The Battle of Giarabub – the First Test of the 2nd AIF

Peter H. Davis

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW CANBERRA

July 2013

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ...... ii

Copyright Statement ...... iii

Authenticity Statement ...... iii

Abstract ...... iv

Declaration ...... v

Acknowledgements ...... vi

Abbreviations and Glossary ...... vii

Figure ...... vii

Maps ...... vii

Tables ...... vii

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1 ...... 12

The of Giarabub – Build up to a Battle

Chapter 2 ...... 39

Operation Galley, the Final Battle for Giarabub

Chapter 3 ...... 77

Why Giarabub’s siege and Operation Galley unfolded the way they did.

Chapter 4 ...... 94

The Wider Impact of Giarabub

Conclusion ...... 107

Bibliography ...... 115

Appendix A ...... 111

Appendix B ...... 112

ii

Copyright Statement

I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material; where permission has not been granted I have applied/will apply for a partial restriction of the digital copy of my thesis or dissertation.

Signed Date 1 July, 2013.

Authenticity Statement

I certify that the Library deposit digital copy is a direct equivalent of the final officially approved version of my thesis. No emendation of content has occurred and if there are any minor variations in formatting, they are the result of the conversion to digital format.

Signed Date 1 July, 2013.

iii

Abstract In 1911 seized , then in 1935 Mussolini’s Italian forces occupied . In June 1940 Mussolini declared war on the with designs of advancing into with his sights set on the strategically significant . The Italian 10th Army stalled close to the Egyptian – Libyan border, confronted by a numerically inferior Allied force attacking west from Egypt, along the Libyan coast. Far to the south in the there existed an alternative route for military forces travelling east or west. This route transited a fortress called Giarabub located at the southern end of a string of Italian forts spaced along a 300 kilometre north–south barbed wire fence.1

Allied troops finally conquered the Giarabub garrison following a siege from which the defenders had little hope of escape. This thesis seeks to answer the question of why this garrison behaved so differently from all the other Italian forces, who generally capitulated rapidly, involved in the First Libyan Campaign. Further questions address the wider impacts resulting from this battle for the Italians and Australians involved. The garrison’s tenacity appears to have been largely a result of the determination of its leader, Lieutenant Colonel Castagna, to never surrender.

The methods used have included study of all the available literature including contemporaneous Italian and British records located in archives in Italy, and Britain. Interviews with survivors of Mussolini’s regime and younger Italians have further added to the body of knowledge.

Many inequities between the Italian and Allied forces at Giarabub have been identified and analysed as reasons for the final dominance by the Allies, such as disparity in weapons, training, logistics, transport, communications and strategic and tactical leadership ability. Numerous mistakes in the Australian Official History and others have also been identified. This thesis goes some way to redressing these and fills the gap pertaining to Giarabub in Australian historiography.

1 MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941, Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 33, 34. iv

Declaration

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published, or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis.

I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Peter H. Davis 1 July, 2013

v

Acknowledgements

My sincerest thanks goes to my family for its endless patience and support in allowing me to pursue my passion for Australian military history, especially to my wife Narelle for moving with me to Italy for three months, and learning a new language. The archivists at the National Archives of Australia, in Canberra, the Royal Museum, Imperial War Museum and The National Archives in London, the ever helpful staff at the were all of great assistance with access and advice. The staff at the Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico Maggiore Esercito (AUSSME) in gave me privileged access to Castagna’s handwritten notes and Giarabub files.

Associate Professor Craig Stockings deserves my sincere thanks as my principal supervisor. Dr John Connor’s work as my assistant supervisor is also much appreciated. Mr Chris Dawkins of the ADFA library performed sterling work with bibliographical assistance. Ms Bernadette McDermott’s ADFA administrative support has always been much appreciated. Thank you to my patient proof readers, Dr Angela Davis and Ms Margaret Hassall and to Ms Monica Davis for encouragement and invaluable help with formatting.

Obtaining the Italian perspective was the most challenging aspect of this thesis and to this end my thanks go to Romana and Mario Fior who shared their memories of life under the Nazis in Italy whilst Romana translated Fattore’s and Castagna’s books. Lugano Rochelli likewise patiently translated the Italian Official History. In Italy, numerous villagers from Sismano and Todi helped me with contacts, stories and translating, especially Giuseppe Veneziano and Andrea Rafenelli. Luigina Pastorelli from Avigliano persevered through days of my questions. The English Language School staff in Todi likewise did many hours of patient translating of archival records from Rome, whilst sharing their Italian hospitality with me.

Lastly, Major John Thurgar, until recently of the History Unit and my mentor for Kokoda expeditions, deserves special mention for his encouragement and motivation in support of my studies of military history.

vi

Abbreviations and Glossary ANZAC Australian and Army Corp BTE Caposaldo Stronghold, in a large defensive position KRRC Kings Royal Rifle LAD Light Aid Detachment (mobile vehicle mechanics) LRDG LRDP Long Range Desert Patrol NCO Non Commissioned Officer Presidium Main fortress RHA Royal Horse Artillery Ridotta Small fort, generally isolated WDF Force 2nd AIF Second Australian Imperial Force

Figure

Figure 1 Aerial view of Giarabub taken 16 April 1942...... 9 Maps

Map 1 The Western Powers in , 1939...... 5

Map 2 Giarabub’s defensive system...... 46

Map 3 Allied artillery objectives 21 ...... 61

Map 4 Allied battle plan for 21 March, 1941...... 64 Tables

Table 1 Estimated number of Allied soldiers at Giarabub 21 March, 1941...... 41

Table 2 Disposition of defenders and weapons on 21 March 1941...... 47

Table 3 Allied artillery fire plan 21 March, 1941...... 60

Table 4 Comparison of troop and vehicle numbers...... 85

vii

Introduction

On 21 March 1941, during the opening phases of the North African Desert campaigns of World War II, soldiers of the 6th Australian Division captured the ancient fortress of Giarabub. The garrison of some 2,000 Italian (and Libyan) troops defending this well–prepared position withstood months of siege, deprived of food and medical support, until being overrun by a well–trained but inexperienced Allied force. Importantly, the tenacity of the Italian defenders marks this battle as all but unique within the context of the First Libyan Campaign of 1940–41. For the Australians this was an important engagement. It represented the first shots fired in anger by Australian troops in World War II. It was a test, therefore, not only of the training, preparation, leadership and equipment of certain elements of the 2nd AIF, but also of the fighting abilities of the ‘sons of ANZAC’1 legend, as perceived in the consciousness of the Australian public and within the minds of the first volunteer formations of the 2nd AIF.2

Congruent with a more general Italian awakening of interest in the operational history of World War II, the first aim of this thesis is to help fill the clear historiographical gap in the published record with respect to Giarabub within the North African campaigns of World War II. Despite its clear significance to Australian military history and historiography, Giarabub is largely unknown to scholarly communities and the public alike. The nine month Allied effort to capture this Italian fort remains largely absent from the modern historical record. From a publishing standpoint it would appear that when compared with the other battles of North Africa, such as ’s dramatic siege, ’s spectacular rout, and ’s decisive effect, Giarabub has been

1 Craig Stockings, Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, University of New South Wales Press, , 2010, p. 95. 2 Ibid, pp. 93–115.It is now known as Al–. However in this thesis the Australian Official History’s name will be used. It has also been known occasionally as Jarabub, as described in Sir Ian Hammerton’s The War Illustrated, Amalgamated Press, London, 1941, Vol 4, p. 90; Gavin Long, Australia in the War of 1939–1942 – To , Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, pp. 287– 304. 1

neglected as no more than a ‘wilderness side show’3 as described in the Australian War Memorial’s contemporary book, Active Service. The timing of the much larger scale Battle of Bardia in particular, in , overshadowed Giarabub, as Giarabub did not fall until March 1941. Further, Giarabub did not have Bardia’s complexity of armoured and maritime support. The battle for Giarabub was fought in an extremely isolated region, far from the public gaze. It was also a relatively small scale engagement. It never captured the Australian or other Allied public imagination at the time – there were better propaganda opportunities available. These combined factors help explain Giarabub’s obscurity – they do not, however, belie its importance.4

The small amount of literature that has been produced concerning Giarabub is almost solely restricted to side references in larger works. Many such books draw heavily on Gavin Long’s Official History, Australia in the War of 1939–1942 – To Benghazi, which itself, despite 17 pages of narrative, but in line with its purpose as an official history, simply records events, without analysis.5 Other large and well known works of North Africa, such as The Crucible of War, Wavell’s Command – The Definitive History of the Desert War, make no mention in the text of Giarabub nor its battle, with not even a notation on a map. Likewise, the Oxford Companion to Australian Military History has no entry for this battle. Giarabub rates barely two pages in The Proud Sixth – An Illustrated History of the 6th Australian Division 1939–1946. Twenty-one pages of Never Late – The 2/9th Australian Infantry Battalion are devoted to this, their first battle; however, this work draws heavily on Long. Alternatively, the Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles simply summarises Long’s account in two pages. There is only one historical article, ‘The Siege of Giarabub’ by Tom Richardson, which aimed to integrate published English language histories to determine the significance of

3 The Military History and Information Section, AIF (Middle East), Active Service with Australia in the Middle East, The Board of Management of the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1941, p. 26. 4 Peter Dennis et al, The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford University Press, South , 2008; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 26. 5 Long, To Benghazi, pp. 287– 304; http://www.AWM .gov.au/histories, (accessed 29 May, 2013); Examples of books drawing on Long, To Benghazi,[Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History; Clarke, The Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles; Dickens, Never Late, The 2/9th Australian Infantry Battalion 1939–1945, Australian Army History Publications, Loftus, 2005; Bill Spencer, In the Footsteps of Ghosts, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1999; Mark Johnston, The Proud 6th, An Illustrated History of the 6th Australian Division 1939 – 1946, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2008.] 2

Giarabub in World War II, and no English language book has even been written solely about Giarabub.6

None of this scant literature represents a concerted attempt at historical analysis or in depth scholarly inquiry, nor provides an insight as to the Italian perspective at Giarabub. The Italians went so far as to make a movie, entitled ‘La saga di Giarabub’, in 1942, depicting Giarabub’s besieged defenders as heroes fighting on regardless, with no hope of escape. There is significant unexplored territory surrounding the Italian story, which is in stark contrast to the typical portrayal of Italian military performance in English language narratives. The commander of the Italian force at Giarabub, Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Castagna, first published a memoir in 1950 entitled La difesa di Giarabub. This book, written in a now seldom used, and therefore difficult to translate, bureaucratic Italian style, gives a chronological account of events at Giarabub. It is a key source and one yet to be utilised by English language historians. In 2006 another book, by Fabio Fattore entitled Dai nostri inviati a Giarabub was published. Fattore’s book indicates ongoing interest in Giarabub in Italy (see Chapter 4). It should be noted that Fattore wrote his book largely based on Castagna’s published work, which was in part sourced from reports written by Castagna following his repatriation to Italy post World War II. Castagna’s work was based on his recollections following his incarceration as a in , some five years after the Battle of Giarabub, therefore detracting from its accuracy.7

The second aim of this thesis, in addition to helping to fill the clear historiographical gap with respect to Giarabub, in the published record of the North African campaigns of World War II, is to examine a range of important questions that remain as a consequence of the lack of attention traditionally paid to this battle. For example, to what extent does an analysis of Giarabub give us an insight into later battles

6 Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War, Wavell’s Command – The Definitive History of the Desert War, Cassell &Co, Great Britain, 2001; Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History, p. 20; Johnston, The Proud 6th; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 51–72; Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, pp. 179–180; Tom Richardson, ‘The Siege of Giarabub’, SVSS document, AWM , 2010. 7 Salvatore Castagna, La Difesa di Giarabub, Longanesi & Co, , 1950; Fabio Fattore, Dai nostri inviati a Giarabub, Mursia, Milan, 2006. Tom Richardson, The Siege of Giarabub, SVSS document, AWM , 2010; ‘La saga di Giarabub’, Argo Films, 1942, www..com/watch?v=LQeYT4CNKW8 (accessed 19 November 2012). 3

in North Africa? Why was this battle, especially with regards to Italian tenacity, so different from others of the First Libyan Campaign? What was it that kept the Italians from surrendering for nine months – was it simply their inability to escape or was Giarabub unique in other ways? How was the conduct of this battle different from other battles in ? How well did the Australians perform, and why? What does this tell us about the early 2nd AIF, its preparation, training and operations? Then lastly, how does Giarabub add to the overall understanding of the First Libyan Campaign in 1941?

In order to begin to provide answers to these important questions, an understanding is first needed of the strategic context, course, conduct and consequences of the battle together with the reasons why Giarabub was considered worth fighting for. The Italian Fascist Party leader, , seized power in 1922 amidst a deteriorating social, industrial and economic situation with a dream of returning to the heydays of the ancient Roman Empire. Mussolini’s ambitions were emboldened by Hitler’s emerging dominance in and increasingly energised following Hitler’s renunciation of the Treaty of Versailles in 1935 and the ongoing conquests by Imperial Japan in Manchuria. The Italians had colonised Libya, their first 20th Century African possession, in 1912. The proximity of Libya to Italy across the Mediterranean made it an attractive target. Mussolini further expanded that influence with the invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935. Occupation of Egypt and Sudan was then deemed essential to allow fulfilment of Italy’s aspirations to Empire status (see Map 1, p. 5.).8

Of significant strategic importance within Libya, the ancient fortress village of Giarabub, complete with an airport and an adequate supply of underground water, is located deep in the Sahara Desert at the important crossroads of an alternate route to the coastal route which was ultimately used as the primary access in the First Libyan Campaign. Its location nearly 300 kilometres south of the coast gives it a fearsome climate of extreme heat, icy nights and blasting sandstorms. Being close to Egypt’s border, Giarabub, at the southern extreme of a line of oases, had significant value, from

8 Glenn Wahlert, The 1940–41, Army History Unit, Canberra, 2006, p. 6; Christopher Duggan, Fascist Voices: an Intimate History of Mussolini’s Italy, Random House, London, 2012, p. 65; Christopher Hibbert, Benito Mussolini, a Biography, Reprint Society, London, 1963, p. 33. 4

a logistics viewpoint (an important consideration in North Africa), to Italy’s designs on Egypt.9

Giarabub

Map 1 The Western Powers in Africa, 1939.

Source: Glenn Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign 1940–41, Australian Army History Unit, Canberra, 2006, p. 6.

With France about to collapse under the German onslaught, Mussolini felt that it was now clear to him which side was going to prevail. On 10 June 1940 he declared war on Britain and her Empire, satisfied that Britain’s surrender was imminent. One of Mussolini’s main motivations for going to war was to release Italy from what he saw as Italy’s Mediterranean prison, the gates of which were guarded by the British and French navies at Suez and Gibraltar. A poorly planned and executed Italian advance into Egypt

9 Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 10; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 287, 288; Active Service, p. 26; Minutes of War Cabinet meeting 20th , The National Archives, London, CAB/66/12/11; W.G. Jackson, The 1940–1943, B. T. Batysford, London and Sydney, 1975, p. 145; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 179; M. Montanari, Stato Maggiore Dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, Le Operazioni in Africa Settenrionale, Sidi el Barrani (Giugno 1940 – Febbfaio 1941), 2nd Ed, Rome, 1990, p. 18. 5

followed, with the aim of capturing the strategically significant Suez Canal. The following month Giarabub was occupied by 2,000 Italian and Libyan troops under Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Castagna. During that same month, July, a British force was sent out across the desert to capture the fortress. A shortage of water, however, in the extreme summer heat forced a halt and ultimately this initial Allied probe withdrew. This aborted attack marks the opening of the preliminary stage of the actual Battle of Giarabub. By 13 September 1940 the Italians had occupied the Egyptian towns of Sollum, and coastal , but at this time the Italian 10th Army Commander, Marshal , called a halt to resupply and reinforce his advance. With Graziani located 500 kilometres to the rear, the Italian 10th Army dispersed into seven defensive localities spread over 50 kilometres of featureless desert from Sidi Barrani southwards. These Italian positions were too distant to be mutually supportive in the face of an attack, and the entire defensive arrangement lacked depth.10

Meanwhile, following the first unsuccessful Allied army attempt to capture Giarabub, General Sir Archibald Wavell, British Commander in Chief Mediterranean, decided to deploy a motorised infantry of the 1st King’s Royal Rifle Corps from the 7th Armoured Division at Siwa, located in Egypt, approximately 70 kilometres south east of Giarabub. These British troops proceeded to dig and wire defences across access routes to Giarabub from the west. This infantry company was subsequently replaced by B Squadron of the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment which arrived at Siwa on 3 , led by Captain F. H. Brown. This deployment marked the start of the Australian involvement at Giarabub.11

Further north, had been limited, up to this point, to harassing the Italian advance into Egypt. On 7 December 1940 General Wavell authorised Western Desert Force, under the command of Lieutenant–General Sir Richard O’Connor, to initiate a counterattack against the Italian Sidi Barrani positions known as Operation Compass. The result for the Italians was a disaster. In what became known as the Battle of the Camps, some 20,000 prisoners were captured along with 180

10 The size of the British force sent to attack Giarabub in July 1940 is not known, although Long later describes it as a column. Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 36; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 287, 288; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 18-21, 107, 123. 11 Long, To Benghazi, p. 288. 6

guns and in excess of 60 , all at a cost of only about 600 Allied casualties. The Italians were emphatically driven from Egypt, and fell back to Bardia and Tobruk.12

Back in the vicinity of Giarabub, on 11 December, 96 Australians headed out from Siwa to Garn el Grein, one of the small enemy frontier posts, located some 50 kilometres north-northeast of Giarabub. The Australians engaged the post, occupied by Libyan colonial troops loyal to the Italians, with Vickers machine guns, Bren guns and rifles, but were briskly shelled, then strafed by three Italian aircraft. Captain Brown withdrew his troops back to Siwa. Five days later Brown’s squadron attacked an Italian convoy, destroying two trucks and forcing the abandonment of four others, which the Australians promptly requisitioned for their own use. The following day Lieutenant Colonel M. Fergusson, the Commanding Officer of the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment, arrived at Siwa with his Regimental headquarters and Major J. E. Abbott’s C Squadron. The arrival of Fergusson coincided with the isolation of the Italian 10th Army at Bardia, following O’Connor’s advance west across the Libyan frontier on the heels of his action at Sidi Barrani. Although the subsequent Battle of Bardia was a much larger engagement, being on a divisional versus battalion scale, the numerous similarities with the Battle of Giarabub make it useful for comparison in this study.13

With Italian–occupied Bardia virtually under siege, the Italians chose to abandon their smaller frontier outposts. Garn el Grein was one of the first to be forsaken. This left Giarabub cut off from resupply by land. A nearby Italian airfield remained operational, however, unbeknown to the Allies. At this point Wavell expected that the Italians at Giarabub would simply run out of supplies, so the Australian truck mounted cavalry were ordered only to observe the fort and ensure that no supplies reached the isolated Italian garrison.14 (see Figure 1, p. 9.) The small Australian cavalry force based at Siwa, now numbering around 200 by the first week of 1941, had neither artillery nor aircraft, but was reinforced with the addition of a troop of Bofors guns, and an engineer

12 Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, pp. 51, 52. 13 Long, To Benghazi, p. 289; Craig Stockings, Badia, Myth, Reality and the Heirs of ANZAC, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2009; S. Castagna, Relazione Relativa Ai Fatti D’Arme Di Giarabub …Mano Avuto … Conseguenza la Gaduta Del..., Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico Maggiore Esercito, hereafter cited as Battle of Giarabub Report, AUSSME, Rome, File DS 1160A/2/12. 14 Long, To Benghazi, p. 290; Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 7

detachment. With orders to increase the pressure on the Italians at Giarabub, Lieutenant Colonel Fergusson set about subduing the isolated posts located around the fort to reduce the distances and area to be covered in order to encircle the defenders. Following the conclusion of these raids on the outlying posts, and their resulting abandonment, subsequent action could be directed entirely at Giarabub itself.15

From this point the routine of almost daily Australian raids forced the Italians to stay behind their wire. All the while the Australians were gaining knowledge of the Giarabub defences, in preparation for an eventual assault designed to take the fortress once and for all. While this was happening, it became apparent that supplies were still getting into the fortress via aircraft. Fergusson, frustrated, could do nothing to stop this as no Allied air support was available. On 4 January 1941, a British troop of four 25– pounder guns of the 8th Field Regiment, , arrived to reinforce the Australians outside Giarabub, bringing the Allied force to 456. The arrival of the 25– pounders enabled the destruction of Italian aircraft on the ground, and from then on Italian resupply was restricted to airdrops on the soft ground near the Giarabub Fort itself. On 11 January yet more reinforcements arrived. A detachment of the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), equipped with vehicles specially modified for desert operations, was deployed in the area west of Giarabub, with instructions to report any enemy activity to Fergusson. Allied intelligence had by this stage established that the Giarabub Fort was garrisoned by 1,200 Italian troops plus 755 Libyans, leaving the Allies still outnumbered by four to one.16

On 7 March, 1941 Fergusson was seriously wounded by artillery fire and replaced by Major J. E. Abbott, in command of Allied forces pressuring Giarabub. At this stage Operation Compass had driven the Italians from northern . Wavell’s Headquarters decided that Giarabub needed to be taken immediately so as to free troops for service in other theatres, and to finally clear out the last vestiges of the on his left flank. , commander of the 18th Australian Brigade, which was a part of the recently arrived 7th Australian Division in Egypt, was ordered by Wavell to use his brigade to assist the Australian cavalry force at Giarabub to capture

15 Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 16 Long, To Benghazi, p. 293. 8

the fortress. Wootten began planning immediately. He concluded that available transport would limit his reinforcement to one infantry battalion plus one company, with enough supplies to last only ten days. Further,

Fort with wired perimeters

Figure 1 Aerial view of Giarabub taken 16 April 1942.

Source: http://cas.awm.gov.au/item/042697, accessed 10 June 2010. he had no tanks and no aircraft. His plan envisaged a three day movement to Giarabub from , four more for the reconnaissance and capture of the position, and three for the return journey. It was a tight schedule.17 A note from Wootten, written after the battle indicates his thinking following his initial reconnaissance:

17 Long, To Benghazi, pp. 294, 295; Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History, p. 608. 9

It appeared that the ground vital to the enemy’s defence of Giarabub was the (Tamma) heights (approx. 200ft high) situated 400 to 600 yards south of the village. These dominated the whole of the defences. The enemy’s main defences lay to the north, northeast and northwest of this and within approximately 1,500 yards. Any advance by us from these directions by day would be under direct observation from the heights mentioned…Any attack from the north, northeast or northwest of this would have to penetrate the outposts, then deal with the defence in depth and then finally with the southern heights which were themselves a tough object to attack owing to their being wired and fortified and to their steepness and inaccessibility. Such an attack would probably have necessitated a large expenditure of artillery ammunition, a further attack at dawn on the second day to get the high ground and would have resulted in heavy casualties. On the other hand the vital ground was not protected by any depth from the south and its altitude would obviously very largely defilade any attack from the south from fire from the…north…There was also another high feature (Ship Hill) south–east, some hundreds of yards from the vital ground and outside the enemy’s wire, which if occupied by us would give good observation to support an attack from the south…Subject to the ground to the south proving suitable…and being able to get the necessary infantry, guns etc. into position…the commander decided upon this course.18

The stage was set for the Battle of Giarabub to commence.

In order to fulfil its dual aims of filling the historiographical gap and answering a number of important questions, this thesis has consulted a range of sources, such as Italian, British and Australian participants’ diaries, notes, orders, maps, recordings of interviews, films, letters and photographs. These are located in archives in Italy, Britain and Australia, such as Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico Maggiore Esercito (AUSSME) in Rome, The National Archives, the Royal Artillery Museum, the Imperial War Museum in London, the Australian War Memorial and the National Archives of Australia in Canberra. Two field trips to North Africa were to be undertaken to review the topography and gain firsthand knowledge of the conditions of the battle ground. Although the author visited Italy for three months to facilitate the European and African research, the civil war in Libya in 2012 precluded any visits to the Giarabub battlefield.

This thesis is structured into four thematic chapters. Chapter 1 sets the basic narrative and analytical framework for subsequent investigations. It analyses the lead up to the final battle in detail, including the long Allied siege, and in so doing uncovers a number of omissions and errors in the current historical record. Chapter 2 investigates

18 Quoted in Long, To Benghazi, p. 295. 10

what occurred during the subsequent and ultimately successful Allied attack on Giarabub, known as Operation Galley, revealing for the first time accurate casualty statistics for both sides and the details surrounding a little known Allied friendly fire disaster. Chapter 3 discusses why the siege of Giarabub and the subsequent Operation Galley unfolded the way they did, including investigating why the Italians held out for so long, and why it took five months for the Allies to prevail. Chapter 4 considers what effects the Giarabub campaign had on the First Libyan Campaign in general, its effects on later Western Desert Force operations for the Allies and on the Italian forces, including its impact on the Italian home front.

The Battle of Giarabub is a neglected episode within the First Libyan Campaign. An analysis of events at the fortress provides the scholarly attention it deserves, and in so doing, allows for a better informed historical understanding of the early desert campaigns of World War II.

11

Chapter 1

The Siege of Giarabub – Build up to a Battle

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a basic narrative and analytical framework for subsequent investigations. In addition, it uncovers and addresses a number of shortcomings in existing historical interpretations of Giarabub, such as the assertion that Giarabub was nothing more than a ‘wilderness side show’.1 The chapter achieves this through an analysis of the first phase or ‘siege’ of Giarabub, which preceded Operation Galley, from both the Italian and Allied perspectives. The siege is first placed in physical context through an examination of Giarabub’s geographical location, landscape, history, access, climate and the Italian defensive position. Second, study of the opposing leaders and their forces provides a necessary understanding and framework of the opposing forces. Finally, issues associated with the ‘driving in’ of outlying Italian posts, the gathering of intelligence by the Australians preparatory to the battle and the difficulties that the Italians faced are investigated.

