishes the Military Revolutionary Court).
Lei 5/79 de 26/05, Cria a Polícia Popular de Moçambique; (Law 5/79 of 26/05 establishes the People’s Police of Mozambique).
500
Lei 5/83 de 31/03; Institui punições severas (includindo chicotadas) para os inimigos da revolução; (Law 5/83 of 31/03 institutes severe punishment (including public flogging) for the enemies of the revolution).
Lei 4/84 de 18/08, Aprova a Lei de Investimentos Estrangeiros na República Popular de Moçambique; (Law 4/84 of 18/08, on Foreign Direct Investment in Mozambique).
Lei 6/89 de 19/09, Extingue a Procuradoria da República e cria a Procuradoria-Geral da República; (Law 6/89 of 19/09, extinguishes the Republic’s Prosecution Office and creates the Office of the Attorney-General of the Republic).
Lei 20/91 de 23/08, Cria o Serviço de Informação e Segurança de Estado (SISE); (Law 20/91 of 23/08, establishes the intelligence services).
Lei 4/92 de 06/05, Lei dos Tribunais Comunitários; (Law 4/92 of 06/05, establishes community courts).
Lei 15/92 de 14/10, Amnistia para crimes cometidos entre 1979 e 1992; (Law 15/92 of 14/10, grants an amnesty for crimes carried-out between 1979 and 1992).
Lei 19/92 de 31/12, Aprova a nova organização institucional da Polícia da República de Moçambique; (Law 19/92 of 31/12, approves a new institutional organisation for the Mozambican police).
Lei 02/96 de 04/10, Regulamenta e disciplina o direito de apresentar petições, queixas e reclamações perante autoridade competente; (Law 02/96 of 04/10, provides regulations and discipline upon the right of presenting petitions, complaints and protest s before due entities).
Lei 17/97 de 07/10, Aprova a Política de Defesa e Segurança; (Law 17/97 of 07/10, Approves the defence and security policy).
Lei 18/97 de 07/10, Aprova a Lei da Defesa Nacional das Forças Armadas; (Law 18/97 of 07/10, Approves the national defence law of the armed forces).
Lei 10/99 de 12/07, Estabelece os princípios e normas básicos sobre a protecção, conservação e utilização sustentável dos recursos florestais e faunísticos; (Law 10/99 of 12/07, Establishes the principles and norms for protection, conservation and sustainable use of forestry and fauna resources).
Lei 11/99 de 12/07, Rege a Arbitragem, a Conciliação e a Mediação como meios alternativos de resolução de conflitos (Law 11/99 of 12/07, Rules the Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation as alternative means of conflict resolution).
501
Lei 2/2005 de 12/04, Altera os artigos 2,3 e 5 da Lei n° 8/96 de 5 de Julho, que cria o Conselho Nacional de Defesa e Segurança; (Law 2/2005 of 12/04, modifies articles 2, 3 and 5 of Law 8/96 of 5 July which creates the National Council of Defence and Security).
Lei 01/2006 de 22/03, Cria a Autoridade Tributária de Moçambique; (Law 01/2006 of 22/03,creates Mozambique’s Tax Authority).
Lei 07/2006 de 16/08, Estabelece o âmbito de actuação, Estatuto, as competências e o processo de funcionamento do Provedor de Justiça; (Law 07/2006 of 16/08, establishes the scope of action, statute, competences and functioning of the Justice Ombudsman).
Lei 22/2007 de 01/08, Atinente à Lei Orgânica do Ministério Público e Estatuto dos Magistrados do Ministério Público; (Law 22/2007 of 01/08, concerning the Organic Law of the Public Ministry and the Statute of its Magistrates).
Lei 24/2007 de 20/08, Aprova a lei de organização judiciária e revoga a Lei n° 10/92, de 06 de Maio; (Law 24/2007 of 20/08, approves the law of the judiciary organisation and revokes Law 10/92 of 06 May).
Lei 19/2009 de 10/09, Revisão à Lei que cria a Autoridade Tributária de Moçambique; (Law 19/2009 of 10/09, revises the law that creates the Tax Authority).
Lei 3/2013 de 16/01, Cria o Serviço Nacional Penitenciário, abreviadamente designado SERNAP; (Law 3/2013 of 16/01, creates the National Penitenciary Service, which uses the acronym SERNAP).
