Auditor General's Report Performance Examination
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AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORT PERFORMANCE EXAMINATION Contract Management of the City Rail Project Report 7 – August 2005 AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia Serving the Public Interest AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia Serving the Public Interest THE SPEAKER THE PRESIDENT LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PERFORMANCE EXAMINATION – CONTRACT MANAGEMENT OF THE CITY RAIL PROJECT This report has been prepared consequent to an examination conducted under section 80 of the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985 for submission to Parliament under the provisions of section 95 of the Act. Performance Examinations are an integral part of the overall Performance Auditing program and seek to provide Parliament with assessments of the effectiveness and effi ciency of public sector programs and activities thereby identifying opportunities for improved performance. The information provided through this approach will, I am sure, assist Parliament in better evaluating agency performance and enhance Parliamentary decision-making to the benefi t of all Western Australians. D D R PEARSON AUDITOR GENERAL 31 August 2005 2 AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia Contents Auditor General’s Foreword 4 Key Findings and Recommendations 5 Key Findings 5 Key Recommendations 7 About this Examination 8 Importance of the City Rail Project 10 Findings and Recommendation 10 New MetroRail 11 The City Rail Project 12 The Design, Construct and Maintain Contract 13 Lessons for the Future 17 Contract Management 19 Findings and Recommendations 19 About Contract Management 20 People 22 Systems 24 Monitoring 26 Relationship Management 32 Other Obligations 35 Claims Management 36 Findings and Recommendation 36 About Claims Management 37 Lump Sum Contract Costs 37 Claims and Variations 39 Dispute Resolution Procedures 44 Project Timeliness 46 Findings and Recommendations 46 Project Delays 47 Project Delay Implications 50 AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia 3 CONTRACT MANAGEMENT OF THE CITY RAIL PROJECT Auditor General’s Foreword It is always a challenge to deliver major infrastructure projects on time and budget. Such projects are inherently diffi cult due to their signifi cant fi nancial investment, technical complexity, exacting regulatory frameworks and potential for industrial action. Recognising the scale and magnitude of the City Rail Project, I decided to audit the contract management arrangements midway into the contract, rather than waiting until after its completion. My motivation was that providing an audit view of the administration of the contract at this point in time is better than the traditional approach of conducting an audit after completion, when there is limited opportunity to address any issues arising. We examined the Public Transport Authority’s (PTA) contract management processes and systems, assessing these against better practice guidelines. No material adverse audit issues were identifi ed. Accordingly, I was satisfi ed that PTA has been competently managing the City Rail contract. The eventual outcome of the City Rail Project cannot be predicted. Signifi cant challenges lie ahead. The project is currently behind schedule, the complex tunnel boring phase is yet to commence, some high value claims are being disputed, and industrial issues are evident. These challenges will put all parties under increasing pressure. Although competent contract management alone cannot guarantee a positive outcome, it is fundamental to protecting the State’s interests. In this context, comfort can be taken from the robust processes and systems in place at the time of the audit. I will continue to observe progress and may revisit this project. 4 AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia Key Findings and Recommendations The biggest public infrastructure project underway in Western Australia is the $1.56 billion budget New MetroRail project. Over its six-year period, New MetroRail will account for about 10 per cent of the State Government’s estimated $15 billion purchases of fi xed assets. The City Rail Project is the most technically challenging and innovative component of New MetroRail. City Rail comprises 770 metres of twin bored tunnel, 475 metres of cut-and- cover twin track tunnel and two underground rail stations within Perth’s central business district. The $324.5 million (design-and-construct price) City Rail contract was awarded on 14 February 2004 to Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (the Contractor), with a completion date of 23 October 2006. On behalf of the State, the Public Transport Authority (PTA) is the project owner, contract principal and contract manager. While the immediate project cost risks are mostly with the Contractor, the long term asset risks remain with the State. City Rail needs to be safe, structurally sound and functional throughout its expected 120 year life span. To ensure this for the future, rigorous care and attention to design and construction detail is required now. This design and construction responsibility rests with the Contractor. PTA’s role in monitoring the Contractor’s work is therefore crucial to protecting the State’s interests. We examined PTA’s contract management of the City Rail Project. Key Findings At 30 June 2005, PTA is capably fulfi lling its contract management role by: using suitably qualifi ed and experienced people maintaining sound systems and processes vigilantly monitoring the Contractor’s performance keeping up a cooperative working relationship with the Contractor. The pricing structure of the City Rail contract aims to provide price certainty for the State, to the extent practically achievable. Ninety-seven per cent of the contract award price of $324.5 million is a ‘fi xed’ lump sum, payable only against completed project milestones. AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia 5 CONTRACT MANAGEMENT OF THE CITY RAIL PROJECT KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ... continued The fi nal price paid to the Contractor will likely be higher than the contract award price, as the contract provides for: rise-and-fall – an indexed allowance for infl ation that is applied to monthly progress payments and to most variations and claims variations to the scope of works allowable Contractor claims made under the contract and under law adjustments to the three per cent of the contract price that was estimated as provisional sums and quantities. Therefore, despite the fi xed-price nature of the contract, it is not possible at this stage to accurately estimate its fi nal price. PTA has been protecting the State’s interest by carefully assessing contractor claims. This includes confi rming that an entitlement exists under the contract, and then checking its dollar value, before making payment. A few high value claims are proceeding through the contract’s dispute resolution process. Given the complexity of the project, and the time and cost pressures facing the Contractor, more high value claims are likely. Scope variations include additions, deletions, increases or decreases to the agreed Project works. At 30 June 2005, the value of scope variations to the City Project was low ($2.7 million) – less than one per cent of the contract award price. At 30 June 2005, the Contractor was targeting a Practical Completion Date of 31 December 2006, about two months later than the current contracted date. A number of key construction activities were more than two months behind schedule, which could indicate a further delay in project completion. The Contractor had advised PTA that it would submit an updated works schedule after it successfully commences bored tunnelling and can re-program its works from a fi rmer baseline. The rate of progress of the works is the responsibility of the Contractor. The contract therefore imposes fi nancial costs on the Contractor for late completion. However, project delays will also affect the people of the State and PTA’s public transport operations. PTA is preparing to systematically assess the risks, and develop contingency plans, in the event that City Rail is signifi cantly late. The City Rail contract was adapted from a Main Roads (Western Australia) contract model. This model has worked well in the past 10 years for less complex projects and in less heated construction markets. If this adapted contract model succeeds with City Rail, it will have further proven itself as a viable option for future major public infrastructure development in Western Australia. 6 AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia Key Recommendations Building on its capable contract management to date, and recognising the mounting time and cost pressures on the Contractor, PTA should: continue to vigilantly monitor the Contractor’s performance; rigorously but fairly scrutinise Contractor claims; and cooperate with the Contractor in its efforts to accelerate the works, without jeopardising PTA’s position under the contract give priority to developing contingency plans in the event that the City Rail Project is signifi cantly late retain its experienced contract management team through to project conclusion periodically review the City Rail budget, in particular the adequacy of its provision for contingencies ensure that the strong elements of its contract management practice to date, together with any lessons learned, are consolidated and shared with other agencies conduct a thorough post-project evaluation of the City Rail contract model to inform the delivery of future public infrastructure projects. AUDITOR GENERAL for Western Australia 7 CONTRACT MANAGEMENT OF THE CITY RAIL PROJECT KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ... continued