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7 MIDSUMMER in the FORTRES S HE Failure of the 18Th Brigade

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7 MIDSUMMER in the FORTRES S HE Failure of the 18Th Brigade CHAPTER 7 MIDSUMMER IN THE FORTRES S HE failure of the 18th Brigade 's counter-attack marked the end of a T phase. No longer was it possible to regard the ground given up as a tem- porary loss to be recovered at first opportunity . The aim of re-establishing the perimeter on the original line, if not discarded, was at least deferred . The immediate emphasis changed to a policy of improving the new line opposite the Salient and of recovering organisation by reverting as far a s possible to normal brigade groupings through a succession of reliefs . There had been a degree of improvisation in the dispositions made to bloc k further penetration after the perimeter had been breached . The regrouping was to begin on the night of 4th-5th May . In the Salien t sector Lieut-Colonel Windeyer's 2/48th Battalion was ordered to take over the right of the new defence line from the two right-hand companie s of Lieut-Colonel Verrier's 2/ 10th Battalion, while Lieut-Colonel Martin's 2/9th Battalion, coming under command of Brigadier Murray's brigade , was to take over defences in the centre of the Salient, near Bianca, fro m the left company of the 2/10th Battalion and the right company of Lieut - Colonel Brown's 2/1st Pioneer Battalion . On the afternoon of 4th May, Martin made preliminary moves in con - junction with Brown's battalion, bringing forward part of his own bat- talion to close a gap on Brown's right flank. Simultaneously Brown's right-hand company, under Captain Graham,' moved forward for abou t a quarter of a mile, dislodging an enemy machine-gun post in the process . Three members of a covering party provided by the 2/1st Pioneers fo r the forward move of the 2/9th were killed . Private Rundle 2 saw Private s Cheney3 and Goodfellow 4 fall. From a position of comparative safety he went to their assistance, found Goodfellow dead, but decided to carr y in the mortally wounded Cheney ; on this compassionate errand Rundle was shot down and killed . Heavy machine-gun fire caused some of the ground taken up by the 2/9th to be relinquished . The planned reliefs took place on the night of the 4th May . Graham's company of the 2/1st Pioneers was relieved by the left company of Martin's battalion, then side-stepped to the left and pushed forward through the neighbouring company of the Pioneer battalion which held the switch- line running north from R14, and took up a position in front of the ol d switch-line and to the right of the previously isolated forward perimete r posts west of R14. The 2/10th Battalion was withdrawn, after its relief , into reserve at Pilastrino . ' Lt-Col G. J . Graham, MM, NX394. (1914-18 : 10 Royal Fusiliers ; later Indian Army .) 2/1 Pn r Bn (CO 1943-44) . Company director ; of Sydney ; b . London, 14 Jul 1897 . z Pte H . R . Rundle, NX28066 ; 2/1 Pnr Bn . Labourer ; of Nimbin, NSW ; b . Kearsley, NSW , 6 Apr 1918 . Killed in action 4 May 1941 . a Pte L . Cheney, NX28413 ; 2/1 Pnr Bn . Carpenter; of Tarcutta, NSW; b . Wagga Wagga, NSW , 10 Jan 1908 . Killed in action 4 May 1941 . * Pte J. T. R. Goodfellow, NX28444; 2/1 Pnr Bn. Builder's labourer; of Canberra ; b . Adelaide , 12 Jul 1903 . Killed in action 4 May 1941 . 4-6 May IN THE SALIENT 237 Later in the night the main body of the 2/32nd Battalion, of which one company was already in the fortress, arrived at Tobruk from Mers a Matruh in the destroyers Decoy and Defender. This brought Morshead' s infantry strength up to four complete brigades . The new battalion was tem- porarily placed under Brigadier Wootten's command and immediately put into a defensive position near the junction of the El Adem and Bardia Roads. On the morning of 5th May Colonel Martin, surveying the positions he had taken over during the night, found his battalion holding a genera l north-south line running through the important track junctions (not all printed on the map) behind and east of Bianca . Appreciating the nee d of denying to the enemy that dominant point of vantage and observation , Martin at once decided to push his line forward. The move was execute d in the early afternoon under intense machine-gun fire and shelling . Ten men were killed and 22 wounded (one mortally) and 2 men were reporte d missing; but though costly in life the realignment added greatly to the security of the defence at its weakest point and moreover enabled a n excellent, if vulnerable, observation post for the artillery, later know n as Nixon's Post, to be established . The enemy made a last attempt to extend the breach of the