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© in This Web Service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00471-9 - Britain’s Two World Wars Against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight Brian Bond Index More information INDEX Advanced Air Striking Force 29, 147 Beyond the Fringe 11 Aldington, Richard 4 Blackadder Goes Forth 21–22, 48–49, All Our Yesterdays newsreels 10 127 Allies, WWII strategy 145, 146–163 Blitzkrieg 70, 147 Amiens blood transfusion 71 Battle of 64, 140–141 Blunden, Edmund 4, 126–143 Gestapo prison bombing 107 Bomber Command Anzio, combat conditions 80–81 defence of British Isles 36 appeasement 28, 170 strategic bombing of Germany area bombing 112–114 100–124 Armistice, WWI 95, 166, 167–168 accuracy 106–107, 112–114 Army–Air co-operation, failure of 147 arguments in favour of 102 Arnhem 160–161 Berlin 105 casualties 161 casualties 105, 115–116, 117, 123: Arras, Second Battle of friendly fire 108–109 improvements in warfare 132–133 contribution to victory 123 tunnels 132–133 criticism of 102–103, 119–122 artillery, WWI, modernisation 55, 129, Dam Busters raid 106–107 131, 132–133, 136–137 Dresden 114–119 Asquith, Herbert Henry, German Hamburg 105 invasion of Belgium 27 Lancaster bombers 104, 110, 115 Attlee, Clement 165 Mosquito fighter-bomber 106–107, Australian Corps, WWI 139–140, 142 110, 115 oil targets 111–112, 114, 116 B-17 bombers 115 Operation Overlord 106, 107–109 battlefield conditions P51 Mustang fighter-bomber WWI 4–5 109–110 Western Front 4–5 railways 112 WWII 4 Ruhr 104–105, 112 Belgium, threat from Germany 1914 27 Sir Arthur Harris: bombing priorities Berlin, bombing of 105 110–115; successes 104–105 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00471-9 - Britain’s Two World Wars Against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight Brian Bond Index More information 185 / Index bombing cavalry, WWI 142 Bomber Command 100–124 Chamberlain, Sir Neville Luftwaffe 101 appeasement of Hitler 28, 170 Britain Hitler’s opinion of 28–29, 170 post-WWI hopes Hitler will withdraw 29, 32 industrial and financial crisis 169, reluctance to bomb Germany 101 175–176 Chantilly, Allied Military Conference military position 168 1915 34 national prestige 170 Christmas Truce 1914 65 public appreciation of Army Churchill, Sir Winston 169–170 aggressive strategy 172–173 WWI appeasement of Roosevelt and Stalin economic vulnerability 90 171–172 friction with Allies 37 as saviour of nation 60, 61 peace negotiation with Germany 37 as writer 9–10 propaganda against Germany attitude to bombing campaign 101 38–39 electoral defeat 1945 165 WWII, loss of power 7, 164, 173–174 First Lord of the Admiralty 26 British Army, WWII, learning process keeps France in WWII 32–33 144–163 on persecution of Jews 13, 14–15 British Expeditionary Force optimistic strategy post-Dunkirk WWI 31, 49–51 33–34 combat conditions 62–63: boredom plan to attack Soviet Union 1945 68; comradeship 68;restand 174–175 recreation 66–67; training and Poland 1945 174 fatigues 67 portrayal by Hitler 40 improvements in warfare 137 Potsdam Conference 175 problems of expansion 49–50 Prime Minister 1940 171 unpreparedness at outset 127–130 promotion of tank warfare 43 WWII 29, 55–56 reputation as leader 7, 9 see also Field Force support for Gallipoli campaign 31 Britten, Benjamin, War Requiem 23 support for strategic bombing of Broodseinde, Battle of 135 Germany 120 Brooke, Rupert, Peace 62 The Second World War 3, 9, 162 Burma campaign 36 The Valiant Years 9 The World Crisis, criticism of generals Cambrai, Battle of, improved artillery 43–44 136–137 WWII propaganda 5 Canadian Corps, WWI 142 Yalta Conference 174 Casablanca Conference 1943 173 cinema casualties interpretation of WWI 2 WWI 3, 70–71, 72, 138–139 Battle of Somme 4 WWII 6, 70–71, 72 interpretation of WWII 3, 10–11 Arnhem 161 Clark, Alan, The Donkeys 18, Bomber Command 105: Dresden 126–141 115–116, 117; friendly fire comics, role in popularising WWII 10 108–109 command structure medical advances 71 WWI 141 Operation Overlord 158 WWII 146 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00471-9 - Britain’s Two World Wars Against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight Brian Bond Index More information 186 / Index communications comparison with WWII 68–71, North Africa campaign 152 86–87 North-West Europe, WWII 146 comradeship 68 Operation Overlord 160 rest and recreation 66–67 Western Front, WWI 50–51, 138, 141 training and fatigues 67 Communism, East and Central Europe communications 50–51, 138, 141 176 defence strategy 29–30, 31, 34–35, 37 comradeship, WWI 68 elite regiments 65, 66 concentration camps 1, 3, 13 futility of 1 conscription German atrocities 38 WWI 31–32 German