Special-Forces Units

In the Shadow:

30 Special Warfare In the Shadow: Chinese Special Forces Build a 21st-Century Fighting Force Story by Scott J. Henderson

In its effort to build a modern 21st- bat Theory, authors Chang Wanquan While destroying enemy command- facilities for follow-on forces after a Rescue. Rescue operations range the West; on the contrary, it appears century fighting force, China has had and Yu Guohua of the People’s Libera- and-control elements is certainly not a strike.14 Special forces are also ex- from securing the release of hostages to be a source of pride for the Chinese its own revolution in military affairs tion Army Daily provide a summary of new concept, it is possible that the PRC pected to be able to handle “sudden to searching for and retrieving downed to train their troops under hazardous that has touched almost every aspect of the operating doctrine of PLA special may add a new strategic wrinkle to the incidents” that occur within the coun- pilots. In 1999, the Beijing, Jinan and conditions.24 The majority of training the armed forces. Chinese special-op- forces. They note, “Special forces war- scenario in the event of conflict with try.15 An article written in the People’s Shenyang military regions carried out a for PLA special forces takes place in erations forces have been no exception. fare includes detailed battle theories, Taiwan. The strategy would involve a Liberation Army Daily may provide consolidated training exercise that in- one of three categories: infiltration, Major transformations in China’s such as special forces reconnaissance, pre-emptive strike against the Tai- a clue as to what sudden incidents cluded hostage and battlefield rescues.21 mountain training, or wilderness and elite special forces began taking place attacks and sabotage, and comprehen- wanese civilian leadership prior to the entail. In the article, a military training survival training. in the late 1980s and early 1990s.1 sive battle theories, such as integrated outbreak of major hostilities between department suggests, “The troops, key Special reconnaissance The People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, land-sea-air-space-electronic combat, the two countries.10 There have been units, special forces, and emergency An article in the Hong Kong Kuang Infiltration training has concentrated on selecting the all-dimensional simultaneous attacks, rumors that the PRC plans to infil- special safeguard detachments sta- Chiao Ching provided a generic de- The ability to infiltrate undetected highest quality individuals within nonlinear combat, no-contact long- trate, or has infiltrated, special-forces tioned in areas where natural disasters scription of the special-reconnaissance behind enemy lines is one of the most the military, providing them with the range warfare, asymmetrical combat, units into Taiwan to capture or kill key and violent terrorist activities happen mission of Chinese special forces: essential skills required for China’s most advanced equipment available, large-scale night combat and ‘surgical’ government leaders. This would enable frequently should conduct training During wartime, special forces special forces. While little is known and training them in a wide range strikes.”4 the PRC either to force the Taiwanese in a selective manner, install a near- usually send small teams deep be- about the actual training methods, Chi- of military disciplines. The PLA has The second development is the government to negotiate or to replace actual-combat situation, emphasize hind enemy lines to collect and moni- nese special forces are said to undergo placed a high degree of emphasis on adoption of code names to distinguish it altogether with a government more training in dealing with an emergency tor enemy information in regions that “highly intensive and comprehensive the physical and mental abilities of units, which is often done by select supportive of mainland China. and effecting an emergency rescue, are of concern to their headquarters multi-course training in complex ter- the candidates: The training can be military organizations.5 The PLA has This decapitation operation could and improve their capabilities to cope and provide urgently needed informa- rain, including in-depth infiltration grueling, and those who are found to assigned at least one dedicated special theoretically be accomplished in a short with various sudden incidents.”16 tion. In war, special forces can carry and ‘covered reconnaissance’ behind be unsuited are cut from the program forces unit to each military region.6 The period of time, which could