Lei 4/2014 de 05/02, Cria o Serviço Nacional de Migração; (Law 4/2014 of 05/02, creates the National Immigration Service).
Lei 33/2009 de 22/12, Cria a Comissão Nacional dos Direitos Humanos e aprova o respectivo Estatuto; (Law 33/2009 of 22/12, creates the National Commission of Human Rights and approves the respective statute).
Ministério da Função Pública (2006) Programa da Reforma do Sector Público- Fase II (2006-2011), República de Moçambique; Ministry of the Civil Service (2006), Programme of the Public Sector Reform- Phase II (2006-2011), Republic of Mozambique.
Ministério da Justiça (12/2000) Relatório de Diagnóstico sobre o Ministério da Justiça, Unidade de Planificação, Ministério da Justiça, República de Moçambique (Ministry of Justice (12/2000) Diagnosis Report about the Ministry of Justice, Planning Unit, Ministry of Justice, Republic of Mozambique).
502
Minutes of the 4th ordinary session of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique, plenary session 14, 01/04/96.
Minutes of the 5th ordinary session of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique, plenary session 3, 31/10/96
Parliamentary Opinion Document 8/96 of 23/02, Commission of Human Rights, Legal and Constitutional Affairs of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique.
Parliamentary Opinion Document 1/96 of 28/02, Commission of Defence and Public Order of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique.
PEI I (2002) Plano Estratégico Integrado do Sector da Justiça 2002-2006, República de Moçambique; PEI I (2002), Integrated Strategic Plan of the Justice Sector 2002-2006, Republic of Mozambique.
PEI II (2009) Plano Estratégico Integrado da Justiça, República de Moçambique; PEI II (2009), Integrated Strategic Plan of the Justice Sector 2009-2014, Republic of Mozambique.
PEPRM (2003) Plano Estratégico da Polícia da República de Moçambique 2003-2012, Ministério do Interior, República de Moçambique; PEPRM (2003) Strategic Plan of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique 2003-2012, Ministry of Interior, Republic of Mozambique.
Portaria 17 710, 04/05/1960, Aprova as normas para a construção de prisões nas colónias; (Ordinance 17 710, 04/05/1960, approves norms for the building of prisons in the colonies).
Decreto Presidencial 5/2000 de 28/03, cria a Comissão Interministerial da Reforma do Sector Público-CIRESP; (Presidential Decree 5/2000 of 28/03, creates the Interministerial Commission for Public Sector Reform- CIRESP).
Despacho Presidencial n° 45/2004 de 02/02, Cria o Comando Conjunto das Forças de Defesa e Segurança de Moçambique; Presidential Order 45/2004 of 02/02, creates the Joint Command of the Defence and Security Forces.
Decreto Presidencial 25/2005 de 27/04, Cria o Conselho de Coordenação da Legalidade e Justiça; Presidential Decree 25/2005 of 27/04, creates the Council for Coordination of Legality and Justice.
Media Articles
A Tribuna Fax 24/02/2010, PGR alerta para risco de linchamento de inocentes, p.3.
