DOCSLIB.ORG

Ukraine After the Orange Revolution by Kataryna Wolczuk

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ukraine After the Orange Revolution by Kataryna Wolczuk Ukraine after the Orange Revolution By Kataryna Wolczuk ★ Ukraine’s new president, Viktor Yushchenko, wants Ukraine to become a candidate for EU membership. For the application to be credible, he must open up the economy, fight corruption and heal post-election rifts – reforms that will proceed slowly and suffer setbacks. ★ The EU’s refusal to consider the possibility of Ukrainian membership looks untenable after the Orange Revolution. And it risks undermining Yushchenko’s reformist, pro-European platform. ★ The EU’s new neighbourhood policy is a welcome attempt to help stabilise and modernise Ukraine, but it needs stronger incentives to be effective. The pace and scope of change triggered by frequently reminded European leaders that Ukraine Ukraine’s presidential elections in late 2004 has has a rightful place in Europe’s political and surprised the EU, the US, Russia and, not least, economic clubs. “I don’t feel comfortable striving to most Ukrainians themselves. The rigged first round join Europe,” he explained during the Davos World of the elections in October sparked the so-called Economic Forum in January 2005, “I feel like I am a Orange Revolution – mass protests under the European. I live in a European country and possess orange banners of the opposition – as well as European values.” widespread international criticism of the regime of President Leonid Kuchma. In the second round of voting in December, the Kuchma regime’s The EU remains cautious candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, lost The EU has congratulated Yushchenko on his to the opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. victory. It has sent its foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, to his inauguration. In a ten-point plan in The election brought about the most radical shake- January 2005, the EU offered Ukraine better trade up of Ukraine’s political scene since the country’s relations, more aid, easier visas and closer co- independence. Yushchenko’s victory promises big operation in security and other areas. But it has so changes, both in terms of domestic and foreign far studiously avoided the question of membership policy. During his spell as prime minister in 2000-01, for Ukraine. While the European Parliament has Yushchenko built a track record as a liberal but called on EU leaders to give Ukraine a ‘membership pragmatic reformer. As president, he has promised to perspective’, EU foreign ministers only went so far kick-start Ukraine’s sluggish economic reform as to acknowledge that the Orange Revolution “is process, helped by his prime minister-designate, Yulia credible proof that Ukraine’s European aspirations Tymoshenko. The new president has also promised are based on common values shared by both to work hard to improve Ukraine’s ties with the West European states and citizens”. The European and end the semi-isolation that Ukraine endured Commission insists that the EU and Ukraine should during most of Kuchma’s second term in office. In first make headway under the EU’s new ‘European particular, Yushchenko has made it clear that he neighbourhood policy’, a programme that is only wants his country to join the EU and NATO. He has just getting under way. Centre for European Reform T: 00 44 20 7233 1199 29 Tufton Street F: 00 44 20 7233 1117 London SW1P 3QL UK [email protected] / www.cer.org.uk 2 The EU’s cautious response to Ukraine’s EU setbacks, without the EU being able to do much about aspirations will disappoint the Ukrainians. But it is in it. The regular EU-Ukraine summits resembled stiff line with the EU’s long-standing neglect of Ukraine. rituals, with little open discussion and even less Throughout most of the 1990s, the EU was busy substantive agreement. A plethora of bilateral expert completing its single market, getting ready for the meetings and commissions achieved some notable euro and helping the Central and East European results in sectoral co-operation, but did little to applicants with their internal reforms. It paid little improve the overall political relationship. The EU’s attention to the countries further east, such as assistance under Tacis has dwarfed other multilateral Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. EU policymakers saw aid programmes, making the EU Ukraine’s largest the former members of the Soviet Union – with the donor. But – poorly targeted and at times badly notable exception of the Baltic states – as a fairly managed – EU assistance has had only a limited homogenous lot. So the EU offered them all more or impact on Ukraine’s transition process. Overall, the less the same treatment: a Partnership and Co- EU’s policy towards Ukraine has lacked a clear vision, operation Agreement (PCA) for closer trade and and its instruments have been rather blunt. political ties, and financial aid and expert advice under the Tacis assistance programme. Neighbours that need each other But the former Soviet countries have differed greatly It is clear that EU-Ukraine relations have not lived in their approach to the European Union. Russia has up to their potential. The EU needs a stable and sought a broad-based relationship of equals, or prosperous Ukraine, and Ukraine needs the EU as an ‘strategic partnership’, while jealously guarding its open and reliable economic and political partner. national sovereignty. Belarus has shunned closer ties Already, the enlarged EU is Ukraine’s most with Western Europe, preferring re-integration with important trading partner, accounting for more than Russia as a way of propping up its ailing economy. one-third of the country’s