eliminate Terrorist response. Terrorist-re- out strategic, campaign and tactical- the enemy line.”25 The Chinese use a immediately. The dropout rate dur- size of the special-forces unit depends outside intervention and negate some sponse activities have been noted level special-reconnaissance missions, “three-dimensional” “all-weather” infil- ing initial training is said to average upon the military region. Units have of the problems associated with a beginning in 2002. The PLA has in- and through special reconnaissance, tration approach, using sea (submarine, between 50 and 90 percent.2 been reported to range from battalion to force-on-force action.11 It must be em- cluded antiterrorism as a part of its they can obtain relevant data on the high-speed ferry, open-water swim- Within the military forces of the division size.7 phasized that this type of operation is new training program for special-forces weather, hydrological and geographi- ming and scuba diving), air (airborne, People’s Republic of China, or PRC, While Chinese special forces are de- dependent upon the PRC being able to units and intends to make it an inte- cal features of specific regions. Special powered parachute and helicopter) and there are many units that could be signed to perform various operations, stand up an alternate means of govern- gral part of their future mission.17 On reconnaissance includes actions such land (long-distance movement and rock classified as “special forces.” They their two main missions are direct ing the country. Jan. 4, 2002, it was reported, “A special as target search, area evaluation and climbing). include rapid-reaction forces, airborne action and special reconnaissance. Harassment. Harassment activities forces regiment in the Chengdu Military verifying the effects of a strike. Special Sea infiltration.Sea training is divisions, amphibious landing units Direct action can be broken down into are designed to inhibit the enemy’s Region known as the Hunting Leopards forces use reconnaissance by combat known to comprise three elements: and marines. While these organiza- five categories: decapitation, harass- ability to operate, or as Jiang Jianx- carried out an antiterrorist exercise for and monitoring techniques similar to open-sea swimming, sea demolition tions certainly fit the category of ment, security, terrorist response and iong, the battalion commander of the the first time.”18 Links between this unit those used by long-range monitoring and sea shooting.26 “During sea train- special forces, for the purposes of this rescue. (These are the author’s catego- Flying Dragons, phrased it, “To make and the People’s Armed Police, or PAP, units. However, more often than not, ing [special forces] are tested to their article, they will be considered to be ries, not the PLA’s.) the special forces battalion the ‘eyes’ cannot be ruled out because, histori- more advanced technology is used in physical limit conducting danger- large special-mission units and there- of our side and a ‘thorn’ in the flesh cally, PAP forces have handled antiter- special reconnaissance.22 ous and difficult courses, including fore not included. Instead, the focus Direct action of the other side.”12 These disrup- rorist activities. From Aug. 6-12, 2003, China’s special forces use “triphi- a 10,000-meter (approximately 6.2 here will be on smaller, more elite Decapitation. The decapitation tions include sabotage of equipment Chinese special forces participated (with bious” (sea, air and land) means of miles) swim, a nighttime swim in full units tasked with unconventional or strategy of Chinese special forces is and systems, attacks on vital civilian member states of the Shanghai Cooper- infiltration to conduct short-term and gear, diving, underwater transport asymmetrical warfare.3 to attack key personnel and control infrastructure, and ambush of military ation Organization) in Coalition-2003, a sustained reconnaissance behind en- and survival drills on islets.”27 Infiltra- Two developments have provided elements, leaving the enemy leaderless forces.13 Psychological operations may “multinational” joint exercise in antiter- emy lines, using digitized battleground tion by submarine is also a common excellent methods for separating Chi- and unable to communicate.8 China’s also play a part in the overall scheme, rorism.19 On July 15, 2004, the People’s monitors and unmanned reconnais- method of insertion in which trainees nese special forces from the larger spe- military has conducted exercises with special forces carrying out raids Liberation Army Daily reported on a sance aircraft to relay information