503
Africa 12/1981, Mozambique: Purge of security forces, nr 124, pp. 39-40. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/governance/snasp/19811200_purge_of_se curity_forces.pdf
Africa Confidential 06/10/1978, Mozambique: Changing tune Vol19, nr 20, London. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/economy/conditions/19781006_economic_ policy_struggles.pdf
African Development 1976, Mozambique: Machel wants production not ideology, pp. 1236-1237. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/economy/conditions/19761200_machel_wa nts_production.pdf
Africa Now 1983, The black market bane- a case-study, March, pp. 43-46, London. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/economy/trade/candonga/19830300_black _market_bane.pdf
Afrique Asie 17/05/1976, Interview Exclusive du President Samora Machel: “Notre tâche principale: Batir Une Societe”, nr109, pp. IV-XI, Paris. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/people/samora_speeches/19760517_afriqu e-asie_interview.pdf
AIM 21/10/2010, Conselho dos desmobilizados desaconselha manifestações Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/noticias/news_folder_politica/outubro- 2010/conselho-dos-desmobilizados-desaconselha-manifestacoes
AIM News 18/12/2000, Prime Minister calls for action on Montepuez prison deaths Mozambique News Agency Report 197. Retrieved November 12, 2012, from http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim197.html#story4
AIM News 05/09/2001, Top banker murdered at Austral Bank Mozambique News Agency Report 214. Retrieved November 12, 2012, from http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim214.html#story1
504
AIM News 30/03/2007, Over a hundred dead as military arsenal explodes Retrieved 16/11/2012 from http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/newsletter/aim338.html
AIM News 28/04/2010, Customs Director brutally murdered Retrieved May 15, 2012, from http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=moza mbique&id=18179&tipo=one allAfrica 26/03/2008, Guebuza Sacks Defence Minister Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://allafrica.com/stories/200803260897.html allAfrica 27/04/2010, Mozambique: Customs Director murdered Retrieved November 13, 2012, from http://allafrica.com/stories/201004271148.html allAfrica 24/05/2011, Mozambique: former minister jailed for four years Retrieved November 13, 2012, from http://allafrica.com/stories/201105260257.html allAfrica 14/11/2012, Mozambique: Dhlakama threatens to destroy the country Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://allafrica.com/stories/201211150280.html allAfrica 22/04/2014, Sierra Leone: Key Note Address Delivered By His Excellency President Ernest Bai Koroma On the Occasion of the Launch of the Report of the Second Security Sector Review for Sierra Leone 2012, Miatta Conference Centre, Freetown Retrieved May 18, 2014, from http://allafrica.com/stories/201404221753.html
BBC 31/07/1993, Summary of World Broadcasts, Fifty MNR soldiers to be trained as instructors in unified army
BBC 17/09/1993, Summary of World Broadcasts, Dhlakama calls for disbandment of private armed groups
BBC 27/11/1993, Summary of World Broadcasts, Principles for future army approved; training of instructors near completion
BBC 24/06/1994, Summary of World Broadcasts, Commandos mutiny over pay and demobilization near Maputo
505
BBC África 09/01/2007, Alta funcionária prisional detida em Maputo Retrieved November 13, 2012, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/portugueseafrica/news/story/2007/01/070109_mozambiq ueprisonsfil.shtml
BBC África 16/03/2009, Moçambique vai combater criminalidade Retrieved April 17, 2010, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/portugueseafrica/news/story/2009/03/printable/090316_ mozcrimeaws.shtml
BBC News 25/05/2003, Anti-corruption conference starts Retrieved November 12, 2012, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2936458.stm
BBC News 01/09/2010, Deadly riots in Mozambique over rising prices Retrieved November 13, 2012, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11150063
Canal de Moçambique 06/08/2008, Governo dificulta reintegração dos desmobilizados de Guerra, p.2.
Canal de Moçambique 18/08/2008, Reina Oportunismo nos trabalhos de reabilitação, p. 2.
Canalmoz 21/05/2010, Renamo apresenta ao Governo as provas da partidarização do Estado Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2010/05/renamo-apresenta- ao-governo-as-provas-da-partidarização-do-estado.html
CanalMoz 14/10/2010, Desmobilizados de guerra já anunciaram as manifestações ao município de Maputo Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://comunidademocambicana.blogspot.com/2010/10/desmobilizados-de- guerra-ja-anunciaram.html
Canalmoz 27/04/2011, ‘Tubarões' continuam intocáveis Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://www.canalmoz.co.mz/component/content/article/6-artigos-2011/22189- tubaroes-continuam-intocaveis-.html
Canalmoz 18/05/2011, Mais de 600 mil meticais sacados dos cofres do Estado Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://www.canalmoz.co.mz/component/content/article/6-artigos-2011/22400- mais-de-600-mil-meticais-sacados-dos-cofres-do-estado-.html
506
Canalmoz 29/04/2012, Governo nega partidarização do Estado pela Frelimo Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://macua.blogs.com/mocambique_para_todos/2010/04/governo-nega- partidarização-do-estado-pela-frelimo.html
Canalmoz 13/11/2012, Queremos dizer a Guebuza você come bem, nós também queremos comer bem Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://www.canalmoz.co.mz/hoje/23959-queremos-dizer-a-guebuza-voce- come-bem-nos-tambem-queremos-comer-bem.html
Committee to Protect Journalists 22/11/2000, Carlos Cardoso Retrieved November 18, 2011, from http://cpj.org/killed/2000/carlos-cardoso.php
DefenceWeb 19/11/2012, Renamo threatens to destroy Mozambique Retrieved January 13, 2013, from http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id =28571&catid=74&Itemid=30
Diário de Moçambique 02/08/08, Homens armados da Renamo “desactivados” em Cheringoma, administrador Ricardo Guilande, p.2, Maputo.