imports and exports. EU- Ukraine, by contrast, left little doubt that it wanted to based companies are also the biggest foreign integrate with the EU and eventually become a full- investors in the Ukrainian economy – although the fledged member of the club. Successive Ukrainian amounts Ukraine has attracted have been tiny governments asked the EU to give their country a compared with the sums that have flowed into the ‘membership perspective’. They did not, however, East European accession states. Perhaps most push through the political and economic reforms that importantly, the EU can act as an anchor for would have made these demands credible. Perhaps Ukraine’s economic and political reform efforts, not surprisingly, the EU showed little enthusiasm for emulating the success of other post-Communist Ukraine’s membership aspirations. ‘Don’t ask us for countries such as Poland and Hungary. Ukrainian candidate status’, the EU insisted ‘because the answer politicians and intellectuals have always cited their would be No.’ country’s ‘Europeanness’ as the key reason for leaving the Soviet Union and aspiring to democracy and an open market economy. Past disappointments Meanwhile, the EU offered little help to keep Ukraine For the EU – with its vastly bigger economy – Ukraine on a pro-European, pro-reform path. The PCA is only a minor trading partner (accounting for between the EU and Ukraine that came into force in around 1 per cent of EU external trade). But it is an 1998 committed both sides to gradually opening their important neighbour nonetheless. With a population markets for goods, services and capital. Ukraine also of 48 million, Ukraine is the most populous non-EU promised to bring its rules and regulations more in country on the continent, after Russia and Turkey (an line with those of the EU and the World Trade EU candidate). Following the EU’s eastward Organisation (WTO), which Ukraine has long sought enlargement in May 2004, Ukraine now shares a long to join. Yet, seven years later, trade between the EU common border with three EU member countries, and Ukraine does still not flow freely. The EU boasts Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Given the presence of that its average import tariff is only 3 per cent, but it ethnic minorities on both sides of the common border, still imposes tight restrictions in those sectors where historical cross-border ties and the large volume of Ukraine is most competitive, such as food, textiles shuttle trade going back and forth, the EU cannot and and steel. The EU officially supports Kiev’s WTO bid, should not try to cordon off Ukraine. Already, but it has not upgraded the country to ‘market Ukrainians are angry that they now require visas to economy status’ for trade policy purposes. (The travel to Hungary, Slovakia and Poland – countries upgrade would change Ukraine’s WTO accession that they could previously visit visa-free. The EU terms and make it harder for the EU to impose anti- should help Ukraine to achieve stability and dumping duties on Ukrainian goods.) prosperity, and not only in the border region. An unstable Ukraine could become a major transit route Similarly, under Kuchma’s presidency the EU and for weapons, drugs and people trafficking coming Ukraine were a long way from the PCA’s other stated from further east. Moreover, Ukraine’s stability also objective, to promote a political dialogue on matters for the EU’s energy security, since much of the democratic values and human rights. Under Kuchma, EU’s oil and gas comes from Russia and is shipped Ukraine’s democratic development suffered numerous through Ukrainian pipelines. 3 By responding to Ukraine’s request for closer ties, the of 2005, as a result of constitutional changes that he EU could help to build a reliable partner in a agreed with his opponents during the political crisis. potentially unstable region. The EU’s nascent common foreign and security policy needs reliable partners. For example, Ukraine could help EU Ukraine’s foreign policy after the election attempts to resolve the ‘frozen’ conflict in In his foreign policy, Yushchenko faces similarly Transdnistria, a breakaway region in Moldova difficult choices. Yushchenko’s priorities may lie in adjoining Ukraine that has become a hotspot for Brussels.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract
    In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden-Baden 2015, pp. 219-235. Iryna Solonenko Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract This is the Maidan generation: too young to be burdened by the experi- ence of the Soviet Union, old enough to remember the failure of the Orange Revolution, they don’t want their children to be standing again on the Maidan 15 years from now. Sylvie Kauffmann, The New York Times, April 20141 Introduction Ukrainian civil society became a topic of major interest with the start of the Euromaidan protests in November 2013. It has acquired an additional dimen- sion since then, as civil society has pushed for reforms following the ap- pointment of the new government in February 2014, while also providing as- sistance to the army and voluntary battalions fighting in the east of the coun- try and to civilian victims of the war. In the face of the weakness of the Ukrainian state, which is still suffering from a lack of political will, poor governance, corruption, military weakness, and dysfunctional law enforce- ment – many of those being in part Viktor Yanukovych’s legacies – civil so- ciety and voluntary activism have become a driver of reform and an import- ant mobilization factor in the face of external aggression. This contribution examines the transformation of Ukrainian civil society during the period between the 2004 Orange Revolution and the present day. Why this period? The Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests are landmarks in Ukraine’s post-independence state-building and democratiza- tion process, and analysis of the transformation of Ukrainian civil society during this period offers interesting findings.2 Following a brief portrait of Ukrainian civil society and its evolution, the contribution examines the rela- tionships between civil society and three other actors: the state, the broader society, and external actors involved in supporting and developing civil soci- ety in Ukraine.