The oasis of Giarabub is located 283 kilometres south, by road, of the Libyan coastal city of Tobruk and 30 kilometres west of the Egyptian border, on the northern edge of the Great Sand Sea in the vast and forbidding Sahara Desert. The oasis is situated in a basin some 25 kilometres long running north–south, and six kilometres measured east to west. Remarkably, for the Sahara, south of Giarabub there are brackish wetlands and marshes. The Giarabub basin is surrounded by a rocky ridge, leaving its floor as much as eight metres below sea level. To the north of this ridge lies a large plateau. The terrain to the south and west of the oasis is predominately broken hilly country. About six kilometres from the eastern entrance of the Giarabub oasis lies a salt bog, which merges into a substantial area of scrubby vegetation on flat sandy country. Further west the landscape rises steadily to 30 metres above sea level. The 100 metre high rocky ridge or escarpment to the north completely dominates the depression which was five kilometres from a small village. The Italian wartime fort at Giarabub was

1 AIF (Middle East), Active Service, pp. 24-29. 12

located on this higher ground, 22 kilometres from the eastern entrance of the oasis, on sandy country set amongst rocky knolls. The fort and village of Giarabub were established, complete with wells, cultivated gardens, palm trees, and a white domed mosque in the late nineteenth century. The majority of the buildings were grouped together on high ground overlooking the oasis and joined together by a town wall some four metres high. This wall had only three large access doors. It was constructed of rough stone and was up to 4.3 metres thick. The village of Giarabub was a maze of narrow streets with a main road down the centre.2

Of strategic significance to the siege and the following battle, there was an operational airport, complete with hangars, located 2.8 kilometres north of Giarabub town. There was also a rudimentary disused airfield west of the Italian fort. Some 97 kilometres southeast of Giarabub, on the Egyptian side of the frontier, lay the large oasis of Siwa, which in 1941 had a resident population of some 4,000 Berbers. Siwa became the main base for the Allied forces which came to blockade the Italian post, and later for the attacking force which finally captured Giarabub. The attackers subsequently established a forward base 13 kilometres southwest of Melfa, 16 kilometres east of Giarabub.3

Aside from its strategic importance to the Allies and the Italians, in 1940 Giarabub was also the centre of an important religious fraternity known as the Senussi. The Senussi were followers of Mohamed Ben Ali el Senussi (1787–1859), who was buried in the Giarabub village mosque. Senussi practised asceticism, being the self– denial of all pleasures. The mosque itself became the most sacred site of the indigenous inhabitants of Cyrenaica, the Senussi Arabs, an issue that was to become significant with respect to Italian relations with the local people during the lead up to and throughout the conduct of military operations at Giarabub. Such was its significance, it

2 Ministro Della Difesa, Stato Maggiore Dell’Esercito, La Prima Controffensiva Italo – Tedesca in Africa Settentrionale, 15 Febbraio – 18 Novembre 1941, Ufficio Storico, Tipografia Regionale Rome, 1974. p. 58; ‘Appendix G, Intelligence Summary No. 16’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 3 ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Gavin Long, To Benghazi, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, p. 287; ‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 13

was later impressed upon all Allied soldiers thrown against Giarabub that no damage be done to the mosque, in order to maintain a good relationship with the local inhabitants.4

Since the settlement of Giarabub village its political history had been turbulent. In 1855 the village was given by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire to the founder of the fraternity, who made it his headquarters. El Senussi sought to return Islam to what he perceived as its original purity by freeing it from modern heresies and innovations. A basic tenet in this respect was a polite avoidance of civilised races. The Senussi doctrine became firmly established among the Arab tribes of North Africa and was taught in the Zavies (instructional colonies or universities) with the fraternity stretching from Arabia to Morocco. Despite this basic principle, the Senussi were embroiled in war against the French in 1901, the Italians in 1911, and the British in 1915. They were on the losing side in each case. Following the Senussi pursued an intermittent guerrilla war against the Italians until 1925. Despite all Senussi efforts Egyptian authorities gave possession and command of Giarabub to the Italians following a border agreement signed on 6 December 1925. Actual Italian occupation of the oasis area began on 7 February 1926. With this occupation the Senussi were compelled to abandon Giarabub, reluctantly. From 1929 to World War II the Senussi were relentlessly harried and scattered by the Italian occupiers, generating a burning desire to return to their holiest place – the mosque containing the tomb of Senussi. Italian treatment of the locals during this period was to have far–reaching consequences in the days leading up to the final battle for the oasis.5

During their occupation, physical access to Giarabub for the Italians was limited to a few rough roads and by air. The relatively small numbers of Italian wheeled vehicles in North Africa in 1940 were not capable of transiting the trackless desert sands thus limiting land access to the road south from Tobruk and the road southwest from Siwa. The Italian garrison had no tracked vehicles as the supply of Italian armour was limited in quantity and reliability, as well as being unsuited to the vast Saharan

4 Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 58; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 26; Peter Badman, North Africa 1940–1942, The Desert War, Time–Life Books, Sydney, 1988, p. 47; Long, To Benghazi, p. 287. 5 Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 58; ‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 14

distances. Supply was greatly assisted by Italian aircraft which used Giarabub as a refuelling point en–route to the colonies in , and Ethiopia. The nearest railhead was Mersa Matruh on the coast some 300 kilometres away – and on the wrong side of the Egyptian border from the Italian perspective. The Senussi had long used camels and donkeys for transport in this area, as the Libyans still do, but these were of negligible military significance. As an aside, this author was offered donkeys as a means of transport to visit Giarabub from Egyptian Siwa in 2011.6

The Australians and their allies, like the Italians, had road vehicles and aircraft for use in the Western Desert. They had a major advantage however, in that they had vehicles capable of effective operations over the vast distances, and the sands of the Sahara, without the need for roads. In particular, the Allies had the Long Range Desert Patrol (LRDP) equipped with heavily modified 30 cwt trucks. The men of the LRDP were highly trained and specially selected. Their extraordinary skills and the vital part that the LRDP played in the Battle of Giarabub are examined in subsequent chapters.7

The extent of Australian use of aircraft in the subsequent siege of Giarabub was not as crucial as it might appear. It was useful but not decisive in the final outcome of the battle. Brigadier G. F. Wootten, commander of ‘Wootten Force’ which was created on 10 March, 1941, and tasked with the capture of Giarabub, sought air support or co– operation from General R. N. O’Connor, Commander of the British Western Desert Force (WDF) but was told by O’Connor: ‘Please don't ask me for any planes. I have only two Wellington bombers with which to prevent Rommel bringing his reinforcing units and supplies into . If I give you one, I will only have one left.’8 Two Lysander air–ground support aircraft were in use by the Allies at Giarabub in January, during the final battle in March 1941 for aerial photography and map verification prior to the battle, and for close observation during the final day. Gavin Long, the Australian Official Historian of World War II, mistakenly states only one was available during the

6 Duncan McNab, Mission 101– The untold story of five Australian soldiers’ extraordinary war in Ethiopia, Pan McMillan Australia, Sydney, 2011, pp. 155, 161; Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, pp. 58, 59; This author, was offered a three day trip by donkey from Siwa to Giarabub in December 2011. Civil war in Libya precluded safe travel however. 7 ‘Summary of Operations at Giarabub, 1941’, AWM 54 519/2/20; One of the original vehicles used in the Sahara in WWII is displayed in the Imperial War Museum, London. 8 Long, To Benghazi, p. 294. 15

final battle. The 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry (6th Cavalry) diary entries show this to be incorrect as both aircraft flew. Yet these Lysanders were not decisive. They were slow heavy machines, good for reconnaissance, but only lightly armed with a few bombs and two machine guns.9

The climate of Giarabub’s isolated corner of the Sahara was a major factor influencing health, morale and logistics, whilst the weather on the final day of the battle for the oasis was one of a number of key determining factors. Temperatures in the March–April period can fluctuate by up to 38o Celsius in a day. Rain is rare. The most dramatic feature is the wind. The wind storms of the Sahara are known as ‘Khamsin’ in Arabic. The local inhabitants have a saying which describes the dread which it instils in those who have experienced it; ‘If the khamsin blows for three days in succession a man has the right to kill his wife; five days, his best friend; seven days, himself.’10

The initial Italian defensive line in the Western Desert, from the Libyan coast to Giarabub, was based on a barbed wire fence built in 1931 by General Rodolfo Graziani for the purpose of restricting the movement of lightly armed Senussi rebels. Graziani’s Fence, as it was known, was some 300 kilometres long, 5 metres high and 3.7 metres wide stretching from Sollum in the north on the coast, to Giarabub in the south. The fence traced the Egyptian–Libyan border and was reinforced with isolated fortified posts scattered along this line from which armoured patrols sallied to patrol the fence. Aircraft also patrolled the fence from airfields constructed along its length. The fortified posts were named ‘ridotta’ by the Italians, such as Ridotta Maddalena located half way between Giarabub and Sollum. The English translation of ‘ridotta’ is ‘redoubt’, meaning ‘military outwork or fieldwork, usually square or polygonal and without flanking defences.’11 Whilst other historians have described redoubts as being common in the 17th century as a means of static defence, the modern equivalent Italian structure was still built without flanking defences and provides some insight into anachronistic Italian

9 ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Aust. Div. Cav. Reg’t, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137. 10 http://113squadron.com/id35.htm accessed 3.4.2012; Khamsin is Arabic for fifty, referring to the notion that the wind blows for fifty days each year; Bruce Moore (ed), The Australian Oxford Dictionary, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2004, p. 691. 11 Moore, The Australian Oxford Dictionary, p. 1081. 16

defensive thinking in 1940. These ridotta were located up to 50 kilometres apart, making timely mutual support impossible across the Saharan sands. The reasons for this spacing by the Italians will be discussed in Chapter 3, as it was one of a number of deciding factors in the outcome of the looming battle. Even though modern mechanised warfare was being conducted by Germany at this time, Mussolini declared that ‘the world was moving toward an age of ‘walled nations’’12, in February 1940.13

Australian knowledge of the layout of the Italian defences at Giarabub developed over the months of the siege from 3 November 1940 to 10 March 1941. By 19 March 1941, two days before the final battle, Wootten Force was armed with a comprehensive picture of the Giarabub fortifications and occupants. This knowledge was greatly boosted by a deserting Libyan soldier’s statement which corroborated details previously garnered from air photographs, radio intercepts and numerous patrol reports. The locations of Italian tactical barbed wire, traps, access points, minefields, strong points, buildings and their uses, calibres and locations of artillery and machine guns were all plotted on an Australian battle map using a 50 yard grid and disseminated to all commanders involved. Such detailed knowledge of the dispositions at Giarabub was an enormous tactical advantage.14

Giarabub’s local defence was based upon four Caposaldos or strong points, (the English translation of the Italian term) numbered one to four, each with multiple machine guns and artillery pieces, spaced around the central fortress (see Map 2, p. 46.). In detail the Italian garrison at Giarabub, as estimated by Australian intelligence on 19 March 1941, possessed 100 Breda machine guns, twenty 47mm guns, three 65mm guns, two or three 77mm guns and four truck mounted Breda machine guns, for anti–aircraft defence. The Italian commander of the Giarabub fort, Major Salvatore Castagna, described his defensive plan as a four kilometre perimeter of defensive positions divided into four sectors, each reinforced with 47mm guns and 20mm machine guns, with the whole area surrounded by barbed wire. Minefields and antitank trenches were

12 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, p. 79. 13 Jackson, The North African Campaign 1940–1943, p. 16; David Atkinson, Nomadic Strategies and Colonial Governance, in Joanne Sharp et al (ed), Entanglements of Power-Geographic Domination, Routledge, London, 2000, pp. 114, 115. 14 ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 17

sited on the northern and eastern sides. Castagna had advanced observation posts at the outlying villages of Melfa, Bahar El Arrascia and Baharia, plus blocking posts at Garet El Barud, Garet El Gazal, Garet En Nuss and Gara Del Diavolo. Inside this perimeter was the landing ground, north of Giarabub town.15 The village of Giarabub stood north of these defensive positions. An example of the depth of Australian knowledge of these Italian dispositions, based on an intelligence summary of 19 March 1941, was as follows:

High ground South – enclosed by wire. Manned by some 300 men with 20 Breda MG’s, 1 possibly 2 x 77mm guns (in sq 3722), 1 or 2 65mm guns in same sq, 2 x 47mm guns, area permanently held. The hills are mostly very steep and the enemy approach and occupy the area by steps in Squadron 3722, then walk along hills to posts in sq 4219, then along bases of hills to steps leading from point 386156 up to posts about sq 3715. There are 30 men holding the strong point in sq 3722.16

The two opposing forces facing each other at Giarabub were commanded by energetic and highly motivated leaders. The Italians were led by Major Castagna who came from southern Italy, and who was known for his particularly obstinate personality. Interestingly, Long spells Castagna as ‘Costiana’ and gives his rank as Colonel. Both are incorrect. Castagna was a passionate believer in the Fascist cause, but somewhat bitter at missing out on what he thought were earned promotions due to not fitting the Fascist ideal of being a family man as he was single. His posting to such a remote place as Giarabub also left him feeling somewhat dejected. Castagna, however, threw his heart into forging the defence of Giarabub.17

The Australians were initially led by Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Fergusson D.S.O., M.C., Commanding Officer (CO) of 6th Cavalry, who developed the first plan of attack on the Giarabub fortress. Fergusson had served in Gallipoli and France in World War I, then in the peacetime Australian militia in artillery and cavalry units. On 9 March 1941, Fergusson was seriously wounded during a reconnaissance of the

15 Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 59. 16 ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 17 The 6th Cavalry Report for the period spells Castagna as ‘Costina’. Long did spell Castagna correctly in his hand written draft; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Aust. Div. Cav. Reg’t, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Long, To Benghazi, p. 293; Dickens, Never Late, 2005, p. 57. 18

Giarabub defences and evacuated to Egypt. At this point he was replaced by Major J. E. Abbott, previously one of his squadron commanders. On 10 March 1941 Brigadier Wootten took command of the composite force gathering to attack Giarabub which was henceforth known as ‘Wootten Force’. Fergusson’s untimely wounding and evacuation meant that his extant plans for the attack on Giarabub went with him to Egypt. Wootten, thereafter, was left to develop his own plan. There is little question of his ability however, as he went on to ascend to the rank of , commanding the 9th Australian Division in Papua against the Japanese. Major T. J. Daly was Brigade Major of Wootten’s 18th Brigade and of Wootten Force at Giarabub. An indication of Daly’s ability as a leader is likewise evidenced by his future career path – he went on to become Lieutenant General Sir , Chief of the Australian General Staff from 19 May 1966 to 18 May 1971 during the Vietnam War. Lieutenant Colonel J. C. “Jock” Campbell who commanded the British 4th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (4 RHA) at Giarabub was also a dynamic leader, and was later awarded the Victoria Cross for service at Sidi Rezegh on 21 November 1941. He was also the instigator of the famed “Jock” columns comprising armoured cars, artillery and truck–borne infantry later used so effectively to harass Italian forces throughout the Western Desert. Campbell was killed in action in Libya on 26 November 1942. The last important Allied commander at Giarabub was Lieutenant Colonel J. E. G. Martin, Commanding Officer of the 2/9th Australian Infantry Battalion, which supplied the bulk of the infantry for the Giarabub attack. Martin was another talented Australian leader, going on to command 19th Infantry Brigade. Further attributes and other aspects of the commanders on both sides, are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.18

Initially the Italian Forces at Giarabub were far superior, numerically, to those of the Allied force as was also the case in three major battles in North Africa during this period: Bardia, Tobruk and El Alamein. On 13 December 1940, following Italian

18 Jock columns were the equivalent of a modern Task Force, that is, a group of selected units, formed for a specific task. ‘Medical report by R.M.O. Australian Cavalry to A.D.M.S. 6th Australian Division for March 1941.’, 3 , AWM 54 481/12/79; Fergusson arrived at 63 General Hospital, Egypt on 10 March; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Aust. Div. Cav. Reg’t, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Dennis, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 608; A. Ekins and I. McNeil, Fighting to the Finish, the Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1968–1975, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2012, p. 824; http://www.pictureaustralia.org/apps/pictureaustralia?action=PADisplay&mode=display&rs=resultset– 7571041&no=8 , photo captions, accessed 16.3.2012; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 49, 57, 289. 19

withdrawals from the Libyan – Egyptian border posts located consecutively from the north of Sceferzen, Maddalena, Vescechet el Heira and Garn el Grein to Giarabub, Castagna reported that he had a total of 2,100 troops stationed at the Giarabub fort. The garrison was made up of 1,350 Italian and 750 Libyan soldiers.19 These troops comprised the following:

4 Companies of G.A.F. (Guardia alla Frontiera, i.e. Italian special frontier guards) 20 5 Companies of Libyan infantry 1 Assault Artillery Company with fourteen 47mm guns 1 Platoon of Libyan general infantry 1 Artillery Battery with four 77/28 guns 1 Artillery Section with two 65/17 guns 1 Artillery Battery with sixteen 20mm machine guns 1 Signals Group 1 Medical Group 1 Quartermaster Group21

The numerical balance at Giarabub gradually changed over time. Allied forces at Giarabub were built up slowly following a failed British expedition which set forth in July 1940 to capture the oasis. The British force withdrew, only a day away from their objective, due to extreme summer heat and a shortage of water. The aborted attempt was followed in September by the deployment of one company of the 1st Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps (1 KRRC) at Siwa, where it dug in and wired defences across routes to the west of Siwa, that is between Giarabub and Siwa, with the aim of preventing Italian access to Siwa and also to keep movements in the vicinity of Giarabub under observation.22

19 Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 59; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long states 2,000 men, Long, To Benghazi, p. 290. 20 http://www.vecio.it/cms/index.php/guardia–alla–frontiera/322–storia–della–guardia–alla–frontiera, accessed 13 April 2012. 21 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Italian company, platoon, section and group establishments vary, and do not correspond to Allied unit establishments. 22 Long, To Benghazi, pp. 287, 288. 20

The 1 KRRC company, resident at Siwa, was insufficient to force the Italians out of Giarabub in July 1940 so a strategy of containment and isolation, driving in of outlying Italian posts, siege, then, when this failed, direct assault of Giarabub was pursued. On 3 November the RAF bombed one of Castagna’s outposts at Garn el Grein killing two and wounding 18 men. The next day Castagna flew to Cyrenaica to meet General Rodolfo Graziani to discuss Giarabub’s situation. The meeting followed an attack on the (Police) Station at Gialo Oasis by a force of ‘armoured cars’ (probably the LRDP), some 280 kilometres west of Giarabub. Gialo was strategically significant to Giarabub as it was the closest major settlement to the west, and on the only access route from that direction. Castagna recommended that all access points made through the Libyan – Egyptian border fence by the British be more effectively closed off. This exchange showed the degree to which the Italian commanders were thinking in terms of a fortress mentality – walled forts and a fenced border – even though British mobile units were clearly penetrating the fence at will. The meeting finished with Graziani promising fighter planes and armoured cars to Castagna, but they never materialised.23

On 3 December the 1 KRRC company was replaced by B Squadron 6th Cavalry, led by Captain F. H. Brown, at Siwa, so beginning direct involvement by Australian forces. The 1 KRRC troops rejoined their battalion and went on to take part in the Battle of Sidi Barrani. To this point the 6th Cavalry had been in training with the 6th Australian Division, its parent formation, at El Amiriya on the northern Egyptian coast. The training of the Australian cavalrymen is covered in more detail in Chapter 3. In El Amiriya 6th Cavalry had been partly equipped with machine gun carriers and obsolete tanks; however, before departing for Siwa, these were replaced with 15 cwt and 30 cwt trucks which could travel faster, and would be more durable in the harsh desert conditions.24 Siwa offered water and limited supplies of meat and vegetables, but other military supplies had to be trucked from Mersa Matruh on the coast, necessitating a weekly convoy of seven trucks for the five weeks during November and early December. C Squadron, under Major Abbott, and Lieutenant Colonel Fergusson’s Headquarters (HQ) Squadron of 6th Cavalry, a Bofors troop, four 25–pounder guns of a

23 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 223. 24 Long, To Benghazi, p. 288. 21

British regular regiment under Captain O’Grady, and 32 engineers joined B Squadron bringing the force up to 456 men in total. Out of this force, 200 men served as a mobile arm, 115 were artillerymen and signallers and 109 were stationed at Melfa and Siwa Bases. The Giarabub garrison still outnumbered their attackers by 4:1.25 An indication of Fergusson’s rapid grasp of the situation at Giarabub and his energetic activity upon arrival in the Giarabub area is given in a letter to Morshead dated 6 December 1940:

The enemy expects attack from the North. Ref inst 3.[Reference Instruction Number 3. viz, To destroy any enemy force attempting to leave and detect preparations for departure.] My appreciation of the courses open to the enemy is:– To leave with his whole force or, Delay my force with a portion of his, and leave with that portion of his force which can be transported.

There are between 30 and 60 lorries in Giarabub. The garrison is stated to be 2000. Unless additional transport is sent, there is little likelihood of a whole force being evacuated unless my squadrons are attacked and defeated.

Every ruse which has occurred to me has been adopted to persuade the enemy that there is a considerably larger force than two squadrons watching him.26

From December 1940 Australian pressure increased with systematic driving in of Castagna’s outlying posts north of Giarabub. Abbott’s B Squadron made the first 2nd AIF against enemy lines in Libya when they cut phone lines near Maddalena Post on 11 December, and returned to their base at Siwa with information about the enemy defences.27 On this same day another force of 96 men from Fergusson’s garrison travelled north all night in the bitter cold, under Captain Brown, to attack the Italian outpost of Garn el Grein. On approaching the post Libyan troops could be seen. Brown sent one troop to cut the fence and phone line to the north, and one troop to the south to cut the fence, pass through and attack from the west, whilst a third force was to advance

25 2,100 Axis soldiers versus 456 Allied soldiers per figures as described here. Johnstone quotes 10:1. The date of C Squadron and 6th Cavalry HQ etc’s arrival at Siwa is unclear. The ‘Summary of Operations at Giarabub’ has them in action on 11 March attacking Garn el Grein. records have them arriving on 18 March. Long has them arriving on 3 March; ‘Summary of Operations at Giarabub, 1941’, AWM 54 519/2/20; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Aust. Div. Cavalry Reg’t, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Johnstone, The Proud 6th, p. 62; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 288–292; ‘8th Royal Artillery War Diary, 1940 – 1943’, The Royal Artillery Museum, Woolwich, London, Box 437. 26‘Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 27 AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 26. 22

to a position 900 metres east of the post armed with Vickers machine guns. A vigorous Italian response with truck mounted infantry caused the northern troop of Australians to withdraw. About an hour later the Australian Vickers machine gunners were shelled briskly and attacked by three Italian fighter aircraft. Long noted:

After the aircraft had gone VX4682 Trooper W. J. Tope, (of Foster, Vic) discovered that he had been wounded and, in the next two days, five shell fragments and a bullet were removed from his groin and buttock. Thus, so far as is known, Tope was the first soldier in the second AIF to be wounded in action against an enemy on the ground, although enemy aircraft had already caused casualties among Australians in camps and rear areas both in England and the Middle East.28

Simultaneously, Italian artillery shelled one of Brown’s troops, under the command of Lieutenant G. C. Corey, in the west and Brown’s own headquarters. After an hour Brown decided to withdraw, as he felt his small force could not effectively continue the attack. On their arrival in the afternoon another of Brown’s Troop Commanders, Lieutenant E. J. Ryrie, led his vehicles forward to investigate, was fired upon, and saw about 100 Italian reinforcements entering the post in trucks. The Australian force departed for Siwa that evening.29

During the following days Fort Maddalena was assaulted by Allied troops and Garn el Grein was attacked for a second time. According to Castagna, the British tactics then changed from direct attacks on posts to setting ambushes for mobile Italian columns. Castagna still had air transport freely available, but the noose was tightening. More bad news arrived by telegram from the headquarters of Italian forces in Libya concerning the routing of the Italians far to the north near the Mediterranean coast at Sidi el Barrani, Solum and Ridotta Capuzzo by O’Connor’s Western Desert Force. Some 40,000 Italian prisoners were captured over the period 12 to 17 December. In Castagna’s sector, which now had a front of 200 kilometres, the RAF intensified their incursions. Italian vehicle columns destined for Giarabub near Bardia were attacked with some soldiers killed and others wounded.30

28 Long, To Benghazi, p. 289. 29 Ibid. 30 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 223. 23

On 11 December, according to Fattore, Castagna was ordered to abandon the small forts at Maddalena, Garn el Grein and Sceferzen, and to concentrate his men at Giarabub, which he accomplished between 16 and 18 December. However Castagna himself stated that on 13 December, after the fall of other small outposts at Buq Buq and Sidi Omar, he received orders to regroup all troops from the forts of Garn el Grein, Uescechet el Hetra, Maddalena and Sceferzen, north of Giarabub. This would appear to be the more likely version. In any case, the outlying forts were lost and the siege of Giarabub itself closed in.31

Major Castagna, in an account of events at Giarabub written by Fabio Fattore, describes in dramatic terms how the “English” launched their first attack with armoured cars on the fort at Garet el Berud, 6 kilometres north of Giarabub:

The Libyan guards opened fire with machine guns and hand grenades. The garrison at that time had no larger guns capable of piecing armour. Our nationals and the Ascari [Libyan soldiers] fought with great bravery, with not much time to rest. Altogether they were under fire for 80 hours. The day after at the other posts of Melfa, Barra Arrascia, Saniet and Deffa (on the coast, south and west of Giarabub some enemy armoured vehicles were sighted).32

On 13 December 18th Brigade’s Commander, Brigadier Leslie Morshead, communicated a plan of attack on Giarabub developed by Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Fergusson to 1st Australia Corps HQ. For this attack Fergusson requested two British armoured squadrons, each consisting of two troops of medium tanks, two troops of light tanks and one troop of carriers plus one medium tank and one light tank, together with squadron and regimental headquarters. This plan was rejected however, due to a shortage of serviceable British armour.33

The opportunity for the second assault, on the outpost of Garn el Grein arose on 16 December 1940, following receipt of an intercepted Italian radio message. The message, decoded by Australians at Siwa, was from the Italian commander asking for reinforcements. A reply was received informing Castagna that a convoy would leave

31 The telegram read ‘Carate di far ripiegare au Giarabub le truppa dai presidi staccati.’; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 223. 32 Fattore, Giarabub, p.191. 33 ‘Message: Morshead to 1st Australian Corps, 13 December 1940.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 24

Garn el Grein at 4.30 pm that afternoon. Captain Brown was ordered directly by Western Desert Force, to attack the Italian convoy. This second message, however, did not reach Brown until after the Italian reinforcements convoy had arrived. The cavalrymen travelled 197 kilometres across the desert and set their ambush astride the track leading north from the outpost. The Italian convoy duly appeared at 7.30 pm and was fired upon for 75 minutes with Vickers and Bren guns. The Italians fought back with machine guns and anti–tank fire. Before withdrawing, the Australians destroyed two trucks and acquired four others that the Italians had been forced to abandon.34

Far to the north the larger contest between WDF and the Italian 10th Army was unfolding. By 17 December, around 40,000 Italian troops had been isolated in Bardia and ordered by Mussolini to ‘hold fast’ and await reinforcements. Giarabub was now isolated 320 kilometres to the south, connected to 10th Army by nothing more than a string of abandoned posts and a lonely windswept and very porous barbed wire fence.35

Back at Siwa, Fergusson learnt of the Italian abandonment of Garn el Grein and many of the other border posts when he sent Australian detachments and who found them deserted of men, but with useful quantities of equipment and supplies left behind. From this point on Fergusson’s task was to keep Giarabub, with its few remaining small outposts still standing to the east, southeast and south under observation, whilst preventing Castagna’s resupply. Wavell expected that as the Italian garrison’s supplies dwindled, so too would their resolve to resist, forcing their surrender. Fergusson, however had only about 200 men, other than those maintaining the Siwa base, to implement the blockade, and no aircraft. Opposing him, the Italian garrison fielded numerous guns and 2,100 men in a position with considerable defensive potential, with the only approaches being over open country and devoid of cover.36

34 Long, To Benghazi, p. 289. 35 Much of this fence remains today, and is visible from space on public domain satellite imagery. Stockings, Bardia, p. 86. 36 The Australian War Memorial holds a tattered Italian tricolour flag taken from an office at Garn el Grein with the names of Private S. Lang (who was attached to 6th Cavalry), and Major Brown penned in the centre of it; Flag in AWM collection, RELAWM 32854; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Long, To Benghazi, p. 290. 25

Yet the Italians had considerable difficulties of their own. On 18 December Castagna calculated that he had only enough food for 12 days’ rations for the Italians and 20 days’ worth for the Libyan soldiers, forcing him to reduce the rations by half for the Italians and by one third for the Libyans. He made an exception for tea as he knew that the Libyans would not function without it. He removed coffee from the Italian’s menu however, to conserve sugar. Castagna explained to his higher headquarters that the air dropped supplies were insufficient.37 An inventory of ammunition taken on the same day at Giarabub stated that Castagna had only enough ammunition for the 20mm machine guns and 47mm guns, for six days of fighting. He therefore urged economy of use and the rationing of ammunition. Castagna reported that he had only two days’ supply of hand grenades. Note that this is in stark contrast to the amount of Italian ammunition salvaged from the fort by the Australians three months later on 21 March 1941 – 900,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 17,950 rounds of Breda 20mm and 4,000 rounds of Breda 47mm plus much other materiel such as 70 vehicles. This disparity in quantities of ammunition cannot be accounted for by the later meagre Italian resupply. Either Castagna was understating the figures to add weight to his requests for more support, or one set of figures is incorrect. On the same day Fergusson’s small force was bolstered with the arrival of a Bofors 40mm Anti–aircraft Group from the 4 RHA at Siwa.38