Domingo 29/06/2008, “Far-se-ia melhor não fosse a guerra” Suplemento Especial/Independência, p.4, Maputo.
Escorpião 30/09/2008, Mabota céptica quanto ao pronuncio de combate a corrupção, p.4, Maputo.
Fim de Semana 04/08/08, Polícia quer inverter tendência de subida de crimes, p.7, Maputo.
Financial Times 03/11/1975, Mozambique between revolution and pragmatism, p.13, London. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/economy/conditions/19751103_revolution_ and_pragmatism.pdf
Herald 5/2/92, Maputo peace talks focus on document Retrieved May 14, 2015, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/history/peace_process/92/02/19920205_tal ks_focus_on_document.pdf
IPS News 11/07/2012, Mozambique’s “People from Germany” Wait Decades for Salaries Retrieved January 13, 2013, from
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http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/07/mozambiques-so-called-people-from- germany-wait-decades-for-salaries/
Jornal a Verdade 08/03/2012, Dois mortos, vários feridos ligeiros e 33 homens da Renamo detidos é o último balanço dos confrontos em Nampula Retrieved November 13, 2012, from http://www.verdade.co.mz/tema-de-fundo/35-themadefundo/25580-tiros-na- rua-dos-sem-medo-homens-da-renamo-tentam-fazer-manifestacao-policia- impede
Jornal a Verdade 18/10/2012, Dhlakama ameaça voltar à guerra Retrieved November 13, 2012, from http://www.verdade.co.mz/nacional/31354-dhlakama-ameaca-voltar-a-guerra
Jornal Notícias online 18/03/2014, Buscam-se Subsídios para Combater o Crime Retrieved April10, 2014, from http://jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/breves/12555-buscam-se-subsidios-para- combater-o-crime
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Notícias 14/06/1985, FDS trocam experiências do trabalho comum, Maputo. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/governance/snasp/19850614_fds_trocam_ experiencias.pdf
Notícias 22/10/1987, Casos dos 34 na Beira: Pronunciadas Sentenças contra 25 contrabandistas- 9 réus absolvidos por insuficiência de provas, Maputo. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/economy/trade/smuggling/19871022_caso _dos_34_na_beira.pdf
Notícias 25/01/92, Homens sem Rosto, Maputo. Retrieved June 16, 2015, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/economy/conditions/19920125_faceless_m en.pdf
Notícias 23/09/2008, Detido ex-ministro Almerino Manhenje, Maputo.
O País 01/08/2008, O Tribunal Judicial da Cidade de Maputo condenou, esta quinta-feira, a 21 anos de prisão, os três agentes da polícia envolvidos nas execuções sumárias… p.4, Maputo.
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Radio Maputo 27/06/1989, Mozambique: budget increase after prisoners die of starvation’, broadcast in English for abroad 1100 gmt, Maputo. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/justice/punishment/19890627_chimoio_pris on_scandal.pdf
RDP África 13/11/2012, Líder da Oposição ameaça “destruir” e “dividir” Moçambique Retrieved January 12, 2013, from http://www.rtp.pt/rdpafrica/index.php?t=Lider-da-oposicao-ameaca-destruir-e- dividir-Mocambique.rtp&article=688&visual=6&tm=10&headline=16
SABC 15/11/2012, Violent fee protests hit Mozambique Retrieved January 12, 2013, from http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/387b37804d76489bb567f5e570eb4ca2/Violent- fee-protests-hit-Mozambique--20121115
SADOCC 01/05/2003, Siba-Siba Macuacua’s killer arrested among growing anti-corruption climate Retrieved November 16, 2012, from http://www.sadocc.at/news/2003-127.shtml
Savana 25/09/1998, Cumprimos as Ordens de quem está no poder, pp. 2-4.