    [Show full text]
  • Ukraine's Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues
    Order Code RL32691 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Ukraine’s Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues Updated February 1, 2005 Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Ukraine’s Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues Summary In 2004, many observers believed that Ukraine was at a key period in its transition that could shape its geopolitical orientation for years to come, in part due to presidential elections held on October 31, November 21, and December 26, 2004. In their view, Ukraine could move closer to integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, real democracy and the rule of law, and a genuine free market economy, or it could move toward a Russian sphere of influence with “managed democracy” and an oligarchic economy. For the past decade, Ukraine’s political scene had been dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and the oligarchic “clans” (regionally based groups of powerful politicians and businessmen) that have supported him. The oligarchs chose Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate to succeed Kuchma as President. The chief opposition candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, was a pro-reform, pro-Western figure seen by many observers as a man of high personal integrity. International observers criticized the election campaign and the first and second rounds of the election as not free and fair, citing such factors as government-run media bias in favor of Yanukovych, abuse of absentee ballots, barring of opposition representatives from electoral commissions, and inaccurate voter lists. Nevertheless, Yushchenko topped the first round of the vote on October 31 by a razor-thin margin over Yanukovych.
    [Show full text]
  • How Far Can the EU Expand? the Dilemmas of Ukrainian Membership
    EU crisis simulation 2013 issue brief How Far Can the EU Expand? The Dilemmas of Ukrainian Membership By Scott N. Duryea While the Council of Europe faces many important issues affect the future of the EU, few involve the geopolitical pressures and question of European identity raised by the possibility of Ukraine membership. Opening membership to European democracies is a foundational concept of the EU, but Ukraine possess great difficulties; it is a very large country (roughly the same in size and population to France), poor it brings difficult relations with Russia. Ukraine has a long border with Russia; 2300 km (1400 miles) long and hosts Russia’s most important navy base. Its population includes are large Russian minority. Some 30 percent of its population (14.5 million out of 45.6 million people) are native Russian-speakers. Bringing Ukraine into the EU would transform the country, and the EU. Refusing to admit Ukraine might have equally powerful consequences. Ukraine is increasingly falling into the fold of the European Union. Many Ukrainians seek eventual membership into the EU, but a number of pressing issues must be resolved before Ukraine fully goes west. These include reforming Ukrainian bureaucracy, obeying the rule of law, cracking down on corruption, and evading Russian attempts to keep Ukraine from breaking away from its unhealthy Eurasian ties. At stake is not just the future of the concept of Europe and European relations with Russia, but the future of Ukrainian democracy and national identity. As stated in the EU Council Conclusions on Ukraine of 10 December 2012, Ukraine’s EU status focuses on three elements of reform: 1 The compliance of the 2012 parliamentary elections with international standards and follow-up actions, Ukraine’s progress in addressing the issue of selective justice and preventing its recurrence, and Implementing the reforms defined in the jointly agreed Association Agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943 Author(S): Timothy Snyder Source: Past & Present, No
    The Past and Present Society The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943 Author(s): Timothy Snyder Source: Past & Present, No. 179 (May, 2003), pp. 197-234 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3600827 . Accessed: 05/01/2014 17:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Oxford University Press and The Past and Present Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Past &Present. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 137.110.33.183 on Sun, 5 Jan 2014 17:29:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE CAUSES OF UKRAINIAN-POLISH ETHNIC CLEANSING 1943* Ethniccleansing hides in the shadow of the Holocaust. Even as horrorof Hitler'sFinal Solution motivates the study of other massatrocities, the totality of its exterminatory intention limits thevalue of the comparisons it elicits.Other policies of mass nationalviolence - the Turkish'massacre' of Armenians beginningin 1915, the Greco-Turkish'exchanges' of 1923, Stalin'sdeportation of nine Soviet nations beginning in 1935, Hitler'sexpulsion of Poles and Jewsfrom his enlargedReich after1939, and the forcedflight of Germans fromeastern Europein 1945 - havebeen retrievedfrom the margins of mili- tary and diplomatichistory.