Despite the small size of Fergusson’s force, during the period 20–29 December, B and C Squadrons of 6th Cavalry successfully blocked road communications to Giarabub. Indicative of the often conflicting reports that bedevil historical accounts of military actions, there are three different versions of an action that took place on 24 December during the siege of Giarabub. Australian records state that Brown’s squadron drove off a half hearted attack by a dozen or so Libyan troops from the post at Melfa, 30 kilometres east of Giarabub, just inside the Libyan border. At the same time the defenders of the Italian El Aemra post southeast of Giarabub were also forced to retreat

37 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 226; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long states that half rations were instituted on 20 December, 1940; Long, To Benghazi, p 293. 38 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 228; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137. 26

to Giarabub. Castagna’s version, recorded five years later, related that on 24 December the Australians attacked Melfa with armoured cars and that the Libyan soldiers tried to defend the position until they were forced to retreat back to Giarabub. He stated that the retreating troops hid a radio with its operator in a cave to provide further reports. Recent Italian author, Fattore, however, states that the post was temporarily retaken by a mobile Italian force yet there is no mention of this in Australian records. For his part, Fergusson, in his contemporary report, stated that Melfa was visited by his men after the raid and the post showed no signs of occupation and nor had a nearby Egyptian position seen any movement there. Fergusson’s account would appear to be the most credible version. Significantly, in relation to the behaviour of the combatants during this period, an Australian account states: ‘The enemy troops at Melfa pretended to surrender twice, and when approached took up their arms and opened fire.’39 This episode may well have helped to provoke the incident in which it was claimed that Australian soldiers shot Italian soldiers immediately after their surrender on 21 March, 1941, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

On Christmas Day, 1940, Brown’s B Squadron moved down the track towards Giarabub from the northeast along a dry gully or wadi, which the Australians had named Pipsqueak Valley. This name was bestowed on account of a small 47mm (incorrectly described a number of times as 44mm in the Australian Official History) Italian gun, nicknamed Pipsqueak by the Australians. As they moved through the area Brown’s men came under sharp fire from field artillery and machine guns. A subsequent attempt by Brown to raid nearby Italian gun positions at night was unsuccessful due to vigilant Italian sentries. The would–be raiders withdrew without loss. Later that night, however, Sergeant K. W. Walsh lost his way, was wounded and

39 Long, To Benghazi, pp. 290, 291; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12 and map No. 2; ‘Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; An interesting comparison can be made here with an incident at Bardia nine days later, when on 3 January, Italian prisoners emerged from a captured post with hands raised. An Australian, Captain David I. A. Green, began walking towards them. When about 20 metres distant, a lone Italian soldier climbed the steps from the post, raised his rifle and mortally wounded Green. This incident is similar to another that occurred in the same theatre. An Australian corporal was shot from a dugout by an Italian officer during the Battle of Bardia. A later inquiry found he had not broken the rules of war, however the corporal’s platoon had ‘burst in fury’, killing all the defenders of the post; ‘Battalion Report on Operations at Bardia on 5 January, 1941’, AWM 52 8/3/11; Johnson, 2/11th Australian Infantry Battalion, p. 65. in Stockings, Bardia, p. 257; P. J. Hurst, My Army Days, AWM MSS1656, in Stockings, Bardia, pp. 210, 211. 27

captured by two Libyan soldiers. When interrogated by Castagna, Walsh gave nothing away. Castagna however claimed that the prisoner had important papers with him. Walsh was flown by the first available plane to 10th Army’s headquarters in Benghazi and then on to Rome.40

The next day Abbott’s C Squadron drove an Italian detachment from a well located in the southeastern part of the Giarabub depression, by using anti–tank rifles against the low stone–walled sangers (firing positions). This was Castagna’s final outpost on the eastern edge of the oasis, leaving the Australian cavalrymen free to concentrate on Giarabub itself. From this point on Australian raids and reconnaissance patrols went forth almost daily, each extending a little further. This probing enabled the Australians to continue to build their knowledge of the Italian positions whilst the Italians no longer ventured from beyond their wire. The sight of any Australian vehicle on the escarpment tended to draw unrestrained fire from field and machine guns, despite Castagna’s pleas for economy.41

According to Castagna, on 26 December Allied armoured cars attacked the Italian observation post of Cesbaia, west of Giarabub. The Libyan garrison withdrew back to Giarabub when they realised their position was hopeless. On hearing of this Castagna says he sent a column to stabilise the situation, allowing the lookout to be used once more. The same report describes a further attack on Garet el Barud on 28 December during which an Australian soldier was captured and sent to the 10th Army Headquarters. This would appear to be the same incident in which Sergeant Walsh was captured on 25 December. Castagna’s accounts were written some five years after the battle, whereas the Australian accounts are based on contemporaneous documents such as message logs, orders and reports. It is likely, therefore, that the events Castagna

40 He was not the first Australian POW in WWII. Three Australians soldiers were captured in British Somaliland at the Battle of Tug Argan Gap on 15 August 1940, whilst numerous RAN sailors were captured in 1939. Greg Swinden, Navy at War: Sailors Behind the Wire, in Wartime, Official Magazine of the Australian War Memorial, Issue 62, Autumn 2013, Hardy Grant Media, Neutral Bay, pp. 24-29; http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/farflung/firstpows.html accessed 22 June 2012; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, p. 290; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 224. 41 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 290, 291. 28

described as occurring on 26 and 28 December were actually the same as those already discussed.42

Despite successful Australian raiding, by the last days of 1940 it had become apparent that the plan to starve the Giarabub garrison into submission through exclusion of food or ammunition was not going to succeed in the short term. Large aircraft were regularly landing on the Giarabub airfield, bringing in supplies. In response Fergusson asked for British fighter aircraft, even preparing a landing ground at Garn el Grein for their use. None was forthcoming. In spite of the long siege, the Australians realised they would need to attack Giarabub itself. To this end General Wilson ordered the Australians to establish an advanced position at Melfa, for the storage of rations, fuel and 25–pounder ammunition. Melfa was henceforth developed as a base; however this was no easy process. The local water, for example, was considered unfit for drinking so supplies had to be laboriously trucked from Siwa, 130 kilometres southeast of Giarabub.43

Once Melfa was established as a depot, the Australian cavalrymen camped well forward of it, and using either a small detachment, one squadron, or both, continued to scout towards Giarabub on an almost daily basis. This regularly drew Italian artillery fire which further added to the Australians’ knowledge of the Italian defences. By 29 December Fergusson was satisfied that his knowledge of the Italian strength was accurate and that the time was ripe to capture the fort. He thus submitted a second plan for an attack on Giarabub to General Wilson, requesting 6th Cavalry (including A Squadron without its armour, although with four carriers if the decision was made to send tracked vehicles), a small detachment of engineers, a six–gun troop of 18 pounder guns (a battery if no Bren carriers were to be used), two infantry companies, an Army Service company and a company of Field Ambulance.44

42 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 43 Long, To Benghazi, pp. 291, 292. 44 Long, To Benghazi, pp. 290, 292; ‘Reconnaissance Report of Giarabub, Lt. Col. Fergusson, 29 December, 1940’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 29

Fergusson was refused his requested reinforcements but his force slowly grew nonetheless. The Bofors troop had arrived, then a detachment of engineers.45 Fergusson was ordered not to commit his forces to an attack at this stage. He therefore kept up his efforts to drive in the few remaining outlying Italian posts, making it possible to confine the enemy to a diminishing area. This in turn meant that he could now use smaller parties for reconnaissance and raiding, who had shorter distances to travel, thereby reducing the strain on his supply lines. Fergusson considered that his force’s frequent appearances on the edge of the dominating plateau, in view of the Italians, would cause them to expend ammunition, perhaps irreplaceably. These frequent appearances also had the benefit of promoting the idea that the Australians were far more numerous than only the two 6th Cavalry squadrons. Further, the Australians began to build an expectation in Castagna’s mind that an attack should be expected to come from the north, in keeping with his defensive plan. This erroneous assumption was to have grave consequences for the Italians during the final battle.46

Fergusson’s many reconnaissances had, in fact, ascertained that a force could be led to Giarabub by night from the southwest. He requested air photos of the area covering the edge of the escarpment to the north, northwest and northeast of the Giarabub village.47As such planning unfolded, the Italian outpost of Garet el Barud was attacked on 31 December 1940. According to Castagna, the Australian penetration initially succeeded until he sent a fast response group to the western side of the post, a Libyan group to the eastern side and a truck to the nearby aviation camp. The struggle went on until the afternoon when the Italians overcame the Australians, after which the attackers withdrew with their dead and wounded. Castagna states that they destroyed two radio trucks and captured a Ford truck, for the loss of two Libyans killed and some wounded. The Australian versions of such events were somewhat at odds with Castagna’s account. The attack is described by Long as a reconnaissance with the aims of photographing the fort and advancing close enough to the airport to damage supply

45 See Footnote 25 on p. 22 regarding confusion over actual arrival date. 46 Long, To Benghazi, p. 290; ‘Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; Dickens, Never Late, p. 57. 47 ‘Letter: Fergusson to Morshead, 6 December, 1940’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 30

aircraft, which led to a ‘brisk engagement’48. Two men, Trooper J. S. C. Fuller and Corporal E. F. Trounce, were killed in the action. They were the only fatalities in 6th Cavalry, with six others wounded, during the whole Giarabub campaign. Trounce’s body was buried in the sand by the Italians and recovered by the Australians once the siege ended in March 1941. Fuller and Trounce were the second and third members of the 2nd AIF to be killed by ground forces in World War II, following the death of Corporal E. Goble at Bardia.49 Two men were also wounded including Corporal Riedel, the photographer, whilst three vehicles were disabled. One of the disabled vehicles, a 1½ ton Ford truck, which had bullet holes shot in its fuel tank, was quickly repaired, under Australian fire, by two Italian aviators named Fermanti and Santarossa. The pair proudly drove this modern vehicle back to the Giarabub fortress and presented it to Major Castagna. Following this engagement Brown’s exhausted squadron returned to Siwa to rest and wash. They had been in the dusty desert continuously for nearly three weeks. Brown’s men had hot meals delivered from Melfa; however, strict rationing of water and frequent dust storms had added to their discomfort.50

On 5 January reports of the capture of Bardia, with the loss of more than 40,000 prisoners, arrived at Giarabub.51 Hoping to capitalise on this bad news for the isolated Italians at Giarabub, RAF Lysander aircraft dropped leaflets encouraging the Italians to surrender:

We have occupied Sidi el Barrani capturing 40,000 prisoners and much materiel. We have not yet counted the prisoners from Bardia. Every resistance from you is useless. Do you want to be destroyed by our 80 ton tanks? The Empire does not forgive. Surrender!52

Meanwhile the Australian 18th Infantry Brigade had arrived in Egypt on 31 December, under the command of Brigadier Morshead. From 7 January to 12 January Morshead, with his Brigade Major, Major Thomas Daly, Lieutenant Colonel J. E. G.

48 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, p. 292. 49 A photograph shows Trounce’s body being transported for burial in Johnston, The Proud 6th, pp. 62, 63. 50 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 225; Long, To Benghazi, p. 292. 51 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 225; The number captured is estimated at around 36,000 prisoners, in Stockings, Bardia, p. 276. 52 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 31

Martin, the CO of the 2/9th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Verrier, the CO of the 2/10th Battalion, Captain G. D. T. Cooper and Lieutenant Colonel Horace Strutt, an artillery officer, reconnoitred the Giarabub area. Following his inspection Brigadier Morshead favoured the current strategy of starving out the garrison, with good reason. Giarabub remained an excellent defensive position. Its thick walls still stood and there were plenty of Italians still behind them.53

Fergusson received news from on 9 January, via an intercepted radio message, that an Italian force was leaving from Benghazi to relieve the besieged Giarabub garrison. Fergusson’s cavalry, less one troop left to maintain the siege, set forth immediately on a 32 kilometre front scouting for the Italian convoy. Aircraft were summoned and the convoy destroyed, terminating any further thoughts of reinforcements for Castagna. Morshead went forward with the cavalry on 9 and 10 January to reconnoitre once again, each time drawing Italian artillery and machine gun fire. On the next day, 11 January, three Italian aircraft added to the daily skirmish. On the same day a New Zealand detachment of the LRDP, under Captain D. E. Steele, arrived and was tasked with patrolling west and northwest of Giarabub, watching the tracks west of Giarabub and passing information back to the Australians by radio. This force, although small in number, produced a projection of force out of proportion to its size, due to its ability to move freely across the desert, unhindered by the need for roads. The LRDP’s ability to attack behind enemy lines or gather intelligence on enemy units became legendary. Over the next five days more Australian detachments drove forward drawing fire. On one of these trips O’Grady’s guns destroyed an aircraft on the Giarabub aerodrome, marking the last landing of a supporting flight for the Italians.54

On 1 February 1941, Brigadier Wootten took command of 18th Brigade whilst Morshead took command of 9th Australian Division. The composite Allied force now gathering in the vicinity of Siwa became known as “Wootten Force”. This growing Australian presence had begun to concentrate as it became apparent that the Allied siege

53 Dickens, Never Late, p. 57. 54 Tim Moreman, Long Range Desert Patrol, The Western Desert 1940–43, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2010, p. 4; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 292, 293. 32

operations were not succeeding and that a larger force would be required to break the Italian garrison.55

For the Italians, still no supplies could be brought in by vehicle, and after the recent raid on the airfield, aircraft could no longer land. Some limited supplies were still being delivered, dropped from aircraft on the sand north of Giarabub.56 Further bad news arrived on 21 January 1941. Castagna told his men: ‘Tomorrow you will hear on the radio that Tobruk has fallen. The defence has done a good job, but do not let this news weaken your spirit. Defend Giarabub, better times will come.’57 Castagna reiterated how important Giarabub had become, protecting the road to Gialo, the next Italian outpost, 280 kilometres to the west, and the flank of what remained of the 10th Army at Gebel.58

Despite Castagna’s determination, for the Italians the situation continued to decline with every day. On 7 February the British broadcast news of the fall of Benghazi. wrote to saying: ‘never have so many soldiers surrendered to so few.’59 Italian radio broadcasts no longer reached Giarabub, increasing its isolation. Fattore states that on 9 February Castagna gained contact with the post commander, who told him that they would not be able to send any more supplies to Giarabub. Kufra was 640 kilometres south of Giarabub and resisted until 1 March when it was captured by Free French forces emanating from .60 Castagna’s own report states that this message came as a telegram from Supreme Command, not Kufra, on 8 February. Castagna was told: ‘We can no longer provide food: resist as long as you can and then surrender and ask the honour of arms. Don’t go back since every road is controlled by enemies.’61

55 The first known written reference to ‘Wootten Force’ is ‘Wootten Force Movement Table No. 1.’, 17 March, 1941, AWM 52 8/2/18/5, although it is likely that the name was used from the first day of the force’s existence; Long, To Benghazi, p. 294. 56 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 57 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 226. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Andrea Molinari, Desert Raiders: Axis and Allied Special forces 1940-43, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2007, p. 41. 61 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 33

By this point Castagna’s resistance at Giarabub was becoming the beginning of a legend back home in Italy, where good news stories were in very short supply. Such was Giarabub’s growing fame that Castagna’s superiors planned to deliver more supplies on 17 February to support his stand. Yet more trouble was brewing, however, in the form of desertions by his Libyan soldiers. On 7 February three Libyans surrendered at Melfa, then from 7 – 17 February a flood of some 600 more Libyans similarly offered themselves up as prisoners. Castagna had asked his superiors for permission to release the Libyans who were wishing to leave, as once they had heard of the collapse of 10th Army in Cyrenaica, he could not physically stop their departure. He wanted to avoid a mass desertion with the Libyans taking their arms. Castagna still sought to treat his Libyan soldiers as best he could, even though he could see they were suffering obvious signs of malnutrition. He tried to maintain their ration of tea and food, and the payment of their wages to their families. Castagna also tried to encourage them by telling them that Cyrenaica would be recaptured and that they should continue to fight with the Italians, but it was useless. With the general rout of Italian Cyrenaica, the Libyans were worried about their families. Most of the Libyans decided to leave, and did so in groups of up to 50 at a time. On 15 February 218 of them were rounded up by the Allies as they either walked north towards the coast, or southeast towards Siwa. They reported their situation as desperate, but there was no talk of an Italian surrender at Giarabub.62

The Libyan prisoners described to the Allies how the food supplies in Giarabub were becoming scarce. By now rations for individual Italian soldiers was reduced to 100 grams of army biscuit and half a tin of meat per day, enough to last until 25 February.63 Sixty years later the Sicilian soldier Benedetto Pipitone remembered only one thing about Giarabub – the terrible hunger:

We would share a ration of bread and a tin of meat between four of us. We had to kill the camels and even the donkey which pulled up the water from the well.

62‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Fattore, Giarabub, p 226; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 293, 294. 63 To what extent the reduction in the garrison’s numbers aided the ongoing food situation is not known, although it was noted that the deserters appeared well fed and had provisions with them. ‘Medical report by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for February 1941 and March 1941’, AWM 54 481/12/79; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 227. 34

Lighting a cooking fire was forbidden so we were forced to eat raw meat. Some soldiers took the lieutenant’s dog, killed it and ate it, but I refused to eat it. When we were starving we ate grass and the pulp from the palm trees even though this was forbidden by Castagna.64

Pressure on Castagna continued to mount. On 19 February the Australians succeeded in driving the Italians out of Garet el Cuscia, only five kilometres east of Giarabub. Castagna took stock of his force. With the small group of 60 Libyans who had decided to stay, he now had 1,046 soldiers and officers, plus 251 sick, injured or in supporting roles. The sick and wounded had been relocated on 22 January inside the Giarabub Mosque for safety. Castagna changed the dispositions of his troops, but still maintained the overall method of defence.65

Meanwhile, with the 10th Italian Army all but destroyed by Western Desert Force, the overall Italian commander in Libya, General Graziani, returned to Rome on 24 February, and submitted his resignation. Mussolini accepted it and replaced him with General Italo Gariboldi. Two days later the Australian 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary noted: ‘The Italian 10th army has now ceased to exist and the whole of Cyrenaica is in our hands with the exception of Giarabub.’66

Major Castagna sent a message of his own on 25 February to his superiors: ‘Promised food provisions not as yet arrived. I have rations for only one more day. It is really sorrowful that after so many sacrifices we have to surrender because of hunger.’67 Two days later an Italian plane arrived over Giarabub and jettisoned food without landing. A little more biscuits and tinned meat was on offer but it did not go far. The garrison had now been on half rations for 50 days but the news of this latest delivery lifted their spirits – they had supplies for another five days. The decline in the general condition of Castagna’s men was, however, becoming desperate.68

64 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 228. 65 Ibid, pp. 227, 234; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 66 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 232; Dickens, Never Late, p. 56. 67 Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 60. 68 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 60. 35

On 27 February the Italian garrison at Kufra, south of Giarabub was captured. Like Giarabub, Kufra was an isolated Italian post, with an airfield, and was part of the strategic plan for Italian held East African colonies. At the same time shelling of Giarabub continued from various positions by the British artillery attached to Wootten Force throughout February. Strict instructions were issued that on no account was the Giarabub mosque to be damaged. Most of the shelling was carried out by British artillery with 25–pounders which, unfortunately for the Italians, considerably outranged the Italian guns. The largest gun the Italians possessed inside the Giarabub fort was a 65mm/17 World War I relic, nicknamed by its unfortunate gunners “Count of Culagna”, the principal figure disparaged in an ancient satirical poem.69 In this context a second exhortation to surrender was dropped from a British aircraft on 2 March:

Giarabub’s defenders, surrender! Your command does not tell you the truth, the entire Cyrenaica is ours. We captured 115,000 soldiers and large quantities of arms and material. Our troops are going to conquer Tripoli. Do not sacrifice yourselves any longer. You cannot retreat. Surrender and we will treat you well.70

As with the previous suggestion to surrender, Castagna responded with artillery. His 47mm guns however had a range of only 2.4 kilometres – a sixth of the range of Fergusson’s guns. While some of these were mounted on trucks to get closer to the attackers the impact was minimal.71

Lieutenant Colonel Fergusson conducted yet another reconnaissance of Giarabub, this time with three war correspondents, one of whom was Gavin Long, the future author of the Australian Official History, and his artillery commander, Captain

69 The Italian Official History map of Giarabub shows two 65/17 guns in Caposaldo No. 1., Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, appended loose maps, Schizzo No. 5, p. 57; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 234; http://books.google.com.au/books?id=5kk9AAAAYAAJ&pg=PA171&lpg=PA171&dq=Count+of+Culag na&source=bl&ots=n0hSU5xz2Z&sig=mhb7_wnSHMgPJ5W9vDde96Lq5CA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gPlCT 73XFs–XiQfx8PDVBA&sqi=2&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Count%20of%20Culagna&f =false accessed 21 February 2012. 70 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 71 ‘AMC Pamphlet, Trajectories, Differential Effects, and Data for Projectiles’, Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command, AMCP 706–140, 1963;‘Medical report by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for March 1941’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79; http://www.flamesofwar.com/Default.aspx?tabid=112&art_id=1019&kb_cat_id=33 accessed 13 June 2012; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 233. 36

O’Grady on 7 March 1941. They ventured forward in a car down a track, through a gully named O’Grady’s Dell. This track was mined by the Italians a few days later, after which the Australians relocated the mines to a detour and managed to blow up an Italian truck. Fergusson was keen to know if troops were arriving or departing via the flights that could be seen (although not landing) in the area. In order to get a better view he and his party progressed closer to the airport. The Italian artillery opened fire. A shell exploded close to Fergusson with a small piece penetrating the left side of his chest, just above his heart. Fergusson was moved about 48 kilometres by ambulance to El Qarn which had a landing ground with a plane waiting to take him to a hospital in Egypt. Five days later Wootten arrived, but Fergusson’s intimate knowledge and plan of attack had departed with him.72

Castagna, in his post war report, stated that on 6 March his last remaining outpost, at Garet el Cuscia, east of Giarabub, ‘was overwhelmed but thanks to the intervention of our mobile patrol and some support from Giarabub we were able to slow and stop the enemy advance. Finally we reversed the situation and started attacking, pushing back the enemy to Malfa (sic)’.73 This report is not in accord with the report from the 6th Cavalry which describes the relocation of the Australian forward base on 9 March. The advanced base, complete with cook houses, was moved further forward, this time to a site about 13 kilometres southwest of the old base and 16 kilometres east of Giarabub. Melfa was now only to be used for reserve tanks of water. Future supplies of food and ammunition were to come direct from Siwa. There are no Australian or British records to support Castagna’s claim of pushing the Australians back to Melfa during March. In truth the Italians could only move safely within their compound at night, due to the persistent British artillery fire. They worked in the darkness to rebuild the defensive positions destroyed during the day.74

72 O’Leary, To the Green Fields Beyond, pp. 95–97, in Tom Richardson, AWM , SVSS document, The Siege of Giarabub, 2010; ‘Medical report by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for March 1941.’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79; Fergusson survived in spite of his serious wound, living until 1975. http://www.26cavcommando.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1551&Itemid=60&l imit=1&limitstart=1 accessed 15 May 2012. 73 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 74 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; ‘Medical report by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6 Aust Div for March 1941’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79. 37

The scene was thus set for a final Australian attack on Giarabub. Significantly in a historiographical context, the Italian obstinacy during the siege was completely out of character with other performances of the Italian army in Cyrenaica. From July 1940 to 8 March 1941 Major Castagna had used his strength of personality and leadership to maintain the resolve of the garrison whilst the odds of escape or success dwindled with every day as the Allied noose tightened. His land and air supply lines were cut. His observation posts were driven in. The wider Italian 10th Army defensive scheme of a fence and fortified posts lay in tatters, yet still he held on. One third of his total force deserted. Those that were left were on half rations but still he would not surrender. He was outgunned. His superiors and his comrades on the coast were capitulating by the tens of thousands and still he would not yield. The Allies were at first frustrated by the hostile environment from July 1940, then by Castagna's tenacity. They were compelled to expand the force steadily in a grinding effort to impose an Italian surrender, all the while building their knowledge of the defence positions, until they finally had to concede that the besieged Italians simply would not give up. The only way to break this obdurate garrison was to be with a numerically superior, better supplied and better armed full force attack – the subject of the following chapter.

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Chapter 2

Operation Galley, the Final Battle for Giarabub

The final Allied operation to capture Giarabub, named Operation Galley, began with an acceptance that besieging the Italian fortress had not caused and was not going to cause their capitulation. The central purpose of this chapter is to investigate the subsequent Allied attack of Giarabub. Specific issues to be examined include the build up of Allied forces under Brigadier Wootten, their movement to the battle site, the challenges of supply which beset both the attackers and the defenders, and the evolution of Allied plans to capture Castagna’s garrison. In the process inaccuracies in the Australian Official History are revealed. Such issues, for example, include the fact that half of the Allied deaths were caused by friendly fire, and an example of how Australians may not have always operated according to the rules of war by shooting prisoners on the battlefield at Giarabub.

The pace of the Giarabub campaign quickened when Brigadier Wootten was advised by AIF HQ, at his Brigade HQ at 1.00 am on 10 March 1941, that one of his battalions plus one additional company were to form part of a force to attack Giarabub. Chosen were the 2/9th Battalion and D Company 2/10th Battalion. These infantry companies were advised of the situation and ordered to prepare themselves for battle immediately. Wootten reported to Lieutenant General , General Officer Commanding AIF, at 9.00 am the following day. Wootten received instructions from Blamey and Lieutenant General Sir Richard N. O’Connor, General Officer Commanding XIII Corps (formally WDF) and the architect of the highly successful Operation Compass. 1

To conduct his attack Wootten was allotted sufficient transport for one battalion plus one company with enough supplies for ten days. In spite of the enemy defences being protected by wire, artillery and machine guns, Wootten was informed that he would have no tanks. Fuel and ammunition would also be restricted, due to the limitation of available transport. One Lysander aircraft was made available at this stage.

1 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 39

Following the production of detailed arrangements for the long journey to Giarabub, the complex task of moving this force commenced on 14 March 1941, when Lieutenant Colonel Martin inspected every man in his 2/9th Battalion, thanking them for their cooperation and hard work during their training. He forecast: ‘We would make for ourselves a splendid record and gain distinction in the field.’2 He also expressed regret that they may not all be there at the next battalion parade. Part of the 2/9th Battalion moved by road and the remainder travelled by train from Ikingi Maryut, close to Egypt’s capital, , to Mersa Matruh 250 kilometres to the west on the Egyptian coast in full battle order, during a raging sandstorm. The train trip, which started at 10.00 am, was slow and erratic due to sand on the track and questionable brakes making for a rough stop–start ride. With 71 men per carriage, 37 officers and 777 Other Ranks from 2/9th Battalion plus the composite 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions’ Machine Gun Platoon arrived at Mersa Matruh at 2.00 am then boarded open trucks to move to barracks a few kilometres away, where they spent what little remained of the night. Those travelling in the 124 vehicles, which included D Company 2/10th Battalion, 47 Light Aid Detachment (LAD3), anti–aircraft and mortar detachments, had detailed arrangements for water, fuel and rations. Orders for dress were to be shorts and shirts, with service dress carried in packs. This was later roundly cursed by the men as they lay shivering at night on the cold windswept dunes. Convoy speed was to be 36 kilometres per hour with a density of only 15 vehicles per 1.6 kilometres.4

The road and rail parties combined at Mersa Matruh and moved out on 15 March in a convoy of 200 trucks headed for the Siwa Depression. ‘The desert was arid, flat and so rocky that the men in the back of the trucks spent as much time airborne as they did actually seated on the hard wooden seats.’5 After travelling 100 kilometres south of Mersa Matruh to Bir Fuad they met 4 RHA at 5.00 pm, which was to support them in the impending battle. With a meal of biscuits and bully beef the weary men rolled themselves into their blankets and spent a bitterly cold night under a stark desert

2 J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 1. AWM 76 B198. 3 Mobile field mechanics equipped to operate in the desert. 4 ‘Administrative Instructions, Road Movement–Ikingi to Matruh.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on Giarabub Incident, O.C. 10/12 Bn Composite M.G. Pl. March 1941’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; ‘Wootten Force Movement Table No.1, 17 March, 1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 5 Dickens, Never Late, pp. 58, 59. 40

sky. Fuel had been placed at Bir Fuad to refuel the convoy during the advance and return journeys. More fuel and rations were left at Melfa for operations around Giarabub with guards set at each dump. The water allocation was 4.5 litres per man per day and the same per vehicle.6 Wootten Force now numbered 2,219 all ranks, including units already on the battlefield, as described in Table 1 below: Unit Men 552nd Res Motor Transport Company R.A.S.C. 150 18th Brigade Head Quarters 65 Two Mortar Platoons 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions 24 Two Protection Platoons (Anti–aircraft) 2/10th Battalion 50 Machine Guns 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions 24 47th Light Aid Detachment 12 J Section Signallers 30 One Battery 4th Royal Horse Artillery 255 One Troop 4th Field Squadron 91 13th Light Field Ambulance 165 2/9th Battalion plus D Company 2/10th Battalion 750 B and C Squadrons 6th Cavalry plus 8th Field Regimental Artillery 456 Long Range Desert Patrol 7 50 Less 1 captured and 2 killed in December 1940 –3 Estimated Total 2,219

Table 1 Estimated number of Allied soldiers at Giarabub 21 March, 1941.