may perform various missions, such cial-purpose components. The first de- employing special forces using various simply to cause fear and confusion “multinational counterterrorism exer- back to their command units.23 as clearing away underwater mines.28 velopment is a sharpening of doctrine modes of transport, such as helicop- behind enemy lines. cise,” consisting of combined-arms and Training for PLA special forces is Air infiltration. In parachute train- regarding the special forces’ missions. ters and powered parachutes, to attack Security. Security operations in- special-forces troops, that was carried exacting and can be quite dangerous. ing, the PLA has “effected a gradual In An Analysis of 20th Century Com- enemy command posts.9 clude the shielding of air and naval out in the Xinjiang Military District.20 Safety is not emphasized as it is in transition from using multi-type para- hicle or even a boat. In 2002, Beijing’s Berets/Heroic Falcons. The Heroic of armed helicopters and airborne China Central Television showed mem- Falcons are trained in special recon- troops. The unit destroyed the island’s bers of a special forces reconnaissance naissance and in triphibious warfare. airport, oil-storage facilities, command militia using ultralight trikes (a pow- The members of the unit work daily center and ammo dumps. The island ered parachute with a three-wheeled on upper-body strength and cardio- was then secured for follow-on forces vehicle attached) and an ultralight vascular endurance. Soldiers must be by removing the enemy’s biological and with a small rubber boat, similar to a able to run 3,300 meters (2.05 miles) chemical weapons.55 small Zodiac, attached.43 in 12 minutes to pass, 3,400 meters Zhanshen. A four-wheeled vehicle (2.11 miles) in 12 minutes to receive a Threat analysis that is almost identical to the High- “good,” and 3,500 meters (2.17 miles) Although it appears that China’s Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle in 12 minutes to receive an “outstand- special forces are still in the early used by U.S. forces. The vehicle was ing.” The unit’s soldiers also practice stages of their development, it would developed by the Shenyang Aviation Qigong, a Chinese form of martial arts be a mistake to dismiss their capabili- Company and was given the name and hand-to-hand combat. ties. The PLA began by selecting the zhanshen, or “god of war.”44 • The Shenyang Military Region’s most experienced officers and cadre Firearms. The Chinese special Fierce Tigers of the Northeast. This is from PRC military forces (estimated forces were the first to be equipped a marine special-forces unit trained to to be well in excess of two million).56 with the 5.8 mm KBU88 sniper rifle.45 perform airborne and commando “SEAL- After establishing the groups, the PLA type” assault operations on airfields, supplied them with the most advanced Special-forces units command-and-control sites and radar- equipment available; vigorously cross- • The Beijing Military Region’s warning sites using powered parachutes trained them in multiple disciplines; Recon and Strike Force. This group is and scuba equipment. Members of the and pushed them to their mental and trained to assault airfields and to take unit undergo extensive survival training physical limits. out command-and-control elements in jungle, desert, prairie, mountain and Training scenarios provide insight using assault helicopters, powered urban conditions.52 into the intended use of Chinese parachutes, mortars and flamethrow- • The Chengdu Military Region’s special forces. A large portion of the ers. The unit is known to target com- Falcons of the Southwest. Established training focuses on skills necessary for munications centers, radar systems in 1992, this group uses high-tech infiltrating and invading Taiwan. The and ammunition depots. They are equipment to carry out special combat decapitation strategy, as applied to considered to be endurance swim- reconnaissance. The unit has received Taiwanese civilian leadership, whether mers who are proficient at underwater numerous awards and was profiled in or not it is truly a part of PLA strategy, demolitions and can pilot boats. a documentary showing air-assault presents two problems. First, like a • The Nanjing Military Region’s and forward-reconnaissance skills. The bomb threat, it has to be taken seri- Flying Dragons. Established in late group is credited with attaining amaz- ously. Time and resources have to be 1992, the unit conducts training said ing results in four disciplines: recon- allocated, and countermeasures put in to be unconventional and carried out