Savana 19/09/2003, Caso BCM: O Roteiro da fraude do século, p.2.
Savana 25/03/2005, Hermínio Morais denuncia discriminação no Exército, p.2.
Savana 15/08/2008, Alfandegários são uma amostra da população do país e da sua cultura, pp. 16-17.
Savana 29/08/2008, Homens armados voltam à ribalta.
Savana 20/02/2009, Tribunal iliba Manhenje em 48 crimes, p.2.
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Summary of World Broadcasts 06/10/1981, Machel’s Speech on Unjust Detentions in Re-education Camps, Part 4, The Middle East and Africa; B. Africa, page ME/6846/B/1 Retrieved June 6, 2012, from
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Taipei times 16/07/2004, Former Workers Occupy German Embassy Retrieved November 12, 2012, from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2004/07/16/2003179183
Tempo 27/08/1978, Resolução sobre casos disciplinares, nr 412, p.12, Maputo.
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Tempo 08/04/1979b, Execução já era uma decisão do povo, nr 443, p. 6, Maputo. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/justice/tmr/19790408_execucao_decisao_d o_povo.pdf
Tempo 15/04/1979, Grupos de Vigilância: Estudar a atuação inimiga, nr 444, p.14, Maputo. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/governance/snasp/19790415_estudar_actu acao_inimiga.pdf
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Tempo 15/11/1981, Ofensiva da Legalidade, nr 579, pp. 22-28, 37-41, Maputo. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/governance/snasp/19811115_ofensiva_da _legalidade.pdf
Tempo 28/02/1982, 400 elementos expulsos em dois anos do Ministério da Segurança, nr 594, Maputo. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/governance/snasp/19820228_400_expulso s.pdf
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The Namibian 08/12/2004, Militia scars Mozambique's era of peace Retrieved March 10, 2011, from http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?id=28&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=61 13&no_cache=1
The Times 21/12/81, Trial of black marketeers Retrieved June 10, 2015, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/economy/trade/candonga/19811221_trial_ of_black-marketeers.pdf
To the Point 31/10/1975, Political Police: Frelimo’s new iron fist nr 4(44), p. 44, Johannesburg. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/governance/snasp/19751031_political_poli ce.pdf
To the Point 03/06/1977, Machel re-education camps teach a tough lesson, p.54, Johannesburg. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/justice/reeducation/19770603_tough_lesso n.pdf
To the Point 20/07/1979, Machel’s Prisons - rape, brutality and starvation nr 8 (29), p. 36, Johannesburg. Retrieved June 6, 2012, from http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/justice/punishment/19790720_brutal_priso n_system.pdf
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Zambeze 14/11/2002, Julgamento do Ano começa na segunda-feira, p.3.
Zambeze 07/02/2008, Terramoto Social em Maputo,p.2.
Zambeze 24/04/2008, Desmobilizados ameaçam com manifestações de vulto, p.32.
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Zambeze 14/08/2008, Maringué é um dos pontos mais seguros do País.
Zambeze 14/08/2008, Vítima do Paiol ”morre” a fome e sede, p.22.
Zambeze 14/08/2008, Comissão da Verdade e Reconciliação precisa-se.
Zambeze 18/09/2008, “Não vamos aceitar que Frelimo ocupe todos os quartéis, comandos e chefias”: Militares da Renamo ameaçam partir a louça nas FADM, p.5. Zambeze 29/01/2009, PGR acusa três indivíduos de assassinarem Siba-Siba Macuácua, p.2.
Zambeze 09/04/2009, “Caso Siba-Siba” em instrução contraditória, p.2.
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APPENDIX A Interview Questions
Guiding questions for Police sector participants
1. Can you please explain the main differences in the management of public security during the periods 1975-1992 and 1992-to the present?
2. What lessons can be derived from the signing of Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (GPA) and its implementation in the field of public security, and particularly police reform? During the peace negotiations and after the signature of the Agreement, how was the re- structuring of the sector discussed and implemented? Would it have been possible to follow alternative routes, and if yes, which?
3. What have been the major areas addressed under police reform programmes? Which criteria guided the setting of priorities and how are they being implemented? What are the main drivers and obstacles of these reforms? How have short-term needs been reconciled with long- term objectives?