Sources: ‘Administrative Instructions, Road Movement – Matruh to Melfa’, AWM 52, 8/2/18/5; Long, To Benghazi, p. 293; ‘HQ Matruh Sub–Area, Admin instructions, Operations – Giarabub Area, 13 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5.

6 ‘HQ Matruh Sub–Area, Admin instructions, Operations – Giarabub Area, 13 March, 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 7 Estimated from similar expedition. Tim Moreman, Long Range Desert Group Patrolmen, The Western Desert 1940–43, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2010, p. 50; The Italians estimated 60 men in the LRDP which attacked Kufra to the south. Ministro Della Difesa, Stato Maggiore Dell’Esercito, La Prima Controffensiva Italo – Tedesca in Africa Settentrionale, 15 Febbraio – 18 Novembre 1941, Ufficio Storico, Tipografia Regionale Rome, 1974, p. 56. 41

In contrast, by 21 March 1941, the defenders numbered only 1,287 (1,086 fighting men and 201 wounded and noncombat troops) following the further defections of all but 35 of the original 750 Libyan troops. The ratio had switched from Italian numerical superiority of 4:1 to being outnumbered by 2:1. The Allies’ superiority of numbers together with their concentration of force was further bad news for Castagna’s defence.8

Whilst the majority of his force was en–route to their first battle of World War II, Wootten set off on a reconnaissance of Giarabub. He returned to Mersa Matruh at 2.00 am, 15 March, not entirely pleased with the result. The reconnaissance had been brief due to the party being unable to get close to the enemy positions. It did, however, provide an efficient overview. The Italians were occupying positions some five kilometres north of Giarabub, but the exact locations of these positions were unknown. Other than in this northern area, further accurate information of enemy dispositions and outposts was still required. South of Giarabub no reconnaissance had been conducted due to a marsh in the east and a sand sea in the west. Even with air photographs, the need for more detailed information was obvious to Wootten. Following his first reconnaissance, Wootten needed to ascertain if an attack from the south would be possible. This would need to cross the depression and marsh south of Giarabub and west of the . Wootten preferred this southern approach as the Italians clearly expected an attack from the north of the town.9

At 10.30 am the next day Wootten left Mersa Matruh by vehicle with his Brigade Major, Major T. J. Daly, for Giarabub arriving at 8.00 am next morning, 16 March. At 9.30 pm a conference was held of the commanding officers of all Allied units then at Mersa Matruh, discussing a move to Melfa and preliminaries for the Giarabub attack. Units were to travel independently to arrive at Melfa on the evening of 18 March. Another reconnaissance was arranged by Wootten for the following day, 17 March, rendezvousing at Melfa at 9.00 am. This group contained Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Campbell, the Commanding Officer of the 4 RHA, Lieutenant Colonel Martin, the

8 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 9 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, War Diary’, March 1941, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 42

Commanding Officer of the 2/9th Battalion, Officer Commanding Troop of 4th Field Squadron Royal Engineers, (name unknown), the Officer Commanding D Company 10th Battalion, (name unknown), and Captain I. D. Hayward the Brigade’s Supply Captain.10

Time available for the looming attack was limited by the difficulty of supplying a large force operating 320 kilometres from the coastal supply line. This made it essential for Wootten to produce a definite plan quickly. Air photographs and a sketch map of Giarabub only showed the defences in the immediate vicinity, within 1.4 kilometres of Giarabub. The 6th Cavalry, however, had already ascertained that the defenders held positions to the northwest, north and east of the village out to some five kilometres. At this stage nothing other than map information was available covering the area south of a line through Giarabub and Qaret Hamra (Brown’s Hill) as no reconnaissance of this area had yet been conducted. Wootten decided that the vital ground to the enemy’s defence of Giarabub was the heights (altitude approximately 70 metres) located some 370 to 700 metres south of the village, which dominated the whole of the defences. Wootten’s appreciation revealed that any attack from the north would require an advance in full view of the heights, penetration of the outlying posts, then dealing with the defences in depth, and finally assaulting the steep and inaccessible heights which were wired and fortified; all this with the Italians heavily armed with considerable numbers of machine guns and artillery. Wootten concluded that this approach would result in a two–day battle, with a large amount of artillery ammunition required and heavy casualties taken.11

The alternative was to attack from the south where higher ground would preclude Italian fire from the northern defences. The southern area was essentially undefended, standing largely by itself. There was another high feature, Ship Hill, sitting just outside of the wire some 100 metres east of the vital ground, which if occupied, would provide clear observation to support a southerly attack. Wootten assessed that an

10 Long’s version is somewhat different, mentioning only Abbott and a day earlier viz: ‘Consequently, on 16 March, he (Wootten) ordered Abbott to examine the country south of the marshy depression which lay between the cavalryman’s familiar ground north of the oasis and the tracks leading into Giarabub from the south, along which Wootten proposed to attack.’; Long, To Benghazi, p. 295. 11 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 43

attack from this direction would provide a higher probability of surprise, fewer casualties, a lesser quantity of artillery expenditure and a quicker, and therefore more decisive, result. This southerly approach was dependent upon suitable access for infantry and guns being found, and suitable ground over which to undertake the attack. Communications to Giarabub for Wootten Force ran east from Melfa on an east–west line so the difference between heading north or south mattered little. Wootten noted that the east–west communications would require a measure of protection from Castagna’s mobile forces but he considered that this would not present any great difficulty.12

A final reconnaissance was therefore ordered by Wootten from Brown’s Hill by 6th Cavalry of the southern area. A good view was obtained; however, it was too far from the objective to be effective. Another reconnaissance by 6th Cavalry was thus ordered from the south. The cavalry had never been further south than Brown’s Hill so this necessitated finding a route across the marsh located east of Giarabub. A track was found, with the reconnaissance party reaching the frontier wire approximately 14 kilometres south of Giarabub. The wire was cut to provide a gap large enough for vehicles but by this time there was insufficient daylight to proceed further. This reconnaissance proved that it was possible to use wheeled vehicles around to the south, and that the Italians were occupying a position at El Aamra on the southern end of the frontier wire. This position needed to be reduced, so a 6th Cavalry squadron was immediately ordered to move to the south and capture the position at first light on Monday 17 March.13

Castagna later wrote that the Australians attacked his positions at El Aamra and Garet el Cuscia, east of Giarabub, forcing his soldiers back to the fort. Italian mobile patrols then obliged the Australians to retreat, but, as they departed, they cut the telephone line between Giarabub and El Aamra. The commander of the El Aamra patrol decided to return to Garet el Nuss (Wootten House) after having seen huge numbers of enemy troops. He had seen more than 200 Allied motor vehicles crossing the El Aamra

12 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; Long, To Benghazi, p. 295. 13 Salvatore Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, Longanesi, Milano, 1967, p. 183, Schizzo No. 2. Il confine egiziano; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 44

area. Castagna reported this to his commander and received an ‘encouraging’ reply ending with the phrase, ‘...we follow you with our heart.’14 During this time Castagna seriously considered surrender, but still hoped that help would come. The garrison received provisions by air on 17 March, with a message from General who was endeavouring to maintain Castagna’s resolve: ‘I salute the valiant defenders of Giarabub and I express my heartfelt admiration. Carry on doing your duty. We shall be with you in a very few weeks.’15 Castagna thanked Rommel for his words, passing Rommel’s message to his men, trying to lift their spirits. In the wider campaign for Libya, Rommel had arrived in Tripoli on 12 February and was already planning a counterattack against gains made by XIII Corps during Operation Compass. He was confident that in the process he could help Giarabub and retake Kufra to the south. Rommel’s plan was to use these two bases to support his advance through Cyrenaica. For this reason Rommel asked General Mario Aimone–Cat, Commander of the Italian 5th Squadra (Air Force Squadron), to continue to supply Giarabub until the could relieve it. This relief operation was planned for April using Italian battalions supported by German troops and transport.16

In spite of not being able to hold the eastern post of Garet el Cuscia, Castagna decided to leave a clandestine lookout post nearby, manned by four men. He still maintained the post at Garet el Barud, because of its position north of the Giarabub settlement, and because it had always resisted and repelled enemy attacks. The position had two officers, 50 men, three machine guns, one 47mm gun and one 77mm gun. By this time the Italians were restricted to a four kilometre front based around four caposaldos or strong points centred on Giarabub. The locations of Castagna’s defenders are shown on Map 2 below whilst the number of men and weapons are summarised in Table 2 following.17

14 The name of Castagna’s immediate commander at this stage is not known. The figure of 200 vehicles would appear to be overstated, considering that this was only one (B) squadron of Australian Cavalry; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 15 Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 61; Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 189. 16 Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 189; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Rommel sent a letter with Lieutenant Colonel Viebahn von dem Bourne to the Italian Supreme Command with details of his plan; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 235. 17 Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 191; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 45

Map 2 Giarabub’s defensive system

Source: Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, Schizzo No. 5.

46

Arc of responsibility, 47mm Machine Caposaldo Men Units centred on Giarabub Fort Guns Guns 1 SE to SW 475 10th GAF 3 2 2 SW to NW 205 3rd GAF 3 6 3 NW to E 150 1st GAF 2 2 4 E to SE – 7th GAF 5 6

Table 2 Disposition of defenders and weapons on 21 March 1941. Source: Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 169, Schizzo No. 6.18

As the Allied preliminary operations unfolded on 16–17 March, a minor action was fought near Wootten House on 17 March when B Squadron, 6th Cavalry, ambushed two vehicles en route to a southern outpost. Lieutenant Lo Mazzi was on his way to El Aamra (southeast of Giarabub) to replace the lookout. With him was 2nd Lieutenant Leonardo Guerrieri of a machine gun group, and engineering Lieutenant Lualdi whose task was to repair the telephone line, with 14 men. B Squadron had driven across the swamp during the night using a track east of Brown’s Hill, then at 5.00 am, moved southwest of Wootten House. At 8.30 am, two Italian vehicles appeared two kilometres north of Wootten House. The Australians sprang the ambush. The Italians fought back with a 20mm machine gun and rifle fire after dismounting from their vehicles. Guerrieri died in a hail of bullets. The truck blew up, the ammunition exploded and shrapnel killed Lance Corporal Oreste Verardi. Lo Mazzi attempted to move back to Giarabub but was captured with his men. Castagna’s only indication of what had happened at this time was from the smoke of the burning truck, as the telephone line was still cut. Several more Italians were wounded with 13 captured and both vehicles destroyed. Later a captured officer provided extremely valuable information, describing the Italian position and indicated the site of each gun. Lieutenant F. C. Taylor, the 6th Cavalry’s Intelligence officer, informed Wootten’s headquarters of this action as the Australians advanced northwards towards Qaret el Tamma (Tamma Heights), located only 3.2

18 Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 169, Schizzo No. 6; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12.

47

kilometres south of Giarabub. Lieutenant C. A. Wade’s B Squadron troop advanced putting the garrison to flight and occupied the position. The Australians were surprised at this point that the captured Italian officer would so willingly pass on information about Castagna’s defence. In this regard it was noteworthy that of the 30 officers in total in the Giarabub garrison, only eight were permanent soldiers. The rest were conscripts and said to be tired of the war. Other prisoners had reiterated that it was only the garrison commander, Castagna, who was holding the defence together.19

Eventually a Libyan fleeing from Wootten House post arrived at Giarabub on foot with news of the enemy attack. Castagna immediately sent a 20mm machine gun, a 47mm gun and a troop of all the available Libyans, under 2nd Lieutenant Rossetti to counterattack and rescue Lo Mazzi’s troop. Rossetti captured the position and one truck but the Australians escaped west at 1.50 pm to El Aamra. Wootten stated: ‘This recce had little value other than to discover the location of further enemy posts south of the main defences’.20 On reaching the site of the attack on Lo Mazzi, only 22 year old Verardi’s body was found. Guerrieri’s body had been buried by the Australians. Rossetti’s troop then returned to Giarabub without rescuing Lo Mazzi or his men. Three wounded Italians were evacuated by Australian ambulance to Siwa, under the command of British Colonel Wallace who was in charge of medical arrangements for the attack on Giarabub. There were no Australian casualties during this engagement.21

Whilst these minor actions were taking place south of Giarabub, the bulk of Wootten Force was closing in from the east. They departed at 8.00 am from Bir Fuad for Melfa, crossing the readily identifiable Egypt/Libyan border, marked by the 300 kilometre long barbed wired fence, an hour later. After travelling 16 kilometres from Bir Fuad the column split into three parallel columns spaced 300 metres apart. The

19 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, p. 295; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; 6th Cavalry records have 3 killed and 13 captured. Long’s has 2 killed and 15 captured. Castagna’s version has 2 killed and 13 captured; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int. Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 20 Long describes the day: ‘…having accomplished the task: the crossing of the swamp and the examination of the track leading into Giarabub from the south.’ Long, To Benghazi, p. 296; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, CAB 106/836. 21 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 244; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; ‘Medical report by R.M.O. Cavalry to A.D.M.S. 6 Aust Div for March 1941.’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79. 48

force bivouacked at 6.00 pm on 17 March, 48 kilometres east of Giarabub and endured a bitterly cold night. The country was arid, devoid of vegetation and dominated by many abrupt features with cliff–like sides. Extra magazines were issued for the Bren guns whilst small arms fire could be heard in the distance. The Australians continued to prepare, removing all traces of oil from their weapons to reduce the problems of dust and grit jamming the mechanisms. During the advance of Wootten’s columns the commander of the LRDP reported in and was tasked with preventing any escape by the Italians to the west from Giarabub.22

Throughout the first half of March, back in Italy, much propaganda was being generated about the heroic defence of Giarabub and its leader, Castagna. Three Italian reporters visited, and promoted the story widely on their return. The wider fall of Cyrenaica had largely passed unnoticed in the Italian papers. Giarabub, however, was being covered every day with photographs and stories. Italian radio commentators such as Mario Appelius also helped build the enduring heroic image of Giarabub in a nation short of good news, and where bad news was heavily censored. News was also broadcast of Castagna’s promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. The promotion stiffened his resolve to continue resistance, while the morale of his men slid ever lower, eroded by isolation and hunger. RAF aircraft flying over the inner defences of Giarabub and vehicles being seen in every direction around the fortress further depressed Italian spirit.23

The next day, Tuesday 18 March 1941, Wootten’s advance columns continued towards Giarabub through a landscape where vegetation was plentiful, small lakes could be seen and small gazelle–like creatures were visible in the distance. After lunch the men of A Company, 2/9th Battalion, organised a game of cricket to while away the time with Bren guns mounted on a nearby hill for anti–aircraft protection. With the game underway, A Company’s officers were busy studying the Italian positions in the southeast and planning the attack. Lieutenant Colonel Martin spent the day surveying

22 ‘Administrative Instructions, Road Movement – Matruh to Melfa.’ AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on Giarabub Incident, O.C. 10/12 Bn Composite M.G. Pl. March 1941.’ AWM 52 8/3/10/7; J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, , Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 2, AWM 76 B198; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 23 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 236; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 49

the Italian wire, Daly House and Tamma Heights which remained in Italian hands and Wootten House which had been recaptured by the Italians the afternoon before. Martin was escorted by two platoons under Lieutenant A. F. Nixon–Smith of 10 Platoon B Company, 2/9th Battalion, and Lieutenant W. H. Noyes.24

As Martin headed off on his reconnaissance at first light, 18 March, the 25– pounder guns of 8th Field Regiment Royal Artillery (8th Field Regiment), attached to 6th Cavalry, opened fire on the Giarabub fort from the north to provide a diversion, while the remainder of Martin’s battalion closed up into position behind them. As Martin’s men moved up, Italian artillery opened fire. Their guns being of shorter range, the Italian gunners were unable to respond with counter battery fire; however, they were able to produce a direct hit on the front of the Vickers Machine Gun Platoon truck, blowing it up and making for a very rapid unloading of equipment. Meanwhile, it was hard going for Martin’s party through the swamp and sand with his vehicles bogging frequently. Eventually the group arrived back at the battalion headquarters after dark having covered 50 kilometres. Martin’s reconnaissance provided the best view so far of the Italian defences. Two vital questions, however, remained largely unanswered – the disposition of the southern defences, and whether the approaches were suitable for an assault.25

A fighting patrol consisting of two platoons from 2/9th Battalion, accompanied by the commander of Wootten’s engineer detachment, departed the bivouac area that evening, intending to find answers to the two key questions, and to make a close reconnaissance of the wire and approaches to the southern Giarabub defences. As with Martin’s daytime reconnaissance, this patrol was held up by bogging in the sand and other mishaps, meaning that they did not get to their rendezvous point until after dark. The patrol decided that the objective was too distant to walk to, in addition to the fact that they had not seen the ground in daylight, hence they did not complete their task. They did, however, discover six enemy vehicles of which two were mounted with Bredas, near El Aamra post. Concurrently, another patrol was sent to reconnoitre a

24 J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 2, AWM 76 B198; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 61, 62. 25 Dickens, Never Late, pp. 61, 62; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 50

shorter route across the bog. This patrol was successful; however, the newly discovered track could not be used until enemy observation posts overlooking it could be captured. Owing to the difficulties encountered traversing the swamp and sands to the south, four captured Italian tractors were summoned from Melfa and placed at the most treacherous parts of the southern route, rendering excellent service towing bogged vehicles. Later that night Lieutenant Noyes came under the command of Captain Bernard Berry, the Officer Commanding C Company, 2/9th Battalion, for the following day’s operation.26

On the other side of the wire, Lieutenant Colonel Castagna assessed that his enemy was gathering more men and artillery to overwhelm his forces. His plan was to wear down and hold the enemy whilst waiting for help from Rommel. He explained this to his officers and described the general disposition of the enemy forces which led him to foresee a main attack coming from the southeast against Caposaldos Numbers 1 and 4, then eventually other attacks from the north. He told his officers not to overestimate the size of the enemy forces since the same vehicles may have been counted several times. (He had reports from all of the lookouts that day, counting 500 vehicles in all directions.) Castagna considered it likely that the enemy was intensifying artillery activity rather than receiving more guns. Castagna told his men that they still had possibilities to repel the attackers and, with this victory, regain contact with their troops and return home safely. Castagna sought help from afar. The Australian J Section Signals intercepted a radio message from the Giarabub garrison asking for bombers. Castagna received a reply from his commander informing him that aircraft would intervene the following day.27

On Wednesday, 19 March, pressure continued to build on all sides of the Giarabub defenders. On the southern side two companies of 2/9th Battalion guided by one troop of 6th Cavalry, under Martin’s command, advanced towards the fortress and

26 Dickens, Never Late, pp. 61, 62; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; The Active Service version states; ‘They were not strong enough to attack, and the commander did not feel justified in continuing his task across completely unknown country while an enemy detachment was at large behind him. The reconnaissance was therefore abandoned.’ There is no mention in Wootten’s version of enemy at large behind the patrol. AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 28. 27 It appears that these messages were unencoded. ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter, 1941’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 51

occupied a line running northeast to southwest through the northwest promontory of Tamma Heights. On the eastern side B Squadron, 6th Cavalry, occupied a line running north to south from Brigadier’s Hill. In the north, C Squadron made a demonstration, while in the west the LRDP patrolled. Wootten’s aim in sending the 2/9th Battalion companies to the south was to test what appeared from maps to be a possible line of approach from that direction. Of particular concern to Wootten were the grave doubts expressed by Campbell, regarding his ability to move his guns to the south by the currently reconnoitred route. If this was not achievable, then attacking from the north would have to be reconsidered.28

The southern force’s task was to secure a northeast–southwest line close to Giarabub by sunrise on 20 March. The result of this thrust would determine if an assault from this direction was viable. Air photographs appeared to show that Giarabub’s defence was dominated by the knolls located to the southeast of the town, and that their loss would therefore unravel the Italian defensive plan.29 Operational Order No. 1 from Major Daly, to Lieutenant Colonel Martin, included the following instructions:

You may destroy any vehicles or posts discovered to the south of the first objective but only on the condition that the attainment of the first objective is not jeopardised by so doing. The operation will be carried out with the utmost speed and determination and every effort will be made to come to close quarters with the enemy.30

During the afternoon of 19 March, B and C Companies, 2/9th Battalion plus mortar and anti–aircraft detachments departed on the mission to the south of Giarabub from the bivouac area forward of Melfa in a long convoy lurching and crawling below rocky outcrops and escarpments. Some of the trucks became bogged whilst others overheated. At 1.30 pm Martin ordered an assault on the wire defences on the Giarabub–Siwa road. C Company was ordered to attack on the left flank whilst B Company was to attack on the right. The 2/10th Battalion Mortar Platoon, under Lieutenant R. E. Porter, was to be in reserve and supporting B Company. The first

28 ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1941’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 29 AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 28. 30 ‘Operational Order No. 1, 19 March, 1941 from 18 Aust Inf Brigade to 9 Bn.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 52

objective was the high feature, Daly House, 4.5 kilometres south of Giarabub. The attack was launched in open order and the position was captured without opposition. The Italians then commenced shelling Daly House and the Siwa Road area at 1.20 pm. B and C Companies reformed, and at 3.45 pm, rushed the high features of Tamma Heights, closer to Giarabub, at right angles to Siwa Road, and the wire defences running along the road. The attack was made using vehicles, with artillery screening the advance. These high features were also taken without opposition, by 5.00 pm.31

At Daly’s suggestion, Martin then ordered C Company to move towards Ship Hill, some 800 metres southeast of the town and to their right. As this company advanced the Italians opened fire with 20mm machine guns whose tracer rounds ‘bounded all over the desert.’32 As darkness fell the leading platoon reached the barbed wire at the south–eastern corner of the Giarabub perimeter. C Company was now 600 metres ahead of the nearest support, but Captain Berry decided to investigate the Italian position east of Caposaldo Number 1 still further. He went through the wire alone until challenged by an Italian sentry who fired a shot. Berry turned back and found Lieutenant Russell Foster’s 14 Platoon. Berry then sent one platoon to the east to enfilade the Italian occupied knoll, whilst he and Forster, with the other two platoons, advanced on the knoll itself to the left.33 Whilst Berry quietly gave orders the Italians threw grenades from their sangers only 20 metres away. The Australians advanced but not a shot was fired, as the Italians had escaped, leaving a machine gun behind.34

Berry then left Forster’s platoon in the post with orders to exploit and explore, while he went back to Lieutenant Beresford Lovett’s 13 Platoon. Lovett’s platoon had moved onto the knoll and was soon joined at 8.00 pm by Nixon–Smith’s 10 Platoon and the Mortar Platoon.35 Lieutenant Porter, Sergeant Atkinson and Private Shepherd of the 2/10th’s Mortar Platoon, also with Berry made a reconnaissance, cutting through the

31 Note that the Australian map marked G.S.I. (A) 10/10/41 M.I. A.H.Q. in AWM incorrectly states that Daly House and Tamma Heights are one and the same. This is not the case. Tamma Heights is some four kilometres north of Daly House; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 63, 64; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 28; ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter,1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7. 32 Long, To Benghazi, p. 297. 33 Long incorrectly describes these platoons as sections. 34 Long, To Benghazi, p. 297. 35 Dickens, Never Late, pp. 63, 64; Long mistakenly says a second company, then mistakenly describes a machine gun section. It was a platoon; Long, To Benghazi, p. 297. 53

wire across Ship Hill. Atkinson and Shepherd returned to bring up the platoon and ammunition. Porter continued on to make a reconnaissance of the position for his mortars. The platoon arrived under the cover of darkness followed by their trucks whilst receiving considerable fire from Italian Breda and 47mm guns. The mortar platoon took no casualties and set up their weapons whilst the enemy kept up spasmodic artillery and machine gun fire throughout the night.36

Berry returned at 10.00 pm to 2/9th Battalion’s headquarters located south of Tamma Heights, and explained to Martin where his men were positioned.37 Lieutenant Forster was, meanwhile, following his orders to explore and exploit. He discovered Post 36 (west of Post 42, on the western side of Caposaldo Number 1) was manned by only one Italian with a 47mm gun who was captured and sent back to Martin’s headquarters for interrogation, carrying a wounded Australian.38 Little fire came from the Italian defenders in Caposaldo Number 1 until, as the moon rose at 2.00 am, a strong counterattack was launched. Captain Caccamo with two Italian platoons, one Libyan platoon and artillery support drove Lieutenant Forster’s men back beyond the perimeter fence.39 Forster had been ordered by Berry not to get involved in ‘anything serious’. During this counterattack, by Foster’s platoon, Private E. E. Powell was killed, Private B. N. Casement died of wounds two hours later and Privates L. H. Conley, K. Currell, H. Clunes, A. Clark, M. Cotterell and A. Woodrow were all wounded.40 The Italians sustained 13 wounded including Lieutenants Cau and Libotte.41 Cau found a bag left by an Australian which he took to Castagna. Castagna was most surprised when, in the bag, he found a map of the Giarabub defences including accurate locations of the command posts, food supplies, fuel stores and the minefields. Castagna reasoned that

36 ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter, 1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7. 37 Long, To Benghazi, p. 297; Dickens confusingly and mistakenly names Caposaldo Number 1 as ‘Tamma’ protected by 400 men; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 63, 64. 38 Long mistakenly describes this as a 44mm gun. Spencer and Dickens both repeat the mistake. There were no 44mm guns used by Italians at Giarabub. 47mm was the closest calibre. Its full name was Cannone da 47/32 M35 where 32 describes the bore length as multiples of the calibre ie 32 x 47 = 1504mm long; http://comandosupremo.com/cannone4732.html, accessed 31 May 2012; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 290, 297; Spencer, In the Footsteps of Ghosts, p. 38; Dickens, Never Late, p. 65. 39 Initial unavailable for Captain Caccamo; Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 203; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 247. 40 Long incorrectly states that three of Forster’s men were wounded and another two went missing; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 297, 298; Dickens, Never Late, p. 65. 41 First initials not available for these Italian soldiers. 54

the map had been produced from air photographs and completed with details probably provided by a deserting Libyan.42

Importantly for Wootten’s preferred plan of attack from the south, with Martin’s force pushed forward, Major Geoffrey Goshen’s C Battery, 4 RHA, was able to push two guns right around to the south, in close support of the attacking infantry to a point some 1,000 metres south of Tamma Heights. Another two guns were brought forward across the swamp and sand with the aid of the captured Italian caterpillar tractors. This movement ended all lingering doubts regarding the possibilities of getting the guns into a position for a southern attack. Likewise, Martin’s infantry’s advance to within 600 metres of the enemy’s main southern defences proved that the advance could be implemented from this direction. Further information arrived at 6.00 pm in the form of more photographs. During the day a RAF Lysander detachment photographed the southern and northern defences of Giarabub, neither of which had been photographed before. The films were developed, printed and delivered to Wootten’s headquarters and provided invaluable supplementary information. Wootten therefore decided to carry out the attack from the south.43