    [Show full text]
  • Biden and Ukraine: a Strategy for the New Administration
    Atlantic Council EURASIA CENTER ISSUE BRIEF Biden and Ukraine: A Strategy for the New Administration ANDERS ÅSLUND, MELINDA HARING, WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, MARCH 2021 JOHN E. HERBST, DANIEL FRIED, AND ALEXANDER VERSHBOW Introduction US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., knows Ukraine well. His victory was well- received in Kyiv. Many in Kyiv see the next four years as an opportunity to reestablish trust between the United States and Ukraine and push Ukraine’s reform aspirations forward while ending Russia’s destabilization of Ukraine’s east. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is greatly interested in reestablishing a close US-Ukraine relationship, which has gone through a bumpy period under former US President Donald J. Trump when Ukraine became a flash point in US domestic politics. Resetting relations with Kyiv will not be simple. As vice president, Biden oversaw Ukraine policy, visited the country six times, and knows most of its players and personalities, which is an obvious advantage. But Zelenskyy is different from his immediate predecessor. He hails from Ukraine’s Russian- speaking east, was not an active participant in the Revolution of Dignity, has had little contact with the West, and took a battering during Trump’s first impeachment in which Ukraine was front and center. However, Zelenskyy is keen to engage with the new Biden team and seeks recognition as a global leader. The Biden administration would be wise to seize this opportunity. The first priority for the new Biden team should be to get to know the players in Ukraine and Zelenskyy’s inner circle (Zelenskyy’s team and his ministers are not household names in Washington) and to establish a relationship of trust after the turbulence of the Trump years.
    [Show full text]
  • Migration and the Ukraine Crisis a Two-Country Perspective This E-Book Is Provided Without Charge Via Free Download by E-International Relations (
    EDITED BY AGNIESZKA PIKULICKA-WILCZEWSKA & GRETA UEHLING Migration and the Ukraine Crisis A Two-Country Perspective This e-book is provided without charge via free download by E-International Relations (www.E-IR.info). It is not permitted to be sold in electronic format under any circumstances. If you enjoy our free e-books, please consider leaving a small donation to allow us to continue investing in open access publications: http://www.e-ir.info/about/donate/ i Migration and the Ukraine Crisis A Two-Country Perspective EDITED BY AGNIESZKA PIKULICKA-WILCZEWSKA & GRETA UEHLING ii E-International Relations www.E-IR.info Bristol, England 2017 ISBN 978-1-910814-27-7 (paperback) ISBN 978-1-910814-28-4 (e-book) This book is published under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license. You are free to: • Share – copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format • Adapt – remix, transform, and build upon the material Under the following terms: • Attribution – You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. • Non-Commercial – You may not use the material for commercial purposes. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission. Please contact [email protected] for any such enquiries, including for licensing and translation requests. Other than the terms noted above, there are no restrictions placed on the use and dissemination of this book for student learning materials / scholarly use.