4. Who were the main international cooperation partners and which projects have been implemented with their support? What criteria guided the choice of these partners and respective projects? How have the leadership and ownership of the reforms been ensured?
5. How does the Ministry of Interior (Mint) planning cycle function (at your level, i.e., central, provincial, district, administrative post)? Are procedures the same as those adopted by the other ministries? What can you say about the way the budget is managed?
6. What have been the greatest human resource management challenges? What inspection and disciplinary mechanisms exist in the MInt and in the PRM? Which mechanisms of external oversight exist and how would you characterise the relationship between these mechanisms, including CSO and the media?
7. What mechanisms of intersection/ coordination exist with the other prominent areas of the security sector, in particular defence and justice? Which are the main differences in terms of the institutional/operational culture of each of these areas and how does that impact collaboration?
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8. What has been the impact of police reforms in the developments within the defence sector? What is the impact of the on-going public sector reform process in the MInt/PRM? What lessons can be extracted from these processes? From which countries and their ‘lessons learned’ has Mozambique gained insight into how to manage public security and police reforms?
9. The National Security and Defence Law was approved without the development of a prior wider security framework/strategy. In your opinion what were the implications of this fact? Is there a need for such a strategy/framework? If so, then who should be responsible and what measures do you feel need to be carried out?
10. What entry-points have existed that could have been utilised to advance the reforms in the area of public security/policing in Mozambique?
Guiding questions for Defence sector participants
1. Can you please explain the main differences in defence management during the periods 1975-1992 and 1992-to the present
2. What lessons can be derived from the signing of Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (GPA) and its implementation in the field of defence, and especially of the armed forces reform? During the peace negotiations and after the signature of the Agreement, how was the re- structuring of the sector discussed and implemented? Would it have been possible to follow alternative routes, and if yes, which?
3. What have been the major areas addressed under defence reform programmes? Which criteria guided priority setting and how are they being implemented? What are the main drivers and obstacles of these reforms? How have short-term needs been reconciled with long-term objectives?
4. Who have been the main international cooperation partners and which projects have been implemented with their support? What criteria have guided the choice of these partners and respective projects? How have the leadership and ownership of the reforms been ensured?
5. How does the Ministry of Defence (MoD) planning cycle function (at your level, i.e., central, provincial, district, administrative post)? Are procedures the same as those adopted by the other ministries? What can you say about the way the budget is managed?
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6. In terms of human resource management what were the main challenges? What inspection and disciplinary mechanisms exist in the MoD and in the FADM? And which mechanisms of external oversight exist and how would you characterise the relationship between these mechanisms, including CSO and the media?
7. What is the status of: o the military justice system o the system of promotions o the training of the FADM o the civil-military relations
8. What mechanisms of intersection/ coordination exist with the other prominent areas of the security sector, in particular the police and justice? What are the main differences in terms of institutional/operational culture of each of these areas and how does that impact collaboration?
9. What was the impact of defence reforms within the developments of the public security/PRM? What is the impact of the on-going public sector reform process in the MoD/FADM? Which lessons can be extracted from these processes? From which countries and their ‘lessons learned’ has Mozambique gained insight into how to manage defence reforms?
10. The National Security and Defence Law was approved without the development of a prior wider security framework/strategy. In your opinion what have been the implications of this fact? Is there a need for such strategy/framework? If so, then who should be responsible and what measures do you feel need to be carried out?
11. What entry-points have existed that could have been utilised to advance the reforms in the area of defence in Mozambique?
Guiding questions for Justice sector participants
1. Can you please explain the main differences in the functioning of the justice system during the periods 1975-1992 and 1992-to the present?
2. What lessons can be derived from the signing of Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (GPA) and its implications for the justice sector? During the peace negotiations and after the signature of the agreement, was the re-structuring of the sector discussed, and if not what were the consequences? Would it have been possible to follow alternative routes, and if yes, which?
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3. What have been the implications for justice and reconciliation in Mozambique deriving from the absence of a restorative justice process?
4. What have been the major areas addressed under justice reform programmes? Which criteria guided priority setting and how are they being implemented? What are the main drivers and obstacles of these reforms? How have short-term needs been reconciled with long-term objectives?