At noon on 19 March, one squadron of 6th Cavalry, supported by 8th Field Regiment guns, commenced a demonstration north of Giarabub which was to last until 11.00 pm. The purpose of the demonstration was to distract the defenders of Giarabub from the activities to the south. At 10.00 pm, D Company, 2/10th Battalion, plus one squadron of 6th Cavalry, was ordered to attack and hold Brigadier’s Hill by first light the next day. Brigadier’s Hill was located immediately east of Giarabub and its possession would cover the passage of the remainder of the force to the south on the following day. As can be seen from Castagna’s subsequent remarks below, the demonstration was entirely successful, with the Italians in the north keeping up a spasmodic fire on fixed lines all night, even though the Australian cavalry had withdrawn at 11.00 pm. During the same night, Wootten’s engineers cut gaps in the wire on this southern side whilst

42 It is more likely that this information came from the Italian officer captured on 17 March; Fattore, Giarabub, p. 247. 43 Dickens, Never Late, pp. 62, 63; Long, To Benghazi, pp. 296, 297; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 55

raiding parties captured three Italian prisoners. Castagna ordered that all the holes created in the defensive wire that day be repaired during the night.44

Meanwhile the Italian situation continued to deteriorate. Allied artillery shells landed on their positions throughout the day leaving the ground completely covered with craters. Castagna recalled:

Only because of the dugouts that we had built near every post, were our men saved from carnage and our weapons not destroyed. Every movement was paralysed making it difficult to move food, water and ammunition. Our largest gun, the 65/7 ‘Count of Culagna’ is hit and out of action. This gun could only fire every quarter of an hour but it was better than nothing. We still had the 77/28 and 47/32 guns.45

To make matters worse, the Khamsin (desert wind), which had started blowing on 18 March, gained in strength on 19 March, blasting a dense cloud of dust and sand across the oasis. Not only did the wind make breathing difficult, jam weapons and make living conditions generally miserable, it also uncovered the concrete blocks that the Italians had emplaced to secure the base of the defensive barbed wire. The defenders were forced to work under enemy artillery fire to clear the sand from their trenches and anti–tank ditches. In the evening the sandstorm intensified, to be the worst seen in seven years.46

By dawn, 20 March, it was apparent that the previous day’s Australian attacks, designed to explore, had surpassed the original aims, thus prefacing the following day, 21 March, as the day of the final assault on Giarabub. Australian morale was high in spite of the raging Khamsin which had reduced visibility to almost zero. The signal wire which the Australians used to navigate from post to post or back to battalion headquarters was buried by up to two metres of sand. Lieutenant Forster described the effort required to keep Bren guns operational in the extreme conditions:

44 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report,’ AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 62, 63; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1941,’ The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 45 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 248. 46 Ibid, p. 249. 56

Each section had to dismantle the Brens under cover of a groundsheet and pass each piece to a section member to clean under whatever cover they had. Then the gun was reassembled, sight unseen under a clean groundsheet. By this means we were able to keep our weapons ready for immediate use.47

During the previous night’s withdrawal Private Powell’s body had not been recovered. Powell, a South Australian aged 32, was the first member of 2/9th Battalion to be killed in action. Significantly, the official Australian records and the headstone on his grave in Halfaya Sollum Cemetery incorrectly show his date of death as 21 March 1941. Private Casement aged 31 from Queensland was the second 2/9th Battalion man to die. He was buried in a shallow grave in the afternoon of 20 March 1941.48

At 6.00 am, 20 March, the 2/10th Battalion Mortar Platoon opened fire from Ship Hill. Lieutenant Porter was pleased with the ranging as several machine guns were knocked out. Their tasks for the day were mainly a roving commission on observed targets of opportunity. Water and food were in short supply until, at 7.00 pm, they moved back under cover of darkness to resupply. The day was spent with the Allied units close to Giarabub disposed, as per the previous day, under cover of a reduced sand storm which blew from the east all day. Trucks ferried the remaining troops of 2/9th Battalion and ancillary units into position for the next day’s attack. Captain Berry’s C Company with 10 Platoon lay amongst the sand hills all day, where they had a view of the white domed mosque and some of the buildings of the town of Giarabub through a gap in the hills.49

Following these attacks on Caposaldo Number 1, Castagna decided that he had insufficient forces in Caposaldo Numbers 2, 3 and 4 to replace casualties in that position. He considered moving some of the 1st GAF from Caposaldo Number 3 but decided against this due to the persistent attacks from the north against Garet el Barud

47 Dickens, Never Late, p. 65. 48 Photograph of Casement’s headstone, http://twgpp.org/information.php?id=2202873 accessed 7.6.12; http://www.AWM .gov.au/research/people/roll_of_honour/person.asp?p=535574 accessed 1 June 2012; Dickens, Never Late, p. 66. 49 ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter, 1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; Dickens, Never Late, p. 66; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 28. 57

which led him to expect another attack from the north, although he did move a 47mm gun from Caposaldo Number 2 to Caposaldo Number 1.50

During the morning of 20 March, Captain Reidy’s A Company arrived and occupied a position on the right of Berry’s company. They brought with them hot food which was very welcome to Berry’s men, as they were facing a second night dressed in only shorts and shirts in the cold sand laden wind. The Italian lines were only 100 metres distant in some places and the Australians could hear their own shells going overhead and exploding on the Italian positions beyond the wire.51 One of Berry’s soldiers later recalled a story which indicates the character of the company commander during this period:

While taking photographs of a machine gun that was firing at them Berry reassured his men by saying ‘they cannot hit you’. No sooner had he spoken the words when a bullet went through his camera case. Without batting an eyelid he just kept on taking snaps. He was still ‘Berry the Bastard’ but he had won the respect of the men.52

As the Australian infantry moved into their forward positions in the afternoon some small Italian outposts still had to be overcome. Eleven Australian casualties were sustained, mostly minor and caused by hand grenades. During the night B Squadron, 6th Cavalry, was withdrawn and D Company, 2/10th Battalion, occupied its position east of Giarabub. The LRDP continued its patrolling in the west. Wootten’s HQ moved up into the lee south of Tamma Heights where final preparations were made for the coming attack.53

On the other side of the defences, Castagna’s view of 20 March was bleak. He described enemy aviation attacking Italian vehicles and troops with British artillery and machine guns attacking continuously. His two 77/28 guns continued to attack the ‘light enemy artillery, motor vehicles and access points.’54 Castagna recorded that the strong

50 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report,’ AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 51 Dickens, Never Late, p. 66. 52 Fountain, BMA, in Dickens, Never Late, p. 65. 53 ‘Medical report by R.M.O. Cavalry to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for March 1941.’, 3 April 1941, AWM 54 481/12/79; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; AIF (Middle East), Active Service, p. 28. 54 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 58

Khamsin blew from the southwest which favoured the attackers, while it blinded the defenders located in Caposaldo Number 1. Castagna’s superiors informed him that aircraft would intervene the following day. That night telephone communications were restored with the Garet el Barud post. They informed him that the enemy had intensified their artillery activity and movement of arms. Castagna renewed the absolute order to resist until the end.55

At 10.30 am 20 March Wootten conferred with Lieutenant Colonel Martin and Lieutenant Colonel Campbell to determine the final plan of attack for the following day. The forward troops for the attack were to be 2/9th Battalion, with a medium machine gun section from 2/12th Battalion, and a mortar platoon from 2/10th Battalion. The attack was to be in two phases as shown on Map 3, p. 61. Firstly the southern fortifications (all of Caposaldo Number 1 and the western part of Caposaldo Number 4) to a line running northeast from the northern side of Caposaldo Number 1, were to be taken. The second involved capturing the line running northeast through the plantation and village. The start line was to be 365 metres south of the fort’s internal perimeter, or tactical wire. Phase 1 was set to begin at 5.15 am. Phase 2 was to start immediately following completion of Phase 1. The first phase was to be supported by the twelve 25– pounder guns of 4 RHA. Table 3, p. 60 summarises the fire plan issued for the Allied attack on 21 March 1941.

For Phase 2 of the Australian attack, one troop of 4 RHA was to support B Company on the right and one troop was to support A Company on the left. The quantity of artillery ammunition to be expended was limited by the amount available, being 200 rounds per gun. Two thirds was to be used up to Z + 25, after which the remainder was to be used for observed shooting. One troop of engineers was to blow eight gaps in the wire south of the first objective using Bangalore Torpedoes to let the

55 This wind direction is almost opposite that quoted above. This is significant in relation to the artillery disaster the next day. Trooper Fred Moon, 2/10th Battalion, described how the wind was so strong that it blew down the tent in which he was conducting signals work. Interview with author, 4 May 2012; ‘Misi l’ufficiale al corrente delle situazione generale e rinnevai il categorico ordine di resistensa ed eltranza.’; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 59

infantry through, clear booby traps, reconnoitre a shorter track across the marsh and clear any mines on the Melfa – Giarabub road, including on the airfield.56

Targets Rounds per gun Total Time (refer Map 3, p. 61) per minute rounds 57 Z to Z+10 1st Objective Z+10 to Z+25 2nd & 3rd Objectives Z to Z+2 3 72 Z+2 to Z+10 2 192 Z+10 to Z+25 3 540 Total rounds planned 804

Table 3 Allied artillery fire plan 21 March, 1941.

Source: ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The Nation Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836.

While the main attack unfolded to the south of Giarabub the two 6th Cavalry squadrons were ordered to mount a supporting attack from the north. This was again to be in two phases. Phase 1 was designed to penetrate the defences from the northeast to an east – west line running through the Egbert feature, which required destroying the machine gun posts to the north of the fort and an outpost at the entrance to Pipsqueak Gully. Phase 2 was to exploit to the south and west with the limit to their operation being a line running east–west through the airport hangar. The cavalry was to be supported by one troop of British artillery.58

56 Trooper Fred Moon, 2/10th Battalion, described driving over a mine located in a break in the fence. The mine was displaced by the vehicles running over the edge of the large mine, until it surfaced without exploding. Interview with author, 4 May 2012; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; Long, To Benghazi, p. 302. 57 For example, 12 guns x 15 minutes x 3 rounds per minute. Total rounds extrapolated by author; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 58 ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; This was from 8th Field Regiment. ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 60

Map 3 Allied artillery objectives 21 March 1941. Sources: ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter,1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, Schizzo No. 4. 61

Aside from the two main avenues of attack, the LRDP was to maintain its patrolling to the west to ensure no escape by the Italian garrison in that direction. Air reconnaissance flights were planned for 8.00 am, 12.00 pm and 4.00 pm on 21 March. Detailed instructions covered medical arrangements, rations, fuel, water, prisoner movement and supervision, and salvage of captured equipment and stores. Particular mention was made regarding the Senussi mosque. ‘All ranks are to treat the mosque with the greatest respect. This mosque must not be damaged in any way by fire or by any other means as it is held most sacred by the Senussi and if damaged in any way would do great harm to the British cause.’59

The remainder of 20 March was spent conducting further reconnaissances by junior leaders, general preparations and registration of artillery. During the night of 20 March, vigorous patrolling was carried out by 2/9th Battalion on the southern perimeter to ascertain whether any withdrawal was being attempted by the Italians. D Company, 2/10th Battalion, relieved the 6th Cavalry position, freeing the calvalrymen for their role in the attack the following day and subsequently advanced to Brigadier’s Hill. This advance protected the newly reconnoitred shorter route across the bog which then became the route for supply and evacuation of the wounded.60

The battle of Giarabub reached its hard–fought climax on Friday 21 March 1941 with the capture of the fort and total deaths from both sides of a maximum of approximately 272. The events of this day are covered in five parts; the northern Allied attack, the southern Allied attack, the Italian defence, the Allied artillery disaster and the final results.

The northern attack was carried out by B and C Squadrons of 6th Cavalry, with artillery support from 8th Field Regiment (see Map 4, p. 64.). The cavalrymen departed from the forward base west of Melfa at 1.30 am, reaching their start line, which ran east–west through Knox’s Pimple, north of Giarabub at 3.00 am. From 7.00 pm on 20

59 Note that the Australians viewed themselves as British. ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 60 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 62

March the sandstorm had intensified until, at 1.00 am, the wind dropped a little. The dust and sand kept swirling however in the icy wind, keeping visibility to almost nil. This wind played an important role in the progression of the battle. It blinded the defenders, allowing concealed movement by the attackers, jammed the weapons of both protagonists and had a deadly effect on the accuracy of artillery trajectories. The 25– pounder guns went into position west of the fence and had forward observation officers with each squadron. Using the north–south fence, which paralleled the road to Tobruk, as an axis, at 6.15 am B Squadron advanced on the left or east side of the fence. C Squadron advanced on the right or west side of the fence. B Squadron moved forward to occupy Lapthorne’s Hill and high ground west towards the fence and C Squadron’s position. B Squadron’s right troop continued the advance until held up by a strong enemy post on the Egbert feature. Valuable information about this post was provided by B Squadron’s centre troop enabling artillery fire to be brought to bear. Meanwhile, C Squadron east of the fence moved to the edge of the escarpment overlooking the fence and road to Tobruk, coming under considerable Italian shell fire. Under cover of Vickers machine guns they moved forward. The troop on the left flank, with assistance from the attached machine gun section, captured an outpost at 7.30 am containing three heavy machine guns and six prisoners61

Castagna’s long awaited air support arrived at 9.30 am when a twin engine German Junkers JU–88 bombed and machine gunned 6th Cavalry’s headquarters and its vehicles, without causing casualties. At 10.00 am the two cavalry squadrons moved forward once more. C Squadron’s left troop, with support from B Squadron’s right troop and C Squadron’s centre troop, attacked and captured another Italian artillery position. This post contained two officers and 35 men of whom three were killed and four wounded.62 A further advance brought the cavalry to the Giarabub aircraft hangars, where five Libyans and the machine gun post surrendered at 10.15 am. The cavalrymen occupied their final objective – the east–west line through the hangars. Wootten

61 ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137. 62 One 65mm field gun, one 47mm and one Breda 20mm, two heavy machine guns, 50 rifles and ample ammunition were recovered; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137. 63

considered it undesirable for the cavalry to continue their advance south, owing to continued poor visibility, as there were no further objectives north of the fort and

Map 4 Allied battle plan for 21 March, 1941.

Source: ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The Nation Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137. plantation delineated. If they had moved further, uncertainty about their exact location would have seriously compromised artillery concentrations as the infantry advanced from the south.63 At 11.30 am, still occupying their final objective, the cavalry received the news that the infantry attack to the south was progressing well. The cavalrymen to this point had captured 80 prisoners, including wounded. They continued their

63 Long states: ‘Wootten had ordered them to remain because he feared that in the sandstorm they might clash with the infantryman advancing in the opposite direction.’; Long, To Benghazi, p. 302; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 64

administrative jobs including collection and counting of stores and equipment, tending to and evacuating wounded and managing prisoners. That night the men of the 6th Cavalry slept in the village of Giarabub marking the end of their part in the five month siege.64

Meanwhile to the south, the main and larger attack was set to commence at 5.15 am. Phase 1 was planned to coincide with the dawn, following a waning moon which would assist the attack. Throughout the early hours of the morning desultory Italian mortar and medium machine gun continued. At 4.30 am the men of A Company 2/9th Battalion filed past their Company Commander, 29 year old Captain R. F. (Bull) Reidy, receiving a handshake and good wishes from him. Reidy was keen to be as close as possible to the Italian wire for the start of the assault, moving his men to within 50 metres – the closest distance that the swirling dust allowed. The attackers lay in the sand waiting for the guns located to their rear to open fire on their target to their front. At 5.15 am the first salvo crashed forth.65 The first and subsequent salvos landed right on top of 8 and 9 Platoons:

Our artillery landed right among us (said Noyes afterwards). I yelled to them to scratch into the sand which they did. We had no word of 8 Platoon or the OC who was with it. As soon as the barrage ceased we got up and into it.66

This was our first experience of shell fire. The noise and the flashes of bursting shells, with which were intermingled the cries of suddenly startled men, and the groans of the wounded, were shockingly frightening. We were so unprepared, it was so unexpected. This was the enemy's portion, not ours. Again the baroom– boom of our guns, the thin whine of the approaching shells, a screaming crash and flashes of light, redly orange, blinding in the strange brilliance. Then silence. We were smothered in choking sand, fumes and smoke. These were our own shells falling among us.67

The 2/10th Battalion Machine Gun Platoon gunners, as they lay in reserve on Ship Hill at 5.30 am, were likewise hit by 4 RHA’s fire landing short. Lieutenant Porter described

64 ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137. 65 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 3, AWM 76 B198; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 68, 69; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 66 Long, To Benghazi, p. 301. 67 J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, quote by James Calvert, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 4, AWM 76 B198. 65

‘becoming uncomfortable for ¼ hour’. In A Company’s position, 11 Australians were killed and about 20 wounded. Reidy was with 9 Platoon and almost certainly saved 16 year old Private William Held’s life when he threw the young soldier to the ground and lay on top of him, protecting him from shrapnel. Reidy died in the process, without having fired a shot at the enemy. Reidy’s artillery forward observer was blasted out of his position, with his signal wire cut, which delayed redirecting the guns to lift their range.68

Eleven Australians were killed in this one incident during the initial stages of Phase 1 of the southern attack, out of a total of 23 killed during the entire Giarabub campaign.69 That is, almost half of all Allied deaths were caused by friendly fire, or in army parlance, ‘drop shorts’. A number of reasons have been given for the disaster. Porter of 2/10th Battalion recorded: ‘Artillery barrage opened at 0515 hrs. A Coy on left apparently moved too far forward and caught in own shellfire. Some casualties.’70 Reidy may have moved his men too far forward. He was, however, known for his careful leadership and he had an artillery observation officer with him who would be unlikely to place himself and others in harm’s way. Long states, ‘The artillerymen were firing under very difficult conditions. They had found the range when a strong tail wind was blowing and opened fire on the 21st in a still fiercer headwind. Evidently the adjustments made were not sufficient.’71 The guns were firing to the north-northwest. Historian Jeffery Grey states that the infantry were out of position and that visibility was appalling due to the ferocity of the dust storms.72 Castagna stated that the wind on 20 March was a tailwind. ‘That was a day with strong Ghibli wind, which favored the forces located in that direction [i.e. from southwest], while it blinded our soldiers in Caposaldo Number 1.’73

68 12 men were killed and about 20 wounded according to Dickens, although he states that Millard was killed by machine gun fire as he led a dash across open ground. Spencer states Captain Reidy, WO2 Jack Millard plus 11 others were killed ; ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter,1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; Dickens, Never Late, pp 68, 69; Spencer, In the Footsteps of Ghosts, p. 40. 69 Long states 17 killed. Refer to Appendices for names of Italians and Australians killed; Long, To Benghazi, p. 302. 70 ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt Porter,1941.’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7. 71 Long, To Benghazi, p. 302. 72 Jeffery Grey, A Soldier’s Soldier, A Biography of Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Daly, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2013, p. 24. 73 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 66

Following the battle, Reidy’s 9 Platoon walked about a kilometre back to its position at the time of the first barrage. Calvert’s assessment was that the heavy wind which blew throughout the night may have displaced the guns slightly, or perhaps the heavier more humid air (showers had fallen that night) may have affected the flight of the shells. Perhaps the bitterly cold weather may have affected the charges. Reidy’s other platoon, 8 Platoon, which was also well outside the designated target area, also lost a number of men. Later exploration of the site by the men of 9 Platoon revealed that the shells had landed as much as 100 metres behind their position.74

Captain Edward Fleming took command of A Company following Reidy’s heroic death. The men were on their feet as soon as the barrage ceased and stormed towards the first knoll. The Italian defenders appeared to have been stunned by the hundreds of shells and very little fire emanated from them, although casualties were still incurred, with C Company’s Captain Berry being one of those wounded. Lieutenant Noyes’ men found the Italians in caves dug into the side of the rocky hill, protected by sandbag or stone parapets. The positions generally had blankets over the entrances which had to be pulled back to allow the attackers to toss grenades inside. The Australians were carrying two grenades each and before they had passed the first knoll they had run out. By this time the artillery fire had lifted to the furthest knoll so Noyes told his men to wait for the bombardment to lift before advancing again. Noyes unsuccessfully searched for a platoon on his left; then without waiting for the barrage to lift, Noyes’ platoon advanced. At the foot of the second knoll they met Berry’s company.75

The second knoll, deep inside Caposaldo Number 1, southwest of the Giarabub Fort, was heavily defended and put up a determined resistance. The assaulting companies moved onto the north face of the knoll, coming under direct fire from the fort itself and the plantation beyond. By 8.00 am, however, all resistance from the first objective had ceased. Lieutenant Nixon–Smith reached this last feature, where he met Lieutenant Noyes, and together they set about readying a captured gun for action against

74 J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 6, AWM 76 B198. 75 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; Long, To Benghazi, p. 301. 67

the Italians. Suddenly they were on the receiving end of some very accurate machine gun fire – friendly fire, from their own Machine Gun Platoon’s Privates George Morris and Peter Murphy. A round penetrated Nixon–Smith’s haversack driving a fork some 50 millimetres into his shoulder. Fortunately the gunners were interrupted by Italian fire on their own position, limiting their shooting to one burst. They had been assured by their range finder (a member of the machine gun platoon) that the targets (the Australian Lieutenants) were Italian.76

As Phase 1 of Wootten’s southern assault was completed the new track across the bog was opened for use, reducing the distance to travel back to the advanced base by some 11 kilometres. The wounded were henceforth moved via this shorter route. At this point B Company, 2/9th Battalion, pushed around the left flank ready for the second phase. The ongoing lack of visibility caused a breakdown in communications between B Company and battalion headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Martin decided it was inadvisable for A Company, which was to move on the right flank, to cross its start line until this situation was rectified. A further issue for Martin was that prisoners had stated that the plantation east of the fort was strongly held. In view of this information, and of the limited amount of artillery ammunition remaining following the previous 48 hours of operations, Martin considered it prudent not to expend the remaining shells on small scale attacks, when it may well be required for a full scale attack on the plantation. There was, therefore, almost no supporting Allied artillery fire after the initial concentrations from Z + 25 (5.40 am).77

By 9.00 am the situation on the left was clarified. Captain F. E. C. Loxton’s D Company made a wide flanking movement west of the main defences and encountered heavy fire, sustaining 15 casualties.78 Martin sent a message at 10.00 am:

One of my pls is reported W of town. I have 2 pls on enemy post centre of main defended feature. Have not been fired on for one hr. Previously when using

76 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; Dickens, Never Late, p. 69. 77 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; ‘4th Royal Horse Artillery War Diary, 1939–42’, The Royal Artillery Museum, Woolwich, London, Box 419. 78 Long, To Benghazi, p. 302. 68

Boys rifle ws shelled suffering 6 casualties slightly wounded. Have exposed ourselves inviting fire but no response. Fort Flag at half mast. Can push on.79

At the same time Loxton reported that opposition had ceased and that he was continuing to advance toward his second objective which was reached without further difficulty. Berry, with two of his platoons, arrived at the fort at about the same time as Loxton’s company. They entered the fort at 11.30 am and replaced the Italian flag with the black and blue flag of 2/9th Battalion. At 12.00 pm the Australians entered the mosque where they were welcomed by the Senussi.80

Meanwhile, at 10.00 am A Company, 2/9th Battalion, advanced slowly on the right towards the plantation. A RAF Lysander reconnaissance had observed a minefield which required time–consuming clearance. At about 1.30 pm this company finally entered the edge of the plantation and it became clear that all resistance had ended, as parties of the enemy occupying posts to the north were coming in to surrender. By 2.30 pm the position was completely mopped up. Every endeavour had been made to avoid damage to the mosque, and it was found that no damage was caused whatsoever during the battle. A guard was mounted to protect the ancient building until it was handed over to the occupying force the next day.81

By 2.00 pm, 21 March, some 600 prisoners had been captured and sent back to a Prisoner of War cage established at Brigade headquarters, south of Tamma Heights. These were then transported by a Motor Transport Company under Colonel Ken Eather, of later Kokoda fame. Lieutenant Colonel Castagna was one of those captured. He was slightly wounded by a grenade, and when captured was heard to exclaim ‘No surrender! No surrender!’82 That evening C Battery, 4 RHA, returned to Melfa. 13th Light Field Ambulance maintained their Medical Dressing Station at Melfa until the next day.83

79 ‘18th Brigade Message Log, 21 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 80 The original Italian Flag is held in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, RELAWM 30011; Long, To Benghazi, p. 302; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 81 Long, To Benghazi, p. 302; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 82 Long, To Benghazi, p. 302. 83 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 69

From an Italian perspective, Castagna’s last day at Giarabub commenced with an inspection at 4.00 am of the forward posts of Caposaldo Number 1. The storm had abated but the wind was still blowing strongly as the Allied bombardment started. Castagna later recalled: ‘In some 45 minutes of preparatory artillery these positions were devastated by the fire of 36 guns of 63mm or 88mm, with approximately 10,000 shells plus those of many smaller guns.’84 Castagna was left in no doubt about an imminent attack. He returned to his headquarters to alert his officers. There he found all the phone lines had been cut by the artillery fire except the one to Caposaldo Number 1, so he sent runners to the other posts. At 5.45 am the Allied artillery reached Caposaldo Numbers 2 and 4, then not long after this Caposaldo Number 1 was attacked. A platoon led by 2nd Lieutenant Napoleone De Vincenzo counterattacked, forcing the attackers back. Napoleone was killed later that morning. The Italians were forced to use their personal weapons and hand grenades as the strong winds and visibility reducing dust had caused the automatic weapons to jam. A few of the 47mm guns continued to fire constantly at the gaps that the enemy had created in the wire. Enemy [RAF] planes flew low over the fort, ‘bombarding nonstop our weapons positions.’85 Wootten’s message log for the morning had the following entry from a Lysander aircraft:

Sortie 0930–1030. 21 lorries and 20 men …400yds S of mosque 0840. 4 lorries and 5 posts, possibly MG, near wire perimeter W of the fort. 0850. 4 lorries but no men in palm trees E of village – 0900. Have scoured within 2 miles around but can observe no further movement. Height 300ft. Gun post 300 yds W of the Mosque – 0930. Gun posts W of village near wire perimeter – do not appear to be manned. Can observe no further movement anywhere. Visibility very bad. Impossible to observe above 300ft.86

This message does not mention strafing or bombing, but it does give an indication of the extremely difficult and dangerous flying conditions.87

Castagna used a support section to stop momentarily the progress of the attackers who had penetrated Caposaldo Number 1. At around 7.30 am the Australians

84 Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, pp. 202, 203; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 85 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 86 ‘18th Brigade Message Log, 21 March’, 1941, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 87 The author is a licensed pilot. 70

in Caposaldo Number 1 were contained but the battle broke out in Caposaldo Numbers 2 and 4. Three caposaldos were now under attack but the greatest pressure remained on Caposaldo Number 1 where the attackers had now succeeded in breaking his defensive line. Caposaldo Number 1 subsequently gave way as the Australians got closer to Caposaldo Numbers 2 and 4. At the same time artillery concentrations had been bombarding the posts at Garet el Cuscia and Garet el Barud (east and north of Giarabub respectively). Garet el Cuscia fell first whilst Garet el Barud lasted longer, and counterattacked. By 11.00 am, however, it too was overwhelmed. By 9.30 am the enemy had occupied the ‘old redoubt’ (fort) and the surrounding peaks. The Australians installed mortars and anti–aircraft guns on these hills, hitting the fort’s inner defences, then attacked further engaging in a ‘vehement struggle using hand grenades’.88

