Usi Lan Ai: the Raja Who Died by Fire the Death of Raja Bil Nope in Netherlands Timor, 1910
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STEVEN FARRAM Usi Lan Ai: the raja who died by fire The death of Raja Bil Nope in Netherlands Timor, 1910 Introduction In the latter half of the nineteenth century the Dutch administration in the Neth- erlands Indies adopted a policy of ‘abstention’ or non-interference with the many native domains throughout the archipelago. In Netherlands Timor this meant in effect that the majority of the territory was under complete Timorese control. In the early twentieth century, however, this policy was overturned and the Dutch actively set out to confirm their authority throughout the Neth- erlands Indies. This change in policy had dire consequences for many of the indigenous rulers in Netherlands Timor and led to the virtual destruction of the once great Sonbai kingdom during the ensuing pacificatie or pacification campaigns. Other rulers, however, found that by allying themselves with the Dutch they could strengthen their positions and rid themselves of rivals, both from within and outside their kingdoms. Such was the case of the keizer of Amanuban, Hau Sufa Leu, also known as Raja Bil Nope, who welcomed the Dutch into his kingdom in 1906. By 1910, however, Bil Nope was totally dis- enchanted with the Dutch administration and rose in revolt, vowing that he would rather die in battle than continue to suffer the humiliations brought on him by Dutch rule. In October 1910 Bil Nope and a handful of loyal follow- ers barricaded themselves in the raja’s sonaf (palace) and engaged the Dutch forces outside in a gun battle. Bil Nope and all who remained with him were killed when the palace was set on fire and burnt to the ground. What follows is an overview of the situation in Netherlands Timor before the pacification campaigns, and a discussion of the Dutch change in policy in the early twentieth century. Then, in order to place in context the later revolt of Bil Nope, a brief description is given of the revolt of Sonbai and the Dutch response. This is followed by an account of Bil Nope’s interactions with the Dutch administration that resulted in his fatal revolt. The paper concludes STEVEN FARRAM is a research associate at the Charles Darwin University, Darwin, where he also obtained his PhD. His main academic interest is the history and politics of Indonesia and East Timor. He is the author of ‘Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart and the British interregnum in Netherlands Timor, 1812-1616’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 163:455-75, 2007, and, ‘Wage war against Beatle music! Censorship and music in Soekarno’s Indonesia’, RIMA 41-2:246-77, 2007. Dr Farram may be contacted at [email protected]. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI) 165-2/3 (2009):191-215 © 2009 Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 192 Steven Farram with the conjecture that Dutch authorities later tried to cover up the affair and remove it from outside scrutiny. Background to the Dutch pacification of Netherlands Timor During the first Dutch expedition to Timor in 1613 the commander Apollo- nius Scotte made an agreement with the Helon ruler of the Kupang area. This agreement allowed the Dutch to establish a settlement at Kupang Bay and to participate in the local sandalwood trade.1 However, it was not until 1653 that the Dutch finally established themselves in Kupang, where they built a for- tress named Concordia that was to be their stronghold in Netherlands Timor for nearly 300 years. In the early nineteenth century the Dutch also established a settlement at Atapupu on the north coast near the present central border, but outside of these two ‘Government Territories’ the Dutch had no control and rarely entered the interior. A number of punitive expeditions were made against kingdoms such as Sonbai and Amanuban in retaliation for raids made on settlers in the outlying districts of Kupang or for warlike actions against other kingdoms friendly with the Dutch administration.2 By the second half of the nineteenth century, however, a policy of non-interference, aimed at limiting administrative costs, was put into effect throughout the Netherlands Indies, resulting in further restraints on Dutch activity outside of the directly governed territories. In the early twentieth century the Dutch overturned this policy and began the pacification campaigns in Netherlands Timor to confirm their authority and bring an end to headhunting and warfare between the indigenous states. Andrew McWilliam (1999:129) has characterized the indigenous Timorese domains as being of ‘considerable complexity and variability’. These domains were not static entities and there had been a marked tendency for them to fuse and integrate into larger federations and an equal counter-tendency for them to divide into smaller, independent territories. As McWilliam describes it, the process was dependent on the ‘relative capacity of competing political 1 Schulte Nordholt 1971:167. A detailed account based on Dutch records of the seventeenth- century sandalwood trade can be found in De Roever 2002. 