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Special-Forces Units In the Shadow: In its effort to build a modern 21st- bat Theory, authors Chang Wanquan While destroying enemy command- facilities for follow-on forces after a Rescue. Rescue operations range the West; on the contrary, it appears century fighting force, China has had and Yu Guohua of the People’s Libera- and-control elements is certainly not a strike.14 Special forces are also ex- from securing the release of hostages to be a source of pride for the Chinese its own revolution in military affairs tion Army Daily provide a summary of new concept, it is possible that the PRC pected to be able to handle “sudden to searching for and retrieving downed to train their troops under hazardous that has touched almost every aspect of the operating doctrine of PLA special may add a new strategic wrinkle to the incidents” that occur within the coun- pilots. In 1999, the Beijing, Jinan and conditions.24 The majority of training the armed forces. Chinese special-op- forces. They note, “Special forces war- scenario in the event of conflict with try.15 An article written in the People’s Shenyang military regions carried out a for PLA special forces takes place in erations forces have been no exception. fare includes detailed battle theories, Taiwan. The strategy would involve a Liberation Army Daily may provide consolidated training exercise that in- one of three categories: infiltration, Major transformations in China’s such as special forces reconnaissance, pre-emptive strike against the Tai- a clue as to what sudden incidents cluded hostage and battlefield rescues.21 mountain training, or wilderness and elite special forces began taking place attacks and sabotage, and comprehen- wanese civilian leadership prior to the entail. In the article, a military training survival training. in the late 1980s and early 1990s.1 sive battle theories, such as integrated outbreak of major hostilities between department suggests, “The troops, key Special reconnaissance The People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, land-sea-air-space-electronic combat, the two countries.10 There have been units, special forces, and emergency An article in the Hong Kong Kuang Infiltration training has concentrated on selecting the all-dimensional simultaneous attacks, rumors that the PRC plans to infil- special safeguard detachments sta- Chiao Ching provided a generic de- The ability to infiltrate undetected highest quality individuals within nonlinear combat, no-contact long- trate, or has infiltrated, special-forces tioned in areas where natural disasters scription of the special-reconnaissance behind enemy lines is one of the most the military, providing them with the range warfare, asymmetrical combat, units into Taiwan to capture or kill key and violent terrorist activities happen mission of Chinese special forces: essential skills required for China’s most advanced equipment available, large-scale night combat and ‘surgical’ government leaders. This would enable frequently should conduct training During wartime, special forces special forces. While little is known and training them in a wide range strikes.”4 the PRC either to force the Taiwanese in a selective manner, install a near- usually send small teams deep be- about the actual training methods, Chi- of military disciplines. The PLA has The second development is the government to negotiate or to replace actual-combat situation, emphasize hind enemy lines to collect and moni- nese special forces are said to undergo placed a high degree of emphasis on adoption of code names to distinguish it altogether with a government more training in dealing with an emergency tor enemy information in regions that “highly intensive and comprehensive the physical and mental abilities of units, which is often done by select supportive of mainland China. and effecting an emergency rescue, are of concern to their headquarters multi-course training in complex ter- the candidates: The training can be military organizations.5 The PLA has This decapitation operation could and improve their capabilities to cope and provide urgently needed informa- rain, including in-depth infiltration grueling, and those who are found to assigned at least one dedicated special theoretically be accomplished in a short with various sudden incidents.”16 tion. In war, special forces can carry and ‘covered reconnaissance’ behind be unsuited are cut from the program forces unit to each military region.6 The period of time, which could eliminate Terrorist response. Terrorist-re- out strategic, campaign and tactical- the enemy line.”25 The Chinese use a immediately. The dropout rate dur- size of the special-forces unit depends outside intervention and negate some sponse activities have been noted level special-reconnaissance missions, “three-dimensional” “all-weather” infil- ing initial training is said to average upon the military region. Units have of the problems associated with a beginning in 2002. The PLA has in- and through special reconnaissance, tration approach, using sea (submarine, between 