A few Italian soldiers continued to resist inside Caposaldo Number 1. Castagna hoped to hold this position as it was an important key to the defence. He sent the Libyan platoon to counterattack, with the Italians, but they were beaten back. A grenade exploded close to Castagna but Soldato (Private) Barbagallo saved him, using his body as a shield. By 11.00 am, however, all of the remaining Italians were captured, including Castagna. He later stated:

The enemy victory was evident. I could even surrender and claim the honour of arms, but I decided to go on in order to show the courage and the pride of the Italian soldiers who were struggling until the death. The behaviour of all the soldiers was absolutely honourable, as it had always been in the glorious military tradition of Italy.89

Castagna insisted that he be allowed to stay with his men despite his wound, but he was moved to the 13th Light Field Ambulance post west of Melfa for treatment then to Siwa, thence to Mersa Matruh. He was interrogated by an Australian sergeant at the aid post, then by General Wavell at Mersa Matruh. ‘The General told me that the Italian Government would be informed about our heroic behavior during the battle’,90 wrote Castagna. ‘Finally, the interpreter told me in French’, he continued, ‘It is a pity that we

88 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 89 Ibid. 90 Castagna, La Difesa Di Giarabub, p. 217. 71

were adversaries this time.’91 Castagna asked if he could go back to Giarabub to bury the dead, but he was told the Australians would do this. The Italian commander later stated that it was impossible to gather figures on the number of his troops that were killed due to his being evacuated, but he read later in the Bourse Egyptienne newspaper of 25 March 1941 that 800 prisoners were captured. Since the total number of men was 1287 he estimated that his losses were 400 dead or wounded.92

At 9.30 am another German Junkers JU–88 overflew and bombed Abbott’s headquarters and his vehicles without damage or casualties. The plane was brought down by fire from a 6th Cavalry trooper, but as the aircraft crashed some 16 kilometres away it was not until 25 March that the Australians learned of it, and of the crew’s difficulties, from two captured crewmen. The Germans led a party back to the Junkers JU–88 to rescue the badly injured pilot and observer.93

One particular incident occurred on this last day of Operation Galley which requires further discussion regarding captured Italians being shot by Australians. Wootten made reference to confusion about what happened when Noyes’ platoon made contact with Berry’s C Company, as mentioned on page 67 of this thesis. ‘Soon after the second phase of the southern attack commenced some of the enemy surrendered and there was then a mix up, some fighting, some surrendering, but it gradually cleared up and by early in the afternoon it was all over.’94 Private James Bowditch, of 2/9th Battalion, is quoted as being interviewed:

91 Ibid. 92 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, File DS 1160A/2/12. 93 Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 62; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, War Diary, March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137. A 6th Cavalry soldier, Trevor Limb, recalled that after the battle Italian arms and ammunition were stacked up together with some larger guns. Some of the Australians were inspecting these guns and trying them out. Limb thought he would do so himself. He picked up a large gun, loaded it and fired at a distant knoll. The shot missed so he let fly with a few more. He was about to fire again when a message was received from a nearby vehicle requesting, ‘Cease Fire’. It appeared that the German crew of the crashed bomber thought that the Australians knew they were still alive, and were firing at them. Soon they appeared waving a white flag; Cavalry News No. 40, 1987 in http://www.26cavcommando.org.au/index.php?option=com_content& task=view&id =2677&Itemid=74, accessed 4 December 2011.; A photograph of two Australian cavalrymen playing with some of the captured equipment appears in Johnstone, The Proud 6th, p. 62. 94‘Letter: Brig. Wootten to Maj. Gen. Lavarack, 28 March 1941, AWM 54 211/11/1. 72

Contrary to popular myth, the Italians fought very bravely, but after a while realised they could not win and surrendered. Between 50 and 100 had been captured. When the troops were told to quickly move to another area where fierce fighting was going on they were told to shoot the Italians. This would be denied by authorities, Bowditch said, but it definitely took place. We were instructed to mow down these prisoners and that, in fact, is what was done. It was contrary to conventions and all the rules governing war.95

Long made reference to the incident in his first draft of his Official History; ‘Noyes’ men, who had been told to take no prisoners in the first phase, found that the Italians were in caves dug into the side of the hill...’ 96, however Wootten directed that it be edited out of the final draft. A recent author on Giarabub, Tom Richardson, wrote:

Most accounts describe the Italians as being ‘too stunned’ to offer much in the way of resistance, but the Australians still made liberal use of grenades in clearing dugouts and soon exhausted their supply. Noyes’s men were also apparently operating under a ‘no prisoners’ order (the origin of which remains unclear) that they were reluctant to follow, particularly when it became clear that many of the Italians had no intention of resisting further. Berry ordered Noyes and his men to encourage the Italians to surrender, and this continued to happen.97

Documentation of some Australian soldiers’ attitudes towards Italian soldiers supports the probability of harsh treatment of Italians at the point of capture. The incident described on p. 27 where enemy (Castagna’s) troops at Melfa pretended to surrender twice, and when approached took up their arms and opened fire on Australians may well have been a major catalyst for the shooting of surrendering Italians. Johnston states:

...Italians often enraged their opponents by firing at advancing Australians then tried to surrender at the last moment, when it was clear they could not halt the attack. This occurred during the assaults on Bardia and Tobruk. At the end of the Australians’ desert campaigns, an Australian NCO told his mother of the same practice at Alamein: ‘on one occasion we attacked a position held by the Ities and they fought like hell right up until we were 3 yds off them then they brought their hands up and called for mercy (they never got much)’.98

Whilst Bowditch’s unsubstantiated account and the documented editing of this aspect of the Official History could be considered highly controversial, unfortunately unless more

95 The date of this interview is not known. http://littledarwin.blogspot.com/2011/03/last–of–fighting– editors–big–jim.html, accessed 20 May 2011. 96 Long’s draft notes for the Official History. ‘Volume I (Army) Ch 12, Giarabub’, AWM 67 3/435; ‘The Siege of Giarabub’, Tom Richardson, AWM 67 3/435 in AWM , SVSS document, 2010. 97 ‘The Siege of Giarabub’, Tom Richardson, AWM 67 3/435 in AWM , SVSS document, 2010. 98 Mark Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 2000, p. 17. 73

information comes to light, the truth of the matter is likely to remain buried in the Giarabub dunes.

The day after the battle on 22 March 1941, 6th Cavalry salvaged captured armaments, ammunition and other stores. A Libyan platoon under a British Lieutenant was placed in charge of the huge collection.99 The captured equipment included:

70 Diesel trucks 900,000 Small arms rounds 17,950 Breda 20mm rounds 4,000 Breda 47mm rounds 1,000 Breda 77mm and 65mm rounds 39 Boxes of hand grenades 16 Respirators 70 Aerial bombs 23 Shovels 40 Diesel fuel drums Qty Spare parts for Breda and Schwarzloise guns.100

For the men of 2/9th Battalion the end of the battle was marked by souvenir hunting.101 They visited the mosque where they were welcomed by the Senussi who showed them around the buildings. A total of 23 Allied soldiers died during the Giarabub campaign, including two killed in December 1940. The men returned to camp and learnt that their dead comrades were to be buried at noon. The service was postponed until 1.30 pm when four or five Italian planes belatedly bombed and machine gunned the area, causing no casualties. The Australians buried their dead in separate graves marked with stones and a simple cross inscribed with their regimental details and name in a short sad ceremony. These were later reinterred in military cemeteries.102

99 ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836. 100 ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137. 101 Calvert’s description – others may describe this as stealing. J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 7. 102 Calvert states five Italian bombers bombed and machine gunned the area. Wootten states four JU 88’s appeared at 2.00 pm and dropped 12 bombs west of the fort. Dickens states that the bombs fell during the service; J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 7, AWM 76 B198; 74

On entering the Giarabub Oasis after the battle a wooden coffin was found inscribed with the words ‘Soldat Inglese’ containing the body of Australian Private E. E. Powell. The Italians had carried his body back with them as they retreated. The respect shown by the Italians for the dead Australian touched the men, such that they found it hard to feel real animosity towards their defeated foe. The Italian dead were buried with respect. Some Italian bodies were lost when covered by blowing sand beforehand so an accurate count could not be made. However, Long states that 250 Italians were killed, which appears high considering that Italian Lieutenant Marini told Castagna that he counted the burial of 84 Italian dead of whom 21 were not identified. To arrive at Long’s 250 killed assumes 164 Italians were buried by wind–blown sand.103

Australian wounded numbered approximately 77, with the Italians suffering some 100 injured during the battle. The Italians had some 1,300 taken prisoner and the Australians just one, in December 1940. The Allied units travelled back to the coast to prepare for their move to Greece. Three members of 2/9th Battalion received gallantry awards on 7 for their part in Operation Galley at Giarabub. Captain Berry received the Military Cross while Sergeant MacIntosh and Private Taylor each received the Military Medal. A little later, on 24 April, news arrived at Tobruk that the Germans had recaptured Giarabub.104

In summary, working with very limited time, in one of the world’s most hostile environments, the Allied force finally broke the Giarabub defence on 21 March 1941.

‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; Dickens, Never Late, p. 71; 20 are buried at Halfaya Sollum Cemetery, one at Melfa, one at Ismailia and one at El Alamein. Appendices A and B show details of all Allied deaths and many of the Italian deaths. One of the 23, Sapper A. Dixon, was a member of the Royal Engineers. Two others were killed in December 1940 in the same campaign; however even if these three are not included, the Allied death toll is 20. Long states 17 deaths and Dickens 20; Long, To Benghazi, in Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 180. 103 This conversation took place in April 1942. Lieutenant Marini was present at the burial but was not permitted to gather the names of all those killed. Appendix B lists the names of 64 Italians known to have been killed in action at Giarabub; Dickens, Never Late, p. 71; Ministro Della Difesa, Controffensiva Italo, p. 62; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; Long, To Benghazi, in Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 180; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12; Long, To Benghazi, in Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 180. 104 Dickens, Never Late, pp. 82, 97. 75

This had followed an unsuccessful British attempt to subdue the garrison in July 1940, followed by a five month siege. Operation Galley finally overcame stout Italian defence by driving in the outlying Italian posts, making full use of deception as to the size of the force and the direction of their attack, together with the concentration of force at critical points ascertained by thorough persistent intelligence gathering. This allowed the well resourced, well led and well trained attacking force to prevail. The cost for the Italian defenders was high, with half of the Allied attacker’s deaths caused by their own fire – a feat unlikely to be repeated in World War II. The reasons for the Italians’ tenacity and ultimate defeat are analysed in Chapter 3.

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Chapter 3

Why Giarabub’s siege and Operation Galley unfolded the way they did.

Whilst the preceding chapters focused primarily on establishing and examining a narrative of events during the siege of Giarabub through to the finalé of Operation Galley, this chapter, in turn, explains why the Italians were able to hold out for so long, why they ultimately capitulated and why it took the Allies five months to finally drive the Italians out of their heavily fortified but lonely fortress. These are complex issues with no one simple answer or singular dominant explanatory factor; rather, the sum of a number of issues made the difference between success and failure for either side. Training, leadership, logistics, food, medical support, artillery quality and deployment, planning, communications, morale, geography and terrain each played a part in the final outcome.

To begin, differences in the relative level of training between the Allied and Axis forces were stark. The 2/9th Battalion, as an example, was formed in November 1939 and immediately commenced individual and unit training, which ranged from attacking Adelaide’s sandhills to undertaking long route marches interspersed with drill and weapons training, all the while building its esprit de corps. In May 1940, the unit left for Palestine, where training continued, then on to Egypt, arriving at Ikingi Maryut on 31 December 1940. More route marches ensued, acclimatising the Australians to desert operations. The 6th Cavalry had arrived in Palestine in January 1940, having undergone basic training in Australia, going on to exercise continuously for 12 months to December 1940 in the Middle East. The Australian 6th Cavalry Regiment’s training involved using machine gun carriers and six old Vickers light tanks. Training progressed for the Australian units that went on to fight at Giarabub from section through platoon, company, battalion and brigade operations. Much of this training was directly applicable to the Giarabub experience, when, for example, on 7 March 1941, the 2/10th Battalion exercised holding a defensive position overnight. This was followed by a three day march to gain experience in administration of a company on detached duties, exactly as the unit’s D Company undertook during Operation Galley. From 10 – 13

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March, 1941, 18th Brigade held a major training exercise involving 2/9th, 2/10th, 2/12th Battalions, 1st Antitank Regiment, 5th Field Ambulance and J Section Signals. The exercise required the brigade to defend against an imaginary attack, by German and Italian forces, on oil storage facilities located on the northern Egyptian coast. The Australians trained in night patrolling, water discipline and the use of their battle equipment, again, all key aspects of the Giarabub campaign.1 Most weeks saw three day marches of 30 kilometres or more per day in the harsh rocky desert terrain. Dickens describes a typical 2/9th Battalion training exercise held on 15 February, 1941:

A battalion exercise in the vicinity of Abu Mina on the 14th started with reveille at 0230 and ended on return to camp at 2000 hrs that night. This was followed by a three–day tactical exercise in the vicinity of Abu Mina from the 19th during which the men subsisted on hard rations and a single bottle of water per day.2

Long described the general preparedness of the division, of which all Australian troops at Giarabub were a part: ‘...it is doubtful whether in the succeeding five years any Australian force was fitter for battle than the 6th Division...’3 This thoroughly detailed and extensive training, in every aspect of the challenges they would face, frustrated the men – they were keen to get into action, but it meant that their skills were honed to the highest possible levels. When Captain Reidy and ten other men of A Company, 2/9th Battalion, were killed, along with twenty wounded, by friendly fire on 21 March 1941 during the final assault, it was training that provided the impetus for the stunned survivors to continue their advance.4

As to the defenders of Giarabub, their training is more difficult to quantify. Castagna, Fattore, the Italian Official History and the Italian Archives all make no mention of training. One obvious possibility for this dearth of information is simply that

1 Spencer, Footsteps of Ghosts, pp. 19, 29; http://www.AWM.gov.au/units/unit_13634second_world_war.asp, accessed 31 July, 2012; ‘No. 3 Pl, 2/10th Bn, Report on Giarabub Incident, Lt. Porter,1941’, AWM 52 8/3/10/7; ‘18 Aus. Inf. Bde., Defence Exercise 10–13 Mar. 41’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; Stockings, Bardia, p. 59. 2 Dickens, Never Late, p. 55. 3 Long, To Benghazi, p. 204. 4 Dickens, Never Late, pp. 68, 69. 78

there may not have been any training. In a wider study of the North African campaign, Stockings described the status of Italian Army training succinctly:

A woefully inadequate system of individual and group training, in many ways a consequence of deficiencies in leadership...handicapped the Italian Army throughout the early stages of the war... Italian units in North Africa... trained ineffectively or not at all, and fought poorly as a consequence. Senior Italian officers were seemingly oblivious to the importance of individual and collective training.5

If training instils confidence and the ability to function under extreme pressure, then Castagna’s men were handicapped from the start. In contrast, Wootten Force’s training was tailored precisely for desert operations, such as those at Giarabub, and contributed substantially to their success.6

Tactical leadership went hand–in–hand with training – and again a clear relative mismatch at Giarabub is evident. The Allied leader on the Giarabub battlefield in the final stages was Brigadier G. F. Wootten. Wootten landed at Gallipoli in 1915, served as a company commander, then in France as a Brigade Major. He was mentioned in despatches five times and awarded the DSO. During the interwar period Wootten excelled whilst studying at the Camberly Staff College in England. Wootten was highly respected by those he commanded.7 Ably supporting Wootten were his battalion commanders. The commander of 2/9th Battalion, the largest Allied unit at Giarabub was Lieutenant Colonel J. E. G. Martin who was a strict disciplinarian, stern but just, and who demanded the best of himself and those around him. The 2/9th’s success was credited in no small part to his insistence on a full and carefully planned training program at all times. As one of his men, James Calvert noted; ‘He was cursed at times for his ruthless insistence that manoeuvres be carried out in the last detail, and the least instruction complied with.’8 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Australians had a large proportion of effective leaders. Many company and battalion commanders had earned their leadership skills on the battlefields of World War I. The junior officers of the AIF

5 Stockings, Bardia, p. 383. 6 For a more detailed study of the state of Italian military training at this time see Stockings, Bardia, pp. 383–386. 7 Dennis et al, Companion to Australian Military History, p. 608. 8 J. Calvert, ‘The Capture of Giarabub’, Stand–to, Vol. 6, No. 5, 1958, p. 1, AWM 76 B198. 79

had learnt the importance of initiative in NCOs and platoon leaders. By 1918 the Australians had advanced the art of aggressive patrolling to an extent that ‘bewildered their enemy and astonished senior British commanders.’9 Many of the junior leaders serving in North Africa in 1940 were, as far as possible, sourced from within the ranks; for example, on 3 January, 1940, nine NCOs were detached from the 2/9th Battalion to attend officer training, completed their course successfully and returned to the battalion. The effectiveness of the experienced 2nd AIF officers was later further demonstrated in the Kokoda campaign at Isurava where they were employed in leadership roles in the 39th Battalion, versus the disastrous results on the opposite ridge at Abuari when inexperienced leaders were employed in the same theatre with 53rd Battalion.10

The value of having officers drawn from their units and of having so many high quality leaders throughout the Allied force at Giarabub lay in the confidence that this built in the men. Strong esprit de corps was cemented by shared adversity and the long journey from the recruiting office in Australia to the Libyan desert. Importantly, inspired leadership encouraged lateral thinking, as demonstrated with Wootten’s push to force a way across the marshes south of Giarabub, previously considered impassable, and which provided the path to tactical surprise.11

The Italian tactical commander throughout the Giarabub campaign was Major Salvatore Castagna, aged 43 in 1940; he was lean and vigorous with a dark complexion and Sicilian features. Castagna possessed a commanding air which drew respect and engendered trust from those around him. Awarded a Silver Medal of Military Valour (equivalent to the British Military Cross) during his World War I service, he rose to 1st Lieutenant in 1917.12 After 1918, Castagna continued serving with the army and was posted to Libya with the Raggruppamento Ruggeri for four years, during which the Italians were still attempting to overpower an Arab rebellion, which had begun at the

9 Long, To Benghazi, p. 130. 10 Dickens, Never Late, p. 19; Peter Brune, A Bastard of a Place, The Australians in Papua, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003, pp. 163-166. 11 Dickens, Never Late, p. 18. 12 Italians from Northern Italy generally have fine features and thin bodies. Their southern counterparts, for example, from Sicily are generally of a more solid and thicker set build with darker complexions. In 1940 the southern and northern Italian dialects were markedly different. The Italian name of the medal is Medaglia d'Argento al Valore Militare. Fattore, Giarabub, p. 182. 80

start of World War I. A term as a full–time instructor in Naples left him frustrated with perceived inactivity, but he continued to hone his leadership skills. A posting to Jeffra near the Tunisian border in 1937 saw Castagna promoted to Major, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 85th Infantry Regiment. Following his Jeffra posting, Castagna was given command of the VIII Libyan Battalion for nine months, furthering his skills in leading African colonial troops.13A colleague, Mario Capucci, described him thus:

A man who is very strict with others and himself. If he made a decision he would stick to it, and would not tolerate superficialities nor indecision. He preferred to praise rather than punish. He had few vices, did not smoke and rarely drank a small beer with the other officers. He loved Africa, and like an African, had trained himself to renounce anything unnecessary.14

On 22 April, 1940, Castagna was ordered to Giarabub where he set about transforming the 19th century defences. Ridotta Marcucci (the ancient central fort), for example, was constructed for defence against , not a modern army. Castagna worked his men hard to improve the defences. Barbed wire was removed from the border fence and used to construct perimeter defences. Tank traps were dug, mine fields laid, gun emplacements constructed, telephone lines laid and ammunition was prepared. There is little evidence of instruction and training of Castagna’s garrison. Whilst the lack of evidence of training does not prove that there was no training, the poor fire discipline repeatedly exhibited, as an example, during the siege and final battle lends weight to a lack of training as being a significant factor in the Italian performance under fire. Stockings, in Bardia, makes the point forcefully:

Field exercises and detailed practical instruction were neglected almost entirely. By the time Graziani's advance into Egypt began, only a little over half of all troops in the Italian metropolitan infantry divisions involved in the invasion had received any formal military instruction. 15

Only eight of the 30 officers in the Giarabub garrison were permanent soldiers with the rest being conscripts. Captain S. H. Good, the 18th Brigade Intelligence Officer, reported on 19 March, 1941 of the conscripted Italian officers: ‘The rest are conscripts and said

13 Fattore, Giarabub, pp. 181, 182, 184. 14 Ibid, p. 183. 15 Stockings, Bardia, pp. 383, 384. 81

to be tired of war’.16 Whether being a conscripted or a regular soldier made a difference to the officers’ motivation is difficult to prove in Giarabub’s case, but it may have been an additional factor affecting the outcome. This contrasts with the Australian officers and men, who were all volunteers. An Australian intelligence report commented that captured Italian prisoners had described the importance of Castagna’s leadership in explaining why the garrison did not surrender:

A considerable portion of the garrison – possibly about half of the garrison – wanted to surrender, but the remainder are desirous of fighting and find inspiration in their commander, who is credited with holding the force together.17

There is no doubt that Castagna’s personality was the key reason for the Italians holding out until their final defeat on 21 March 1941. Whilst we have a picture of Castagna’s personality, his post war book and scant Italian records to go by, the actual methods that he used to achieve this motivation remain unclear. We do know that Castagna himself struggled with the conscripted members of his force:

Castagna, with his long experience as a colonial, knew the Askari [Libyan warriors] well and had great admiration for them, but was much less enthusiastic about the later conscripted Libyans. He said, ‘the graduates and volunteers are excellent soldiers, obedient, hard working and dedicated to their duties. After the Ethiopian Campaign they were proud to belong to our army. The conscripts, soldiers and officers, do not show the same enthusiasm. Some are old (nearly 40) and not suited to our army, complain a lot, and leave for agricultural excuses and subsidies. They cause me a lot of worry.’18

The ability of this one man to motivate 1,200 men to stand and fight, completely isolated and with little hope of winning, in the dire circumstances described in this thesis, is quite at odds with the archetypal image of Italian Army officers of World War II as portrayed in popular literature.19

16 Captain Good’s assessment was based upon captured prisoner statements;‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int. Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 17 ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int. Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 18 Fattore, Giarabub, pp. 201, 202. 19 Stockings, Bardia, pp. 299, 300; Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, p. 9; Mark Johnston: Correspondence with author, June 2013. 82

Senior battlefield leadership in the North African theatre of World War II provided great contrasts. On one hand the Allies were usually led by modern thinking generals with considerable drive, tenacity and energy, whereas the Italians were more often handicapped by unimaginative leaders using outdated strategies poorly applied. A case in point is Graziani’s 300 kilometre barbed wire fence, mentioned in Chapter 2, built in 1937 to stop the resupply of Senussi rebels. Even as the British demonstrated that they could simply drive over or cut the fence at will, Graziani continued to maintain this fence, believing that it would block British movement west from Egypt. The widely used Italian strategy of placing forts at 50 kilometre intervals along this fence likewise demonstrated a failure to understand the principles of mutual support. Even the concept of the Giarabub fort itself demonstrates outmoded thinking. Modern warfare in 1940 had evolved from fighting a colonial insurgency to encompass force mobility over vast distances and the use of long range artillery, not static defence in isolated strongholds. No force of personality, on Castagna’s part, could make up for such anachronistic thinking.20

Senior Allied military leadership ability pertaining to Giarabub was demonstrated firstly with Field Marshal Archibald Wavell’s drive to instigate desert offensives against Italian forces in 1940–41. The skills required of Wavell, when faced with a vast area defended by a numerically superior enemy, would be, amongst others, bluff, audacity and imagination.21 Wavell ordered Major General Sir Richard O’Connor to produce a plan. The plan that O’Connor conceived was the stunningly successful Operation Compass. O’Connor had a reputation for ‘boldness and unorthodoxy’.22 Much has been written about these senior commanders and the figures themselves speak volumes. Wavell’s 30,000 men faced 200,000 Italians and Libyans to the west and 250,000 to the east (not including 150,000 occupying troops far to the south in Ethiopia), yet Wavell would go on to destroy Mussolini’s vast 10th Army. For the loss of less than 2,000 Allied troops the Italians sustained 130,000 captured or killed whilst the Allies advanced 800 kilometres in 10 weeks.23

20 Jon Diamond, Masterstroke in the Desert, in WWII History, Vol. 11, Sovereign Media, Virginia, USA, 2011, p. 36. 21 B. Pitt, The Crucible of War, Wavell’s Command, Cassell and Co, London, 2001, pp. 5–7. 22 Diamond, Masterstroke in the Desert, p. 32. 23 Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 94. 83

Disparity of logistics was one of the main factors that ultimately determined the outcome at Giarabub. The difficulty of logistics was summed up well by German General Johann von Ravenstein who famously described operations in the Libyan thus: ‘a tactician’s paradise but a quartermaster’s hell.’24 Wavell was faced with severe shortfalls in equipment on his arrival in North Africa but understood the vital importance of adequate logistics, later stating, ‘[Logistics]...the crux of generalship – superior even to tactical skill.’25 Difficulties started for both sides with sea transport to North Africa across the . Much of this route was within bombing range of land based aircraft. The was substantially damaged or confined to inactivity following the Taranto raid of 11 November, 1940, which utilised British torpedo aircraft from the Naval Air Arm in a brilliant night attack. Further devastation for the Italian navy, off Cape Matapan two weeks later, cleared it from the Mediterranean for the next three months, allowing Wavell’s attacks in Cyrenaica to proceed.26

The similarities of the Battle of Bardia to the Giarabub campaign are numerous and illuminating, and none more so than when analysing logistics. The weaknesses of Italian logistics greatly facilitated the imposition and enforcement of at both Bardia and Giarabub. The Italians’ lack of terrestrial mobility was not a matter of choice for the battlefield commanders, but rather the result of a dysfunctional logistics train, commencing with a lack of political power or will to enforce wartime production requirements, an enfeebled economy and an antiquated industrial design and production system which was unable to provide modern equipment in the quantities or time required.27 Many historians claim that the Italians did not understand or adjust to the concept that modern warfare demanded mobility on an industrial scale. Stockings highlights this, pointing out that the Italians at Bardia had no option but to ‘stockpile

24 Allyn Vannoy, North Africa: The War of Logistics, in WWII Quarterly, Winter 2012, Sovereign Media, Virginia, 2012, p. 96. 25A. Wavell, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell of Cyrenaica (1883–1950), in Peter G. Tsouras, (ed), The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, Greenhill Books, London, 2000, p. 276. 26 H. C. O’Neill, (ed.), Odhams History of the Second World War, Vol. 1, Odhams Press, London, 1951, p. 108; Clarke, Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, pp. 180-182. 27 Stockings, Bardia, pp. 303, 309, 321. 84

and defend’.28 An eloquent example in this regard is transportation. It is difficult to quantify precisely the total number of vehicles available to Castagna at Giarabub prior to Giarabub’s isolation from 10th Army on 16 December, 1940; although, Australian Intelligence estimated that the Italians had only 30 to 60 vehicles on 14 March, 1941. On the final day of Operation Galley, 70 trucks were captured. Allowing for perhaps 10 Italian vehicles destroyed during the siege and battle, this still stands in stark contrast to the Allies’ mobility. The 1,716 Allied men moved to the Giarabub area for Operation Galley were transported on 300 trucks. This was in addition to the LRDP and 6th Cavalry vehicles already at Giarabub. If the same ratio of vehicles to men is extrapolated to these units, then their additional 89 trucks brings the total to 389 (see Table 4).29

Giarabub Castagna’s Force Wootten Force Troops 2,100 2,219 Vehicles 80 389 Men per vehicle 26.25 5.7

Table 4 Comparison of troop and vehicle numbers.

Sources: per footnote 29.