2 For example, in 1814 forces from Amanuban made an incursion into Amabi, a kingdom con- sidered to be one of the most loyal allies of the Dutch. This was during the British interregnum in Netherlands Timor, but nevertheless, the punitive expedition sent to Amanuban was accompa- nied by the former Dutch resident, J.A. Hazaart. The expedition was inconclusive, as were a series of campaigns against Amanuban that Hazaart led after the return of Dutch rule (Heijmering 1847:217; Farram 2007:471). There were further Dutch expeditions against Amanuban and Sonbai in 1847, 1849 and 1857 (Ormeling 1956:147). Usi Lan Ai: the raja who died by fire 193 centres to attract and maintain networks of alliances’.3 The Dutch interven- tion in the early twentieth century brought an end to this process by defining the boundaries of the indigenous states and the powers of their rulers. By entering into contracts agreeing to support these rulers the Dutch also ended the likelihood of successful internal revolt. The Dutch effort to impose rust en orde (peace and order) in their terri- tory was not confined to Timor. Military campaigns to impose formal Dutch control were carried out in various parts of the archipelago, including Jambi (1901-1907) and Kerinci (1902-1903) on Sumatra, Seram in Maluku (1904), Banjarmasin in Kalimantan (1904-1906), Bone and elsewhere in Sulawesi (1905-1907), and Bali (1906 and 1908) (Locher-Scholten 1994:95). Other European powers at the time were similarly keen to extend the territory under their control and the years 1870 to 1914 have often been designated as the period of ‘new imperialism’.4 While the Dutch were consolidating their position in Netherlands Timor, the Portuguese were doing the same in their half of the island5 and expanding their control in Africa as well. In the same period, the long-standing imperial powers Britain and France were extend- ing their territories and new players appeared on the scene, such as Belgium, Germany and Italy. Dutch policy on territorial expansion was affected by the conduct of the Aceh War. Pepper-rich Aceh in northern Sumatra had had reason to fear Dutch expansion, but the Dutch in turn had feared that Aceh would pre-empt Dutch action by seeking the intervention of other powers, such as Turkey, 3 McWilliam (1999:129, 131) describes the ideal Timorese domain as being made up of four sub-districts surrounding a fifth sacral ruling centre. The sub-districts supplied the ruling centre with harvest tribute and in return received ritual services to ensure the prosperity and fertility of the land. In this system the ruling centre relied on the support of the independent sub-district rulers. As Schulte Nordholt (1971:307-10) explains it, the situation was somewhat different in Amanuban, as the Nope clan had to a great extent managed to gain control of the whole domain. Such a situation could not last indefinitely, and when a number of Bil Nope’s subordinates began to revolt against his rule he made the fatal decision to seek assistance from the Dutch. 4 Some useful works on this topic are Owen and Sutcliffe 1972 and Fieldhouse 1982. Fieldhouse 1983 gives a succinct explanation of the issues. 5 The Portuguese had to control a number of revolts in their half of the island in the late nine- teenth and early twentieth centuries. A major revolt began in 1911, ostensibly led by the ruler of Manufahi, Dom Boaventura, and was only crushed after two years of fighting. After 1913 the po- sition of the Portuguese as the supreme ruling power in East Timor went virtually unchallenged. The violent methods used to establish Portuguese rule did not go unnoticed, and in 1914 a former resident of Netherlands Timor, F. Fokkens (1914:644-5), wrote that the Portuguese in Timor had been accused of ‘bestial cruelty’ and ‘atrocities’. With disarming frankness, Fokkens said that similar accusations had been levelled at the Dutch in various parts of the Indies, but concluded that such acts were understandable when turning ‘pretended claims’ into ‘real claims’. For more on the consolidation of colonial rule in Portuguese Timor, see Davidson 1994; Pélissier 1996; Schli- cher 1996. 194 Steven Farram France or America. Such intervention did not occur and in the early 1870s the Dutch attacked Aceh and occupied the capital Kota Radja (Banda Aceh). The Acehnese, however, would not surrender, and resistance continued for decades (Ricklefs 1990:136-7). Military resources destined for other areas were reassigned to Aceh. The monetary and human costs made the Dutch wary of any other imperial venture in case it should turn into ‘a second Aceh’. Such fears began to dissipate in 1894 when a clear victory was achieved on Lombok after a short campaign.