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Above: Italian Armoured Division. 32nd Armoured Regiment on the move with some motorcyclists from 8th Bersaglieri Regiment in support. Front cover: British 7th Armoured Division. Matilda tanks from 4th Armoured Brigade with an 11th Hussars’ Rolls Royce and Morris armoured car in the background. All the Italian models and Matilda tanks from the collection of Simon Raines. Left: Major Wilhelm Bach from Infantry Regiment 104 - the defenders of Halfaya Pass during Operation Battleaxe. One of Rommel’s favourite officers and rumoured to be the only one he would permit to carry a walkingSample stick. file Published by Rapid Fire Publications Limited 1 Willow Park Road Wilberfoss York YO41 5PS United Kingdom Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.rapid-fire.uk.com All material © Colin Rumford 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the copyright holder. ISBN 978-0-9550063-2-6 RAPID FIRE! is a registered trade mark. Printed by: Side by Side Print Services ([email protected]) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction 2 Key Units (February - June 1941) 4 The First German Advances (14th February – 17th April 1941) 6 • German 5th Light Division 8 • Italian 132nd ‘Ariete’ Armoured Division 10 • British 2nd Armoured Division 12 • Australian 9th Infantry Division 14 Assault on Tobruk (30th April – 2nd May 1941) 16 • German 15th Panzer Division 22 • Italian 27th ‘Brescia’ Infantry Division 24 • Italian 102nd ‘Trento’ Motorised Division 26 Operation Brevity (15th – 16th May 1941) 28 Operation Scorpion (27th May 1941) 30 Operation Battleaxe (15th - 17th June 1941) 31 • British 7th Armoured Division 34 • 4th Indian Division Sample file 36 Equipment / Aircraft Data Sheets 38 Below: British 7th Armoured Division: a cruiser squadron (two A13s and an A9) from 7th Armoured Brigade. Page 1 INTRODUCTION This book covers the battles during the Spring of 1941 when British throughout the summer months. However, on the German army first entered the North African campaign. the 13th September 1940 the Italians invaded Egypt. After This period of the desert war was a time of spectacular covering 60 miles the advance came to a halt on the 20th advances and heroic defence. Both sides were frustrated September and the Italians began constructing a series of from achieving total victory due to a number of factors. The fortified camps. This limited success had been won at a high British suffered through poor equipment in the early stages price, the Italians suffering some 3,500 casualties. British and bad tactics generally. The Germans forces were limited loses amounted to only 150. in number and they could not rely on their Italian colleagues to perform well at crucial moments. On the 9th December the British launched Operation Compass. Within two months the Italian army had been It was also during this period of W.W.II that new household routed. Ten divisions were destroyed, 130,000 prisoners names emerged: taken and nearly 400 tanks and 850 guns captured. Bardia, Tobruk and Benghazi fell to the British and their The Desert Fox – Rommel Commonwealth allies. The Italians were on the brink of total defeat. The Desert Rats* – The Defenders of Tobruk Two events then happened that were to prolong the desert Background war for another two years. The first of these was that at a crucial moment the British withdrew large parts of their th The campaign in North Africa began on 11 June 1940 – less force and sent troops to other theatres of operation (most than 24 hours after Italy declared war on Great Britain. notably Greece). Secondly, and what was to prove more th British Rolls Royce and Morris armoured cars from the 11 decisive, Hitler answered a plea for help from his Italian ally. Hussars crossed the frontier wire that separated Egypt from Libya and raided the Italian troops defending the frontier The German leader agreed to send a small mobile division forts. to North Africa to prevent Mussolini losing the jewel in his colonial crown. A second (panzer) division would follow This set the scene for a series of guerrilla actions by the later. N The Theatre of Operations February - June 1941 Sample file Derna Barce Tobruk Gazala Bardia Bengasi Mechili Acroma El Adem Sollum Sidi Barrini Soluch Msus Bir Hacheim Bir el Gubi Fort Capuzzo Mersa Matruh Beda Fomm Antelat Sirte Agedabia Mistrata Mersa el Brega El Agheila LIBYA EGYPT 200 km The ‘Via Balbia’ coastal road The Frontier ‘Wire’ Page 2 To command this ‘blocking’ force Hitler appointed the man who had led the 7th Panzer Division in a spectacular drive Above: German 5th Light Division. Elements from Panzer Regiment 5 and Infantry Regiment z.b.V. 200. Unlike his Italian allies Rommel’s infantry through France to the Channel coast during the invasion of were highly mobile as they employed large numbers of motorcycles May 1940: Generalleutenant Erwin Rommel. and light cross-country cars. Models by Andy Hamilton. About this Guide better. When playing a scenario with this unit a d6 should be thrown for each tank at the beginning of each