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Diyala Governorate Profile May-August

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Diyala Governorate Profile May-August Overview DIYALA GOVERNORATE PROFILE GOVERNORATE OF ORIGIN May-August 2015 2% 3% Anbar Situated on Iraq’s eastern border with Iran, Diyala Baghdad (less than 1%) governorate borders Baghdad. It has a total 6,600 IDP families Diyala GENDER- AGE BREAKDOWN population of 1,560,021 (excluding Syrian 5% refugees and IDPs) and is one of the most rural 68,322 IDP individuals Ninewa (less than 1%) governorates in Iraq. 56% Salah al-Din 0-5 95% Over the past decade Diyala has received multiple 6-11 waves of displacement. The February 2006 Qoratu MOST COMMON SHELTER TYPE bombing of the Al-Askari Shia mosque in Samarra IDP all s in city triggered a wave of sectarian conflict that Al Yawa New of i 12-18 ra 9,084 IDP individuals Al Wand % q resulted in 8 per cent of the displaced population 4 being driven to Diyala. Since 2013, Diyala has 7% 19-49 received a new influx of over 121,000 IDPs; in addition, over 193,000 persons originating from 330 IDP individuals 50+ less than 1% Rented Host Families Unfinished/ the governorate left their homes, seeking safer 28% housing 34% Abandoned 0 locations. Buildings 21% 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 In June, armed groups seized control in Jalawla INTENTIONS and Saadiyah areas, causing displacement to the 33,780 IDP individuals centre of Khanaqin, a district reportedly disputed 3,630 IDP individuals Notably, 59% of all IDPs assessed in Diyala were under 18. 28% 3% between Diyala and Kurdistan. As a result, Khana- Al-Khalis qin held the largest number of IDPs in the governo- IDP camps 11% 87% 2% rate, due to stable security in the district centre Total population: 15,660 individuals Al-Muqdadiya 100% assured by Peshmerga soldiers deployed to Baladrooz 1% 95% 4% DISPLACEMENT OVER TIME maintain safety. IDP individuals in the Ba'quba 98% 1%1% governorate As a result of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) actions, 258,108 Khanaqin 100% IDP individuals who left 248,556 many areas have been reclaimed, including parts of 232,596 222,726 Al-Maqdoudiya and Al-Khalis districts. This has Displacement trends Kifri 100% 212,964 205,728 145,464 203,496 encouraged many IDPs to return to their proper- Grand Total 1% 0.5% 98% 0.5% 193,206 ties, although IOM reported many houses Displacement in Diyala was mainly internal, due to its proximity accommodated in the governorate dropped by almost 17,000. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 123,834 south-west from Baghdad. It holds strategic value for armed groups, Nearly 35,000 additional IDPs returned to their areas of origin. 161,136 damaged during the continuing violence. Also 98,508 98,196 152,424 89,886 particular in their efforts to seize control of Baghdad, the country’s Locally integrate in current location Return to place of origin 140,184 troubling is that kidnappings and assassinations by 136,230 The August car explosion in Ba’quba district caused numerous casual- 71,364 83,310 125,622 unidentified persons have reportedly been spread- capital. Following armed group activities along Salah al-Din and Waiting on one or several factors Return to Area of Past 127,146 ties and triggered a further wave of displacement. In general, the 119,856 121,746 ing in Ba’quba district. Baghdad borders, 95 per cent of all the IDPs residing in the governo- Blank Displacement 75,498 district suffers from poor security, including widespread kidnap- 69,438 rate as of August also originate within it. 21,816 54,162 For more information on the governorate please pings for ransom and assassinations, as described above. 13,284 South-eastern parts of Diyala districts adjacent to conflict-affected - - refer to our previous governorate profiles, Displacement trends in Diyala are likely to be strongly affected by available on IOM website governorates witnessed fierce fighting between armed groups and TOP PRIORITY NEEDS liberation campaign advances, whether successful or not. 12,000 (http://iomiraq.net/allreports). ISF. As more areas are reclaimed by coalition forces, Diyala reports a 6,720 810 720 significant wave of returnees, mainly to Al-Khalis and Muqdadiyah districts. This movement added more complexity to the overall displacement trends in the governorate, strongly affecting IDP Food 43% July-14 April-14May-14June-14 April-15May June-15 -15July -15 The first priority need March-15 20,291 IDPs 121,746 IDPs 193,206 59% figures. Between May and August, the number of displaced persons August-14 January-15 August -15 October-14 February-15 FAMILIES INDIVIDUALS OF ALL IDP INDIVIDUALS OF ALL IDPS ARE September-14November-14December-14 ACROSS IRAQ ORIGINATE UNDER 18 FROM DIYALA Information based on DTM Master List, Round XXVII, August Produced and disseminated by International Organization for Migration IOM Iraq Funded by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration PRM and Group Assessment, Cycle 2 from August. Shelters Intentions Needs Shelter trends between May and August remained NFI distribution in Ba’aquba IDP intentions in governorates hosting displaced popula- Conflict in neighbouring governorates and areas in consistent, given that IDPs in Diyala were still most tions, the majority of whom originate from within them, Diyala bordering them have disrupted national trade and likely to rent a house (34%); however, in August, IOM staff reported that depleting funds made were consistent and shaped by similar factors. As with goods routes, and undermined food supplies. The first many families susceptible to multiple displacement IDPs in Ninewa and Kirkuk, the majority (98%) of those priority need for 43 per cent of the respondents in Diyala in search of cheaper housing. Moreover, even if assessed in Diyala wished to return, presumably encour- was confirmed as being food. Those assessed in Khana- available and affordable, rented apartments did aged by the close proximity to their properties. Addition- qin indicated greater need of food than the rest of the not offer adequate living conditions, as the ally, ISF advances have liberated numerous areas within governorate, linked to its scarcity in the local market. DIYALA infrastructure was dilapidated and buildings the governorate, such as parts of Al-Khalis district, Health care was considered the first priority need by 19 frequently lacked basic amenities. fostering hopes of return. Moreover, the conflict had per cent of the respondents in the district, associated caused displacement of less than two years’ duration, with health centres being located far from the assessed which does not allow IDPs sufficient time to establish dwellings and their operating hours were frequently Twenty-eight per cent of IDPs in Diyala stayed with Return personal and professional lives in their new location. considered ill-adapted to circumstances. The respond- host families, this trend being fostered by the ents in Kifri were also in dire need of food, due to its high internal character of the displacement, presumably There is a major change in intentions of IDPs assessed price. related to strong social bonds between governo- Between May and August alone, almost 22,000 IDPs returned to and currently residing in Al-Khalis district. In May, 94 GOVERNORATE rate residents. Another 21 per cent lived in Diyala and the overall number of returnees reached 65,688. Eighty- per cent wished to return, while in August this number While 17 per cent of Diyala respondents overall unfinished or abandoned buildings and suffered two per cent of these returned from within the governorate to their dropped to 87 per cent and 11 per cent intend to indicated shelter as being their first priority need, assess- PROFILE from poor living conditions: reportedly, these areas of origin in Al-Khalis (45%), Al-Muqdadiyah (50%), Khanaqin integrate locally, which implies that many IDPs have ments conducted in Al-Muqdadiyah, Al-Khalis and structures had neither windows nor doors, lacked and Kifri districts. The remainder returned from Kirkuk, Anbar and already fulfilled their intentions and are no longer Baladrooz reflected higher housing needs, linked to the access to basic amenities and were overcrowded, Sulaymaniyah governorates. included in the assessments. poor quality infrastructure. Those assessed in Al-Khalis MAY -AUGUST 2015 leading to numerous health issues. Due to widespread damage to houses during the violence only 45 per also stated that rents were too high. cent of returnees went back to their properties. The remaining 54 per Additionally, the respondents in Baladrooz and Ba’quba IOM staff stated that skin diseases, such as scabies, cent settled in unfinished or abandoned buildings, particularly in reported that water was an urgent need. In Ba’quba this were spreading in Khanaqin IDP camps. Summer Al-Khalis and Muqdadiyah. Additionally, a few families in Muqdadi- need originated from the poor quality of available water heat, water shortages, overcrowding, financial yah had to rent houses. and that IDPs were prevented from access to it, even if difficulties preventing displaced people from available. In Baladrooz the problem concerned the high buying medicines or consulting doctors combined SHELTERS OVER TIME cost of water. to cause significant deterioration of health among 20,000 IDPs living in critical shelter types in addition to MAY-AUGUST 2015 camps, such as unfinished buildings, religious 18,000 buildings and schools. 16,000 14,000 THE FIRST PRIORITY NEED Returnees also faced difficulties regarding their 12,000 Al-Khalis 11% 15% 1% 2% 66% 5% properties, as many buildings have been booby- 10,000 trapped by armed groups or damaged during fierce 8,000 Al-Muqdadiya 100% fighting. This will cause a future housing crisis, exacerbated by damaged local infrastructure and 6,000 Baladrooz 2% 13% 2% 41% 42% disruption of basic services.
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