    [Show full text]
  • Nationality in Ukraine: Some Rules of Engagement Oxana Shevel
    Nationality in Ukraine: Some Rules of Engagement Oxana Shevel Although the fall of empires gives rise to states, it need not create nations. The collapse of the Soviet Union 10 years ago did not in- stantly transform citizens of its successor states into members of nations. As in other postimperial settings, in post-Soviet Ukraine the modern nation is built, or not. The question of Ukrainian nation- building deserves the attention it draws from social scientists. De- scribed as “the West of the East or the East of the West,” and strad- dling the faultline between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania, Ukraine was partitioned among empires, and stood at the cross- roads of various religious and cultural inuences. 1 In today’s Ukraine we perceive ethnic and linguistic diversity, a poor match to modern national ideals where “state borders conne linguis- tic communities, and the languages of speech, politics, and wor- ship are one and the same.”2 In Ernest Gellner’s terms, it is not at all obvious that the Ukrainian political and the national units are “congruent.”3 Attempts to make the nation match the state are called “nation- building,” although this term is extremely broad. In historical terms, attempts to build nations have ranged from wartime eth- nic cleansing to peacetime textbook editing. Nation-building in independent Ukraine has received a good deal of attention in the past decade, with scholars evaluating the results as mixed. Stud- ies of popular opinion question loyalties to the new state, while analyses of nation-building policies characterize them as vague and 1.On early modern Ukrainian politics, consult Frank Sysyn, Between Poland and the Ukraine (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Andrzej Kaminski, Re- public vs.
    [Show full text]
  • What Does Ukraine's Orange Revolution Tell Us About the Impact
    FREE POLICY NETWORK BRIEF SERIES John S. Earle, George Mason University Scott Gehlbach, University of Wisconsin-Madison November, 2016 What Does Ukraine’s Orange Revolution Tell Us About the Impact of Political Turnover on Economic Performance? Political turnover is a normal, even desirable, feature of competitive politics, yet turnover in a context of weak institutions can create policy uncertainty, disrupt political connections, and threaten the security of property rights. What is the impact of political turnover on economic performance in such an environment? We examine the behavior of over 7,000 enterprises before and after Ukraine's Orange Revolution—a moment of largely unanticipated political turnover in a country with profoundly weak institutions. We find that the productivity of firms in regions that supported Viktor Yushchenko increased after the Orange Revolution, relative to that of firms in regions that supported Viktor Yanukovych. Our results illustrate that the efficiency consequences of turnover can be large when institutions are weak. Introduction Ukraine in 2004 Politics in much of the world is a winner-take-all Three factors make Ukraine in 2004 an appropriate contest. When Viktor Yanukovych fled Kyiv in setting for identifying the effect of political February 2014, for example, he was joined by a turnover on economic performance. First, Ukraine close group of associates overwhelmingly drawn under Kuchma was a paradigmatic case of from the country’s Russian-speaking East, “patronal presidentialism,” in which the president including Yanukovych’s home region of Donetsk. “wields not only the powers formally invested in The governors who ran Ukraine’s regions under the office but also the ability to selectively direct Yanukovych fared no better.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections, Revolution and Democracy in Ukraine
    ELECTIONS, REVOLUTION AND DEMOCRACY IN UKRAINE: REFLECTIONS ON A COUNTRY’S TURN TO DEMOCRACY, FREE ELECTIONS AND THE MODERN WORLD By Jeffrey Clark With Jason Stout October 2005 DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES: STRENGTHENING ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION IN UKRAINE PROJECT This publication was made possible through support provided by the Regional Mission for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Agreement No. 121-A-00- 04-00701-00. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development. PREFACE A USAID-supported activity known as the Strengthening Electoral Administration in Ukraine Project (SEAUP), administered by Development Associates, played a decidedly important role in facilitating Ukraine’s turn to democracy in 2004. The pages that follow provide evidence of that unequivocal conclusion, but just as importantly offer reflections on how the project was perceived and implemented of interest to promoters of free elections and democratization elsewhere. SEAUP’s success would have been unattainable without the unwavering support USAID gave the initiative and the trust placed in its professional staff. The Kyiv Mission granted considerable administrative flexibility that proved essential as political tensions increased and unplanned program inputs had to be devised virtually overnight to meet the challenges of a massively fraudulent vote and a court-ordered revote. The efforts of external players to foment anti-American sentiments further complicated the environment and imposed additional constraints on project implementers. USAID sponsored other implementing agencies actively supporting democratic consolidation in Ukraine, working directly with NDI, IRI, Freedom House, InterNews, and ABA/CEELI.