turn it The guide provides historical summaries of the major attempts to move. If the result is a 1 the tank is deemed engagements (although there were numerous small actions to have suffered a total mechanical failure and should be going on at the same time) and the units making up the key abandoned. divisional level formations that were involved in the fighting during the spring and early summer of 1941. Players should also note that not all formations were fully Samplemotorised, file particularly Italian infantry. The allocation of Rather than adhere rigidly to the normal RAPID FIRE! trucks within the tables reflects this shortage of motor scaling for wargames units (1 : 15 for figures and 1 : 5 transport. for vehicles/crew served weapons) the divisional orders of battle are representative of the formations involved to produce practical balanced ‘all arms’ wargames forces. Morale and Specialist Small Arms Players familiar with other RAPID FIRE! orbats will recognise Treat all Italians as ‘poor’ and all German/Australian that in some cases infantry units that would usually be infantry as ‘elite’. All other troop types are ‘regular’ called battalions are now regiments or brigades. Similarly armoured regiments or battalions are now called brigades or regiments respectively. When applying the morale rules German infantry can add 1 to their d6 rolls for small in RAPID FIRE! tests should be taken by regiments/brigades arms firing groups (rule 13.1). rather than at the battalion level. The Commonwealth forces utilised large quantities of Acknowledgements captured Italian arms and armour - the orbats show where these were likely to be found. As the desert war dragged My thanks to Simon Raines and Andy Hamilton in providing on both sides made use of captured equipment, however, examples from their excellent collections for the photos; even in the early stages of the campaign Italian trucks were Alan McCoubrey, Mark Piper, James Field and my co commonly found in German and British formations and it conspirator Richard Marsh for constructive comments and would not be unreasonable to exchange an Opel Blitz or a checking the drafts and also to my better half, Sue, for her Morris for a Lancia or a Fiat. encouragement (and offering to relieve me of domestic chores so I could get the book finished). What the tables do not show is the poor state of repair of the British tanks in the 2nd Armoured Division. The cruisers * Later the name ‘The Desert Rats’ became associated with the entire were worn out and the ex Italian M13/40s were not much 8th Army. Page 3 KEY UNITS (FEBRUARY - JUNE 1941) AXIS DIVISIONS ND ITALIAN 132 ‘ARIETE’ The Deutsches Afrikakorps (German Africa Corps) was ARMOURED DIVISION GENERALE DI DIVISIONE ETTORE formed on 19th February 1941 following the arrival of BALDASSARRE Rommel. For the next six months the main units were: 32nd Armoured Regiment • 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Battalions TH GERMAN 5 LIGHT DIVISION • 4th Medium Battalion GENERALLEUTNANT J. VON RAVENSTEIN 8th Bersaglieri Regiment th th Panzer Regiment 5 • 5 and 12 Bersaglieri Battalions rd • 1st and 2nd Battalions • 3 Heavy Weapons Battalion Infantry Regiment z.b.V. 200 132nd Artillery Regiment • Machine Gun Battalions 2 and 8 • 1st and 2nd Battalions (75s) Reconnaissance Battalion 3 Attached Troops Anti-Tank Battalion 39 • 1st Battalion / 24th Artillery Regiment (105s) Anti-Tank Battalion 605 (SP) • 1st Battalion / 39th Infantry Regiment Pioneer Battalion z.b.V. 200 Artillery Regiment 75 • 1st Battalion (105s) ITALIAN 102ND ‘TRENTO’ MOTORISED DIVISION Anti-Aircraft Battalion 606 GENERALE DI DIVISIONE LUIGI NIEVELONI Attached Troops (Luftwaffe) 61st Infantry Regiment st • 1 Battalion / Anti-Aircraft Regiment 33 • 1st and 2nd Battalions 62nd Infantry Regiment Sample file• 1st and 2nd Battalions 7th Bersaglieri Regiment TH GERMAN 15 PANZER DIVISION • 8th, 10th and 11th Bersaglieri Battalions GENERALLEUTNANT W. NEUMANN-SILKOW 46th Artillery Regiment st nd Panzer Regiment 8 • 1 and 2 Battalions (75s) • 1st and 2nd Battalions • 3rd and 4th Battalions (100s) Motorcycle Battalion 15 51st Engineer Battalion Infantry Regiment 115 • 1st and 2nd Battalions Infantry Regiment 104 ITALIAN 27TH ‘BRESCIA’ • 1st and 2nd Battalions SEMI-MOTORISED DIVISION Reconnaissance Battalion 33 GENERALE DI DIVISIONE BORTOLO ZAMBON th Anti-Tank Battalion 33 19 Infantry Regiment • 1st and 2nd Battalions Pioneer Battalion 200 th Artillery Regiment 33 20 Infantry Regiment • 1st and 2nd Battalions • 1st and 2nd Battalions (105s) 55th Artillery Regiment • 3rd Battalion (150s) • 1st and 2nd Battalions (75s) Anti-Tank Battalion 33 Attached Troops Pioneer Battalion 33 • 16th Artillery Regiment (100s) Anti-Aircraft Regiment 33 Page 4 AUSTRALIAN 9TH INFANTRY ALLIED DIVISIONS DIVISION* These units were part of British XIII Corps which was MAJOR-GENERAL LESLIE MORSHEAD formed from Major-General Sir Richard O’Connor’s famous 20th Infantry Brigade Western Desert Force that routed the Italians during • 2/13th Battalion Operation Compass.
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