naissance, airborne insertion, surprise place, to deal with the threat. Second, with “great intensity” under danger- attacks and emergency evacuations.53 the decapitation threat places psy- ous conditions.46 In 1997, the unit • The Chengdu Military Region’s chological pressure on the Taiwanese carried out a simulated attack on a Hunting Leopards. This unit carried leadership. concealed enemy airfield in the Zijin out its first antiterrorism exercise in If the decapitation strategy is Mountains of Nanjing. During the ex- 2002 in the Xiling Mountains.54 From indeed part of a PLA plan, why does ercise, the group used UAVs to relay available reporting, it is difficult to the PLA conclude that it would be battlefield intelligence back to head- ascertain whether this unit is strictly successful? One possible reason is quarters and assaulted the site using military or has ties to the PAP. that it senses a lack of resolve in the parawings and armed helicopters.47 • The Lanzhou Military Region’s U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan, • The Guangzhou Military Region’s Tigers of the Night. Information on this and that a rapidly installed de facto Sword of Southern China. This group, unit is vague; reports offer only general government would be enough to deter comprising 4,000 soldiers, operates references to a “certain” special-forces U.S. interference. It seems unlikely out of Qixi, in the Guangzhou Military unit located in the Lanzhou Military Re- that the U.S. would acknowledge a Region.48 Established in 1988, it is gion being involved in various types of new government’s legitimacy while said to be one of the earliest groups activities. “North Education,” an online Taiwanese forces were still actively en- formed after China began modernizing site sponsored by the Tianjin Education gaged. However, it is possible that the its military.49 The unit is said to be a Committee, references a dedicated spe- PRC envisions that a large portion of triphibious force capable of all-weather cial-forces unit in the Lanzhou Military Taiwan’s military and civilian populace warfare; of carrying out long-range air- Region and talks about the unit’s par- would support the invasion, allowing borne operations; of underwater cross- ticipation in Estonia’s “ERNA” special- the PLA to conclude operations before ings; and of capturing beachheads. forces competition. However, the article the U.S. had time to act militarily or Soldiers of the unit cross-train in 60 does not give any background, the politically. subject areas (individual subject areas unit’s mission or the unit’s code name. Recent world events have raised are not referenced) of the Chinese navy • The Daggers (military region un- other possibilities for employment and air force. The unit is trained in known). This amphibious unit, formed of China’s special forces. Is there a contingency operations and has carried in 2001, is described as “one of the scenario in which China’s special out joint training in island operations ace cards” for dealing with Taiwanese forces might use the decapitation with other branches of the military.50 It independence. In 2004, the unit car- strategy against North Korea? It is not is said that the unit has 400 personnel ried out a mock exercise involving the in China’s long-term interest to have trained to fly aircraft, perform “stunt capture of a coastal island in which an unstable nuclear neighbor. Should driving” and pilot boats.51 the unit set up an “electronic interfer- China decide to take matters into its • The Jinan Military Region’s Black ence system,” followed by the arrival own hands and resolve the situation,

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8 Mei Lin, “Analysis of the CPC Armed Forces’ Develop- Domestic Service, 10 August 1999, as translated by FBIS refer- Taiwan Strait,” Tokyo Foresight, 18 June 2004, 31, as translated ment of New Methods of Operations,” Taipei Chung Kung ence FTS19990814000037. by FBIS reference JPP20040524000043. Yen Chiu, 15 November 1997, 50-60, as translated by FBIS 25 Zhou Mengwu, “Uncovering the Secrets of the Chinese 43 “Beijing CCTV-7,” 6 February 2005, as transcribed by reference FTS19980310000807. Special Forces.” No definition was given for the term “covered FBIS reference CPP20050207000017. 9 Chen Qiang, “Jiang Jianxiong: Dauntless Special reconnaissance.” 