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A Guide to Conducting Successful Overseas Projects

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A Guide to Conducting Successful Overseas Projects The Battle of Giarabub – the First Test of the 2nd AIF Peter H. Davis Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW CANBERRA July 2013 Table of Contents Table of Contents .............................................................................................................. ii Copyright Statement ........................................................................................................ iii Authenticity Statement ..................................................................................................... iii Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iv Declaration ........................................................................................................................ v Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... vi Abbreviations and Glossary ............................................................................................ vii Figure .............................................................................................................................. vii Maps ................................................................................................................................ vii Tables .............................................................................................................................. vii Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 ......................................................................................................................... 12 The Siege of Giarabub – Build up to a Battle Chapter 2 ......................................................................................................................... 39 Operation Galley, the Final Battle for Giarabub Chapter 3 ......................................................................................................................... 77 Why Giarabub’s siege and Operation Galley unfolded the way they did. Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................... 94 The Wider Impact of Giarabub Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 107 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 115 Appendix A ................................................................................................................... 111 Appendix B ................................................................................................................... 112 ii Copyright Statement I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material; where permission has not been granted I have applied/will apply for a partial restriction of the digital copy of my thesis or dissertation. Signed Date 1 July, 2013. Authenticity Statement I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis. No emendation of content has occurred and if there are any minor variations in formatting, they are the result of the conversion to digital format. Signed Date 1 July, 2013. iii Abstract In 1911 Italy seized Libya, then in 1935 Mussolini’s Italian forces occupied Ethiopia. In June 1940 Mussolini declared war on the British Empire with designs of advancing into Egypt with his sights set on the strategically significant Suez Canal. The Italian 10th Army stalled close to the Egyptian – Libyan border, confronted by a numerically inferior Allied force attacking west from Egypt, along the Libyan coast. Far to the south in the Sahara Desert there existed an alternative route for military forces travelling east or west. This route transited a fortress called Giarabub located at the southern end of a string of Italian forts spaced along a 300 kilometre north–south barbed wire fence.1 Allied troops finally conquered the Giarabub garrison following a siege from which the defenders had little hope of escape. This thesis seeks to answer the question of why this garrison behaved so differently from all the other Italian forces, who generally capitulated rapidly, involved in the First Libyan Campaign. Further questions address the wider impacts resulting from this battle for the Italians and Australians involved. The garrison’s tenacity appears to have been largely a result of the determination of its leader, Lieutenant Colonel Castagna, to never surrender. The methods used have included study of all the available literature including contemporaneous Italian and British records located in archives in Italy, Australia and Britain. Interviews with survivors of Mussolini’s regime and younger Italians have further added to the body of knowledge. Many inequities between the Italian and Allied forces at Giarabub have been identified and analysed as reasons for the final dominance by the Allies, such as disparity in weapons, training, logistics, transport, communications and strategic and tactical leadership ability. Numerous mistakes in the Australian Official History and others have also been identified. This thesis goes some way to redressing these and fills the gap pertaining to Giarabub in Australian historiography. 1 MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 33, 34. iv Declaration I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published, or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. Peter H. Davis 1 July, 2013 v Acknowledgements My sincerest thanks goes to my family for its endless patience and support in allowing me to pursue my passion for Australian military history, especially to my wife Narelle for moving with me to Italy for three months, and learning a new language. The archivists at the National Archives of Australia, in Canberra, the Royal Artillery Museum, Imperial War Museum and The National Archives in London, the ever helpful staff at the Australian War Memorial were all of great assistance with access and advice. The staff at the Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico Maggiore Esercito (AUSSME) in Rome gave me privileged access to Castagna’s handwritten notes and Giarabub files. Associate Professor Craig Stockings deserves my sincere thanks as my principal supervisor. Dr John Connor’s work as my assistant supervisor is also much appreciated. Mr Chris Dawkins of the ADFA library performed sterling work with bibliographical assistance. Ms Bernadette McDermott’s ADFA administrative support has always been much appreciated. Thank you to my patient proof readers, Dr Angela Davis and Ms Margaret Hassall and to Ms Monica Davis for encouragement and invaluable help with formatting. Obtaining the Italian perspective was the most challenging aspect of this thesis and to this end my thanks go to Romana and Mario Fior who shared their memories of life under the Nazis in Italy whilst Romana translated Fattore’s and Castagna’s books. Lugano Rochelli likewise patiently translated the Italian Official History. In Italy, numerous villagers from Sismano and Todi helped me with contacts, stories and translating, especially Giuseppe Veneziano and Andrea Rafenelli. Luigina Pastorelli from Avigliano persevered through days of my questions. The English Language School staff in Todi likewise did many hours of patient translating of archival records from Rome, whilst sharing their Italian hospitality with me. Lastly, Major John Thurgar, until recently of the Australian Army History Unit and my mentor for Kokoda expeditions, deserves special mention for his encouragement and motivation in support of my studies of military history. vi Abbreviations and Glossary ANZAC Australian and New Zealand Army Corp BTE British Troops in Egypt Caposaldo Stronghold, in a large defensive position KRRC Kings Royal Rifle Corps LAD Light Aid Detachment (mobile vehicle mechanics) LRDG Long Range Desert Group LRDP Long Range Desert Patrol NCO Non Commissioned Officer Presidium Main fortress RHA Royal Horse Artillery Ridotta Small
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