50 and 90 percent.2 been reported to range from battalion to force-on-force action.11 It must be em- cluded antiterrorism as a part of its they can obtain relevant data on the high-speed ferry, open-water swim- Within the military forces of the division size.7 phasized that this type of operation is new training program for special-forces weather, hydrological and geographi- ming and scuba diving), air (airborne, People’s Republic of China, or PRC, While Chinese special forces are de- dependent upon the PRC being able to units and intends to make it an inte- cal features of specific regions. Special powered parachute and helicopter) and there are many units that could be signed to perform various operations, stand up an alternate means of govern- gral part of their future mission.17 On reconnaissance includes actions such land (long-distance movement and rock classified as “special forces.” They their two main missions are direct ing the country. Jan. 4, 2002, it was reported, “A special as target search, area evaluation and climbing). include rapid-reaction forces, airborne action and special reconnaissance. Harassment. Harassment activities forces regiment in the Chengdu Military verifying the effects of a strike. Special Sea infiltration.Sea training is divisions, amphibious landing units Direct action can be broken down into are designed to inhibit the enemy’s Region known as the Hunting Leopards forces use reconnaissance by combat known to comprise three elements: and marines. While these organiza- five categories: decapitation, harass- ability to operate, or as Jiang Jianx- carried out an antiterrorist exercise for and monitoring techniques similar to open-sea swimming, sea demolition tions certainly fit the category of ment, security, terrorist response and iong, the battalion commander of the the first time.”18 Links between this unit those used by long-range monitoring and sea shooting.26 “During sea train- special forces, for the purposes of this rescue. (These are the author’s catego- Flying Dragons, phrased it, “To make and the People’s Armed Police, or PAP, units. However, more often than not, ing [special forces] are tested to their article, they will be considered to be ries, not the PLA’s.) the special forces battalion the ‘eyes’ cannot be ruled out because, histori- more advanced technology is used in physical limit conducting danger- large special-mission units and there- of our side and a ‘thorn’ in the flesh cally, PAP forces have handled antiter- special reconnaissance.22 ous and difficult courses, including fore not included. Instead, the focus Direct action of the other side.”12 These disrup- rorist activities. From Aug. 6-12, 2003, China’s special forces use “triphi- a 10,000-meter (approximately 6.2 here will be on smaller, more elite Decapitation. The decapitation tions include sabotage of equipment Chinese special forces participated (with bious” (sea, air and land) means of miles) swim, a nighttime swim in full units tasked with unconventional or strategy of Chinese special forces is and systems, attacks on vital civilian member states of the Shanghai Cooper- infiltration to conduct short-term and gear, diving, underwater transport asymmetrical warfare.3 to attack key personnel and control infrastructure, and ambush of military ation Organization) in Coalition-2003, a sustained reconnaissance behind en- and survival drills on islets.”27 Infiltra- Two developments have provided elements, leaving the enemy leaderless forces.13 Psychological operations may “multinational” joint exercise in antiter- emy lines, using digitized battleground tion by submarine is also a common excellent methods for separating Chi- and unable to communicate.8 China’s also play a part in the overall scheme, rorism.19 On July 15, 2004, the People’s monitors and unmanned reconnais- method of insertion in which trainees nese special forces from the larger spe- military has conducted exercises with special forces carrying out raids Liberation Army Daily reported on a sance aircraft to relay information may perform various missions, such cial-purpose components. The first de- employing special forces using various simply to cause fear and confusion “multinational counterterrorism exer- back to their command units.23 as clearing away underwater mines.28 velopment is a sharpening of doctrine modes of transport, such as helicop- behind enemy lines. cise,” consisting of combined-arms and Training for PLA special forces is Air infiltration. In parachute train- regarding the special forces’ missions. ters and powered parachutes, to attack Security. Security operations in- special-forces troops, that was carried exacting and can be quite dangerous. ing, the PLA has “effected a gradual In An Analysis of 20th Century Com- enemy command posts.9 clude the shielding of air and naval out in the Xinjiang Military District.20 Safety is not emphasized as it is in transition from using multi-type para- 30 Special Warfare In the Shadow: Chinese Special Forces Build a 21st-Century Fighting Force Story by Scott J.
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