On the Allied side at Giarabub, every logistical detail of the Allied operations was planned for – fuel dumps, vehicle repair (47th LAD), number of men per vehicle, bivouac sites, meal and rest stops, vehicle spacing and speeds, number of rations, weight of ammunition and, critically, water. There is little evidence of similar planning or management on the Italian side at Giarabub. Stockings notes that in addition to a severe shortage of vehicles in North Africa, there was no system for repair or recovery of vehicles and the vehicles were unsuited to the environment, often with 40 per cent

28 Stockings, Bardia, p. 321. 29 ‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16, 14 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Giarabub Campaign, 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, December 1940 to March 1940’, The National Archives, Kew, London, WO/06/2137; ‘H.Q. Matruh Sub–Area Administrative Instructions, Operations Giarabub Area. 13 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 85

unserviceable. For the Italians located 300 kilometres south in the Sahara, the situation could only have been worse.30

To continue the comparison of Bardia versus Giarabub; as at Bardia, the defenders at Giarabub suffered dire shortages of rations. At Bardia the ten days of rationing has been described as a major contributor to the Italian defeat.31 Castagna’s men were on half or less rations for ninety–three days from 18 December 1940 to 21 March 1941. The extent to which this affected the Italians at Giarabub is difficult to quantify. It is a reasonable assumption, however, that this would have had a major impact on their health, strength and morale, and therefore on their ability to resist the Wootten Force onslaught. On the other hand, the Australians had excellent provisioning throughout the Giarabub campaign. The 6th Cavalry, whilst enforcing the siege, were well fed, often having a hot meal brought forward for them from the field kitchens established at Melfa. During the battle, on 20 March, hot food was brought forward to the men of 2/9th Battalion whilst they were only 100 metres from the Italian front line, lying on the sand with the British 25–pounder shells screaming overhead. Attention to detail for the attacking force’s provisioning even included planning for a rum ration to be issued at 5.00 pm on 21 March, after the battle.32

The health of the defenders versus that of the attackers provides yet another contrast. By 7 February, 1941, 20 defenders were in the Giarabub hospital, which was located in the mosque, suffering from gastro conditions. Libyan deserters described the water as ‘bad’.33 Once the Giarabub airfield was closed by Allied artillery in January 1941, no medical evacuations could be undertaken. At Bardia some three per cent of the Italians were suffering from dysentery and others hepatitis. One in ten had serious lice infestations and medical supplies were inadequate. At Giarabub, far distant from support of any kind, short of clean water, and besieged for four and a half months, one can only imagine the state of the garrison’s medical affairs. Wootten’s planning for

30 Stockings, Bardia, p. 310. 31 Ibid, pp. 315, 316. 32 Long, To Benghazi, p. 292; Dickens, Never Late, p. 66; ‘18 Aust Inf. Bde. Administrative Instn No. 2’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 33‘Medical report by R.M.O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for February 1941, 1 March 1941’, AWM 54 481/12/79. 86

Operation Galley included detailed arrangements for every possible aspect of medical requirements including those of the expected large haul of prisoners. Air evacuations were arranged from an airfield to the north, Australian 13th Light Field Ambulance was on hand to move and manage patients, a forward dressing station was set up at Melfa, and further attention was provided at Siwa, then in Egypt at Cairo’s Number 63 General Hospital at Helmier. Five of the 23 Allied fatalities resulting from the siege and battle at Giarabub are recorded as ‘Died of Wounds’ from 82 wounded in total. The equivalent figures are not known for the defenders while the efficient, prompt and professional Allied medical service must surely have been a factor in producing such low mortality among the Allied casualties.34

Differences in equipment continue the theme of relative inequality between the attackers and the defenders. The second most important ‘tool’ after transport was artillery, both in its quality and its use. Wootten Force artillery outgunned the Italians in terms of range, destructive power, mobility, concentration, accuracy, volume, fire discipline and gun placement: all of which led to a crushing advantage over the Italian garrison. The Italian gunners had short range, inaccurate small calibre guns which were poorly deployed and used without the disciplined fire plans of the British artillery. The British 25–pounder was new technology, introduced just prior to World War II, with a range of 12,253 metres whereas the three Italian guns, the 47/32, 65/17 and the 77/28 all had ranges of only 7,000 metres or less. The 65/17 and 77/28 were both of World War I vintage, with slow rates of fire and low reliability, particularly in sandy or dusty conditions. The British Boys Anti–tank rifle was a devastating weapon against the Italian stone sangers, although ineffective for its designed purpose against armour. The 37mm Bofors anti–aircraft guns were also in use by the British artillery at Giarabub. The approximate equivalent of both these British weapons used by the Italian defenders was the 20mm Breda machine gun which required each cartridge to be mechanically oiled on loading to facilitate extraction. This was a serious weakness in the swirling dust storms of Giarabub. As to the quantities of artillery pieces, the Italians had fourteen 47/32 guns, four 77/28 guns, two 65/17 guns and sixteen 20mm Breda machine guns,

34 Stockings, Bardia, pp. 320, 321; ‘Medical report by R.M. O. Aust Cav to A.D.M.S. 6th Aust Div for March 1941, 3 April 1941’, AWM 54 481/12/79; Appendices A and B. It is not known if the air evacuation system was ultimately used. 87

against Wootten’s Bofors, Boys and sixteen 25–pounder guns. However, the unreliability, ineffectiveness and short range of the Italian weapons negated any numerical superiority. Long recorded the Australian view of Italian weaponry: 35

The Australians considered that nearly every sort of Italian weapon compared unfavourably with their own. The Italian rifle seemed like a toy beside the Lee–Enfield; the red painted, thin–skinned grenade was far less lethal than the British equivalent. The Italian field guns ‘were of all sizes, shapes and vintages; shell fragmentation seemed poor and many men blown off their feet got up again.’36

Comparison of planning and intelligence yields further revealing contrasts, particularly during the Operation Galley phase. Fergusson, then Wootten, vigorously pursued knowledge of their enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities, employing almost continual patrolling, numerous reconnaissance expeditions, aerial photography and frequent interrogation of prisoners. Prisoners provided confirmation of assumed or sketchy information, facilitating accurate production of maps and their continual improvement, identification of the vital ground, discovery and testing of previously unknown access routes and awareness of minefield locations. Through persistent probing the Italian strong points and gun emplacements were precisely located, which allowed for accurate, concentrated, and therefore highly effective, artillery fire prior to and during the final assaults. All unit commanders and junior leaders were sent forward to study the ground for the impending attacks.37 Watches were synchronised, code names allocated, fire plans produced and guns laid onto targets – all as per Wootten’s plans. The importance that Wootten placed on planning is demonstrated by the fact that 26 copies of the detailed plan for the movement of the 1,716 men on 300 vehicles from Mersa Matruh to Giarabub were distributed on 13 March, 1941, as ‘Administration

35 Long, Benghazi, pp. 200, 290, 291; Wahlert, Western Desert Campaign, pp. 115–120; S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 36 The Australians did however use Italian weapons, which became known as the ‘Bush Artillery’ during the . Timothy Hall, Tobruk 1941, The Desert Siege, Methuen Australia, North Ryde, 1984, pp. 31, 110, 185; Long, Benghazi, p. 200; Stockings describes similar scenes at Bardia. Stockings, Bardia, pp. 335, 336. 37 ‘Appendix G, 18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16, 14 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Int. Summary No. 17, 19 March 1941.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Operational Order No. 1, 19 March, 1941 from 18 Aust Inf Brigade’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘18th Aust Inf Brigade, Operational Order No. 2, 20 March 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 88

Instructions Operations – Giarabub Area’.38 This document was accompanied by movement tables, maps and other appendices. The plans for the final attack were promulgated firstly as ‘Operational Plan No. 1’ on 15 March, then, demonstrating flexibility as new information came to light, a revised plan, Operational Plan No. 2, was distributed on 20 March. The planning of the logistical support has been discussed above but bears emphasising as evidence of the thoroughness and detail of the Australian planning. In the tradition established by Lieutenant General Sir John Monash on 4 July 1918 at the Battle of Hamel, meticulous planning, communicated to all ranks, helped lead to outstanding success on the battlefield.39

In his 1950 book, Castagna described the layout of defensive positions within the outer perimeter wire and the adjacent knolls, but this shows little sign of attempting to understand the Allied force’s capabilities or activities. Even though German and Italian aircraft were in use, and did make one report of an Allied convoy en route to Giarabub, there appears to have been ineffective use made of this resource for the gathering of tactical intelligence.40 Castagna’s shortage of vehicles meant that mounted reconnaissance patrols were not an option available to him; however, Castagna did have static lookouts in place around the Giarabub area and along the border fence. Due to the distances between them – up to 50 kilometres apart – these were easily neutralised. The Italian defenders could not make use of captured prisoners for intelligence, as the Australians did, as the Italians only captured one attacker, who was eventually flown to Rome for interrogation. It could be considered that Castagna could have used foot patrols to ascertain the Australian strengths and locations. It is not hard to imagine the difficulties in undertaking such strenuous reconnaissance trips after months of starvation.

Battlefield communications have always been vital in warfare and this was especially so in the vast featureless desert of North Africa in World War II during the Giarabub action. The Australians made full use of radios, telephones and heliographs, using coded messages when required, coded names for units and locations, and pre–

38‘HQ Matruh Sub–Area, Administration Instructions, Operations – Giarabub Area, 13 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 39 Clark, The Encyclopaedia of Australia’s Battles, pp. 148, 149. 40 Castagna, Giarabub, Schizzo No. s 4–6, p. 168. 89

planned radio procedures such as frequency allocations and radio silence periods to ensure secure communication systems. There were failures, such as when the Forward Observation Officer with 2/9th Battalion’s A Company had his phone line cut by his own British artillery fire on 21 March 1941; yet, viewing the copiously detailed 18th Brigade message log for that final day clearly indicates that the Allied communications were of a high standard.41 Italian communications suffered from unreliable radio availability, poor radio security and easily intercepted telephone lines between isolated observation posts, as described in the previous chapters. The poor state of Italian radio security was demonstrated by an unencoded message, sent from inside Giarabub by the Italians, received at 18th Brigade Headquarters on 15 March 1941: ‘Enemy wireless message intercepted calling for bombers.’42 The telephone lines within the fortress were destroyed during the final battle on 20 and 21 March, as would be expected under sustained artillery attack, contributing to the compounding failure of the Italian defences.

Much is made of the importance of morale in modern populist histories as a reason for the relatively small Allied force involved in Operation Compass being able to conquer the vast numbers of men of the Italian 10th Army. Morale can be defined as ‘the mental attitude or bearing of a person or group, especially as regards confidence, discipline, etc.’43 Napoleon stated: ‘Morale makes up three quarters of the game; the relative balance of man–power accounts only for the remaining quarter’;44 however, this was not necessarily the case at Giarabub. If high morale is considered to be the outcome of a long chain of positive events then the 6th Cavalry firstly, followed by the balance of Wootten Force, had peak morale. They were executing a well–promulgated detailed plan, had good equipment, had trained for a year; their officers were drawn from the ranks, were of exceptional quality and had earned the highest respect of the men. They were fit, healthy, well fed and rested with adequate leave. The only thing that could add

41 ‘Special Issue of Code Names for “Galley” Operation’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘O. Inst. No. 1 19 March 41.’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; ‘Message Log 18th Brigade’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 42 ‘Message Log 18th Brigade’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5. 43 Moore, The Australian Oxford Dictionary, p. 829. 44 Napoleon, Correspondance de Napoleon ler publiee par ordre de l’Empereur Napoleon III, XVII, No. 14276, 1858–1870, in P. Tsouras (ed.), The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, Greenhill Books, London, 2000, p. 312. 90

to the morale of the men in Wootten Force was the ultimate measure of a soldier’s ability – success in battle.

This situation stands in stark contrast to the Italians (the Libyan defenders will be discussed separately), who were fighting with little or no hope of success once their support on the coast was destroyed. Their equipment was old and insufficient, their weapons were ineffective, their training was limited, and, in the nature of the Italian army of World War II, the junior officers were usually unskilled in even the most minor infantry tactics. An ever shrinking supply of food to well below subsistence levels provided every Italian soldier with a nagging reminder of their hopeless position. Lastly, watching one third of their fellow soldiers – the Libyans – desert in the hour of most need, just before the final battle, must surely have driven a stake through the heart of the remaining defenders’ morale.45

The Australian intelligence reports make repeated mentions of the low morale of the defenders at Giarabub. This was clearly accepted as an accurate assessment by Wootten and the other Australian commanders at Giarabub, as evidenced by two separate air drops of pamphlets urging the defenders to surrender. However, despite popular conceptions of World War II Italian soldiers literally running up the white flag at every opportunity, this simply did not happen at Giarabub.46 A 2/9th Battalion flag was raised over the fort on 21 March 1941, but it replaced the Italian Tricolour, not a white flag.47 Castagna is quoted as shouting: ‘No surrender! No Surrender!’48 upon his capture. Some parties of Italian soldiers did surrender, but generally in the face of overwhelming force, as described in the previous chapters. During the final days of Operation Galley, between 84 and 250 of the defenders were killed, depending upon which report is consulted. Even allowing for the possible shooting of Italian prisoners,

45 Stockings, Bardia, p. 376, 377, 400. 46 A further example of Italian steadfastness was exhibited by some of their artillerymen at Badia, who stayed at their post until killed. Ibid, p. 152. 47 ‘18th Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 16, 14 March, 1941’, AWM 52 8/2/18/5; The original Italian Flag is held in the Australian War Memorial, Canberra; RELAWM 30011; Long, To Benghazi, p. 302; ‘Report on Giarabub Campaign’, G. F. Wootten, The National Archives, Kew, London, CAB 106/836; There is one report of the 2/9th Battalion flag replacing a white flag over the fort, however the balance of evidence does not support this. Mark Johnston, The Silent 7th, an Illustrated History of the 7th Australian Division 1940-46, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2005, p. 22. 48 Long, To Benghazi, p. 302. 91

this would indicate that the Italians were intent on fighting to the finish. In view of the above, low morale amongst the Italian defenders cannot be seen as a major contributor to their defeat.

Castagna’s Libyan soldiers, however, need to be considered in a different context. The Libyans had been suppressed by the Italians since 1912 then further during Mussolini’s quest for Empire. The Senussi desire for an isolated and independent existence at Giarabub had been thwarted and their Koranic University destroyed. They had little reason to support far off Mussolini’s dreams of new Roman prominence in Africa. When Operation Compass thrust westwards, the Libyan soldiers’ families were directly in line. They had every reason to avoid dying from starvation or Allied gunfire at Giarabub, and none to stay. For the Libyans, surrender was the only viable alternative to a trap offering a lingering or violent death as the likely outcome.49

The use of geography and terrain are the final issues to be considered when analysing the outcome of Operation Galley. Chapter 1 discussed the fact that Giarabub had a virtually impassable marsh to the south, a rocky escarpment to the west and sandy terrain interspersed with rugged outcrops to the north and east. Castagna correctly deduced that access from the south of Giarabub was extremely difficult, and therefore less likely to be used by attackers. He did not, however, appreciate that Wootten would use this more difficult route to instigate complete tactical surprise. Castagna’s concept of strong points or caposaldos was itself flawed (like all Italian defended locations across North Africa) in that the strong points did not provide mutual support to each other (e.g. interlocking arcs of fire), even though there were opportunities to achieve this, with much high ground available. Stockings gives an in–depth analysis in Bardia of why this may be so, with the principal reason being that of poor officer training. Wootten’s use of the LRDP to the west made excellent use of the terrain. Despite being numerically minute, the LRDP was ideally suited to operating in the difficult desert conditions prevailing in that direction. With its virtually unlimited mobility, effective armament and unmatched ability to operate in the extreme environment, the LRDP was able to use terrain to deny the Italians any possibility of escape to the west and

49 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 226. 92

northwest of Giarabub, helping in no small way to seal the fate of the besieged defenders. The dominant geographical features of the siege and battle at Giarabub were the distances and difficulties of supply 300 kilometres deep into the Sahara Desert. Defenders and attackers alike faced the same problems. The Italians were not able to overcome the challenges of the harshest geography on the planet, but Wootten Force was.50

Of the issues discussed above, for the victors at Giarabub, their superior training, high quality and depth of leadership, thorough logistics, careful and complete reconnaissance, complete planning and modern equipment provided the highest possible probability of success. For the Italians at Giarabub, their problems started with Mussolini’s decision to pursue the dream of empire status, then were compounded by outdated strategy implemented by pedestrian senior commanders. The ineffective Italian logistics left the defensive system of forts in an unsustainable situation. Even if these factors had been overcome, the antiquated weapons used by poorly trained soldiers in static defence against the highly mobile attackers meant that Giarabub was doomed from 16 December 1940, when the limited Italian vehicle access was severed. None of these points differ significantly from other Italian battles against the Allies in North Africa in World War II; however, the fact that Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Castagna held his starving countrymen to their posts for four and a half months, against hopeless odds remains the standout feature of the Battle of Giarabub.

50 Stockings, Bardia, pp. 361–382. 93

Chapter 4

The Wider Impact of Giarabub

The previous chapters have examined what happened and why at the desolate oasis of Giarabub during World War II. This chapter now considers what effects the siege, then capture, of Giarabub had on the First Libyan Campaign, their effects on subsequent operations of the Western Desert Force, and also their wider impacts upon the Italian 10th Army and the converse effects of the operations of the 10th Army on events at Giarabub. The potential for Giarabub to provide an alternate route for movement of both Allied and Italian forces to travel east and west is analysed and the influence of the siege on the strategic calculations on both sides is examined. Taking a wider perspective, the important impact of Castagna’s stand at Giarabub on Italian morale during World War II, and beyond, are also placed in historical perspective.

The First Libyan Campaign, as defined in the Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, spanned from December 1940 to February 1941, encompassing a series of operations undertaken during the initial advance of Allied forces during World War II in North Africa, westward against Mussolini’s Italian 10th Army. From the Australian perspective, the 6th Australian Division led the way as the first Australian force in action with the 2nd AIF, following behind the British (including other Empire troops) who opened the campaign with attacks on the camps around Sidi Barrani then on the village itself. The British 7th Armoured Division and the Australian 6th Division constituted Western Desert Force which was commanded by Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor and later renamed XIII Corps. XIII Corps drove a vastly numerically superior Italian army 800 kilometres westward from the north western corner of Egypt back into Libya in a series of spectacular battles. The line of the Allied advance generally followed the coast, as this provided the fastest and most practical route for the retreating Italians, with their limited ability to travel off formed roads. Originally planned to occupy only four or five days due to limited availability of logistic support, the initial British advance, Operation Compass, grossly exceeded expectations as the Italians rapidly capitulated. The sequence and timings of the Italian defeats is significant

94

to Giarabub’s Operation Galley and the siege that preceded it. Advancing westwards, Operation Compass commenced with the conquest of Sidi Barrani on 11 December, 1940. At this time Giarabub, some 300 kilometres to the south, became effectively the southern end of the Italian front line, now delineated by the string of forts, joined by Graziani’s barbed wire fence along the Libyan – Egyptian border. On the Italian side, continued occupation of Giarabub was seen as vital to maintain the option of using it as an inland base from which to sally forth, in a flanking action against the southern side of the expected Allied advance.1

Such flanking actions as initially envisaged by the Italians for Giarabub, were in fact a feature of Operation Compass, with the immense featureless wastes of the Sahara Desert providing near perfect opportunities for manoeuvre, not unlike battleships at sea. Those with the means of transiting these terrestrial oceans of sand, together with the logistical ability to maintain operations, held the winning advantage. Giarabub thus offered a port of sorts with an airfield and water, dominating the junction of a number of desert tracks. To the north lay the road to Bardia on the coast, east was Siwa, west led to Gialo, and far to the south lay Kufra. The significance of Giarabub as a future Allied base was not lost on O’Connor. For him, Giarabub provided an alternative route westward which could have allowed a flanking manoeuvre to be instigated into the southern flank of the Italians as they retreated west. In the event, the rapid pace of the Italian retreat and the limitations of logistics, especially for large forces, precluded the need for the Allies to travel as far south as Giarabub to accomplish the encirclement and destruction of the Italian 10th Army. This does not, however, belie the perceived significance of the Oasis in the early planning and conduct phases of Operation Compass.2

The practical difficulties in using the Giarabub route for access to the west, however, can be gauged by the logistics effort required to undertake Operation Galley. Wootten Force required 389 vehicles to transport 2,219 men and their equipment for a maximum of only ten days. The number of vehicles required to transport even a portion

1 Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History, pp. 316, 317; O’Neill (ed), History of the Second World War, pp. 135–144; Stockings, Bardia, pp. 77–81. 2 Italian occupied Kufra lay 640 kilometres to the south of Giarabub, but this was a staging post for Italian aircraft en–route to the East African colonies, rather than a defensive position, see Chapter 1. 95

of a fighting force of the tens of thousands involved in Operation Compass deep through the desert, and far from decent roads, water and naval support, was clearly a serious disincentive to the Allies using the Giarabub route. As O’Connor’s Operation Compass advanced westward against unexpectedly ineffective opposition, the desirability of Giarabub as an Allied base, or as an access route, thus decreased. As events overcame Giarabub’s initial strategic significance, a second requirement for O’Connor to focus on Giarabub then emerged. As O’Connor advanced, the Italian garrison’s potential to impact from the south against his logistics tail grew. With every kilometre that the Allies advanced west of the Libyan – Egyptian border, the theoretical risk that Castagna could attack and cut off the Allies from behind increased. On 5 January 1941, the Italian occupation of Bardia was emphatically terminated by the Allies in a three day battle, as Compass relentlessly swept westward. Meanwhile, as noted earlier, O’Connor’s expectation was that Giarabub would capitulate simply by continued enforcement of the state of siege. At this stage B and C Squadrons of the 6th Cavalry, plus some ancillary troops, were engaged at Giarabub, so its numerical impact on Operation Compass was not significant – 456 men at Giarabub from a total force of 30,000. Tobruk fell on 22 January, followed by an inland sweep to on 27 January. Derna, further west again, on the coast, was captured on 30 January. Interestingly, A Squadron, 6th Cavalry featured prominently in Derna’s demise, whilst B and C Squadrons were jousting with Castagna, far to the southeast. Yet with each conquest, Giarabub fell further to the rear, increasingly exposing O’Connor’s line of communication. With the benefit of hindsight, and perhaps it should have even been clear from early 6th Cavalry intelligence reports, it is now obvious that Castagna did not have the means, in particular, transport, to mount a serious attack over any great distance. At the time, however, the Italian threat to the Allied flank appeared very real, especially considering the possibility of aerial reinforcement.3

Benghazi, on the western coast of Cyrenaica, fell to the Allies on 6 February, followed by the final humiliating trapping and surrender of the remnants of 10th Army at on 7 February. Operation Compass had swept all before it, except for

3 Long, Benghazi, p. 294; Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 55; B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, Pan Books, London, 2011, p. 144; Castagna had only about 80 vehicles (see Chapter 3), Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 83; Dennis, Companion to Australian Military History, pp. 316, 317; Long, To Benghazi, p. 294. 96

Lieutenant Colonel Castagna’s tenacious garrison. Giarabub remained besieged, yet unyielding, with Castagna’s hopes of rescue or support fading ever further as each day passed. In short, Giarabub’s relevance was initially as a route for either side to use as an alternative line of advance, then as a base for flanking manoeuvres, but by the time the last Italian prisoner straggled into captivity at Beda Fomm on 7 February, 1941, Giarabub’s strategic relevance had faded.

The influence of Giarabub did not, however, end with the conclusion of the First Libyan Campaign. The siege of Giarabub also had an important impact on subsequent Allied and Axis operations. The First Libyan Campaign ended with the spectacular Allied success at Beda Fomm, but the Western Desert remained an active theatre. Wavell’s first offensive was certainly over, leaving Mussolini to lament the defeat of the 10th Army and the 5th Squadron of the . Yet half of Graziani’s 215,000 troops remained in . Further, from this point on, the tide of war in North Africa soon turned. Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel arrived at Tripoli in North Africa on 12 February 1941, and quickly established that the remnants of the 10th Army were in total disarray with many having thrown away their weapons and seized trucks to escape. On the Giarabub front some 715 Libyans had deserted from 7 to 17 February. Rommel’s first action was to about–face two retreating Italian divisions and send them forward. German forces then took six weeks to build up their operational strength. With the front some 700 kilometres to the east of Tripoli, Rommel’s logistics problems were serious, dogging him for the rest of his North African campaign. Rommel was always more inclined to blame the jealousies within the Wehrmacht for his logistics crises; although, these are more accurately ascribed to the RAF and when his transports were sunken en–route to Africa. Meanwhile in the early hours of 22 , , the German invasion of Russia, exploded across Eastern Europe. This second German front took priority over operations in North Africa, further reducing logistical support to the Afrika Korps. Luckily for Rommel, the Allied Western Desert Force was itself largely spent by this time and in urgent need of refitting.4

4 Graziani started the First Libyan Campaign with 215,000 men under his command, but lost over 100,000 men captured. Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, pp. 64, 94; Stockings, Bardia, p. 285; An 97

The following brief description of the subsequent siege of Tobruk identifies similarities and actions that were affected by involvement with Operation Galley. Following Operation Galley the battle weary Australian 2/9th Battalion endured a difficult journey back to Mersa Matruh on 25 March, in part using captured Italian vehicles, complete with Italian drivers. The wounded had a particularly painful trip, grinding over the bumpy desert tracks. The 7th Australian Division, of which 2/9th Battalion, 18th Brigade, was now a part, was under orders to move to Greece but, with Rommel’s Afrika Korps now advancing east, events in Cyrenaica competed with Wavell’s plans for other Mediterranean operations. Wootten’s 18th Brigade was instead ordered to Tobruk on 4 April 1941. Continued Allied occupation of this newly captured port was seen as vital. Tobruk possessed a fine harbour and whoever controlled it held the key to landing supplies within 130 kilometres of the Egyptian border. Rommel was just as determined to access the Tobruk harbour. The imperative for Rommel was that access to Tobruk would remove the 1,200 kilometre motor vehicle route from his logistics calculations.5 The 18th Brigade arrived in Tobruk, exhausted, on 7th April, 1941, some having travelled by road and the rest by sea. On disembarking the seafarers faced a 16 kilometre forced march to join their companions manning posts on the Tobruk perimeter. Speed was imperative as Rommel was advancing rapidly. The 2/10th and 2/12th Australian Battalions, some members of which had also served at Giarabub, manned posts close by or were in reserve.

Further useful comparisons of Giarabub with Tobruk can be drawn from the 18th Brigade War Diary for the month of April 1941 alone, written during the siege of Tobruk, which has 163 pages describing daily bombings by German aircraft, almost daily attacks and breakthroughs by German tanks – all on a vastly larger scale than that at Giarabub, with its very occasional and ineffective Axis bombings, and no Italian armour. Yet the similarities of Wootten’s 18th Brigade operations at Tobruk to those at Giarabub include movement orders, training, level of detail of intelligence gathered about the enemy strengths and dispositions, morale, food and armaments.