5. In your opinion what was the role played by donors in terms of the start- off/timing of the reforms in the justice sector? Who have been the main international cooperation partners and which projects have been implemented with their support? What criteria have guided the choice of these partners and respective projects? How have leadership and ownership of the reforms been ensured?
6. What is and how does the planning cycle of the MJus work (at your level, i.e., central, provincial, district)? Are procedures the same as those adopted by the other ministries? What can you say about the way the budget is managed?
7. What have been the greatest human resource management challenges? What institutional control mechanisms exist in the justice system? What mechanisms of external oversight exist and how would you characterise the relationship with these mechanisms, including CSO and the media?
8. How does the separation of powers work in practice in Mozambique? Is the judicial branch truly independent?
9. What mechanisms of intersection/ coordination exist with the other prominent areas of the security sector, in particular the defence and police? What are the main differences in terms of institutional/operational culture of each of these areas and how does that impact collaboration?
10. What was/is the impact of justice reforms in the developments of the police? What is the impact of the on-going public sector reform process in the MJus and remaining Justice system institutions? Which lessons can be extracted from these processes? From which countries and their ‘lessons learned’ has Mozambique gained insight into how to manage its justice system?
11. What entry-points have existed that could have been utilised to advance the reforms in the area of justice reforms in Mozambique?
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Guiding questions for participants representing International Cooperation partners
1. What lessons can be derived from the signing of Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (GPA) and its implementation? Can you offer your views on the country in terms of post-war reconstruction? What strategic frameworks and policy-making underlined this process? Why was it successful and what are the elements that make peace sustainable?
2. What is your analysis of the reforms that have occurred in the security sector in Mozambique, post-conflict and until today?
3. How has your country/organisation contributed towards SSR efforts (in the field of defence, police and justice) in Mozambique? Under which policy frameworks, in conjunction with which concrete programmes and/or projects? What have been the constraints and achievements of the process?
4. Has sequencing within the different reforms of the security sector been factored into your country’s support programmes throughout the last 16 years? In what terms?
5. What has been the level of collaboration and ownership of SSR programmes and/or projects exhibited by successive Mozambican Governments?
6. How do the SSR initiatives supported by your country contribute to strengthening the relationship between security and development in Mozambique (in the short, medium and long term)? How do these activities fit within Mozambique’s wider reform frameworks under the Vision of the 20-25 Agenda, PRSP/PARPA and Public Sector Reforms?
7. How does your country/institution deal with policy and implementation coherence in such a process? - Between development co-operation, trade, diplomatic, military and financial instruments of foreign policy? - Between multilateral institutions (UN, EU, IMF-WB, OECD, etc.) and bilateral partner countries?
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Guiding questions for participants representing the Parliament, CSOs, Academia and the Media
1. Can you please explain the main differences in the functioning of the state and society during the periods 1975-1992 and 1992-to the present? How do you see the impact of democratisation, rule of law and separation of powers?
2. What lessons can be derived from the signing and implementation of Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (GPA)? Which factors have contributed towards its success and the sustainability of peace? How was the reconstruction period managed?
3. What were/are the implications for justice and reconciliation in Mozambique deriving from the absence of a restorative justice process?
4. What do you think about the reforms that have been taking place in the defence, police and justice arenas? How do these activities fit within Mozambique’s wider reform frameworks under the Vision of the 20-25 Agenda, PRSP/PARPA and Public Sector Reforms? Do reforms translate into benefits for the lives of common citizens?
5. How do you see the role of the donors in terms of the kick off/timing of the reforms in the security and justice system? How have leadership and ownership of the reforms by Mozambicans been ensured?
6. What is/ how is your institutional relationship with the ministries of the areas mentioned above? Is it easy to obtain information, dialogue and collaborate on specific initiatives?
7. How do you rate ‘civil-security’ relations in Mozambique? What explains the limited performance of Mozambique’s civil society in their interactions with the security and justice sector and their reforms?
8. What entry-points have existed that could have been utilised to advance the reforms in the area of justice reforms in Mozambique?
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Guiding questions for focus groups with Local Communities
1. How are the community's daily activities and management organised? What are the main constraints and what improvements have been made since the end of the war?