44 Yihong Chang, “China reveals details of cross-country Troops Tempered This Way,” Beijing Zhongguo Qingnian 26 “Select Maritime Troops Train Hard,” People’s Libera- vehicle,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 14 February 2002. Bao, 20 July 1999, 1-2, as translated by FBIS reference tion Army Daily, 19 September 2001, 8, as translated by FBIS 45 Zhou Mengwu, “Uncovering the Secrets of the Chinese FTS19990806000269; Zhou Mengwu, “Uncovering the Secrets reference CPP20010921000116. The article references eight Special Forces.” of the Chinese Special Forces,” Beijing Junshi Wenzhai [Mili- courses but lists only three training topics. 46 Chen Peng and Cao Zhi, “Casting Chinese ‘Flying tary Digest], No. 10, 5 October 1997, 2-3, as translated by FBIS 27 Yang Deshan and Ni Minzhi, “Nanjing Military Region’s Dragons.’ ” reference FTS19980206000535. Special Operations Battalion Acquires Three-Dimensional 47 Chen Peng and Cao Zhi, “Casting Chinese ‘Flying 10 “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Infiltration and Operations Capability,” People’s Liberation Army Dragons.’ ” Northeast Asia,” 3 August 2004. Daily (Internet Version-WWW), 9 June 2002, 1, as translated by 48 Glenn Schloss, “PLA ‘Dragons’ Take Their Cue from US 11 U.S. Secretary of Defense, “FY04 Report to Congress FBIS reference CPP20020610000054. Elite,” Hong Kong South China Morning Post, 4 March 2002, on PRC Military Power,” 19. 28 Chen Peng and Cao Zhi, “Casting Chinese ‘Flying 14, from FBIS reference CPP20020304000117. 12 Chen Peng and Cao Zhi, “Casting Chinese ‘Flying Dragons.’ ” 49 “The Special Forces Units in Each of China’s Dragons’ — Featuring Jiang Jianxiong, Commander of Special 29 Yang Deshan and Ni Minzhi, “Nanjing Military Region’s Military Regions, Beifang Jiaoyu (North Education) article 6,” Forces Battalion Under Nanjing Military Region,” Beijing Special Operations Battalion Acquires Three-Dimensional downloaded on 1 February 2005, site of the Tianjin Education Xinhua Domestic Service, 10 August 1999, as translated by Infiltration and Operations Capability.” No definition was given Committee, http://www.northedu.cn /junshibolan/zhonghuajun- FBIS reference FTS 19990814000037. of the term “armed parachuting.” wei/show_xiangxi.asp?classid=666666666666666649&inforid 13 Information for this paragraph collected from two sourc- 30 Zhou Mengwu, “Uncovering the Secrets of the Chinese =200309181024453734&neirongform=0. es: “Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces,” 13 November Special Forces.” 50 Mao Zhe, Wang Yongqing and Zhang Zhimeng, 2002; Ou Shijin and Du Xianzhou, “Display Invincible Might 31 John Pike, “Taiwan Geography,” 26 July 2004, Global “Guangzhou Military Region Establishes First Triphibious by Wreaking Havoc Behind ‘Enemy’ Lines: Give them more Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan- Special Operations Force,” Guangzhou Nanfang Ribao (Internet than they can see all at once – New operational modes such as geo.htm. Version), 29 July 1999, as translated by FBIS reference ‘blocking the ears and gouging out the eyes’ and ‘penetrating 32 Andrew Nien-dzu Yang, “The PLA and Taiwan Strait FTS19990729000625. the vital points,’ ” People’s Liberation Army Daily, 25 August Campaign,” Taipei Chien-Tuan K’o-Chi, 1 March 2004, as 51 Huang Rifei and Wang Yongqing, “Chinese Special 1999, 2, as translated by FBIS reference FTS19990928000709. translated by FBIS reference CPP20040413000274. Forces Match the World Powers,” Beijing Renmin (Guangzhou 14 “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - China and 33 Chen Peng and Cao Zhi, “Casting Chinese ‘Flying South China News Supplement) in Ribao, 30 July 1999, 1, as Northeast Asia,” 3 August 2004. Dragons.’ ” translated by FBIS reference FTS19990730002144. 15 Su Yincheng, Zhuang Yichun, and Jian Boyou, “Avia- 34 It is not readily apparent that four hours would be 52 “The Special Forces Units in Each of China’s Military tion Unit, Always on Alert,” Beijing Renmin Ribao (Internet considered a long-range raid. The PLA may use this scenario Regions, Beifang Jiaoyu (North Education) article 6.” Version-WWW), 15 September 2003, as translated by FBIS to demonstrate their endurance training at extremely high 53 “The Special Forces Units in Each of China’s Military reference CPP20030915000049. altitudes. Regions, Beifang Jiaoyu (North Education) article 6.” 16 Military Training Department of the Headquarters of the 35 Li Xiangjun and Li Fengming, “Division in Xinjiang 54 “Chinese Special Force Launches Anti-Terrorism Ma- Lanzhou Military Region, “Training in Non-War Operations,” tempers troops in Karakorum and Kunun Mountains,” People’s neuver,” Guangzhou Ribao (Internet Version-WWW), 4 January People’s Liberation Army Daily, 5 November 2002, 6, as Liberation Army Daily (Internet version WWW.), LA Daily 2002, as translated by FBIS reference CPP20020104000135. translated by FBIS reference CPP20021105000086. 