Italian Air Force Squadron was the equivalent of an RAF Command; Antony Beevor, The Second World War, Weindenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2012, pp.174, 175, 191. 5 Dickens, Never Late, p. 73. 98

Unsurprisingly the movement orders to transport the 18th Brigade to Tobruk were produced in an identical format to that used for Operation Galley. The number of vehicles, how many men per vehicle, vehicle spacing and speed, planned rest stops, refuelling arrangements, vehicle recovery and anti–aircraft protection, were all detailed precisely, just as for the final assault on Giarabub. So too training for the impending defence of Tobruk was, as for Giarabub, tailored to match the expected requirements. The training instruction issued on 1 April 1941, covered company exercises in occupation of defensive positions, siting of localities, digging and organisation plus local counterattacks. The men, NCOs and officers, all had specific training goals. Tank hunting was a special skill requiring training in the siting of traps, obstacles and ambushes, knowledge of simple explosives, and preparation then use of Molotov cocktails. An examination of this training regime, instituted before the long siege began, almost suggested that Wootten’s men had prior knowledge of what was to come in the seven dark months ahead. All this planning of training requirements, as promulgated by Major Thomas Daly, who was recently on operations at Giarabub, indicates that the benefits of such thorough training of troops and officers would, at the very least, have strengthened these practices by vindicating them at Giarabub.6

The importance placed on gathering, assessing and dispensing accurate and timely intelligence by the 18th Brigade, as practised at Giarabub, was reiterated at Tobruk. At Giarabub, months were spent in collecting information about such things as enemy dispositions, their state of morale, enemy leadership, placement, quantity and calibre of weapons, number of vehicles, access routes, mine field locations, water quality and quantity. The Allied defenders at Tobruk produced, almost daily, highly detailed intelligence summaries which were then disseminated to appropriate commanders. These reports covered, for example, enemy patrol activity, enemy artillery locations and shells fired, aircraft seen or shot down, number and types of tanks seen or destroyed, use of captured Allied vehicles by the enemy, enemy uniform descriptions and fifth column activities. The results obtained by the small Allied force at Giarabub, which were largely founded on sound intelligence, could only have reinforced the

6 Dickens, Never Late, p. 73; ‘HQ 18th Aust Inf Bde Administrative Instn No. 2’, Appendix A, AWM 52 8/2/18/8; ‘18th Aust Inf Bde Tng Instn No. 11’, Appendix W, AWM 52 8/2/18/8. 99

positive aspects of continuing this approach to Allied battle craft as used in the later, larger, battles in North Africa.7

The effect of Operation Galley on morale of the succeeding operations of Western Desert Force is difficult to quantify; however, accounts of how the men of Wootten Force felt about their first wartime action illustrated a new–found self confidence and resignation to the realities of war:

The Battalion had fought and won its first action. Its leaders, men, equipment and tactics had been tested as only battle can test. The Battalion had suffered its first casualties and confronted the bitter reality of death and injury on the battlefield. Sixteen men had died in action, 87 were wounded, five subsequently died of wounds, and the rest were wiser.8

The official historian, Gavin Long, saw a larger influence on the 2nd AIF:

For the Australian soldiers the experience was of special value because it would seep so quickly through the whole of the growing Australian force assembled in the Middle East. Leaders and staffs had gained in confidence and wisdom. Fears expressed by Australian staff officers in Palestine and Alexandria that the division would be spoiled by easy victories not only underestimated the strenuousness of the campaign and the bitterness of some of the fighting but underrated the leaders...Success gave them increased confidence in their officers, in themselves and their training, and from among the younger men were emerging outstanding leaders.9

The Giarabub campaign had some influence on the morale of the 2nd AIF; however, the experiences of 2,219 men at Giarabub, compared with the experiences of 30,000 Allied soldiers who confronted and defeated the Italian 10th Army, endured daily attacks during the siege of Tobruk, and then later fought other desperate battles against Rommel need to be kept in proper perspective as regards to scale and duration.10

Meanwhile, following the Italian capitulation at Giarabub, the 6th Cavalry, fighting as a complete regiment and now mounted on Vickers light tanks handed over from the Cavalry, were pursued east to Egypt during the aptly named

7 ‘18th Aust Inf Bde Int Sum No. 19.’, Appendix E, 11 April 1941, AWM 52 8/2/18/8. 8 Dickens, Never Late, p. 71. 9 Long, To Benghazi, pp. 303-304. 10 Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 144. 100

Operation Brevity which was cancelled on its second day. This unit continued desert operations when they crossed the Suez Canal on 27 May heading into Palestine in preparation for Operation Exporter, the invasion of Syria, which took place from 8 June, 1941. The long months spent by this regiment patrolling around Giarabub all enhanced self confidence, team work, navigation, survival skills and built leadership ability – all vital for the ensuing battles. How large this influence was on their later conflicts is again difficult to quantify, and the fact that only two squadrons were involved at Giarabub needs to be kept in mind. In time, the 2/9th Battalion was likewise despatched to Syria, where their hard–earned battle skills proved useful. After resting and refitting in Australia, the 2/9th Battalion went on to fight fierce battles on the north coast of New Guinea against the Japanese. As with the 6th Cavalry, the 2/9th’s experience at Giarabub could only have added to their preparation for their later battles requiring team work, resilience and good leadership, as at the battles of Milne Bay, the Northern Beaches and Shaggy Ridge in Papua New Guinea.11

The final element of this investigation concerns the impact of the Giarabub campaign on the Italian 10th Army. Conversely, the effect of the 10th Army’s demise on the Giarabub garrison provides an interesting contrast. Lastly the disproportionately large effect of the Giarabub story, which can fairly be described as a very minor battle in the scheme of World War II, on the Italian national morale is examined.

Firstly, where the Giarabub siege, then Operation Galley fit into the chronology of the 10th Army’s existence is important. Mussolini declared war on Britain and France on 10 June, 1940. Only one month later the British 1 KRRC infantry company stationed at Siwa mounted an unsuccessful operation to capture Giarabub, giving another indication of the strategic importance O’Connor placed on the oasis. Graziani reluctantly advanced into Egypt on 9 September, 1940 with the 10th Army occupying the Egyptian coastal town of Sidi Barrani on 13 September, where the Italian commanders then halted to consolidate their huge but poorly equipped force. Whilst stationary around Sidi Barrani the Italians constructed forts, complete with trenches,

11 Shawn O’Leary, To the Green Fields Beyond: The Story of The 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Commandos, 6th Divisional Cavalry Unit, History Committee, Sydney, 1975, pp. 117, 120; ‘6th Div Cav Reg’t War Diary, May 1941, June 1941’, AWM 52/2/2/7; Johnston, The Proud Sixth, pp.106, 107; Dickens, Never Late, pp. 135–320. 101

minefields and tank traps, spread across a 50 kilometre arc from the coast. During this latter part of 1940 Wavell’s forces were outnumbered 6:1 by the 10th Army in North Africa, limiting him to defensive and skirmishing tactics. Giarabub, being effectively on the front line at this stage, was one of the key targets of Wavell’s attention.12

The siege of Giarabub commenced on 3 November 1940 continuing until 21 March 1941, with planning for Operation Galley commencing on 10 March. Operation Compass, started with the westward advance of O’Connor’s force towards Sidi Barrani on 9 December, 1940. At distant Giarabub, on 11 December, Captain Brown’s squadron of the 6th Cavalry Regiment was advancing toward Garn el Grein, the first of the series of isolated Italian frontier posts strung along the Egyptian and Libyan border. The 6th Cavalry attacked Garn el Grein the next morning, before withdrawing. As later at Giarabub, Sidi Barrani’s defeat was prefaced by the capitulation of the widely scattered forts which were spaced too far apart to provide mutual support. The destruction of the outlying forts or camps came to be known as the Battle of the Camps with Sidi Barrani falling on 11 December, 1940. The die was already firmly cast when, two days later Castagna was ordered to withdraw from the strung out Egyptian border forts under his control as the brittle fortified post strategy rapidly disintegrated.13

It could be argued that the fall of Sidi Barrani and the isolation of Giarabub, following the destruction of the outlying forts, provided a learning opportunity for the Italian defenders at Bardia and Tobruk. As at Giarabub, Bardia and Tobruk had isolated posts sited with little or no defence in depth and little opportunity for vital mutual support, replicating, albeit on a different scale, the failed strategy of early December. Given the Italian 10th Army’s lack of mobility due to insufficient transport vehicles, and a lack of imaginative leadership, this partly explains why this brief opportunity was lost.14 An example of Graziani’s lack of tactical enterprise, as alluded to by many historians, was demonstrated at this stage by the method of the advance on Sidi Barrani, as Wahlert suggests:

12 Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, pp. 45–47; Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, Castle Books, New Jersey, 2004, p. 28. 13 Long, To Benghazi, p. 288. 14 Stockings, Bardia, pp. 302–402. 102

...advancing at a walking pace in lines of columns. The whole affair resembled a ceremonial parade rather than a tactical advance. The Italians had not deployed an effective advance guard or other screening force, allowing the to keep a close watch on the advance and attack vulnerable points and opportunity targets.15

Reinforcing the point, Graziani was in his headquarters 500 kilometres to the rear – in stark contrast later with the German Commander of Afrika Korps, Rommel, with his, ‘...impetuous urge to be everywhere...’16 which was usually close to the front.

The next key date in the Italian 10th Army’s ill–fated history in North Africa was to be at Bardia. Bardia was directly north of Giarabub being 25 kilometres west of the Egyptian/Libyan Border and on the coast. On 3 January 1941, the 10th Army felt the full force of the 6th Australian Division’s determined attack producing a disaster of unprecedented scale for the Italians. As at Giarabub, but on a much larger scale, prepared defences were poorly located, the troops poorly trained and equipped, and their leaders unskilled in the tactical and strategic requirements of modern warfare. At Bardia 40,000 Italians were captured with Italian morale being shattered as Tobruk, in turn, awaited impending doom.17

The devastation caused to Italian military pride following Bardia had far– reaching consequences, as was evidenced in the remaining short lifespan of the Italian 10th Army as they were pursued westward across Cyrenaica. With news of Bardia’s fall, the Allies attempted to exploit the corresponding blow to Italian morale, when at Giarabub on 5 January 1941, RAF Lysander aircraft dropped leaflets encouraging the garrison’s surrender. Even though Mussolini’s grand strategy of an eastward advance lay in tatters, Graziani’s view of Giarabub’s strategic value was that, at this stage, it was important, as demonstrated by his despatch of a force to relieve Giarabub on 9 January. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this force left from Benghazi, only to be intercepted by a 6th Cavalry force from Giarabub complete with aerial support, leaving the Italian relief convoy destroyed.18

15 Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, p. 45. 16 J. Dimbleby, Destiny in the Desert, Profile Books, London, 2012, pp. 155, 327–343. 17 Wahlert, The Western Desert Campaign, pp. 60–64. 18 S. Castagna, ‘Battle of Giarabub Report’, AUSSME, Rome, DS 1160A/2/12. 103

Yet Graziani had still not given Giarabub up as lost. Three Axis aircraft ineffectively attacked the Giarabub besiegers on 11 January.19 From this point, however, Axis air support for Castagna’s garrison became increasingly limited and irregular. The most likely reason for Graziani’s ongoing, if spasmodic and insufficient, support for Castagna in this instance lies with events back in Italy. The modern Italian historical author, Fabio Fattore, wrote an entire book about the visit of five reporters to Giarabub at this juncture in which they described the appalling conditions of the garrison but highlighting the defender’s determined stance, and in particular the driven and unshakable passion of Castagna to never surrender. The reporters returned to Italy where their stories inspired the birth of a legend, similar, but on a smaller scale, to the result of Australia’s C. E. W. Bean’s writings about the ANZACs. It is important to understand the state of the Italian nation’s morale at this stage to appreciate the significance of the rare good news from the front. Massive military losses were humiliating Mussolini. At the same time, the Fascist leader was desperate for good news to bolster public support for an unpopular war and his regime. Mussolini’s imperial and military causes were less than enthusiastically supported by many senior Italian officers and much of the population. The same was true of many rank and file. 20 Whilst some units were loyal Fascists, ‘most Italian conscripts had no political allegiance, saw no purpose in the Desert War, and only wished to be at home with their families.’21 The reporters’ news about the heroic Lieutenant Colonel Castagna was broadcast frequently on radio, with updates keeping the siege story alive and in the public eye. Newspaper and magazine articles carried the story, and then came a movie.22

The broadcasting of news of the heroic stand by Castagna may be one reason why he persisted for so long in an essentially unwinnable situation. Six movies were made for propaganda purposes by the Italians during World War II. ‘La saga di Giarabub’ was one of these, made in 1942, a year after the Battle of Giarabub. The theme song from the movie remains well known by older Italians today. The striking

19 Probably German but this cannot be confirmed. 20 Duggan, Fascist Voices, p. 379. Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 253-256. 21 Dimbleby, Destiny in the Desert, p. 291. 22‘La saga di Giarabub’, Argo Films, 1942, www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQeYT4CNKW8, accessed 19 November 2012; Fattore, Giarabub; Correspondence, Fattore with author 15 November, 2011. 104

similarity, although to a much lesser extent, to that of the ANZAC legend is that a battle lost has become a legend. Interestingly, three Australian reporters also covered the Giarabub campaign, one of whom was the future Official Historian for this period of World War II, Gavin Long. It is clear from these examples that positive publicity or propaganda was an important tool in the waging of war, especially from Rome’s perspective; however, as with many of the non–physical aspects of this battle, the actual result of this propaganda on the Italian population is difficult to quantify. Parallels might be drawn from the effects of the press in other conflicts, with the impact of a photograph taken during the Vietnam War being a case in point. A photograph of a girl who had just been napalmed running down Route 1 near Trang Bang, Vietnam, won its author a Pulitzer Prize in 1973 and created a huge impact on US public opinion. Interviews with Italian survivors of World War II indicate that Mussolini’s politics generated a split in Italian society, based on whether or not one supported . Those that did were influenced positively by the Giarabub news articles, movie and the song, and those that were not had their negative sentiments reinforced.23

This chapter has analysed the effects of the siege and capture of Giarabub on the Italian 10th Army and the 2nd AIF. As the strategic importance of Giarabub ebbed and flowed, with the Italians’ eastern front creeping towards Egypt, then sweeping back to Beda Fomm, so too did its relevance to the Allies change with its distance from the front. With hindsight it can be seen that Giarabub’s strategic importance was never going to be decisive, yet this is not how events were necessarily perceived at the time. Whilst Giarabub’s siege was amongst the first Allied operations in North Africa in World War II, by the time Operation Galley was launched the massive success at Bardia had vastly overshadowed the Allied experiences at Giarabub. As for the Italians, Giarabub may have provided learning opportunities for their military leaders; however, as demonstrated time and again, Italian leadership was not up to the task of rapidly assimilating lessons from past mistakes. Giarabub’s lasting legacy for the Italians lies in

23 ‘La saga di Giarabub’, Argo Films, 1942; www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQeYT4CNKW8, accessed 19 November, 2012; http://www.lyricsmania.com/la_sagra_di_giarabub_lyrics_carlo_buti.html, accessed 19 November, 2012; Interviews Romana and Mario Fior with author, 2012, 2013, Interview Luigina Pastorelli with author, 2012; Interview Andrea Rafenelli and family with author 2011; Interviews Giuseppe Veneziano and Lugano Rochelli with author, 2011; http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/1973, accessed 7th June, 2013. 105

the creation of a legend immortalised in a movie that was largely drawn from the story of the indomitable willpower of one man – Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Castagna.

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Conclusion

As has been demonstrated, Giarabub was in many ways a unique battle within the context of the North African theatre. The standout feature of the battle is that of the five month siege that Italian Lieutenant Colonel Castagna and his garrison endured, all the while knowing that they had no realistic chance of rescue or escape. There are few other records of an Italian force showing such sustained tenacity in World War II and none within the First Libyan Campaign. A number of probable reasons for this perseverance have been revealed. Among these was the inability to escape due to the lack of vehicles, the vast distances involved and the ever increasing distance of the Italian 10th Army and its transport vehicles from Giarabub. The difficulty of escaping was compounded by the limiting of air transport by the besiegers, then later by its complete denial by Wootten Force. As Castagna’s contemporaries and later writers have described, Castagna’s personal influence, using his strong self–discipline and determined personal behaviour, could not stop the defection of most of the Libyan soldiers but was quite likely a central contributing factor for the Italian soldiers to remain at Giarabub. Publicity in the Italian media about the Giarabub siege is also likely to have also been a significant influence on the remaining garrisons’ decision to stay and fight on. In this context this thesis helps forcefully debunk the popularly held myth of Italian soldiers serving in World War II running up the white flag of surrender at the slightest hostile threat. It also reinforces the danger of relying on coerced colonial troops in the North African theatre, in this case realised by the desertion of 715 Libyan soldiers at Giarabub.1

Further lessons, ignored by the Italian commanders to their later peril during the remainder of Operation Compass, and subsequent North African operations, included the outmoded strategy of static defensive positions located lineally with no defence in depth and beyond the range of mutual support. The strategy of placing an army in a theatre with massive and unrelenting logistical requirements without adequate land, aerial and naval transport to service those needs further weakened the Italian defensive capacity. The tactical use of outdated and worn out artillery using unreliable ordinance

1 Fattore, Giarabub, p. 236; Johnston, Fighting the Enemy, p. 133. 107

incapable of accurate counter battery fire, the use of ineffective grenades and the failure to seek and use intelligence adequately, all became hallmarks of Italian warfare during the North African Campaign, and all were flagged at Giarabub.

The first aim of this thesis was to help fill the gap in the historiographical record surrounding the Giarabub story. The reasons for its strategic importance during the opening phases of the First Libyan Campaign have formed the underlying narrative for the thesis. Research has uncovered detail not yet seen in the military history record describing the long siege with all the difficulties encountered by both the protagonists. Chapter 2 discusses the final battle in March, 1941 which opened with a disastrous friendly fire shelling of 8 and 9 platoons of B Company, 2/9th Battalion. As a result of the research behind this thesis, the number of Allied casualties now accurately stands at 23 killed, contrary to the 17 described in the Australian Official History (see Appendix A). One of these, Private E. E. Powell, has been further found to have an incorrect date of death on his headstone and in the Australian War Memorial’s records. Similarly, Italian casualties have been clarified, with 64 names now attributed (see Appendix B). Long’s figure of 250 killed is inaccurate. Italian deaths may have been as low as 84; however, it is impossible to confirm the exact number. Controversial references to Italian prisoners being shot at Giarabub have been raised; yet conclusive evidence one way or the other remains elusive, leaving the potential for further research. Lesser issues such as Italian gun calibres have been identified as being mistakenly recorded, firstly by the Official Historian, then perpetuated in successive histories. To some degree this thesis has helped set the record straight.

The second aim of this thesis was to answer seven key questions. The first sought to ascertain to what extent analysis of Giarabub gave an insight into later battles in North Africa. In brief, Giarabub demonstrated the superior training, leadership, equipment and motivation of the Allied forces when compared to the Italians. From the Italian perspective Giarabub exposed all that was deficient in their military systems, from archaic defensive planning to poor generalship, from poor logistics and an insufficient industrial base incapable of manufacturing modern equipment, to poor training. The second question asked what it was that made Giarabub so different from other Italian battles in North Africa. It is clear that the Giarabub garrison behaved quite 108

differently from most other Italian forces serving in North Africa. Other than the tenacity of individuals or specialised units such as artillery, the Italian forces generally capitulated when faced with a determined, better led, better trained and better equipped foe, such as at Bardia and Tobruk. This was despite the Italian forces being vastly superior in numerical terms to their enemy. Giarabub was quite the opposite.

The third question posed in the introduction addressed what it was that kept Castagna’s force from surrendering; specifically; was it simply their inability to escape? The lack of a means of escape does not alter the fact that the garrison could have surrendered at any stage, yet chose not to. Although difficult to quantify, the most likely reason was Lieutenant Colonel Castagna’s leadership, which was in turn fired by his passionate support for Fascism and the realisation that the Italian nation was watching, via the media, in awe of his garrison’s tenacity. Fourthly, what made the conduct of this battle different from other battles in Operation Compass? To put it bluntly, most battles in the First Libyan Campaign terminated in a rout for the Italians, where Giarabub was anything but a rout. On 21 March 1941 only 1,287 weakened defenders faced 2,219 attackers who were far better supported, trained, equipped, fed, led and informed; the Italians chose to fight on with no hope of reinforcement or escape. All the other Compass battles occurred with some possibility of access for Italian escape, generally along the Libyan coastal strip. The fifth question concerned assessing how well the Australians performed and why. If viewed against the yardstick of performance in later operations, the Australians at Giarabub performed equally as well, especially given that Giarabub represented a ‘first test’ in World War II (the Battle of Bardia started and concluded within Giarabub’s siege and Operation Galley time frames). The question relates to Australians at Giarabub; however, this discussion should not overlook the important role of the British supporting artillery, which unfortunately, accidentally caused 48 percent of the British and Australian deaths during the siege and battle.

The sixth question seeks to uncover what Giarabub has to tell us about the early 2nd AIF: its preparation, training and operations. The Giarabub story, in particular the five–day Operation Galley, provides the modern historian with a compressed version of Australian battles in North Africa. It was conducted on a much smaller scale than Bardia, Tobruk or El Alamein, yet demonstrated most facets of modern warfare, with 109

the two exceptions being naval and armoured aspects. The Australians’ precise attention to thorough training, the detailed and efficient logistics, the depth of intelligence collected and the energetic and highly skilled leadership all demonstrated at Giarabub were to be repeated throughout the First Libyan Campaign.

The final question of how Giarabub adds to the understanding of the First Libyan Campaign in 1941 rests on two points. First, Giarabub adds an atypical experience within the context of Operation Compass as a whole. The attacking Australians were not out–numbered, the Italians did not surrender nor attempt to escape, the Italians withstood the long siege with no hope of rescue, and they fought on till the last possible moment; all of which contrast starkly with Italian performances elsewhere in the First Libyan Campaign. The second point is that Giarabub demonstrated features on both sides that indicated how their desert warfare would continue to be conducted. The Australians continued to pursue accurate intelligence of their enemy’s weaknesses and strengths, they continued to train aggressively for the specific requirements of the next battle; their logistics management was maintained at the same high level and their leaders generally continued to perform at the highest standards.

For the Italians, poor military procedure continued to be demonstrated with little change throughout the North African campaigns. Ineffective strategic leadership did little to make use of outdated and inadequate materiel supplied through ongoing poor logistics systems (if at all). Inadequate training of all ranks in the Italian army, with the possible exception of those in the artillery, was the result of long term neglect and failure to adopt modern military practices, with predictable results continually repeated. To this end Giarabub’s story highlights many of the Italian military difficulties in World War II. This thesis has helped further to redress the imbalance in the military historiography surrounding the First Libyan Campaign. It has delivered an understanding of the Italian side of this story and uncovered a lasting legacy in Italian culture, under–recognised by Allied historians until now. It highlights a small but significant part of the evolution of the early 2nd AIF and rightly recognises the contribution and sacrifice on both sides.

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Appendix A

23 Allied soldiers killed at Giarabub (KIA = Killed in Action, DOW = Died of Wounds, MIA = Missing in Action) Army Rank Surname Other Status Unit Date of

No. Names Death 1 SX2563 Private Batty C. A. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 2 QX5010 Private Casement B.N. KIA 2/9th Bn 19.3.41 3 QX4855 Private Coates W.I. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 4 QX1234 Sergeant Cooke C.F. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 5 QX1249 Private Coote L.J. DOW 2/9th Bn 3.6.41 6 QX318 Private Davis G.G. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 7 2044736 Sapper Dixon A. DOW R.E. 2 21.3.41 8 QX3057 Private Dodds G. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 9 NX509 Trooper Fuller J.S.C. KIA 6th Cav 31.12.40 10 QX2507 Corporal Hansen C.O. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 11 QX4450 Private Lewis T.A.W. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 12 QX1436 Private McDonald L.F. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 13 QX1185 Private McDonald E.J. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 14 QX522 Private McDonald H. DOW 2/9th Bn 22.3.41 15 QX1223 Private McKean T.M. DOW 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 16 QX1256 WO2 Millard J. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 17 QX2096 Private O'Neill D.S. DOW 2/9th Bn 23.3.41 18 QX4805 Private Potter J.V.W. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 19 SX2606 Private Powell E.E. KIA 2/9th Bn 19.3.413 20 QX6076 Captain Reidy R.F. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 21 QX4007 Private Rundle R.L. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 22 QX65 Corporal Smith J.P. KIA 2/9th Bn 21.3.41 23 NX5419 Corporal Trounce E. F. KIA 6th Cav 31.12.40

2 British engineer 2nd Field Squadron. 3 Incorrectly shown as 21 March 1941 in AWM records and on his headstone. 111

Appendix B

64 Italian soldiers known to be killed at Giarabub Rank Surname Other Unit or Status Names Corp 1 Artigliere Afragola Vicenzo 258th Battery KIA 2 Artigliere Amoroso 258th Battery KIA

3 Soldato Armato Caspare MIA 4 Soldato Barbuscio Bruno KIA 5 Soldato Belbruno Leonardo KIA 6 Artigliere Bellavia 258th Battery MIA

7 Artigliere Bevilacqua Orlando 27th Battery KIA 8 Soldato Bubaker Libico KIA

9 1st Cp. Sergente Maggiore Burrasca KIA Cannoni 10 Soldato Cacichiodo Giuseppe KIA 11 Soldato Cannizzaro Angelo 3rd G.A.F. KIA 12 Soldato Cappa Alfredo 3rd G.A.F. KIA 13 Sergente Maggiore Carhoni KIA

14 Soldato Carnivale Andrea 10th G.A.F. KIA 15 Sergente Ciaravino Antonio 256th Battery KIA 16 Sotto Tenente Coduti Ennio KIA 17 Artigliere Criscione Giovanni 258th Battery KIA 18 Soldato De Angelis KIA

19 Sotto Tenente Medicale Della Rosa Salvatore KIA 20 Soldato Di Como Andrea 10th G.A.F. KIA 21 Sergente Maggiore Di Falco Binda KIA 22 Soldato Di Fazio Calogero 10th G.A.F. KIA 23 Soldato Di Fina Giovanni 10th G.A.F. KIA 24 Sergente Maggiore Di Giovani Giacono KIA

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Rank Surname Other Unit or Status Names Corp 25 Soldato Di Sano Calogero MIA 26 Sotto Tenente Di Vincenzo Napoleone KIA 27 Sotto Tenente Donati Eugenio KIA 28 Autista Fantin Angelo MIA 29 Tenente Fornasier Aderito MIA 30 Sotto Tenente Guerriero Leonardo Artillery KIA 31 Artigliere Jannotto Nicola 27th Battery KIA 32 Soldato Jarrocci Domenico 10th G.A.F. MIA 33 Caporal Kalifa di Giaeo Libico KIA 34 Soldato La Cagnina Nicola 10th G.A.F. KIA 35 Artigliere La Verde 258th Battery MIA

36 Soldato Loffredi Servio MIA 37 Caporal Maggiore Mancuso Oresta 27th Battery KIA 38 Soldato Manetta 10th G.A.F. KIA

39 Artigliere Manno 258th Battery MIA

40 Sotto Tenente Mattia Giuseppe KIA 41 Artigliere Mazza Filippo 258th Battery KIA 42 Soldato Micliori Calogero MIA 43 KIA where - Sotto Tenente Morello Salvatore Medical abouts unknown 44 KIA where - Soldato Musumeci abouts unknown 45 Artigliere Nicolo Paelo 27th Battery KIA 46 Soldato Paglia Giuseppe KIA 47 Capitano Perricone Giovanni KIA 48 Soldato Pipitone Benedetto MIA

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Rank Surname Other Unit or Status Names Corp 49 Soldato Prina Salvatore 10th G.A.F. KIA 50 Soldato Prossimo Luigi 10th G.A.F. KIA 51 Soldato Radovieri Antonio KIA 52 Caporal Maggiore Robito Calogero KIA 53 Soldato Sanfilippo Sebastiano 10th G.A.F. KIA 54 Soldato Sautarossi Silvio 3rd G.A.F. KIA 55 Soldato Scarlato Giuseppe 10th G.A.F. KIA 56 Caporal Maggiore Scaturro Salvatore 10th G.A.F. KIA 57 Soldato Troia Filippo 10th G.A.F. KIA 58 Caporal Verahdo Oreste KIA 59 Capitano Verardo KIA

60 Soldato Vitali Giovanni 10th G.A.F. KIA 61 Soldato Volpi Gaspare 10th G.A.F. KIA 62 Soldato Zaffiro Giuseppe 10th G.A.F. KIA 63 Soldato Zeidan Libico KIA

64 Soldato Zummo Baldassarre MIA

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Correspondence

Fattore, F., Author of Dai nostri inviati a Giarabub, With author, July, 2011.

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