2. What is the situation like in terms of education and health services?
3. What is the biggest economic activity in this area?
4. What are the main forms of criminality in this community?
5. What is the performance of the police and the defence forces like (whenever they are stationed nearby) and what is their impact on community life?
6. What are the mechanisms of conflict resolution utilised in this community? Can you exemplify in practice how they work?
7. Do you need to have a local group in charge of your own policing? How are they chosen, how do they operate and how is this articulated with the police?
8. Do you have a working community court? How does it work and how does it articulate with the council of elders (in case you have them) and with the formal system of justice, i.e., the district police and court?
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APPENDIX B
Consent Form
Protocol Title: Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Environments: An Analysis of Coherence and Sequencing in Mozambique
PLEASE READ THIS CONSENT FORM CAREFULLY BEFORE DECIDING TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY.
Purpose of the research study: To extract lessons learned and examples of positive and negative practices in complex post-conflict reconstruction scenarios, taking into account the analysis of defence and security in the case of Mozambique.
What you will be asked to do in the study: You will be asked to participate in this research by granting an interview and potentially providing relevant documentation.
Time required: Approximately between 45 m and 1h30m
Confidentiality: Your identity will be kept confidential by assigning your information with a code number, in lieu of any personally identifying information. The list connecting your name to this number will be kept in a protected file in a location other than that of the interview transcripts. When the study is completed and the data has been analysed, the list will be destroyed. The analysis of the information may be utilised in academic publications, but the name of the interviewee will never be cited. Your name will not be used in any report.
Voluntary participation: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. There is no penalty for not participating. You may also refuse to answer any of the questions asked.
Right to withdraw from the study: You have the right to withdraw from the study at anytime without consequence.
Whom to contact if you have questions about the study:
Dr. Neil Cooper, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK
R.N.Cooper@ Bradford.ac.uk
Agreement: I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the research and I have received a copy of this description.
Participant: ______Date: ______
Researcher: ______Date: ______
Anícia Lalá § [email protected] § [email protected]
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Formulário de Consentimento
Título do Trabalho: Reformas do Sector de Segurança no Pós-conflito: Uma análise sobre Coerência e Sequência em Moçambique
POR FAVOR LEIA ATENTAMENTE ESTE DOCUMENTO ANTES DE DECIDIR PARTICIPAR NESTE ESTUDO
Objectivo do Trabalho de Pesquisa: Proceder ao levantamento de lições aprendidas (lessons learned) e exemplos de práticas positivas e negativas em cenários complexos de reconstrução pós-guerra, tendo por base a análise das reformas da Defesa e Segurança no caso de Moçambique.
Neste estudo ser-lhe-á pedido que contribua através da concessão de uma entrevista e eventualmente a disponibilização de documentação relevante.
Tempo necessário: Aproximadamente entre 45m e 1h30m.
Confidencialidade: A confidencialidade será assegurada através da utilização de um sistema de codificação numérica das entrevistas, retirando qualquer dado pessoal que possa levar à identificação do (a) entrevistado (a). A lista contendo a ligação entre o nome do entrevistado e o número específico será mantida em local diferente do das transcrições das entrevistas. Quando o estudo terminar e a informação for analisada, a lista será destruída. A análise da informação poderá ser utilizada no contexto de publicações académicas, mas o nome do entrevistado nunca será citado ou utilizado nos trabalhos que eventualmente possam vir a ser publicados.
Participação Voluntária: A sua participação neste estudo é completamente voluntária e não existe qualquer penalização caso decida não participar. Poderá igualmente recusar responder a quaisquer das perguntas que lhe forem colocadas.
Direito de terminar a entrevista antecipadamente (parcialmente ou por completo): Tem o direito de se retirar deste estudo em qualquer altura e sem quaisquer consequências.
Se tiver dúvidas ou necessitar de algum esclarecimento sobre o estudo poderá contactar: Dr. Neil Cooper, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK
R.N.Cooper@ Bradford.ac.uk
Expressão de Concordância: Li os procedimentos acima descritos e concordo participar voluntariamente. Recebi uma cópia desta descrição.
Entrevistado: ______Data: ______
Pesquisador: ______Data: ______
Anícia Lalá § [email protected] § [email protected]
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