reparations 166–167 WWII 5 German war aims 38 Coventry, bombing by Luftwaffe 101 leadership 42–55 creeping barrage 131, 132 media interpretation of 2, 63–64 military achievements 6–7 Dad’s Army 11 naval blockade 88–99 Dam Busters raid 106–107 restrictions on neutrals 91–92, 97 Declaration of London 88–89 negative stereotypical view of 1–3, 5, Desert Air Force 153 7, 8, 17–24, 126–127, 165 Dresden post-war settlements 6–7, 95, bombing of 114–119 165–169 political reaction to 116–117 reasons for Britain’s involvement 3–4, post-war arguments about 117–119 12 Dunkirk siege conditions 50, 62–63 Field Force 147, 148 state control of economy 32 Royal Air Force 147 transformation of warfare 6–7, 64, 125–143 Eastern Front, WWII, defeat of German artillery 55, 129, 131, 132–133, forces 3 136–137 Eden, Sir Anthony command structure 141 capture of Messines Ridge 134 Royal Flying Corps 55, 137–138, meeting with Karski 13–14 141 El Alamein, Battle of 153 tanks 55, 130–131, 136 evacuation, children 5 transport 50, 138 Treaty of Versailles 95, 165–169 Field Force 28, 29, 55–56, 73–86, 145, France 146, 149–153 invasion by Germany 1940 32–33, Dunkirk 147, 148 35–36 films see cinema ‘blessing’ for Britain 35–36 First World War Armistice 166, 167–168 Gallipoli campaign 31 attrition towards Germany 88–99 generals Britain’s failure to negotiate peace 37, cavalrymen 53–54 40 WWI 42–55 casualties 138–139 misconceptions about 51–55 comparison with WWII 70–71, 72 WWII 56–61 cavalry 142 see also leadership combat conditions 4–5, 62–63, 64–71 Germany boredom 68 armaments production © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00471-9 - Britain’s Two World Wars Against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight Brian Bond Index More information 187 / Index WWI 94–95 Hancock’s Half Hour 11 WWII 124 Harris, Sir Arthur atrocities, WWI 38 Chief of Bomber Command 103–104 control of Mediterranean 33 criticism of bombing priorities defeat 110–115 WWI 139–141, 168–169 oil targets 111–112, 116 WWII 41 successes in Germany 104–105 invasion of Low Countries and France Hastings, Max, criticism of strategic 32–33, 35–36 bombing 120–121 invasion of Poland 29, 31 Hitler, Adolf lack of hostility towards 1914 26 attack on Soviet Union 40 naval blockade by Royal Navy WWI occupation of Prague 1939 28 88–99 opinion of Chamberlain 28–29, 170 civilian death rate 93–94 opinion of Churchill 40 civilian shortages 90–91, 92–94, unsystematic strategy 33–34 95–97 Horrocks, Lieutenant General Sir Brian, military shortages 94 showmanship 71–72 professionalism WWI 51 idealism 15–16, 39 WWII 60, 145–146, 147, 149, Irving, David, The Destruction of 156–157 Dresden 117 reparations, WWI 166–167 Italy campaign 36, 155–156 strategic interest, WWI 4 combat conditions 77–81 submarine warfare, WWI 97, 99 threat to Belgium, WWI 27 Jews, persecution by Nazis 12–15 war aims, WWI 38 Journey’s End (R. C. Sherriff) 22 Gordon Highlanders, Normandy 82–83 Gort, Field Marshal Sir John, WWII Karski, Jan, reports of persecution of 146 Jews 13–14 Graves, Robert 4 Katyn Forest, massacre of Polish officers emphasis on horror of war 66, 14 126–143 King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 4th Grayling, A. C., criticism of strategic Batallion, combat conditions bombing 121–122 83–86 Grey, Sir Edward, response to German Kitchener, Field Marshal Lord, strategic invasion of Belgium 27 plan 30, 31, 62–63 Guards regiments 65 gunnery see artillery Lancaster bombers 104, 110, 115 Larkin, Philip 62 Haig, Sir Douglas leadership as national hero 169–170 WWI 42–55 attitude to new technology 55 age 54 attitude to Press 57–58 cavalrymen 53–54 criticism of 42 challenge of BEF expansion 49–50 Basil Liddell Hart 46–47 communications 50–51 Lloyd George 44–45 German professionalism 51, 60 Somme campaign 131–132 innovation 54–55 Hamburg, bombing of 105 misconceptions about: ‘lives of Hamel, capture of 139–140 luxury’ 51–53 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-00471-9 - Britain’s Two World Wars Against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight Brian Bond Index More information 188 / Index leadership (cont.) Monte Cassino, combat conditions WWII 56–61 78–80 charismatic 58–59 Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard lack of suitable officers 59 as all-conquering general 61 misconceptions about 53 Arnhem 160–161 League of Nations, President Woodrow commander of Eighth Army 153–155 Wilson 166 Operation Overlord 159–160 lend-lease agreement 171–172, 175 public relations 58–59, 71–72 Lewis gun 131 Mosquito fighter-bomber 106–107, 110, Liberal government 1914, ignorance of 115 warfare 26, 27, 29–30 Munich Agreement 1938 28 Liddell Hart, Captain Basil H.
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