9 August 2004 http://english.pladaily.com.cn/english/pla- 55 Cheng Hsin-hua, “Capturing Taiwan Within Seven Days 17 “Chinese Special Force Launches Anti-Terrorism Ma- daily/2004/08/09/20040809001030_ChinaMilitaryNews.html. — an Exposure of the PLA’s Top-Secret Strategies,” Hong Kong neuver,” Guangzhou Ribao (Internet Version-WWW), 4 Janury 36 Li Chengfeng, “Challenging the Limits of Survival: Tung Chou Kan, No. 71, 5 January 2005, 28-32, as translated 2002, as translated by FBIS reference CPP20020104000135. Record of a Certain Beijing MR Special Reconnaissance Force’s by FBIS reference CPP20050110000064. 18 “Chinese Special Force Launches Anti-Terrorism Wilderness Survival Training,” Hong Kong Hsien-Tai Chun- 56 “China’s National Defense in 2004,” downloaded 3 Maneuver,” Guangzhou Ribao. Shih, No. 260, 11 September 1998, 19-22, as translated by January 2005 from http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/. 19 “China’s Frequent Multilateral Joint Military Exercises,” FBIS reference FTS19981023000467. 57 “Planned Russia-China military exercise not directed at Hong Kong Hsiang Kang Shang Pao (Internet Version- 37 Li Chengfeng, “Challenging the Limits of Survival: any third country: army chief,” People’s Daily Online, 18 March WWW), 15 December 2003, as translated by FBIS reference Record of a Certain Beijing MR Special Reconnaissance Force’s 2005, FBIS reference CPP20050318000033. CPP20031215000091. Wilderness Survival Training.” 58 F.W. Lacroix, Robert W. Button, John R. Wise and Stuart 20 FBIS summary of People’s Liberation Army 38 “Three Beidou Satellites Cover Peripherals of Mainland E. Johnson, A Concept of Operations for a New Deep-Diving headlines, http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/pladai- China. PLA Strides Toward Precision Control And Guided Submarine (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Publications, 2001), ly/2004/07/15/20040715001017. Warfare,” Hong Kong Hsiang Kang Shang Pao, 22 June 2003, appendix I. 21 Information for this paragraph was collected from the B5, as translated by FBIS reference CPP20030623000047. 59 Ko Shu-ling, “Taiwan’s Premier Says China Wants a following three sources: “Report on Training of PRC’s Special 39 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - China and North- War to Push US Out of Asia-Pacific,” Epoch Time online, 23 Forces,” Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She, 4 September 1999, as east Asia, 3 August 2004. August 2004, downloaded 10 February 2005 from http://eng- translated by FBIS reference FTS19990907000248; Shui Chih- 40 Hsiung Chien-chun, “Large-Scale Exercise Reflects the lish.epochtimes.com/news/4-8-23/22968.html. shan, “China’s Special Forces Are World-Class”; Su Yincheng, Combat Strength of the People’s Liberation Army,” Hong Kong 60 Telephone conversation with Ralph Howard, owner of Zhuang Yichun and Jian Boyou, “Aviation Unit, Always on Alert.” Wen Wei Po, 12 September 1999, a5, as translated by FBIS Buckeye Powered Parachute. Howard stated that while it had 22 “Underwater Amphibious Operations Centering on reference FTS19990915000111. not been done to his knowledge, it is feasible that a powered Submarines,” Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, 16 Septem- 41 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - China and North- parachute could be delivered by airborne methods. ber 2001, No. 348, 36-39, as translated by FBIS reference east Asia, 3 August 2004. 61 Chen Peng and Cao Zhi, “Casting Chinese ‘Flying CPP20010918000092. 42 “China’s ‘Stealth Attack Ferry’ Casts Shadow Over Dragons.’ ” 23 Information for this paragraph was collected from two sources: Yang Deshan and Ni Minzhi, “Nanjing Military Region’s Scott J. Henderson is an analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Special Operations Battalion Acquires Three-Dimensional Kan. He retired from the Army after serving 20 years in the intelligence community as a Infiltration and Operations Capability,” People’s Liberation Army Chinese linguist. He holds a bachelor’s degree with an emphasis on Chinese studies and Daily (Internet Version-WWW), 9 June 2002, 1, as translated is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif. In 1997, he was on by FBIS reference CPP20020610000054; and Zhou Mengwu, special assignment to the U.S. Embassy in China, and in 1995, he attended the Beijing “Uncovering the Secrets of the Chinese Special Forces.” Institute of Economic Management Immersion Program. 24 “Special Forces Battalion Commander,” Xinhuashe

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