    [Show full text]
  • Ukraine's Choice: European Association Agreement Or Eurasian
    Policy Brief NUMBER PB13-22 SEPTEMBER 2013 Ukraine concluded negotiations on a deep and compre- Ukraine’s Choice: European hensive free trade area (DCFTA) with the European Union in late 2011 and the Association Agreement in March 2012. Th e Association Agreement consists of over 1,200 pages, of Association Agreement or which DCFTA forms the bulk with some 1,000 pages. Th e agreement is comprehensive covering all areas of interest. It Eurasian Union? off ers enhanced cooperation in 28 key policy areas, including political cooperation, foreign and security policy, justice, and Anders Åslund freedom. It aims to accelerate the deepening of political and economic relations between Ukraine and the European Union and gradually integrate Ukraine into the EU internal market. Anders Åslund has been senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics since 2006 and is an adjunct professor at Th e Association Agreement thus provides for signifi cant legal, Georgetown University. He has worked as an economic adviser to the regulatory, and political convergence with the European Union, Russian and Ukrainian governments. Åslund is the author of 12 books, for which the European Union off ers considerable assistance. most recently the second edition of How Capitalism Was Built: Th e Yet it stops short of granting EU membership. Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (2012). He is also the author of How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy (2009), and Russia’s Capitalist Ukraine should improve its macroeconomic Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed (2007). He has also edited 16 books and published widely.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ukraine-Russia Conflict Might Prevent, Mitigate, Or Resolve Violent Conflicts in the Regions Neighboring Russia
    UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org SPECIAL REPORT 2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Lauren Van Metre, Viola G. Gienger, and Kathleen Kuehnast As the Ukraine crisis escalated, staff at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) with experience in the region mobilized for a comprehensive conflict analysis with the aim of identifying plausible conflict scenarios and the forces and factors that propel them, ultimately pinpointing potential approaches that The Ukraine-Russia Conflict might prevent, mitigate, or resolve violent conflicts in the regions neighboring Russia. Using scenario analysis, facilitated by Alan Schwartz, Policy Futures, LLC, this report provides a Signals and Scenarios for the framework for understanding emerging conflict dynamics in post-Soviet countries and identifies conflict prevention and mitigation opportunities. Broader Region ABOUT THE AUTHORS Dr. Lauren Van Metre is a director in USIP’s Center for Applied Summary Research on Conflict, which conducts evidence-based research to • Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the military operations in eastern Ukraine have overturned improve practice in conflict-affected countries. She holds a PhD the post–Cold War norms that provided stability and development for the former Soviet—now in Russian Studies and has spent significant time working in St. Petersburg and conducting research throughout Russia’s regions. sovereign—countries bordering Russia. Viola Gienger is a senior writer for USIP, reporting and writing • Neighboring countries are recalculating their security and foreign policies through the lens of on issues related to the Institute’s work in the United States Ukraine, assessing their own security and conflict dynamics based on Russia’s newly aggres- and abroad.
    [Show full text]
  • Internal Displacement in Ukraine: Where the Government Went Wrong
    University of Mississippi eGrove Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors Theses Honors College) 2016 Internal Displacement in Ukraine: Where the Government Went Wrong Annelise Albert University of Mississippi. Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Albert, Annelise, "Internal Displacement in Ukraine: Where the Government Went Wrong" (2016). Honors Theses. 91. https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/91 This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Internal Displacement in Ukraine: Where the Government Went Wrong. By Annelise Albert A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion Of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies at the Croft Institute for International Studies The University of Mississippi Approved: ________________________________________ Advisor: Dr. Joshua First ________________________________________ Reader: Dr. Kees Gispen _________________________________________ Reader: Dr. Shine Choi 1 Abstract: The purpose of this project was to show how the Ukrainian government has delegitimized itself currently in the eyes of the Ukrainian People through its handling of the internal displacement problem. To show this, this thesis analyzes Ukrainian legislation passed pertaining to internally displaced people and how these pieces of legislation have been ineffective at producing any significant change in the IDP problem. In certain cases, this legislation is correlated with an increase in the number of IDPs. Further, this thesis analyzes the decline in public opinion of Ukrainian citizens with the government.
    [Show full text]