perimeter on the morning of 6th May . About 7.30 a.m. a strong German fighting patrol closed in on Post S9 in the area held by Captain Malloch's compan y of the 2/23rd Battalion . The attack was driven off with the help of artiller y fire and supporting fire from Post S8 but one man in the post was kille d and another wounded . More enemy, estimated to be in excess of one com- pany, were then observed about 300 yards from the wire; but after enduring fire for two hours the enemy withdrew at 9 .30 a.m. Henceforward the positions in the Salient were steadily improved b y digging, wiring and mining, and were edged forward when opportunit y offered. As each side developed its positions and pushed them out toward s the other, the strain on the men holding the front, particularly in the Salient, became intense, sapping vigour and draining away enthusiasm. The hard work of constructing the defences had all to be done at night i n conjunction with a vigorous program of night patrolling and vigilant manning of the forward defences. By day the scorching sun withheld sleep after the night's exertions. The rations were good and well-balanced bu t for long, unbroken periods, were "hard" and monotonous and in th e forward posts had to be eaten "hard", except at night, when a hot mea l cooked in the "B" Echelons was brought forward in hot boxes . Many men tended to go off their food. The water, of which the daily ration was only half a gallon per man, was brackish and unpalatable . Morshead insisted that the defence should never be inactive. The mastery of no-man 's land by all brigades was positively required and was unrelent- ingly maintained throughout the siege by patrols and excursions beyon d the wire and aggressive employment of the artillery . As soon as the front was stabilised after the thrusts and counter-thrusts of the first few day s 5 Named after Lt A . F. Nixon-Smith of the 2/9th Battalion. 238 MIDSUMMER IN THE FORTRESS May 1941 of May, the patrolling policy was intensified along the whole length of the perimeter from the Wadi Sehel (held by the 18th Indian Cavalry Regiment) in the west to the Wadi Zeitun in the east . In the early hours of 10th May Lieutenant Brown6 of the 2/23rd Battalion led out a fighting patrol of platoon strength from S13 and pro- ceeded westward along the escarpment south of the coast road to attack an enemy position about 2,500 yards from the perimeter. As the patrol was approaching its objective it surprised a large Italian working compan y and shot down a great number . The remainder surrendered and 3 1 prisoners were brought in . In the 2/48th Battalion area patrols to the old headquarters area of the 2/24th Battalion and Forbes ' Mound were boldly executed . One day a fighting patrol commanded by Lieutenant Bryant skilfully extricated a small daylight patrol which had attracte d enemy attention while recovering equipment from the old headquarters . A night fighting patrol under Lieutenant Kimber to Forbes ' Mound am- bushed a German patrol; Kimber was wounded but all the enemy were killed. Meanwhile patrols from the 2/ 15th Battalion holding the perimeter adjoining the left of the Salient were, night by night, deeply and vigorousl y probing the enemy 's right flank. In Brigadier Godfrey ' s sector on the east of the perimeter Lieutenant Pratt ? and Captain Sudholz8 of the 2/43rd Battalion and Lieutenan t Mase1 9 of the 2/28th executed in daylight several Bren gun carrier patrol s deep into enemy-held territory near the Bardia Road, shooting up workin g parties and taking prisoners . Carriers with the Army Service Corps detach- ment manning the perimeter along the Wadi Zeitun also patrolled adven- turously. These successes encouraged Brigadier Godfrey and Lieut-Colonel Crellin, commanding the 2/43rd Battalion, to plan a more ambitiou s foray. Captain Jeanes'' company was assigned the task of destroying the enemy at the head of the Wadi Belgassem, on its western edge, abou t a mile and a half beyond the perimeter. From the prisoners captured by the carrier patrols the Intelligence staff had been able to ascertain that a Bersaglieri regiment occupied, with at least two battalions, a defensive line that extended south from the head of the wadi through Sidi Belgasse m and across the Bardia Road . (Later it was established that a third bat- talion was present.) One troop of infantry tanks and two of cruisers wer e to neutralise the enemy positions covering the approaches and to protec t the open flanks; three armoured cars were to provide communicatio n between the tanks and infantry ; two carrier detachments (one provided by the A .A.S.C.)—7 carriers in all—a platoon of machine-guns, a detach - Maj W.
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